perception i || the causal theory of perception

The Causal Theory of PerceptionAuthor(s): Michael P. BradieSource: Synthese, Vol. 33, No. 1, Perception I (Jun., 1976), pp. 41-74Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20115124 .

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MICHAEL P. BRADIE

THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION

Is a Causal Theory of Perception (CTP) a viable philosophical option? In this paper I want to concentrate on some recent and some not so

recent arguments to the effect that it is not. Along the way I want to look

at Grice's attempt to suggest that a CTP is viable. The main thrust of the

paper is critical, but I hope to bring out the extent to which the viability of a CTP rests on how we are to treat scientific evidence in relation to

philosophical analyses, and the question of what constitutes a philosoph ical thesis. In Section I, Price's arguments against the feasibility of employ

ing scientific evidence in philosophical analyses of perception are examined

and criticized. In Section II, Grice's attempt to formulate a CTP free of

some of the traditional objections is discussed. In Section III, Vesey's

argument that the CTP is misguided is examined. In Section IV, Hamlyn's

criteriological arguments against a CTP are examined. The final conclu

sion is that these attempts all fail to show that a CTP is untenable. The task

of constructing a viable CTP is the job of a different paper.

i

No one who studies the Causal Theory, certainly no plain man who studies it, can fail

to feel that there is a certain fundamental artificiality and, as it were, incredibility about

its whole procedure - and not merely about the details but about the very idea of such a

theory. Why, we ask, does it invent cumbersome Methods... to prove something that

everyone has always been convinced of? For surely everyone is convinced not only that

there are material objects, but what shapes, sizes and positions they have. We feel, in

fact, that there is no need for a Causal Theory; that it is all the time preaching to the

converted... in no very convincing way [to boot]... ([3], 99).

Questions about the acceptability of a causal theory of perception are

tied up with questions about the relevance of scientific evidence for

deciding philosophical disputes. To the extent to which scientific con

siderations are ruled to be irrelevant for the resolution of philosophical issues and to the extent to which causal considerations concerning percep tion are deemed to be matters of empirical fact, so causal analyses of

perception are deemed to have no clear philosophical interest.

Synthese 33 (1976) 41-74 All Rights Reserved Copyright ? 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company? Dordrecht-Holland



42 MICHAEL P. BRADIE

The distinction between philosophical and scientific considerations no

longer seems quite as clear to many as it once seemed. One result is a

recent resurgence of interest in the use of scientific evidence to arrive at an

adequate theory of perception. Nonetheless, as Quinton remarks, the use of scientific evidence in philosophical discussions of perception has

been generally under a cloud. ([4], 194.) Quinton puts forward the view

that much of the disinclination by philosophers of perception to consider

scientific evidence as relevant to their problem can be traced to an argu ment which appears in Price's Perception to the effect that since any scientific premisses must rest on perceptual knowledge, such scientific

premisses can neither be used to shore up nor be used to undermine any

particular conception we might have of the nature of that perceptual

knowledge. ([4], 195.) As a matter of fact, in Chapter I of Perception, Price gives two argu

ments designed to show

(1) No scientific discovery can throw doubts on our beliefs about

ordinary macroscopic objects, such as chairs and cats.

(2) No scientific result is relevant to a philosophical analysis of

perception.

(1) Price's first argument is simple enough but the import of the con

clusion he draws is difficult to assess, for in at least one clear sense some

beliefs about material objects are modifiable in the light of scientific

theories. For example, our beliefs about the constitution and nature of

material objects, our beliefs about the nature of the sun, for one, are

clearly modifiable in the light of new scientific evidence. The beliefs that

Price presumably has in mind are those which concern the existence or

reality of macroscopic objects.

Price's First Argument

(1) What we see and touch is the basis for our belief in the

existence of tables and chairs.

This boils down to two claims :

(la) Without certain sensory (visual and tactual) experiences, it

would not be possible for us to believe in the existence of

tables and chairs.



THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION 43

(lb) Without certain sensory experiences it would not be reason

able for us to believe in the existence of tables and chairs.

(2) Our belief in the existence of the theoretical entities of

science is derivative upon our beliefs about (the existence of)

macroscopic material objects.

Therefore,

(3) Our belief in the existence of theoretical entities is indirectly based upon what we see and what we touch.

(4) A belief Bi can discredit a belief B2 only if Bx is better

established than B2.

(5) Beliefs which rely directly on what we see and touch are

better established than beliefs which rely indirectly on what

we see and touch.

(6) Beliefs about (the existence of ) macroscopic material objects are based directly on what we see and touch.

Therefore,

(7) Our beliefs in the existence of theoretical entities cannot be

used to discredit our beliefs about the existence of macro

scopic material objects.

Price concludes :

the not uncommon view that the world which we perceive is an illusion [not real] and

only the 'scientific' world of protons and electrons is real, is based upon a gross fallacy, and would destroy the very premisses upon which science itself depends. ([3], 1.)

Prices Second Argument

Price's second argument is designed to counter the claim that scientific

beliefs are relevant for explicating the extent to which our sensory ex

periences justify our beliefs concerning material objects. As Price sees it:

(1) The ultimate basis for all our beliefs about the world are our

sensory experiences.

(2) Our beliefs about macroscopic material objects are based on

and justified by our sensory experiences.




(3) Our scientific beliefs (about theoretical entities and causal

processes) are in turn based upon our beliefs about macro

scopic material objects.

