persia and the great powers, 1856-1869.mikhail volodarsky

Persia and the Great Powers, 1856-1869Author(s): Mikhail VolodarskySource: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 75-92Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282923 .Accessed: 28/02/2014 15:28

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Persia and the Great Powers, 1856-1869 Mikhail Volodarsky

Persia's relations with the two rival great powers - Britain and Russia - were influenced in the period we are investigating by two major international events. The first was the Crimean War, in which the Tsar and the Shah failed to involve Persia. The second was the Anglo-Persian War of 1856-1857, which broke out as a result of the Shah's attempt to unite by every means the purely Afghan province of Herat with his own holdings.

Russia's ruling circles felt a certain temptation to take advantage of the Anglo-Persian armed conflict in which Britain was deeply involved in order to exact revenge for the great loss that Russia had suffered in the Crimean War. However, for understandable reasons, Petersburg had to reject such thoughts and adopt a position of non-interference according to the Russo-Persian treaty of 29 September 1854. The new Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince A. M. Gorchakov, decisively rejected the Shah's request for assistance' although he had quite mixed feelings about the request. It was precisely then that he, whose previous career had been connected only with Europe, came to a clear understanding of the inevitability of a political and economic struggle with Britain in the depths of Asia.2 He was particularly impressed by a report that was causing quite a stir in those days in military and diplomatic circles in Petersburg. It was written in January 1856 by Staff Major General Blaramburg, a commander in Persia during the Crimean War with a special mission. It said in part:

Russia's future is not in Europe: it is toward Asia that Russia must look. The brilliant development (especially in the last thirty years) and the continuously growing number of factories and manufacturers in the fartherland that demand raw materials require that we find new pathways for selling our goods; and since the European markets have been closed to Russian manufacturers as a result of the competition of all the states of this part of the world, Russia must reluctantly turn to the vast countries of Asia to sell its goods.3

As a result of this re-evaluation, Prince Gorchakov made significant changes in the personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. First, E. P. Kovalevskii, a major orientalist, naturalist and experienced diplomat, was appointed to the post of Director of the Asian Department. He energetically initiated a detailed study of the Middle Eastern market with the aim of moving into it with Russian capital, and he despatched trade and political missions to Persia, Western China (Kashgar) and the independent khanates of Central Asia. One mission to Persia and Afghanistan was headed by the famous orientalist and diplomat (the former Consul-General in Tabriz) N. V. Khanykov. Its task was to conduct detailed research on the political and economic situation of Khorasan and Afghanistan and to examine the possibilities of converting them into sources of raw materials and into markets for Russian industry. But


76 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

the chief assignment of Khanykov's mission was to gather information about the political situation in Persia and Afghanistan and the spread of Russian influence in that region.4 When, in 1861, Kovalevskii left his post, he was replaced by a young officer of the General Staff, Colonel N. P. Ignatev, who displayed extraordinary diplomatic ability in regulating the difficult problems in Russo-Chinese relations during the Second Opium War and who succeeded in proving his authority in deciding the Balkan and Middle Eastern problems. Ignatev was for unlimited Russian expansion in Central Asia and for establishing a monopoly over the Afghan market, not to speak of the Persian one, which he saw as a natural appendage to the Russian economic structure.

Petersburg naturally attempted with all its power to avoid the developing Anglo-Persian conflict before it became a war, judging that Persia would surely lose such a war and that this would weaken Russia's position in the Middle East still further. On Gorchakov's instructions, the Russian envoy, Anichkov, while meeting with the Shah's Prime Minister, Mirza Aga Khan Nuri, insisted on the unconditional withdrawal of Persian troops from the territory of the Herat Principality.' At the same time steps were taken in London to avert the conflict and to re-establish the balance of British and Russian forces in Tehran that had existed before the Crimean War. In a letter of 27 August 1856 to Baron Brunnov, Gorchakov wrote:

Russia supposes that between it and England there must be a unity of action in Iran as there had been during the last fifteen years of the reign of Nicholas I ... Thanks to this unity of views and action, peace was successfully maintained in Iran. If England desires to change this system and to undertake an act of aggression and revenge against Iran, it takes upon itself responsibility for a great political mistake.6

Russia's efforts were in vain. As the war between Persia and Britain became an established fact, the attention of Russian diplomacy was focused on preventing the kind of peaceful regulation of the conflict that would interfere with Russian interests. Russian diplomats carefully followed the Anglo- Persian peace talks, which began in Paris at the end of 1856, and the Russian ambassador in Paris, Count Kiselev, kept in constant contact with the head of the Persian delegation, Farouk Khan. Britain's demand to allow it to open a series of consulates and vice-consulates in the northern districts of Persia especially disturbed Petersburg. On 26 February 1857 Gorchakov wrote to the new Russian envoy in Tehran, Lagovskii: 'The removal of the English consulates from the shores of the Caspian Sea remains extremely necessary for us.... The essential problem is that there must in no case be English consulates on the shores of the Caspian.'

The question of the consulates, insofar as it touched upon the interests of Russia in the southern shore of the Capsian Sea, was part of the wider question of Russia's dominance in Turkmeniia, which Petersburg already considered to be the next victim of Russian expansion. The consulates upset the tsarist government so much that it decided upon open blackmail: Gorchakov announced to the British ambassador, Lord Woodhouse, that if Britain did not drop its demands on this question, 'the Imperial government would use its maximal influence to advise Tehran not to ratify the treaty that had been


PERSIA AND THE GREAT POWERS 77

signed in Paris'.8 The ambassador of Russia in London, Count Khreptovich, in conversation with the Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, insisted that Britain must drop its intention to establish consulates in Northern Persia, insofar as 'it has no serious trade interests there'.9 With threatening frankness the ambassador advised the minister: 'In the conditions of Iran, the consuls are really political agents', and therefore Russia did not desire their presence in districts adjoining those it was eyeing for itself.'0

Britain nonetheless rejected this blackmail and did open its consulates in a number of cities of Northern Persia. This action was evaluated in Russia as undoubted proof of 'Britain's attempt to fortify a position for itself on the shores of the Caspian Sea'. " I The Tsar's representative in the Caucasus and the commander of the Caucasian Army, General-Field Marshal Prince A. I. Bariatinskii, wrote in a letter to the Minister of War, General N. 0. Sukhozanet that the expected consequence of the British action would be 'the appearance of the English navy in the Caspian Sea', which 'will be a fatal blow not only to our influence in the East, not only to our foreign trade, but also to the political existence of the Empire'.'2

