PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON PERFORMANCE MONITORING

RIGHT TO PUBLIC SERVICES ACTS

BALASUBRAMANYAM MURALIDHARAN,

FEINBROTH CONSULTING

BHUBANESHWAR 23 NOVEMBER 2012

SEMINAR ON ADDRESSING CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RIGHT TO SERVICE ACTS –

PERFORMANCE MONITORING –SOME PRELIMINARY IDEAS 1

A. Objective of the Seminar: “deliberations to focus on overcoming challenges related to (i) raising awareness among beneficiaries, (iii) ensuring access to service delivery, (iii) performance monitoring and evaluation of RTS implementation, (iv) re-engineering back-end process to strengthen operations, and (v) establishing synergies between RTS and other public service reform initiatives. “

Point number (iii) on performance monitoring and evaluation in deed also relates to the other four points; more of this later.

B. Background to Legislation on Public Services:The quintessence of the Right to Public Services Acts [by whatever nomenclature they may be called] by different states in India is provision of a legal basis for public service guarantee; the origin is a perceived failure of ‘voluntarily’ following the Citizens Charter route adapted from the British mode. Madhya Pradesh was the pioneer and about 15 states have quickly adapted their original legislation. For details on origin and early assessments of the legislations please see “Right to Public Services: A Comparative Perspective of Implementation of Guarantee of Public Services in Select States of India”.2

C. CAVEATS for this Note:This is an extremely preliminary note put together for the purpose of provoking discussions, debates, and ideas for practical strengthening of ensuring access to and delivery of public services. Any interpretation of this note beyond this baby-step is at the peril of the interpreter. D. Key Features of RTPS Acts and their implications for monitoring:RTPS Acts essentially aim to guarantee public services through demystification of eligibility and access conditions, holding a nominated person responsible for service delivery and delineating an upper boundary for the time required within which the service would be delivered.

1. Transparency : Are the notified services and their delivery mechanisms transparent; is it clear who is eligible and how an applicant should navigate the delivery mechanism? Is there a status update on an application and is the information conveyed to the applicant?

2. Accountability : Is it clear who is finally accountable to the applicant for the delivery of the service? Are procedures laid out and followed on what the accountable public servant should do in the event of delay or denial of a service? Are procedures for complaints/grievances laid out clearly and followed [appeals, reviews, etc]; what happens if the accountable person has not followed the provisions of the Act?

3. Time Dimension : are provisions in the notifications on services related to timelines being followed: delivery or denial? Are timelines followed in case of appeals or reviews?

1 This is the first cut of ideas for a presentation and are based on work done principally in monitoring & evaluating the MP Guarantee of Public Service Delivery Act 2010 and the Bihar Right to Public Services Act 2011 2

2012, Tina Mathur, Right to Public Services, A Comparative Perspective of Implementation of Guarantee of Public Services in Select States of India, Centre for Organization Development, Hyderabad, India http://www.codhyd.org/images/RightToPublicServices_TinaMathur.pdf

A simple process flow diagram of the service delivery mechanism is placed below. Most states have this as the basis for their MIS for monitoring implementation status of their RTS Acts.

E: RIGHT TO SERVICE ACTS: BASIC PROCESS FLOW FOR SERVIC DELIVERY 3

Samples of the way in which data are aggregated through the different MIS are shown in the following pages to highlight that basic monitoring of implementation is essentially linked to:

1. Services Delivered: a] on time; and b] beyond time2. Services Pending: a] within the time limit; and b] beyond time limit3. Services Denied: a] within time limit; and b] beyond time limit

Caveat: This is by no means the only format on which monitoring is done by these states; they are the foundation on which further analyses are done. Data shown have been at random and with the specific purpose of only highlighting how monitoring is done to track compliance with the provisions of the laws. However, they are not the latest figures; they have been shown here for an illustrative rather than an evaluative purpose.

3 I would like to thank my colleague in the Governance Technical Assistance Support Team [GTAST] to the Government of Bihar on the DFID-supported Bihar Governance and Administrative Reforms Programme, Siddharth Kumar, Deloitte Touche Tomhatsu India for his support in my work in Bihar.

