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PHILIPPINE NAVAL MODERNIZATION

Current State and Continuing Challenges

Rommel C. Banlaoi

Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR)

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Philippine Naval Modernization: Current State and Continuing Challenges

By Rommel C. Banlaoi

Copyright@ 2012

by Professor Rommel C. Banlaoi

All rights reserved.

Except for brief quotations for scholarly purposes, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recordings and/or otherwise without the prior written permission of the author. You may reach the author at rbanlaoi@pipvtr.com.

Published by

Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) Quezon City, Philippines

Recommended Bibliographic Entry:

Rommel C. Banlaoi, Philippine Naval Modernization: Current State and Continuing Challenges (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012).

*This monograph is a revised, updated and expanded version of a paper presented at the international conference on “Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences” organized by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Marina Mandarin Hotel, Singapore on 26-27 January 2011. Comments are welcomed.

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PHILIPPINE NAVAL MODERNISATION Current State and Continuing Challenges

ROMMEL C. BANLAOI

ABSTRACT

As a maritime nation of around 95 million people and an archipelagic state of 1,707 islands, not to mention the contested islands in the South China Sea, there is no doubt that the Philippine Navy (PN) has an essential role to play in the country’s security.

However, from the finest naval forces in Asia in the 1960s, PN has become one of the most ill-equipped navies in the world at present despite the recent acquisition of second-hand Hamilton Class Cutters from the United States. In fact, PN is the only one in the region without a missile capability. Though PN has a Naval Modernization Program to upgrade its present capabilities, current threat perceptions, inter-service rivalry, resource constraints, difficult procurement system and lack of social acceptability have stunted the growth of naval forces in the Philippines.

This paper aims to describe the nature, causes and consequences of naval

modernization in the Philippines. This study contends that the success of PN modernization depends largely on threat perceptions of current decision-makers, effective mobilization of necessary financial resources, resolution of inter-service rivalry, efficient procurement system and strong social acceptability .

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INTRODUCTION

Since the formulation of Thayer Mahan’s concept of sea power1 and the development of Julian Stafford Corbett’s principles of maritime strategy,2 sovereign states have regarded the strengthening of their navies as a vital source of national greatness and a credible instrument of national power. Informed by the realist theory of international relations, most, if not all, of the developed countries have, in fact, invested their strategic resources on the development of their navies for world expansion, power projection and global power balancing.3 Even developing countries are now involved in various levels of naval modernization for sovereignty protection and nation-building purposes.4 With the proliferation of various transnational security threats operating in the maritime domain5 and the growing relevance of the sea not only for international commerce and navigation but also as a supplier of important natural resources such as oil, gas and other marine products, sea power development6 and naval transformation7 have become aspirations and essential components of maritime security strategy of various nations. 8

                                                                                                                         1 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (London: Metheun & Co, 1965). First published in 1890. 2Julian Stafford Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, Classics of Seapower Series, 1988). Also see Julian Stafford Corbett, Naval and Military Essays. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914). reissued by Cambridge University Press, 2009. 3 Lawrence W. Prabhakar, Joshua H. HO and Sam Bateman (eds), The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006). 4 For a good reference on the role of the navy in nation-building, see David Stevens and John Reeve (eds), The Navy and the Nation (New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 2005). 5 See Caroline Ziemke-Dickens and Julian Droogan (eds), Asian Transnational Security Challenges: Emerging Trends, Regional Visions (Sydney: Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research and the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 2010) and David Fouse (ed), Issues for Engagement: Asian Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2010). 6 On sea power development, see Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty First Century (London and New York: Taylor and Francis, 2009). 7 On Naval transformation, see Geoffrey Till, Naval Transformation, Ground Forces, and the Expeditionary Impulse: The Sea-Basing Debate (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006). 8For more details on the many ramifications of these issues, see Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (Eds), Llyod’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (London and New York: CRC Press Taylor and Francis Group, 2009), Chong Guan Kwa, John Kristen Skogan (eds), Maritime Security in Southeast Asian (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), and Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond (eds), The Best of Times and The Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific (Singapore: World Scientific and Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005).

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In short, many countries are now positioning their navies as part of their national security strategy that aims to effectively address current and emerging security challenges in the maritime world. 9

However, the Philippines, which is considered as an archipelagic state and a maritime nation, 10 is regrettably possessing a very small, ill-equipped, and truly modest, if not obsolete, navy in Asia. The Philippines’ current naval capability is arguably not commensurate with the archipelagic and maritime character of the country. From one of the world’s finest naval forces in the 1950s, and considered to be the best in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, the Philippine Navy (PN) has enormously deteriorated into one of the world’s weakest in terms of equipment and naval assets.11 At present, PN is lagging very far behind its neighbours in maritime Southeast Asia and has become ridiculously a butt of joke among navies in the region.12 A senior naval officer regrets that PN is really lagging both in quality and quantity among other navies in the Asia Pacific region.13

Despite this discomforting reality, PN continues to have a very strong commitment and determination to upgrade its present naval capability not only to revive its past glory but more importantly to carry out its inherent function as the “Guardian of the Philippine seas” and “Protector of Philippine sovereignty”. Towards this end, PN has crafted the Philippine Naval Modernization Program (PNMP) pursuant to the implementation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program (AFPMP).14

With the current threats and emerging challenges emanating from the Philippine

maritime domain, PN also formulated in 2006 the Strategic Sail Plan 2020 to provide a roadmap of naval transformation and development and thereby make PN a significant symbol of national pride and effective instrument of national power. PN even prepared the 15-Year Strategic Development Plan completed in 1999 and the 15-year Equipment

                                                                                                                         9 See Jack McCaffrie (ed), Positioning Navies for the Future (Sydney: Halstead Press and Sea Power Centre-Australia, 2006). 10 For a useful reference on this topic, See Mary Ann Palma, “The Philippines as an Archipelagic and a Maritime Nation: Interests, Challenges and Perspectives”, RSIS Working Paper, No. 182 (21 July 2009). 11 Sam Bateman, “'Naval Balance in Southeast Asia - Search for Stability ', Jane's Defence Weekly (11 May 2005). 12 See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: IISS, 2010); Geoffrey Till, Emrys Chew and Joshua Ho (eds), Globalization and Defence in the Asia Pacific: Arms Across Asia (New York and London: Routledge, 2009); Andrew Tan, “Force Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia{, IDSS Working Paper, No. 59 (2004); and, Bates Gill and J.N. Mak (eds), Arms, Transparency and Security in South-East Asia (Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 1997). 13 Jose Renan Suarez, :Towards a Navy of Substance: A Modernization Program”, Navy Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January-June 2003), p. 32. 14 The AFPMDP was enacted by the Philippine Congress in 1995.

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Acquisition Plan drafted in 2005, among other modernization plans, to realize its long-term vision and fulfil its current missions. In other words, PN is not short of plans and programs to modernize its naval forces. In fact, the Philippines has the most systematic, elaborate and legally mandated naval modernization programs in Southeast Asia. Yet, PN is still one of the most ill-quipped navies in Asia. PN lacks the adequate capacity to effectively promote maritime security in the world’s second largest archipelago. While there is no doubt that the Philippines has vigorously pursued naval modernization programs since 1995 to ensure the country from various maritime threats and defend its maritime territories, several domestic challenges obstruct the effective implementation of these programs.

This monograph describes the nature and causes of naval modernization in the Philippines and examines its unintended consequences for regional security. It also identifies some factors that pose domestic challenges to the realization of PN modernization.

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BRIEF BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATE OF THE PHILIPPINE NAVY

PN traces its “glorious” naval tradition from the pre-colonial times. On the basis of this notion, PN propagates and even romanticizes the idea that the “story of the Philippine Navy is, in a sense therefore, the story of the [Filipino] nation itself.”15 But based on historical facts, the current navy actually evolved from the Philippine Naval Patrol created in 1947, less than a year after the granting of Philippine independence on 12 June 1946. It was only in 1951 when PN received its present name.

In the 1950s, the Philippines was the only country in Southeast Asia with an operational navy composed of all naval and marine forces, combat vessels, auxiliary craft, naval aircraft, shore installations, and other supporting units.16 Because of its erstwhile capabilities, PN became the role model of its Asian neighbours. Armed with a credible and reliable navy assisted by its security ally, the United States, pursuant to Mutual Defence Act of 1954, the Philippines courageously participated during the height of the Korean War. By the 1960s, the Philippines received the very rare accolades of its Southeast Asian neighbours as the “best equipped navy” in the region. In fact, PN proudly writes in its official history that during the 1960s, PN was the envy of the region.17 Indonesia even requested PN to share its best practices in organizing a navy. Malaysia and Thailand used PN as the benchmark in the development of their respective navies. Brunei and Singapore accorded PN with highest respect. PN also participated in a peacekeeping mission in the Vietnam War and played a constructive role during the Cambodian crisis. During those glorious years, PN excelled on anti-submarine warfare and amphibious operations, which became one of the sources of the country’s national pride in the international community.18

However, PN capabilities rapidly deteriorated in the 1970s because of many

interrelated factors. But one of the major reasons identified was the country’s heavy dependence on American security umbrella for its own external defence at the height of the cold war and this made the Philippines complacent in developing its capabilities for

                                                                                                                         15Headquarters Philippine Navy, “A Comprehensive History of the Philippine Navy” at http://www.navy.mil.ph/history.htm <accessed on 1 December 2010>. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. For a discussion on the glorious days of the Philippine Navy, see Regino Giagonia, The Philippine Navy (1898-1996) (Manila: Headquarters of the Philippine Navy, 1997). 18 For an excellent discussion on the exemplary practices of the Philippine Navy on naval operation, see Office of the Assistant Naval Staff for Operations, N3, Lessons from Naval Battles and Operations in the Philippines for PN Doctrines and Development I(Manila: Headquarters Philippine Navy, undated).

