personal values and prosocial behaviour in strategic ... values and prosocial behaviour in strategic...

European Journal of Social Psychology, Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. (2013)Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.1976

Review article

Personal values and prosocial behaviour in strategic interactions: Distinguishingvalue-expressive from value-ambivalent behaviours

JAN-ERIK LNNQVIST1, MARKKU VERKASALO2, PHILIPP C. WICHARDT3,4

AND GARI WALKOWITZ5,6*1Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland; 2Institute of Behavioural Sciences,University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland; 3Department of Economics, University of Rostock, Rostock, Germany;4Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany; 5Department of Corporate Development andBusiness Ethics, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany; 6Laboratory of Experimental Economics,University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

Abstract

Relying on the framework provided by Schwartzs theory of personal values, we investigated whether values can help explainprosocial behaviour. We first distinguished value-expressive behaviours from value-ambivalent behaviours. The former arecompatible with primarily one value or with congruent values, the latter with mutually conflicting values. In Study 1, ananalysis over all 41 (39 unpublished) samples in which we measured personal values and prosocial behaviour in monetarilyincentivized strategic interactions (N = 1289; data collected between 2007 and 2010 in China, Finland, Germany, Israel, and theWest Bank) supported our idea that personal values, universalism in particular, predict value-expressive (prisoners dilemmacooperation and trust game back-transfers) but not value-ambivalent behaviours (trust game transfers and ultimatum gameproposals and responses). Study 2 (N= 56) focused on dictator game behaviours, which we expected and found to be stronglyvalue-expressive. The findings contribute to the ongoing discussion on whether and under which circumstances values shapebehaviour. Copyright 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Can personal values, conceptualized within the framework ofSchwartz (1992) values theory, help explain prosocial behav-iour? Considering the success of the values concept across thesocial science disciplines and its widespread use also inapplied settings (e.g. Meglino & Ravlin, 1998), it can beconsidered surprising how little research there is on whetherand when personal valuessupposedly acting as guidelinesby which we evaluate different courses of action and outcomes(Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992)influence behaviour. Onereason for this could be that personal values in fact hardly everinfluence behaviour (e.g. Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996;McClelland, 1985; for a review, see Maio, Olson, Bernard,& Luke, 2003), and such null results are seldom submitted tojournals, yet alone published (Easterbrook, Berlin, Gopalan,& Mathews, 1991). However, as we will argue later, anotherpossibility is that personal values do influence behaviour butthat the relations between values and behaviour are often notdetected by means of interindividual correlations due to theinvestigated behaviours being value-ambivalent, that is, servingvalues on opposite sides of the values circle (Figure 1).

We investigated the relations between personal values andbehaviour in some typical economic exchanges that pitted

*Correspondence to: Gari Walkowitz, Department of Corporate DevelopmentCologne, Germany.E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

against each other good for the self and good for the other.Specifically, we first (Study 1) conducted an analysis acrossall of the studies that we had carried out between 2007 and2010, over 95% of them unpublished, with the only inclusioncriterion being that the studies involved both personal valuesand a monetarily incentivized strategic interactionhere cap-tured by different types of games that model social exchange.We then (Study 2) collected new data in a setting in whichvalues could be expected to strongly predict behaviour.

In the introductory section that follows, we first presentSchwartzs (1992) values theory. We then review some of theevidence regarding valuebehaviour relations and argue thatpersonal values can only be expected to predict value-expressivebut not value-ambivalent behaviours. Finally, we present thevarious types of strategic interactions or economic exchanges thatwe utilized.

Theory of Human Values

Theorists from diverse disciplines, including psychology(Rokeach, 1973), sociology (Williams, 1968), and anthropology(Kluckhohn, 1951), have, since the mid-20th century,

and Business Ethics, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923

Received 26 November 2012, Accepted 15 July 2013

Self-Direction

Stimulation

Hedonism

Achievement Power

Security

TraditionCon-formity

BenevolenceUniversalism

CONSER-

VATION

OPENNESS

TO

CHANGE

SELF-TRANSCENDENCE

SELF-ENHANCEMENT

Figure 1. Schwartzs model of the relations between values. Note:From S. Schwartz (1992). Copyright 1992 by Elsevier. Adapted withpermission

Table 1. Schwartzs ten basic values and their operational definitions

Value Operational definition

Benevolence Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those withwhom one is in frequent personal contact

Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protectionfor the welfare of all people and for nature

Self-direction Independent thought and actionmake own decisions,create, and innovate

Stimulation Excitement, novelty, adventure, and risks in lifeHedonism Have a good time, have fun, and do things that bring

gratification for oneselfAchievement Personal success through demonstrating competence,

seeking admiration, and impressing othersPower Wealth, control, or dominance over people and

resourcesSecurity Safety and stability for oneself and ones countryConformity Restraint of actions and intentions that could upset or

harm others and/or violate social norms and rulesTradition Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs

and ideas that ones culture or religion provides

Jan-Erik Lnnqvist et al.

championed the values concept as central to all of the sciencesconcerned with human behaviour. Reviewing the accumulatedliterature, Schwartz (1992, 2006) developed his theory of humanvalues, in which he summarized the most important features ofthe values concept. This theory puts forth that values (1) arecognitive representations of desirable, abstract goals (2) thatmotivate behaviour by serving as (3) standards or criteria bywhich people evaluate actions, people, policies, and events. Incontrast to attitudes, values are more abstract in that they (4)transcend specific situations and (5) are ordered by relativeimportance to one another, forming an ordered hierarchicalsystem of value priorities that characterizes individuals.

Values are distinguished from one another by the goals thatthey express. One of the most central and distinctive aspects ofSchwartzs values theory is that it identifies 10 basic valuetypes that can be found across a very wide range of cultures(for empirical evidence regarding the cross-cultural robustnessof the theory, see, for instance, Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz,2008; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005;Spini, 2003; Vauclair, Hanke, Fischer, & Fontaine, 2011).Although originally derived from universal requirements ofthe human condition (survival needs of the individual andgroup and necessity of social interaction), empirical supportfor 10 universal and motivationally distinct basic values hasbeen provided by Schwartzs cross-cultural researchprogramme that has investigated the content and structure ofvalues in a steadily growing number of countries (77 countries,according to Schwartz, 2009). The 10 basic values recognizedin cultures around the world can be characterized by describingtheir central motivational goals (Table 1; also Schwartz, 2006).For instance, the central motivational goals of universalism areunderstanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for thewelfare of all people and for nature.

Besides identifying 10 motivationally distinct basic values,the content of which is more or less universal, the other keyfeature of Schwartzs (1992) values theory is the universalstructure of personal values that the theory identifies. Thestructure of values derives from the conflicts and congruencies


between the 10 basic valuesactions in pursuit of one valuewill often have psychological, practical, and social conse-quences that may converge or conflict with the pursuit of othervalues. Values adjacent to each other in the values circle(Figure 1) reflect compatible goals that can often be attainedsimultaneously by the same action. For instance, the pursuitof universalism values is often compatible with the pursuit ofbenevolence values; enhancing the welfare of all others islikely to also bolster the welfare of those with whom one is infrequent contact. In essence, both universalism and benevolenceare sensitive to the needs of others. By contrast, values oppositeto each other in the values circle reflect conflicting goals. Forexample, the pursuit of universalism values is likely to conflictwith the pursuit of power values; actions that promote the goodof all people will often obstruct such actions that are related toenhancing ones own supremacy and authority.

Values and Behaviour

Bardi and Schwartz (2003) argued that the natural way to pur-sue important values is to behave in ways that express them orpromote their attainment (p. 1208). Consistent with this, intheir recent review on advances in theory and empiricalresearch on the relations between personal values and behav-iour, Roccas and Sagiv (2009) argued that one of the reasonsfor the interest in understanding personal values is their effectson behaviour (p. 30) and that personal values have beenfound to be associated with a large variety of behaviours(p. 33). In support of this claim, they listed 18 studies in whichpersonal values were correlated with behaviour. However, in12 of those studies, the behaviour of interest was assessedexclusively by means of questionnaire self-ratings. A furtherthree studies included both self-reports and other reports, andanother two studies included both self-reports and actualbehaviours. Regarding the two studies that involved actualbehaviours, values were related to self-rating questionnairesmeasuring negotiation schemas (Brett & Okumura, 1998)and the valence of different university courses (Feather,1988). However, values were related neither to actual negotia-tion outcomes nor to actual course enrolment. These results are

Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. (2013)

Personal values and prosocial behaviour

particularly pertinent to the present research. As we arguelater, negotiation behaviours and course enrolment decisionscould serve values on opposite sides of the values circle.Finally, one study involved making decisions regarding hypo-thetical scenarios (e.g. which of two briefly described jobs theparticipant would prefer; Feather, 1995), but these decisionswere entirely nonconsequential.