The Russian command in the Caucasus took immediate measures to reinforce its military garrisons. Russia reviewed its diplomatic policy in Persia in the light of the events of recent years and especially of recent months. Petersburg was willing to forget Persia's not so friendly attitude in the years of the Crimean War and, taking advantage of worsening Anglo-Persian relations, to speed up the new Russo-Persian rapprochement.'3 On 12 January 1857 Gorchakov ordered Lagovskii to bring to the attention of the Shah and his Prime Minister that Russian representatives in London, Paris and Constantinople had received instructions to support Persia. Gorchakov soon requested Lagovskii to advise the Shah that Russia, desirous of easing Persia's positions in its war against Britain, was releasing it of the need to repay the part of the contribution that had been agreed upon in the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828.14

The generally pro-Persian position of Russia during the Anglo-Persian War elicited sympathy toward Petersburg in the Shah's court and, toward the end of 1856, the contours of a new Russo-Persian rapprochement became clear. The British press of those days called the Shah an 'insignificant vassal of Russia'.'5 In 1857 Russian military leaders took up the question of sending a group of Russian instructors to Persia and even to Afghanistan. Lagovskii was sure that the arrival of Russian officers in Persia would 'produce an impression in Afghanistan, whose rulers were still vacillating between fear of the English and a desire to free themselves from their influence'.'6 Lagovskii was convinced that the propitious moment had come 'to link Persia to our policy'.'7 When insurrection against British domination broke out in India, Petersburg seriously considered using Persian agents to influence events in that country. It had in mind distributing such agents among the population of the Muslim districts of India in order to provoke anti-British demonstrations there.

The new honeymoon in Russo-Persian relations was however short-lived: soon after the conclusion of the Crimean War, Russia's renewed attacks in Central Asia and particularly in Turkmeniia posed a direct threat to Persia.



Lands to the north of the Atrek River, populated by Turkomans, were viewed in Tehran as the sovereign possession of the Persian crown, even though the Turkoman tribes that inhabited these desert and semi-desert territories had never recognized the Shah as their ruler. The question of the Shah's right to Turkmeniia had arisen in relations between Persia and Russia in 1836 and had been raised by the Persians in connection with incidents that took place in the Gulf of Astrabad. At the preparatory talks on the Turkoman question between the Russian mission in Tehran and the Persians, Count I. 0. Simonich, the Russian envoy in Tehran, had asked the Persian government about its borders in the Turkoman steppe. He was told that the Shah considered all the Turkomans to be his subjects and their lands to be a part of the Persian crown possessions.18 In reply the Russian Vice Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, had ordered Count Simonich to inform the Shah that the Emperor was prepared to recognize the spread of the Shah's influence in Turkoman lands only between the rivers Gurgan and Atrek. Each side continued to adhere to its own view 'but the Tehran cabinet did not lose any opportunity to advertize its claims to sovereignty over all Turkomans'."9 From the strategic point of view, these territories gravitated toward Persia and constituted nothing else but a Persian border district. Therefore as early as 1857, as revealed in the annual report of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Persian government expressed its apprehension to Russia regarding the Tsar's order to establish a Trans-Caspian trading society 'for developing trade relations with Persia and Central Asia on a new basis and on a broad scope...'. As A. M. Gorchakov wrote, this step by Russia awoke 'serious fears' in Tehran, which the minister considered unfounded. He ascribed them 'to the suspiciousness that was characteristic of the Iranian government and partly, perhaps, to influences with bad intentions'.20

Anichkov received instructions to allay the doubts and fears of the Persian ministers. At the same time, Russian diplomacy in Tehran and London continued its efforts to create a positive attitude in both Europe and Persia toward the planned major Russian offensive in Central Asia. In March 1857, Gorchakov still considered such an offensive impossible. In a letter to War Minister Sukhozanet of 9 [20] March 1857, he wrote,

Not only the obvious preparations for the goal must be kept in mind, but even revealing the thought of such a goal, in my opinion, is sufficient to hasten the conflict between us and England. But the dimensions and development of such a conflict could not be foreseen by anyone. At any time an undertaking of this kind would have demanded the most cold- blooded judgement. Now just the thought of it seems to me so out of place considering our finances, the war that has drained us, and the political situation of Europe, that my convictions do not allow for even the possibility of this. I, at any rate, for my part ... would not take responsibility for supporting such a project or for helping it. If any kind of preparations by us reinforce the English opinion that we are attempting to destroy her domination in India, there is no conceivable administration in England that would not use all the national resources and diplomatic means at their disposal to force us to pay dearly for such



a thought on this matter, which is vital for them. There is sympathy for us in Europe but we lack allies, especially those who would stick their neck out for us. I cannot promise that our enemies will not find that sort of ally, however.2'

Similarly, in 1857 Gorchakov decisively sided with the decision of a Special Committee against a proposal by Bariantinskii to build a railroad from the Caspian to the Aral Sea in order to reinforce Russia's economic and political influence in the East and to weaken British competition. In a letter to the ambassador in Paris (Count P. D. Kiselev), Gorchakov emphasised that Bariantinskii's project was not right for the times and could call forth undesirable complications in relations with Britain.22 Gorchakov also wrote at about this time to the director of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, E. P. Kovalevskii: 'You remember that an obligatory rule of our policy, in my opinion, is not to push ourselves forward, so that we do not have to retreat later'.23

The Indian Mutiny however, proudly changed Gorchakov's position and forced him to rethink his ideas. By the beginning of the following year, 1858, he was able to write: 'Russia cannot remain indifferent to the situation in Central Asia. It wants to retain the status quo and not let it break down in a way that would favour English influence.'24 In a letter to the ambassador in London, Baron Brunnov, written at the same time, Gorchakov set forth Russia's programme for moving into Central Asia and the Middle East:

The dignity and interests of Russia must be respected. From this time forth, Russia has full freedom and does not want, as earlier, to pay for England's favours by retreating in the East. We demand our participation in the cultural work in that part of the world that we border.... If Persia turns out to have to defend itself from humiliation or foreign invasion, Russia will be forced to save it from the one or the other.... If the views of England [on Persia] conceal an aggressive thought, they doubly justify in our eyes the measures, taken in the proper time, to enable Persia to defend itself.25

To save Persia from British aggression did not turn out to be necessary for Gorchakov, but the necessary conclusions were drawn in Petersburg as a result of the Indian uprising. This was soon recognized in Tehran, which began to look north with anxiety. Unlike the Russians, the British did not show such awareness of the domestic problems of their rival. The British government made no attempt to exploit the acute domestic crisis (the so-called revolutionary situation of 1859-1861) that was developing in Russia to force Petersburg to moderate its appetite in Central Asia. The most striking fact of all is that the obscurantist Shah and his unenlightened ministers (as Count Gobineau, the French envoy in Tehran, testified), saw the crisis in Russia as providing an excellent opportunity for Persia to release itself from the protection of its northern neighbor, while the enlightened British government, headed by Viscount Palmerston, did not. In a dispatch of 20 May 1862, Count Gobineau wrote that in the eyes of the Shah and his ministers, 'Russian might has not only been diminished but it has become a joke. The Persians have



already seen peasants who have freed themselves, thanks to the insurrection, an empire in ruins, Poland breaking away, an independent Finland, and all the Muslim countries becoming free.'26 In this situation, Tehran could have hoped for a quick reaction from the British government. The reaction was quick but, as we shall see, completely different from the expected one.

