perspectives on saber junction-i vehicle during a decisive action ... supported by german panzers,...

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I n October 2012, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR) rolled out of its motor pools near Vilseck, Germany, crossed the line of departure and attacked into the German countryside. So began Exercise Saber Junction 2012, the largest, most complex U.S. Army training event seen on the European continent in more than 20 years. Partnered with military forces from 18 other nations, ranging from British 38 ARMY March 2013 By LTC Curtis D. Taylor Above, Bulgarian army soldiers from the 61st Mechanized Infantry Brigade re- turn simulated fire from behind a BMP-1 tracked vehicle during a decisive action training environment Exercise Saber Junction 2012, at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Ger- many, last October. Opposite, a Stryker armored vehicle provides cover for a halted convoy. U.S. Army/SGT Paul Sale Perspectives On Saber Junction-I

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In October 2012, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR) rolled

out of its motor pools near Vilseck, Germany, crossed

the line of departure and attacked into the German

countryside. So began Exercise Saber Junction 2012, the

largest, most complex U.S. Army training event seen on the

European continent in more than 20 years. Partnered with

military forces from 18 other nations, ranging from British

38 ARMY � March 2013

By LTC Curtis D. Taylor

Above, Bulgarian army soldiers from the61st Mechanized Infantry Brigade re-turn simulated fire from behind a BMP-1tracked vehicle during a decisive actiontraining environment Exercise SaberJunction 2012, at the Joint MultinationalReadiness Center in Hohenfels, Ger-many, last October. Opposite, a Strykerarmored vehicle provides cover for ahalted convoy.

U.S. A

rmy/SG

T Paul Sale

PerspectivesOn Saber Junction-I

mechanized infantry to Serbian military police, the Regi-ment faced a multinational opposing force (OPFOR) ledby the professional OPFOR of 1st Battalion, 4th InfantryRegiment, supported by German Panzers, Czech artilleryand Slovenian aircraft. For the first five days of the rota-tion, the blue force objective was to fight its way across80 kilometers of rolling countryside and villages ofsouthern Bavaria through a region known as the Maneu-ver Rights Area and seize critical river crossing pointsinto the Hohenfels Training Area. At more than 1,000square miles, this region is roughly the same size as theNational Training Center in Fort Irwin, Calif., and repre-sents the most complex, integrated training environmentcurrently available to the U.S. Army.

Saber Junction 2012 marked the fourth decisive actiontraining rotation executed by the Army over the past 18months, but this exercise was unprecedented in manyways. Operating among German towns over extendeddistances and dealing with a real host-nation populationand real multinational partners on a complex battlefieldthat forced the simultaneous execution of offensive, de-fensive and stability tasks, 2CR was presented with alevel of realism and operational complexity that cannotbe replicated anywhere else on the globe.

Operation Saber Junction differed from previous deci-sive action rotations in three fundamental ways: It fea-tured sustained offensive operations over extended dis-tances, multinational integration and operations among

A New Level of ComplexityIn the Decisive ActionTraining Environment

March 2013 � ARMY 39

U.S. A

rmy/SPC Jordan Fuller

a live host-nation population. When 2CR crossed the lineof departure early on the morning of October 13, 2012,their ultimate objective was a fictitious city named Kibirliin the Hohenfels Training Area, more than 50 kilometersaway. Between them and their objective were several majorGerman towns, more than 100,000 German citizens, an au-tobahn, rivers and, most importantly, a hybrid enemy threatconsisting of near-peer conventional forces and insurgentswho moved freely among the real German population. The2nd Cavalry attacked for 148 hours without interruptionbefore their forces finally closed around Kibirli. Duringthat time, the regimental main command post jumpedthree times with squadron command posts in nearly con-tinuous movement in order to keep up with the forwardline of troops. This attack represented the longest sustained advance

against organized enemy forces that our Army has con-ducted since the 3rd Infantry Division fought its way toBaghdad in 2003. The ability to conduct continuous offen-sive operations over long distances remains one of the greatasymmetrical advantages of the U.S. military and a likely

condition in any future war. This eventbrought to light many great lessons forour Army regarding our ability to sus-tain our forces and communicate onthe move across large distances. Specif-ically, it highlighted both the urgencyand importance of the ongoing work atFort Bliss, Texas, to field and test Capa-bility Set 13 networks that can operateon the move in a highly fluid, fast-moving battlefield.Operation Saber Junction was the

first decisive action rotation to see theextensive employment of multina-tional partners in both the training unitand the opposing force. Nineteen dif-ferent nations participated in the rota-tion. The 2nd Cavalry fought as a truecoalition with a Romanian infantrybattalion, British and Slovenian mecha-nized forces, Italian airborne infantry,Slovenian engineers and air defense,and Serbian military police—all sup-ported by French special forces andUkrainian Hind D attack helicopters.The Regiment’s higher headquartersfor the exercise included a contingentfrom the First German-NetherlandsCorps to replicate a multinationalheadquarters.