On the basis of research cited by Roccas and Sagiv (2009),the literature on personal values may suffer from a similareclipse of actual behaviour as does the entire field of personal-ity and social psychology (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder,2007). Our purpose is not to dismiss research in which behav-iour is measured by means of questionnaire ratingssuchmeasures without doubt provide valuable insights. However,we believe that actual behaviours could be an importantcomplement to questionnaire ratings. Therefore, our first goalis to present new data on the relations between values andactual behaviour.

Value-expressive and Value-ambivalent Behaviours

Besides presenting data on valuebehaviour relations, our sec-ond goal is to theoretically develop and empirically test whatwe believe is an important but overlooked aspect ofSchwartzs values theory. Bardi and Schwartz (2003), in theirstudy on relations between values and behaviour, noted thatmost behaviours can express more than one value (p. 1208)and gave hiking as an exampleadventure (stimulationvalues), love of nature (universalism), or compliance withfriends expectations (conformity) could all motivate hiking.However, in the empirical part of their research, Bardi andSchwartz (2003) constrained themselves to empiricallystudying what they denoted as value-expressive behaviours,behaviours that express primarily one value (p. 1209).Using questionnaires to assess the frequency of suchvalue-expressive behaviours, they found reasonable correla-tions between personal values and behaviour. For instance,universalism values were correlated (r = .34) with partnerratings of universalism behaviour, measured with items suchas Uses environmentally friendly products and Makes sureeveryone he knows receives equal treatment. But what aboutpredicting behaviours that can express more than one value,or even behaviours that can express opposing values?

As noted earlier, one of the most important features ofSchwartzs values theory is the total pattern of conflict andcompatibility among the valuesactions compatible withone value will frequently be incompatible with other values.Nevertheless, the same behaviours could, for different individ-uals, be motivated by values on opposite sides of the valuescircle. For instance, publicly giving to charity could be drivenby the intrinsic desire to help others (universalism), or it couldbe a means of signalling to others ones wealth and social sta-tus (power; e.g. Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Harbaugh, 1998).Similarly, the punishment of unfair behaviour, for instance ina negotiation situation, could be motivated either by justiceand fairness considerations (i.e. by universalism) or by the rep-utational advantages that such behaviour confers (i.e. bypower; e.g. Kurzban, DeScioli, & OBrien, 2007). A furtherexample could be course enrolmentmany university subjectsand careers, such as law or medicine, could be chosen either


for the good that they bring the self (e.g. high prestige or goodsalary) or in order to gain the competence to help others. Notethat in the studies reviewed by Roccas and Sagiv (2009),values predicted neither actual negotiation outcomes norcourse enrolment (Brett & Okumura, 1998; Feather, 1988).

Values opposite to each other in the circular structure ofvalues (Figure 1) are negatively correlated. For instance,someone scoring high on universalism is very likely to scorelow on power (and vice versa). Now, if a given behaviourcan be motivated by either universalism or by power values,the correlations between these two values and that behaviourare likely to be very low. This is because those for whom thebehaviour is motivated by universalism are likely to scorelow on power, mitigating, on the interindividual level, the pos-sible explanatory power of power values. Analogously, thosefor whom the behaviour is motivated by power are likely toscore low on universalism, mitigating, again on theinterindividual level, the predictive power of high universal-ism. The associations between these two values and the behav-iour should thus, at least to some extent, cancel each other outacross individuals. We therefore argue that values cannot beexpected to be correlated with behaviours that promote valueson opposite sides of the values circle, and we denote such be-haviours as value-ambivalent behaviours.

Personal Values and Prosocial Behaviour

The present research deals with behaviour in economicexchanges that basically set against each other (monetary)good for others and good for self. Two previous studies haveexamined the relations between personal values and behaviourin experimental games similar to the ones that are investigatedin the present research. Schwartz (1996) studied personalvalues and allocation behaviour in a cooperation experimentin which participants could allocate money between them-selves and their group members. Similarly, Sagiv, Sverdlik,and Schwarz (2011) conducted a study in which participantsplayed two different social dilemma games. In both studies,universalism and benevolence values were positively, andpower values negatively, correlated with prosocial behaviour.

The preceding empirical results are consistent withSchwartzs (2006) classification of values according to theinterests they serve: ones own or others. Universalism(emphasizing the welfare of all people) and benevolence(emphasizing the welfare of ones in-group) are other-focused,whereas power (emphasizing control over people andresources) is self-focused. The defining goal of universalismvalues is to care for the welfare of all people, suggesting thatthey may be the most relevant basic value in the type of anon-ymous situations currently under investigation (Schwartz,1992). Although benevolence values also provide an internal-ized motivational base for caring for the welfare of others(Schwartz, 1992), this caring is limited to those with whomone is in frequent personal contact; most critical are relationswithin the family and other primary groups. Because the eco-nomic exchanges that we investigated were all carried outamong anonymous strangers, benevolence values would beexpected to be only weak determinants of behaviour. Appar-ently contradicting this line of reasoning, the precedingreferred two studies (Sagiv et al., 2011; Schwartz, 1996) did



find an effect for benevolence values. However, the study bySchwartz (1996) required participants to choose betweenallocating money between themselves and a member in owngroup (Table 1.2; Schwartz, 1996), as well as did the secondstudy by Sagiv et al. (2011). Benevolence values, emphasizingthe welfare of the in-group, were therefore likely to be moreimportant in these studies than in the present study.

In terms of value expressiveness versus value ambivalence,the behaviours investigated by both Schwartz (1996) and Sagivet al. (2011) were clearly value-expressive. Schwartz (1996)had participants play a variant of the prisoners dilemma game.In this game, participants could always maximize theirpersonal gain by choosing the individualistic alternative.Regarding the two studies employed by Sagiv et al. (2011),in the paired charity game, players could choose betweencooperating or competing. Importantly, regardless of what theother player did, each player maximized his or her personalpay-off by competing. In the group charity game, the situationwas similar: Participants could free ride and enjoy the potentialprofits of their group being victorious without significantlyweakening the possibilities of their group winning (Footnote5; Sagiv et al., 2011). The present research adds to these studiesby investigating also value-ambivalent behaviours.

The Present Research

The present research reports on two studies. First, in an analy-sis of our own work in which we included all of the relevantstudies that we had conducted between 2007 and 2010, we in-vestigated how personal values, conceptualized according toSchwartzs (1992) values theory, predicted behaviour in vari-ous types of economic exchanges. All of the decisions that

Figure 2. The five types of experimental economics games that were e


participants made in these various strategic interactionsinvolved some form of social exchange that provided theopportunity to pursue good for the self or good for the other.

The different types of strategic interactions (games) inwhich behaviour was measured are shown in Figure 2. Thegames in Study 1 were included because they were availableand complied with our inclusion criteria. All games involveddyadic economic exchanges. The games were the prisonersdilemma, the ultimatum game, the trust game, and the gift-exchange game. In the prisoners dilemma, all participants,referred to as (1) cooperators, faced the same decision task.The other three games each involved two different roles. Inthe ultimatum game, these roles are referred to as (2) proposerand (3) responder. The trust game and the gift-exchange gamewere virtually identical in terms of the decisions that had to bemade, and both games distinguished between the (4) truster and(5) trustee role. The dependent variable across games and roleswas the extent to which the individuals decision was prosocialthe percentage of money that was transferred (prisonersdilemma), the percentage of the pie that was proposed oraccepted (ultimatum game, proposer or responder roles,respectively), or the percentage of money that was transferredor back-transferred (trust game, truster or trustee roles, respec-tively). Across games, we expect universalism values to predicthigher, and power values to predict lower, levels of prosocial be-haviour. Importantly, we expect these effects to be stronger forthose roles in which we expect behaviour to be value-expressive.

Because Study 1 was based on data originally collected forother purposes, the assortment of strategic interactions thatwe ended up with was not sufficiently comprehensive. Mostimportantly, the studies that we had run between 2007 and2010 did not include a single dictator game, perhaps the moti-vationally least ambiguous standard experimental economics

mployed



game. Behaviour in this game excludes strategic considerationsand could therefore be expected to be strongly value-expressive.To assess the robustness of our Study 1 results, we thereforeran an additional experiment involving the dictator game(Study 2). We expected behaviour in this game to be highlyvalue-expressive.

