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Barman Explorer, Volume 2, Number 1, September 2009, ISSN 1998-5568

Philosophical Investigation into Language:

20th Century Analytic Movement and Some Recent Phenomena

Dr. Binoy Barman*

Abstract

Philosophers have often been interested in language because, they have felt, language has anintrinsic connection with thought and knowledge. Philosophers delved deep into the mind of

language users and attempted to discover the basic principles thereof. Philosophers

engagement in language took the form of a movement in the twentieth century. The movement isknown as Analytic Movement, which claimed that philosophical problems can be solved if the

language in which the problems are expressed can be analyzed properly. The philosophers who

resorted to the analysis of language for resolving philosophical problems are known as analytic

philosophers. Analytic philosophers primarily concentrated on the problem of validity ofstatements, stating what conditions should be fulfilled for a statement to be true. In the present

article I have tried to measure the contributions of the philosophers to the resolution of

philosophical problems through the technique of linguistic analysis and how their attempts havesolidified the way of philosophical investigation into language. It has been observed that in the

initial stage of development, the analytic philosophy demonstrated certain precisely defined

trends, but later the discipline diversified to a considerable extent as linguistic analysis lost itspivotal role. The analytic movement for our purpose here has been grossly divided into five

phases, which seem to have subsumed all the works of mainstream philosophers interested in

language.

*Asst. Professor, Dept. of English, Daffodil International University

Email: [email protected]

Philosophical Investigation into Language: 20 th Century Analytic Movement and Some Recent Phenomena 1


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Philosophical Investigation into Language:

20th Century Analytic Movement and Some Recent Phenomena

Dr. Binoy Barman*

1. Introduction

Philosophers have often been interested in language because, they have felt, language has an

intrinsic connection with thought and knowledge. Philosophers delved deep into the mind of

language users and attempted to discover the basic principles thereof. A. P. Martinich (1990, pp.3-4) identifies four reasons for philosophers interest in language. First, language is a distinctive

characteristic of human being, so it is important to know the language in order to know the

species capable of speaking. Second, better understanding of language should help solve or avoidmany philosophical problems as these arise from false beliefs about language. Third, if one could

understand the structure of language one could understand the structure of reality since language

is thought to be a reflection of reality. Fourth, language is an interesting object of systematic

study per se, so it should be studied profitably as a branch of knowledge.

Philosophical contemplation with language has culminated in the discipline now known as

Linguistic Philosophy. It is an enterprise mainly initiated by analytical philosophers who wererather interested in the analysis of language for resolving the problems very much of

philosophical nature. That is why this particular type of philosophy is also branded as Analytic

Philosophy. It may be compared and contrasted with the other discipline in the realm oflinguistics called Philosophical Linguistics. The two disciplines are related but their areas and

ways of investigation are different. Linguistic Philosophy concentrates on the problem of validity

of statement while Philosophical Linguistics deals with, broadly speaking, the problem ofcommunication or meaning. The former states what conditions should be fulfilled for a statement

to be true while the latter sheds light on the mechanism of encoding and decoding of meaning. Inthis article an attempt has been made to measure the contributions of the philosophers to the

resolution of philosophical problems through the technique of linguistic analysis and how theirattempts have solidified the way of philosophical investigation into language.

Though philosophy is very old, philosophical interest in language has blossomed in the pastcentury, making inroads well into the twenty first century. Twentieth century Western

philosophy has two major branches: one is Continental Philosophy and the other is Analytic

Philosophy; the latter concerns us in the present discussion. Continental philosophy along thisline began with the work of Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, and Adolf Reinach on the

development ofphenomenologyi. The analytic philosophy, on the other hand, was developed by

Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore and A. J. Ayer, who found the utility oflanguage in philosophical investigation. E. D. Klemke remarks:

The twentieth century has been referred to as the age of analysis. Throughout this

period, a number of philosophical positions have been put forth and defended, allof which are now commonly classified under the heading of analytic philosophy.

Some of these philosophies were the work of individual thinkers such as G. E.

Moore. Others represent the combined efforts of numerous thinkers who formed



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various groups and came close to being representatives of certain schools: for

example, logical positivism. (Klemke 1983, p. 15)

The development of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century has not been a straight-line and

single-track event. It has many twists and turns. In its course of development new ideas replaced

the old ones, with shifted emphasis on hitherto unexplored aspects with differing methods ofinvestigation coming into application. To track the twentieth century analytic philosophy,Richard Popkin says:

The history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy is marked by the rapiditywith which major movements suddenly appear, flourish, lose their momentum,

become senescent, and eventually vanish. Examples include idealism, in its

absolutist and subjectist variants, sense-data theory, logical atomism, neutralmonism, and logical positivism. Popkin 1999, p. 604)

In the twenty first century, analytic philosophy has assumed a complicated shape with

immensely diversified trends. At the present state of affairs, a sort of eclecticism can bediscerned in the discipline.