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autonomous defence.19 The country’s strong preoccupation on internal security campaigns against local communist and Muslim separatist insurgencies also led to the government’s utter neglect of the Navy because the bulk military resources and defence spending went to the Philippine Army (PA), which is leading the ground operations against internal threats.20 As a result, PN faced the grim realities of rapidly ageing ships, patrol vessels and other naval equipments in the 1980s. The withdrawal of American forces from Subic in the 1990s due to the termination of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in 1991 enormously diminished US military assistance to the Philippines. This made the “once-strong” and “once-special” Philippine-American security relations essentially moribund.21 The fading of Philippine-American security relations in the post-bases era severely aggravated the deterioration of PN until it became practically crippled at the turn of the 21st century due to obsolescence of its floating assets and non-sustenance of genuine replacement parts for ships, machinery, electronic communications, and fire control systems.22

As an example of an apparent corrosion of Philippine naval capabilities, PN’s

Cannon Class escort destroyer PF 11, locally known as BRP (Boat of the Republic of the Philippines) Rajah Humabon (BRP-RH), was the state-of-art patrol frigate during World War II. The BRP- RH’s sister ships in the United States were all commissioned in 1943 and already in display in US naval museums. But the BRP-RH served PN in various naval exercises in the region.23 In fact, the BRP-RH also served as PN’s largest asset and symbolized the country’s Flagship.

Aside from BRP-RH, PN still impressively operates some World War II vintage

ships such as BRP Rizal and BRP Quezon, which were originally used as minesweeping flotillas of the US in the early 1940s. Travelling the average speed of 20 knots, both are still being used to patrol the nine facilities of the Philippines in the South China Sea. Furthermore, PN continues to use 8 out of 60 Patrol Craft Escorts (PCEs) built for the US Navy during World War II as anti-submarine convoy escorts. PN possesses Patrol

                                                                                                                         19 For excellent discussions on the Philippines’ dependency on American security umbrella during this period, see Stephen R. Shalom, The United States and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1986); Ed Garcia and Francisco Nemenzo, The Sovereign Quest: Freedom from Foreign Military Bases (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1988); and Patricia Ann Paez, The Bases Factor: The Realpolitik of RP-US Relations (Manila: Center for Strategic and International Studies of the Philippines, 1985). 20 For a recent study on these twin-insurgencies, see Soliman M. Santos and Paz Verdades M. Santos, et al, Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010). 21 Richard Fisher, “Rebuilding the US-Philippine Alliance,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1255 (22 February 199). 22 Fancis Malahay, “The Need for the Inclusion of Submarines in the AFP Modernization Program to Enhance the Navy Capability” (MA Thesis: National Defence College of the Philippines, 2004), p. 18. 23 “The Technology of the Philippine Navy” at http://technogra.ph/2008/02/29/the-technology-of-the-philippine-navy/ <accessed on 3 December 2010>.

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Ships 19, 20, 22 and 23 that were once part of the South Vietnamese fleet that escaped during the fall of Saigon government in 1975 and eventually sold to the Philippine government.24 Based on its current inventories, PN vintage naval assets include the following:

1 Rajah Humabon Light Frigate 3 Jacinto Class Corvettes 1 Cyclone Class 2 Quezon Class Corvettes 6 Miguel Malvar Class Corvettes 2 Aguinaldo Class Large Patrol Craft 3 Kagitingan Class Patrol Craft 6 Tomas Batillo Class (PKM 200) Patrol Craft 12 Conrado Yap Class (SK) Patrol Craft 2 Point Class Cutters 24 Jose Andrada Class Patrol Craft 6 LSTs (Landing Ship Tanks) 2 LSVs (Logistic Support Vessels) 7 LCUs (Landing Craft Utilities) 1 Repair LST (Landing Ship Tank) Hull 6 Armored Troop Carriers 6 LCM (Landing Craft Mechanized) Mk8 11 LCM Mk6 2 AFDL (Auxiliary Floating Dry Docks) (AFDL 40 No Longer In Use) 1 Floating Dry Docks25

Most of the PN assets (see Table 1 for more details) are considered obsolete. Though half of these outdated assets are still “service capable”, the rest really need desperate repair if not total replacement or final decommissioning. Based on most recent reports, of the 53 ships in the PN inventory of naval assets, only 25 are considered operational. 26 Out of its 32 small crafts, only 23 are operational while only four of its ten Navy auxiliary ships are operational. 27 On 10 December 2010, PN announced the final decommissioning of three World War II vintage patrol crafts, which will be sold as scrap metal to the highest bidder.28

Thus, when the Philippine Congress passed the AFPMP in 1995, PN immediately formed the Naval Modernization Office (NMO), which became the symbol of PN aspiration for naval modernization. The NMO prepared Philippine Navy Modernization                                                                                                                          24 P. Ervin A. Mundo, “A Multi-Purpose Vessel for the Philippine Navy: Options and Prospects”, Office of Strategic and Special Studies Digest (4th Quarter 2008), p. 18. 25 “Philippine Navy” at http://www.hueybravo.net/Philippine%20Navy%20Main.htm <accessed on 8 December 2010>. 26 Alexis Romero, “Navy decommissions 3 WW II patrol boats”, Philippine Star (10 December 2010). 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.

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Program in August 1995, the 15-Year Strategic Development Plan completed in 1999, and the 15-year Equipment Acquisition Plan prepared in 2005. These Plans aim to purchase new naval assets and to upgrade existing ones in order to catch-up with the current phase of naval developments in the region.

Table 1 INVENTORY OF EXISTING NAVAL ASSETS OF THE PHILIPPINES

FRIGATES Datu Kalantiaw (USN Cannon Class)

BRP Rajah Humabon (PF-11) (ex-USN USS Atherton DE-169)

CORVETTES Jacinto Class (RN Peacock Class) o BRP Emilio Jacinto (PS-35)

(ex-RN HMS Peacock P239)

o BRP Apolinario Mabini (PS-36) (ex-RN HMS Plover P240)

o BRP Artemio Ricarte (PS-37) (ex-RN HMS Starling P241)

Rizal Class (USN Auk Class) o BRP Quezon (PS-70) (ex-

USN USS Vigilance AM-324)

o BRP Rizal (PS-74) (ex-USN USS Murrelet AM-372)

Miguel Malvar Class (USN Admirable / PCE Class) o BRP Miguel Malvar (PS-

19) (ex-USN USS PCE(R) 852 / USS Brattleboro E-PCE(R)-852)

o BRP Magat Salamat (PS-20) (ex-USN USS Geyety AM-239)

o BRP Sultan Kudarat (PS-22) (ex-USN USS PCE-895 / USS Crestview E-PCE-895) 1975

o BRP Datu Marikudo (PS-23) (ex-USN USS PCE(R)-853)

o BRP Cebu (PS-28) (ex-USN USS PCE-881)

o BRP Negros Occidental (PS-29) (ex-USN USS PCE-884)

o BRP Pangasinan (PS-31) (ex-USN USS PCE-891) 1948

o BRP Iloilo (PS-32) (ex-USN USS PCE-897) 1948

PATROL CRAFTS USS Cyclone, now BRP Mariano Alvarez (USN Cyclone Class) o BRP Mariano Alvarez (PS-

38) (ex-USN USS Cyclone PC-1)

Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo Class o BRP Gen. Emilio

Aguinaldo (PG-140) o BRP Gen. Antonio

Luna (PG-141) Kagitingan Class

o BRP Bagong Lakas (PG-102)

o BRP Bagong Silang (PG-104)

Tomas Batillo Class (ROKN Chamsuri PKM Class) o BRP Tomas Batillo (PG-

110) o BRP Boni Serrano (PG-111) o BRP Bienvenido

Salting (PG-112) o BRP Salvador Abcede (PG-

o BRP Alfredo Peckson (PG-372)

o BRP Simeon Castro (PG-374)

o BRP Carlos Albert (PG-375) o BRP Heracleo Alano (PG-

376) o BRP Juan Magluyan (PG

392), a Jose Andrada class patrol boat

o BRP Liberato Picar (PG-377)

o BRP Hilario Ruiz (PG-378) o BRP Rafael Pargas (PG-

379) o BRP Estor Reinoso (PG-

380) o BRP Dioscoro Papa (PG-

381) o BRP Ismael Lomibao (PG-

383) o BRP Leovigildo

Gantioqui (PG-384) o BRP Federico Martir (PG-

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114) o BRP Ramon Aguirre (PG-

115) o BRP Nicolas Mahusay (PG-

116) o BRP Dionisio Ojeda (PG-

117)] o BRP Emilio Liwanag (PG-

118) (ex-ROKN PKM223) Conrado Yap Class

o BRP Jose Artiaga (PG-844) o BRP Leopoldo Regis (PG-

387), o BRP Apollo Tiano (PG-

851) o BRP Sulpicio

Fernandez (PG-853) BRP Jose Andrada (PG-370)

o BRP Enrique Jurado (PG-371)

