persons prelim

ATENEO DE MANILA LAW SCHOOL

Persons and Family Relations Case Digests

Judge Bonifacio

By Bastion Jerome G. Ortiz

8/28/2008

Family Code Case Digests

Digest by Jerome G. Ortiz

Article 2:

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a)

Tanada vs. Tuvera

Facts:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

Petitioners now wanted the SC to clarify its decision regarding the ff. questions: What is meant by “law of public nature” or “general applicability” Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? What is meant by “publication” Where is the publication be made When is the publication be made

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.

Issue:

Held: In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows: The Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Article 2 of the Civil Code states that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper or general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

The clause “unless it is otherwise provide” in Art.2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of publication. The requirement of publication cannot in any event be omitted. However, it is likely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result.

Publication must be in full or otherwise, it is no publication at all.

Prescription that states Official Gazzete shall be the organ where statutes must be published before they take effect may be amended to authorize and may be amended


in a newspaper of general circulation, but until such amendment is enacted, the official medium where it should be published is the Official Gazette and not any other medium.

These are matters which need not be published for they only pertain to details regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public.

interpretative regulations internal policies letters of instruction issued by administrative superioirs conerning the rules or guidelines

to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties municipal ordinances which are governed by the Local Government Code

Laws which must be published general application local application private laws administrative rulings enforcing a statute city charters central bank circulations presidential decrees and executive orders

De Roy vs. CA

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

Facts:

The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.

The judgment found petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987.

September 9, 1987: the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.


Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion

Held:

Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,


therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

E.O No.200:

Article 7:

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution (5a).

Sec 444 Local Government Code:

Navarro vs Judge Dumagtoy:

Facts:

Respondent Judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga despite of the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his wife even if he has only submitted a joint affidavit.

In pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code, these are the requirements to have a subsequent marriageo Even if the present spouse has well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already

dead or absent for four consecutive years, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to enter into a second marriage.

Respondent Judge also solemnized a marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario at his residence in the municipality of Dapa which is outside his court’s jurisdiction.

There are only 3 instances where a marriage may only be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber or at a place other than his sala. Article 8 of the Family Code states these instances as

1) either or both of the parties is at the point of death 2) the residence of either party is located in a remote place 3) both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage

may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Nothing of these three circumstances happened.

Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando, which he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.


Issue:

Whether or not respondent have acted in gross ignorance of the law?

Held:

Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

The marriage between Gaspar and Arlyn is considered bigamous and void.

The marriage between Floriano and Gemma is valid.

Ratio Decidendi

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated; prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.

Regarding the marriage between Floriano and Gemma, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Regarding the marriage between Gaspar and Arlyn, it is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar and Ida (first wife).

He is sentenced a six month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Beso vs. Judge Daguman:

Facts:

Respondent judge charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority on December 12, 1997 in a complaint-affidavit for solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar

August 28, 1997, complainant and fiancée, Bernardito Yaman had their marriage solemnized by the respondent in respondent’s residence in J.P.R. Subdivision, Calbayog City, Samar. Principal


sponsor Pacifico Maghacot and spouses Ramon Dean and Teresita Dean are present during the ceremony. After the wedding, husband Yaman abandoned the complainant without any reason.

Complainant went to Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding her marriage contract. Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City informed complainant that the said marriage was not registered and recommended to write the respondent. Respondent said that all the copies of the marriage contract were taken by Yaman, and that no copy was retained

Complainant alleged that the respondent committed acts which are prejudicial to her interests:o Solemnizing complainant’s marriage outside his jurisdictiono Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering their marriage before the office

of the Local Civil Registrar

Respondent’s comments:o Complainant and fiancée had to be solemnized by respondent due to the some pressing

circumstances: 1) Respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station and the

complainant and fiancée came to his house without any appointment 2) Complainant must leave that same day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad, as

scheduled 3) Going to another town and find another solemnizing officer and sponsors would entail

serious problems4) Complainant would be out of the country for a long period and marriage license would

lapse and her employment abroad might have complications if they failed to get married5) All other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were considered impractible by

the parties6) All the desired documents for a valid marriage are in order already7) Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who deserves more than

ordinary official attention under present Government Policyo Respondent leaned on the liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and

complicated for citizens to get marriedo Failure to gather the documents and triplicate it was beyond respondent’s control

Issue:

Whether or not the judge neglect his dutyWhether or not the judge abuse his authority

Held:

The judge did abuse his authority and neglect his duty.