Given this hierarchy of beliefs, if what we wish to do is explicate the sense

in which our sensory experiences justify our beliefs in macroscopic ma

terial objects, then our scientific beliefs will be of no help. For, Price

holds, they themselves are in need of justification and, hence, can hardly

help us to understand the nature of that justification. There are two possible replies to Price's argument here. One move is to

deny that the relation between our sensory experiences and our beliefs

about material objects is a justificatory or logical relationship. This, in

effect, is the line taken by Quinton. ([4], 193.) It rests on the rejection of

the notion that the content of our sensory experiences are private existents.

A second move would be to admit that sensory experiences (of private

existents) do form the justificatory basis for our beliefs about common

sense material objects but deny that Price's construal of the function of

the causal theory and the general evidence from science is correct. Price

seems to take the causal theory to be an attempt to justify the justification of our beliefs about macroscopic material objects by our sensory experi ences. In effect, the causal theory and the evidence from science seemingly is being invoked to justify our beliefs in the existence of material objects.

But, one might argue, the causal theory and the evidence from science is

misconstrued when invoked to justify our belief in the existence of ma

terial objects. At most, it explains why we are justified in our beliefs about

material objects on the basis of our sensory experiences by showing how

these sensory experiences are the causal products of the interaction be

tween our nervous systems and causal signals in the world. A view

similar to this can be found, I believe, in some of Russell's later writings on perception. ([5])

Quinton argues that those who invoke scientific premisses to challenge the nature of our perceptual knowledge do not usually do so with the

intent of challenging the claim that we can have perceptual knowledge of a

material world. Usually, scientific considerations are invoked to challenge the contention that we have direct immediate knowledge of a material

world. Thus, Russell, for example, who made free use of the evidence from




science in his analysis of perception, argued that the scientific evidence

necessitated the adoption of a complex view of private and public spaces which made our knowledge of a 'material world' a matter of inference

from 'private' experiences. Smythies and Brain are also followers of this

line, although Brain ultimately changed his mind about the significance of the scientific evidence. ([7]) Views like Russell's and those of the

Representationalists in general, rely on a distinction between direct and

indirect knowledge, or, in the case of Russell, the somewhat parallel distinction between 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge by

description'. This leads us to see that the

... conclusion that we have no direct knowledge of the material world through percep tion is entirely consistent with the assumption that we have some perceptual knowledge and thus a support for the scientific findings... ([4], 195).

This opens the door for admitting scientific evidence as relevant for the

resolution of issues about the nature of our perceptual knowledge. The

problem, as Quinton discusses it, is to decide between direct realism and

sense-datum theory. ([4], 195.)

Quinton defines direct realism as the view that

in at least some, and as a matter of fact in most, situations in which [one's] senses

incline [one] to believe something about the physical world the belief is both true and

not inferred from any antecedent belief about something non-physical. ([4], 195.)

He apparently takes the sense-datum theory to hold :

...that what we really perceive, the direct and immediate objects of perception, are

appearances (impressions, sensations, presentations, sense-data, etc.) (p. 179)... [and] that the appearances that we are directly aware of in perception are always private,

subjective entities, states or contents of personal sense fields (p. 180)... [and that our

beliefs about material things are inferences from and justified in terms of our awareness

of sense-data.]

The key point, from Quinton's point of view, seems to be whether or not

our beliefs about material objects are inferred from our awareness of

private subjective entities.

Having established the relevance of the arguments from science for

adjudicating between direct realism and the sense-datum theory, Quinton

goes on to argue that:

(a) the arguments from science do not preclude accepting some

version of direct realism.




(b) Direct realism is compatible with a causal theory, at least to

the extent that a causal theory of perception includes the

claim that "the occurrence of sensations is a causally nec

essary condition of our having justified beliefs about matters

of fact." ([4], 172, 193.)

The emphasis on 'causally' reflects Quinton's view that the occurrence

of sensations is not a logically necessary condition of our having justified beliefs about matters of fact. Thus, on page 193, we find

The relation between immediate experience and our beliefs about material things is not

logical but causal, a matter of psychological fact which explains but does not justify those beliefs.

If Quinton's arguments are correct, then they would serve to rule out an

appeal to some form of direct realism as a justification for rejecting the

CTP. I do not want to examine those arguments here, but instead move

on to a series of objections which derive from the 'ordinary language' tradition. One way of access to these issues is via Grice's attempt to

formulate a CTP.

n

Grice, in a symposium on the Causal Theory of Perception, defends a

version of the CTP which holds, at least, that

(a) The elucidation of '5 perceives X' involves some reference to

the object perceived in the 'causal ancestry' of the perception or sense impression involved in the perception.

(b) "The perception of a material object is always to be causally

explained by reference to conditions the specification of at

least one of which involves a mention of the object perceived."

([1], 85.)

Picking up on Price's characterization of the CTP, Grice holds that to

accept the CTP is to "accept the claim that perceiving a material object includes having ...a sense-datum." ([1], 86.) Thus, the first step in

defending the CTP is to discredit the arguments against sense-datum

theories, and show that it is not, in principle, impossible for such a view

to be correct. The bulk of Grice's paper is devoted to showing that one

potential candidate for sense datum statements is not ruled out. White, in




his contribution to the Symposium, claims that, despite this, no evidence

is put forward to support the truth of a claim which Grice holds to be

central to the CTP, namely, that "perceiving a material object involves

having... a sense-datum." ([10], 116.) Price also felt that accepting a CTP involves accepting the view that

knowledge of (and beliefs about) material objects is inferential. Grice

denies that this is an essential feature of the CTP he wishes to defend, if,

saying that B is inferential means that B must be justified on the basis of

what appears to me to be the case. This feature of the CTP is accepted by

Quinton and rejected by the more traditional views of Russell and

Smythies. The line that Grice proposes to defend is that 'sense datum' is a techni

cal term which is to be defined in terms of some standard 'It looks... to

me' locution. Grice argues that the 'It looks... to me' locutions are not

necessarily restricted to cases where some doubt is present or where some

one has denied something. (E.g. A: "That's not red", B: "It looks red

to me".) If they were, then they could not serve as the basis for sense

datum statements, for the sense datum statements are supposed to be

applicable both in doubtful cases and in normal cases. Specifically, the

thesis Grice wishes to refute is the

D-D thesis: 'It looks... to me' implies a D-or-D condition.