Meanwhile, taking advantage of Britain's difficulties in India and the reduction of British influence in Persia, Petersburg hastened to increase its pressure on the Central Asian states and to intensify its intrigues in Turkmeniia. Naturally the leaders of the feudal states of Central Asia looked toward Persia and hoped for its aid. In 1858-59 frequent exchanges of letters and delegations took place between Tehran, Khiva, and Bukhara. The British mission was regularly informed-of the contents of these talks and exchanges by the Persian side and, for its part, kept London and Calcutta informed about everything.27 At the same time, the Persian envoy in London, on the orders of his government, often complained to the British cabinet about Russia's aggression in the southeast part of the Caspian Sea. One must admit that Lord Derby, the British Prime Minister, was correct: in complex circumstances, at the height of anti-British disturbances in India, he considered it absolutely necessary to resist Russian aggression in Central Asia decisively. During the year 1858 Baron Brunnov had quite a few unpleasant talks on this matter in the Foreign Office.28 In Tehran itself the British mission wasted no opportunity either to remind the Russian representative that Britain considered the Russian push to the south illegal. Anichkov announced in Petersburg: 'In Tehran the English are intensifying their intrigues against US. '29

The Russian attack on Khiva and the implementation of the Russian policy in Turkmeniia by the beginning of 1859 began to strain Russo-Persian relations. This gave rise to some anxiety in Petersburg. Incidents with an openly anti-Russian character became more frequent. For example, in the autumn of 1859 the authorities of Shiraz, acting unofficially but with the approval of the central government, refused to meet the demands of a group of Russian merchants although these demands were based on the Turkmenchai Treaty. The merchants were humiliated and their goods were confiscated and stolen. Only after the intervention of the British consul in Shiraz, Castelli, were they freed.30 Other clear evidence of the deterioration in Russo-Persian relations came when Petersburg, alarmed by the outbreak of the Franco- Italian-Austrian War in 1859, sent Anichkov precise instructions to clarify Tehran's position if the war grew into a general European conflict. Persian Foreign Minister Mirza Sayed Khan, in conversation with Anichkov, declined to give a direct answer, but he did frighten Anichkov by advising him that Murray had already explored this ground.3' In this situation it became imperative for Britain to strengthen the leadership of its mission in Tehran. The head of the mission, Charles Murray, was unable to establish good relations with the Shah and his ministers as he personally disliked both the Shah and Persia as a whole. He did not consider it necessary to hide this and he was repaid with open Persian animosity. This naturally influenced Anglo- Persian relations. In a personal letter, dated 5 April 1857, Murray wrote that he 'hates Persia, this nest of intrigue', and he continued, 'it is really



paradoxical that England, France, Russia and other powers speak with the Shah with respect and conclude treaties with him as if he were a prince of the civilized world'.32 Not surprisingly, Murray's appointment was unsuccessful from the very beginning. His lack of success became abundantly clear in 1859 when, ignoring the fundamentally changed circumstances, he continued to terrorise the Persian government and the Shah at every opportunity with notes containing 'continual threats to start a war'.33 The position of the British envoy was especially untimely and inflexible on the question of Persian- Afghan border demarcation in Seistan. Instead of writing the objective and dispassionate messages that were required in the new circumstances, he continued to take an emphatically pro-Afghan position. Thus, learning that the leader of Seistan intended to proclaim himself a vassal of the Shah, Murray sent the Persian government a sharp note advising it that 'the annexation of Seistan would be a threat to the territorial integrity of Afghanistan and would contradict the latter treaty' (the Paris Peace Treaty of 4 March 1857)).34 In short, Murray became odious and apersona non grata and it was necessary to replace him as quickly as possible.

In 1859 it was decided to recall him and to replace him with a major English orientalist and diplomat, Henry Rawlinson. Both the recall and the replacement were met in Tehran with great satisfaction. Rawlinson was known as an active proponent of a forward policy by Britain in the Middle East. He considered that the pivot of this policy would have to be forthright and uncompromising opposition to Russian aggression in Central Asia. Rawlinson considered that Britain would have to be a real ally of Persia in its rebuff to Russian claims on territories that bordered it and that it would have to give unconditional support to Persia's right to Turkoman lands right up to the Amu-Darya. The Persian ruling elite looked to Rawlinson to open a new chapter in the history of Anglo-Persian relations. On 21 June 1859 the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mirza Sayed Khan, meaningfully informed a representative of the Russian mission in Tehran, Gref, that the appointment of Rawlinson was 'not fortuitous'.35 In fact when Derby's government named Rawlinson to such an important post it was following long-term plans. First of all it wanted to reassure Parliament and business circles in Britain, which were disturbed by the decrease of British influence in the Middle East. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Stanley, supporting the appointment of Rawlinson, expressed the hope that Britain's new representative in Persia 'would be able to return to those influential positions and that influential situation that England had occupied in the past'.36 Rawlinson's appointment was supported by a special parliamentary committee established in March 1858 to study problems of the development of British trade in Central Asia.37

Rawlinson arrived in Tehran in late 1859 and presented his credentials to the Shah. With his very first steps, the new envoy showed that he was willing to break with customs rooted in the Turkmenchai Treaty, for example, the custom that before presenting his credentials the newly-appointed envoy did not have to make unofficial visits to Persian ministers but that they had to visit the envoy. Rawlinson disregarded this rule and paid respectful visits to the Persian ministers, producing a most positive impression on the Shah and infuriating the Russian mission.38 The members of the British mission and



consulates welcomed Rawlinson's appointment, which they saw as the beginning of a new period in British policy in Persia. Most British diplomats considered that the time had long since come to review the basic postulates of British policy in the Middle East, to reject the one-sided pro-Afghan position and to shift the focus of British policy from Persian-Afghan affairs to the Turkoman-Persian border and Central Asia. One of the leading diplomats in Persia, the consul in Astrabad, MacKenzie, travelled around his district in 1859 and even visited the Russian naval base at Ashur Ada Island. It had been established there in the 1830s, according to an agreement with Persia, to intercept Turkoman pirate attacks on the Persian coast. During his travels MacKenzie held talks with leaders of Turkoman tribes and urged them to end the attacks on the Persian coastal cities and towns in order to make the presence of Russian troops on the island unnecessary. MacKenzie established quite friendly relations with the Governor of Astrabad, Prince Lutfullah, whom he persistently advised to begin construction of naval ships on the Caspian Sea, which would also allow Persia to reject the services of Russia. He promised the Prince all possible assistance. The talks with MacKenzie were not fruitless: Prince Lutfullah suggested the plan to the Shah and the Prime Minister, Mirza Aga Khan, who, as Anichkov wrote, 'took up the idea of obtaining steamships for the Caspian Sea'. Anichkov added that MacKenzie, considering his low rank, could not be acting on his own initiative, which meant that 'it is difficult to hope that the matter will be limited only to ships'.39