Ratio Decidendi


Court agreed to the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator:

Abuse of Authority1. Judge Daguman’s authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those

municipalities under his jurisdiction. 2. There are only 3 instances where a marriage may only be solemnized by a judge

outside his chamber or at a place other than his sala. Article 8 of the Family Code states these instances as:

1) either or both of the parties is at the point of death 2) the residence of either party is located in a remote place 3) both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the

marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Neglect of DutyIn pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code, “it shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized”.

Respondent also undermined the very foundation of marriage, w/c is the basic social institution in our society whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting that the respondent failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies, he should have exerted more effort to locate them.

Moreover, as a holder of such a sensitive position, he is expected to take care of official documents. His statements that he saw Yman getting the copies are based on conjecture and not deserve consideration.

Courts also added:Jimenez vs. Republic: underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution. Marriage in the Philippines:Surrounded by safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity, and permanence. Interest and duty of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation

Article 7 of the Family Code: Mariage may be solemnized by 1) any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.

Article 9:

No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.

Chuayan vs Bernas:


Facts:

Plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo. The justice of the peace court pronounced that the bout was a draw. Defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province. The plaintiff then filed a complaint praying that the court render judgment ordering the defendant to comply with the rules and regulation governing cockfights.

Defendant denied all the allegations of the complaint and moved to dismiss with the costs against the plaintiff.The Court of First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the appeal of the defendant without special finding as to costs. The defendant objected to this judgment as well as to the order rendered by the same court on November 8, 1913.

The grounds for the dismissal by the lower court in the judgment appealed from were that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature. The judge is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof. The judge doesn’t know where to find the law relative to the case. Finally, that the judge knows of no law whatever governing the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning cockfights.

Issue:

Whether or not the grounds for the dismissal were enough reasons for it to terminate the proceedings and dismiss the case without deciding the issues.

Held:

The judgment and the order appealed from are reversed and the record of the proceedings shall be remanded to the court from where they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law.

Ratio Decidendi

The reasons stated by the lower court are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing the case without deciding the issues. In pursuant to Article 6 of the Civil Code (Art. 9 of the NCC), in cases where no law would exactly apply, the customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.

People vs Veneracion:

The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused individual in a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?


Facts:

On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from it was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.

Abundio Lagunday, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, Richard Baltazar y Alino, Catalino Yaon y Aberin and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide.

The trial court rendered a decision on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law.

Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua).

Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction. The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied with the legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal. Consequently, for lack of jurisdiction, this Court cannot take cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Public Prosecutor of Manila.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

Held:

Respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.

Instant petition is GRANTED. There should be imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the


instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ratio Decidendi

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," 4 resist encroachments by governments, political parties, 5 or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.

In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:

Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:1. By using force or intimidation.2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. The law plainly and unequivocably provides that when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.

We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his religious convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty


to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.

Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees.

Article 10:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (n)

People vs Purisima:

Facts:

26 petitions for review filed by the People of the Philippines represented respectively by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one decision as they involve one basic question of law.

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

The judges of three Courts of First Instance dismissed the cases, on a common ground, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

Petitioners’ contention: The main argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of

paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.

The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which


characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

Judges’ reasons: In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal

of the defense that one essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, : that the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

Hence, these petitions.

Issue:

Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?

Is the perusal of paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not to be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy?

Held:

The court denied the 26 petition for review and affirmed the orders of the respondent judges dismissing or quashing the Informations concerned.

Ratio Decidendi

What makes the act punishable or criminal under the decree is the motivation behind it. When there is ambiguity in the presidential decree manifested from the conflicting view, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the meaning and the scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state. The legislative intent is the controlling factor in determining the spirit of the statute.

The acts penalized in PD 9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation of 1081 and General Order Nos. 6 and 7. It is only the act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of the Proclamation of 1081 that is within the intent of P.D 9(3) and nothing else.