385) o BRP Filipino Flojo (PG-

386) o BRP Anastacio

Cacayorin (PG-387) o BRP Manuel Gomez (PG-

388) o BRP Teotimo

Figoracion (PG-389) o BRP Jose Loor Sr. (PG-

390) o BRP Juan Magluyan (PG-

392) o BRP Florencio Inigo (PG-

393) o BRP Felix Apolinario (PG-

395) Ex-Point Class Cutters

(USCG) o BRP Alberto

Navarette (PG-394)(ex-USCGC Point Evans)

o BRP Abraham Campo (PG-396)(ex-USCGC Point Doran)

AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS ex-WW2 LST 512-1152 Class o BRP Zamboanga del

Sur (LT-86) o BRP South Cotabato (LT-

87) o BRP Laguna (LT-501) o BRP Lanao del Norte(LT-

504)

o BRP Benguet (LT-507) o BRP Kalinga Apayao (LT-

516) Bacolod City Class

(Modified Frank Besson Class LSV) o BRP Bacolod City (LC-550) o BRP Dagupan City (LC-

551) AUXILLIARY SHIPS BRP Pag-asa (AT-25) (Formerly,

BRP Ang Pangulo) (Presidential Yacht)

BRP Subanon (AT-291) BRP Bagobo (AT-293) BRP Mangyan (AS-71)

BRP Lake Buluan (AW-33) BRP Lake Paoay (AW-34) BRP Lake Taal (AF-72) BRP Lake Buhi (AF-78)

MINOR NAVAL ASSETS

29 US Swift Class Patrol Boats 3 Multi-purpose Attack Crafts

Source: Public Affairs Office, Headquarters of the Philippine Navy, Navy Journal Yearend Edition (Manila: The Philippine Navy, 2009). Also listed in Wikipedia, “Philippine Navy”.

Based on the AFPMDP, PN has to implement within the 15-year time frame the

Capability, Materiel, and Technology Development (CMTD) project under the two sub-programs of the entire military modernization scheme. With the CMTD, equipment acquisition projects were lined up for PN to boost its naval defence power. Under the CMTD, PN was mandated to acquire necessary naval assets listed in Table 2 within the 15 years mandate of the AFPMP. The implementation of CMTD should have started in 1997. But the Asian financial crisis of that year aborted all military acquisition programs not only of the Philippines but also of the entire region.

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From its list of naval acquisition, PN only intends to develop a Navy with inshore territorial defence capability and does not intend to develop a Navy with a blue water capability. Unlike some of its neighbours in Southeast Asia, the Philippines does not even have a plan to acquire a submarine, which is a source of regional anxieties at present.

Table 2

PHILIPPINE NAVY CAPABILITY, MATERIEL, AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ACQUISITION UNDER THE AFP MODERNIZATION

PROGRAM

TYPE SUB-PROGRAM I SUB-PROGRAM II Corvette 3 3 Patrol Craft 18 6 Patrol Boat 10 6 Offshore Patrol Vessel 7 5 Mine Warfare Vessel 1 3 Frigate 3

Source: Department of National Defence, In Defence of the Philippines: 1998 Defence Policy Paper (Quezon City: Department of National Defence, 1998). At present, PN still struggles with enormous challenges of naval modernization.29 While PN has present defence capabilities against surface and ground targets, it, however, has limited capabilities against air targets.30 Its existing naval aircrafts can only conduct very limited reconnaissance and transport operations. While its naval firepower is considered sufficient for International Security Operations (ISO), PN’s capabilities for Territorial Defence Operations (TDO) are still considered meagre and insufficient, if not totally miserable.31 PN laments:

For external defence, the Navy is significantly constrained against air, surface and sub-surface threats. It cannot assure real-time reliable and secure communications. Electronic warfare capabilities are wanting in many aspects. There are serious deficiencies in the quantity and more so the quality of platforms and equipment. There are no resources for long range detection, surveillance, reconnaissance and deployment. The capability to utilize the neutralize mines still needs to be developed. The automation necessary to engage high-speed and low observable craft and weapons has not been put in place. The organization is not equipped for conventional naval warfare and needs to significantly build up its

                                                                                                                         29 Philippine Navy, The Philippine Navy Modernization Program (Manila: Headquarters Philippine Navy, 1995). 30 Headquarters Philippine Navy, Naval Modernization Guide (Manila: Headquarters Philippine Navy, 2008), p. 28. 31 Ibid., p. 29.

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capabilities. With meagre self-defence means, PN ships are vulnerable to better-armed platforms.32 As a glaring proof of PN’s limited capability, it only has 32 active vessels to patrol

36,000 nautical miles of Philippine waters.33 Given this situation, PN does not have the required capability to defend Philippine claims in the disputed islands, islets, reefs and shoals in the South China Sea. According to a high ranking naval officer, “It is ironic that for a country surrounded by waters, the Philippines has the worst equipped navy in the world.” 34 With this condition, another PN officer commented, “should the Chinese or Vietnamese naval forces seize the Spratly Islands, the PN ships may not even reach the scene of battle in the South China Sea. They can fire their missiles even before we can see them on radar and we may never know what hit us”.35

The limited external defence capabilities of PN can also be discerned from the

size of its naval personnel. Out of an estimated 120,00036 personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), only 20,000 to 30,000personnel belong to PN. 37 The Philippine Army has the largest personnel of around 60,000 to 70,000 while the Philippine Air Force (PAF) has the smallest personnel of 15,000 to 20,000 (Figure 1). 38 Other sources, however, indicate that PN has a total of only 20,733 personnel broken down as follows:

1,888 Officers including 400 Marines 17,342 Enlisted Personnel including 7,700 Marines 1,503 Civilian Employees 20,733 TOTAL39

                                                                                                                         32 Ibid. 33 Abigail Kwok, “Navy Optimistic Modernization Will Finally Push Through”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (28 July 2010). 34 Cited in Alberto Araojo, “Towards a Responsive Education and Skills Training Program in Preparation for PN Modernization” (Commandant’s Paper: AFP Joint Command and Staff College, 10 January 2001). Also see Manuel de Leon, “The Philippine Navy Fleet Modernization” (MA Thesis: National Defence College of the Philippines, 1992). 35 Ibid. 36 There is an estimate that the AFP has a total strength of 130,000. See “Military: The Philippines”, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/phillipines/intro.htm <accessed on 7 December 2010> 37 But the website of the Philippine Navy states that it only has 21,957 personnel composed of sailors, marines and civilian employees. See Philippine Navy website at http://www.navy.mil.ph/about.htm. According to Naval intelligence, PN has no more than 22,000 personnel. Other sources indicate that PN has a total strength of 24,000. 38 Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 1 December 2010. Also see Armed Forces of the Philippines, Facebook at http://www.facebook.com/pages/Armed-Forces-of-the-Philippines/111440715551567 <accessed on 1 December 2010). 39 “Philippine Navy” at http://www.hueybravo.net/Philippine%20Navy%20Main.htm <accessed on 8 December 2010>.

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Figure 1 ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF PN AGAINST AFP

Sources: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 1 December 2010. Armed Forces of the Philippines, Facebook at http://www.facebook.com/pages/Armed-Forces-of-the-Philippines/111440715551567.

Despite its small number relative to the gargantuan tasks it has to perform, PN has recently adopted a very ambitious operational concept that seeks to establish “naval prominence in all mission areas”.40 Though this concept can generate some false hopes and failed expectations in the Service, it is from this operational concept that the PN inspires its personnel to perform three major roles that reveal the comprehensive function of the naval service in the 21st century: military, constabulary and diplomatic, to wit:

Military Role is the essence of any military institution such as the Navy. In PN context, this role is generally viewed to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Philippines. This is sustained through fleet-marine operations employing the use of forces to launch from the sea to enable application of military capabilities and sustained units in the sea. This role does not only to maintain naval prominence with the country’s maritime jurisdiction but may also reinforce claims in disputed territories and contested waters.

                                                                                                                         40 The Philippine Navy, “An Operational Concept: Naval Prominence in all Mission Areas” (Maritime Stakeholder’s Summit, 18-19 May 2009).

