peter gourevitch

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International Organization Foundation

The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic PoliticsAuthor(s): Peter GourevitchSource: International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn, 1978), pp. 881-912Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706180

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The second image reversed:theinternationalourcesof domestic politicsPeter Gourevitch

Is the traditionaldistinctionbetween internationalrelationsand domestic politicsdead?Perhaps.Asking the questionpresupposesthat it once fit reality, which isdubious. Nonetheless, the two branchesof political science have at the very leastdifferingsensibilities.Each may look at the samesubjectmatterwithoutaskingthesame questions.The international elationsspecialistwants to explain foreignpolicyand international olitics. He cares about the domesticsysteminsofar as it is usefulfor that purpose. He may, if dissatisfied with pure internationalsystem expla-nations, make his own explorationinto domestic politics, a voyage which canfrequentlybring back discoveries (such as Allison's Essence of Decision') mostuseful to the comparativists.Still, the ultimategoal of the tripremains the under-standingof internationaldynamics.Domestic structureor the "I.R." personis anindependentor interveningvariableand sometimesan irrelevantone.2 Most of theliteratureconcernedwith the interactionof the international ystem and domesticstructure s authored by writers with internationalconcerns, and that literaturethereforeprimarily ooks at the arrows that flow from domestic structure owardinternational elations.A comparativistoften seeks to explain the natureof the domestic structure:why it is as it is, how it got that way, why one structurediffersfromanother,how itaffects variousaspects of life, such as health, housing, income distribution,eco-nomic growthand so on. To answersuch questions, the international ystem may

The authorwishes to acknowledgethe assistance of DavidBloom, Lisa Hirschman,Stanley Hoffmann,Miles Kahler, Peter Katzenstein, James Kurth, Janice Stein, and the editors of InternationalOrganiza-tion.tGrahamAllison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).2KennethWaltz, "Theory of InternationalRelations," in Fred Greensteinand Nelson Polsby, eds.,Handbookof Political Science: InternationalRelations(MenloPark:Addison-Wesley, 1975), vol. 8, pp.

1-86.InternationalOrganization32,4, Autumn 19780020-8183/78/0004-0881 $01.00/0? 1978 by the Regentsof the Universityof WisconsinSystem

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882 InternationalOrganizationitself become an explanatory variable. Instead of being a cause of internationalpolitics, domestic structuremay be a consequence of it. International ystems, too,become causes insteadof consequences.Like others working in these fields, I am interested n the questions posed byboth sensibilities. In this essay, however, I wish to concentrateon those posed bythe comparativist.We all know aboutinteraction;we all understand hat interna-tional politics and domestic structures ffecteach other.Having recently read, for avariety of purposes, much of the current iteraturewhich explores this interaction,Ithinkthe comparativist'sperspectivehasbeen neglected, that s, thereasoning rominternational ystem to domestic structure.I offer comment and criticism of thatliteraturen three interrelateddomains:First, in using domestic structure s a variable n explaining foreign policy, wemust explorethe extent to which that structuretself derives from the exigencies ofthe international ystem. As a contribution o such exploration,I will examine avariety of arguments ound in diverse writings which seek to do this.Second, in usingdomesticstructure s a variable or explainingforeign policy,much of the literature s "apolitical." It stresses structural eatures of domesticregimes which constrainpolicy regardless of the content of the interests seekinggoals throughpublic policy or the political orientationof the personsin control ofthe state machine. I will examine this problem througha brief discussion of thedistinction often made between "strong" and "weak" statesas an explanationofforeign economic policy.Finally, in exploring the links between domestic and internationalpoliticsmuch of the literatureargues that a break with the past has occurredsuch that thepresent characterof the interactionrepresentsa discontinuity which requires newcategoriesof analysis. In particular,much is madeof interdependence,permeabil-ity, transnational ctors, and the decline of sovereignty. While it is certainthatthepresent is not identical to the past, this claim for newness is overstated. Manyfeatureswhich are consideredcharacteristicof the present (interdependence, herole of trade, transnationalactors, permeability, conflict within the state overdesirablepolicy) also seem relevantto past systems and regimes;and conversely,characteristicsof the past (war, instability, sovereignty, military power, interna-tional anarchy)seem to be still with us.The bulk of the paper deals with the firstpoint. The othertwo are handled alltoo brieflyandtentatively.I placethemall together,at the risk of overburdeninghereader, because I wish to show that there is some reward for the internationalrelations specialists interested in the second and third points who are willing toundertake he voyage of looking at the first. Treating hemtogetherwill compel usto thinkdifferentlyaboutthe linkagebetween international elations and domesticpolitics.Part one: the impact of the international system on domestic politics

Two aspectsof the internationalystemhavepowerfuleffects uponthe charac-ter of domesticregimes:thedistributionof power among states, or the international


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The second image reversed 883state system; and the distributionof economic activity and wealth, or the interna-tional economy. Putmore simply, politicaldevelopment s shapedby war andtrade.These two categoriesare certainlynot exhaustive.Otherexternalforces exist.Ideas or ideology, for example, can make a great difference to political develop-ment: Catholic vs. Protestant;Napoleonand the FrenchRevolution vs. the AncienRegime;fascism, communismand bourgeoisdemocracyagainsteach other.Theselines of ideological tension shaped not only the international ystem but internalpolitics as well. This should be no surprise.Ideas, along with war and trade,relateintimatelyto the criticalfunctionsany regimemustperform:defense against nvad-ers, satisfactionof materialwant, gratificationof ideal needs.3Of course, the clearest form of externalinfluenceon politics is outright nva-sion and occupation, though occupationcan be complex, as it usually requiresnative collaborators.Less clear empirically but equally obvious conceptually is"meddling": subsidies to newspapersor to fifth columns, spying, assassination,and so on. Neither of these categoriesrequiresmuch investigation.We need notlook very far to find examples of regimes altered by the arrivalof foreign troops:Germanyafter both WorldWars,Italyin 1943, Austria-Hungaryn 1918, Hungaryin 1956, Czechoslovakia n 1968. Nor is it hard to find cases of meddling:Iranin1954, Guatemala n the sameyear, Chilein 1973, VietnamsinceWorldWarII. Therole of ideas requirescareful consideration,but for reasons of space and mentaleconomy, I shall limit my discussion to the internationalstate system and theinternational conomy.Similarly, I shall limit the range of outcomes to be explored. "Impact ondomesticpolitics" could include a varietyof effects: specific events, specific deci-sions, a policy, regimetype, and coalitionpattern.It is not hardto thinkof exam-ples of the first three: he Zinoviev letterand the British electionof 1924;the UnitedStatesdeclarationof war after Pearl Harbor; he rise of worldtarifflevels after theprice dropbeginning in 1873. I shall focus here on the more complex outcomes.First,regime type:constitutionalist r authoritarian;ourgeoisdemocraticor fascistor communist;monarchicor aristocratic r democratic; iberalor totalitarian; ffec-tive or debile; unitaryor federal; presidentialor parliamentary.Second, coalitionpattern:ype and mix of dominantelites:propertyowners orpoliticalelites, or armyor finance or manufacturing r tradeunionists;integrated,autonomousor radicalworkingclass movements;narrowlyheld power or broadlysharedpower. Regimetype and coalitionpatternare certainlyinterconnectedand it is not easy to sustainneatly the distinction. By the former I wish to evoke institutionalstructure,themachinery,processandproceduresof decisionmaking;by the latterI wish to evokesocial forces andthe political relationshipsamong them. The latter has to do withwhat the groupsare and whatthey want;the formerstressesthe formalpropertiesofthe links among them. These are the more significantoutcomes for our purposesbecause they constitute enduringfeaturesof a given political system, ones whichoperateover time to shape behavior at specific moments of decision, events, orpolicy formation.Regime type and coalition patternare the propertiesof a politicalsystem most often used as a variable for the explanationof foreign policy. These3FranzSchurmann,The Logic of WorldPower (New York: Pantheon, 1974).


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884 InternationalOrganizationdifferentexternalforces and the outcomes they produce are presentedin tabularform in the appendix. The remainderof the first section looks at argumentssug-gestingthe impactof two typesof internationaltimuluson theformationof regimetype and coalitionpattern: he economy and the international tate system.The internationaleconomy

Recent events and the international elationsliteraturehave made us acutelyawareof the impactof worldmarketforces upon domestic politics. Citing the oilembargo after the Arab-Israeliwar of 1973 makes other examples unnecessary.These effects thoughare not somethingnew. The GreatDepressionalone did notbringHitler to power:Germanhistory,institutions,parties,politicalculture,classesand key individualsdidthat,butit is impossibleto imaginethatwithoutthe millionsthrownout of workby the contractionof the UnitedStateseconomy following theCrashof 1929 these otherforces could have broughtthe resultabout.The economic cycle referred o as the GreatDepressionof 1873-96 also haddramatic ffects on politicallife around heworld. Immense ncreases n agriculturaland industrialproductioncaused the prices of both sorts of goods to plummet. InBritain,the flood of foreigngraindrovemanypersonsoff the land, underminedhelandedaristocracy,and hasteneddemocratization f politicallife (the secretballot,universalsuffrage, elected local government,disestablishmentof the Church).InFranceand Germany,the dropin prices threatenedandedandindustrial nterests.In both countries, these groups managedto protect themselves by erecting hightariffbarriers.In France, this served to strengthenthe Republic. In Germany,itstabilized Bismarck's newly-fashioned ramshackle empire. In both countries,preindustrialgroups were thereby able to prolong their positions with ultimatelydisastrousconsequencesfor constitutional government:fascism in Germany, theFrenchcollapse in the thirtiesandVichy afterwards. taly, RussiaandSoutheasternEuropecould no longerprovideeven subsistenceto muchof theirpopulationsandsent a tidal wave of migrantsaroundthe world. In America, the late nineteenthcenturydepressionspawnedPopulism, a most powerfulchallengeto the two-partysystemandto thehegemonyof industrialnterests.It was ultimatelydefeated n partbecause the immigrantshurled ashore by the crisis in Europe sided with theirRepublicanemployersagainstthe Populistand Democraticfarmers.4In all these countries, what we now call transnationalactors were certainlypresent (at least in some sense of that term)5:British investors, German steelmanufacturers,Frenchengineers, Americanmissionaries.Thatinternationalmarket orces affectpoliticsand havedoneso fora long timeseems incontrovertible.Can we find general argumentswhich posit systematicrelationshipsbetween such forces and certainconfigurationsof regime type andcoalitionpattern?4PeterGourevitch,"InternationalTrade,Domestic Coalitions and Liberty:ComparativeResponses tohe Crisis of 1873-1896," Journal of InterdisciplinaryHistory, VHII: (Autumn1977): 281-313.5SamuelHuntington,"TransnationalOrganizations,"WorldPolitics, 25 (April 1973): 338-368.