Indeed, soon after MacKenzie's visit, Prince Lutfullah informed Tehran that Russia was laying in large quantities of military supplies, military equipment, and provisions on Ashur Ada and was planning to garrison 12,000 men there and also to construct military fortifications on Cheleken Island. Persian Foreign Minister Mirza Sayed Khan immediately invited Anichkov to meet him and officially inquired about this report, declaring that 'all the Turkomans are loyal to the Shah and for any foreign powers to take any part of their territory is illegal'.40 Anichkov declined to go into the Turkoman problem and merely stated that he knew of no plans to increase Russia's military presence in the Caspian Sea.4'

It is understandable that both the British mission and the Shah's court looked forward to the arrival of the new British envoy. Rumors of his openly pro-Persian feelings quickly spread throughout Tehran and the provinces. Anichkov's reports to Petersburg continuously emphasized that Rawlinson would 'be shown the warm reception in Tehran that he so highly desires'.42 Arriving in Tehran, Rawlinson immediately called Consul MacKenzie from Astrabad and met with Mirza Sayed Khan, whom he told that he wished to become acquainted with the essence of the Turkoman problem as soon as possible. Mirza Sayed Khan expressed to the envoy his country's pleasure that Britain had adopted such a forthright pro-Persian position on the question, which was vitally important for Persia. The Russian mission attempted without success to convince Mirza Sayed Khan that the Shah's 'hopes that Sir Henry Rawlinson would fulfil his promises were vain hopes' and that 'England would not allow the real participation of Iran in resolving the problems of Central Asia insofar as it was preparing this region as a market for its own goods and as a military theatre for containing Russia'.43



Rawlinson's arrival and the warm reception shown to him in Tehran saddened Anichkov. In one of his reports, he wrote: 'Now the Shah will do everything possible to convince the English that close relations no longer exist between Iran and Russia.'44 Further, he advised that the Shah had instructed his representative in London to complain continually about our 'desire to seize the Caspian coast and Khiva'.45 Everything seemed to favour Rawlinson when he received his appointment. Yet, even given the poor relationship between Persia and Russia in this period, he could not count on attracting Persia to the sphere of British influence, for he could not completely re- establish the credibility of British policy among Persia's ruling circles. Then the unforeseen happened: in June 1859, when Rawlinson was on the way to his new assignment, there was a cabinet change in London. The Conservative government headed by Derby was replaced by a Whig cabinet headed by Palmerston. The Whigs were alarmed by events in India. In order to avoid similar shocks and considering Russia's preponderant influence and possibilities in that region, they believed it necessary to end the disagreement with Russia in the regions that bordered India.

In the re-evaluation of British Middle East policy under Palmerston, Rawlinson's position did not meet with sympathy from Lord Russell, the new British Foreign Secretary. Russell wrote to Rawlinson that the latter's policy, based on unconditional support of the claims of the Shah to Turkoman lands, did not correspond to the line of the new cabinet and to British interests as the new administration understood them. His letter expressed the fear that Rawlinson's decisive stance in Tehran could be interpreted in Petersburg not only as expansionist but as provocative.46 At the same time Russell warned the British envoy in Petersburg, Lord Woodhouse, of 'the appearance of too much suspiciousness or sensitivity regarding the Russian advance in Central Asia', indicating to him that 'an emphatic defense of Persian interests in Petersburg could bring more failure than success'.47 Petersburg soon saw this reversal in British foreign policy as a shift in focus from Asian to European affairs and as an excellent chance to fortify its own position in Central Asia and Persia. In 1861 Gorchakov wrote in his annual report to the Tsar: 'Distracted by the reconstruction of the profoundly disturbed order in India, England does not wish for openly antagonistic actions in Persia from Russia' and further: 'In a quiet Persia it sees the guarantee of peace in Afghanistan '*48 Gorchakov stressed that Britain had decided on a sharp reduction in its obligations to Persia and on a return to a tactic of 'coordinated action'. In Petersburg this unexpected turn was accepted as a gift of the gods, but Gorchakov did not allow his delight to distract his common sense. As opposed to Palmerston and Russell, who were quite serious about this return to the tactics of the 1 840s, Gorchakov wrote to the Tsar in his report: 'what is shared in our and its [England's] interests allowed us to accept its call to cooperate in Tehran. But where our interests are different, we will not give up our freedom of action.'49

In the new situation Rawlinson could not remain at his post and in 1860 he left Tehran. He was replaced by Sir Charles Allison, who had been personal secretary to the famous diplomat Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The new envoy received straightforward instructions from Russell 'to take a cautious,



accommodating attitude toward Russia'.50 The unfortunate results of London's 'new course' were not long in appearing: during Palmerston's lifetime Russia took Tashkent and persistently knocked at the gates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand. Nonetheless, Palmerston to the end of his days (he died in 1865) remained faithful to the tactic of giving way to Russia in Central Asia. His successors, Russell (1865-66) and Derby (1 866-68) followed his course and Gorchakov had reason to inform the Tsar, with a certain amount of gleeful superiority, that England had finally recognised that 'in moral and commercial relations, Russia had a civilising mission in Asia, a mission from which it could not be freed, and which, in the final analysis, corresponded to the interests of the whole world'.5'

A policy of retreat was not characteristic of Palmerston, especially in his relations with Russia,52 and it confounded many of his contemporaries. Palmerston's Russophobia was, however, one of the most clear-cut features of his policy. Regarding this metamorphosis, the Indian historian K. S. Menon writes:

The Russian advance in Central Asia and Kazakhstan continued. If indeed this posed a threat to India, this was just the time to sound the alarm. But the ruling circles of England and their organs praised the Russian 'civilising mission'. The reasons for such indifference must be sought in the British Empire itself. In the period of the revolt of 1857-1859, British rule almost came to an end in India.... This was not the time for ambition. The circumstances were such that the English were forced to ignore the calls of the Khan of Kokand and the Emir of Bukhara for help against Russia. The Russian bogeyman, which had been the main argument of the British in their claims upon Northwest India, was relegated to the archives. England prepared to cooperate with Russia."3

Menon correctly defines the rationale for Palmerston's uncharacteristic retreat, although he is wrong in attributing substance to it.