1. Bihar

Department Service(s) Total Applications Received

Disposed Applications

Pendency (after tim

elines)

Disposal (aft

er timelines)

Services Denied

Disposal (as %

of application received)

Pendency after tim

elines (as %

of applications received)

Pending within tim

elines (as %

of applications received)

Denial (as %

of disposed application)

Disposal aft

er timeline (as %

of disposed applications)

A B C D E (B/A) (C/A) (A-B-C)/A (E/B) D/B

General Administration

Residential certificate 6788596 6703752 25463 49691 175386 98.75% 0.38% 0.87% 2.62% 0.74%

Income certificate 2401509 2347970 15829 26079 71236 97.77% 0.66% 1.57% 3.03% 1.11%

Caste certificate 4125259 4051468 24357 866365 46972 98.21% 0.59% 1.20% 1.16% 21.38%

Social Welfare Pensions 1367846 1235207 72349 629982 263901 90.30% 5.29% 4.41% 21.36% 51.00%

Mukhyamantri Kanya Vivah Yojana

2895 378 767 45 71 13.06% 26.5% 60.45% 18.78% 11.90%

Rashtriya Parivarik Labh Yojana

537 51 0 0 35 9.50% 0.00% 90.50% 68.63% 0.00%

Transport All Services 524373 517938 3493 72345 63853 98.77% 0.67% 0.56% 12.33% 13.97%

Registration All Services 2453686 2452120 1536 114394 63947 99.94% 0.06% 0.00% 2.61% 4.67%

Revenue & Land Reforms

Mutation 1604935 1517398 48219 181318 257047 94.55% 3.00% 2.45% 16.94% 11.95%

Land Possession Certificate 630780 623258 5524 15951 33299 98.81% 0.88% 0.32% 5.34% 2.56%

Commercial Taxes Declaration under CST 17218 17149 69 2231 1627 99.60% 0.40% 0.00% 9.49% 13.01%

Application under VAT 34414 34272 3 237 1181 99.59% 0.01% 0.40% 3.45% 0.69%

Food & Consumer Protection

New Ration card 77038 72305 4209 28023 52889 93.86% 5.46% 0.68% 73.15% 38.76%

Urban Development

Determination of urban holding

10275 8946 695 1567 1578 87.07% 6.76% 6.17% 17.64% 17.52%

Home Character Verification Report 593877 575060 3413 54441 12117 96.83% 0.57% 2.59% 2.11% 9.47%

Education All Services Not captured by ADHIKAR software

All Districts (All Services) 20633238 20157272 205926 2042669 1045139 97.69% 1.00% 1.31% 5.18% 10.13%

2. Karnataka

3. Madhya PradeshS.No Departmen

tApplication Received

Applications Disposed within time limit

Applications Disposed after time limit is over

Pending Applications Number of

Incomplete Applications

Service delivered

Service Application Rejected

Total Service delivered

Service Application Rejected

Total Beyond Time limit

Whose Time limit will be over

Total

Today

In two days

In Three days

after three days

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)1 General Administration 201682 195658 1374 197032 888 19 907 3267 0 0 0 0 3267 476

2 Home 146 86 0 86 0 0 0 27 0 0 3 30 60 0

3 Revenue 437027 429133 542 429675 1703 16 1719 4680 0 0 2 241 4923 710

4 Transport 6915 4775 73 4848 0 0 0 2047 0 0 0 0 2047 20

5 Forest 94 34 0 34 5 1 6 26 2 0 0 4 32 22

6 Energy 131602 123398 2939 126337 597 58 655 3462 28 4 12 20 3526 1084

7 Labour 27877 20811 2581 23392 115 20 135 2837 110 7 91 604 3649 701

8Urban Administration and Development

18466 15443 574 16017 23 4 27 1263 113 7 89 645 2117 305

9 Rural Development 585 438 18 456 0 0 0 82 0 0 0 40 122 7

10 Tribal Welfare 385 340 19 359 0 0 0 20 1 0 0 4 25 1

11 Social Justice 133144 98665 10273 108938 467 52 519 5197 286 109 257 12564 18413 5274

12Food, civil supplies and consumer Protection

68782 61487 1080 62567 263 13 276 3618 167 32 141 1137 5095 844

13 Public health engineering 10418 9917 52 9969 19 2 21 398 0 0 0 0 398 30

14Women and child welfare

2451 444 1 445 0 0 0 890 1 59 146 753 1849 157

Total 1039574 960629 19526 980155 4080 185 4265 27814 708 218 741 16042 45523 9631

F: Monitoring the Mandates of the Acts:The main purpose of monitoring of data from the field offices appears to be ‘Dispose Applications within the respective time limits”.