In the following, we briefly describe the games and lay outour hypotheses for each game. In the prisoners dilemma, tworandomly matched participants are simultaneously asked todetermine the amount of money from a given endowment thatthey wish to transfer to the other participant. The best option,in terms of maximizing own pay-off without any concern forthe other participants pay-off, is to transfer nothing, regard-less of what the other player does. But if both players do this,each players individual reward will be smaller than if theyboth had cooperated. Is cooperative behaviour in the pris-oners dilemma value-expressive, or is it value-ambivalent?We expect the behaviour in the prisoners dilemma to bevalue-expressive. The participants in a dyad simultaneouslyface the decision about whether or not to cooperate. Coopera-tion always entails an immediate monetary loss, regardless ofwhat the other person doesin order to maximize ones mon-etary gain, one should not cooperate at all. Therefore, the moreone transfers, the more one is giving up good for the self infavour of good for the other. Consistent with previous researchsuggesting that individual differences in motivation arerelevant for prisoners dilemma behaviours (Kuhlman &Marshello, 1975), we hypothesized values to predict suchbehaviours. Specifically, we expect high universalism valuesto predict higher transfers and high power values to predictlower transfers (Schwartz, 1996).

In the ultimatum game (Gth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze,1982), there are two distinct roles: Proposers are matched withresponders to constitute dyads. Within the dyads, participantsare asked to divide between themselves a fixed amount ofmoney. The proposer is asked to suggest a division. Theresponder has to decide between accepting and rejecting theproposed division. In the standard ultimatum game, in casethe responder accepts the proposed division, both participantsreceive the amounts proposed to them in the proposers divi-sion. If the responder rejects the proposers division, bothparticipants receive nothing. Are the proposers andresponders decisions value-expressive? We did not expectthem to be. The proposers task is very complex. Theproposers decision to suggest a relatively fair division ofmoney can be motivated by an interest in the responderswelfare (universalism values). However, such a decision mayalso be motivated by strategic considerations (i.e. fear of rejec-tion), as a means to secure ones own outcome (power values;Thaler, 1988; Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004).Regarding responders, the decision to accept even a smallamount of money could also be motivated by universalismvalues: In order not to destroy the joint good of both players,someone valuing universalism may abstain from striking backat the person by whom one is treated unfairly, even when retal-iation would be warranted. However, such a decision couldalso be motivated by power values, as a small amount ofmoney is better than no money. Similarly, the decision toreject an unfair offer could be motivated by universalismvaluesthose valuing universalism could respond to an unfair


offer with moral outrage and seek to punish the proposer forviolating fairness principles. However, the decision to punishcould also be motivated by power values, as punishing wouldbe a way to exercise power. Drawing on our reasoning above,because of the motivational complexity of the decisions, we donot expect personal values to predict either proposer orresponder behaviourthat is, we expect both proposer andresponder behaviours to be value-ambivalent.

In the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), par-ticipants are assigned into dyads, with one participant assignedthe role of the truster and the other the role of the trustee. Thetruster receives an endowment of money and has to decidehow much of the money to transfer to the trustee. This sumis removed from the trusters account and multiplied by afactor larger than 1 as it is transferred to the trustees account.This multiplication is essential, as it means that the amount ofmoney that the truster and trustee jointly earn increases the ini-tial transfer from the truster to the trustee. The trustee decideson whether to return none, some, or all of the received moneyto the truster. Is the truster behaviour value-expressive? We donot think so. In terms of motivation, the trusters decision ishighly complex. The truster could transfer money to the trusteeout of concern for the trustees earnings (universalism). How-ever, the truster could also transfer money in hopes of a largeback-transfer (power; these two motives have been unveiledwhen trusters have been asked to explain their decisions;Jacobsen & Sadrieh, 1996). We therefore expected truster be-haviour to be value-ambivalent. By contrast, we expectedtrustee behaviour to be value-expressive. The trustee role issimpler: Back-transfers to the truster will always entail a mon-etary loss (the trustee is in a position in which own good andothers good are in direct opposition). We therefore expectuniversalism values to predict higher back-transfers and powervalues to predict lower back-transfers.

In the gift-exchange game, participants are assigned intodyads, with one participant assigned the role of the employerand the other the role of the employee (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, &Riedl, 1998). Employers choose a wagethat is, how manyunits to be paid to the employee. Employees decide on howmuch costly effort to exertthat is, how many units to back-transfer to the employer. The units back-transferred by theemployee to the employer are multiplied by a factor larger than1. As in the trust game, this multiplication is essentialthemore the employer pays (transfers to the Employee), thegreater the possible joint earnings of the employer and the em-ployee. The employers wage payment reflects the employerslevel of trust towards the employee. The exerted effort levelcan be interpreted as the employees degree of kindness to-wards the employer. The gift-exchange game is, in fact, almostidentical to the trust game described earlier: The employer isfacing essentially the same decision problem as the truster(how much to transfer), and the employee essentially same de-cision problem as the trustee (how much to back-transfer). Ourpredictions were therefore identical to those we made for thetrust game: Employer behaviour is hypothesized to be value-ambivalent, whereas employee behaviour is hypothesized tobe value-expressive, with high universalism values and lowpower values predicting higher effort levels. As the decisionsituations in the trust game and gift-exchange game are vir-tually identical, the roles that are assigned in these games



were collapsed for purposes of the present research. Both thetruster role (trust game) and the employer role (gift-exchangegame) are referred to as the truster role, and both the trustee role(trust game) and the employee role (gift-exchange game) arereferred to as the trustee role.

Study 2 was run in order to assess the robustness of theStudy 1 results. The dictator game can be described as similarto the ultimatum game used in Study 1, except that the dictatorgame controls for strategic behaviour. In this dyadic game, thedictator determines how to split a given endowment betweenhimself or herself and a receiver. The receiver does nothing.The only reason for the dictator to give anything at all to thereceiver is thus concern for the receivers well-being. Suchan unambiguous motivation suggests that the dictators trans-fer decisions, our dependent variable, should be highlyvalue-expressive. We therefore hypothesize universalism andpower values to strongly predict dictator behaviour. In Study2, the recently developed PVQ5X Values Survey (Schwartzet al., 2012) was used to measure those 19 values argued, inthe refined theory of personal values, to constitute the original10 broad value constructs. Our behavioural measure was theamount that participants transferred in the role of the dictatorin a dictator game.

STUDY 1

Methods

Data Selection

For Study 1, we report on all data collected by our researchteam during the time between 2007 and 2010, which fulfilledthe following criteria:

(1) Participants took part in an experimental economics gameand completed a questionnaire that assessed personalvalues as conceptualized by Schwartzs (1992) valuestheory.

(2) All decisions were monetarily incentivized. This excludedlottery and other designs in which only some of the partic-ipants were paid. This was done because the relationsbetween individual difference variables and decisionsmay differ depending on whether decisions are monetarilyincentivized or not (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009;Ben-Ner, Amit, & Ori, 2008; Kang, Rangel, Camus, &Camerer, 2011; Lnnqvist, Verkasalo, & Walkowitz, 2011;Smith, 1976).

(3) Decisions were made in a controlled classroom or labora-tory environment (excluding Internet studies).

Incentives were designed to be similar across games (com-parable expected gains) and were scaled to local incomelevels, so that the economic incentives were roughly similarfor all participants. The dependent variable that was selectedfrom each sample was always the one that was measured inthe first game of that particular session (sometimes, partici-pants played more than one game during the course an exper-iment; however, participants never had knowledge of anyfuture games). All games were played in randomly formeddyads of participants with an unknown other person. In none


of the reported games did participants interact repeatedly withthe same person. That no games were played in iterationshould exclude those strategic considerations that repeatedinteractions with the same participant could have elicited.Importantly, participants were at all times fully aware of theone-shot nature of the interactionsat no stage did theyexpect their interaction with the other participant to continuein any way. The rules of the games were made completelytransparent to all participants (e.g. in the trust game, all partic-ipants were aware that trusters transfers were multiplied bythe experimenter). Understanding of the mechanics of thegame was always tested by several questions that all partici-pants had to complete successfully before the game started.

Participants and Procedure

Prisoners Dilemma. Participants in Samples 13 (seeTable 2 for sample descriptives) were students from variousfaculties at the Universities of Helsinki (Finland) and Bonn(Germany). Participants were contacted through universitymailing lists using the Online Recruitment System for EconomicExperiments (ORSEE; Greiner, 2004), and with notices put upon general university notice boards. On arrival, participants wererandomly seated in a large classroom (Samples 1 and 2) or incomputer cubicles that secured anonymity (Sample 3). In theclassroom, the desks were placed in a way that maximized pri-vacy (participants were seated as far apart from each other aspossible). All experiments were conducted with pen and paper.

In Samples 1 and 3, a prisoners dilemma give game (Goerg& Walkowitz, 2010) was implemented. In this game, tworandomly and anonymously matched participants received aninitial endowment of 10 talers (1 taler =0.5). They were thengiven the opportunity to simultaneously transfer as many talersas they wished (010 talers; integers) from themselves to theother participant. Any transferred amountour index of pris-oners dilemma give prosocial behaviourwas doubled by theexperimenters (recall that in all games, participants were fullyaware of the game mechanisms; i.e. they knew that their transferswould be doubled). In Sample 2, participants took part in the pris-oners dilemma take game (Goerg & Walkowitz, 2010). Bothparticipants were also in this game given 10 talers, but partici-pants were now allowed to transfer as many talers as they wished(010 talers; integers) from the other participant to themselves.The amount that participants did not transfer from the otherparticipantour index of prisoners dilemma take prosocialbehaviourwas doubled by the experimenters. The prisonersdilemma give and prisoners dilemma take are strategicallyand formally identical games (Goerg & Walkowitz, 2010).