A D-or-D condition is a disjunction of alternatives of the form 'I am not

sure...' or 'Someone has denied that...'. Grices's rejection of the D-D

thesis involves a characteristic examination of different kinds of implica tions. The details are unimportant, for even if the D-or-D thesis is rejected the most that Grice has shown by rejecting the D-or-D thesis is that 'It

looks... to me' locutions (which for convenience we may henceforth

refer to as 'L-statements') are suitable candidates for serving as the basis

for sense datum statements. He certainly has not shown, as White cor

rectly points out, that "the thesis that perceiving involves having a sense

datum... has at least a fair chance of proving acceptable." ([10], 116.)

Granting that no hard evidence has been presented by Grice for the

causal thesis he wishes to defend, we may still find it useful to try to

characterize the thesis itself. Grice considers and rejects four arguments

designed to show that a causal theory of perception is basically mistaken.




These are

(1) The argument from Ordinary Usage.

(2) The Normal Situation objection.

(3) If a causal account were true then material objects would be

unobservable.

(4) If a causal account were true then the existence of material

objects would be unknowable.

We consider each objection in turn.

1. The Argument from Ordinary Usage ([1], 103)

In discussing Price's version of the CTP, Grice holds that it is committed

to

P: 'A"s sense impression is causally dependent on some state of

affairs involving M '

is a necessary and sufficient condition for

the truth of 'X perceives M\

Grice agrees to the former being a necessary condition for the latter but

denies that it is sufficient. The problem is that in any given case of X

perceiving some object M, X\ sense impression will be causally depen dent on some state of affairs involving other things than M, but we would

not say (ordinarily) that X perceived these other things. For example, all

of A^s visual sense impressions are causally dependent on some state of

affairs involving the light present, yet, we do not (ordinarily) say that X

perceives light. Price's way out of this difficulty is to try to distinguish between 'standing conditions' and 'differential conditions'. Grice rejects this move and suggests instead that a more promising line is to try to

formulate the necessary restriction in terms of the causal chain from M to

X. The problem here, he sees, is that a too detailed specification runs into

the objection that

if we are attempting to characterize the ordinary notion of perceiving, we should not

explicitly introduce material of which someone who is perfectly capable of employing the ordinary notion might be ignorant. ([1], 105.)

This passage suggests that Grice takes the condition to be part of the

meaning of 'X perceives M '. Having done so, Grice goes on to suggest that the Causal Theorist need only specify the nature of the causal chain




by examples, and leave the details to be put in by the 'specialist'. For

example

X perceives M iff X9s sense impression is

causally dependent on some state of affairs involving M, in

the same sort of way in which, normally, X's sense impression of his hand (the table, etc.) is causally dependent on some

state of affairs involving his hand (the table, etc.), whatever

way that may be (to be filled in by the specialist).

The problem with this move is that it is hard to see how any such clause

can be part of the meaning of 'X perceives M\ For no matter how vaguely and generally the causal connection is stated, it still seems that someone

may know how to use the word 'perceive' without knowing or being aware

of the need for any kind of mechanism, causal or otherwise. So if the

causal dependency condition is to be part of the meaning of 'A'perceives M ', then the 'meaning=use' equation must be abandoned. But, if the 'mean

ing = use' equation is abandoned then the force of the objection which

Grice is trying to counter disappears, for there would seem to be no need

to restrict the characterization of the ordinary notion of perceiving in

such a way as to explicitly exclude 'material of which someone who is

perfectly capable of employing the ordinary notion might be ignorant.' It seems clear from Grice's subsequent remarks that he felt that by leaving the exact specification of the causal connection open, he was only im

plicitly introducing it into the characterization of the ordinary notion of

perceiving. But, if the import of the above remarks are correct, his final

characterization is still too explicit. It should read, one would think, as:

X perceives M iff X's sense impression is connected with

some state of affairs involving M, in the same sort of way in

which, under normal conditions X's sense impression of his

hand... is connected with some state of affairs involving his

hand..., whatever that way may be.

In this form, all trace of the causal connection has disappeared and it is

no longer clear in what sense Grice's theory is a causal theory. White

makes a similar objection with respect to Grice's handling of the Normal

Situation Objection. ([10], 121.)




2. The Normal Situation Objection ([1], 105)

The Normal Situation Objection can be cast as the following argument:

(1) The CTP requires that it be correct to talk about the causes of

sense-impressions in normal situations.

(2) It is correct to speak of the cause of L ( = sense impression)

only if the situation is abnormal.

Therefore,

(3) The CTP cannot be right.

To this argument, Grice makes three replies.

Rl : The CTP must not be restricted to locutions of the form 'M causes

LM' (where LM = the look of M). The defender of the CTP, Grice urges,

must be allowed other locutions such as 'accounts for', 'explains', etc.

White objects to this move, and rightly so. If Grice's move were allowed, the status of the CTP and its claim to be a causal theory would be put in

doubt. Surely, not every account of the relationship between M and the

sensory experiences of someone seeing M is to be called a causal account.

To use this loophole to escape the objection is to invite the collapse of the

theory as a causal theory.

