perdana sti policy brief issue 1(4)

ISSUE 1 SEPTEMBER 2014

1 DIPLOMACY:

THE GEOPOLITICS OF MH370 SAR

There is no doubt that the Malaysian government

will spare no effort to find the missing Malaysian

Airlines flight MH370 which proves to be very

difficult due to the lack of data to work on. There

is growing acceptance by all concerned that it

may take many more months or even years of

search in the deep southern Indian Ocean which

is believed where the ill fated flight ended.

PERDANA STI POLICY BRIEF ISSUE 1

International cooperation for the search and rescue (SAR) mission has been

very astounding and if not unprecedented. Never before in the history of

international SAR where twenty six different nations worked hand in hand.

Super powers such as United States of America and China with all their

advanced military assets conducted the mission in tandem in the super

sensitive South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Not to be left behind, smaller

nations with their limited capabilities such as Brunei and Indonesia joined in this unprecedented international

SAR mission.

Who would ever thought that the highly advanced U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft and its Chinese

counterpart the Ilyushin would fly in the same area searching for any sign of the MH370 debris. Remote sensing

satellites controlled by both super powers were seemed to be deployed to the full extent of its capabilities to

scourge the wide search area of both oceans.

There exists the perception that both the Americans and the Chinese are trying to outwit each other to show

whose military assets are more superior or which satellite images are more reliable. Or which black box detection

signal technology is more trustworthy. Both the ADV Ocean Shield which has the Bluefin-21 ultrasonic signal

detector and the Chinese vessel Haixun 01 with a hand held detector detected the black box signal albeit at

different locations.


The perceived collaborative but with a tinged of rivalry characteristics between the Americans and the Chinese in

the MH370 SAR mission reflected the unique and complicated China-Malaysia-U.S. triangular relationship. It

cannot be denied that the unsolved mystery MH370 disappearance has stressed the China-Malaysia relationship.

During the first few weeks of the incident, Chinese government was under immense pressure from its citizens to

react harshly to Malaysia’s perceived incompetence or the lack of transparency in handling the issue. Taking into

account to Beijing sensitivity to domestic populism, control demonstrations of its citizens venting their anger to

Malaysia are numerous in its initial period. China has the history of encouraging its citizens to vent its anger

directed at foreign powers if their country or citizens has been badly treated.

Yet despite all this strained relations, Beijing is very cautious in taking any actions that may jeopardized its cordial

relationship with Kuala Lumpur. The arrival of the two giant pandas Fu Wa and Feng Yi on loan to Malaysia was

delayed only one month. Taking into account the sensitivity of the MH370 issue, it would not be surprised if

Beijing renegade its commitment that was sealed two years ago in 2012 under the Giant Panda International

Conservation Cooperation Agreement.

Malaysia is important to the Chinese not only because of the healthy trade between the two nations but more

importantly because of the changing geopolitical landscape of the South China Sea. A very harsh Beijing view on

Malaysia’s handling of the MH370 issue will alienate Kuala Lumpur further away from the Chinese.


Beijing surely does not want to undo the existing cordial relationship with Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia is the first of

Asean to establish diplomatic relation with China in 1974 and under Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak

administration this special relationship has been upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

In fact during Minister of Defense Datuk Seri Hishamuddin Tun Hussein visit to

Beijing last year, Malaysia strengthened its military ties with China that was

initiated in 2005. It is expected that the inaugural military exercise between the

two nations will commence sometime this year.

President Barack Obama visit to Kuala Lumpur does not created undiplomatic response from Beijing as opposed

to similar visits by Obama to Tokyo, Seoul and Manila. These three U.S. allies reacted aggressively when faced

with maritime dispute with China. Kuala Lumpur on the other hand took the more pragmatic approach when

handling similar issue with China.Kuala Lumpur was always a friend when China needed one. Be it forty years ago

or now, Beijing always understood and appreciate this scenario. And the MH370 issue shows how important it is

both for Beijing and Washington not to undermine or isolate Malaysia.


Singapore Foreign Affairs Minister K Shanmugam reiterated during the

January 2012 Parliament session that the issues of overlapping claimants

surrounding the South China Sea (SCS) are not likely to be resolved in the

near future. The best approach, according to him is to maintain the status-

quo and all claimants should agree on a way in which they can relate and co-

operate with one another. He said this during answering questions session

from Singapore MPs in Parliament on the January 14 2012 on how he

expects the leadership renewal in the U.S. and China to affect the ongoing SCS dispute.

The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which includes four of the competing territorial claimants

(Vietnam, Philippine, Brunei and Malaysia), has been trying to make it clear that territorial disputes can only be

solved by the states themselves. But within ASEAN, there exists no consensus and the differences between the

four claimants lay bare the difficulty facing the grouping.