Ultimatum Bargaining Games. Participants in all sampleswere students from various faculties at the University of Bonn(Germany; Samples 48 and 1418) and the SouthwestJiaotong University of Chengdu (China; Samples 913 and1923). Participants in Bonn were recruited through the onlinerecruiting system ORSEE and in Chengdu via telephone (onlyparticipants who had volunteered to take part in researchconducted at the laboratory were called). On arrival, partici-pants were randomly seated in computer cubicles that securedanonymity and were assigned the proposer or responder role.All experiments were conducted with computers in a lab using


Table 2. Sample descriptives

Sample Game Action Role Country City NMean %transferred

SD oftransferred

Female(%)

Meanage

1 PD Transfer Cooperator Finland Helsinki 20 36 27 70 24.42 PD Transfer (reverse) Cooperator Finland Helsinki 21 47 33 71 25.03 PD Transfer Cooperator Germany Bonn 60 34 32 58 24.94 UG Offer (150; 30) Proposer Germany Bonn 18 24 11 61 25.15 UG Offer (30; 150) Proposer Germany Bonn 22 57 14 59 25.06 UG Offer (30; 30) Proposer Germany Bonn 10 46 12 30 26.77 UG Offer (30; 90) Proposer Germany Bonn 22 48 09 36 25.88 UG Offer (90; 30) Proposer Germany Bonn 24 36 12 54 24.09 UG Offer (150; 30) Proposer China Chengdu 10 28 11 n.a. 23.510 UG Offer (30; 150) Proposer China Chengdu 10 64 07 n.a. 24.111 UG Offer (30; 30) Proposer China Chengdu 40 38 15 n.a. 24.112 UG Offer (30; 90) Proposer China Chengdu 10 46 06 n.a. 23.413 UG Offer (90; 30) Proposer China Chengdu 10 37 08 n.a. n.a.14 UG Acceptance threshold

(150; 30)Responder Germany Bonn 18 30 11 44 25.3

15 UG Acceptance threshold(30; 150)

Responder Germany Bonn 22 64 08 41 25.4








Responder China Chengdu 10 32 14 n.a. 23.6








Responder China Chengdu 10 37 07 n.a.

24 TG Trust transfer Truster Germany Bonn 125 46 31 46 23.625 TG Trust transfer Truster Germany Bonn 54 58 26 56 22.826 TG Trust transfer Truster Israel Jerusalem 18 57 31 44 23.827 GE Wage payment Truster Germany Bonn 36 43 26 50 23.928 GE Wage payment Truster Germany Kln 36 45 23 50 24.829 GE Wage payment Truster West Bank Abu-Dis 47 59 19 48 21.230 GE Wage payment Truster West Bank Ramallah 36 58 16 50 20.831 GE Wage payment Truster Israel Beer-Sheva 36 49 22 50 24.332 GE Wage payment Truster Israel Jerusalem 36 58 31 50 25.433 TG Back-transfer Trustee Germany Bonn 125 33 20 48 23.434 TG Back-transfer Trustee Germany Bonn 53 31 22 60 22.335 TG Back-transfer Trustee Israel Jerusalem 18 34 23 56 24.736 GE Effort Trustee Germany Bonn 36 17 13 50 23.337 GE Effort Trustee Germany Kln 36 09 12 50 24.638 GE Effort Trustee West Bank Abu-Dis 36 47 11 50 20.139 GE Effort Trustee West Bank Ramallah 36 58 18 50 20.340 GE Effort Trustee Israel Beer-Sheva 36 25 16 50 24.141 GE Effort Trustee Israel Jerusalem 36 19 15 52 24.4

Note: The transferred and SD transferred columns indicate the average and standard deviation of the percentage transferred, or in case of ultimatum game re-sponders, the percentage demanded. Proposer and responder outside options are shown in the third column: The left number indicates the outside option forthe proposer, and the right number the outside option for the responder, for example, for Sample 7, if the proposal is rejected, then the proposer receives 30 pointsand the responder 90 points. Female (%) indicates the percentage of females. Age shows the average age of the participants of the respective experiment.PD= prisoners dilemma, UG=ultimatum game, TG= trust game, GE= gift-exchange game.


the software z-Treea program designed for running interac-tive experiments (Fischbacher, 2007).

In Samples 423, participants played various variants of theultimatum game (Gth et al., 1982) with different outside options.Outside options are participants pay-offs in case the proposalis rejected. Participants were randomly and anonymouslymatched into proposerresponder dyads. In each dyad, partici-pants bargained on an amount of 240 points (10 points = 0.6


for Samples 48 and 1418; 10 points = 0.15 for Samples913 and 1923). The proposer decided which amount to offerto the responder (0240 points; integers), while the respondersimultaneously indicated the lowest acceptable amount (0240points; integers). If the offer made by the proposerourmeasureof proposers prosocial behaviourto the responder exceededthe minimum level of acceptance set by the responderourmeasure of responders prosocial behaviourthen the



240 points were split according to the offer made by the pro-poser. However, if the offer made by the proposer was lowerthan the minimum acceptance level set by the responder, bothproposer and responder received their respective outside options.

Trust Game. Participants in Samples 24 and 33 were stu-dents from various faculties at the University of Bonn (Germany).Participants were recruited via ORSEE. On arrival, participantswere randomly seated in computer cubicles that secured ano-nymity and were randomly assigned a role (truster or trustee).All experiments were conducted on the computer using z-Tree(Fischbacher, 2007).

In Samples 24 and 33, participants played a trust game(Berg et al., 1995). In this game, there are two playersatruster and a trustee. Initially, both players are endowed withan amount of 10 talers. The truster is given the opportunityto transfer any part of the endowment (010 talers, integers)to the randomly matched and anonymous trustee. The trusterstransferour measure of trusters prosocial behaviouris tri-pled by the experimenter. Upon receiving the transfer, trusteesdecide on how much to return to the truster. In our set-up, bothplayers decided simultaneously. Because trustees at the time oftheir decision did not knowwhich amount the truster had actuallytransferred, trustees back-transfers were elicited with the strat-egy method (Selten, 1967). That is, each trustee indicated foreach possible transfer the amount that they would back-transfer,and the index of trustee prosocial behaviour was the average ofthese decisions. We applied an exchange rate of 1 taler =0.60.

Consecutive Trust Games. Participants were studentsfrom various faculties at the University of Bonn (Germany;Samples 25 and 34) and from the Hebrew University in Jeru-salem (Israel; Samples 26 and 35). It had originally beenintended to collect data from the West Bank and more data fromIsrael, but this had not been completely carried out at the time ofthe present analysis. Participants in Bonn were invited viaORSEE and those in Jerusalem with notices put up on generaluniversity notice boards. On arrival, participants were randomlyseated in computer cubicles that secured anonymity and wererandomly assigned a role (truster of trustee). All experiments wereconducted on the computer using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).

Participants in Samples 25 and 26 and Samples 34 and 35played a trust game consisting of three consecutive decisionrounds (refer to the trust game methods). Each truster(Samples 25 and 26) was randomly assigned one trustee fromthe University of Bonn (Germany; Sample 34), one trusteefrom the Hebrew University in Jerusalem (Israel; Sample35), and one trustee from the Al-Quds University in Abu-Dis(West Bank, data from this sample were unavailable for thepresent research) in a randomized order. Initially, both playersare endowed with an amount of 10 talers. Trusters and trusteesknew the university name and city of their respective counter-part. Participants made one decision for each of their threecounterparts and received no feedback between decisions onthe outcomes of previous interactions. Both players decidedsimultaneously. Because trustees at the time of their decisiondid not know the amount that the truster had actually trans-ferred to them, their back-transfers were elicited by applyingthe strategy method (Selten, 1967). As in the one-shot trustgame described earlier, each trustee indicated for each possibletransfer the amount that they would back-transfer, and the


index of trustee prosocial behaviour was computed as the aver-age of these decisions averaged over the three consecutivegames. As an index for trusters prosocial behaviour, we usedthe average transferred amount across the three games. In ourset-up, we used the following exchange rates: 1 taler = 0.25in Samples 25 and 34 and 1 taler =NIS1.25 in Samples 26and 35.