Palmerston had many contemporaries who saw and understood that Russia was bluffing in Central Asia and that Palmerston's re-evaluation of Russia's strength and its ability to defeat the British in India was unfounded.54 Many influential and competent people in Britain were not prepared to recognize Turkmeniia, for example, as within the Russian sphere of influence. They saw that Turkmeniia and the western districts of Khiva and Bukhara felt a geographic and historical pull toward Persia and that they were the natural border defense of Persian territory. Thus they sensed that Turkmeniia's annexation to Russia would pose a direct threat to the territorial integrity of Persia and a real danger to the north and northwest flanks of British India." Palmerston and his successors, Russell and Derby, continued to yield in one Central Asian position after another right up to 1868. They also avoided confrontation in Persia, overwhelmed by their fear of arousing further disturbances in India, where they considered that Russia was beginning to exert too much influence after its successful advance into Central Asia. Indeed, in the 1850s and 1860s certain national and feudal elements in India (for example, the Kashmir Maharaja) showed an increased interest in Russia.



After Tashkent was occupied by Russian troops in 1865, emissaries from Kashmir came there. The Russian authorities declined to hold any kind of political discussions with them although some Petersburg officials did not hide their desire to play the India card. Thus N. P. Ignatev, taking up his duties as director of the Asian Department of MID in 1861, wrote Gorchakov that it was necessary to exert pressure on England, 'using the Muslim population of India against it'.56 He suggested that Russian forces be sent to establish an anti-British coalition, including Persia and the Ottoman Empire, under the aegis of Russia, and to give substance to the continual British fears that the forces of this coalition could move against India at any time.57 But Ignatev's point of view did not meet with sympathy in higher Petersburg circles, which well recognised the fact that Russia did not have the strength to undermine British dominion in India. Gorchakov was rather inclined to agree with M. A. Terentev, a publicist and official in the tsarist administration in Turkestan, who wrote that 'England does not fear invasion itself for this is impossible.... It is simply not up to being a neighbor of Russia with its Indian possessions...'58 In all his actions Gorchakov carefully exploited this circumstance to the full in relations with Britain.

Palmerston's decision to remove the Tehran mission from the authority of the India Office and to subordinate it to the Foreign Office was another sharp blow to the proponents of a more active and decisive British policy in Central Asia and the Middle East. With this action Palmerston demonstrated his resolve to move the centre of gravity of British policy from Asia to Europe just when Russia decided to view Asia as its chief arena in opposing Britain. Palmerston could not have presented a better gift to Gorchakov. The British government had been placed in a complicated situation by Palmerston's measure. The Secretary for India, Sir Charles Wood, and his colleagues expressed sharp dissent over the removal of the Tehran mission from their control, pointing out that this measure would reduce the activity of British diplomacy in Persia and in the entire region and would arouse a crisis of British credibility in the Shah's court. They argued that 'Persia was no more than a vestibule to the Indian house and was in the orbit of the Indian policy'. Palmerston, however, countered that 'although a major part of Persian affairs are connected to India, Persia's main role is still in the regulating of relations between England and Russia'.59 Sir Charles Wood and his close friend Rawlinson did not want to abandon any position at all to Russia and they sharply criticised Palmerston's capitulatory policy. They saw that Russia's might was largely confined to the imagination of certain over-fearful people and that Gorchakov was playing a dishonest game and was clearly bluffing.

One can imagine the Shah's disappointment and concern over the shift in British policy which was seen in Tehran as capitulation to Russia and as handing over the peoples of Asia to its whim. Persia had one more opportunity to be convinced that Britain was an untrustworthy ally and that London was not listening to its own representatives in Tehran. What was the use of the fact that a quarter-century before these events John McNeil had formulated the idea that England would always have to be the 'guarantor of Persia's independence'? 'Persia must know', wrote McNeil, 'that England is ready to speak firmly to Russia or we will lose both Persia and India'.60



Palmerston's refusal to oppose Russia's aggressive policy in Central Asia in fact facilitated the Tsar's seizure and annexation of all of Central Asia, including Turkmeniia. London reacted to the seizure of Tashkent and the direct threat of Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva in a most surprising manner. Lord Russell told the Russian envoy:

England is attempting to preserve with no changes the situation of mutual possessions in Central Asia. Her Majesty's government also wishes to preserve the independence of the Persian monarchy, will not tolerate an invasion of Persian territory, and wishes to act in this spirit and direction insofar as this is the best method of supporting and reinforcing the sovereignty of the Shah.6'

Gorchakov correctly concluded that this toothless approach was nothing more than capitulation. London had apparently recognised all of Russia's seizures in Central Asia in advance and was prepared to 'defend' the sovereignty of Persia without defining the geographical borders of this sovereignty. This was the essence of the problem, for Russia was not attempting to destroy Persia's 'independence', but to claim territory that the Shah could consider his inheritance more justifiably than the Tsar could. It is therefore not surprising that Gorchakov readily agreed to the vague English formula on the problems of Central Asia and Persia. Russia, he announced, 'is prepared to respect the status of possessions in Asia such as the independence and integrity of the Persian monarchy, but with the stipulation that Russia does not recognise anyone's right to interfere or demand explanation about our policy in those countries where we do not directly affect the interests of any power'.62 The latter included Central Asia, where Russia, in Gorchakov's view, did not interfere with the interests of Britain or anyone else. In brief, Petersburg humiliated London, which swallowed the bitter pill, and liquidated the independence of Kokand and Bukhara. At the end of 1864, Petersburg was fully occupied with the fate of the western part of Central Asia - Turkmeniia and Khiva. In December 1864 the new director of the Asian department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stremoukhov, submitted to Gorchakov a special memorandum on the measures necessary to take over the southeast shore of the Caspian Sea. It recommended a programme of economic occupation of Turkmeniia, adding that 'it is true that friendly relations with Persia ought to be reinforced in order to nullify all the attempts of the English'.63

The Tsar ordered a Special Committee to review this memorandum and a session was called for 4 January 1865. Participants included War Minister Miliutin, Naval Ministry Director N. Krabbe, Quartermaster General of the Chiefs of Staff A. Verigin, Chief Commander of the Astrakhan Port S. Voevodskii, and Stremoukhov himself. The Special Committee worked out a series of steps for effectively taking over the Chelekin Peninsula, Krasnovodsk Bay, and territories in the interior of the continent. Nothing was said about military measures. The Minister of War recommended the construction of industrial enterprises on Chelekin and 'other islands that are rich in oil', but insisted on strengthening and developing peaceful relations with the Turkomans and the populations of the neighboring Iranian provinces.64 In



May 1865 the question of Turkmeniia was again reviewed by the Special Committee. The topic this time was the 'occupation of Krasnovodsk and the nearest islands', and decisions reached at this session were conveyed to the envoy in Tehran, N. K. Girs. The Minister of War was ordered to work out a general report on the 'temporary occupation', to be carried out in 1866, of the Krasnovodsk Gulf for the development of trade with Central Asia by a shorter and more convenient route.65 Krasnovodsk was not taken in 1866, however, but three years later, since Russia first had to resolve the problem of Bukhara, which took two years.