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Thesecond image reversed 885Late industrialization and centralized state control

One of the most well-known of these is Alexander Gerschenkron's amousessay "Economic Backwardness n HistoricalPerspective."6Gerschenkron'sar-gumentgoes, briefly, as follows: the economic andpolitical requirements f coun-tries which industrializeearly, when they have few competitorsand simple, low-capitaltechnology, aredifferentfromthe requirementsof those which industrializewhencompetitionalreadyexists andindustryhas become highly complex, massive,andexpensive. The moreadvanced he worldeconomy, the greater he entrycosts.Paying those costs requiresgreatercollective mobilization,which in turnrequiresgreatercentralcoordination.Societies which, priorto industrialization,developedstrongcentral nstitutionswill find these institutionsuseful if they attempt o catchup with "early" industrializers.The first industrializer,Britain, enjoyed a congruence between the liberalcharacter f its society andthe relativelysimplenatureof economicdevelopment nthe first stageof the industrial evolution n the eighteenthcentury.The society hadweak or nonexistentguilds which were unable to preventthe introductionof newpractices.It hadan abundantaborsupplyto be pulledoff the landintofactoriesanda commerciallyorientedaristocracyandmiddleclass, bothwith sharpeyes for newways for finding profits. Its navy was able to corralworld markets.Its state wasstrongenoughto support hatnavy andto maintainorderat home, withoutcurtailingadventuresomenessand profit seeking even when, as with enclosures, thesethreatened ocial stability.Industrywas at the textile stage, in its first incarnation:innovationwas small-scale, relatively individualistic, and dependenton artisans;capitalrequirements ndorganizational equirementswere low andeasily mobilizedby marketforces.7In the eighteenthcentury,Germansociety couldnot imitatethis model. Politi-cal fragmentation imited demand-pull.Strong guilds inhibited innovation. Theregime in the land acrosswhatbecame Germanyvariedconsiderably,but in mostparts,the peasants,while lackingthe freedomsof theirEnglishcounterparts, ouldneverthelessnotbe drivenoff it. The middleclass was of a traditional omposition:lawyers, civil servants,teachers,traders,all little inclinedtoward ndustrialnnova-tion. The aristocracyvaried considerably. In the east the gentry were profit-oriented,but soughtto maketheirmoneyfromthe landand relatedactivitiessuchasbrewing,andwerequitedisinclinedto invest in new activitieswhichmightthreatenthe hegemony of farming. While the Germanstate did not exist, local ones did.

'AlexanderGerschenkron,"Economic Backwardness n Historical Perspective," in EconomicBack-wardness n HistoricalPerspective (Cambridge:HarvardU.P., 1963). See JamesKurth'svery brilliantextensionof Gershenkron, ombining his withother lines of reasoning,"The PoliticalConsequencesofthe ProductCycle: IndustrialHistoryandComparativePolitics," InternationalOrganization forthcomn-ing) and his equallybrilliantessay "Delayed DevelopmentandEuropeanPolitics" (mimeo, 1977) partof which will appearas an essay in a forthcomingvolume on LatinAmerica, edited by David Collier,sponsoredby the JointCommittee on LatinAmericanStudies of the Social Science ResearchCouncil.7E.J.Hobsbawm,PidustryandEmpire(Baltimore:Penguin, 1970); D.J. Landes, The UnboundProm-etheus (Oxford: OxfordU.P., 1969).


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886 InternationalOrganizationThesehadvery strongtraditionsof stateactivity,especiallystate-directed conomicactivity.8Over a century later, some of these liabilities became advantages.When theindustrialrevolution moved from textiles to iron and steel to chemicals, fromputting-outsmall spinningjennys and handlooms to gigantic factories, blast fur-naces, mines and so on, capitalrequirementskyrocketed.Organizationandcoordi-nation becamecriticalcomponentsof productivity.The corporatecharacterof Ger-man society, at first a hindrance, now became a help. Once a certain level oftechnologywas reached,it was no longer necessaryto become like England n orderto copy her. Banksand the state organized very rapid industrializationn a highlycentralizedway withoutparallel n Britain.This sortof centralized tate corporatismwas strongly rewardedby internationalmarkets.Germanysurgedahead of Britainby the turnof the century.While Gerschenkron'sarticledeals only with the late nineteenthcentury,it ispossible to extendthe argumentquitewidely. BarringtonMooredoes so in suggest-ing thatbourgeois democracy, fascism, and communismare successive modes ofmodernization,ratherthan options available to any given countryat a particularmoment. Moore ties the consequencesof "lateness" more explicitly to fascism.The very configurationwhich made it possible for Germanyand Japan,and to alesser extent Italy, to catch up to Britain so rapidly(the survivalof classes, institu-tions, and values from a preindustrial,anticonstitutionalist ra), also made thosecountriesmorevulnerable o fascism. Moore thenextrapolates o the peasant-basedrevolutionsof Russia and China:by the time theywere drawn ntothe worldsystemof states and competition, things had proceededeven farther:even the German-Japanesemodel was no longer appropriate.The landlord-industrialist-bureaucratalliancewas too weak in relationto the peasantryand the nascentproletariatwhichcould be mobilized underthe conditionsof extreme pressurebrought aboutby theWorld Wars and capitalistpenetration.By the twentiethcentury,autonomousde-velopmentrequiredautarchy;politically the only base for securing such a policywas a mass one, requiringa disciplinedpartyto overthrowthe old elites. Mooresketches out the bones of this argumentall too briefly:

To a verylimitedextentthese threetypes-bourgeois revolutionculminat-ing in the Westernform of democracy,conservative revolutions from aboveendingin fascism, andpeasantrevolutions eadingto communism-may con-stitute alternativeroutes and choices. They are much more clearly successivehistoricalstages. As such, they display a limited determinate elation to eachother. The methodsof modernization hosenin one countrychangethe dimen-sions of the problem for the next countries who take the step, as Veblenrecognized when he coined the now fashionable term, "the advantagesofbackwardness." Withoutthe priordemocraticmodernizationof England,the

8F. Carsten, The Origins of Prussia (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1968); T. Hamerow, Revolution,Restoration, Reaction (Princeton:PrincetonU.P., 1958); J.H. Clapham,Economic Development ofFrance and Germany,4th edition (Cambridge:CambridgeU.P., 1935).


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Thesecond image reversed 887reactionarymethodsadopted n GermanyandJapanwould scarcely have beenpossible. Withoutboth the capitalistand reactionaryexperiences, the com-munist method would have been somethingentirelydifferent, if it had comeintoexistence at all.... Althoughtherehavebeen certaincommonproblems nthe constructionof industrial ocieties, the taskremainsa continuallychangingone. The historicalpreconditionsof each majorpoliticalspecies differ sharplyfrom the others.9Gerschenkron's deas have also found resonancein studies of LatinAmerica.AlbertHirschman, n a well-known articleon import-substitutingndustrialization,finds both parallels and differencesbetween Latin America's "late late develop-ment" and the German-Japanesemodel: "lateness" may not correlatewith vigor-

ous growth, high concentration,and strong government n a linear way; in somerespects, the curve is "backward-bending": fter a certainpoint, lateness leads tosporadicgrowth,anderraticcentraldirection.1IDrawingon Hirschman,GuillermoO'Donnelloffers an explanationof the spreadof dictatorship cross Latin America.These 'bureaucratic uthoritarian'egimes, he suggests, derive from a crisis in theimport-substituting trategy of developmentswhose failures induce diverse pres-sures which in turn provokeharsh political techniques for their control.11In some fascinatingrecent work on "Latin Europe," James Kurthmakes abrilliantsynthesis of Gershenkronianeasoningandotherconcepts drawn romsuchdiverse authorsas RaymondVernon (the productcycle), JosephSchumpeter(theepoch-making nnovation),and Max Weber (types of authority),in the service ofspeculations about the distinctive features of politics common to Portugal,Spain,Italy, Greeceandthe countriesof LatinAmerica. As with other"late developers,"politics in each of these countries s stronglyaffectedby thejuxtapositionof prein-dustrialand industrialclasses; the alternationbetween liberal and authoritarianformsderives in partfrom thatmixture. Unlike the "earlier" late developers, theSouthEuropeancountries face an even moreevolved intemationaleconomic struc-ture, one in which certainforms of industrialactivityaresloughed off by the mostadvancedcountries,or more precisely, by corporationsseeking lower labor costs.9BarringtonMoore, Jr., Social Originsof DictatorshipandDemocracy (Boston:Little, Brown, 1966),pp. 413-44. For a critique of Moore directed at the failure to develop sufficiently an "intersocialperspective,"see ThedaSkocpol, "A CriticalReview of BarringtonMoore'sSocial Originsof Dictator-ship and Democracy," Politics and Society (Fall 1973): 1-34."0AlbertHirschman, "The Political Economy of Import Substituting Industrialization n LatinAmerica," in A Bias for Hope (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1971), pp. 85-123, and "The Turnto Authoritarianismn LatinAmericaandthe Search or ItsEconomicDeterminants, in theforthcomingvolume on Latin Americaedited by David Collier, and "A GeneralizedLinkage Approach o Develop-ment, with Special Reference to Staples," EconomicDevelopmentand CulturalChange, 25 (Supple-ment 1977): 67-98."Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernizationand Bureaucratic Authoritarianism Berkeley: University ofCalifornia, Institute or International tudies, Politics of Modernization-eries, no. 9, 1973) and "Re-flections on the GeneralTendencies of Change in Bureaucratic-Authoritariantates," LatinAmericanResearchReview, forthcoming.