2. Instrumentalities of the work undertaken

Thesis statement: Linguistic analysis proved to be a useful tool for the philosophers to resolve

philosophical problems, which in the 20th century led to the emergence of LinguisticPhilosophy, running into the current times with increasing diversification.

Methodology: The methodology in my work, descriptive-analytic in nature, has been to examinethe doctrines of the philosophers in the Analytic movement and how they proceeded to the way

of resolution of philosophical problems. I have tried to unravel the common and differingfeatures in their doctrines and map the territory in which they have infused their important

contributions. As a reflective and contemplative enterprise, the relevant theoretical informationhave been analyzed and organized into this piece of writing with the vision of post-movement

era that I belong to as a linguist.

3. Defining the Job of Analytic Philosophy:

Analyticphilosophy is intended to clarify language and analyze the concepts expressed in it.Although no specific tenet is universally accepted for the movement, analytic philosophers agree

that the proper activity of philosophy is to clarify language or concepts. The purpose of this

activity is to resolve philosophical problems, which originate in linguistic confusion. Hallett(2008, p. 6) thinks an analysis of language is required for the analysis of thought, whose

foundation is perceived to be language, again, clarity of which is the perquisite for knowledge.

A considerable diversity of views exists among analytic philosophers regarding the nature oflinguistic or conceptual analysis. Some have been primarily concerned with clarifying the

meaning of specific words or phrases to make philosophical assertions clear and unambiguous.

Others have been more concerned with determining the general conditions that must be met for



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any linguistic utterance to be meaningful. A group of analysts have been interested in creating

formal and symbolic language; still others, by contrast, have focused on the analysis of ordinary

or natural language. Samuel E. Stumpf remarks:

The dominant movement of philosophical activity in the contemporary English-

speaking world is known as analytic philosophy. To call it movement rather thana school underscores the fact that although analytic philosophy has certain cleardistinguishing characteristics, the sources out of which it emerged, the changes it

has undergone, and the variety of ways in which it is pursued are many. What

unifies all analytic philosophers is their agreement concerning the central task of philosophy. The task of philosophy, they say, is to clarify the meaning of

language. (Stumpf 1975, p. 430)

The great diversity of the twentieth century philosophical discussion centering language has also

been echoed by Bernard Harrison (1979) in his preface to An Introduction to the Philosophy ofLanguage:

Philosophical discussions of language this century has been almost coterminous

with philosophy itself.There is thus a bewildering variety and quantity of

philosophical writing about language and it does not, even within the loosecollection of philosophical outlooks called analytical philosophy, exhibit

community of what is called approach.

4. Empiricist Tradition and Analytic Philosophy

Empiricism is the philosophical doctrine which emphasizes observation and experimentation asthe method of investigation. On the epistemological question, it relies on the experience of

human beings rather than on innate ideas. In this respect, Empiricism is contrasted with Idealismand Rationalism. Idealism counts idea or spirit as the ultimate reality and Rationalism resorts to

reason for explaining acquisition of knowledge. John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume andJohn Stuart Mill were the most influential empiricists in the history of Western philosophy.

Analytic philosophy has strong ties with this empiricist tradition.

During the last decades of the 19th century, English philosophy was dominated by AbsoluteIdealismii that stemmed from the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel. The seeds of modern

analytic philosophy were sown when two philosophers, Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, bothfrom Cambridge, broke with Idealism at the turn of the 20th century. They emphasized the role

of language in resolving the philosophical problems, on a par with empiricist interests, doctrines,

and methods, opposing the Idealist stance.

5. Trends in Analytic Philosophy

All through the twentieth century, analytic philosophy has proliferated not in a single line, but invarious streams. I identify five phases in the history of analytic philosophy. The first phase runs

approximately from 1900 to 1910. It is characterized by a turn toward language which was

manifested with the idioms of proposition and meaning. The second phase lasts from 1910 to



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1930, when the propositional-semantic theorizing was abandoned in favor of realistic philosophy

of common sense and logical atomism. The third phase, approximately from 1930 to 1945, is

characterized by the rise of logical positivism, which emphasized the strict scrutiny of theconnection between linguistic and world phenomena. The fourth phase, approximately from

1945 to 1960, is characterized by the turn to ordinary language analysis, which highlighted the

importance of everyday language in philosophical analysis. The fifth phase starts from 1960 andends with the end of the century and, I should say, still runs today, albeit in different guises.During the 1960s, analytic philosophy diversified into the philosophy of language, metaphysics,

epistemology and a variety of other philosophical sub-disciplines. So a kind of eclecticism or

pluralism now prevails in the scene of analytic philosophy.