R2: One might grant, Grice admits, that, strictly speaking, it is not correct

to use an L-statement in a normal perceptual situation, but this may only

reflect a general linguistic rule to the effect that one ought, other things

being equal, to assert the strongest possible statement.

Thus, it might be argued that under normal circumstances, it is in

appropriate (incorrect) to say 'It looks like a pen to me' when it is per

fectly obvious that it is a pen. If this is the sense in which (2) is to be con

strued, then (2) cannot be taken to reflect on the truth or falsity of the

L-statement in such situations, and, hence, (3) does not follow.

In effect, Grice's point here is that 'correct' is being used equivocally. If 'correct' is taken to mean something like 'appropriate to utter' then

while (2) is true, (1) is false. Acceptance of the CTP surely has no bearing on what it is or is not appropriate to say in a given conversational setting. If 'correct' is taken to mean something like 'in fact true', then while on




the CTP it is in fact true that sense-impressions of material objects in

normal circumstances are caused by material objects (i.e. (1) is true), (2), construed along the same lines, is false. The argument does not show that

the CTP is incorrect (i.e. in fact, false). Even so, the force of Grice's objection is directed against the propriety

of uttering L-statements in normal perceptual situations. The Normal

Situation Objection seems directed against the propriety of talking about

the causes of LM's in normal perceptual situations. Thus, Grice's re

sponse seems directed against:

(1) The CTP requires that it be correct to utter L-statements in

normal perceptual situations.

(2) It is correct to utter an L-statement only if the situation is

abnormal.

Therefore,

(3) The CTP cannot be right.

rather than against the original objection. The point is that even if Grice

should show that the use of L-statements in normal perceptual situations

is merely proscribed by a usage-rule, he has not even succeeded in show

ing that talk about the causes of sense impressions in normal perceptual situations is merely proscribed by a usage rule.

R3: Finally, there are some situations, Grice points out, in which it is

correct to say 'It looks... to me' even when the situation is perceptually normal. For example, I am walking home from the office in broad day

light, sober, etc. and I see what I take to be (and what is) an elephant

coming down the street. My companion says: "Do you see what I see."

I reply: "It looks like an elephant to me." A clever defender of the

Normal Situation Objection might argue that this is not a normal situa

tion, in the sense that normally elephants do not saunter down the main

street of Bowling Green at 5 o'clock on a workday afternoon. But, Grice's point is that the same statement, made at the circus is also true,

although, he admits, perhaps provocative. We may grant that Grice has partially succeeded in defusing the Normal

Situation Objection. His replies R2 and R3 seem unexceptionable. How

ever, to the extent that the Normal Situation Objection falls before R2




and R3, all Grice has succeeded in showing is that L-statements can

sometimes be used in normal perceptual contexts (R3) and that the in

appropriateness of using L-statements in normal situations (generally)

may be due to a rule of linguistic usage (R2).

3. The Unobservability Objection ([1], 107)

Grice considers the charge that the CTP entails the unperceivability of

material objects insofar as it is tied to a sense datum theory. He examines

various senses of 'unobservable' and concludes that the fact that per

ceiving involves having sense-data does not render material objects

unperceivable. In one sense, 'unobservable' mightmean 'incapable of being perceived'.

Given Grice's version of the CTP, to say that material objects are

/?capable of being perceived is to say that they are incapable of causing

sense-impressions. This, surely, Grice argues, does not follow from the

version of the CTP he is concerned to defend. The CTP, as Grice conceives

it, plus the claim that material objects are incapable of causing sense-data

would entail that material objects are incapable of being perceived, but

the needed extra claim, Grice avers, is open to 'grave objections'. In a second sense, 'unobservable' might mean 'not directly observable'.

If 'not directly observable' is taken to mean 'not immune from factual

mistake', then Grice admits the charge but does not consider it damaging. In a third sense, 'unobservable' might mean 'only inferrable'. On this

view, the existence of material objects can only be a matter of inferences.

Grice objects that this is not an essential assertion of any causal theory that he wants to defend, although it is, he admits, an explicit part of what

Price considers the causal theory to be.

4. The Unknowability Objection ([1], 109)

Finally, Grice urges that although the Causal Theorist does not assert

that material objects are unobservable (in the sense that we cannot know

that they exist), it might be argued that such a conclusion is an 'unwanted

consequence' of adopting the CTP. Grice construes the argument as

potentially following along these lines :

(1) Perceiving is to be analysed in causal terms.

(2) Knowledge about perceived objects depends on causal in

ferences.




(3) The required causal inferences depend for their soundness on

general principles of correspondence which themselves are

dubious.

Therefore,

(4) 'Knowledge' about perceived objects depends upon unsound

inferences, i.e., is not knowledge at all.

Therefore,

(5) No knowledge of material objects is possible, because no

justified causal inferences to such objects are available.

Grice's main objection to this line of argument is that it views the CTP

in an unsympathetic light and shuts off discussion which Grice feels might be fruitful. The criticism assumes that the CTP is designed to provide a

justification of our knowledge of the external world. Seen this way, the

weakness of (3) vitiates interest in the rest of the system. Grice proposes instead that the CTP be judged on what he calls its

'intrinsic merits'. The import of Grice's remarks at this stage is not entirely clear. He seems to be suggesting that insofar as myopic preoccupation

with the CTP as a theory designed to justify our knowledge of the external

world leads one to dismiss the CTP in the light of stumbling over (3), such

dismissal must be seen to be premature. He does agree that the adoption of a CTP leads to a 'sceptical difficulty'. After presenting the difficulty,

Grice throws out some suggestions for dealing with it.