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888 InternationalOrganizationThe systemwhirls like a fast merry-go-round: taly, Greece, Spain, or Portugalcanleap on when certain types of manufacturing avor their mix of labor supply andorganizationalskills but they lack the maturedstrengthto hold on for good, andconsequently face the constant danger of being thrown off. This situation alsoconstrainspolitics, pushingand pulling towardand away from liberalism.'2For this groupof authorswith whomI amassociatingGerschenkron' notionoflate development, political outcomes within countries are stronglyaffectedby thecharacterof the worldeconomy at the time in which they attempt ndustrialization.Because of competitionandchangesin technology, each entrant nto the "industri-alizationrace" faces a new game, with alteredrules. For all theseauthors,however,the impactof each international ituationcannot be determinedwithoutknowledgeof the internalcharacter f each society. Gerschenkron howed how certaincharac-teristics of German and Russian society became advantages as the economychanged. Moore, Hirschman, O'Donnell, and Kurthall stress internalfactors aswell: the characterof social developmentat the pointat which the country s drawninto the international conomy. This, amongotherpoints, differentiates hemfromthe next group, the "dependencia"or "center-periphery" heorists.Theories of dependencia, core-periphery, and imperialism

A second groupof theoristsattributes ven greater mportance o the interna-tional political economy in shaping political developmentthan does what I havelabeled the Gerschenkronians.This diverse set of writers(who will be called thedependencia heorists,even if they are more well known in association with someotherrubric,such as imperialismor core-periphery heories)strives harder o avoid"reductionism"to the level of internalpolitics; indeed, theymay be the only groupto stay at the international ystem level, or to come close to doing so. Like theGerschenkronians, he dependencia theorists stress the non-repeatablenature ofdevelopment, the new rules for each follower, the importanceof competition. Incontrast with them, though less so than the liberals, the dependencia theoristsattribute ess weight to purely national, internalfactors such as specific historicaltraditions, nstitutions,economicforms, and politics. They are also gloomier aboutthe possibilities and benefits of the process.What the dependenciatheorists stress is the matrix set up by the advancedcapitalistcountries,a system of pressureswhich sharplyconstrain, indeed, whollydetermine he options available to developing countries. Since capital, organizationtechnology, and military preponderanceare in the hands of the core, the corecountries are able to set the termsunder which skill, capital, and markets will beprovided o theperiphery.Thecore forces others intosubservience: uppliersof rawmaterials, purchasersof finished goods, manufacturers f whateverthe core allowsthem to do. The developing countriesare unable to allocateresources accordingto12JamesKurth, "PatrimonialAuthority, Delayed Development,and Mediterranean olitics," Ameri-can Political Science Association (New Orleans, 1973) and "Political Consequences of the ProductCycle," and "Delayed Developmentand EuropeanPolitics."


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The second image reversed 889their internalneeds, following some alternativevision of development.As a resultthey are locked into a structurewherethe benefits of growthaccruedisproportion-ately to the core. Countries n the perpherydevelop dual economies: an expandingmodern sector tied to the needs of the core, and a stagnant, miserable sector,irrelevant o the needs of international apitalism, hence abandonedand ignored.The political consequence of this system for the periphery s some form ofimperialism:outrightcolonialism for Lenin andHobson, where the peripheriesareruled outrightby the core powers;neocolonialism for GunderFrank,'3where theperipherieshave formal sovereigntybut are in fact prisonersof a structurewhichthey cannot affect.None of the theorists speculates very farabout how much variance n politicalform these relationshipspermit dependentregimes to have. They offer no expla-nations as to why some countries in the neocolonial position are more liberalthanothers, some moreauthoritarian,ome civilian, some military. Generally hey see atendency towardauthoritarianismn the neocolonial countries, but of two differenttypes. Elite-based authoritarianismwith the elite of the comprador,or foreign-allied, foreign-dependent ariety) suppressespopularpressure or a greatershareofthe wealth, or for a different type of development (Brazil, Chile, Argentina,Uruguay). Popular-basedauthoritarianismala Cuba mobilizes the mass supportneededto withdraw rom the internationalapitalisteconomy altogetherandpursuea socialist or communistdevelopmentstrategy.

Some of the authors in this group see political consequences for the corecountries as well: Hobson and Lenin, of course, saw imperialismas the export ofinternalconflicts-falling profits andincreasingworkerpressure ead the capitaliststo invest overseas.Hobson thought ncome redistribution ould solve theproblemofdomestic demand but doubtedthat it could be realized. Lenin was certain that itcould not. Again, the rangeof variance n politicalformsallowed core countries snot at all clear:neither Lenin nor Hobson derives from his theories of imperialismany systematicexplanationof parliamentary s. authoritarian evelopment.The most ambitiousattempt o derivespecific political forms fromthe interna-tionaleconomy is thatrecently offered by ImmanuelWallerstein."4Whilehis argu-mentthus far has been worked out in detailonly for the period 1450-1650, Waller-stein intends to apply it through to the present and is at work on the subsequentvolumes. Very briefly his argument s this: the development of capitalism in thefifteenthcentury entailed the formation of a core, semi-periphery,and periphery.Eachpole had specific political requirements.Each countryhad therefore o gener-ate the forms which corresponded o its place in the system. The core economiesrequiredstrongstates, the peripheriesweak ones, while the semi-peripherieswerehybrids. ThusFranceandEnglandwere strong as befits the core, while Poland andpre-GreatElectorPrussia were weak as befits the periphery.

13AndreGunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment n Latin America (New York: MonthlyReview Press, 1967).14ImmanuelWallerstein, TheModern WorldSystem (New York: The Academic Press, 1974).


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890 InternationalOrganizationWallerstein'streatment s complex: it has vices and virtues about which I andmany others have written.15 For the purposeat hand, the importanceof his discus-sion lies in his insistence on a "world-system" perspective. Wallerstein sees his

work as a break with state-centeredaccounts of economic and political develop-ment. Commercializedagriculture,early manufacturing,and the factory systemcannot be understood n disaggregated,national terms. From the beginning, na-tional economies grew in interactionwith each other. The analyst must seek there-fore to understand he propertiesof the system as a whole. Differentiation s one ofthe centralpropertiesof that system, one which confirms the necessity of the worldviewpoint since its effects can only be detected from such a perspective. For Wal-lerstein the very essence of capitalism ies in that sort of differentiation: he opera-tion of marketforces leads to the accentuationof differences, not their reduction.Rather slight differences at an early point may explain why one area or countryrather hananother akes a particular lacein the system-why for exampleWesternrather han EasternEurope became the core. Once the system begins to articulateitself, it greatly magnifies the consequencesof the early differences.Also political differentiationmust, for Wallerstein, be viewed from worldsystem to country,not vice versa. The international ystem is the basic unit to beanalyzed, ratherthan units of power which come into being from some processconceived of quite separatelyfrom the operationof the system. States are theconcreteprecipitates rom the system, not the componentunits of it. Perhaps t isnot accidentalthatthis argumenthas been enunciatedby a sociologist, rather hanby a political scientistor more particularlyan international elationsspecialist. Itamply partakesof Durkheim,as well as Marx,andnot, as the international elationsspecialist would do, of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant. Durkheim derives the indi-vidual from society: he is as individuallydifferentiated rom others as the societyallows, accordingto its division of labor. Similarly, Wallersteinderives the statefromthe system. The internationaldivision of labordetermineshow much variancein political forms is allowed the componentunits. Position in the division of labordetermines he typeof form: states at the core must be strong;statesat theperipherymust be weak.Wallerstein wavers from this resolute application of the world-systemframeworkat times. Whenhe takesup the explanationof why "coreness" requiresstrength,he notes that the core states needed governments capable of defendingthemselvesmilitarilyagainst rivals, of imposingthemselves on certainmarketsandsourcesof materials,andof creating argeuniform markets nternally.The reason-ing is thencircular: trongstates led to a core position, not a core positionto strongstates. Thatthere was interactionmakes sense but reduces the explanatory everageprovidedby thegeneral argument.The explanationof strengthcan no longerbe socleanly connected to a system-level argument. Some exploration of internal15PeterGourevitch,"The IntemationalSystemandRegimeFormation:A CriticalReview of Andersonand Wallerstein," ComparativePolitics (April 1978):419-438. See AmericanJournalof Sociology 82

(March 1977) for reviewsof Andersonby MichaelHechter and Wallersteinby Theda Skocpol, and myreview for a large numberof other citations.