Klemke & Geirsson (2000) identities the following trends in the analytic philosophy: realism and

common sense (G. E. Moore); logical atomism (Bertrand Russell); logical positivism (A. J.Ayer); conceptual analysis (Gilbert Ryle, G. E. Moore, John Wisdom); logico-metaphysical

analysis (Gustav Bergman, W. V. O. Quine); linguistic analysis (J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, J.

R. Searle); and new realism (Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, Richard N. Boyd). All

these trends are somehow related to our scheme of five phases and the relationship will be clearas we proceed with our discussion.

5.1. First Phase (1900-1910): Analysis and Linguistic Turn

Linguistic analysis as a method of philosophy is as old as the Greek Philosophy. Analytic

philosophy has its root in Platonic realismiii. Several of the dialogues of Plato are specificallyconcerned with clarifying terms and concepts. He sought a universal form or essence in the

diversity of languages (Lavine 1984, p.406). However, the style of linguistic philosophizing has

received dramatically renewed emphasis in the 20th century. Influenced by the earlier Britishempirical tradition, the 20th-century English philosopher G. E. Moore became the founder of this

linguistic trend. Moore first revolted against idealism with his influential paper, The Nature ofJudgment (1899), and next with The Refutation of Idealism (1903).

According to Moore, philosophy is first and foremost analysis. The philosophical task involves

clarifying puzzling propositions or concepts. Puzzling propositions or concepts are transformed

into easier ones. Once this task is completed, the truth or falsity of problematic philosophicalassertions can be determined more adequately. Moore argues that each common sense

proposition has an ordinary meaning which is apparent to the knower. So, according to Moore,

the task of the philosopher is not to question the truth of common sense propositions, but toprovide their correct analyses or explanations. Moores use of the term analysis in this way is

the source of the name Analytic Philosophy.

Bertrand Russell came to defend what Moore called the common sense or ordinary view of the

world. He joined the Moorean camp and together established what is called Cambridge Realism,

initiating a linguistic turn in philosophical investigation. This linguistic turn is regarded by

many as constituting a revolution in philosophy. Richard Rorty, an enthusiastic Americanphilosopher, highlighted its significance in his anthology The Linguistic Turn (1967), where

he identified linguistic philosophy as the most recent philosophical revolution. He said that

philosophical problems may be solved either by reforming language or by understanding more



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about the language. The linguistic turn is very significant in the history of analytic philosophy.

Timothy Williamson observes:

The linguistic turn has subsequently become the standard vague phrase for a

difficult event in twentieth-century philosophy, one not confined to signed-up

linguistic philosophers in Rortys sense. For those, who took the turn, languagewas somehow the central theme of philosophy. (Williamson 2008, p. 10)

5.2. Second Phase (1910-1930): Ideal-Language Analysis and Logical Atomism

The second phase of analytic philosophy is characterized by the turn to ideal language, which is

thought especially suitable for rigorous analysis. On one side, Russell developed his formal

logic, following the work of Gottlob Fregeiv. On the other, he worked closely with LudwigWittgenstein, and together laid the foundation of logical atomism.

Russell emphasized the dissecting of propositions and facts into atoms in parallel. On the

linguistic level, the atoms are atomic propositions, the simplest statements about the world,corresponding to atomic facts. More complex propositions, called molecular propositions, can

then be built up from atomic propositions via logical connectives such as eitheror, and

bothand. For example, this leaf is green, can be expressed in logical symbolism: F(a).Both the proposition F(a) and the fact F(a) are atomic. A molecular proposition can be p and

q. Such a proposition will be true if and only if its constituent propositions p and q are true

on their own. Thus, the truth-value of the molecular proposition is a function of the truth valuesof its component atomic propositions. Alfred Weber and Ralph Barton Perry evaluate Russells

theory in the following terms:

Russell construes the particular existences of sense as ground common to the

physical and the psychical realms. The sense-datum is either physical or psychicalaccording to the causal relations in which it is viewed. Hence the physical world,

or the world of science, is composed of the same stuff as our sensoryconsciousness. (Weber & Perry 2002, p. 590)

Wittgenstein expressed his idea of logical atomism in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922),

where he attempted to set the criteria and limits of meaningful saying. He made it clear that

language is meaningful only when it pictures facts for us. That a sentence is a picture is

construed as the picture theory of meaning. According to the theory, a proposition will be true ifit provides a picture of the actual fact. Propositions which fail to picture the actual facts are

meaningless or nonsensical.

5.3. Third Phase (1930-1945): Logical Positivism

Influenced by Auguste Comte, Ernst Mach, Russell, and Wittgenstein, a group of philosophers

and mathematicians in Vienna during 1920s initiated a movement called Logical Positivism.Logical positivists held that in order for a sentence to be cognitively meaningful, it has to be

verifiable. The group reputed as Vienna Circle was led by Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap.