 

Philippine  Army  

65,000  to  70,000  57%  

Philippine  Navy  

20,000  to  30,000  30%  

Philippine  Air  Force    

15,000-­‐20,000  13%  

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Constabulary Role meanwhile refers to preserving the internal peace and unity of the Philippine archipelago. The task involves inter-agency operations and collaborative efforts with other maritime enforcement agencies such as the Philippine Coast Guard, Maritime Industry Authorities, The PNP-Maritime Group and Bureau of Fisheries. Diplomatic Role can be viewed in terms of contribution of PN to regional peace and stability as well as prevention of inter-state conflicts. In this regard, PN conducts a wide range of military and non-military activities designed to promote peace and security and enhance security cooperation in the region. These activities ensure peaceful purposes and aim for cooperation rather than dispute.41 These aforementioned roles have complex interlocking functions to perform the

following interrelated tasks that are arguably easier said than done considering the current PN resources: internal security, territorial defence, disaster response and relief operations, support to national development, international defence and security engagement and international humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations (see Figure 2). It is expected, however, that the adoption of this new operational concept will put PN in “a better position to define how it intends to conduct its mandate, program its resources for better service delivery, and formulate our future assets acquisitions to match with emerging strategic realities.”42 It can be discerned from this operational concept that the main crux of naval modernization in the Philippines is to create an inshore territorial defence navy that can secure the Philippine archipelago from internal threats and external challenges.43

Notwithstanding the grandiose intention of this operational concept, it is sad to

stress that PN does not have enough wherewithal at present to fully implement it. PN admits that its weapons systems and resources are not sufficient to enable the Service in effectively confronting current and emerging threats to Philippine maritime security. PN discloses that while it has short to medium range anti surface capabilities, it has a very limited short range capabilities and does not even have long range anti-air competences.44 PN expresses grief that it does not have any anti-submarine, electronic warfare and mine warfare capabilities. Adding insult to injury is the inconvenient truth

                                                                                                                         41 Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Operations, N3, Compilation of Operational Policies, Procedures and Guidelines. 2009 (Manila: Headquarters Philippine Navy, 2009). Also see “Draft PN Strategic Sail Plan 2020” (Manila: Headquarters Philippine Navy, 2010). 42 Vice Admiral Ferdinand S. Golez, “State of the Navy Address”, Navy Journal, Vol, XVI, Issue No. III (May 2009), p. 18. 43 The author is grateful to CDR Rommel Ong of the Philippine Navy for stressing this point. 44 “A Strategy for Naval Defence and Modernization” in Headquarters Philippine Navy, Naval Modernization Guide, p. 3.

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that the Philippines is the only Navy in Southeast Asia without a much-needed missile capability.45

Brunei and Singapore, two smallest countries in the region in terms of land area

and population, have better equipped navies than PN.46 To adapt to the many security challenges of the 21st century, naval developments in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are in fact growing much faster than the Philippines.47 It is essential to take into account, however, that naval developments in Southeast Asia are very modest and “considerably less ambitious” compared to the more developed states like Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea.48 These advance states are now involved in a sea power development that has tremendous implications for the evolving maritime balance of power in the Asia Pacific.49

In other words, while PN has sufficient capabilities for ISO, it does not have the necessary capabilities for TDO compared with its neighbours in the region. Even its capabilities to maintain presence in key maritime points of the archipelago are truly wanting. Existing PN ships that are tasked to undertake effective patrols and efficient blockades in the EEZ only have 40-mile radius coverage as against the 200-mile EEZ that they need to protect and defend.50 Its ill-equipped coastal patrol and anti-infiltration ships only have two-day endurance and 20-mile radius coverage, which is not enough given the country’s archipelagic features.51

Though PN has the present capabilities to undertake efficient amphibious

landing, reliable electronic intelligence missions, and small but credible special naval operations,52 it does not have deterrent naval power against unwanted activities happening around Philippine territorial waters, particularly in Sulu Sea of the Southern Philippines where all sorts of maritime crimes occur.53 Thus, naval modernization

                                                                                                                         45 Ibid. 46 For more discussion, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, ,“Military Developments and Relations in Southeast Asia” (Paper presented at the East Asia Security Outlook Conference organized by Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Ministry of Defence, Brunei Darussalam on 7 January 2010). 47 See Tim Huxley, “Southeast Asia’s Navy in the 21st Century: Adapting to New Challenges” in Andrew Forbes (ed), Sea Power: Challenges Old and New (Sydney: Halstead Press, 2007), pp. 259-270. 48 Ibid. 49 Lawrence W. Prabhakar, Joshua H. HO and Sam Bateman (eds), The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006). 50 Malahay, p. 75. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 For more discussions, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Political Stability in the Southern Philippines: Threats of Insurgency, Internal Conflicts and Key Players” (Paper delivered at the International Workshop on Security and Stability in the Southern Philippines: Implications for Australia and the Region held at the University of Wollongong, Australia on 28-29 September 2010).

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continues to be a strong aspiration in the Philippines being a maritime nation and an archipelagic state.

Figure 2 ROLES OF THE PHILIPPINE NAVY

Source: The Philippine Navy, “An Operational Concept: Naval Prominence in all Mission Areas” (Maritime Stakeholder’s Summit, 18-19 May 2009).

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NATURE AND PHILOSOPHY OF

PHILIPPINE NAVAL MODERNIZATION

Philippine naval modernization program is guided by the over-all objectives of the AFP Modernization Program, which intends to “make the AFP a worthy player in any regional or international security arrangement.”54 Specifically, the AFP Modernization Program aims to pursue the following:

1. To develop the AFP’s capability to uphold the sovereignty of and territorial integrity of the Republic and to secure the national territory from all forms of intrusion and encroachment;

2. To develop the AFP’s capability to assist civilian agencies in the preservation of the national patrimony, including the country’s living and non-living marine, submarine, mineral, forest and other natural resources located within its territory and its Exclusive Economic Zone;

3. To enhance the AFP’s capability to fulfill its mandate to protect the Filipino people not only from armed threats but the ill effects of life-threatening and destructive consequences of natural and man-made disasters and calamities, including typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, major accidents in far-flung or inaccessible terrain or at sea from all forms of ecological damage;

4. To improve the AFP’s capability to assist other agencies in the enforcement of domestic and foreign policies as well as international covenants against piracy, white slavery, smuggling, drug trafficking, hijacking of aircraft and sea craft and the transport of toxic and other ecologically-harmful substance taking place in or through Philippine territory;

5. To enhance the AFP’s capability to assist the Philippine National Police in law enforcement and internal security operations;

6. To enhance the AFP’s capability to fulfill the country’s international commitments; and

7. To develop the AFP’s capability to support national development.55

                                                                                                                         54Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Modernization Program, “Program Overview” at http://www.afpmodernization.mil.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19&Itemid=27 <accessed on 26 December 2010>. 55 Ibid.

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PN modernization efforts are also based on the premise that PN shall be at the forefront of external defence and the bastion in the promotion of Philippine maritime security. Naval modernization, therefore, may be viewed as the cornerstone of Philippine force modernization. As maritime nation of 95 million Filipinos and archipelagic state of 7,107 islands, not to mention the contested islands in the South China, PN contends that the country needs to rely on a credible navy that is mandated to provide naval defence of the country and assure maritime security of the Filipino nation. Modernizing the naval force is therefore imperative in the realization of the overall goals of national security. PN modernization also supports the latest National Military Strategy of the Philippines, which endeavours to accomplish the following military objectives:

1. Decisively defeat all armed internal security threats; 2. Maintain territorial integrity and defend the national territory; 3. Protect the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); 4. Contribute to regional peace and stability; and, 5. Support and assist lead government agencies within the AFP’s capabilities

As directed by national authorities in the following areas: conduct of Socio-politico-economic development programs; respond to national emergencies; enforcement of national laws.56

From these military objectives, PN identifies its three primary missions: 1)

ensuring territorial integrity, 2) protection of the EEZ, and 3) contribution to regional peace and stability. These three primary missions are consistent with PN operational concept that pursues naval modernization with the main intent of establishing an inshore territorial defence navy. The PN also takes cognizance of its supporting role in ISO, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and in the enforcement of Philippine national laws.57

The nature and philosophy of the present efforts to modernize PN are best articulated in PNMP. PN regards the PNMP as part of the overall process of naval transformation and development, to wit:

The Philippine Naval Modernization Program (PNMP) is a transformative endeavour that would enable the Navy to effectively perform its mandate of defending the national territory, protecting the nation’s maritime interests and of maintaining a regime of law and order within the extensive maritime jurisdiction of the country. It aims to

                                                                                                                         56 General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines. The National Military Strategy (Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 07 January 2002). This document is currently being amended to suit the current situation. 57 Headquarters Philippine Navy, The Philippine Navy Fifteen-Year Equipment Acquisition Plan (Updated Manuscript, 28 April 2009).

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develop capabilities in the command and control of forces, collaborative operations with other Services, the detection, tracking and neutralization of threats, the surveillance of the maritime zone and the deployment of mobile forces all over the archipelago.58

The most recent effort to modernize PN is embodied in the Strategic Sail Plan 2020 (SSP 2020), which expresses the most current aspiration of PN “to restore its former glory and surpass it in the near future.”59 Initially drafted in 2006, the SSP 2020 provides the roadmap of PN for capability development and naval modernization. It adopts the overarching philosophy of “performing while transforming” as it attempts to make PN strong and credible Philippine naval force of the future. Its main vision is to make PN “a credible Navy that our maritime nation can be proud of” by 2020.60

One important innovation of SSP 2020 is the creation of the Centre for Naval Leadership and Excellence, which is considered to be the first of its kind in the whole AFP. The main purpose of the Centre is “to oversee, ensure and sustain the proper implementation and cascading of the Sail Plan as well facilitate its review and enhancement.” Specifically, the Centre is mandated to perform the following functions:

1. Oversee the implementation of the PN Strategic Sail Plan 2020. 2. Organize/facilitate forums, seminars and other leadership related activities

by inviting experts, leaders and exemplary individuals from within and outside the organization who can share their personal experience in leadership and best practices in their organizations.