After the seizure of Kokand and Bukhara and the formation of a Turkestan general-gubernatorstvo, the question of Turkmeniia became relevant. As Gorchakov suggested, these years had given Britain time to 'get used to our advance in Central Asia and not to consider the advance to be a direct threat to British rule [in India]. The Indian press continues to express fear and anxiety, which the government takes note of but does not share.'66 But the Turkomans themselves reminded British diplomats of the growing danger and asked to be defended from the Russian aggression. In 1868 a large group of Teke tribesmen arrived in Tehran and managed to be granted a meeting with Allison. They informed him that they were ready to oppose Russia decisively and they asked London to help them and to proclaim Turkmeniia a British protectorate. Allison's reply can only be termed deliberate disinformation. He advised them that Russia, in his opinion, would not dare cross the Syr Darya and that the Turkomans should unite all their tribes to organise their defense in case they became victims of aggression. Allison declined to consider the question of assistance to the Teke. Later he similarly declined the Shah's suggestion to renew the spirit of friendship, as in the time of Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834), in Anglo-Persian relations. Allison well knew of the capitulatory mood that then reigned in British governing circles and he not only did not oppose it, but wholeheartedly supported it. He even wrote to Clarendon that Russia had very solid arguments for refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the Shah's claims to the Turkoman lands, etc.67 The fate of Turkmeniia was thus pre-ordained and the Shah was obliged to accept the idea. Nevertheless Petersburg had certain doubts about the advisability of forcing events. These doubts were especially prevalent at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had information from Baron Brunnov that Britain's dissatisfaction with its own capitulatory position in Central Asia and the Near East was growing. In February 1869 Brunnov advised that, in connection with the change of cabinet,68 'the system of inaction of the Viceroy of India, Sir John Lawrence, in his policy toward countries located beyond the bounds of the territory that he ruled is coming to an end. This system is unpopular both in Calcutta and England and needs review.'69 Indeed, Lawrence was replaced in that year by Lord Mayo. A member of the House of Commons, E. B. Eastwick, who had previously held various administrative and diplomatic posts in India and Persia, demanded that important contingents of the Indian army he concentrated in North India to 'counter a Russian invasion', that an active policy be adopted in Persia, and that the Persian army he reorganised under the leadership of British officers.70 All these signs of British concern made Gorchakov hesitate over the occupation of Turkmeniia. Consequently, the



Director of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stremoukhov, advocated talks with Persia on Krasnovodsk and considered that an expedition to seize this point should be undertaken 'in no other way than in friendly cooperation with Persia, which should in no way be pushed into the embrace of the English'.7' Fears of this kind were also expressed by the brother of Tsar Alexander II, namestnik (viceroy) in the Caucasus, Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, in a note 'On the Krasnovodsk Expedition' submitted to the Emperor on 16 August 1869.72 However the War Ministry insisted on going ahead with the Krasnovodsk expedition. In a letter to the Grand Duke, War Minister Miliutin categorically stressed: 'Occupying this point on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea is for us a matter of necessity in any case, no matter how Persia views it.'73 On 22 August 1869 Alexander II authorised preparations for the Krasnovodsk operation to be undertaken in the autumn of that year. On 5 November a detachment under the command of Colonel Stoletov disembarked in Muravevsk Bay of the Gulf of Krasnovodsk and established a post and harbour in Krasnovodsk. Thus was the conquest of Turkmeniia begun by Russian troops.

The Persian government attempted to protest against this unilateral act but its protest was rebuffed coarsely by the Russian envoy Beger, who announced that 'he rejected all Persian claims to Krasnovodsk because its occupation by Russian troops was an established fact [author's emphasis] and because the Persian government lacked any proof of its right to the Gulf of Krasnovodsk'.74 Mirza Sayed Khan attempted to clarify whether Russia had any proof to support its claim to the Gulf of Krasnovodsk but Beger did not condescend to answer. After the short argument, the Persian Foreign Minister realised that Britain had betrayed his country and had washed its hands of the affair. He was reduced to muttering that 'he did not -see in the disembarking of Russian troops in Krasnovodsk anything that should concern his government'.75 With this the incident could be considered closed, as Beger hastened to inform his government. In early December 1869, Mirza Sayed Khan sent Beger a memorandum requesting official recognition of Persia's right to rule the nomadic Turkoman tribes between the rivers Gurgan and Atrek and requesting the Russians not to fortify the banks of the latter river. The answer came quickly from Petersburg. Stremoukhov wrote: 'You can answer the Shah that we recognise his sovereignty up to the Atrek and therefore we do not plan to fortify this locality in any way.'76

Such was the international background against which Russia seized the most important theatre in Turkmeniia. During the ensuing fifteen years, Petersburg joined all the 'new territories' to the Turkoman lands that had previously been seized and completed the annexation of Turkmeniia in 1885. The success of this policy of seizure was predetermined insofar as London demonstrated no real opposition to tsarist expansion in this region, which bordered British spheres of influence. The documents cited above justify concluding that British ruling circles came to terms with the transfer of Turkmeniia to tsarist control even before it actually became a possession of the Tsar. Naturally Persia, whose rights to Turkmeniia appeared much more legitimate than



Russian claims, was forced to accept the loss of this important territory on its border. Yet certain circles in Petersburg were, to the end, unsure of the success of the 'undertaking' and considered it absolutely necessary to secure the neutrality of Persia toward the Krasnovodsk Expedition of 1869. This confirms the hypothesis, often expressed by proponents of the forward policy in London and Delhi, that tsarist circles were uncertain about Russia's strength and that this uncertainty was not unfounded. Nonetheless, those in London who were responsible for implementing policy did not heed these warnings and they paved the way for Petersburg to seize new territories.

NOTES

1. Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossii (AVPR), fond (F.) 'Persidskii stol', 1856, delo /(d.) 461, list (1. 271.

2. B. E. Nolde, Peterburgskaia missiia Bismarka, 1859-1862 gg. Rossiia i Evropa v nachale tsarstvovaniia Aleksandra II (Prague: 1925), p. 63.

3. Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (TsGVIA), f. 'Voenno-uchetnyi arkhiv' (VUA), d. 18293,11. 1-2.