The idea of logical positivism was made popular in England by the publication of A. J. Ayers



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Language, Truth and Logic (1936). Bertrand Russell defends the positivist stance in the

following terms:

It gradually became clear that a great part of philosophy can be reduced to

something that may be called syntax, though the word has to be used in a

somewhat wider sense than has hitherto been customary. Some men, notablyCarnap, have advanced the theory that all philosophical problems are reallysyntactical, and that, when errors of syntax are avoided, a philosophical problem

is thereby either solved or shown to be insoluble. (Russell 1961, pp. 784-785)

According to logical positivism, the only function of philosophy is clarifying language by

providing a logical analysis of statements. There are three ways of doing this. First, philosophy

can provide a measuring standard of meaningfulness so that meaningless statements can beexposed and discarded. Second, philosophy can clarify scientific statements by analyzing them

into observable statements. Third, all the sciences can be unified by reducing them to the

language of physics in an orderly logical procedure. (Ravine 1984, p. 400)

The positivists divided all meaningful assertions into two classes: analytic propositions and

empirically verifiable propositions. Analytic propositions, which include the propositions of

logic and mathematics, are statements, the truth or falsity of which depends on the meanings ofthe constituent terms. An example would be the proposition two plus two equals four. The

second class of meaningful propositions includes all statements about the world that can be

verified by sense experience. This verifiability theory of meaning would demonstrate thatscientific statements are legitimate factual claims and that metaphysical, religious, and ethical

sentences are factually empty. John Shand spells out its consequence:

Logical positivism, by way of a theory of meaning, involves the elimination of

much of traditional philosophy, in particular metaphysics and also theology, asliterally meaningless. What this amounted to was the view that the investigation

of any substantial facts about the world was the province of science alone, not philosophy, which could be concerned only with conceptual elucidation and

linguistic task of precise definition. (Shand 1993, p. 259)

5.4. Fourth Phase (1945-1960): Ordinary-Language Analysis

After World War II, turning away from formal language, the analytic philosophy moved towardsordinary language, resulting in ordinary language philosophy. Ordinary language philosophy is

sometimes called Oxford philosophy, as the principal philosophers in this movement came

from the Oxford University. The band of philosophers includes Gilbert Ryle, LudwigWittgenstein, J. L. Austin and Paul Grice.

Ryle is best known for his analysis of mentalistic language, language that misleadingly suggests

that the mind is an entity in the same way as the body. According to Ryle, the task of philosophyis to restate systematically misleading expressions in forms that are logically more accurate. He

was particularly concerned with statements, the grammatical form of which suggests the



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existence of nonexistent objects. His theory was expressed in his bookThe Concept of Mind

(1949).

In a later thesis expressed in Philosophical Investigations (1953), Wittgenstein pays attention

to the way language is actually used in ordinary discourse. He says the meaning of a proposition

must be understood in the background of its context, that is, in terms of the rules of the languagegamev, of which that proposition is a part. Wittgenstein concludes that philosophy is an attemptto resolve problems that arise as the result of linguistic confusion, and the key to the resolution of

such problems is ordinary language analysis and the proper use of language.

Austin wrote How to Do Things with Words (1962) to set a trend that has been followed out in

a growing literature. He took speech act as the starting point of analysis, which allowed him to

focus on such points as the speaker's intentions in making an utterance and its expected effect onthe audience. His analysis of language eventually led to a general theory of speech acts, that is, to

a description of the variety of activities that an individual performs when something is uttered.

Grice is remembered mainly for his contribution to the study of speaker meaning, linguisticmeaning, and the interrelation between the two. In order to explain how nonliteral utterances can

be understood, he postulated a general cooperative principle, as well as certain special maxims

of conversation. In order to describe certain inferences, which are not explicit, he introduced thenotion of implicature. His philosophy may be met in his seminal 1957 essay Meaning and

1981 essay Presupposition and Conversational Implicature. Grice's work is one of the

foundations of the modern study ofPragmaticsvi.

5.5. Fifth Phase (1960-2000): Eclecticism

In the sixties the scene of philosophical inquiry into language changed in spectacular

kaleidoscopic shapes. The centrality of language in resolving the philosophical questionsdiminished in intensity and scope, leading to various consequences. Although contemporary

philosophers self-identify as analytic, they have widely divergent interests, assumptions andmethods. Analytic philosophy, in its contemporary state, may be defined by the precision and

thoroughness of investigation about a narrow topic, avoiding cavalier discussions of broad

topics. I term the philosophical practice in contemporary analytic philosophy as eclectic orpluralistic, due to widely diversified tendency. The eclecticism or pluralism can be understood

from the vast array of subfields found today, some of which are touched on lightly in the

following sections.