The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order

Article 11:

Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. (n)

Article 12

A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. (n)

Martinez vs Van Buskirk:

Facts:

11th day of September 1908, plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendandt used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to that in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of said plaintiff’s carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant’s delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant’s wagon and horses ran into the carrmoata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.

Defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that on for purpose of delivery, the cochero driving the team as defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon, and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up to Calle Herran to Calle Real, which they turned up and on which street they came into collision with the carromatta, in which the plaintiff, Carmen de Martinez was riding.

Carmen Ong de Martinez with his husband filed a case against the cuchero and its employer

Court of first instance saw the case in favor of the appellee/plaintiff and found that the defendant was guilty of negligence and a judgemenet of Php 442.50 with interest of 6% per annum


Issue:

Whether or not there was negligence on the part of the cuchero thus the accident.Whether or not the employer has liability on the case.

Held:

Judgment is reversed.

There was no negligence on the part of the cuchero and there is also no liability on the employer as well. Ratio Decidendi

Art. 1902 states: “A person who by an act or ommision causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so doneArt 1903 states: The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable not only for personal acts and omission, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

Regarding Art. 1902, negligence was not proved because of the following grounds: That the cochero was experienced and capable, the horses on the other hand are gentle

and tractable and that the cochero has driven one of the horses for a year and the other one for 6 months but no accident occurred.

It has become a custom for all cocheros to leavethe horses as they were during the incident to help carry the loads off the wagon. This was allowed because it was beneficial to the businessmen.

The performance was not proved to be destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held of themselves unreasonable and imprudent

That the act of not tying the horses, which resulted to an injury, is in itself not negligence. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because it only creates a prima facie evidence

Regarding Art 1903, it was also not proved thus the employer is not liable on the ff ground: Neligence of the cochero was not proved thus art 1903 does not apply against the

employer

Yao-Kee vs Sy-Gonzales:

Facts:

Sy Kiat, Chinese national, died on Jan. 17, 1977 in his home in Caloocan. He left behind real and personal properties worth Php 300,00.000 more or less.


Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe Rodolfo Sy filed petition for grant of letters of administration at Court of First Instance Rizal Branch 33, Caloocan. Petition states that:

they are children of Sy Kiat and Asuncion Gillego Sy Kiat died intestate to their knowledge Do not recognize the marriage of the deceased and Yao kee and the filiations of their

children to him Aida Sy Gonzales as the administratix of the intestate estate of the deceased

Petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sok Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Yun Chen and alleged that:

Yao Kee is the lawful wife Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Yun Chun were legitimate children of Yao Kee with

Sy Kiat Sze Sook Wah as the eldest and will be the administratix of the estate of Sy Kiat

After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that: (1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee (2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat (3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego

CFI rendered a decision in favor of the (petitioners, Yao Kee and others), and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the adminitratix, and children of Sy Kiat and Asuncion Gillego as illegitimate.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court finding: Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, and Teresita Sy Bernabe are acknowledged natural

children of Sy Kiat and Asuncion Gillego Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Chun Yen, the acknowledged

natural children of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee had not been proven to be valid to the laws of China

Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property should be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and

Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased.

Respondents filed petition with SC questioning paragraphs 3 and 4 of the CA’s decision. SC denied the petition and the motion for reconsideration. Petitioners (instant petition at hand) questioned paragraphs 1 and 2 of the CA’s decision.

SC initially denied, but reconsidered and decided to give due course the petition. Errors pointed out by the petitioner:

CA erred in declaring marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not have been proven valid


CA erred in declaring Aida Sy-Gonzales, etc. as natural children

Petitioner argued that marriage bet. Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was in accordance to Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven

Although there is no marriage certificate, elders need only to agree upon bethrothal of children in China and during the wedding, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat and mother of Yao Kee signed a document but has been lost. Sy Kiat and Yao Kee have been married 46 yrs.

Testimony of Yao Kee’s younger brother verified that no marriage certificate is needed since it is a custom in China. Signed document by parents or elders being sufficient

Statements made by Asuncion Gillego testified before court that Sy Kiat married to Yao Kee in Chinese custom and Sy Kiat admitted to Asuncion that he has a Chinese wife who he married in Chinese custom.