3. Assess the effects of PN leadership and governance programs and activities to PN personnel.

4. Develop new leadership modules and programs that can be taught to PN personnel.

5. Coordinate with HPN Staff the consolidation and dissemination of Command thrusts, plans and programs to PN units.

6. Facilitate for the establishment of networks from PN external stakeholders and ensure their involvement in PN initiatives.61

The Centre is also serving as the main mouthpiece of the PN in developing, propagating and enriching the concept of SSP 2020. One of the major advocacies of the Centre that is considered part and parcel of naval modernization is the adoption of a Capability-Based Planning (CBP) Framework as an alternative to Threat-Based

                                                                                                                         58 “Navy Modernization Project Management Team and Its Membership: Making Naval Dreams a Reality” in Naval Modernization Guide, p. 54. 59 Headquarters Philippine Navy, “Philippine Navy Strategic Sail Plan 2020” (Presentation delivered at the Maritime Stakeholders’ Summit held at the AFP Commissioned Officer’s Club, 18 May 2009). 60 Ibid. 61 “Philippine Navy Strategic Sail Plan 2020” (Draft Manuscript, October 2010), pp. 6-7.

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Planning (TBP) Framework. CBP focuses more “on delivering capabilities to address wide range of threats rather than delivering the capability to defeat a specific threat.” Thus, the CBP embedded in the SSP 2020 conveys the benign intention of PN in its modernization efforts.

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CAUSES OF

PHILIPPINE NAVAL MODERNIZATION Philippine naval modernization may be considered part of the regional trend of maritime capacity building in the Asia Pacific region.62 Domestically, the main causes of Philippine naval modernization are based on what the PN describes as the “Imperatives of Naval Defence”, which aims to address the following interrelated maritime security concerns: territorial sovereignty, protection of the marine resources, external security threats, maritime crimes, and maritime terrorism:63

Territorial Sovereignty Naval modernization aims to defend territorial sovereignty of the Philippine

Republic. This includes the protection Philippine territorial waters, EEZ and claimed islands, islets and shoals in the South China Sea. The protection of Philippine territorial sovereignty is embodied in the concept of Territorial Defence, which, in the words of former Navy Flag Officer in Command (FOIC), simply means that “not one of our island territories shall never again be occupied by foreign forces.”64 Based on the Defence Planning Guidance 2011-2016 issued by the DND, “With the anticipated winding down of internal security concerns … capability development for territorial defence shall become the main priority over the course of the 2011-2016 medium term period.” (Underscoring mine)65 The passing into law on 10 March 2009 of the Republic Act (RA) 9522, otherwise known as the New Philippine Baselines Law, reaffirms the Philippines’ commitment to defend its territorial waters, including its extended continental shelf, economic zones and an area of the contested Spratly archipelago known in the country as the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG).66

To carry out the task of territorial defence, enhancing the capability of PN is therefore essential, which specifically means the strengthening of the Philippine Fleet Marine Team. According to the Commander of the Western Command of the AFP, “the force of choice for external defence is the Fleet Marine because it is highly mobile and

                                                                                                                         62 See Andrew Forbes (ed), Maritime Capacity Building in the Asia Pacific Region (Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2010). 63 “The Imperatives of Naval Defence” in Headquarters Philippine Navy, Naval Modernization Guide, p. 2. 64 Vice Admiral Ferdinand S. Golez, “State of the Navy Address”, Navy Journal, Vol, XVI, Issue No. III (May 2009), p. 18. 65 Department of National Defence, Defence Planning Guidance, 2011 – 2016 (Quezon City: Office of the Secretary of National Defence, 2010). 66For a complete electronic copy of the New Philippine Baselines Law or Republic Act 9922, see http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9522_2009.html.

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can easily adapt to both land and sea environment.”67 The Western Command of the AFP has the primary mission to defend Philippine territories in the disputed islands in the South China Sea. Regrettably, PN only deploys 55 naval personnel in the nine occupied features of the Philippines in the South China Sea.

Protection of the Marine Resources As an archipelago, the Philippines is very rich in marine resources considering

that 64 out of its 79 provinces have coastal domains. It means that 80% of Philippine provinces are coastal. Out of 1,502 municipalities, 832 are considered coastal towns representing 55% of total Philippine municipalities. In other words, 60% of total Philippine population of around 95 million live in coastal areas. The Philippines has a total coastline of 36,289 km, which is one of the world’s largest. The country also has 27,000 sq km of coral reef system with rich marine biodiversity. As such, the Philippines belongs to the 10th top marine capture producing country and 10th top aquaculture producer in the world.68 Indeed, the Philippines is a maritime nation endowed with natural resources that emanate from the maritime domain.

However, its rich maritime resources are at risk because of unsustainable fishing

practices and destructive economic activities in the maritime areas. Naval modernization intends to build the needed capacity of PN to conserve and protect its rich maritime resources surrounding the Philippine archipelago. Because many Filipinos get their livelihoods from the sea, the protection of the marine resources is important for the survival of Filipino nation.

External Security Threats The Philippines does not see any current threat of external aggression from its

neighbours, particularly in Southeast Asia. There is a wide perception in the Philippines that the region is generally more peaceful and stable than at any time since the end of the cold war.69 The Philippine government accepts the view that the norm of cooperation fostered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made intra-regional sources of inter-state conflicts at its manageable level, thus far.70 The defence establishment even regards the adoption of an ASEAN security community

                                                                                                                         67 Tessa Jamandre, “China builds lighthouse on PHL-claimed territory in Spratlys”, 8 December 2010 at http://verafiles.org/main/focus/china-builds-lighthouse-on-phl-claimed-territory-in-spratlys/ <accessed on 8 December 2010. 68This data is from Atty Rodel Cruz, President of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Forum and former Undersecretary of National Defence in the Philippines. 69 For the author’s elaboration on this issue, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, Current and Emerging Security Environment in Southeast Asia: A Regional Security Appraisal for Philippine Defence, Security and Foreign Policy (Manila: Yuchengco Center, 2010). 70 Ibid., p. 84.

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(ASC) as a reinforcement of the pacific settlement of disputes in Southeast Asia. 71 With the ASC, the likelihood of inter-state wars in the region is said to be diminished.

But PN asserts that it has to build naval capabilities to confront transnational

security threats emanating from the Philippine maritime domain. The AFP even supports naval modernization in order to deter potential external security threats from its neighbours, particularly those with territorial disputes with the country.72 The Philippines still has unresolved territorial issues with Malaysia over Sabah. The Philippines also has territorial claims in the contested islands, islets, reefs and shoals in the South China Sea involving claimants from Brunei, China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam. The Sabah Conflict and the South China Sea Disputes are two major external security concerns that may have bearing on Philippine naval modernization efforts.

Thus, the Philippine military argues that though external security threats

emanating from unresolved territorial disputes over Sabah and contested features in the South China Sea are “less immediate” at present, the AFP “continuously seeks to develop its capacities for territorial defence to be fully capable of undertaking unilateral defensive operations should external armed aggression happen.”73 This military policy declaration currently shapes the direction of naval modernization in the Philippines.

Another important issue that might be considered as an external security threat

to the Philippines as an archipelago is the intrusion of foreign vessels in its territorial waters and archipelagic sea-lanes. PN has recorded an annual average of 155 foreign vessels intruding into the Philippine waters. The top-five foreign vessels that have frequently intruded the Philippine waters are from China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam.74 Naval modernization aims to enhance the capability of PN to deter and prevent the intrusion of foreign vessels in Philippine waters that are considered to be one of the busiest sea lanes in Southeast Asia (Figure 3).

PN is therefore developing an “Active Archipelagic Defence Strategy” (AADS), which is a naval strategy “that sets out the means and ways on how the PN intends to evolve its current navy into the Navy of the future” that can effectively address external

                                                                                                                         71 This view is expressed in a working paper prepared in 2004 by the Department of National Defence. See Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy and Special Concerns, The Emerging Security Environment to 2022 (Quezon City: Department of National Defence, 14 April 2004). 72Armed Forces of the Philippines, The Strategic Direction of the AFP International Military Affairs (Quezon City: AFP Headquarters, 2008), pp. 7-10. 73 Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Internal Peace and Security Plan: Bayanihan (Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2010), p. 13. 74 Headquarters Philippine Navy, The Philippine Navy Fifteen-Year Equipment Acquisition Plan (Updated Manuscript, 28 April 2009), p. 13.

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security challenges to Philippine security.75 The AADS also intends to rationalize “the future development of the PN force structure and its most effective employment founded on the need to attain Naval Dominance in future battle space.”76 The development of AADS is an integral aspect of naval modernization program that aims to enhance PN defensive capacity to confront external security threats.

Figure 3 PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES

Source: Philippine Navy, 2010.

Maritime Crimes As maritime nation, the Philippines is vulnerable to various maritime crimes

such as piracy, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal arms trade among others. Maritime crimes are considered non-traditional security threats in the Philippines being

                                                                                                                         75 The Philippine Navy, “Active Archipelagic Defence Strategy: Strategizing the Future of the Philippine Navy” (Presented at the Philippine Navy Seminar-Workshop on Formulating an Active Archipelagic Defence Strategy At the PN Headquarters, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City on 13-14 May 2009). 76 Ibid.