He does not evaluate these suggestions although he does not seem to

take any of them to be overpowering. Somewhere, out of the resulting

give and take he seems to feel that some interesting philosophical points will emerge. Exactly what these points may be is not clear.

The sceptical line of argument which Grice presents is this :

(6) The claim 'S perceives AT is based on L-statements.

(7) The presence of M causally explains the appropriate L's.

(8) S accepts 'M exists' on the grounds that the L-statements

would not be true if M did not cause L. From his L, S infers

that M exists and is the cause of L.

(9) A model of causal inference is 'From the presence of smoke,




infer the presence of fire.' This model presumes the establish

ability of correlations between instances of smoke and in

stances of fire. These contingent correlations can be set up

only in virtue of the fact that some instances of fire can be

identified as such other than through a causal inference from

an instance of smoke.

(10) But, in the case of inferences from sense-impressions (L's) to

material objects (M's) there is no independent method of

identifying instances of Af's except by means of an inference

from an appropriate L.

Therefore,

(11) Either the causal inference from L's to M's is not of the

smoke/fire type; or the causal inference from L's to Af's is of the smoke/fire

type but is unjustified. ([1], 109.)

Choosing the first horn, one might argue that causal inferences from L's

to M's are legitimized by invoking appropriate principles of correspon dence. This, in effect, is the move made by Russell. This alternative is

rejectable on the grounds that such principles are extremely dubious

themselves (cf. (3) above). An attempt to provide a different model by

treating material objects as theoretical entities, i.e., by taking sense-data:

material objects:: material objects: theoretical entities, is likewise repugnant,

according to Grice. On this proposed model, material objects are treated

as 'invented' entities, when they start out (on the right hand side in the

proportion) as the paradigm of ??invented entities.

Therefore,

(12) Given the rejection of the alternative models, we are forced to

the sceptical conclusion that the inference to the existence of

material objects is unjustified.

To this line of reasoning Grice offers four potential counter moves. We

consider the first and the last as particularly relevant to our present concerns.

Grice's first point seems to confuse a point about usage with the causal

claim. He says :




It may be argued that it is quite incorrect to describe many of my perceptual beliefs

(e.g. that there is now a table in front of me) as 'inferences' of any kind, if this is to be

taken to imply that it would be incumbent upon me, on demand, to justify by argument ... the contention that what appears to me to be the case actually is the case. When, in

normal circumstances it looks to me as if there were a table before me, I am entitled to

say flatly that there is a table before me, and to reject any demand that 1 should justify

my claim until specific grounds for doubting it have been indicated. ([1], HOf.)

All this is well and good, but does Grice mean to reject the causal con

nection in normal cases? If he does not, and it is hard to see how he can

and still maintain a CTP, the niceties of what one is entitled to say flatly seem to have nothing to do with whether the perceptual claim is in need of

any justification. It would surely be inappropriate to ask for a justification in such cases but this does not mean that one is not necessary. At a posh

garden party it might be inappropriate to ask the Duke if he had an in

vitation, but even so, his presence is legitimized only if he has one.

Grice's last suggestion is to criticize the smoke-fire model. He does so

on two potential grounds. First, given the success of his first point, one

might argue that not all perceptual beliefs need to be justified. If not, then

no model of justification designed to treat all perceptual beliefs can be

adequate. In the light of remarks above, this move does not bode success.

Grice's second criticism of the smoke-fire model is that it misrepresents the nature of the connection between L's and M's:

whereas the proposition that fires tend to cause smoke is supposedly purely contingent, this is not in general true of propositions to the effect that the presence of a material

object possessing property P tends to (or will in standard circumstances) make it look

to particular persons as if there were an object possessing P. ([1], 111.)

Grice has it that the sceptic treats a non-contingent connection as if it

were contingent. But, surely Grice's account is open to the same sort of

objection. After all, in what sense is the connection between M and L a

causal connection if it is not contingent? Grice's claim that

'X is P tends to (causally) account for X looks P'

is a non-contingent preposition only reinforces White's criticism that

whatever kind of theory Grice wants to defend, it is in no way a causal

theory. To defend his position, Grice appeals to the following analogy. Consider:

(a) 'Corrosive substances tend to destroy surfaces.' (non

contingent)




(b) 'This surface damage was caused by some corrosive sub

stance.' (contingently true, if true)

Compare this pair with:

(a') 'M's tend to causally produce LM's.' (non-contingent)

(b') 'This LM was caused by some M.' (contingently true, if true)

There are several things that can be said about Grice's attempt to demon

strate that insofar as (a') is what the CTP asserts, the theory is both causal

and (a') noncontingent. First, note that (b') must be held to be contingent, if the analogy is to go through. But, regardless of what we decide with

respect to (a'), the purported contingency of (b') presents problems of its

own. The basic problem is that the M which is supposed to be the cause of

the LM is still 'inaccessible'. There is no way it can be identified, except by means of further LM's. No matter how we try to get at the M-itself, we

only get other LM's. If so, in what sense can (b') be contingent? To be

contingent would require that the referents in (b') be independently identifiable. Any attempt to identify M other than through LM produces a

class of instances {LMi}. The members of this class are all sense-impres

sions, and we are no 'nearer' the object itself than when we started. If this

class {LM.:LM.j^LM} is to be identified with the object M, then step (10) of the sceptic's line collapses and undercuts the grounds for asserting that

the inferences from sense-impressions to material objects are not of the

same kind as those from instances of smoke to instances of fire. This

would then suggest that (a') is analogous to

(a") 'Fire tends to produce smoke'

and not to (a).