5.5.1. Philosophy of Language

As analytic philosophy disintegrated, the centrality of language remained intact in the domain of

the Philosophy of Language, or as sometimes called, Philosophical Linguistics. Acknowledging

the authority of language in philosophical investigation, it now concentrates on the problem ofmeaning or communication (Hallett 2008). The most important philosophers in this field include

Alfred Tarski, W. V. O. Quine, Donald Davidson, Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Ruth Barcan

Marcus and J. R. Searle.



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Alfred Tarski first gave the inductive definition of truth in The Concept of Truth in FormalizedLanguages back in 1936. Some have called it a correspondence theory of truth, which statesthat the truth or falsity of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world, and

whether it accurately describes that world. Quine analyzed the relationship between language

and ontology. For him, the justification for speaking one way rather than another is a thoroughlypragmatic one. His philosophy has been expressed in Word and Object (1960).

In 1967 Donald Davidson published Truth and Meaning, in which he argued that any

learnable language must be statable in a finite form, even if it is capable of a theoretically infinitenumber of expressions. Otherwise it could not be learned through a finite, empirical method such

as the way humans learn their languages. Saul Kripke developed direct reference theory, which

claims that some words, particularly proper names, have no meaning, but simply serve as rigiddesignators for the things they name. Along with Saul Kripke and others, Hilary Putnam

developed the causal theory of reference, inventing the notion of semantic externalism based on

a famous thought experiment called Twin Earthvii.

Bertrand Russell also contributed to the philosophy of language with his description theory of

proper names. He said existence can only be asserted of description. For example, we can

consider the statement Scott wrote Waverly. It will be interpreted as One and only one manwrote Waverly and that man was Scott. Or, it can be expressed logically as: There is an entity c

such that x wrote Waverly is true if x is c and c is Scott. (Russell 1961, p. 785) Ruth Barcan

Marcus extended the idea and proposed that proper names are mere tags. (Modalities and

Intentional Languages 1961). These tags are used to refer to an object, i.e. the bearer of the

name. The meaning of the name is regarded as exhausted by this referential function. His idea is

different from that of Saul Kripke expressed in Naming and Necessity. Professor TimothyWilliamson marks the difference in Laudatio: Professor Ruth Barcan Marcus presented in

Lauener Prize award ceremony on 29 May 2008:

One of the ideas in them that resonates most with current philosophy of languageis that of proper names as mere tags, without descriptive content. This is not

Kripkes idea of names as rigid designators, designating the same object with

respect to all relevant worlds, for rigidified definite descriptions are rigiddesignators but still have descriptive content. Rather, it is the idea, later developed

by David Kaplan and others, that proper names are directly referential, in the

sense that they contribute only their bearer to the propositions expressed bysentences in which they occur.

(http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/files/Laudatio.doc)

J. R. Searle developed the speech act theory following Grice and published it in his famous book

Speech Acts (1969). He presented an account of 'illocutionary act', which is perceived via

language as an associative meaning. His idea of illocutionary act ultimately led to other theories

such as the theory of intentionality (Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind 1983)and the theory of consciousness (The Rediscovery of the Mind 1992), and the theory of social

reality (The Construction of Social Reality 1995) and the theory of rationality (Rationality inAction 2001).



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Within the discipline, some philosophers have taken interest in the development of theory of

metaphor. They have attempted to examine whether metaphors can be paraphrased in literalterms. The philosophers in this line include George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Metaphors We

Live By 1986), and Andrew Goatly (The Language of Metaphors 1997). Earlier the problem

was taken up by Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean 1978) and J. R. Searle(Metaphor 1979).

5.5.2. Analytic Metaphysics

One striking break with early analytic philosophy was the revival of metaphysical theorizing in

the second half of the twentieth century, which Tom Rockmore (2001) termed Hegelian turn.

Philosophers such as David Lewis, David Armstrong and Gustav Bergmann developed elaboratetheories on a range of topics such as universals, causation, possibility and necessity. For

Bergmann, the basic question of ontology is: what kinds of things must exist in order for us to

devise a formal language in which everything can be perspicuously expressed? Since 1950s the

problems of analytic metaphysics have been studied in Britain by Stuart Newton Hampshire andPeter Frederick Strawson. The former pursued in the manner of Spinoza, with the relationship

between thought and action, and the latter in the manner of Kant, with describing the major

categories of experience as they are embedded in language. P. F. Strawson formulated his theoryof descriptive metaphysics, to explore the structure and content of natural languages to illuminate

different metaphysical worldviews. In the U.S. metaphysics has been pursued much in the spirit

of positivism by Wilfred Stalker Sellars and W. V. O. Quine. Sellars has sought to expressmetaphysical questions in linguistic terms, and Quine has attempted to determine whether the

structure of language commits the philosopher to asserting the existence of any entities. Quines

views about meaning and verification opened the door to speculative metaphysics by showingthat theory cannot be reduced to observation even in science.