Sy Kiat’s Alien Certificate of Registered Alien declared that he was married to Yao Kee Certification issued by the Chinese Embassy to the Philippines stated that Sy Kiat

married to Yao Kee (aka Yui Yip) were married on Jan 19, 1931.

Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition of the petitioners has merit and follows article 12 of the Civil Code.

Held:

The decision of the CA is hereby affirmed

Ratio Decidendi

Evidence presented by the petitioner may prove that the fact of marriage, but not sufficient to establish validty

On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. Procedure is provided in proving unwritten foreign law.

Petitioners in the case at bar did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. Testimonies of Yao Kee and brother cannot be considered on the following grounds:

self-serving evidence showed that they were not competent to prove the foreign law or custom failed to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently the validity of marriage with

said law or custom.

Petitioners have not shown any proof that Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time of Sy Joc Lieng marriage in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took


place in 1931 or 84 years later.

Thus, the marriage bet. Yao kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts for Phil courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, they must be alleged and proved as any other fact

Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours.

Article 13:

When the law speaks of years, months, day or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days of twenty-four hours; and nights, from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a)

Garcia vs Recio:

Facts:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;


thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage had irretrievably broken down.

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.

Issue:

Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was provenWhether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

Held:

This Court remand the case to the court quo for the purpose of receiving evidence in proving respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and failing in that, of declaring parties marriage void on the ground of bigamyRatio Decidendi

First issueProving the divorce

Petitioner argues divorce decree, saying that it may only be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of existence of: 1) foreign law allows absolute divorce and 2) divorce decree

Art. 26 of the Family code marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated.Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce hence the court does not grant it.

Marriage between 2 Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. – aliens may obtain divorce abroad and be recognized by the

Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law Divorce decree is insufficient

Divorce as a Question of Fact Petitioner contends that divorce decree can be admitted in evidence as long it complies

with the registration under Art. 11, 13 and 52 –not necessary since respondent is not bound by our laws since he acquired Australian Citizenship

Respondent argues divorce decree is a public document – written official act of Australian court, therefore it requires no further proof of its authentication and due execution


Court finds that before a foreign judgment be included in evidence the document must be first presented and admitted in evidence

Best evidence of judgment is judgment itself When the divorce decree was presented in evidence petitioner objected to that it has not

been registered to the local registry

Burden of Proving Australian Law Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent

Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

Second IssueRespondent’s legal capacity to remarry

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

2 types of divorce1. Absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii

o Terminates marriage2. Limited divorce or a mensa et thoro

o Suspends and leaves the bond in full force Respondent presented an interlocutory order 1. Provisional judgment of divorce2. Same as separation of bed and board3. It may turn into an absolute divorce after lapse of time which no reconciliation is

effected Even if absolute marriage remarriage be restricted by statute, thus a guilty party in a

divorce due to adultery may be prohibited in marrying again Australian divorce decree contains restriction1. If a party of marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits

offence of bigamy2. Court finds no basis for RTC ruling restoring respondents capacity to remarry

Significance of the certificate of Legal Capacity The respondent has no absolute evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner

provided in Art. 21 Court neglects the petitioner’s prayer to declare marriage null and void on the ground for

bigamy for the reason it may turn that under Australian Law he was capacitated to marry.

Article 15:

Van Dorn vs Ronillo Jr:

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively


Facts:

Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Petitioner’s contention: respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the

representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community o property;

that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds; and that respondent’s claim is barred by prior judgment.

Respondent’s contention: avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the

prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy. that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary

to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

Issue:

The effect of foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

The Nevada divorce of the parties. Is the petitioner still considered under Philippine laws to be married to the respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations under the Family Code?


Held:

Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss the Complaint

Ratio Decidendi

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the U.S. (in Atherton VS Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799): “The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife or a wife without a husband is unknown to the law.”

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain that under our national laws petitioner has to be considered married to the respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations cannot be just. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Barreto vs Gonzales:

This is an appeal to the judgment of the Court of First Instance

Facts:

Both Plaintiff and defendants are citizen and resident of the Philippines. They were married in Manila on January 19, 1919 and lived together until spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated


and since that time have not lived together as man and wife. Of this union, they also had 4 children.