Second, let us examine the purported similarity between (a) and (a'). It

seems clear that to the extent that (a) is a non-contingent proposition, it

does not assert a causal connection. For, if the connection between being a corrosive substance and tending to destroy surfaces were a causal con

nection, then one would be able to identify corrosive substances in

dependently of their tendency to destroy surfaces, and, hence, the con

nection could only be contingent and not necessary. Thus, if (a') is claimed

to be non-contingent on the basis of the non-contingency of (a), then its

claim to express a causal connection must be abandoned. Thus, once again




we are driven to the conclusion that Grice's theory succeeds only to the

extent that it is not a causal theory at all.

These last remarks provide a lead in to the consideration of the views

of some of the contemporary critics of the CTP. White, Vesey and Hamlyn

all argue that the CTP is in some sense misguided. They all agree that

(a'), or something like it, is non-contingent. Whereas Grice does not see

this as fatal to a CTP, the critics do.

Grice's co-symposiast was A. R. White. The dispute between Grice

and White hinges on the relation between

Px : 'X looks red under normal conditions.'

and

P2: 'X is red.'

In particular, does

N: 'X looks red under normal conditions because X is red'

express a causal connection or does it not? Grice's view seems to be that

the connection is both causal and non-contingent. White seems to hold

that the connection is non-causal and analytic. Hamlyn and Vesey, other

critics of a Gricean line, both argue that the connection is non-causal and

conceptual, but not analytic. Their views will be considered in turn.

White ([10], 114) divides Grice's thesis into two parts. The thesis

G : To perceive M is to have an LM such that M causes LM.

becomes

Gt : To perceive an M is to have a sense-datum,

and

G2 The sense datum (from Gt) is caused by the M.

As noted above, White argues that Grice has failed to offer any evidence to

support Gx. White also challenges G2. He claims that when S sees an X

as an X, the existence of X is part of the explanation of the look, but the

explanation is not causal. On the other hand, when S sees a F as an X,

this has a causal explanation, but the existence of A" has nothing to do with

it. ([10], 119.)




White holds that it is analytic that 'X's under normal conditions are

seen as A^s.' He puts it

... it is an analytically true statement that the word 'gaol' (a snake, a bush) looks to

normal persons in normal conditions as if it were e.g., the word 'gaol' (a snake, a bush). If X can look to anyone as if it were an X, then having a characteristic appearance is, I think, part of its being what it is. ([10], 121.)

What is analytic, on White's view is

Wi : An X looks to a normal perceiver in normal conditions as if it

were an X.

The key concepts are 'normal perceiver' and 'normal conditions,' for

clearly,

W2 : An X looks to a perceiver as if it were an X.

is not analytically true.

Normality conditions are notoriously difficult to make explicit. In the

light of W2, Wj might be recast as

W/ : An X looks to a perceiver as if it were an X, under normal

circumstances (normal perceiver and normal conditions).

W[ is presumably analytic (if Wt is), but W2 (the first clause in Wt) is not

analytic. So perhaps, when 'under normal circumstances' is spelled out,

Wi becomes

W'l : An X looks to a perceiver as if it were an X, when an X looks

to a perceiver as if it were an X.

This is clearly analytic, but tells us nothing about the relation between

X's and their 'looks'.

Vesey reads White's view as implying that part of the meaning of 'This

is an X* is This looks like an X to normal perceivers under normal con

ditions'. ([8], 22.) White's position, then entails:

W3: This is red'=df This looks red to normal perceivers under

normal conditions'

Against this Hamlyn argues, from a Wittgensteinian standpoint, that

'looks red' locutions are parasitic on 'is red' locutions, and hence, 'looks

red' cannot be part of the meaning of 'is red'. Thus, on Hamlyn's view,




the relation between '0 is red' and '0 looks red' is not analytic, although it is not contingent either. ([8], 22.) White interprets Grice as committed to the "view that the explanation

of its here and now looking to me as if there were the word 'gaol' in terms

of the presence of the word 'gaol' is of a causal kind." ([10], 121.) Consider the following argument schema.

Si : (1)_looks X because_is X

(2)_is X

(explains) (3)_looks X

White claims that Grice holds that Sx represents a causal explanation.

But, this explanation is a causal explanation, according to White, only if

the non-contingent statement that "its looking to a normal person as if

there were an X is in normal conditions due to the presence of an X,

expresses a causal law." ([10], 121) The problem, then, is how a non

contingent proposition (a proposition that Grice admits to be non-con

tingent) can express a causal law. The evidence that Grice holds the view

White attributes to him comes from the last paragraph of the penultimate section of Grice's paper. There Grice says :

The non-contingent character of the proposition that the presence of a red (or round)

object tends to make it look to particular people as if there were something red (or

round) before them does not, of course, in itself preclude the particular fact that it looks

to me as if there were something red before me from being explained by the presence of

a particular red object; it is a non-contingent matter that corrosive substances tend to

destroy surfaces to which they are applied; but it is quite legitimate to account for a

particular case of surface damage by saying that it was caused by some corrosive

substance. In each case the effect might have come about in some other way. ([1], 111.)

Grice is inviting us to consider the following two arguments.

A : (1) O is red tends to (normally) make it such that O looks red.

(2) O is present and red.

(explains) (3) O looks red.

B : (1) Corrosive substances tend to destroy surfaces.

(2) This surface was in contact with a corrosive substance.

(explains) (3) This surface is damaged.




A(l) and B(l) are admittedly non-contingent. Given A(l) and B(l) are

non-contingent, can A and B be causal explanations? I take it that White

wants to deny that this is possible unless A(l) and B(l) express causal

laws (and this, under the circumstances, is impossible). Hence, White is

arguing that St is the schema of a non-causal explanation. Consider a non-controversial example of a non-causal explanation:

C: (1) All bachelors are unmarried.