For doing this, the ‘unit of management’ is the District. Therefore, states like Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Karnataka have begun a process of ranking of districts according to this idiom where ‘Performance=MAINLY Disposal of Applications within specified time limits’

G: Appeals and Reviews:

Appeals and reviews in all states have been minimal. Initial reports seem to indicate that this could be because:

1. SERVICE DELIVERY EFFICIENCY WAS VERY HIGH : THANKS TOa. The seriousness of the political executive and bureaucracy to RTPS –

their emphasis on regular monitoring using MIS - and in the case of Bihar through the Chief Minister’s interactions with citizens on RTPS during his Seva Yatras - has meant that at the service delivery points a large majority of staff have gone beyond the routine to ensure compliance to the law;

b. Special measures were undertaken, thanks to learning from MP’s and other early starters like Bihar’s experiences, that ensured better service delivery

2. PSYCHOLOGY: Many applicants interviewed in Bihar were of the view that, especially for delays, there was no point in going for appeals. They were glad if services were delivered even after a tolerable delay beyond mandated time limit

3. LACK OF AWARENESS: Many were not aware that they could go on appeal in case of delay or denial; this was, interestingly, even in cases where the details displaying the RTPS Act, in Bihar, were right behind the applicant’s back, so-to-speak. When queried, we were informed that the entire process listed was not worth going into as it was either an eye-wash, or confronting government officers was not a good idea given that they had to approach government for services on a continual basis; one confrontation can have long-term negative consequences to the individual.

H. BEYOND MAIN MANDATES AND ENTERING THE REALMS OF EVALUATION:

However, to the credit of state governments it must be mentioned that each has devised a method of going beyond this simple measure, however fundamental it may be in their calculus, to include other features/parameters of ‘PERFORMANCE’. See below examples from Bihar and Karnataka.

1.KARNATAKA

2. BIHAR

The Parameters and their respective weightage in brackets are: Disposal of applications [30%] ; Messages to Applicants Through SMS about Status of Delivery [40%]; Synchronization of Application and Service Delivery Data from the field to the district and HQ [10%]; RTPS Counters constructed [2.5%]; Full Information on RTPS Written/Printed on Wall/Board [2.5%]; Shelter/Shed available for People waiting in Queue [2.5%] and Waiting/Seating Place Available for People [2.5%]

As is clear from the above 2 examples states have gone beyond merely measuring performance according to parameters defined in the law, related rules and notifications of services. However preliminary and tentative these may be, it is worth noting that these are self-driven and important initiatives.

To recap, some of the features that are being captured in the monitoring of performance are apart from disposal of applications:

1. Number of applications per 100,000 of population2. SMS-based information sent to applicants on status of service delivery3. Synchronization of local data with the district and state level monitoring system4. Provision of information on RTPS Act at the Point-of-Service 5. Special counters for RTPS Services6. Shelter and seating for applicants

A Block/Circle Office in Jehanabad District. Please note that apart from the shelter and seating arrangements, a token system with a LED Display of status of token is operational.

I: OTHER POINTERS FOR PERFORMANCE MONITORING

1. Awareness: Initial pointers from Bihar, MP and Karnataka indicate that ‘modern’ methods- advertisements, TV and radio jingles, internet-based communication, and hoardings – are grossly inadequate in raising awareness. Face-to-face communication in small group settings appears to be the best option- states will

have to utilize the services of Gram Panchayats, Wards, and institutions like schools and colleges as in the case of Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka.

2. Access: As shown above much improvements can be brought out in access, even though the laws may not state anything about quality of access at all.

3. Are front-line service-delivering institutions adequately provisioned in terms of Infrastructure, Human Resources and Funds? Our preliminary, if unscientific, findings suggest that they are not in a large majority of cases.

4. An audit of denial and delay of services should be mandated under the rules to the Acts. A preliminary pilot in Bihar suggests nuances in services: services like Pensions are more difficult to access [as proof of qualifying criteria require other public services to have been accessed before – like age certificate, death certificate of husband, level of handicap certified by a ‘government-approved’ medical officer, etc, and some like Ration Cards may have ‘annual quotas’] and therefore there are more cases of denial or delay. Evaluation of denials and delay will help streamline these other services too.

5. One ‘black box’ is the back end process for each service: are the sub-processes mapped and are there time limits and accountability for each? If there are, are they transparent to the public? As far as I know, even where such attempts have been made such as in Purnea District of Bihar, it is not clear if the back-end is monitored.

6. Are existing processes the most rational ones: many determinants of the service delivery process in government are driven by rules and procedures that in some cases date back to several decades. Are they relevant today, or is there a case for process re-engineering. A recent paper by a colleague of mine from GTAST suggests that a strong case exists for process engineering.4

7. Are provisions of 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution of India adequately addressed? There is a need for evidence collection on this aspect of RTPS Acts.