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The second image reversed 891dynamics becomes indispensable,which pushes us back to the Gerschenkroniancamp. From the world-systempointof view, it is hard to see why certaincountriesdiverge politically: why, for example, Poland and Prussia become bywords forweak and strongstates respectivelywhile having very similareconomicsystems andsimilar positions in the internationaldivision of labor. And why Holland, Britain,andFrance were so differentin the seventeenth century, when all were part of thecore. Again, the answerdirectsus back to domestic politics, aboutwhich I will saymore in the next section of the paper.In order to dramatize he differences, I have focused on dependenciatheoristswho stress heavily internationalconstraints. Not all writers associated with thatschool do so to an equal degree. To the extent that dependenciatheorists payattention o internal orces in explainingregime type and theGershenkronians tressexternalones, the boundarybetween the two camps disintegrates.FerdinandEn-rique Cardosoperhapsbest exemplifies the junctureof these two modes of reason-ing. 6The liberal development school

Liberal theories of economic development offer a very apolitical analysis insome ways. They also attribute onsiderable mportance o the international con-omy. The relatively free play of world market-forcespromotesgrowth andwealthfor the investorsand recipientsalike. As a country s drawn nto the world economy,the laws of supply and demand and comparative advantage initially give it the"supplier-buyer"role suggestedby the previous groups of theorists.But the coun-try does not remain here. Foreigncapitaltouches off a series of reactions eadingtoeverhigher evels of industrialization.There are no inherentobstaclesto therealiza-tionof parityor "maturity."The interactionof two unequalbodies leads eventuallyto their homogenization, to the elimination of the inequality;this is, as MichaelHechter has aptly analyzed, a "diffusion theory."'7In sharpcontrastwith the Gerschenkronians nd the dependencia heorists,theliberalstreatall developmenttrajectoriesas similar.All developers recapitulate hesamemodel, thatof the initialcountry.Thepresenceof new technologyandcompe-tition is an advantage,as it allows the latecomers to benefit from the skills and

'6Ferdinand nriqueCardoso, "AssociatedDependentDevelopment:Theoreticaland Practical mplica-tions," in Alfred Stepan, ed., AuthoritarianBrazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), and"Industrialization,Dependency and Power in Latin America," Berkeley Journal of Sociology, XVII(1972). The most frequently cited of Cardoso's untranslatedworks is that written with E. Faleto,Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina (Santiago: II Pes, 1967). An interesting "dependent-development" literatureon non-ThirdWorld countrieshas also developed, such as that on Canada.SeeTom Naylor, "The Third CommercialEmpire of the St. Lawrence," in Gary Teeple, ed., Economicsand the National Question (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 1-42; Jeanne Laux,"Global Interdependenceand State Intervention," in Brian Tomlin, ed. Canada's Foreign Policy:AnalysisandTrends Toronto:Methuen, 1978), pp. 110-135; KariLevitt, TheSilent Surrender Toronto:Macmillan, 1970)."7For n excellent discussion of liberal "diffusion" and "dependencia" or colonial models, seeMichael Hechter, Internal Colonialism (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1976).


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892 InternationalOrganizationsurplus of theirpredecessors.The question to ask accordingto the liberals, is notwhether the relationshipbetween core and periphery s unequal, but what wouldhave happened o the latterwithoutany contactwith the former; o whichthe liberalreply is that the underdevelopedcountries would have remained trapped n theircondition. Of politics, liberal theorists say rather ittle except to deploreefforts tointerferewith market forces.For the other theorists, contactwith the core may indeedbe indispensable,butthe resultsarenot what the liberalsclaim. The natureof the industrializingprocesschanges as the world economy evolves. New conditions requirenew models, newarrangements f people, resources,institutions,politics. There is no inherentreasonwhy latecomersshould develop the institutionsof theirpredecessors whose institu-tions were hardlyuniformanyway).Indeed, there s every reasonto supposethatthepolitical systems of the newcomersmust be different.The liberalsdiffer from theircolleagues in a normativesense as well: they seethe world economy as beneficial to all parties. The Gerschenkronian ensibility ismore gloomy: good or bad, that is the way things are, and it is not clear whatalternatives ealisticallyexist. The dependencia heoristscondemnthe system; manyof them believe alternativesare possible, generally in some form of socialism.The transnational relations, modernization and interdependence school

A fourth category of theorizingabout the impactof the international conomyon domestic politics can be constructedfrom the authors writingon transnationalactorsand modernizationn international elations. The spread of interdependencehas led to the emergenceof a distinctivephase in international elations,discontinu-ous from earlierones for which traditionalmodels of sovereigntywere applicable; nthis new phase, interdependence everely constrainsthe freedomof action of gov-ernments and even affects their internalorganization.18The roots of this outlook in the criticism of the "realist" paradigmare wellknown. Inthemid-sixties the critiqueof realismcenteredon its view of the state as aunitary actor. Graham Allison's article set the pattern for a number of studiesshowingthe conflict amongvariousportionsof the governmentover the determina-tion of policy."9In the seventies, the centralityof government tself in the formula-

18RobertKeohane and Joseph Nye, eds., TransnationalRelations and World Politics (Cambridge:HarvardU.P., 1971), and Power and Interdependence Boston: Little Brown, 1977); EdwardMorse,Modernizationand the Transformation f InternationalRelations (New York: Free Press, 1976). Forcriticism, see KennethWaltz, "The Myth of NationalInterdependence," n CharlesP. Kindleberger,ed., The InternationalCorporation(Cambridge:MIT Press, 1970)."9Graham llison, "ConceptualModels and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political ScienceReview LXIII (September 1970). Not surprisingly,these debates relate to changes in reality:realismdominatedin a period of war andmilitary confrontations; he easing of Cold War tensions and greaterfluidityin international elationsmeant he system was less plausibly constraining,hence thedisaggregat-ing of the state through bureaucraticanalysis; the salience of internationaleconomic issues in theseventies led to even furtherdisaggregation,andeven furtherdowngradingof militaryandstate-centeredviews.


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The second image reversed 893tion of foreign policy was the question. Nye and Keohane, Karl Kaiser, EdwardMorse andothersstressed he growing roleof transnational,nternational ndmulti-nationalactors, and global, non-militaryforces such as technology, trade, com-munications,andculture,in shapingpolicy. Stateswere depictedas losing controlover importantssue areas,especiallyeconomic ones. Insteadof explainingforeignpolicy, which is implicitly state-centered, he emphasis is on explaining "interna-tionalregimes" in variousissue areas, andnot just the international ystem, whichessentiallystressesmilitarypower. Countriesdifferin these issue areasaccording otheir "sensitivity" and "vulnerability"in various domains. In their most recentwork, Nye and Keohane call this model "complex interdependence"and exploretheconditions underwhich it, rather hanotherparadigms, s themost applicable.20Complexinterdependence lters domestic structuresbecauseit entails shifts inpowerawayfromcertaingovernmentalnstitutions owardotherones, or even shiftsoutside the government o privateactors,or to international ctors, or otherforeignactors.Policy becomes theoutcomeof an immense swirl of forces, in which piecesof governmentbecomecomponentsalongwithcompanies, unions, pressuregroups,international rganizations, echnologyand so on. Patternsexist in these outcomes;the system is not totally anarchic,or at least, unlike the liberals, most of theseauthorsdo not wish it to be.In theirlatestbook, Nye andKeohanehave become morecautious. "Complexinterdependence"s not the paradigmof the present,but one model amongothers,whose applicabilitymust be empiricallydeterminedcase by case. KeohaneandNyeaccept quitereadilythattraditionalmodels become more relevant on many issues,especially those involving conditions of considerabletension between countries,since military capability partakes more of the realist paradigm. The gains inapplicabilitywhich come from these more limited claims are welcome but theyreducethe uniquenessof the interdependence iterature.The interdependence rgumenthas been taken farthestby EdwardMorsein hisrecentbook, Modernizationand Interdependence.2"Morse sees the two as linked:modern societies are interdependentones. Hence modernitythroughinterdepen-dencehas altered he natureof the internationalystem so much thatthe "anarchy"model of sovereignunits loses its relevance. All modern societies in interdependentsituationsacquirecertain common political characteristics uch as strongwelfarepressures,bureaucratization,egitimationproblemswhich increasetherelevance ofdomesticpolitics in foreignpolicy-makingcompared o the classic period of diplo-macy. Thus the internationaland the domestic spheres become more importantwhile the intermediateevel, nationalgovernment,diminishes.

The neo-mercantilists and state-centered MarxistsIn strongcontrast o the interdependence-modernizationiteratureare the writ-ings which assert the importanceof the state in shapingresponsesto international20Nyeand Keohane, Power and Interdependence.2"Morse,Modernizationand the Transformation f InternationalRelations.