Negotiations of both parties, both being represented by attorneys that it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff her support of P500 a month, this could be increased in times of illness and necessity.

Shortly after this agreement, defendant left the islands, secured a jurisdiction of absolute divorce in Reno, Nevada dated November 28, 1927.

He moved to California and returned to the Islands on August 1928 and has remained ever since. He then remarried and has three children. He then reduced the amount he agreed to pay monthly to support wife and children.

The wife then filed an action in the Court of First Instance requesting that the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada, that section 9 of Act. 2710, which reads as follows:

The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon such decree becomes final but shall not dissolve bonds of matrimony until one year thereafter.

The defendant to deliver ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as legal portion from the estate of the parents.

Also prayed for the payment of attorneys fees the sum of P5000

The CFI ruled against the defendant and granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff and intervenors with reducing the attorneys fees to P3000

Objection by the defendant, hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the foreign decree of divorce would be recognized by the Philippine Islands?

Held:

The Judgment of CFI is reversed and defendant absolved from the demands made by the plaintiff

Ratio Decidendi

The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times, matrimonial domicile of the parties have been the Philippines and the residence acquired by the husband in Nevada securing a divorce and was not a bona fide evidence and did


not confer jurisdiction upon the court of the state to dissolve the marriage.

Philippine Law still governs and which doesn’t recognize divorce.

Gov’t vs Frank:

Facts:

April 19, 1903: In the City of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, in the United States, the defendant, through a representative of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, George I. Frank entered into a 2-year contract with the Government of the Philippine Islands. Frank was to receive a salary of $1,200.00 per year as a stenographer of the plaintiff.He will be paid in advance the traveling expenses incurred from Chicago to Manila. He will receive one-half salary during the period of travel.

In case of Frank violating its terms, he will be liable to the plaintiff the amount of the expenses incurred in traveling and the one-half salary paid during such period.

The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th Day of April 1903, and was paid half-salary from that date until the date of his arrival in the Phillipines.

On February 11, 1904, Frank left the service and refused to make further compliance with the terms of the contract.

Issue:

Did Frank violate Laws No. 80 and No. 224?Was he capable of entering into a contract since he was a minor at that time?

Held:

Yes (for both issues)

Ratio Decidendi

The amendment of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the plaintiff and defendant.

The execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. (Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.)

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.


Barnuevo vs Fuster:

This case is about an APPEAL from two judgments (by the plaintiff and defendant) of the Court of First Instance of Manila

Facts:

February 7, 1875: Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yanez were married (Catholic/canonical) in Malaga, Spain

On February 1892: Fuster went to the Philippines, settled, and acquired real and personal property

1896: Constanza came to Manila and lived with her husband in conjugal relations until April 1899

April 4, 1899: they made an agreement (public document): They resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and by

virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases.” (B. of E., P.13)

Fuster acknowledged that he would send the sum of 300 pesatas monthly, payable in Madrid, Spain to support his wife starting June 1899. However, on the month of August of the same year, he stopped to make further payments.

March 11, 1909 Constanza started filing divorce proceedings against Fuster, indicating adultery committed by her husband in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and cohabited and by whom he had two children.

Plaintiff prays that: she be granted a decree of divorce the court order the separation of properties between the plaintiff and defendant the conjugal society be therefore liquidated and after the amount of the conjugal property

had been determined, that one half thereof be adjudicatedto her as to the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant

be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to P12,959.90

Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and defendant ordered the latter to pay the former 5,010.17 That the communal property be divided between the parties with costs against the

defendant And in event that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be effected by

commissioners according to law


Both parties appealed, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with.

Defendant’s Appeal Lack of jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject matter of the litigation; and

over the persons of the contending parties, because neither of the spouses was a resident of the Philippines on the date of the complaint.

The court erred in its finding that he had committed adultery with a certain woman from 1899 until 1909.