8. Using the Laws of Unintended Consequences or LUC: Bihar decided to use ICT extensively in implementing the Bihar RTPS. This helped the government to have a large data base of applicants. 2 simple, but extremely important, improvements have about because of this. One, in 2012 the Bihar Government notified that those citizens who are applying for Caste, Income and Residence certificates and had applied before – but after the implementation of the Act in August 2011 – would be delivered their services within 3 days [as opposed to 14 days for those who were applying for the first time]! Two, those who had provided a mobile number at the time of application would be notified their date of service delivery through SMS; they need not go to the respective offices to find out the status. Alternatively, applicants can use either mobile or internet technology to find out the status of their application.

4 2012, C K Ramachandran, Electronic Service Delivery: Are the Poor being Served? International Conference on Public Administration (ICPA 8th )

J: SOME OTHER POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION

1. Chyris Argyris in his ladder of inference suggested that after a time even social scientists tend to ‘select data based on beliefs’, rather than ‘constructing beliefs on data’. There is, therefore, a constant need to reconsider and re-evaluate the frameworks on which MISs are built for monitoring and evaluation purposes of RTPS implementation.

2. Double-loop Learning: Standard Project Monitoring systems measure performance by pre-set criteria; they help in readjusting the ‘Thermostat’ to get to a ‘Desired Temperature’ that is PRE-SET: 25 degree Celsius. They do not ask the question ‘Is 25 degrees’ the right temperature. Chris Argyris suggests what is called Double Loop Learning where this is question is asked: are the standards themselves the right ones for measuring performance?

3. Some theoretical points/cautionary remarks on ‘Management by Metrics:

There are at least three dangers of Management by Metrics that I know of. a. The first one is Measurement Mania: In most cases of management by metrics formats are provided where staff are asked to fill in the “values” for indicators/parameters based on verifiable data. This indeed, is an admirably rational approach. When these numbers are limited, complaints that they don’t account for finer realities will appear; when the metrics management framework is enlarged to accommodate these finer nuances, the model becomes large and unwieldy at the individual and organisational levels. Demand will increase for parameters to be increased, for indicators to have a greater range of weightages, etc. Eventually, there is the dreadful possibility of the staff looking only at how to fulfill the measurement requirements rather than any other including actually providing better service. It then produces the additional problem of a larger set of data being verifiable and eventually leads to the Russell paradox of “Who shaves the barber, if nobody can shave themselves and only the barber is supposed to shave all members of the community”! Who measures the measurer, who verifies the verifier, and who manages the manager! While in private sector these issues do not arise due to clarity on ownership, lie dormant or are brushed under the carpet, in government disposal of the problem/dilemma is not so easy.

We may believe that this can be moderated by the citizen surveys and social audit. I have serious doubts on how much of verification for veracity is in reality possible given the number of institutions and the number of indicators. Clearly the smaller the number of measures, the more amenable the system is to management. Purity has to step aside in favour of practicality.

b. The second is Mistaking the Messenger for the Message: this is a pernicious danger. In many cases that I have observed it is easy for superiors to castigate the Messenger of the bad news, rather than view

the bad news as something that needs to be looked into independently of the messenger.

c. This provokes what could be called the Margaret Mead Syndrome: there is a story, probably apocryphal, that a whole lot of social anthropology based on Margaret Mead’s method was ironically based on fluff and not solid substance. A researcher, it is said, who went to study the same community decades after Margaret Mead did, was delighted to find out that the tribes had hoodwinked Margaret by giving replies that would satisfy her rather than what were or should have been “real” responses. Those who have been in large organizations need no introduction to this; many have been producing replies that satisfy the bosses than reveal the truth.

4. Rationality as a principle of service delivery: Many believe that our systems should be rational, especially those related to public service delivery. There is inherent danger in using such a term as Rationality without defining operational boundaries. In fact one of the fundamental premise of rationality is axiom: if this is so, then that is so and so, etc. Moreover, the factors, variables, constants, etc., that are supposed to be used should be accepted by the entire lot of persons involved to be indisputably and unarguably standing for what they are supposed to stand for. This is hardly the case in realities dealing with people. There is also a second and more fundamental problem. Following Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem for axiomatic systems, you can have a “rational” system only with incompleteness built in. As along as rationality is tied so acutely with axioms, you cannot have both a complete and a rational system. You can have “bounded rationality”, following Simon. But bounded rationality necessarily will raise the question “Whose Rationality”. The Service Delivery Acts are presumably and especially aimed at the poor and marginalized sections of society. So at least in a substantive manner, if not solely, the rationality for service provision has to be theirs not that of the “power elite” alone.