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used to justify naval modernization.77 Maritime crimes are high in Sulu and Celebes seas, which are porous and ungoverned triborder sea areas between the littoral states of Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.78 The Philippines intends to build naval capabilities to address these problems and help promote good order at sea in Southeast Asia.79

PN regards the development of a strong navy as vital for the promotion of

Philippine maritime security against various crimes at sea. Specifically, PN pursues naval modernization to protect the Philippines’ archipelagic sea-lanes and uphold Philippine sovereignty of its archipelagic waters against maritime crimes.80

One effort towards this end is the creation of Coast Watch South (CWS) which is

an operational response to combat maritime crimes and other maritime security challenges occurring in the waters of the Southern Philippines, particularly in the Sulu-Sulawesi (Celebes) Seas.81 Currently based in Zamboanga City under the operational command of the Naval Forces Western Mindanao, CWS aims to uphold inter-agency coordination and whole-of-government approach in promoting maritime security. Currently being led and funded by PN, the creation of CWS is deemed consistent with naval modernization in the Philippines as it is a purely PN initiative at present.82 PN intends to make CWS as a template for National Coast Watch System in the Philippines.83 It is also designed to establish and enhance maritime security cooperation with Malaysia and Indonesia to combat not only maritime crimes in the littoral states but also maritime terrorism.

                                                                                                                         77 For the authors detailed discussions on maritime crimes affecting Philippine security, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asian Maritime Domain: Implications for the Indian Ocean” in VR Raghavan and W Lawrence S. Prabhakar (eds), Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Critical Issues in Debate (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Limited, 2008), pp. 239-262. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Security Threats in Post-911 Southeast Asia: Regional Responses” in Burns, Bateman and Lehr (eds), Llyod’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, pp. 253-270. 78Ian See Ian Storey, “The Triborder Sea Area: Maritime Southeast Asia's Ungoverned Space”, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 19 (24 October 2007). 79 Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho and Jane Chan, Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia (Singapore: RSIS Policy Paper, April 2009). 80 See Eriberto Varona, “Designation of Archipelagic Sea Lanes: The Philippine Navy Perspective”, Ocean Law and Policy Series, Volume I, No. 1 (January-June 1997), pp. 18-20. Also see Jay Batongbacal, “Archipelagic Sea Lanes and Transit Passage Through Straits: Shared Responsibilities are Essential to Implementation”, in Andrew Forbes (ed) The Strategic Importance of Seaborne Trade and Shipping (Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 10, 2003), pp. 99-112. 81 Rodel Cruz, “Coast Watch South and Maritime Security in the Tri-Border Area” (Presented at the International Forum on Asia Pacific Secruity organized by the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, Dusit Thani Hotel, Manila, 29 October 2010). 82 The Philippine Navy, “Coast Watch South: Official Briefing” (Manila: Headquarters of the Philippine Navy, 2010). 83 Ibid.

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Maritime Terrorism Since the bombing of MV Superferry 14 in Manila Bay on 27 February 2004, PN

has been upgrading its capability to combat maritime terrorism originating primarily from the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which has been known to have established links with Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.84 The Navy Sail Plan 2020 and the PN 15-Year Equipment Acquisition Plan assert that thwarting maritime terrorism is one of PN priorities for modernizing its naval force. PN even conducted the Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) capability drill on 13 March 2010 in Manila Bay to enhance maritime boarding actions and tactics against maritime terrorism and other maritime crimes.85 PN has also formed the Naval Special Operations Group (NAVSOG), which enhanced and replaced the Special Warfare Action Group (SWAG). There is a need to underscore that SWAG played a crucial role in the neutralization in 2002 of Abu Sabaya (real name Aldam Tilao), a very notorious ASG commander responsible for a number of kidnap-for-ransom activities in Mindanao.86 SWAG was renamed as NAVSOG to enhance naval capabilities in countering maritime terrorism. NAVSOG is the Philippine equivalent of the Navy Seals in the United States.

                                                                                                                         84 For the author’s elaboration on this topic, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism” in Peter Lehr (ed), Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 121-138. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat”, Naval War College Review, Volume 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 63-80. 85 “Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) Capability Demonstration”, The Philippine Navy Today at http://navyspeak.blogspot.com/2010/03/lieutenant-colonel-edgard-arevalo-pnm.html <accessed on 18 December 2010> 86 For more discussions, see Ernesto De Leon, “The Fleet-Marine Teams on the Neutralization of Abu Sabaya” in Lessons from Naval Batlles and Operations in the Philippines for PN Doctrines Development (Manila: Headquarters of the Philippine Navy, undated), pp. 128-135.

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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

OF PHILIPPINE NAVAL MODERNIZATION ON REGIONAL SECURITY

Philippine naval modernization program has been viewed as part of the over-all trends of military build-up occurring in the Asia Pacific region at the end of the cold war.87 It is also considered as an indication of the prospects of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in Southeast Asia.88 Though military modernization does not equate with military effectiveness, countries in Southeast Asia pursued force modernization for various reasons and to varying degrees.89

One of the consequences of military modernization in Southeast Asia is a perceived arms race in the region.90 The trend happened in the 1980s and early 1990s when the region enjoyed relative economic prosperity. This got the attention of international community to call for arms trade transparency in Southeast Asia.91 But Southeast Asian countries reject the concept of arms race to describe military modernization in the region. For them, force modernization is simply an attempt to upgrade their obsolete military assets so they can effectively protect their sovereignty and enhance military capacities to deal with non-traditional security challenges in the era of globalization. While their relative economic prosperity may have encouraged them to pursue military modernization, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, in fact, delayed all force modernization efforts in Southeast Asia.

The Philippines is one of the countries that were greatly affected by the financial crisis. Though other countries already recovered from the crisis, the Philippines has yet to recover to finance its naval modernization programs.

Nonetheless, PN is geared to receive modest funding for naval modernization

through the AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund (AFPMATF). PN expects an amount of P134.5 billion to be used for a period of 20 years. This amount intends to implement PN equipment acquisition program focusing on the purchase of surface warfare, anti-

                                                                                                                         87 Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia Pacific Region”, International Security, Volume 18, Number 3 (Winter 1993/1994). 88 J.D. Kenneth Boutin, “Prospects for a revolution in military affairs in Southeast Asia”, RSIS Commentaries, No. 3 (November 2001). 89 Andrew Tan, “Force Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia”, IDSS Working Paper, No. 59 (January 2004). 90 Amitav Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994). 91 Edward J. Laurance, “A Conceptual Framework for Arms Trade Transparency in South-East Asia” in Gill and Mak, Arms, Transparency and Security in South-East Asia, pp. 10-24.

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submarine, coastal patrol, sealift, amphibious, naval air, search and rescue, mine countermeasure operations and command and control, and support systems, upgrading and refurbishing of a number of ships, aircraft, amphibious vehicles, and equipment of the naval shipyard.92

As an unintended consequence of the PN Modernization Program, there is a perceived, if not real, heightening of security dilemma in Southeast Asia. Security dilemma exists when the military preparations of one state create an un-resolvable uncertainty in the mind of another state as to whether those preparations are for “defensive” or “offensive” purposes.93 With the concept of security dilemma associated with naval modernization trends, countries in Southeast Asia are trapped in a “guessing game” situation where decision makers try to speculate on other countries’ strategic intention whether the said intention is benign or malign. States perceptions of security dilemma create a paradox in which states believe that their security requires the insecurity of others.94

This difficult situation occurs because of the anarchic nature of international system where there is the absence of an overarching authority that can regulate the behaviour of sovereign states. In an anarchic international environment, states constantly compete with one another to protect their sovereignty and to pursue their national interests.95 Though the state of anarchy can also encourage states to cooperate by building international regimes or constructing international norms, mutual suspicions continue to describe the reality of international politics.

In Southeast Asia, mutual suspicions among states continue to exist because of still unresolved bilateral territorial disputes.96 Though Southeast Asian states have the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to provide various mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of regional disputes, particularly in the context of an ASEAN security community, each of them is still informed by the realist view of international relations where autonomous defence is considered to be necessary for each state to fend for its own security. Thus, security dilemma is a regional tragedy because war can occur

                                                                                                                         92 Headquarters Philippine Navy, The Philippine Navy Fifteen-Year Equipment Acquisition Plan (Updated Manuscript, 28 April 2009), p. 1. 93Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, “The Security Dilemma” in John Baylis and N.J. Rennger (eds), Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in Changing World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 29-60. 94Jack Snyder, “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross (eds), Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 155. 95For a concept of anarchy, see Robert C. Art and Robert Jervis, International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 4th edition (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1996), pp. 1-148. 96 See Narayanan Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in the Post-Cold War ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).

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between and among states though none of them truly desire such an outcome.97 Because each state is mandated to promote its own national interests and purse autonomous defence, security uncertainties pervade in the region. These security anxieties exacerbate the security dilemma associated with naval modernization.

It has to be noted, however, that since 2001, defence spending in some Southeast Asian countries has been increasing. Southeast Asian claimants became more serious in their programs to upgrade their naval capabilities, particularly in the context of growing regional maritime security concerns,98 renewed security tensions in the South China Sea99 and rapid development of China’s naval power.100 Malaysia, for example, acquired in October 2009 a Scorpene Class submarine to bolster its capability to guard its waters. Vietnam, on the other hand, ordered in 2007 two Gepard Class frigates from Russia. Vietnam also explored the procurement of six Kilo Class submarines from Russia to increase its maritime capabilities. Indonesia also planned to construct 12 additional submarines by 2024 and considering the Chanbogo Class submarines from South Korea or Kilo Class submarines from Russia. While Thailand acknowledged the deterrent value of acquiring submarines and expressed no plan to acquire submarines arguing that “deploying a submarine would heighten tensions” with neighbours,101 it is currently, however, considering acquiring one.