Gift-exchange Games. Participants from six distinct uni-versities in Germany (Samples 27 and 28, and 36 and 37), theWest Bank (29 and 30, and 38 and 39), and Israel (31 and 32,and 40 and 41) took part in the gift-exchange game. Partici-pants in Germany (Bonn and Cologne) were invited throughORSEE. In Israel (Jerusalem and Beer-Sheva) and in the WestBank (Abu-Dis and Ramallah), they were recruited throughnotices put up on general university notice boards. The experi-ments, run in each university with six groups of 12 participants,were conducted on computers (Bonn, Cologne, and Jerusalem)or by pen and paper (Abu-Dis, Ramallah, and Beer-Sheva).When participants arrived at the venue of the experiment, theywere seated in laboratory cubicles or large class rooms andrandomly assigned a role (employer or employee).

In Samples 2732 and 3641, participants acted asemployers and employees, respectively, in a cross-culturallyrun gift-exchange game (Fehr et al., 1998). All employersdetermined a wage (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90,100, 110, or 120 points (1 point = 0.18 in Samples 27 and28 and 1 point =NIS1 in Samples 2932)) to be paid to 12 dif-ferent employees. Each employee represented a unique3 2 2 combination of the following characteristics: region(Germany, West Bank, or Israel), sex (men or women), andschool performance (employee belongs to the best 50% ofGerman/Palestinian/Israeli employees with respect to schoolgrades or no information). Simultaneous to the employersdetermining a wage, the 12 employees decided on how mucheffort (0120 units, integers) to exert for each of the 13 poten-tial wage payments (one unit of effort costs the employee onepoint). For pay-off determination, employers and employeeswere matched. The income of one specific employer/employeedyad depended on the wage paid by the employer to theemployee and the effort exerted for that specific wage by theemployee. Employers pay-off equalled twice the employeeseffort minus the employees wage. The employees pay-offwas equal to the received wage minus the costs for the exertedeffort. As an index of employers prosocial behaviour, wecomputed the average wage that the employer was willing topay across the 12 potential employees. Regarding employees,a prosocial behaviour index was computed as the employeesaverage effort across the 13 potential wage payments.

Values Questionnaires

Values were measured with the Chinese (N = 160), Finnish(N= 41), and German (N= 502) language versions of the40-item Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ40; Schwartzet al., 2001) and with the Arabic (N=156), German (N= 251),and Hebrew (N=180) language versions of the 21-item PortraitValues Questionnaire (PVQ21; Schwartz, 2007). Both measuresare based on descriptions of different people, whose goals,aspirations, and wishes are characterized shortly. For example,



the item She wants everyone to be treated justly, even peopleshe doesnt know. It is important to her to protect the weak in so-cietymeasures universalism, and the item She always wants tobe the one who makes the decisions. She likes to be the leadermeasures power. Respondents indicated in response to each itemhowmuch like you this person is by using a 6-point scale rang-ing from 1 (not like me at all) to 6 (very much like me). In order tocontrol for scale use (some people may consistently use the upperend of the scale across values, whereas others the lower), we com-puted ipsatized scores (each individuals mean score across the 10values was centred to be one). The scores thus represent the rela-tive importance of each value, converting absolute scores intovalue priorities (e.g. Schwartz et al., 2001).

Means, standard deviations, and internal consistency reli-abilities of all values questionnaires are presented in Table 3.It should be noted that some of the PVQ21 reliabilities wererather low (the lowest being = .16 for tradition in the Germansamples). This is due to the fact that few items (two or three;Table 3) are used to measure each value and that each valuerepresents a wide concept. The reliabilities are in line withthe reliabilities reported in earlier studies (e.g. Schwartz,2007; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005), suggesting no particularproblems in the current samples. Despite the low reliabilitiesinherent to the PVQ21, there is firm evidence supporting thevalidity of this questionnaire. The measure has been consis-tently related to different variables such as political orienta-tion, interpersonal trust, immigration attitudes (Schwartz,2007), and gender differences (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005).Furthermore, the similarity of the empirical structure of theinstrument with the theoretical structure shown in Figure 1has been tested and confirmed (e.g. Bilsky, Janik, & Schwartz,2011; Davidov et al., 2008).

Analytic Considerations

Despite the games being played in dyads, each observation wasindependent of the dyad in which it was madeacross games,all decisions were made blind to the other persons actions. Thevalues questionnaire was always administered last, after all deci-sions had been made but before participants had learned of thedecisions of the other player and the outcomes of those decisions.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for values questionnaires

Personalvalue

PVQ40

Germany Israel West Bank

M SD M SD M SD

Benevolence 1.03 0.15 0.60 1.14 0.19 0.70 1.14 0.18 0.68Universalism 1.06 0.13 0.60 1.25 0.19 0.86 1.06 0.19 0.79Self-direction 1.00 0.16 0.58 1.17 0.17 0.21 1.15 0.16 0.57Stimulation 0.78 0.21 0.73 1.02 0.23 0.91 0.93 0.24 0.78Hedonism 1.04 0.19 0.65 1.04 0.28 0.93 1.08 0.24 0.83Achievement 1.01 0.19 0.76 0.95 0.25 0.82 0.96 0.23 0.85Power 0.82 0.21 0.66 0.73 0.18 0.57 0.81 0.23 0.68Security 1.09 0.16 0.63 0.96 0.22 0.65 0.95 0.20 0.62Conformity 1.01 0.17 0.63 0.76 0.24 0.67 0.88 0.22 0.67Tradition 0.82 0.17 0.33 0.74 0.21 0.36 0.79 0.23 0.61

Note: The column labelled Items gives the number of items that measure the va


Taken together, we report on data collected from 41 differ-ent samples from five different regions (Finland, China,Germany, Israel, and West Bank). Many of the samples arehighly similar to each other, but they all differ with respectto at least one key characteristic, such as differences due toexperimental manipulations (e.g. whether the prisonersdilemma transfers are framed as giving or as taking) or the regionthe experiment was conducted in (e.g. China or Germany).Almost none of the data have been previously published(Samples 1 and 2 being the only exceptions; Lnnqvist,Walkowitz, Wichardt, Lindeman, & Verkasalo, 2009).

Regarding the statistical methods, the number of partici-pants in some samples was quite small, and the data werenot normally distributed in approximately half of the samples(in 19 out of 41 samples, the KolmogorovSmirnov test indi-cated that the behavioural variable was not normally distrib-uted at p< .05). We therefore report Spearman rank-ordercorrelations when investigating the associations betweenvalues and behaviour (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). Meta-analy-ses of these correlations were conducted both separately foreach role and across all roles. In order to investigate whetherthe correlations across roles differed, we treated the Spearmancoefficients as though they were Pearson coefficients and usedFishers z-transformation. This type of comparison has, usingMonte Carlo simulations, been shown to be better than eitherignoring the nonnormality of the data or converting the Spearmancoefficients to Pearson equivalents prior to Fishers z-transformation(Myers & Sirois, 2006). Universalism and power were expected topredict value-expressive but not value-ambivalent behaviours,that is, to predict behaviour in the cooperator and trustee role,but not in any other role. To further verify our results and testfor some other possible effects, we ran linear mixed-modelanalyses. We changed from nonparametric to parametric statis-tics because the dependent variable was, in contrast to thedistributions within samples, normally distributed across sam-ples (for the appropriateness of applying parametric statistics tononnormal data, see Norman, 2010). In our linear mixed-modelanalyses, we sought first to verify that the relations between per-sonal values and behaviour vary across roles when controllingfor possible confounding variables. We also investigated whichvalues could predict behaviour when entered together with othervalues and the possible interaction effect between universalism

PVQ21

Items

Germany Israel West Bank

ItemsM SD M SD M SD

4 1.16 0.27 0.43 1.18 0.16 0.50 1.08 0.14 0.48 26 1.11 0.23 0.50 1.09 0.21 0.64 1.03 0.14 0.36 34 1.11 0.21 0.35 1.10 0.21 0.46 1.05 0.16 0.52 23 1.01 0.26 0.71 0.91 0.25 0.84 1.01 0.18 0.27 23 1.07 0.26 0.69 1.01 0.26 0.74 0.99 0.19 0.54 24 0.99 0.23 0.73 1.13 0.22 0.76 1.06 0.15 0.33 23 0.90 0.26 0.55 0.86 0.23 0.41 0.79 0.21 0.33 25 0.92 0.24 0.36 0.99 0.23 0.35 1.06 0.18 0.49 24 0.83 0.26 0.57 0.79 0.25 0.62 0.93 0.23 0.53 24 0.91 0.29 0.12 0.84 0.27 0.30 0.88 0.22 0.29 2

lue.



and power valuessome combination of these two dimensionscould be expected to be particularly predictive of behaviour.