(2) He is unmarried.

(explains) (3) He is a bachelor.

C (1) is non-contingent. But there is a key difference between C and A or

B. In C, if C (2) were false, then C (3) would remain unaccounted for. In

fact, if we exclude such cases as bachelors of arts and the like, then if

C(2) is false there can be no explanation for C(3); in short, C(3) must be

false as well. But, this is not the case for A and B. If A(2) and B(2) turn

out to be false, this does not preclude the possibility that A (3) and B(3) might still be true. I take this to be the force of Grice's remark to the

effect that 'In each case the effect might have come about in some other

way.' In the case of C, the effect could not have come about in some other

way (given appropriate restrictions on the meaning of 'bachelor'). If

Grice's remark is taken as characterising a causal explanation, then

A and B qualify as causal explanations regardless of the status of A(l) and B(l).

Can it be so taken, though? It would seem that in order to qualify as a

causal explanation the explanation should make use of causal laws. If this

condition is taken as necessary then A and B do not qualify as causal

explanations, even though the 'effects' in either case could have been

brought about in some other way. This seems to be White's view.

He says:

When someone sees an X and it looks to him as if there were an X, then the existence

of X does furnish an explanation, though not of course a complete explanation, of its

looking to him as if there were an X but it does not furnish a causal explanation; and

that when someone sees an A" and it looks to him as if there were something other than

an X, then this has a causal explanation, though it also is not a complete explanation, but that it is not furnished by the existence of X. ([101,119.)




This suggests the following:

S2 : (1) X9s tend to look like JTs.

(2) This (=what I see) is an X.

(explains) (3) This ( = what I see) looks like an X.

52 is the schema of a non-causal explanation. It is, for our purposes,

sufficiently like Sx. Now it is clear that the effect This looks like an X'

could be brought about in some other way. I might be seeing a Y and for

some reason mistake it for an X. Thus, we get:

S3: (1) Statement of relevant causal laws and conditions of

observation.

(2) This (=what I see) is a Y.

(explains) (3) This ( = what I see) looks like an X.

53 is the schema of a causal explanation and it invokes some appropriate causal laws (but does not invoke, as White puts it, 'the existence of X9). This does not exhaust all the cases. If these were all the cases White's view

would entail that when someone sees what is, in fact, an X and it looks

like an X to him, then there would be no causal explanation of its so look

ing to him. That this cannot be White's view would seem to follow from

his remarks to the effect that

I presuppose that nothing said by either Grice or myself asserts or denies any facts of

physiology e.g., anything about matter, waves, nerves, brain cells, etc., and their causal

or other relationships. ([10], 119.)

Thus we must consider yet another schema:

S4: (1) Statement of relevant causal laws and observing condi

tions.

(2) This ( = what I see) is an X.

(explains) (3) This ( = what I see) looks an X.

It is clear White must accept something like S4 although he seems to deny it. Thus, later, he says:

Let me repeat that I am not asserting or denying anything about the scientific reasons

why, e.g., some roses look yellow and some look pink; all I am contending is that to say




that this is 'because' some are yellow and some are pink is not to give a causal explana tion. Whereas to say that this is because the sunlight is playing on them in a peculiar

way is to give a causal explanation, though not one in terms of the roses themselves.

([10], 121f.)

'Some roses look yellow because they are yellow' is an explanation which

fits schema S2.

E: (1) Yellow roses tend to look yellow.

(2) This rose is yellow.

(explains) (3) This rose looks yellow.

E is not a causal explanation. 'Some roses look yellow because of the way they are lit' could be an

explanation which fits schema S4. It could be:

F: (1) Statement of relevant causal laws and lighting conditions.

(2) This rose is yellow.


On the other hand, White could mean something which fits S3

G: (1) Statement of relevant causal laws and lighting conditions.

(2) This rose is pink.


In either case, F or G, the explanation of This rose looks yellow' is in

terms (partly) of the roses themselves, despite what White says. But of

crucial importance to White's case is the admissability of F. Some such

explanation must be forthcoming in normal cases where someone sees an

JasanI if certain facts of science are not to be denied.

To wind up a rather convoluted discussion, the following point emerges. Grice's view that explanations which fit schema Sl are causal explanations seems mistaken. In order for an explanation to be a causal explanation, it

would seem necessary that the explanation appeal to some causal laws.

Schema St does not satisfy this condition. On the other hand, White's

view seems equally suspect. First, it is not clear that N should be con

strued as analytic, if this is taken to mean that, e.g. This looks red to




normal perceivers under normal conditions' is part of the meaning of

This is red.' Secondly, it is not clear on White's view, how the causal

considerations relevant to its looking to someone as if there were an X

are to be brought into play when, in fact, there is an X with which the

someone is confronted.

in

We turn to an examination of a view developed by G. N. A. Vesey in a

recent book, Perception. ([8]) As Vesey sees it,

The task of the philosopher of perception is that of distinguishing the different kinds of questions that can be asked about perception, and answering the conceptual ones. The

idea that his task is to 'justify our claims to knowledge of the external world' or to

'analyse perception' in terms of 'sensations'... and judgments based on them, is itself

the product of the mistake to prevent which he should have been working. ([8], 87.)

According to Vesey, the CTP is part and parcel of this mistake. The CTP, he claims, arises from the attempt to give a causal answer to a non-causal

question about perception. Crudely put, the question is: What is the

relation between appearance and reality? In order to make this question more specific, Vesey distinguishes be

tween three senses of 'appearance' ('appears', 'looks'). These are (1)

epistemic sense; (2) an optical sense and (3) a resemblance sense. Only the

first two are centrally relevant to our concerns here.