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894 International Organizationforces. This literaturedoes not deny that the international conomic system con-strains states, nor that the system affects the content of the policies which theyformulate. Ratherit challenges the tendency of some liberals, transnationalists,Marxists, and dependencistas o make the state witheraway.Theleading neomercantilistormulations RobertGilpin'sU.S. PowerandtheMultinationalCorporation.22He arguesthatgovernmentsof states have and assertsome notion of national nterest, be it power, stability, welfare, security, which isnot reducible o the goals of any one groupor coalition. Thesegovernmentshavethecapability of acting in a coherent way, at least some of the time, in orderto maketheir views prevail over those of other members of the polity. When the statechooses to act, its power is greater hanthatof any subunit, includingsuch transna-tional actors as multinational orporations.In general, whenever statesasserttheirviews they are able to prevail over internationalorganizations. Interdependencederives from state policy, not the otherway around; hatis, it exists becausestatesallow it to exist. Should states refuse to do so, the constraining quality of thatinterdependencewould be broken.All of these propositionsare truerof some statesthanof others andvary accordingto the historicalperiod. "International egimes"express the configurationof power. If a hegemonic power exists, the internationaleconomy will be open; in a multipolarworld, economic nationalismand protec-tionism are more likely to prevail. Statesare constrainedby the international co-nomic system if they are not the hegemonic power. When there is no hegemonicpower then all states are constrainedby the system. Nonetheless, for the neo-mercantilists,the system leaves some latitudeof policy response. At least for thelarger states, the determinationof thatresponse, lies ultimatelynot in the hands ofprivate actorsbut in those of the state.Marxist writing on the internationaleconomy is generally criticized for aneconomic reductionistview of the role of politics and institutions.This is oftentrueof the most frequentlycited literature:Magdoff, Baran, and Sweezy.23 Thesewriterstend to derivepoliticalbehaviorfrom strictlyconstructedeconomicexigen-cies: the drive to counteractfalling profits, or to obtain resources critical to theoperationof the defense technologyof capitalist states, or to exportdomestic con-tradictions.The state is the instrumentof the capitalistclass.Some recent Marxist literaturehas sought to set out a far less reductionistargumentabout the role of the state. The state is seen as having considerableautonomyfrom any one sectorof the capitalistclass or from any narrowly ormu-latedeconomicgoal suchasprocuringa particular esourceorprotectinga particularmarket. The state seeks to preservethe capitalistsystem, a tenetwhich makestheseauthorsMarxists,butin order o do so it mayhave to do a greatmany things specific22RobertGilpin, US Power and the MultinationalCorporation New York:Basic Books, 1975);Gilpin,"Three Models of the Future," InternationalOrganization, 29 (Winter 1975): 37-60; Steven Krasner,"State Power andthe Structure f InternationalTrade," WorldPolitics XXVII (April 1976):317-347,is not clear as to the balance betweeneconomic and militarydimensions in the definitionof a hegemonicpower.23HarryMagdoff, The Age of Imperialism(New York:Monthly Review Press, 1969); Paul BaranandPaul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968).


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The second image reversed 895sectors of the capitalist class do not like: welfare, nationalization,governmentintervention,unionization.Sometimesthe capitalistshave to be saved from them-selves. Such "counter-class saviors" include FDR and Bismarck.

So far, these state-centeredMarxists have not looked much at foreign policy.Instead they have concentratedon an explication of the limits of reformisminadvanced capitalistsocieties. Insofar as this writing touches on foreign policy, itresonates quite harmonically with neo-mercantilistwritings. Both attributegreatimportance o the international conomy, with the mercantilists tressingpoweras adeterminantof that economy, andthe Marxistsseeing the economy as basic. Bothsee the international conomy as a powerfulforce field acting upon each country.Both see some leeway left to each countryby that field, some range of choice. Thechoice is madepolitically, througha process in which the stateplays an importantrole.The most notable example of the influence of these ideas on internationalrelations writing is Franz Schurmann'sThe Logic of WorldPower.24 Schurmannpays attentionto variables such as ideas, ideology, vision, bureaucratic ivalries,national traditions, group fragmentation, which are usually stressed by non-Marxists, but he seeks to relate these factors to the realm of interests, to eco-nomically groundedstruggles for advantageamongdifferentclasses and segmentsof classes or industries.Thus he seeks to specify the isomorphismof alternativeviews of America's world role (isolationism, internationalism,mperialism),withdiffering segments of American capitalism and to the process of acquiringandkeeping politicalpower.His view is not reductionistbecause none of these views issimply the epiphenomenonof class interest;politics and institutional tructuremat-ter greatly.The difference between the neomercantilistsand the state-centeredMarxistslies not in theirview of the autonomyof the state, in whichthey resembleeach othermorethandoes either of the otherschools. Rather t lies in theirview of the endsserved by the state (national interestfor the neo-mercantilists,partial nterestsforthe state-centeredMarxists) and in their conceptualizationof the domestic forceswith whichthe state must deal (groupsfor the former, classes for the latter).And ofcoursethe two differ normatively.The neo-mercantilistsdo not necessarilydisap-proveof the international conomic order: heirmajorconcern tends to be with itsstability(the need for leadership)and withthe preservationof nationalvalues otherthan those desired by certain powerful interestswithin the state. Thus they canmarshalcriticism of oil companieswith which the Marxistswould takelittle excep-tion.25The state-centeredMarxistsvalue stability less and quite drasticchange inboth the capitalistanddeveloping countriesrathermore.On the role of the state, the interestingconflict at presentis thatbetween theneo-mercantilists,state-centeredMarxists, and Gerschenkronians n one side andthe liberals, the interdependencistas,and the economistic Marxistswithin the de-pendenciaschool on the other.The lattergrouptendsto favoranalyseseithertoward

24Franz churmann,The Logic of WorldPower.25StevenKrasner,"The Great Oil Sheikdown,"Foreign Policy 13 (Winter 1973-74): 123-138.


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896 InternationalOrganizationdisaggregationof the state or towards reductionism,eitherup to the internationallevel or down to some otherprocesssuch as economics;in all cases the state withersaway.

The interdependence chool and the dependencia argumentbear a strongre-semblancein anotherway: both seek to give an accountof the international ystemand to derive state responsefrom it. The difference between them, which will befurtherdiscussed in the final section, is thedatingof this interdependence.ForNye,Keohane, andMorse, it is a partof modernity, especially since World WarII. ForWallerstein t is at least half a millennium old.The internationalstate system

The argumentswhich imputegreat force to the international conomic systemin shaping he character f domestic political structures avebeenlookedat thus far.The other majoraspect of the international ystem to which similarcapabilitycan beattributeds the international tate system. The anarchyof the international nvi-ronmentposes a threat o stateswithin it: the threatof being conquered, occupied,annihilatedor made subservient.The obverse of the threat s opportunity:power,dominion, empire, glory, "total" security. This state of war induces states toorganizethemselvesinternallyso as to meet these externalchallenges. Waris likethe market: t punishes some forms of organizationand rewards others. The vul-nerability of states to such pressures is not uniform since some occupy a moreexposed position than others. Hence, the pressurefor certainorganizational ormsdiffers. The explanation ordifferentialpolitical development n this line of reason-ing is found by pointing to differing externalenvironmentsconcerning nationalsecurity.The classic exampleof this argument andfor manyotherargumentsas well) isthe contrastbetweenEnglandand Prussia.As the EnglishChannelsharply essenedthe chances of invasion, Englandwas spared henecessityof constitutinga standingarmyand mobilizing national resources to sustain it. Instead, it was inducedintomaintaininga navy, an instrumentof war with special characteristicsregardingconstitutionaldevelopment. A navy cannot be used, at least not as easily as anarmy, for domestic repression.England's international ecurityenvironment husfacilitated the developmentof a liberal, constitutionalpolitical order.Conversely, Prussia'sgeopolitical location was very vulnerable.It was sur-roundedby a flat plain, here and there carved by easily fordablerivers. There wasnothingnaturalaboutits borders, ndeed nothing naturalabout thevery existence ofthe country.It emerged n responseto war, which also shaped ts internalorganiza-tion. In the seventeenthcentury, the GreatElectorof Prussiapersuaded he Estatesto forma standingarmywith autonomous inancingunderhis directcontrol, with-out supervision by representativebodies. This turned into the garrisonstate. Thecontinual mportanceof militaryconcernsgave the armyandthe Crown fargreaterinfluence thanwould have been the case had security-power ssues mattered ess.The consequences for Germanpolitical development and Germandemocracy aretoo well-known to need repeating.


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Thesecond image reversed 897Security arguments

A classic statementof this argumentcan be found in Otto Hintze's "MilitaryOrganizationand the Organizationof the State."26 "All state organizationwasoriginally militaryorganization,organization or war."27... in short, power politics and balance-of-powerpolitics created the foun-dations of modem Europe: the international ystem as well as the absolutistsystem of governmentand the standingarmy of the Continent.England, withher insularsecurity, was not directly exposed to the dangerof these wars. Sheneeded no standingarmy,at least not one of Continentalproportions,but onlya navy which served commercial interests as much as war aims. In conse-quenceshe developedno absolutism.Absolutism andmilitarismgo togetheronthe Continent ust as do self-government and militia in England. The mainexplanationfor the difference in the way political and military organizationdevelopedbetweenEnglandandthe Continent-one which becamemore andmore distinctafterthe middle of the seventeenthcentury-lies in thedifferencein the foreign situation.28

Hintze is quite explicitly critical of analyses of political development which focusexclusively on internalrelationships.For the purpose of understanding hose inter-nalrelationshipshe is most sympathetic o class analysis but he finds it insufficient,or underdetermining:

If we want to find out about the relations between militaryorganizationandthe organizationof the state, we must direct our attentionparticularly otwo phenomena,which conditioned the real organizationof the state. Theseare, first, the structureof social classes, and second, the externalorderingofthe states--theirpositions relativeto each other,andtheiroverall positionin theworld.It is one-sidedexaggerationand thereforefalse to consider class conflictthe only driving force in history. Conflict between nations has been far moreimportant; nd throughout he ages pressurefrom within has been a determin-ing influence on international tructure.29

Hintze cites approvinglyHerbertSpencer's interestin the importanceof militaryand industrialpursuits n shapingsocial organization,but he criticizes Spencerforbeing too optimisticaboutthe spreadof commerceand industry.In the four thousandyearsof humanhistorythat we look backover todaytherehas beenunquestionably great ncrease n commercialactivitybutreally

no diminution n the readinessof states for war.3026OttoHintze, "Military Organization nd the Organizationof the State," in TheHistoricalEssays ofOtto Hintze, Felix Gilbert, ed. (New York: Oxford, 1975), pp. 178-215.27Ibid.,p. 181.28Ibid.,p. 199.29Ibid.,p. 183.30Ibid.,p. 130.