Though still financially challenged to acquire modern naval ships, the Philippines

acquired in May 2009 three multi-purpose attack crafts to be deployed in the waters of Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi.102 As part of Philippine naval modernization project, the Department of National Defence (DND) also ordered in May 2010 to rush the acquisition of two multi-role vessels from either Singapore and South Korea.103 PN underscores, however, that its recent acquisitions are meant to ameliorate the security dilemma by increasing Philippine naval capacity to promote maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asian rather than compete with its neighbours.

                                                                                                                         97The concept of security dilemma as a tragedy was popularized by Herbert Butterfield. See Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), pp. 6-20. 98 Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan (eds), Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (New York and London: Routledge, 2007). 99 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Renewed Tensions and Maritime Security Dilemma in the South China Sea” (Delivered at the National Defense University of Taiwan on 15 April 2010 and at the International Maritime Security Forum at Keelung, Taiwan on 16 April 2010). 100 See Zhang Wennu, “Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices”, China Security (Summer 2006), pp. 17-31. Also see Ronald O Rourke, China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report for Congress, 19 November 2008). 101 National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2010 (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 2010). 102 AFP Modernization Office, “Multi-Purpose Attack Crafts” (3 July 2009) at http://www.afpmodernization.mil.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1:mpac&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=50 <accessed on 26 December 2010> 103 “DND rushing acquisition of Navy vessels”, The Philippine Star (16 May 2010).

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CHALLENGES IN PHILIPPINE NAVAL MODERNIZATION

Though the Philippine government is truly serious in its plan to implement naval

modernization, there are at least five major domestic challenges that PN has to confront to realize it: 1) Current threat perceptions of decision makers, 2) Resource constraints, 3) Inter-service rivalry, 4) Difficult procurement system, and 5) Lack of social acceptability.

Current Threat Perceptions of Decision Makers The current state of PN is a function of current threat perceptions of Philippine

decision makers. The Philippine government continues to regard internal security as its foremost security concern and this threat perception has made naval modernization program not a top priority. The 1998 Defence Policy Paper, which is considered to be the only defence white paper of the Philippines to date, underscores that the “focus of defence is the insurgency because of its immediate effects on national stability and economic progress.”104 In August 2008, the Department of National Defence (DND) drafted a defence white paper reiterating the primacy of internal security in Philippine defence and security policy. 105 Though the DND recognizes that external security situation also affects Philippine security and views national security as the fusion of internal and external security, the priority of the Philippine government in terms of resource allocation is still internal security.106 Even the 2001 National Military Strategy of the AFP prioritizes internal security threats.107 In the formulation of the 2002 AFP Capability Development Plan, internal security also gets the foremost attention.108

On 21 October 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued the Memorandum Order No. 6 “Directing the Formulation of the National Security Policy and National Security Strategy for 2010-2016”. This Memorandum reflects the current government’s national security thinking that is focused primarily on four key internal security issues: governance, delivery of basic services, economic reconstruction and sustainable development and security sector reform. In its draft national security policy

                                                                                                                         104 Department of National Defence, In Defence of the Philippines: 1998 Defence Policy Paper (Quezon City: Department of National Defence, 1998). The Philippines continues to confront two major armed insurgencies emanating from local communism and Muslim separatism. 105 See Department of National Defence, The Defence White Paper (Draft August 2008). This draft has never been approved to date. 106 See Department of National Defence, Defence Strategic Policy Framework (Quezon City: Department of National Defence, 2006). 107 Armed Forces of the Philippines, National Military Strategy 2001 (Quezon City: Strategic Planning Committee of the AFP, 2001), p. 1. As of this writing, the NMS is being revised to incorporate “territorial defence” in national military strategy formulation. 108 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, AFP Capability Development Plan (Quezon City: Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2002), pp. 1-2. This document is also being reviewed in order to include external defence capability building in the light of the renewed security tensions in the South China Sea.

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document, the number one national security policy objective is internal security, which aims to promote internal socio-political stability.109 The recently launched AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan reaffirms the primacy of internal security in Philippine national security policy.110

All these official national security documents and pronouncements reveal that the continuing threat perception of decisional makers in the Philippines is dominated by internal security concerns. This is based on the prevailing perspective in the Philippine security establishment that the country is “unlikely to be confronted with invasion or direct-armed aggression in the near to the medium-term”.111 Though the Philippines is faced with external security challenges in the South China Sea, existing territorial disputes with Malaysia over Sabah and other transnational security challenges surrounding the Philippine archipelago, internal security concerns continue to shape the threat perception of decision makers in the Philippines.

As a result, resource allocation for external defence is not in the budgetary priority of the government. PN, which is viewed to be at the forefront of the country’s external defence, is therefore receiving less funding that it should. The Philippine Congress, which has “the power of purse”, does not consider naval modernization as a priority in defence budgeting. In fact, there is a perception that the Philippine government, in general, lacks an appreciation of naval power as internal security is viewed mainly as “land” problem. One study laments:

The Philippine government shows lack of appreciation of naval power. Often, government agencies only seek the services of the PN for the transport of their staff, supplies and equipment to their field units in the provinces and islands in the country. Seldom do they consider the Navy as a very important component of the government for the security of our borders, safety of our maritime resources, or protection of our claims in the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG). Furthermore, the seeming lack of understanding shown by the government on naval power is reflected on the limited resources it allocates for the operations and development of the PN.112

                                                                                                                         109 National Security Council, “A Briefer on National Security Policy and National Security Strategy” (Presented at Dialogue Forum organized by Incitegov at Oakwood Premier Joy-Nostalag Center Manila on 25 November 2010). 110 Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan (Quezon City: Headquarters of the AFP, December 2010). 111 Department of National Defence, International Policy: Engaging our Strategic Defence and Security Partners in the Asia Pacific Region and Beyond (Quezon City: Department of National Defence, 2007). Though this document is not recognized as an approved document, this, however, reveals the prevailing security threat perception in the Philippines. 112 Caesar C. Taccad, “An Assessment of the Naval Strategy of the Philippines” (MA Thesis: National Defence College of the Philippines, 2007), p. 10.

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Resource Constraints Naval modernization relies largely on resource allocation. Effective budgeting for

naval forces is essential for capability upgrade necessary for the performance of PN missions. However, PN can only operate “on the basis of budgetary allocations that the national government provides and releases to it.”113 Given the Philippine budgetary system and processes, “There is little the Navy can do about the budgetary allocations the General Appropriations Act provides for the AFP in general and for the PN in particular.”114

For Fiscal Year 2010, PN recorded a budgetary allocation of P10.5 billion against

the total AFP budget of around P50 billion.115 Around 70 percent of the Navy’s annual budget is used for the salary of naval personnel while the rest are being used for the maintenance and operation of existing naval assets. This kind of budgetary allocation leaves no room for capital outlay or equipment acquisition. PN, therefore, has to rely on the budget coming from AFPMP to fund its naval modernization efforts.

Under the Sub-Program 1 of the Navy component of the AFPMP, PN is expected

to receive a total of around P62.2 billion to fund PN equipment acquisition spread over a period of fifteen (15) years beginning 1995. Around P57 billion is allocated for PN Equipment Acquisition under the AFPMP Sub-Program 1 (Table 3) while around P4.6 billion is assigned for the PN Equipment Upgrade Schedule under Sub-Program 1 (Table 4).

Under Sub-Program 2, PN Equipment Acquisition Fund is around P72 billion (Table 5).

However, the implementation of these programs did not push through due to budgetary challenge and difficult procurement system, among others.

                                                                                                                         113 Jesus Estanislao, “The Navy’s Resources”, The Philippine Navy in the News (17 September 2010) available at http://navytoday.blogspot.com/2010/09/navys-resources.html <accessed on 22 December 2010>. 114 Ibid. 115 Department of Budget and Management, National Expenditure Program 2010 (Manila: Department of Budget and Management, 2010) available at http://www.dbm.gov.ph/index.php?pid=9&xid=30&id=1240 <accessed on 22 December 2010>.

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Table 3 PN EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION UNDER THE AFPMP SUB-PROGRAM 1

GENERIC TYPE QUANTITY FUND ALLOCATION (in Millions of Pesos)

1. Major Weapons Systems Patrol Craft 18 1,336.11 Patrol Ship 10 5,562.43 Corvette 3 18,144.89 Off-shore Patrol Vessel (OPV) 7 26,722.80 Mine Warfare Vessel 3 687.31 Transport Ship 4 4,154.90 Multi-purpose Helicopter 4 2,336.85 Missile System 14 868.23 Amphibious Vehicle 10 455.00 2. Support Systems Training Simulator 9 1,215.00 Harbour Tug 4 300.00 Dredger 2 520.00 3. Others Ordnance 14 lots 4,319.00 Command and Control 14 lots 276.90 Coastwatch Equipment 6 lots 420.00 Other Equipment 1199.73 TOTAL 57,619.05

Source: Philippine Navy, 2010.

Table 4 PN EQUIPMENT UPGRADE SCHEDULE UNDER SUB-PROGRAM 1

TYPE QUANTITY FUND ALLOCATION

(In Millions of Pesos) Ship Refit/Upgrade 10 3,479.00 Aircraft Upgrade 14 249.00 Amphibious Vehicle 25 451.00 Naval Shipyard 8 lots 425.00 TOTAL 4,604.00

Source: Philippine Navy, 2010.