The court also erred in its finding that the adultery was accompanied by public scandal and injured the dignity of his wife.

o In law, it is not necessary that adultery, to be a cause for divorce, should be accompanied by public scandal and contempt for the wife. There is no law that requires this.

for having decreed the divorce, suspension of the married life, and the separation of the properties of the parties.

against the finding of the court that there exists conjugal property (appellant maintains that it has no foundation)

the court erred in ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P5,010.17, whereas the plaintiff had made no demand in her complaint with respect to this sum and that the plaintiff has allowed ten years to elapse before claiming it, her action prescribed in 1904, that is to say, after 5 years.

the court erred in empowering the receiver to proceed to the separation of property and in appointing commissioners to make the partition and distribution between spouses

the whole of the property should be adjudicated to the defendant as being exclusively his

Plaintiff’s Appeal petitioner prays that the judgment be reversed and that in its place this court order the

defendant to pay to the plaintiff her claim of P12,959.90 (instead of P5,010.17) plus the additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of P107.70 per month, dating from the 1st of August 1909 until the date of payment with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until the date of payment.

Findings of the court:o the total amount of the alimony owing to the plaintiff amounted to 34,200 pesetaso the sum that the plaintiff had collected in Madrid was 6,365.68o that the remainder was 27,834.32 and was equivalent t 5,566.86 Mexican

currencyo Mexican peso was worth 90 centavos Philippine currencyo Therefore, the sum was equivalent to P5,010 Phil currencyo There was no evidence as to the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to be

presumed that it was that current at the time and place where the agreement was made, which was Mexican pesetas

it does not appear that the defendant in his answer accepted the fact in the manner alleged in the complaint.


Issue:

Whether or not the partition of property decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance should be confirmed

Held:

The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of September 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed. The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement of costs in this instance.

Ratio Decidendi

Paraphernal property is that which the wife brigs to the marriage without being included in the dowry and that she may acquire after the creation of the same without being added thereto. But, it is a provision of article 1384 that “the wife shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may administer said property. In such case the husband is obliged to create a mortgage for the value of the personal property he may receive, or to secure said property, in the manner established for the dowry property.”

Article 16:

Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)

Testate Estate of Bohanan vs Bohanan et al:

This is an appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project.

Facts:

Testator was born in Nebraska, therefore a citizen of Nebraska or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located. This contention is untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his particular choice, which is Nevada, as stated in his will.


The court finds that the testator was at the time of his death a citizen of the US and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament is fully in accordance with the laws of the State and admits the same to probate.

On April 24, 1950, CFI judge, Hon. Amparo admitted to probate the last will and testament of the testatorTestator made a last will with the ff. partitions:

½ of residuary estate to the Framers and Merchant National Bank of L.A., in trust only for the benefit of his grandson, Edward George Bohanan, which consists of P90,81.67 in cash and ½ shares in stock of several mining companies

Other half of the residuary estate to testator’s brother and his sister, share and share alike P6,000 grandson Edward Gilbert, and his daughter Mary Lydia P10,000 Clara Daen. P2,000 Katherine Woodward P4,000 Beulah Fox P2,000 Elizabeth Hastings

Ex-wife and children questions the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitime that the laws of the forum concede to them.

CFI dismissed the objections filed.

Issue:

Whether or not the testamentary provisions are valid

Held:

The order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions is hereby affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

The Old Civil Code is applicable because testator died in 1944.

Art. 10(2) of the Old Civil Code states that “Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of property and the country in which it is to be found”.


Testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and permanent residence.

Sec. 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925: Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may by last will dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator’s debts

The ex-wife has no legal claim to any portion of the estate left by the testator since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court a quo had already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and the ex-wife,

It does not appear that at the time of the hearing of the project of partition, Section 9905 of the Nevada Compiled Laws was introduced as evidence. The Law of Nevada can only be proved in our courts in the manner provided by our Rules:

Sec 41. Proof of public or official record: An official record or any entry therein, when admissible for any purpose may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record if not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer had custody.

Bellis vs Bellis:

Facts:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:

$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,

Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven

surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.


On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippines’ law to succession should be followed?

Held:

Petition denied. With costs against appellants.

Ratio Decidendi

Doctrine of renvoi, was not raised nor even applicable. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. Article 16 of the Civil Code states that national law of the deceased should govern

Since under laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.

Aznar vs. Garcia

This is an appeal from a decision of the CFI of Davao, approving among other things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P 3, 699 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, ½ of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Borton in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator.