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898 International OrganizationThis sentence is full of meaning for current discussions of interdependenceandtransnational elations.A recent brilliantly ormulatedversion of this argumentcan be found in PerryAnderson's Lineages of the Absolutist State.31 Anderson seeks to explain theemergenceof absolutismin WesternandEasternEurope duringthe sixteenthandseventeenthcenturies.In the West, he argues, absolutismwas a responseto a crisisof feudal relations generatedfrom within. Following the contractionof populationand economy in the fourteenthcentury, feudal economic relations started o crum-ble: labordues were commutedto rents, traderevived, the use of landrationalized,and so on. These developmentsunderminedhe aristocracy'sholdoverlife, particu-larly its dominance at the village level. Anderson sees absolutism as a means ofprotectingthe aristocracyby recasting power upward.The centralizedmonarchiesreestablished he nobility's privileged position, albeit in new ways and at the priceof some concessions. The crown's new relationship o the nobles andothergroupsallowed it in turn some autonomy; it was able to undertakevarious kinds ofmodernizing asks which the nobility might neverhave done on its own. Andersonthus fits in with the neo-Marxists discussed above who root the autonomyof thestate in class relationships.In the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturies, the crisis inWesternEurope,andthe responses, were fundamentally ndogenousdevelopments.In EasternEurope, Andersoncontends, absolutismwas exogenously induced.Market orces strengthened eudal labor relationships, nstead of undermining hemas in the West. Had this been the only stimulus,the aristocracywould have had noneed for strong central government. Instead, the East was continually involved inwar. The more advanced states of the West (Spain, France, Sweden, Holland,England), plus the great Turkishinvasions from Central Asia, engaged the statesandterritoriesof EasternEurope n aninternational tate-systemwhichforced themto adapt or sink. Prussia, Austria, and Russia generated centralized, absolutistregimes capable of fielding armies. Poland did not and was partitionedby thesethree neighborsin the eighteenth century.Other recentexamplesof this type of argument nclude Stein Rokkan'sessay"Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building,'32 and Samuel Finer's"State Building, State Boundaries,and BorderControl."33Rokkanconnects hisParsonianmodel of state development34with Albert Hirschman's"Exit andVoice"paradigm35o a wide varietyof countriesand situations.Finerrelates these conceptsexplicitlyto the cases of FranceandEngland.Francedevelopedabsolutismas a wayof preventing he constant mpulseto exit. England acked these centrifugal enden-cies and was thereforeable to allow a greatervoice through parliamentarism.31PerryAnderson,Passages from Antiquity o Feudalism andLineagesof the AbsolutistState (LondonNew Left Books, 1974).32SteinRokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and State-Building," in Charles Tilly, ed., TheFormation of National States in WesternEurope (Princeton:PrincetonU.P., 1975), pp. 562-600.33SamuelFiner, "State Building, StateBoundariesandBorderControl,"Social Sciences Information,13 (4/5): 79-126.34SteinRokkan and S.M. Lipset, "Introduction,"Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York:Free Press, 1967).35AlbertHirschman,Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge:HarvardU.P., 1970).


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Thesecond image reversed 899The special nature of foreign relations

Warhas always loomed largein the concernsof political theorists.We usuallyread them as giving models of organized ife within a community, or polis, or state.For some, such as Hobbes, accounts of life withouta sovereign aretakenas modelsof the international ystem. It has always been understoodthat foreign relationsposes specialproblemswithimplications or the organizationof the state.Thepointof Machiavelli's maxims was to help the Prince unite Italy. Bodin's discussion ofsovereigntyconsideredhow to allow theCrownto defendthe state withoutescapingthe rule of law altogether.Defense of the realmwas quintessentially hat functionwhich required a single sovereign; it required speed, authoritativeness,secrecy,comprehensiveness. These attributeswere beyond the reach of representativeas-semblies. Hence, involvement in the international ystem inevitably meant morepowerto the Crown. This was preciselythe argumentput forwardby some Ameri-canisolationists."Foreignentanglements" hreateneddemocracyathomeby upset-ting the balanceof powerin favor of the presidency.The same critiqueof imperialconquests was madein ancient Greece andRome and returned o the United Statesduring the Vietnam War.36State building as foreign policy: territorial compensation

Anotherway the international tatesystem can affect political development sthrough he deliberateactionsof one stateupon another, suchas territorial ompen-sation. Prussia-Germany ose and fell because of this. From the sixteenth to thenineteenthcenturies, Francepromoted ragmentationn CentralEuropeas a meansof resistingHapsburg ncirclement.She wanted no concentrationof powernearherborders.Prussia was one of the beneficiaries of thatpolicy, being weak originallyand farfromthe Rhine. Francegave territory o Prussia n orderto build a counter-weight to Austria, bufferedby Saxony, Hanover, Palatinatecloser to the Frenchborder.Without he territorial rantsgiven atthePeaceof Westphalia, heTreatyofUtrecht,the Peace of Paris, andthe Congressof Vienna, Prussiacould never havebecome the Frankensteinmonster which turned on its benefactor.An unfortunatechoice of allies at key momentsundermined he ability of Bavariaand Saxony tocontest Prussian eadership n the nineteenthcentury. And, quiteobviously, interna-tionalpolitics explainsthe dismemberment f Germanyafter 1945, and the charac-ter of the two regimes which have grown up in the East andthe West.37The strains of foreign involvement

Finally, those argumentsshould be noted which examine the strain that theinternational tate system imposes on domestic society as a whole. This is mostevident in the study of revolution. The English, French, Russian, and Chinese36StanleyHoffmann,Primacy of WorldOrder:AmericanForeign Policy Since the Cold War (NewYork:McGrawHill, 1978).37KarlKaiser,GermanForeign Policy in Transition(London:Oxford U.P., 1968).


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900 InternationalOrganizationRevolutionsall beganwith some internationaldisturbancehat overtaxedthe politi-cal system. For the English, it was the need to fight a war withScotland; n France,involvementin the AmericanRevolution; n Russia, the defeatsof World WarI; forChina, the Japanese nvasion duringWorldWarII. The Civil War was America'snearest equivalentto a revolution n its impact upon society andinstitutions.38Theoutbreakand outcomeof these revolutions s unintelligiblewithoutan examinationof international actors. At present, Israel, Lebanon, and the Arab states offerobvious examples of the impactof these forces.

Part two: domestic structures and the international systemThus far argumentshave been presentedwhich discuss the effect of interna-tional politics on domesticpolitics. While the argumentsdifferwidely in the type ofrelationshipposited, in tightness and plausibility, there is certainly enough tosuggestthatstudentsof comparativepoliticstreatdomestic structureoo much as anindependentvariable, underplayingthe extent to which it and the internationalsystem are partsof an interactivesystem.In this section, I return o the traditionalquestion:which aspect of domesticstructurebest explainshow a countrybehavesin the internationalphere?The onlytype of argumentwhich would render that question unnecessary is one which

derived domestic structurecompletely from the internationalsystem. This is athoroughlynonreductionist pproach in Waltz's language)39 ndargumentsof thattype are not totally convincing. The international ystem, be it in an economic orpolitico-militaryform, is underdetermining.The environment may exert strongpulls but short of actual occupation,some leeway in the responseto thatenviron-ment remains. A country can face up to the competitionor it can fail. Frequentlymore than one way to be successfulexists. A purelyinternational ystem argumentrelies on functional necessity to explain domestic outcomes;this is unsatisfactory,because functional requisitesmay not be fulfilled. Some variancein response toexternalenvironments possible. The explanationof choice amongthe possibilitiesthereforerequiressome examinationof domestic politics.PrussiaandPoland, for example, both occupied similarpositions in relation-ship to world economic forces and similarly vulnerablesecurity positions. The onedevelopeda powerfulmilitaryabsolutismwhich eventually conquered ts linguisticneighbors to form Germany. The other gave rise to the liberum veto, a largeeighteenthcenturyliteratureon defective constitutions,and was partitioned.Thedifferencehas to do with internalpolitics. Thus the formationof regime type andcoalitionpatternrequiresreferenceto internalpolitics.38See he excellent study by Theda Skocpol, "France, Russia, China:A StructuralAnalysis of SocialRevolutions," ComparativeStudiesin SocietyandHistory 18 (April 1976): 175-2 10. See also her bookon revolutionsto be published by OxfordUniversity Press.39KennethWaltz, "Theoryof InternationalRelations." By non-reductionist,Waltz meansan explana-tion of international olitics at the system level, thirdrather hansecond image. HereI amextendingtheword to distinguishbetween endogenousand exogenous explanationsof regime type.