5.5.3. Philosophy of Mind

In recent years, a central focus for research in the analytic philosophy of mind has been

consciousness, rather than behavior, as it was earlier, under the aegis of behaviorism and logical

positivism. While the prime concentration is restricted to neural network, there are many othertheories in fashion. The best known theories are heterophenomenology of Daniel Dennett,

representationalism of Fred Dretske and Michael Tye, higher-order thought theory of David M.

Rosenthal and higher-order perception theory of David Armstrong and William Lycan. Aninteresting development in psychology has ensued from Computer Science. Analytic

philosophers in this line use the technique of computation in the analysis of concepts (Cohen

1986, p. 193). Some others have been interested in resolving philosophical problems throughthought experiment (Schick & Vaughn 1998). One current topic in the philosophy of mind is

the individual identity, whereby anti-individualism comes in sharp focus. Tyler Burge worked in

this field. As an anti-individualist, he expressed his theory in Foundations of Mind (2007).

According to him, the foundations are conditions, causal, social and psychological, in theindividual or the wider world that determine the natures of mental kinds. Paul Churchland is

another famous contemporary philosopher of mind noted for his studies in neurophilosophy

(Neurophilosophy 2007). He is a major proponent of eliminative materialism, which claims



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that everyday mental concepts such as beliefs, feelings and desires are unnecessary for scientific

understanding of the brain and will be eliminated in future science and philosophy.

5.5.4. Analytic Epistemology

Owing largely to a 1963 seminal paper of Edmund Gettier titled Is Justified True BeliefKnowledge? epistemology has seen a rebirth in the analytic philosophy. In his article, Gettierchallenged the justified true belief definition of knowledge. He showed that justified true belief

can involve luck, instead of solid evidence and thus fall short of knowledge. His account was

consistent with the work of many other philosophers like Clarence Irving Lewis (An Analysis of

Knowledge and Valuation 1946) and Roderick Chisholm (The Nature of Epistemic

Principles 1990). On the justification of belief, at least three theories have been put forward --

infinitism (infinite series of justification is possible), foundationalism (some beliefs are self-justifying) and coherentism (beliefs are justified circularly if they are coherent). Recent work has

also investigated the conditions of truth and the extent of human knowledge. We get a clear

picture of contemporary analytical epistemology in Robert Audis Epistemology: A

Contemporary Introduction (2002), which tapped new research in the fields of virtueepistemology, feminist epistemology and social epistemology. The theory of New Realism has

also revived the issue of knowledge in recent years. According to the theory, knowledge is not

mediated by any mental state, idea or sensation but real objects are directly presented inknowledge (Patrick 2004, p. 355).

5.5.5. Analytic Approach to Ethics

As the influence of logical positivism began to wane in the mid twentieth century, contemporary

analytic philosophers took a renewed interest in ethics. G. E. M. Anscombes Modern Moral

Philosophy (1958) sparked a revival of Aristotle's virtue ethical approach and John Rawlss A

Theory of Justice (1971) of Kantian ethical approach. At present, contemporary ethicalphilosophy is dominated by three schools: utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and Kantianism. Perhaps

most influential in this area is Elizabeth Anscombe, whose landmark monograph Intention wascalled by Donald Davidson the most important treatment of action since Aristotle. Richard N.

Boyd, well known for his book The Philosophy of Science (1991), is also a famous moral

philosopher in the contemporary scene. He has made important contributions to the developmentof Cornell realism, a distinctly naturalistic position in moral philosophy. According to the theory,

there are suitably mind-independent and objective moral facts that moral judgments describe.

5.5.6. Analytic Approach to Philosophy of Religion

The collapse of logical positivism led to the revival of spiritualistic and mystic philosophies.Analytic philosophy of religion was primarily inspired by the works of Sren Kierkegaard and

Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophers such as Peter Winch and Norman Malcolm developed what

has come to be known as contemplative philosophyviii. Many analytic philosophers have

undertaken to analyze language of religion in connection with religious rituals and customs.Cambridge philosopher John Wisdom made important contribution to this area. Although,

according to him, metaphysical and theological statements are technically non-sensical, they may

play a significant role in human life. In Gods, for example, he explored the functions and uses



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of religious language independent of supernatural claims. We get other philosophers taking

interest in the philosophy of religion. In The Philosophy of Religious Language: Sign, Symboland Story (1996), Dan Stiver has examined how developments in philosophy of language haveimpinged upon religious language.