2 DEFENSE POLICY:

THE NEW SAVIOR OF THE SCS DISPUTE


Mr Shanmugan, who is also Singapore’s Law Minister, stated he has the confidence that ASEAN can handle the

dispute but added that the regional grouping must put in place a framework that shows how they have to

structure their conduct with each other. In this respect he reiterated the need for an agreeable Code of Conduct

(CoC) on SCS, saying the sooner it is started the better.

But the problem with the CoC strategy is that in reality ASEAN wants China to agree to the code but unfortunately

can’t form a consensus on how to do so. China, on the other hand has no real incentive to sign off on such an

agreement.

As a result there is much bickering over the choice of strategy regarding SCS within ASEAN. Amongst the

claimants, Vietnam and Philippine clearly favor involving a third party in this dispute – i.e. the U.S.

Singapore for example has been a very active partner in the increased U.S.

military engagement for the Asia-Pacific region. Next month will see four U.S.

Navy littoral combat ships (LCS) that will soon begin rotational deployment to

Singapore. While this U.S.-Singapore relationship will be the most significant

beneficiary of that, so too will other ASEAN members and no doubt the SCS

freedom of navigation will be the prominent issue. The presence of the LCS

even on rotational basis will have a very significant effect since the ships have a spread of designed capabilities

ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief right up to its ability to act as a warship.


LCS is designed to operate in near-shore environments and is effective against anti-access threats such as mines,

quiet diesel submarines and fast surface craft. It is also capable of open-ocean operation such as the SCS. The

mere presence of LCS is a very sensitive issue whether in SCS or Straits of Melaka.

When the U.S. proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in 2004 to base its marines and LCS

along the Straits of Melaka, Malaysia and Indonesia as the littoral states objected to the program due to the

presence of war ships. The RMSI thus had no chance to see daylight and never took off.

Even though Singapore is a non-claimant state in the SCS dispute but its relationship with the U.S. which

underscores its shared belief that a strong U.S. presence in the Asia Pacific enhances regional stability and

security may play a pivotal role not only in SCS but also the Melaka straits. The deployment of the LCS signals U.S.

commitment to the region by enhancing its ability to train and engage with its ASEAN allies.

The Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) signed in 2005 is the bulwark

of defense cooperation between the two allies. The two nations are

always in the forefront to explore additional joint initiatives to further

operationalize the SFA and facilitate U.S. engagement in the region. The

deployment of LCS is the latest SFA initiative.


The alliance of U.S. and Singapore is good for ASEAN since it emphasises the importance of evolving regional

security architecture for the Asia-Pacific region that brings together all key stakeholders in the region, and

accommodates their interests and aspirations. A stable military-to-military relationship is needed to maintain

peace in the region.

But the problem with SFA is that it is only a one sided relationship, that is, with the U.S. only. Singapore SFA

underpinned the importance of the U.S. continuing role in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, but

this strategy holds potential for a confrontation with China.

It is very difficult for ASEAN not to take sides and adopt a position that is neutral, forward-looking that

encourages the peaceful resolution of issues if within its members the implementation of opposite strategy is the

norm. Singapore with a very influential standing in ASEAN and its close cooperation with the U.S. no doubt will

play a very critical role in SCS sovereignty disputes.

Since the era of the Vietnam War, Singapore has been subscribing to the notion of overwhelming power on its

side. But with China as the emerging superpower, this strategy will certainly create a very volatile atmosphere

that creates antagonistic camps within ASEAN. It is not too farfetched to imagine that USN despatching LCS from

Singapore to support the Philippines in a stand-off with China. Scenarios such as these must be avoided at all cost

to ensure that the security partnership with the U.S. would not incur the obligations that Singapore has to bear.


Meanwhile to make things worse, even among the non-claimant nations of

the grouping, no common strategy exists on how best ASEAN should

approach the SCS dispute. ASEAN is intensely divided over this issue and

can’t reach consensus even on an appropriate enforcement mechanism,

without which the CoC would be toothless.

To complicate matters, a number of ASEAN nations have been implementing their own strategies to ensure the

SCS sea lane is safe for navigation. A divided and discredited ASEAN has forced member states to choose between

major powers.

This could turn Southeast Asia into a new arena for rivalries and contention.


The interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the so-called P5+1

nations comprised of United States, Great Britain, Russia, France,

China and Germany is the best strategy so far to provide the

assurance needed by the global community that Tehran has no

intention to acquire nuclear weapon capability. It is true that the

agreement is only good for six months, but within this short period

time frame it will provide a good barometer to test the sincerity of not only Iran but also the P5+1 nations.

Despite certain quarters claim that the deal is a mistake, it is indeed a good and fair agreement since the interim

provisions will ensure that Iran does not possessed the capability to produce nuclear weapons through the

restriction of producing weapon grade uranium and plutonium. Since Iran is the signatory to the United Nations

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the provisional agreement also does not restricts Iran’s right to developed its

nuclear capabilities to generate power or to be used for medical purposes or other research activities.