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Thesecond image reversed 901So do most of the categories used in discussing regime type or domesticstructure.The international elationsliterature ontains numerousargumentsaboutthe importanceof domesticstructure.The debatehas centeredaroundwhich aspect

mattersmost: thepresenceandcharacter f bureaucracyKissinger, Allison, Halpe-rin); the pressureof the masses on policy making or the lack of such pressure(Kissinger,Wilson, Lenin);the strengthandautonomyof thestate(Gilpin,Krasner,Katzenstein); he drives of the advancedcapitalisteconomy (Lenin, Magdoff, Ba-ran, and Sweezy); the perceptual set of leaders (Jervis, Steinbrunner,Brecher);nationalstyle (Hoffmann); he logic of industrialdevelopment Kurth);he characterof domestic coalitions (Gourevitch,Katzenstein);the relative weight of transna-tional actors in a given polity (Nye and Keohane); the level of modernization(Morse).40

Having gone throughthe exercise of Part one helps bringout a deficiency inmany of these argumentsorpresent ormulationsof them. Manyargumentsocus onprocess and institutionalarrangementdivorced from politics; on structure n thesense of procedures, separate from the groups and interestswhich work throughpolitics; on the formal propertiesof relationshipsamong groups, ratherthan thecontent of the relations among them; on the characterof decisions (consistency,coherence, etc.) rather han the content of decisions. Somehowpolitics disappears.Clearly,a carefuldefense of suchbroadassertionswould requireanexaminationofeach of the argumentsabout which I am critical.There is no space to do thathere.Instead, I shall consider one example, chosen because it deals with foreign eco-nomicpolicy, anareain whichI have worked. The line of argument o which I referis thatwhichuses as a majorexplanatoryvariablestatestrength "strong states" vs."weak states," or "state-centeredpolicy networks" vs. "society-centeredpolicynetworks").41The strongstate argumentgoes something like this. In societies with strongstates,or state-centered olicy networks,policy-formation orresponds o themodelof unitary government: he state, emanatingfrom the public or some other sover-

40Besidesworks already cited, see: Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in InternationalPolitics (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonU.P., 1976); John Steinbrunner,TheCyberneticTheoryof Decision:New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonU.P., 1974); Michael Brecher,TheForeign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Processes (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1972); MichaelBrecher,Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1975). See also R. HarrisonWagner, "Dissolving the State: ThreeRecent Perspectives on InternationalRelations," InternationalOrganization28 (Summer, 1974): 435-466.41StephenKrasner,Raw Materials Investment and American Foreign Policy (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, forthcoming); Peter Katzenstein, "Introduction"and "Conclusion" to "BetweenPower andPlenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced IndustrialStates," InternationalOrganiza-tion 31 (Autumn 1977) and "InternationalRelations and Domestic Structures:Foreign EconomicPolicies of Advanced Industrial States," International Organization 30 (Winter 1976); StanleyHoffmann,"The State:For WhatSociety," Decline or Renewal (New York:Viking Press, 1974); BruceAndrews, "Surplus Securityand NationalSecurity: State Policy as Domestic Social Action," Interna-tional Studies Association, Washington,D.C., February22-26, 1978. John Zysman has some astutecomments about the connectionbetweeninstitutional ormand the contentof policy toward nternationalcompetition in his study of the Frenchelectronics industry:Political Strategies for Industrial Order(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1977).


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902 InternationalOrganizationeign, formulatespolicy which is an articulationof collective interests. The statespeaks on behalf of goals broaderthan those of any particulargroup. Its unitarystructureallows it to impose thatpolicy over the objectionsof particularisticnter-ests. In societies with weak states (or society-centeredpolicy networks) policy-formationcorresponds o a model of pluralisticgovernment: ocial forces arewell-organizedand robust.Public institutionsarefragmented;poweris formallydistrib-uted among a large number of interdependentbut autonomous agencies. Thesepieces of the state are capturedby differentprivate nterests,which are thenable touse them to exercise veto power over public policy or even to acquirea completecontrolover public policy in a given domain. Policy is the outcome of the conflictamong these complex public-private inkages. The United States is obviously themost commonly citecdexemplar.The prevalenceof one or the othertype of state or networkcan be explainedhistorically: different state-society relationships prevailed in the process ofmodernization.However similar countries have become in other respects, thesedifferences persistand remainrelevant.The natureof the networkor statestructureexplains, according o this school, key aspectsof foreign policy. In several remark-ably comprehensiveessays," Peter Katzensteinargues, for example, that UnitedStates foreigneconomic policy is less consistentand more dominatedby economicconsiderations han is Frenchpolicy, which tends to have more coherence and toreflect politicalpreoccupationsaboutFrance'spositionin the world. Morerecently,he has contrasted he marketorientationof American, British, andGermanpolicywith the dirigisteorientationof the Frenchand Japanese.Lacking space for careful examinationof each of the countries, let me evokethe problems with such argumentation hroughtwo examples, one concerninga"weak state" country,the other concerninga "strong" one. Katzenstein,Krasner,and other authorspropose that in the United States, protectionists' interests arestrong n Congress,while free trade nterestsarestronger n theexecutive. The shiftfromprotection o free tradeafterWorldWarII thusrequiredand was facilitatedbythe shift in power from Congress to the presidency. That the presidencygrew inpower and thatit favoredfree tradewhile protectionists quawked n CongressI donot dispute.Was thepolicy change, though,causedby a shiftingbalance of institu-tions or were both symptomsof somethingelse? The argument mplies thathad thepresidencysomehow managed to acquirepower earlierthere would have been ashift in United States commercialpolicy. I find that dubious.The United Statesandmany other countries with widely differing political forms, strongand weak statesalike, pursuedprotectionistpolicies from the 1870s through 1945, with few inter-ruptions.Would Congressionaldominancehave preventedthe shift to free tradeafter World War II? I doubt even that. A great many American interests wereshifting to free trade. Perhapsthe votes in Congresswould have been closer, butwould the outcome have been so different?

42Katzenstein,nternationalOrganizationarticles.


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The second image reversed 903For France, the strong state argumentrequiresus to think thatit matters ittlewho controlsthe state; the fact of having a state-centerednetworkbecomes moreimportant hanthe questionof the politicalorientationof the government.Thusthe

changefrom the FourthRepublicto de Gaulle did notmatter, his argumentmplies,since the bureaucracy an the show in both, as presumably t did under the ThirdRepublic. Is that plausible?Would the same be trueif the Left hadwon the legisla-tive elections of 1978? Would there be no policy change because the strongstatenetwork remains in place, because the state-societybalance remainsthe same?Orwould it change because the state machine was now in the hands of persons withdifferentpolicy goals?Even continuity n policy wouldbe hardto interpret.Shouldthe Left coalitionturnout to be prudentandcautious,pursuingpolicies not differentfromGiscard's,would that be becausethe statemachine constrained t, or becausethe coalition fearedflight of capital, an investor's strike, foreign pressures, labormilitancy, voter discontent: in short, politics of a similarkind, regardlessof thisstrong-weakstate distinction?The strong state-weakstate argumentsuggests thatthetypeof relationpredominates,hence the identityof the governingcoalition doesnot matter.This is a very apoliticalargument.The basic problemwith this line of reasoning s that it provides no explanationfor the orientationof state policy in the supposedlystate-dominated ountries. Theadvantageof looking at politics and the state is that it helps us get away from thewell-known problemsof pluralistor Marxianreductionism:policy is not simplytraceableto the interestsof one or anothergroup. First, powerful groupsconflictamong themselves. Second, the interactionamonggroupsis affected by structures.Third, politicians andbureaucratswho runthe state have some leeway. Hence, theimportance f politics and the state.But thenotion of a strongstateaspresentlyusedescapes from this trap at the cost of heading into another: nstead of explainingsociety (where the groups get theirorientations,why some arestronger hanothers)we have to explain the state. Why does the state go in one direction ratherthananother?Why does it articulatea particular onceptionof the nationalinterestoveranother?Why does it use its leverage over particulargroups in some ways and notothers?Why doesn't the Frenchstate use its power to bring aboutworkers'control,equality of income distribution,stricterpollution control? Why does it supporttraditionaland small industries?Why does it also promoteconcentrationof indus-try?How does it choose between the claims of small and large enterprises?Anypolicy pursuedby thestate must be ableto elicit the supportof at least enoughsocialelements to sustain the stateleadersin power. Hence explanationof the orientationof state policy requires some examinationof the politics behind state action. Tospeakof the strong state suggests thatpolitics can be taken out of the equation forsome states and not for others. The action of the strongstatedependsas much onpolitics as does that of the weak one.Ignoringpolitics in fact shapes the discussion in a way those interested n thetype of state would presumablydislike. The argumentrevertsto explanations in-volving a rationalactor, or at least a unitaryactormodel of the state, andtowardsrealisttype reasoningabout the state, in which the statebecomes a unitaryactor. If


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904 InternationalOrganizationthere is no conflict, latentor actual,about hepropercourseof policy, and if there sno disagreementaboutwhat publicpower shouldbe used for, then the state or thenetworkbecome wholes, responding n a collective way to externalstimulants.Theanalysisof foreign policy is then reducible to the examinationof the internationalsystem. If, on the otherhand, conflict withineach country exists, then the conse-quencesof havinga particularypeof statemust be linkedwith thepoliticalstrugglefor one or anotherpolicy option. If thereis little or no conflict over policy, thattoorequiresexplanation.Such constraintcould be derived from a range of causes: thelogic of an international ituation(back then to rationalactoranalysis), or the logicof market capitalism (which then requires an analysis of how and why it hasinfluence, somethingusually only the neo-Marxist iterature s interested n show-ing).43