Results

The Spearman correlations between values and behaviour areshown in Table 4. Separate meta-analyses of these correlationswere conducted for each role. Also shown at the bottom ofTable 4 are the results of a meta-analysis over all data (sampleswere weighted according to number of participants, andFishers z-transformation was used). Universalism values wereassociated with behaviour in the cooperator (Spearman=.32, p< .01) and trustee roles (Spearman =.16, p< .01),

Table 4. Spearman correlations between personal values and cooperato

Sample Role Benevolence UniversalismSelf-

direction Stimulatio

1 Cooperator 0.07 0.24 0.12 0.312 Cooperator 0.17 0.47* 0.57** 0.063 Cooperator 0.15 0.29 0.14 0.234 Proposer 0.20 0.48* 0.02 0.015 Proposer 0.31 0.12 0.52* 0.256 Proposer 0.07 0.25 0.36 0.367 Proposer 0.29 0.01 0.35 0.368 Proposer 0.24 0.05 0.00 0.159 Proposer 0.32 0.01 0.04 0.2610 Proposer 0.05 0.35 0.61 0.2211 Proposer 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.1812 Proposer 0.25 0.17 0.12 0.5713 Proposer 0.31 0.24 0.06 0.3114 Responder 0.01 0.17 0.47 0.1415 Responder 0.24 0.17 0.29 0.51*16 Responder 0.02 0.39 0.15 0.78**17 Responder 0.05 0.39 0.09 0.2018 Responder 0.20 0.02 0.20 0.64**19 Responder 0.10 0.24 0.14 0.1220 Responder 0.15 0.43 0.54 0.4921 Responder 0.16 0.10 0.20 0.0422 Responder 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.4623 Responder 0.17 0.290 0.71* 0.85**24 Truster 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.0225 Truster 0.05 0.00 0.13 0.0826 Truster 0.30 0.49* 0.25 0.2227 Truster 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.0128 Truster 0.08 0.10 0.22 0.1529 Truster 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.1230 Truster 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.0231 Truster 0.25 0.06 0.13 0.2932 Truster 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.1133 Trustee 0.20* 0.35*** 0.12 0.1734 Trustee 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.1835 Trustee 0.12 0.22 0.37 0.1036 Trustee 0.20 0.06 0.01 0.1037 Trustee 0.26 0.24 0.06 0.0838 Trustee 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.1339 Trustee 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.1440 Trustee 0.11 0.23 0.27 0.1341 Trustee 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.18Cooperators (N= 101) 0.11 0.32** 0.07 0.19Proposers (N= 176) 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.07Responders (N= 176) 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.15*Trusters (N= 412) 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05Trustees (N= 424) 0.10* 0.16*** 0.01 0.06All (N = 1289) 0.07* 0.09*** 0.03 0.01Note: Behaviour is operationalized as the percentage of money transferred, excoperationalized as the percentage demanded.***p< .001; **p< .01; *p< .05.


but not in the other roles. Power values were, in these sameroles, also weakly correlated with behaviour (Spearman = .15, p = .15 and Spearman = .12, p< .05, respectively).As expected, all other correlations were either rather weak interms of effect size or unreliable. For instance, although the cor-relation between benevolence and prosocial behaviour reachedstatistical significance when all samples were combined, thecorrelation was very weak ( = .07, p< .05). Some unexpectedcorrelations, such as the one between stimulation values andresponder behaviour, are perhaps best interpreted as chancefindings.

Regarding differences between correlation coefficientsacross roles (these differences were computed using Fishers

r, proposer, responder, truster, and trustee behaviours (Study 1)

n Hedonism Achievement Power Security Conformity Tradition

0.27 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.37 0.100.10 0.12 0.02 0.30 0.22 0.44*0.05 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.22 0.100.19 0.11 0.41 0.03 0.17 0.260.10 0.07 0.21 0.19 0.09 0.47*0.42 0.37 0.12 0.15 0.45 0.65*

0.03 0.43* 0.07 0.01 0.30 0.340.32 0.27 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.170.30 0.09 0.34 0.23 0.17 0.140.07 0.49 0.58 0.11 0.47 0.250.11 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.05 0.02

0.03 0.06 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.330.33 0.24 0.56 0.19 0.53 0.220.16 0.15 0.17 0.011 0.02 0.120.35 0.02 0.19 0.30 0.37 0.03

0.51 0.10 0.12 0.42 0.48 0.050.02 0.05 0.07 0.19 0.23 0.270.01 0.12 0.11 0.58** 0.25 0.160.08 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.20 0.070.51 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.29

0.26 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.04 0.170.48 0.23 0.04 0.14 0.36 0.050.16 0.65 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.610.14 0.17 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.010.08 0.06 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.120.02 0.16 0.25 0.35 0.38 0.120.07 0.20 0.21 0.07 0.17 0.05

0.08 0.22 0.08 0.24 0.17 0.120.07 0.10 0.12 0.31 0.22 0.130.08 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.16 0.26

0.26 0.00 0.19 0.17 0.34* 0.040.19 0.21 0.33 0.09 0.10 0.300.16 0.08 0.22* 0.01 0.10 0.040.16 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.070.04 0.00 0.07 0.36 0.15 0.16

0.08 0.09 0.01 0.17 0.18 0.030.01 0.31 0.06 0.17 0.24 0.030.13 0.34 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.08

0.14 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.080.05 0.06 0.17 0.01 0.13 0.040.02 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.210.01 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.02

0.01 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.090.04 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.070.02 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03

0.03 0.09 0.12* 0.04 0.08 0.020.01 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 0.03 0.04

ept in the case of ultimatum game responders (Samples 1423), where it is



z-transformation; Myers & Sirois, 2006), universalism valueswere more strongly correlated with behaviour in the cooperatorrole than in any other role (all z> 2.39, all p< .05) except thetrustee role (z = 2.52, p = .13). No other differences betweencorrelations across roles were statistically significant at p= .05.

To further investigate the robustness of our results, we ranthree linear mixed-model analyses predicting prosocial behav-iour. In our first model, we entered the measurement instrument(version of PVQ), country, sex, age, role, group-centred1 uni-versalism values (our most potent predictor variable based onthe Spearman correlations), and the interaction between roleand universalism values. In this omnibus analysis, both univer-salism values (F(1, 1079) = 9.79, p< .01) and the interactionbetween universalism and role (F(4, 1079) = 2.84, p< .05)were statistically significant. Simple slopes tests showed thatuniversalism was a statistically significant predictor ofbehaviour in the cooperator (b=0.09, SE=0.02, t(1078) = 3.90,p< .001) and trustee (b=0.03, SE=0.01, t(1078) = 2.91,p< .01) roles and a marginally statistically significant predictorof behaviour in the truster role (b=0.02, SE=0.01,t(1078) = 1.67, p= .09). Universalism did not predict behaviourin the proposer or responder roles (both t(1078)< 0.25, p> .1).Universalism was a stronger predictor of behaviour in thecooperator role than in any other role (all contrastst(1078)> 2.20, all p< .05). Although we expected behaviour inthe trustee role to be value-expressive, universalismwas not a stron-ger predictor of behaviour in the trustee role than in the proposer,responder, or truster roles (all contrasts t(1079)< 1.48, all p> .1).

In our second model, we added the other nine group-centred values. However, none of them emerged as a statisti-cally significant predictor. In this model, the main effect ofuniversalism values (F(1, 1069) = 3.61, p = .06) was renderedmarginally statistically significant, but the interaction effectbetween universalism and role (F(4, 1069) = 2.63, p= .05)was still statistically significant.2 To further investigatepossible confounding factors, we added for our third modelthe interaction effects between universalism and country anduniversalism and measurement instrument. In this final model,the main effect of universalism (F(1, 1065) = 1.50, p= .22)was no longer significant, and the interaction between roleand universalism (F(4, 1065) = 2.07, p= .08) was renderedonly marginally statistically significant. This suggests somemulticollinearity between the different interaction termsinvolving universalism, but the results are difficult to interpretas neither of the interactions that were added for the thirdmodel was statistically significant. In sum, the results of our

1Group-mean centring means that we centred the scores of each of our valuesscales within samplesin linear mixed-model analyses, variables should beleft uncentred only if they have a raw metric with a meaningful zero point(e.g. Enders & Tofighi, 2007). As a rule of thumb, group-mean centring hasbeen recommended when Level 1 associations (e.g. association between uni-versalism values and behaviour in the prisoners dilemma) or cross-level inter-actions (e.g. the interaction between universalism and role) are of substantiveinterest (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). Furthermore, we believe that grand-meancentring would not have been appropriate because the different forms and dif-ferent translations of the values measure that we used ordained that the valuesscores were not comparable across samplesthat is, although the values mea-sures typically show structural equivalence across cultures, they do not showscalar equivalence (e.g. Spini, 2003).2We also tested in our second model for the interactions between universalismand power, and between values other than universalism and role, but removedthese as they were nonsignificant. In a model that included all of these interac-tion effects, not a single predictor was even marginally statistically significant.


linear mixed-model analyses confirm that the predictive powerof universalism is moderated by role but also suggest thatother values may not be able to contribute beyond universal-ism in the prediction of prosocial behaviour in the type ofgames that were studied.