5.5.7. Analytic Approach to Political Philosophy

Current analytic political philosophy owes much to John Rawls, who produced a sophisticated

theory in defence of a liberal welfare state. Jrgen Habermas is another important figure in

contemporary analytic political philosophy, whose social theory is a blend of social science,Marxism, neo-Kantianism, and American pragmatism. An offshoot of analytic political

philosophy is Analytical Marxism. Members of this school seek to apply the techniques of

analytic philosophy, along with the tools of modern social science to the elucidation of thetheories of Karl Marx and his successors. Feminist question has also cropped up in recent

literature. Does language make women invisible and encode a male worldview? It has been an

important aspect of feminist philosophy. In Analytical Political Philosophy: From Discourse,

Edification (2006) David Braybrooke illustrated how human populations can avoid the worstevils of recent politics. He based his theory on his earlier works -- Moral Objectives, Rules, andthe Forms of Social Change (1998), Natural Law Modernized (2001) and Utilitarianism:

Restorations; Repairs; Renovations (2004).

5.5.8. Analytic Approach to Philosophy of Science

The analytic philosophy of science arose from the questions of method, validity and certainty of

scientific theories. Sir Karl Popper set falsifiability criterion which distinguished between

science and non-science. He said a statement is meaningful if and only if there is a way it can befalsified. Thomas Kuhn denied the thesis of the logical positivists that scientists choose between

competing theories in a purely rational fashion. According to Kuhn, the sciences do notuniformly progress strictly by conventional scientific method. There is often paradigm shift in

sciences with the emergence of new methods. Paul Feyerabend rejected the existence ofuniversal methodological rules in scinece. In his books Against Method and Science in a FreeSociety (1975), he claimed that there are no methodological rules which are always used by

scientists. Any single prescriptive scientific method might limit the activities of scientists, andhence restrict scientific progress. In his view, science would benefit most from a dose of

theoretical anarchism. The problem of science/non-science distinction has taken center stage in

the debate regarding evolution and intelligent design. The philosophy of science has also tendedto be particular discipline-specific as manifested in the philosophy of physics, philosophy of

biology, philosophy of chemistry and the philosophy of mathematics etc in recent decades.

5.5.9. Analytic Approach to History of Philosophy

Because analytic philosophy initially saw itself as superseding traditional philosophy, its

tendency throughout much of the twentieth century was to disregard the history of philosophy.Beginning in the 1970s, some scholars in the analytic context began to rebel against this anti-

historical attitude. The following remembrance by Daniel Garber describes well the emerging

historical consciousness in the analytic context:



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What my generation of historians of philosophy was reacting against was a bundle

of practices that characterized the writing of the history of philosophy in theperiod: the tendency to substitute rational reconstructions of a philosophers views

for the views themselves; the tendency to focus on an extremely narrow group of

figures (Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume in myperiod); within that very narrow canon the tendency to focus on just a few worksat the exclusion of others, those that best fit with our current conception of the

subject of philosophy; the tendency to work exclusively from translations and to

ignore secondary work that was not originally written in English; the tendency totreat the philosophical positions as if they were those presented by

contemporaries, and on and on and on. (Garber 2004, p. 2)

Eventually, this new historical approach was adopted by philosopher-scholars interested in the

analytic philosophy. As a result, the last couple of decades have seen the emergence of

historiographyix as an increasingly important sub-discipline within analytic philosophy.

6. Conclusion

So it is clear that the analytic philosophy dominant in the twentieth century has been primarilyconcerned with resolving philosophical problems through the analysis and clarification of

language, though the second half of the century has been abuzz with varied trends inside and

around the core inquiry. No doubt, analytic philosophy will continue to develop in multifariousstreams, through a process of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. Philosophical investigation is

cumulative in nature, deeply embedded in history. Juliet Floyd and Sanford Shieh notes:

As with most human activities, philosophy has been shaped by its past. More

importantly, it is, like other intellectual pursuits, deeply conditioned by itsconception of its own history. For this reason, the history of philosophy is never

far from the center of philosophical consciousness. Indeed, history is a prominentmode of philosophizing because of the self-knowledge it provides. The more we

know about how our questions have been shaped by their original motivations, the

better we will be able to see new possibilities in the problem-space to which theybelong -- new ways of posing old questions and new questions to pose. (Floyd &

Shieh 2003, p. 393)

There has been a chain of development in the realm of philosophical investigation. Modern

philosophy is indebted to the medieval philosophy, which again owes to ancient philosophy.

Avrum Stroll rightly observes:

Old philosophy has the power to educate and improve new philosophy. And

new philosophy not only preserves the quality and character of old philosophy but

has the capacity to refresh it. Intermingling, preservation and refreshment are thuscharacteristics that define the relationship between contemporary philosophy and

its intruding history. (Stroll 2000, p. 246)



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The analytic philosophy in the twenty first century will continue to be eclectic/pluralistic, with

increasing vigor, opening up new horizons of philosophical investigation, taking necessary

lessons from the historical traditions. New questions will arise as a result of advancement in thepursuit of knowledge through various disciplines and those will be answered with a mix of old

and new insights, as ever.