4. AVPR, f. 'Otchety MID', 1857,1. 174 ob. 5. AVPR, f. 'Posol'stvo v Londone', 1856, d. 154, 1. 10. 6. Ibid., 11, 36-36 ob. 7. Ibid., 1. 190. 8. Ibid., 1. 255. The developing new conflict with Britain, based on the two countries' interests

in Persia, was considered at a January 1857 session of a Special Committee, which included higher nobles of the empire and members of the Emperor's household. At this session, several members of the Committee, including the namestnik (viceroy) of the Tsar in the Caucasus, Prince A. I. Bariatinskii, took a sharply aggressive position, demanding an invasion of India. Although most of the participants at the meeting rejected this suggestion, Bariatinskii continued to insist on a more active 'Eastern policy', arguing that the British were not limiting themselves to war with Persia but were preparing for a war with Russia in the Middle Eastern theatre, where Russia was weakest. This blow, according to Bariatinskii, would come 'from the south - from the shores of the Persian Gulf- and from the east - through Afghanistan' (TsGVIA, VUA, d. 3, 11. 1-10). Enjoying influence with Emperor Alexander II, Bariatinskii was ordered by the latter to prepare a report 'on the highest level' 'On the Possibility of a Hostile Clash with England in Central Asia' (ibid., 11. 78-99).

9. Ibid., 1. 255 ob. On this question, Russian diplomacy unswervingly maintained the tough stance that had been formulated as early as the late 1 830s by Emperor Ni'cholas I. In 1839 the Tsar appointed General A. 0. Diugamel as his envoy in Tehran. He then turned his attention to the fact that 'the English had no trade interests in the Caspian sea and establishing their consulates in that country could have no other aim but intrigue' (Diugamel, Avtobiograflia A. 0. Diugamelia, Russkii arkhiv, kn. 2, 1885, p. 184).

10. TsGVIA, f. VUA, d. 3,1. 253. 11. TsGVIA, f. VUA, opis 2s, d. 3, 1.9. 12. Ibid., 1. 10. 13. Britain suffered great moral and political losses in the war. In Persia a real outburst of anti-

British feeling temporarily dulled the traditional enmity between secular and religious circles. 'The clergy demanded a holy war against England. News of the occupation of the Persian Gulf ports called forth from the clergy an outpouring of greater animosity than Russian aggression in the Caucasus had thirty to fifty years earlier.' Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906; The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1969), p. 153.

14. AVPR, f. 'Gl. Arkhiv 1-1', op. 781, d. 97, 1857,1. 19. 15. V. K. Chavda, India, Britain and Russia: A Study in British Opinion (1858-1878) (New Delhi:

1967), p. 20. 16. TsGVIA, f. 446, d. 35, 11. 1-2.



17. Ibid., 1. 3. 18. AVPR, f. 'Missiia v Persii', 1836-1851, d. 269, 1 2. (Note from Persian Foreign Minister

Mirza Masud, I 1 January 1836). 19. AVPR, f. 'SPB GI. Arkhiv V-Az', 1859. d. 7,11. 129-137. In instances when Tehran's actions

went beyond simple 'advertising', Russia reacted quite sharply. Thus, for example, on 13 March 1842, when Captain of the First Rank, E. V. Putiatin, who commanded the Russian naval detachment on the Caspian Sea, informed the Russian envoy in Tehran, Count A. I. Medem, that 'from the instructions given to me, I suppose that our government will not look on with equanimity if Persian troops cross the Atrek' (AVPR, f. 'Kantseliariia M-ID', 1842, d. 211, tom I, 1. 241 ob.).

20. AVPR, f. 'Otchety MID', 1857, 1. 79. 21. TsGAOR, f. 'Kniaz' A. M. Gorchakov', ed. khran. 1341, 11. 3-7. 22. AVPR, f. 'GI. Arkhiv 1-1', op. 781, d. 97, 1857,11. 66-7. 23. Ibid., 1. 146. 24. Ibid., d. 98, 1858,1. 43 ob. 25. Ibid., f. 'Kantseliariia MID', 1858, d. 78,11. 76-9. Gorchakov was usually most decisive on

paper. When he sent Khanykov on his 'tour' to Persia and Afghanistan, he strictly proscribed any discussion with the Shah and Dost Muhammad of questions that might bring Russia into conflict with Britain and aggravate the situation in the region. Thus when the Shah offered to conclude a treaty directed against Britain and Afghanistan, Khanykov hastened to change the subject (AVPR, f. 'GI. Arkhiv I-F', op. 781, d. 99, 1859-60, Aziatskii department, 1. 24 ob.).

26. A. D. Hytier (ed.), Les depeches du comte de Gobineau en Perse (Paris-Geneve: 1959), p. 180. 27. For example, in June 1859 the Shah received from the ruler of Khiva, Ata Murad Khan,

information 'about the approach of the Russians'. Ata Murad Khan, requested advice on his line of conduct in the developing situation. The Shah immediately sent a reply to Khiva advising the overcoming of differences with Bukhara and the fortifying of Khiva (AVPR, f. 'SPB GI. Arkhiv V-Az,' 1859, d. 7, 11. 98-100)

28. The British ambassador in Petersburg, Lord Woodhouse, also made occasional representations to Gorchakov and to the director of the Asian Department of MID, Kovalevskii (AVPR, f. 'SPB Gl. Arkhiv V-Az.', 1860, d. 8,1. 105).

29. AVPR, f. 'SPB GI. Arkhiv V-Az,' 1859, d. 7,1. 86. 30. Ibid., 11. 166-70. 31. Ibid., 11. 109-110. 32. Hytier, p. 32. 33. AVPR, f. 'Fl. Arkhiv V-Az', 1859, d. 7, 1. 10. 34. Ibid., 11. 9, 50, 51. 35. Ibid., 1. 110. 36. A. P. Thornton, 'British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890', The English Historical Review, LXIX,

273, 1954-55, p. 555. 37. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons (henceforth PDC), CXLIX, p. 555.

The formation of this committee was preceded by stormy debates, during which Members sharply criticised the government's policy on the question of obtaining new markets in Central Asia and emphasised the importance of strengthening British positions in Persia to achieve this goal (ibid., pp. 276, 290-91).

38. AVPR, f. 'SPB GI. Arkhiv V-Az', 1860, d. 8, 1. 148. 39. Ibid., 1859, d. 7,11. 33-9. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 1. 39. 42. Ibid., 1. 216. 43. Ibid., 1860, d. 8, 1. 120. 44. By 1859 Russo-Persian relations had reached such a low point that Anichkov persistently

asked his government to take measures, even if only symbolic ones, to relieve the tension. Recommending General Jafar Kuli Khan for a Russian medal for helping to regulate border disputes between Russia and Persia, Anichkov advanced a curious but symptomatic argument:

With our current Persia policy and with the direction reigning here since the rule of Nasr Ed Din, it seems quite harmful to our cause to leave unrewarded those of His



Majesty's servants who have rendered us services despite the conviction that their steps would not meet sincere approval or reward by their own government (ibid., 11. 124-125).