3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

NUCLEAR GENEVA AGREEMENT


The Geneva agreement is considered as the beginning to bring Iran into the

world’s nuclear community as a trusted partner and not as a rogue or pariah

nation. The agreement is considered as a win-win situation as it would remove

alleged international concerns and recognize Iran’s inalienable rights as provided

by the NPT.

With numerous economic and military sanctions imposed by the United States,

European Union and U.N. on Iran, it is unrealistic to believe that Tehran would halt and dismantle its nuclear

program completely even if the sanctions regime were continually strengthened. In fact when sanctions started

Iran had less than 200 centrifuges but currently it has more than 19,000 centrifuges. Even though the sanctions

severely crippled Iran’s economy, it failed to at least slow down its nuclear development. The purpose of these

sanctions is to get parties concerned to the negotiating table. Sanctions are not meant to destroy a nation, cause

widespread poverty of its people and destruction of their economy, or topple governments.

It is also interesting to note that President Barack Obama acknowledged that there are some tactical differences

with the Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, who called the deal "a historic mistake", but said that U.S.

and Israeli bottom-line goals are the same. No surprise if Washington will confer closely with Tel Aviv about

crafting a permanent Iran agreement after the six-month confidence-building period laid out by the Geneva deal

since the nuclear issue is all about Israel.


It is not that surprising when President Obama lamented that Washington still

doesn’t trust the nature of the Iranian regime. “I think that we have to be

more realistic and ask ourselves: what puts us in a strong position to assure

ourselves that Iran's not having a nuclear weapon, what is required to

accomplish that and how does that compare to other options that we might

take?", added Obama.

Make no mistake the deal is not about trust. No one trusts any governments in

total faith, even supposedly the good ones. That is one of the reasons that a key provision of the deal is the

unfettered access to the IAEA to inspect all Iranian nuclear facilities. Two weeks after the deal is signed, IAEA

experts inspected Iran's Arak heavy water plant for the first time si nce 2011, amid international concern that the

site may serve as a military purpose. The Arak small heavy water research reactor is single out in the deal because

Tehran could theoretically extract weapons-grade plutonium from its spent fuel if it also builds a reprocessing

facility.

History has shown that the strategy of isolation will never work to bring a country into the civil world’s fold. North

Korea is a good example as its get. President Obama and its counterpart Hassan Rouhani has moved forward in a

way that does not shame both the United States and Iran. It’s Iran and not the rest of the world has taken a huge

risk in this very tricky and dangerous situation. Countries that possessed nuclear weapon capability never seem to


get attacked. How many times has India and Pakistan came close to a full scale war. But those that give up their

nuclear programs completely tend to end badly. Iraq and Libya can attest to this predicament.

But the deal does not in any way curb the nuclear facilities activities that can

be used to support generation of nuclear power or other research activities

such as medical, as was the original purpose of Iran’s nuclear program when

the United States set it up under the Shah in the 1960s. To be more precise

and direct, that is the actual end point of this whole deal. And the deal is not

about Israel demand to end of Iran’s nuclear program or the destruction of

their facilities, their country or their people.

What transpired after the six months interim agreement is over goes far beyond just Iran. Most nations, Malaysia

included, need nuclear energy to spread around the world without any chances of these interested nations

proliferating weapons. How the P5+1 nations and Iran behave within this critical six months period will determine

the future of nuclear energy in many countries outside the developed world.

It is true that the interim deal isn’t a done deal. Nothing concrete was actually signed. The deal is not, as of this

moment, even operational except for the IAEA visit. A final deal most probably will be more specific such as that

will include a workable and operational structure that precludes the ability to make a weapon. For this objective

to be achieved, two nuclear facilities of Arak and Fordow will take center stage. Agreement such as abandoning


or altering the reactor at Arak and may be closing the Fordow enrichment facility will probably need to put in

place. Fordow nuclear facility is the most sensitive because it is basically immune from attack being under a

mountain.

The deal succeeded in bringing together the warring factions to the negotiating table. It is time that talks were

given a chance to succeed. But all things positive and negative points considered, the P5+1 deal with Iran is

indeed a good one for the world. And Iran has shown to the world that its nuclear development is not for nuclear

weapon purposes since the interim agreement curtailed such an ambition.


PERDANA SCHOOL OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION POLICY

Perdana School of Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (UTM Perdana School) was officially established in

June 3, 2010. In line with Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) premier University aspiration and the drive for a

more involvement in the international issues related to science, engineering and technology (SET). The need to

ensure a more holistic approach towards the science, technology and innovation policy culminated with the

inception of the UTM Perdana School.

perdana sti policy brief issue 1(4)

Documents

mh370 issue

mh370 sar mission

chinamalaysia relationship

geopolitics of mh370

chinese government

mh370 debris

complicated chinamalaysia

rescue sar mission