Facts:


Edward Christensen was a citizen of the United States but at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines. In his will, he declared that he has one child, Maria Lucy Christensen, who will get all of his properties minus P3,600 to be given to Maria Helen Christensen who though was baptized Christensen was not in any way related to him.

However, Helen, the respondent, contested the will and claimed that the will must be subjected to Philippine laws as stated in Art,16, and thus entitled to ½ of the said properties.

Lucy on the other hand alleged that under the California Probate Code, a testor may dispose his property by will in any form or manner he desires. The lower court held the contention of Lucy to be with merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine laws or California Law shall apply, being it the natural law of the testor, in accordance to Art.16 of the civil code.

Held:

The ruling of the lower court was appealed and reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made in accordance to the Philippine laws.

Ratio Decidendi

The natural law of the person whose succession is under consideration is the California law in which he is a citizen of.

However, there are two laws governing the citizens of the state namely: Internal Laws - internal laws shall govern all citizens residing therein and the Conflict of Laws –while conflict of laws rules for the citizens abroad.

Hence in this case, the conflict of laws should apply since Edward’s domicile is the Philippines. Under the conflict of laws, it authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testor’s domicile.

Therefore, Philippine court should apply its own laws for the Philippines is his domicile. Applying the doctrine of ren voi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should refer back to the laws of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines. And so, under the Philippine laws, civil code makes natural child legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

Article 19:


Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 20:

Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21:

Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage.

Development Bank of the Philippines vs CA:

Uypitching vs Quiamco:

Facts:

1982: respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan, Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. The motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent’s business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public.

October 1981: the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, told petitioner corporation’s collector, Wilfredo Veraño, that the motorcycle had allegedly been “taken by respondent’s men.”

January 26, 1991: petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitching’s instruction and over the clerk’s objection, took the motorcycle.

February 18, 1991: petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City.

July 30, 1994: the trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial court’s


decision.

Thus, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages?

Held:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Ratio Decidendi

As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to respondent but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have accepted the correctness of such findings.

A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property:

if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.

Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent’s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent.

On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent.


Hence, they should indemnify him. Article 22:

Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

This case involves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to reverse the decision of the Seventh Devision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76574.

Villalva vs RCBC Savings Bank:

Facts:

Petitioner spouses issued 48 checks totaling P 547, 392 to cover installment payments due on promissory notes executed in favor of Toyota, Quezon Avenue (TQA) for the purchase of a 1993 Toyota Corolla. The promissory notes were secured by a Chattel Mortgage executed by the petitioner spouses on the vehicle in favor of TQA. Under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage, petitioner spouses were to insure the vehicle against loss or damage by accident, theft and fire, and endorse and deliver the policies to the mortgagor.

June 22, 1993: promissory notes and chattel mortgage were assigned to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). They were later assigned by RCBC to RCBC Savings Bank. All the 48 checks issued by the petitioner were encashed by respondent RCBC Savings Bank.

For the period of August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997, petitioner spouses procured the necessary insurance but did not deliver the same to the respondent until January 17, 1997. As a consequence, respondent had the mortgaged vehicle insured for the period of October 21, 1996 to October 21, 1997 and paid a P14,523.36 insurance premium. The insurance policy obtained by respondent was later cancelled due to the insurance policy secured by petitioner spouses over the mortgaged vehicle, and respondent bank was reimbursed P10,939.86 by Malayan Insurance Company. The premium paid by respondent bank exceeded the reimbursed amount paid by Malayan Insurance Company by P3,583.50.

February 10, 1999: respondent sent a letter of demand to the petitioners for P12,361.02 allegedly representing unpaid obligations on the promissory notes and mortgage as of January 31, 1999. In lieu thereof, respondent demanded that petitioner spouses surrender the mortgaged vehicle within five days from notice. The petitioner spouses ignored the demand letter.

April 5, 1999: respondent, in order to get the ’93 Toyota Corolla, filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Replevin with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, which was raffled to Branch 45 thereof. Two weeks later, or on April 19, 1999, the respondent caused the enforcement of a writ of replevin and recovered possession of the mortgaged vehicle.

On June 18, 1999: petitioner spouses filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim for


moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioners asserted that they insured the mortgaged vehicle in compliance with the Deed of Chattel Mortgage.