STUDY 2

Study 1 supported our contention that universalism values(positively), and to lesser extent power values (negatively),predict prosocial behaviour, but only when the behaviour isvalue-expressive. Study 2 was run to assess the robustness ofour Study 1 results in the context of a dictator game. As arguedin the introduction, this game would be expected to allow forthe most value-expressive behaviours.

Study 2 also adds to the results of Study 1 in the sense thatwe now employed the recently developed PVQ5X ValueSurvey (Schwartz et al., 2012). This instrument measuresthose 19 values argued, in the refined theory of personalvalues, to constitute the original 10 broad value constructs.Most pertinent to the present research, universalism valuesare divided into the subtypes of tolerance (accepting thosewho are different), concern (commitment to equality andjustice), and nature (protection and conservation of theenvironment). Of these three, universalism-concern shouldon conceptual grounds be most strongly correlated withdictator transfers. The aggregate universalism score, whichdiscards subtype-specific variance, was expected to showlower predictive validity than universalism-concern. Powervalues, on their part, are divided into the two subtypes ofpower-resources and power-dominance, with the former beingconcerned with the acquisition of wealth, status, and position andthe latter with authority over people. Of these two subtypes, onlypower-resources, thought to motivate the acquisition of wealth,should be relevant for predicting behaviour in the dictator game.

Besides the restricted sample of games analysed in Study 1,another potential limitation was that we always started theexperiments with the games and, after various types of filleritems, ended them by gathering ratings of personal values.We always kept this order to keep the economic decisionsunbiasedcompleting a values questionnaire could activatepersonal values and thereby influence subsequent behaviour(e.g. Verplanken & Holland, 2002). However, behaviour inthe games could have influenced ratings of personal values,thereby inflating the size of the observed correlations. To ruleout this possibility, we now administered the values question-naire in an ostensibly unrelated questionnaire survey conductedover the Internet 7months prior to conducting the laboratoryexperiments. To enable comparison with the results of Study1, we also administered the PVQ40 after the dictator game.

Methods

Participants and Procedure

In an unrelated decision-making study conducted over theInternet, 950 undergraduate research volunteers contacted viaa University of Cologne Laboratory of Economic Researchmailing list with around 3700 subscribers had in March 2012



completed the PVQ5X (Schwartz et al., 2012). They wereapproached in October 2012 with an invitation to take part ina laboratory experiment. The experiments were conducted ontwo occasions, with 32 and 26 participants. On both occasions,one participant was randomly selected as receiver, and allothers were assigned the role of the dictator, giving us 56 par-ticipants in the role of the dictator (30 women, mean age25.1 years). After the dictator game and some filler tasks, par-ticipants completed the PVQ40 values questionnaire (Schwartzet al., 2001).

Measures

Values Measures. The 19 values identified by the refinedtheory of values were measured with the German version ofthe PVQ5X (Schwartz et al., 2012). These values are orga-nized along the same motivational continuum as the 10 origi-nal values (Figure 1). Each of the 19 values is measured bythree items. For instance, universalism-concern is measuredby the item It is important to him to protect the weak and vul-nerable people in society and power-resources by the itemBeing wealthy is important to him. Respondents indicatedin response to each item how much like you this person isby using a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (not like me at all)to 6 (very much like me). The alpha internal consistencyreliabilities for universalism-concern, universalism-tolerance,universalism-nature, power-resources, and power-dominancewere .73, .85, .94, .85, and .78, respectively. We also reporton results for the universalism composite scale (= .89) andfor achievement (= .77).

The 10 basic values were, besides being measured by thePVQ5X, also measured by the PVQ40 (Schwartz et al., 2001;Study 1 Methods). As in Study 1, we computed ipsatized scores(e.g. Schwartz et al., 2001) for both the PVQ5X and PVQ40values measures. The universalism and power scales had inter-nal consistency reliabilities of .78 and .69, respectively.

Dictator Game. Two participants were randomly chosento be receivers, whereas the rest acted in the role of the dictator(N= 56; Participants and Procedure). Each dictator was givenan endowment of 100 points (10 points = 1). The dictatordecided which amount to transfer to the receiver, who didnothing. Dictators were paid according to the transferredamount, which was our dependent variable. The dictatorwhose choice actually determined the receivers outcomewas randomly determined before computing all participantspay-offs (dictators were not at any stage aware that only onedictators decision would actually matter for computing thesingle receivers pay-off). The average transfer was 16.0points (SD= 19.5; range, 050 points). The transfers werenot normally distributed (the KolmogorovSmirnov test gavep< .001), and we therefore report Spearman rank-ordercorrelations (Siegel & Castellan, 1988).

Results

The Spearman correlations between universalism-concern,universalism-tolerance, universalism-nature, and transfer deci-sions were = .47 (p< .001), = .11 (p> .1), and = .16(p> .1), respectively. As expected, universalism-concern


showed stronger correlations with transfer decisions than dideither universalism-tolerance (for the difference between depen-dent correlations, Steigers Z=2.99, p< .001) or universalism-nature (Steigers Z=2.15, p< .05). The composite universalismscore computed as the mean score of these three subtypes wasalso, as expected, not as strongly correlated ( = .26, p< .05)with transfer decisions as was universalism-concern (SteigersZ=2.30, p< .05).

As expected, power-resources ( =.34, p< .05) wasnegatively correlated with transfers, whereas power-dominance( =.16, p= .25) was not. However, this difference in correla-tions was not statistically significant (Steigers Z=1.33,p= .18). Power-resources did not predict transfer decisionsbeyond universalism-concernin an ordinal regression withboth values as predictor variables, universalism-concern was astatistically significant predictor (Wald = 5.77, p< .05), butpower-resources was not (Wald= 0.30, p= .58). Regarding allother values, only achievement (=.31, p< .05) was statisti-cally significantly correlated with transfer decisions, but this valuealso lost its predictive power (Wald= 0.18, p= .67) when enteredtogether with universalism-concern (Wald=6.91, p< .01).

The PVQ40 universalism and power scores were corre-lated, = .39 (p< .01) and =.38 (p< .01), respectively,with the dictators transfer decisions. These correlations, basedon the same procedure with which Study 1 data were gathered,were, as expected, somewhat stronger than the correlationsreported on in Study 1. Comparing the universalism correla-tion coefficients after Fishers z-transformation (Myers &Sirois, 2006) revealed that the universalism correlation in thedictator game differed from the correlations found in the Study1 proposer, responder, and truster roles (all z> 0.24, allp< .05) but did not differ from the correlation found in thecooperator role (z=0.40, p= .68) and differed only marginallystatistically significantly from the correlation found in the trusteerole (z=1.64, p= .10). Regarding power, the correlation with thedictator game behaviour differed from the correlations foundin all Study 1 roles (all z> 1.92, all p .05). Of the other 10basic values, only PVQ40 achievement was statisticallysignificantly correlated ( =.30, p< .05) with the dictatorgame behaviour.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In Study 1, in which we included all of the relevant studies thatwe had conducted from 2007 to 2010, we investigated howpersonal values, conceptualized according to Schwartzs(1992) values theory, predicted behaviour in various types ofsocial exchanges. As expected, we found universalism values,and to some extent power values, to be associated withbehaviours that we beforehand argued were likely to be value-expressivethat is, behaviour in the cooperator and trusteeroles. However, values were only weakly or not at all associatedwith behaviours that we beforehand argued to be value-ambiva-lentthat is, behaviour in the proposer, responder, or trusterrole. Linear mixed-model analyses revealed that when consider-ing the joint impact of all 10 personal values, only universalismvalues emerged as a statistically significant predictor of behav-iour. Such analyses further showed that the predictive power of



universalism was stronger in the cooperator role than in anyother role. However, unexpectedly, universalism values did notpredict behaviour in the trustee role more strongly than in theproposer, responder, or truster role. In Study 2, we found strongcorrelations between Dictator Game transfers and the narrowervalues universalism-concern and power-resources, as definedby the refined theory of values, supporting both the notion thatvalues predict value-expressive behaviour and the notion thatnarrower values have heightened criterion validity as comparedwith the original 10 values.