We will likely never fight another conflict withoutsubstantial involvement from coalition partnerson our flanks, in our higher headquarters, andwithin our own formations. With more than

1,800 foreign soldiers involved in the exercise, OperationSaber Junction afforded the ideal opportunity to test ourability to integrate formations from multiple nations in afast-developing tactical situation. The list of potential fric-tion points is long and detailed. Rules of engagement, na-tional caveats, fuel and ammunition compatibility, night vi-sion capability, and doctrinal differences all affected therapid integration of multinational formations in the Regi-ment during this exercise. The lack of compatible radio sys-tems and the ever-present language barrier also hamperedtrue integration at the tactical level. While 2CR did an impressive job working through these

many challenges, it is clear that the task of integrating coali-tion partners requires sound doctrine and continual train-ing at every echelon. President Rosen Plevneliev of the Re-public of Bulgaria visited his troops during the exercise. Heobserved how the interface challenges were similar to thestruggles he faced as a software developer building com-patibility among various platforms and operating systems.“Compatibility is essential in the multinational environ-ment,” he said. Ultimately, the exercise demonstrated thatthe decisive point in successful multinational operations

40 ARMY � March 2013

LTC Curtis D. Taylor is currently serving as the brigade seniortrainer at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohen-fels, Germany. He was previously assigned as the commanderof Task Force 3-66 Armor in Paktika Province, Afghanistan.

Hohenfels Training Area

Hohenfels Training Area

GrafenwoehrTraining AreaGrafenwoehrTraining Area

SABER JUNCTIONManeuver Rights Area

JMTCNTC

The Seventh Army Joint Multinational Training Command’s (JMTC) SaberJunction Maneuver Rights Area in Bavaria is comparable in size to the Na-tional Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., roughly 1,000 square miles.

U.S. A

rmy

lies in finding creative ways to bridgethe cultural and doctrinal divide. Thisis a skill too difficult and too impor-tant not to include in future decisiveaction training exercises.

Saber Junction 2012 is the first U.S.brigade-level training exercise totake place in the midst of a realhost-nation population in 23

years. The complexity of this environ-ment added a level of realism unob-tainable anywhere else in the world.Military operations in the future willalmost certainly occur against thebackdrop of the homes and businessesof an indigenous population, and thisexercise truly tested our ability to op-erate in that context. Throughout the 21-day rotation, the

Regiment never occupied a traditionalforward operating base. Units movedconstantly in response to a dynamicenemy. While there were many lessonslearned about the basics of field craft—the use of white light, field sanitation,digging of fighting positions—our soldiers proved surpris-ingly adaptive. Sergeants who in multiple combat tourshad never spent more than three continuous days outsideof a secured perimeter went up to three weeks in open ter-rain, surrounded by an ever-present enemy threat. This

highlights a critical but often overlooked advantage that isresident in our young soldiers, noncommissioned officersand junior officers. Our battle-tested force is surprisinglyresilient and can adapt rapidly to a changing environment.As we move into a very uncertain future, in which so many

42 ARMY � March 2013

Right, BulgarianPresident Rosen

Plevneliev ad-dresses his troops

participating in Operation SaberJunction during avisit to JMTC lastOctober. Below, aU.S. Army Europe

fighting vehicle assigned to 1stBattalion, 4th

Infantry Regimentmoves into a fight-ing position during

Saber Junction2012. U

.S. A

rmy/SG

T Michael Reinsch

U.S. A

rmy/SPC Markus Rauchenberger

threats to American security are completely unknown to ustoday, it is that adaptability that will be our greatest corecompetency.

Four decades ago our Army found itself in a period ofgreat transition, not unlike our current one. In the early1970s, Generals Creighton W. Abrams and William E.DePuy recognized that a decade of counterinsurgency

operations in the jungles of Vietnam had resulted in atrophyof the skills necessary to synchronize complex operations atthe brigade and battalion levels. Accustomed to years of sup-porting what was essentially a platoon-and-company fightfrom small firebases, our brigade headquarters had lost theart of synchronization and served primarily as a resource-providing headquarters. Abrams and DePuy, both WorldWar II veterans, knew that in order to succeed against Sovietland armies pouring through the Fulda Gap, our brigadeshad to learn to plan and synchronize complex operations.The nature of the mission itself demanded a much more cen-tralized approach and a different set of behaviors from ourtactical headquarters. The result was the creation of the U.S.Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and thebirth of the combat training centers a decade later. Our lead-ership at the time recognized that if we could accuratelyreplicate the conditions our soldiers might expect on the bat-tlefield in a live environment, then they would adapt, andthe doctrine and training necessary for success wouldemerge as a generation of soldiers grew into leadership withexperience in this environment. The key to success was repli-cating the environment as accurately as possible. The trans-

formation of our Army in the 18 years between the birth ofTRADOC in 1973 and Operation Desert Storm in 1991 isnow viewed as one of the most productive periods in thehistory of our military.Our challenges today are different but reminiscent of

those we faced after Vietnam. A decade of counterinsur-gency has taught us great lessons about understanding theoperational environment and built great initiative and au-tonomy into our company-level formations. While weshould seek to retain those strengths, there are instanceswhen old lessons must be adapted to the new environmentand relearned. The decisive action training environmentpresents a new challenge to brigade and battalion staffs ac-customed to decentralized company-level operations. Si-multaneously faced with a near-peer conventional threatand a stability challenge across a broad operational envi-ronment, staffs must have the tools to manage both whilethey synchronize a growing variety of battlefield enablers,including significant contributions from our allied andhost-nation partners. The first step in building a tactical Army that can handle

this level of complexity is to accurately replicate it at ourcombat training centers. If we can continue to do this well,with scenarios that force extended operations over largedistances in complex terrain and integrate our coalitionpartners, then the American soldier will adapt, as he hasdone so well in the past. Then the Army will succeed, asour predecessors did four decades ago, in building a newgeneration of warfighters who are prepared for the chal-lenges of a new century. �

44 ARMY � March 2013

A Romanian battal-ion commander

and a British mech-anized companycommander dis-

cuss their schemeof maneuver as themain effort for theregimental attack

while the regimen-tal operations

officer, MAJ AndyWatson (arms

folded), 2nd Cav-alry Regiment,

looks on.

U.S. A

rmy/LTC Jeremy Wilson