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Table 5 PN EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION UNDER THE AFPMP SUB-PROGRAM

2

GENERIC TYPE QUANTITY FUND ALLOCATION (In Millions of Pesos)

Patrol Craft 6 445.69 Patrol Ship 6 3,344.07 Corvette 3 20,602.81 Off-shore Patrol Vessel (OPV) 5 11,134.71 Mine Warfare Vessel 2 5989.79 Transport Ship 4 4154.90 Multi-purpose Helicopter 5 4016.85 Missile System 14 868.23 Amphibious Vehicle 10 455.00 Frigate 3 22,266.00 Seaplane 5 3,525.80 Graving Dock 1 366.57 Upgrade of equipment 12.00 TOTAL 72.082.29 Source: Philippine Navy, 2010. Inter-Service Rivalry Another obstacle to Philippine naval modernization is the perennial problem of

inter-service rivalry common among armed forces in the world. There are two major sources of inter-service rivalry in the Philippines that affect naval modernization: issues over the appropriation of the military budget and debate on the procurement of military weapons. These two interrelated issues are also functions of the threat perception of decision-makers.

Internal security receives the highest budgetary allocation in AFP operations.

Thus, PA, which is at the forefront in counter-insurgency operations in the country, receives a higher budgetary support than PN. The 2010 national budget shows that PA has a budgetary allocation of around P30.5 billion compared to PN, which only has a budget of P10.5 billion – a budget only slightly higher than the budget of Philippine Air Force ( PAF) of P9.2 billion.116

There is a prevailing view in the Philippines that as long as there are internal

security problems in the Philippines, PA will continue to receive the highest budgetary priority in the AFP. In fact, PA uses internal security problems as justifications for a higher budgetary allocation compared to other services of the armed forces. PN, which

                                                                                                                         116 Department of Budget and Management, “Appropriations and Obligations: Department of National Defence”, in National Expenditure Program 2010 (Manila: Department of Budget and Management, 2010) available at http://www.dbm.gov.ph/index.php?pid=9&xid=30&id=1240 <accessed on 22 December 2010>.

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is advocating for a shift to territorial defence, bitterly accepts, if not resents this stark reality.

With a budgetary allocation that privileges internal security and ground

operations, PA largely determines the procurement of military weapons. This bias is reflected in the AFP Capability Development Plan where military procurement is PA heavy and is intended for ISO.117 With the AFP focus on ISO, there is a perception in the Navy that PA will always receive higher budget and PN will always play a supporting role. It is for this reason why PN wants internal security problems to be solved soon so the armed forces can focus on territorial defence where PN will play the leading role. If territorial defence becomes the government’s priority, there will be an enhanced role for PN and this enhanced role will mean more budget and better equipment for naval modernization.

Difficult Procurement System

Under the PNMP, a certain budget, though considered meagre, has been allocated for PN modernization. However, the procurement of naval equipment necessary for modernization is also being slowed down by the existing national procurement processes. The Philippine government passed Republic Act (RA) 9184 , otherwise known as the New Procurement Law. This law intends to ensure that the government procurement processes are transparent, accountable and competitive.

While RA 9184 can work well in normal government procurement requirements, the AFP argues that this law is difficult to implement for defence modernization procurement, particularly for naval modernization. PN specifically regards the issue of transparency as very problematic for naval procurement, which requires confidentiality. PN also views public bidding as very limited as the process “does not necessarily get the best weapon system vis-a-vis similar weapons systems in the possession of other armed forces.” 118 PN further argues that “While the business of war compels armies and navies to seek even the minutest tactical advantage in weaponry and tactics to gain victory, the current procurement system caters to merely getting savings from the purchase of equipment and systems.”119 In the study made by PN on the impact of RA 9184 on naval modernization, it underscores:

                                                                                                                         117 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, AFP Capability Development Plan (Quezon City: Headquarters of the Armed Forces of theilippines, 2002 118 The Philippine Navy, “Procurement Issues” (Presented to PN Staff, General Headquarters, Bids and Awards Committee, Last Quarter of 2007). 119 Ibid.

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Naval modernization requires substantial investments in money, men and materiel. The high cost of naval platforms and weapons systems dwarf that of ground and air forces. Warships also require a considerable amount of time to repair, upgrade or build. The huge amount of financing required and the length of the project pose a substantial financial burden on the proponents and a high level of risks. Hence, the demand for a down-payment and progressive billing has been practiced within the industry.120

In other words, PN considers the current national procurement system as

anathema to Philippine naval modernization.121 Thus, PN advances an alternative means of procurement that can suit the present requirements of Philippine naval modernization. This includes the adoption of a multi-year financing and multi-year budgeting or obligational authority, among others. Through the persistent lobbying of the defence department, the Philippine Congress has adopted a multi-year budgeting system to suit the requirements of Philippine force modernization program, which by law, should have expired in 2010. However, there is a strong call from the Philippine Congress to improve the military procurement system, particularly in the context of alleged corruption in the Philippine Navy procurement system.122

Lack of Social Acceptability Finally, the lack of social acceptability prevents PN to modernize. As a

developing country that continues to face the challenge of limited financial resources amidst growing social needs, putting more money on defence is something unacceptable in a society with a government that has a very poor performance in the delivery of social services. Using taxpayers’ money for military modernization at the expense of better services for health, education and housing does not make sense to the Filipino people, at least 60% of whom live below the poverty line. While a strong military is indeed a source of national pride, which is more ideational and intangible, there is a greater practical desire and stronger material needs from the Philippine society for the government to pay higher budgetary priorities to education, health, housing and other social services.

                                                                                                                         120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Antonio F. Trillanes IV, “Corruption in the Philippine Navy Procurement System” (Manuscript, March 2002). Available at http://trillanes.com.ph/?p=1106 <accessed on 26 December 2010>. Trillanes was one of the leaders of the Oakwood Mutiny in 2003. He was put to jail for acts of rebellion and ran for senator in 2007 and won. On 20 December 2010, he was granted provisional freedom by the Philippine court by virtue of the Amnesty Proclamation issued by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III on 11 October 2010.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Naval modernization is considered essential for archipelagic states like the Philippines. With vast territorial waters to protect against current threats and emerging security challenges, naval modernization is necessary to achieve the overall national security objectives of the Philippine state. From the type of naval assets that PN wants to procure under its naval modernization program and acquisition plans, PN has no intention to create a Navy with blue water capability. The main intention of naval modernization in the Philippines is just to create an inshore territorial defence navy to secure archipelagic borders and protect territorial waters, particularly with the passing of New Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law. The acquisition second-hand Hamilton Class Cutters from the United States is an indication of PN’s benign intention in its naval modernization program. However, naval modernization in the Philippines has been wrongly viewed as part of the general trend of arms race in Southeast Asia. Though this view has been challenged by Southeast Asian states, naval modernization exacerbates maritime security dilemma in the region. To ameliorate this maritime security dilemma, PN modernization also aims to increase Philippine capacity to promote maritime security cooperation rather than compete with Southeast Asian neighbours.

While the Philippine regards naval modernization as important component of national power necessary for sovereignty protection and nation-building, PN modernization is affected by five domestic challenges: current threat perceptions of decision makers, resource constraints, inter-service rivalry, difficult procurement system, and lack of social acceptability. Unless the Philippine government overcomes these challenges through a paradigm shift in national security policy and priorities, PN will find it arduous to regain its glory as one of the world’s finest naval forces.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Rommel C. Banlaoi is the Chairman of the Board and Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) and Head of its Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies (CINSS). He is a recipient of the Albani Philippine Peace Prize Award in 2011 for peace education. He currently teaches at the Department of International Studies of Miriam College handling undergraduate and graduate courses on global issues as well as international peace and security. Rommel was a professor of political science and international relations at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) from 1998-2008 where he also served as Assistant Vice President for Research in 1998 and Vice President for Administration from 1999 to 2001. He also served as a senior adviser of the League of Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP) from 2001 to 2010. He is currently a member of the board of Directors of the Mayor’s Development Center (MDC) where he once served as a founding center director. He also currently serves as Member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Chinese Studies (PACS) and Center for Political and Democratic Reforms, Inc (CPDRI). Professor Banlaoi is also a Senior Fellow at the Yuchengco Center of De La Salle University, Manila where he once held an appointment as Assistant Professor in International Studies in 1997 and was awarded Most Popular Teacher. He also held an appointment as University Research Associate at the University of the Philippines, Diliman in 1996 where he took his BA, MA and PhD (ABD status) in Political Science. He was also an Instructor in Political Science at the University of the Philippines, Los Banos from 1992-1995. A frequent commentator on local and international newspapers, television and radio talk shows, Banlaoi has single-authored seven books and four monographs, co-authored four books, and single-authored at least 75 book chapters and international journal articles on various issues of regional security, foreign and defense policy, local governance, civil-military relations, security sector reforms, international terrorism and the peace process. He is the author of terrorism trilogy, namely Philippine Security in the Age of Terror (New York: CRC Press/Taylor and Francis, Inc. 2010), Counter-Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? (Manila: Yuchengco Center, 2009), and War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Manila: Rex Book Store International, 2004). He can be reached at rbanlaoi@pipvtr.com.