45. Ibid., 1. 122. 46. Thornton, p. 556. Russell refused to support Rawlinson's suggestion to the Shah at their

meeting of 4 January 1860 that they conclude a treaty analogous to the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1814. The Persian delegation that came to London to sign such a treaty returned to Tehran empty handed (AVPR, f. 'Otchety MID', 1962, 1. 226 ob.).

47. Ibid. 48. AVPR, f. 'Otchety MID', 1861,1. 195. 49. Ibid., 1. 196. 50. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism (New

Haven: 1968), p. 18. 51. AVPR, f. 'Otchety MID', 1865,1. 123 ob. 52. Contemporaries recalled that in 1847, when he was Foreign Secretary, Palmerston had

announced: 'Since the Russians are moving toward India, we cannot sit still in Europe. But Russia is strong enough in its own European defense and we must be in a position to defend India in Asia and Europe to the same degree' (Chavda, pp. 81-2).

53. K. S. Menon, The'Russian Bogey' and British Aggression in India (Calcutta: 1957), pp. 31-2. 54. Among the more important and stubborn opponents of Palmerston's capitulatory policy

were former British envoys in Persia - Colonel Justin Shiel (1842-53) and Rawlinson. Because of this they were characterised by Baron Brunnov as 'jealous characters and part of that atmosphere of scepticism, which served to set English society against Russia' (AVPR, f. 'Posol'stvo v Londone', 1865, d. 280, 11. 55-55 ob.).

55. A. Lamb, Asian Frontier: Studies in a Continuing Problem (London: 1968), p. 61. 56. Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Okt'abr'skoi revolutsii (TsGVIA), f. 790, op. I, d. 507,

1861, II, 7-8. 57. Ibid., 1. 3, ob. 58. M. A. Terentev, Rossiia i Angliia v Srednei Azii (Petersburg: 1875), p. 259. 59. Thornton, p. 554. 60. John McNeil, Progres et position actuelle de la Russie en Orient (Paris: 1836), p. 201. The

Indian author Chavda writes, with some bitterness, that although British agents in Persia and Central Asia were able to alert British public opinion to the problems of the Near East and to the Great Game being played on the expanses between Peshawar and Tehran, their views were nonetheless discounted by the British cabinet (Chavda, p. 7).

61. AVPR, f. 'Posol'stvo v Londone', 1865, d. 139, 11. 6-7. 62. Ibid., f. 'Otchety MID', 1865, 11. 123-4. 63. Turkestanskii krai: sbornik materialov dlia istorii ego zavoevaniia, sobral polkovnik A. G.

Serebrennikov, v. 17, part 2 (Tashkent: 1914), p. 218. 64. TsGVIA, f. 38, 'Departament general'nogo shtaba', op. 31/282, d. 26,1. 154. 65. Ibid., 11. 210, 219, 296-306. 66. AVPR, f. 'Otchety MID', 1869, 1. 160. 67. Kazemzadeh, p. 16. 68. In 1868 the British Prime Minister was a Liberal - W. E. Gladstone. His Middle East policy

was characterised by a somewhat greater assertiveness than that of his predecessor but basically it remained as indecisive and capitulatory in all that pertained to rebuffing Russia's claims. It was Gladstone who entered into talks with Petersburg about the demarcation of the spheres of mutual interest and influence in Central Asia. His Foreign Secretary, Clarendon, suggested to Brunnov the establishment of a 'neutral Central Asian belt' between the possessions of England and those of Russia. This signified recognition of Russian seizures in Central Asia and the defacto refusal of London to defend those Central Asian peoples (the Turkomans in particular) who had not yet fallen under Russian rule (AVPR, f. 'SPB G1. Arkhiv 1-9', op. 8, d. 20, 1869, 1. 85).

69. TsGVIA, f. VUA, d. 6910, 1. 12. 70. PDC, CXCV, pp. 1544-60.

In support of Eastwick, another MP Winfield suggested, in particular, concluding a close alliance with Persia. Furthermore, Assistant Secretary of State for India, Grant Duff, speaking in the name of the government, devoted a large part of his speech to Anglo-Persian



relations and supported Eastwick's proposal to send British officers to Persia. At the same time, however, Duff and the Assistant Secretary of State, Foreign Office, Stafford Northcot, attempted to calm Parliament's fears. They asserted that rumours of Russia's plan to invade India were nonsense. Moreover, Prime Minister Gladstone, attempting to reassure Parliament, claimed that talks with Russia were going well and that there was no reason for anxiety. No member of the cabinet included in his speech anything about Central Asia or condemned its annexation by Russia. Worse, Duff misled Parliament when he claimed that the government's undertaking to rebuild the port of Karachi among with a series of other measures would enhance the development of British trade with Central Asia (ibid., CXCV, pp. 1562-81). It is difficult to say which Central Asia he was referring to, for a major part of it had already come under tsarist control and was beyond the reach of British trade.

71. AVPR, f. 'SPB Gl. Arkhiv 1-l', d. 109, 1869,1. 65. 72. AVPR, f. 'Posol'stvo v Londone', d. 321, 1869,1. 89. 73. TsGVIA, f. 483 'Voennye deistviia v Srednei Azii', d. 115, 1. 6. 74. AVPR, f. 'SPB Gl. Arkhiv 1-I', d. 109, 1869,1. 107. 75. Ibid. 76. TsGVIA, f. 483, d. 115,1. 23.


Article Contentsp. [75]p. 76p. 77p. 78p. 79p. 80p. 81p. 82p. 83p. 84p. 85p. 86p. 87p. 88p. 89p. 90p. 91p. 92

Issue Table of ContentsMiddle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 1-136Front Matter [pp. 1-2]The Shii Imami Community and Politics in the Arab East [pp. 3-16]Women and the Shii Ulama in Iran [pp. 17-27]The Legacy of Imperial Rule: Military Intervention and the Struggle for Leadership in Ethiopia 1974-1978 [pp. 28-42]The Straits Question in the First World War, 1914-18 [pp. 43-74]Persia and the Great Powers, 1856-1869 [pp. 75-92]Principles of Islamic Economics [pp. 93-103]The Role of the Mufti of Jerusalem in the Political Struggle over the Western Wall, 1928-29 [pp. 104-118]Review Article: Bulgarian Studies on the Ottoman Empire and Turkey [pp. 119-125]Book ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 126-129]Review: untitled [pp. 129-132]Review: untitled [pp. 132-133]

Back Matter [pp. 134-135]

persia and the great powers, 1856-1869.mikhail volodarsky

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