On June 28, 2002: the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners and ordered respondent to pay petitioner spouses P100,000.00 in moral damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, P25,000.00 in attorney’s fees, and the costs and expenses of litigation. Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied on September 16, 2002.October 3,2002: Respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case was raffled to Branch 114. On March 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court in toto.

Undaunted, the respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the March 21, 2003 decision of the Regional Trial Court. On July 8, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. It ordered petitioner spouses to pay respondent P3,583.50 within thirty days of finality of the decision, and issued a writ of replevin as regards the mortgaged vehicle. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence, the present petition for certiorari.

Petitioners: In ruling against them, the CA erred when it failed to consider two pieces of evidence.An Acknowledge Receipt dated January 17, 1997, which shows that the premium for the 2nd insurance policy has been refunded to the respondent bank.

An Endorsement by the Malayan Insurance Company dated June 11, 1997, which shows that petitioners handed the required insurance policy to the respondent. Petitioners also point out that the respondent was furnished a copy of the insurance policy on January 17, 1997.

Respondents: They contend: that the CA did not make reversible errors, petitioners seek a review of factual findings which the Supreme Court cannot do as it is

not a trier of facts. Setting aside its decision would result in the unjust enrichment of the petitioners

Issue:

Whether the petitioners failed to comply with their obligation to insure the subject vehicle under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage.

Held:

Rule Petition is granted. Decision of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 8, 2004 and its resolution promulgated on Sept. 28, 2004 are reversed and set aside. The June 28, 2002 decision and Sept. 16, 2002 resolution of the Pasay Metropolitan Trial Court, as well as the March 21, 2003 decision of the Pasay Regional Trial Court are reinstated.


Ratio Decidendi

In a previous case, namely, Servicewide Specialist, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals, due to the mortgagee’s failure tonotify the mortgagors prior to application of the latter’s payments to the insurance premiums, this Court held that the mortgagors had not defaulted on their obligation to secure the insurance over the mortgaged vehicle, and affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s decision dismissing the mortgagee’s complaint for replevin.

In the case at bar, the respondent failed to demand that petitioners comply with their obligation to secure insurance coverage for the mortgage vehicle. Following settled jurisprudence, we rule that the petitioners had not defaulted on their obligation to insure the mortgaged vehicle and the condition sine qua non for respondent to exercise its right to pay the insurance premium over the subject vehicle has not been established. Regarding the respondent’s contention that the petitioner has unjustly enrich himself, the respondent has adverted to the provisions on quasi-contractual obligation in the Civil Code. Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable reductions in the patrimony of a person or even prevention of a loss or injury. In the case, petitioner spouses were not enriched when respondent obtained insurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicle as the petitioner spouses had already obtained the required insurance coverage for the vehicle.

Article 26:

Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and the similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

a) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence

b) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another

c) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends

d) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect or other personal condition.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.

Facts:

Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December


18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Petitioner’s contention: respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the

representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community or property;

that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds; and that respondent’s claim is barred by prior judgment.

Respondent’s contention: avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the

prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy. that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary

to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

Issue:

The effect of foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

The Nevada divorce of the parties. Is the petitioner still considered under Philippine laws to be married to the respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations under the Family Code?

Held:

Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss the Complaint

Ratio Decidendi

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the


United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the U.S. (in Atherton VS Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799): “The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife or a wife without a husband is unknown to the law.”

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain that under our national laws petitioner has to be considered married to the respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations cannot be just. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Pilapil vs. Somera

Facts:

An ill-starred marriage between Filipino and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

Imelda Manalysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany

Lived together in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabel Pilapil Geiling is born on April 20, 1980.

After 3 and a half years of marriage, connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court. German law said that the court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.

2 months later, private respondent filed adultery charges against former spouse before the City of Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.


Petitioner asserts that court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the case of adultery which is a private offense

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner, after a valid divorce decree has been issued, still has the right to file adultery charges against former spouse

Held:

Husband of petitioner had no legal standing to commence the adultery case

After divorce decree has been decreed, the petitioner no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offender.

Ratio Decidendi

According to the law, prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.

Thus, it is important that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

After the divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute a prosecution for adultery.

Since the Federal Republic of Germany is admitted, the said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.


persons prelim

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