Strength of ValueBehaviour Relations

Given that any single behaviour is always influenced by alarge variety of factors specific to the situation in which itoccurs, one may ask, as Epstein (1980, p. 804) did, what placeis there for the single-session experiment that examines a singleevent? Epstein himself responded that although no findingsfrom such single studies should alone be given much credibility,they may be useful in contributing to a population of studies thatcan then be interpreted in aggregate. However, as also noted byEpstein (1980), if such meta-analyses are ultimately to make acontribution, journals should encourage replication studies andnot be influenced by the outcomes of such studies. In truth,studies with statistically significant results are more likely to bepublished (e.g. Easterbrook et al., 1991), making publication biasthe greatest threat to the validity of meta-analyses (for a review,see Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005). A strong point ofthe present research is that it avoided publication bias by includ-ing all of the formally relevant studies that we conducted duringa specified period. This lack of bias should be kept in mind whencomparing the effect sizes obtained in the present research withthose obtained in similar studies.

A recent meta-analysis of 82 studies linked social valueorientation to cooperation in social dilemmas (Balliet et al.,2009). Social value orientation, referring to how people weighttheir own and others outcomes in social dilemmas, is mea-sured by having participants play a decomposed game inwhich participants choose between options that offer varyingpoints to themselves and to another person (Messick &McClintock, 1968). On the basis of these choices, most partic-ipants are classified as cooperators, individualists, or competi-tors. The strategic interactions included in the Balliet et al.(2009) meta-analysis were almost exclusively prisoners di-lemma games: Two-player prisoners dilemma games andgive-some and take-some public goods games (these aremultiplayer prisoners dilemma games) constituted 85% ofthe studies. The results showed that when participants werepaid (as in all of the samples included in Study 1), the averageeffect size regarding the relation between the social value ori-entation scale and cooperation was r= .22. This number issomewhat smaller than the one we report: In our prisoners di-lemma games, universalism was correlated, = .32, with coop-eration. The fact that universalism values did at least as well asthe social value orientation scale can be considered rather sur-prising for at least two reasons. First, only a fifth of the studiesincluded in the meta-analysis by Balliet et al. (2009) wereunpublished, suggesting that there might exist a lot ofunpublished studies with nonsignificant results that wouldhave attenuated the reported effect size had these studies been


available. Second, as the measure of social value orientationrequires the respondent to choose between different outcomes,it has a very similar response format to social dilemma games.Thus, shared method variance could be expected to contributeto the correlations between the social value orientation scaleand social dilemmas (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, &Podsakoff, 2003). However, Schwartzs values appear to havepredictive power comparable with that of the social valueorientation scale.

Many theorists have suggested that personal values are infact not related to actual behaviour (e.g. Kristiansen & Hotte,1996; Maio et al., 2003; McClelland, 1985). However, notonly do the effect sizes we report on compare well with effectsizes typically found in similar literatures, but they are alsoquite consistent with the effect sizes generally found in socialpsychological research (social psychological effects typicallyyield an effect size of r= .21; Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota,2003). Mischel (1968, p. 78) coined the phrase personalitycoefficient to describe the correlation between .20 and .30which is found persistently when virtually any personalitydimension inferred from a questionnaire is related to almostany conceivable criterion involving responses sampled in adifferent mediumthat is, not by another questionnaire. Webelieve that showing that personal values will reach (andsometimes even break) the barrier set by Mischels personalitycoefficient supports the use of Schwartzs (1992) values theoryas one possible framework within which to study individualdifferences as predictors of behaviour.

In the field of personality trait research, the question ofwhether it is worthwhile tomeasure the narrow constituent facetsof the Big Five factors or whether measurement of the broad per-sonality factors is sufficient has been keenly debated. However,both the theoretical (Paunonen, Rothstein, & Jackson, 1999)and empirical (Paunonen, 1998; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001;Paunonen, Haddock, Forsterling, & Keinonen, 2003) evidencesuggest that narrower measures are preferable for prediction pur-poses. The present results, according to which the universalism-concern subtype of universalism values outperformed thecomposite universalism construct, suggest that also in valuesresearch, narrower measures may be preferable in the predic-tion of behavioural variables (for similar results regarding theprediction of beliefs, see Schwartz et al., 2012).

Value-expressive and Value-ambivalent Behaviours

The most important theoretical contribution of the presentpaper is that we suggested and found support for the idea thatpersonal values can, across individuals, only be expected topredict value-expressive, but not value-ambivalent, behav-iours. The former are compatible with primarily one value,or adjacent values, whereas the latter are compatible withopposing values. This finding can serve to explain some ofthe disagreement on whether or not values predict behaviour.

Most importantly, the distinction between value-expressiveand value-ambivalent behaviours poses an interesting method-ological challenge to values research. Value-ambivalentbehaviours could be just as strongly motivated by values asare value-expressive behaviours. However, traditionalmethods of analysing the influence of individual differences(e.g. by means of correlations) will obscure these relations.



For example, both those scoring high on universalism (whowill tend to score low on power) and those scoring high onpower (who will tend to score low on universalism) may wantto spend on a Toyota Priusa relatively expensive hybridgaselectric vehicle with low emissions. The former groupmay be motivated by environmental concerns and the latterby status concerns (Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh,2010). But if this is the case, across individuals, the correlationbetween personal values and the purchase of a Toyota Priuswill be trivial. However, we acknowledge that our currentdesign does not allow us to say anything definite on whethervalue-ambivalent behaviours are in fact driven by values(the effects of which could cancel each other out whenanalysed at the interindividual level) or whether value-ambivalent behaviours are simply not driven by values. Thisshould be investigated in future research.

Limitations and Conclusions

Some limitations of the present research warrant mention. TheStudy 1 samples were not gathered systematically for the pur-poses of the present research. In retrospect, it can still be con-sidered quite fortunate that our behavioural variables, althoughnone of them collected for the purposes of this meta-analysis,happened to represent a rather wide variety of importantaspects of social exchange. The importance of cooperation(measured in the prisoners dilemma) in everyday life is self-evident, but the other behaviours that were measured may beat least equally relevant. Fairness considerations together withpunishing for unfairness (measured in the ultimatum game)have had a pivotal role in the evolutionary development ofhuman cooperation (Fehr & Gchter, 2002), and trusting behav-iour (measured in the trust game) has famously been argued tobe the lubricant that enables most essential everyday decisions(Arrow, 1972, p. 357; for the importance of trust for the function-ing and development of modern economies, see Fukuyama, 2001).

Another type of limitation is that our behavioural variablescould be considered rather artificial. As is typical in research inthe field of experimental economics, participants made theirdecisions in a highly controlled laboratory environment. Towhat extent such decisions generalize to more realistic con-texts outside of the laboratory can be disputed. However, thetasks should have some ecological validity: The relationshipthat participants entered into was bilateral and realthe otherperson was real, the information was real, and the conse-quences of the decisions were real. Monetary incentives arethought to ensure that participants perceive their behaviouras relevant, experience real emotions, and take decisions withreal economic consequences (e.g. Falk & Heckman, 2009; forempirical evidence, see Balliet et al., 2009; Ben-Ner et al., 2008,2009; Kang et al., 2011; Lnnqvist et al., 2011; Smith, 1976).Furthermore, laboratory behaviour in the prisoners dilemmaand ultimatum games has, across cultures, been shown to closelycorrespond to templates for these behaviours in the participantsdaily life (Henrich et al., 2005). Finally, and more generally, theeffect sizes found in the laboratory tend to correspond to field-based effect sizes across a broad range of domains (Anderson,Lindsay, & Bushman, 1999). Nevertheless, it would be impor-tant to observe behaviour also in other settings.


A methodological limitation specific to Study 1 was that wealways started the experiments with the games and, after vari-ous types of filler items, ended them by gathering ratings ofpersonal values. It is conceivable that behaviour in the gamescould influence ratings of personal values, thereby inflatingthe size of the observed correlations. However, in Study 2,universalism values collected in an online web survey pre-dicted prosocial behaviour in a laboratory game conducted7months later at least equally strongly as did personal valuescollected in the laboratory right after the game. This suggeststhat the predictive power of personal values may not generallyhave been influenced by being measured after the games wereplayed. The fact that personal values, measured 7monthsbefore the behavioural data, were relatively strong predic-tors of behaviour, speaks to the stability of personal values(also Lnnqvist, Jasinskaja-Lahti, & Verkasalo, in press) andtheir usefulness as general predictors across time and situations.

In conclusion, the results of the present studies suggest thatpersonal values are relevant in explaining the causes of prosocialbehaviour. Furthermore, the strength of the relations betweenvalues and prosocial behaviour, as revealed in traditional corre-lational analyses of individual differences, depends on whetherthe behaviour is value-expressive or value-ambivalent.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This researchwas supported by theAcademy of Finland (ResearchGrant 127641) and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SE 137/3-1 and HE 2790/2). We wish to thank Zeina Barakat, JuliaBerndt, Emanuel Castillo Ruiz, Mohammed Dajani, SebastianJ. Goerg, Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Bernd Irlenbusch, KatharinaPeeters, Katrin Recktenwald, Rainer M. Rilke, Bradley Ruffle,and Eyal Winter for their support in data collection.

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