I do not wish to argue that the characterof the state structureor the "policynetwork"has no impacton policy. On the contrary,by settingdown therules of thegame, institutions rewardor punish specific groups, interests, visions, persons.These effects can be seen case by case, as in the Cubanmissile crisis, or over awhole patternof cases, such as tariffpolicy. But the impactof structuresies not insome inherent, self-contained quality, but ratherin the way a given structureatspecific historical moments helps one set of opinions prevailover another.Structureaffects the extent to which a governing coalition must make side-paymentsto build up its strength,the extent to which it can impose its views. Itaffects the possibilityof realizingcertainpolicies. Examplesabound. The types oftaxes the Italianstate can raisearelimitedby the weakness of the statebureaucracy;the types of industrialpolicies Britaincan pursue are limited by the fragmentedcharacterof banking and industry;Frenchdirigisme s surely facilitated by theposition of the grandcorps there;Americanenergy policy is not likely to be somecarefullyorchestratedcheme which must get throughCongress n toto or not at all.In each case, the effect on policy derives fromthe voice given by structureso somepointof view: relatively fragmented,or open political systems increase the numberof veto groups;relativelyunitary,or closed systems, do not eliminateveto groupsorbargainingbut only limit their range. Whoevercontrols the state in unitarysystemshas an easiertime passinglaws, though whetherthis makesthe formationof policy"easier" is not clear. Witness Britain.4Whatthe strong-weakstate distinctiondoes, along with manyotherstructuralcategorizations, s to obscure importantways in which politics, our centralsubjectmatter,shapes outcomes.It therebyencouragesvariousformsof reductionism.Theneed to securesupportfor a policy affects its final content. Majoritieshave to bebuilt, coalitions constructed,terms of trade among alliance partnersworked out,legitimatingargumentsdeveloped, and so on. These tasks impose constraintson43PeterBachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytic Framework,"AmericanPolitical Science Review 57 (1963)."Whetherbeing open or closed, or having strengthor weakness can be systematicallylinked to thecontentof politics is much less clear. Attentionto such variablesmakesthemost sense in looking at thecharacteristics f decisions otherthan their actualcontent:coherenceof a series of decisions, say, abouttariffs, rather han the actual level.


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The second image reversed 905groups, constraintswhich cannot be understoodeither by examining them sepa-rately, which is the characteristicshortcoming of reductionist liberal or Marxistargumentation, r by examiningthe structureshroughwhichthey workor even thepropertiesof the relationshipsamongthem, which is the characteristic hortcomingof the authorsI am criticizinghere.This idea is captured n the old concept of logrolling:theneedto makebargainschanges the outcome. The importanceof organizations,politicalparties,elections,ideologies, vision, propaganda,coercion and the like as well as the more obviousaspects of economic interestarise fromthis need. Whatmust be illuminated s howspecific interests use various weapons by fighting throughcertain institutionsinorderto achieve theirgoals. Each step in this chain can affect the final result. Wemaycall this sort of argument"coalitionalanalysis" since it seeks to explainpolicythroughinvestigation of the content of group interests and the efforts to formalliancesamongthem."Coalitionalanalysis" enables us to see how the process of getting a policyadopted affects its content. In analyzingBismarck's foreign policy, for example,Hans-UlrichWehlerstressed the importanceof domesticpolicy goals in the foreignmaneuverings, der Primat des Innenpolitik over Aussenpolitik.45Bismarck con-fronted a wide range of social forces disgruntledwith the empire which he hadconstructed:iberals,constitutionalists, ocialists, Catholics,particularists.To keepthis oppositiondivided and to rally some of its membersto the conservativesideBismarck manipulatednationalismand imperialism. Foreign policy crises wererepeatedlyused, arguesWehler, as the ideological glue for the diversecoalitionthatkept him and the system thathe constructed n power. Again the fault in a purelystructural rgument s evident:themachinerywhichgave Bismarckpowerwas itselfa politicalcreation.Politics could bring it down, hence it was not an independentvariable.PaulSmithmakes a similarargument oncerningDisraeliand theConservativeParty.46The sentiment for empirehelpedprovide the means for linking up landedsquires,businessmen,rural aborersandworking men, whose differences on mat-terssuch as tariffs,democratization,andsocialism were large. In the UnitedStates,rivalry with the Soviets was used in the late 40s andearly 50s to justify purgesathome against leftists in unions, universities, government, and business.47TheSoviet Union uses this rivalry to controldissidentstoday.In all of these examples, a plausible case can be made for the importanceofstructures.I do not wish to assertthat one or the other mode of analysis must inprinciple always be correct. We are likely to find, as in all interestingcases,

45Hans-UlrichWehler, "Bismarck'sImperialism,1862-1890," Past andPresent 48 (1970): 119-155.LeopoldRanke s the mostnotedexponentof theprimacyof "foreignpolicy" school. See TheodorevonLaue, LeopoldRanke, TheFormative Years (Princeton:PrincetonU.P., 1970). Also the commentsbyMorsein Modernizationand the Transformation f InternationalRelations.46PaulSmith, Disraelian Conservatismand Social Reform (London: 1967); Robert Blake, Disraeli(New York: 1966). Miles Kahler, "Decolonization: Domestic Sources of ExternalPolicy, ExternalSourcesof Domestic Politics," Ph.D. Thesis, HarvardUniversity, 1977.47Franz churmann,TheLogic of WorldPower.


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906 InternationalOrganizationmultiple causation,or several factorsproducinga given result, so that it becomeshard to sort out which does what. Take Americanand Frenchenergy policy: thestate plays a much more active role in Francedirecting the securingof adequatesupply, import, marketing,pricing and other aspects than does the state in theUnited States. The Frenchstate plays a greaterrole in handlingFrenchrelationshipswith other countries concerning energy. France goes farther in placating Arabopinion. France is also much more dependentthanthe United States on oil, has amuch less well developedenergy industry,and fewer private companies. The rela-tionship of the state in France to the issue area is thus completely different. Theconnectionto society, theoutside world, andstrategicandeconomicconcernsdifferradicallybetween the two countries. Couldnot those differencesexplaina good dealof the dissimilaritybetweenFrenchand Americanenergypolicy and the veryroleofthe state itself? The perfect test of the consequencesof structure which is rarelyrealizable) s to find two countries with similar positions or interests n relationshipto some policy areabut with differingpolitical structures;f the policy is the same,structuresdo not matter; f the policies differ, structuresmay well be the explana-tion. I triedto test this by examiningtariffs in the late nineteenthcentury, and Iconcludedthat structuresmatteredmuch less than the prominentdifferencesof theGerman,British, French,and Americanpolitical systemsmight leadone to suspect.Carter'sefforts to put throughan energy programgive us only a weak test: theseparation of powers clearly imposes obstacles on comprehensiveness andstrengthens he leverage of the lobbies. Cabinet governmentshave an easier time.But it is also true that the dangers to the Americaneconomy of having no com-prehensiveenergy policy are also not yet overwhelming,certainlynot in compari-son with some Europeancountries. Since the situation s so different,we cannot besure whatproducesthe differentresult.The same logic can lead to differentresultsoperating n differentsituations. Katzensteinstresses the differencesin structure;would stress those in situation.While these argumentscannot be settleddefinitively, care can be taken to beclearer aboutwhat is being argued.I suggest that we requiremorestringent ests ofthe variouspositions. Given my proclivities, the tests I suggest are framedwith thestrong-stateweak-stateargument n mind. Argumentsfor the importanceof stateform in explainingforeign economic policy should deal with the following ques-tions:1. What is the position of the countrybeing studiedin relationto the worldeconomy? That is, what position on the policy issue would we expect it to havegiven soine view of its interests?(E.g., oil producerswant higher prices.) If thecountry's policies are in accordancewith that expectation, there is no reason toelevate "state structure"above "interest" as an explanation.2. Withinthe society, whom does the policy benefit? Who supports t? Whoopposes it? Does actualpolicy correspondwith the wishes of a significantcoalitionof interests?If so, there is again no reason to prefer "state structure" to eitherconventional"group politics" or "Marxistreductionism"as anexplanation.Whenpolicy and the interests of the strongestcoincide, it is not clear that the state hasproducedthe result. Politics and structuremay help one groupof interestsdefeat


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The second image reversed 907another.It is certainly importantto ask: what levers do structuresgive variousinterests in policy battles?3. Who defines the policy alternatives, both the ones debatedand the onesadoptedas policy-officials of the state, politiciansand civil servants,or agentsofnon-state actors, business, union, voluntaryassociation leaders? If the policy isformulatedoutside the state apparatus,that is evidence for the state as "instru-ment."48 If the policy is formulated nside the stateapparatus,a certainprimafaciecase has been made for the importanceof that apparatus.4. How is the policy "legitimated?" What makes the policy politically suc-cessful? What is the political statusof alternativepolicies? Whoseopposition couldblock the policy? Whose opposition could impose severe political costs on thosewho seek thatpolicy?Is the stateable to impose thepolicy, and uponwhom--a firm,an industry, a sector of the economy-and how-by inducement,coercion? Whatkinds of oppositionarepossible-electoral, strikeof labor, strikeof capital?Here isthe weakest link in the state-centeredarguments. Even state coercion requiressomeone's backing, be it that from the secret police or others. In each case apolitical explanationof support s required.An attemptto answer these questions should help to clarify this argument.Without doing so, the difficult cases where state behavior and the wishes of adominantgroupappear o coincide cannotbe unravelled.Katzensteinnotes that inhis cases of "state-centered"policy networks,Franceand Japan, thereis consider-able symbiosisbetween business and the state. Discussions, interchange,coopera-tion, andso on areextensive. Who has cooptedwhom?Is the relationshipbetweenbusiness and the state

peter gourevitch

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