References:

Cohen, Jonathan, L. (1986). The Dialogue of Reason: An Analysis of Analytical Philosophy.Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Floyd, Juliet & Shieh, Sanford. (2003). Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Garber, Daniel. (2004). Philosophy and the Scientific Revolution, in Teaching New Histories

of Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Center for Human Values. Online at

http://www.pdcnet.org/tnhp.htmlHallett, Garth L. (2008). Linguistic Philosophy: The Central Story (S U N Y Series in

Philosophy). New York: State University of New York Press.

Harrison, Bernard. (1979). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. London: TheMacmillan Press Ltd.

Klemke, E. D. & Geirsson, Heimir. (2000). Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies.

2nd edition. New York: Prometheus Books.

Klemke, E. D. (1983). Contemporary Analytic and Linguistic Philosophies New York:

Prometheus Books.

Lavine, T. Z. (1984). From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophic Quest. New York: BenthamBooks.

Martinich, A. P. (1990). The Philosophy of Language. 2nd edition.New York: Oxford University

Press.

Patrick, Geroge Thomas White. (2004). The Introduction to Philosophy. Delhi: SurjeetPublications.

Popkin, Richard H. (1999). The Columbia History of Western Philosophy New York: Columbia

University Press.

Rockmore, Tom. (2001). Analytic Philosophy and the Hegelian Turn in The Review ofMetaphysics, Vol. 55. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America.

Russell, Bertrand. (1961).History of Western Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Schick, Theodore, Jr. & Vaughn, Lewis. (1998). DoingPhilosophy: An Introduction through

Thought Experiments. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Shand, John. (1993). Philosophy and Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy.

Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press.



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Stroll, Avrum. (2000). Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy, New York: Columbia University

Press.

Stumpf, Samuel Enoch, (1975). Socrates to Sartre: A History of Philosophy. New York:

McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Weber, Alfred & Perry, Ralph Barton. (2002). History of Philosophy. Delhi: SurjeetPublications.

Williamson, Timothy. (2008). The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell Brown Lectures in

Philosophy). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.



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iEndnotes:E

Phenomenology is the philosophical investigation and description of conscious experience in all its varieties withoutreference to the question of whether what is experienced is objectively real or not.

iiNineteenth century German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel preached the philosophy of absolute idealism.Hegel believed that absolute truth, or reality, exists and that the human mind can know it. This is so because whatever is

real is rational. To him, reality was Absolute Spirit, or cosmic reason. The world of human experience, whether subjectiveor objective, is the manifestation of Absolute Spirit.

iiiPlatonic realism refers to the idea that these are the existences in the form of universals corresponding to the objects in theexternal world after the Greek philosopher Plato (427-347 BC). Since universals were considered by Plato as ideal formsthis stance is confusingly also called Platonic idealism. Plato's own articulation of the realism regarding the existence of

universals is expounded in his The Republic,Phaedo,Phaedrus, Meno, andParmenides.

ivGerman mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege of the University of Jena developed a system of formal logic,

which greatly influenced Bertrand Russell. Frege had provided his own system of formal logic, with distinct symbolic

notation. Freges goal was to prove logicism, the view that mathematics is reducible to logic. This was also Russells goal in

thePrincipia Mathematica .

v

Ludwig Wittgenstein introduced the concept of language-game to refer to simple examples of language use and theactions into which the language is woven. This is based on his important book Philosophical Investigations.

vi Pragmatics is the branch of linguistics that studies language use rather than language structure. It is the study of theaspects of meaning and language use that are dependent on the speaker, the addressee and other features of the context of

utterance.

vii The Twin Earth thought experiment was presented by philosopher Hilary Putnam in his 1973 paper Meaning andReference and subsequent 1975 paper The Meaning of Meaning, as an early argument for what has subsequently come to

be known as semantic externalism. According to the experiment, in two remote identical worlds, two apparently similar but

compositionally dissimilar objects may be referred to by the same name. Therefore, Putnam argued, meaning is not just in

the head, but external to human mind.

viiiContemplative philosophy lays importance on contemplation rather than observation or reasoning. It calls a philosopherto transcend the everyday level of understanding towards a deeper dimension of life and reality. Its aim is wisdom, which

implies openness of understanding to realms beyond our limited and self-centered perspective, towards new layers of being.

ixHistoriography is employed in a special sense in philosophical literature, a little different from history. History, in itsbroadest sense, is the totality of all past events, although a more realistic definition would limit it to the known past.

Historiography is the written record of what is known of human lives and societies in the past and how historians have

attempted to understand them.

philosophical investigation into language final

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