EA : X appears (epistemically) Y to S = dfS would judge A" to be Y

if he did not know better.

OA: X appears (optically) F to S = d( The projected image of X

on a screen perpendicular to 5"s line of vision is Y.

An example discussed by Vesey may clarify these characterizations.

Consider the M?ller-Lyer illusion. There two lines, which are measurably

equal, appear to be unequal. The sense in which they appear to be unequal is the epistemic sense. That is, someone to whom the lines were presented

would be inclined to judge that they were unequal, if he did not know

better (i.e., had not just measured them and found them to be equal in

length). On the other hand, if the lines were projected onto a screen

perpendicular to the subject's line of vision, they would be measurably

equal (or, presumably, if their retinal images were measured, they would




be equal). That projection (or retinal image) constitutes the optical ap

pearance of the lines.

Vesey's basic claim is that

Perception would not be how we find things out about the world if there were not

epistemic appearances. Or, in plain language, it is only because we see things, as being

things of a certain sort that we find out about the world by seeing things. ([8], 15.)

What this amounts to is that the relation between epistemic appearances and the world is not a causal relationship but a 'conceptual' relationship.

Optical appearances, on the other hand, are causally related to the world, if the laws of perspective are to be construed as causal laws. But atten

tion to optical appearances alone, or the attempt to project them (via) retinal images) into the brain or 'mind' will never succeed in explaining how 'we find out about the world by seeing things.' The CTP, insofar as

it is an attempt to do just this, constitutes a misguided attempt to give a

causal answer to a question for which there can be no causal answer.

Vesey traces the root of this evil to Descartes. Vesey argues that

Descartes (and a large part of the Western philosophical tradition which

followed) can be construed as trying to establish that the relationship be

tween what Vesey calls epistemic appearances and the world is a causal

relationship. Pressed to its logical conclusion, Vesey argues, the conse

quences of such an attempt are phenomenalism. This Vesey takes to be a

reductio of the Cartesian position and the causal posture in general.

([8], ch. 2-4).

Vesey's positive view turns on the distinction between 'external' and

'internal' questions. Thus, the question, 'Are there physical objects?', can

be read either as an 'internal' question within the realm (or framework) of

physical objects, or as an 'external' question about the realm (or frame

work) of physical objects. Regarded as an 'internal' question, it admits of

an unambiguous and non-sceptical 'yes'. As an 'external' question, it is to

be read as a question "about the logical truths of the language relating how things appear and how things are." ([8], xiii.)

In this context, Vesey defends a version of the thesis that there is a

conceptual (but not analytic) connection between 'being red and looking red under normal circumstances.' This is taken to support the view that

the connection between the way things (epistemically) appear to us and

the way they are is a conceptual (non-analytic) connection and not a




causal connection. It follows that any attempt to give a causal answer to

this question is misguided. The usual caveat is given, viz., that this is not

to deny the obvious ; that some causal conditions are necessary for per

ceiving, but rather to deny that 'something is seen as an X because it is an

X' is a causal explanation. ([8], 75-76.) It remains to examine the argu ments for these claims.

We turn to Vesey's arguments against construing epistemic appearances as causally determined. His argument hinges on a distinction, borrowed

from Austin, between being 'true to' the world and being 'true of the

world ([8], 14) Vesey says:

The epistemic appearance... [unlike the optical appearance]... is not something which

can be correlated with the object as a projection or representation of it. It is true, or

false, o/[not 'to'] the object. ([8], 18.)

Austin's view was that whatever is a causal effect of something else (e.g. a

copy, replica, photograph, or recording) can be true to the original, but

not true ?/the original. Combined with Vesey's basic claim (cited above

p. 35) the following argument emerges.

(1) Perception involves having epistemic appearances.

(2) Epistemic appearances are (potentially) true o/the world.

(3) What is a causal effect is, at best, true to the world.

Therefore,

(4) To argue that an epistemic appearance is the effect of a causal

process would be to assimilate the concept of 'true of t? that

of 'true to' (Descartes' crime). But, there is a 'categorical gap' between these two concepts, exemplified by the fact that what

is 'true to' the world can be so faithfully or unfaithfully but

not truly or falsely.

From this it allegedly follows that epistemic appearances (in virtue of

which perception takes place) are not the effects of a causal process. This

argument rests heavily on Austin's distinction, and an appeal to niceties

of linguistic usage. While rejecting neither out of hand, I fail to find this

argument convincing. It is open to the obvious objection that despite what we say, things, in fact, may be quite different.

A similar point emerges as a result of Vesey's discussion of the impor




tance of distinguishing between 'internal' and 'external' questions.

Vesey's argument, essentially, is

(1) One traditional problem of perception is the question: How

are we justified in believing that physical objects exist?

(2) The question of justification is raised only with respect to

those claims which are hypothetical or assumptive.

(3) 'Physical objects exist' is neither a hypothesis nor an assump tion.

Therefore,

(4) 'Physical objects exist' is in no need of justification.

Therefore,

(5) At least one traditional problem of perception is misguided.

So much emerges from Chapter 5 of [8]. Combined with some remarks of

Vesey's in the introduction ([8], viii-ix), the argument continues

(6) The CTP is an attempt to justify the belief in physical objects.

Therefore,

(7) The CTP is an attempt to answer a misguided problem.

Therefore,

(8) To the extent that the CTP is an attempt to answer a mis

guided problem, the CTP itself is misguided.

Grice, for one, would challenge (6) on the grounds that it misrepresents the role of the CTP. To forestall this objection, (6) and (7) could be more

felicitously combined to give

(6a) The CTP, insofar as it is an attempt to justify the belief in

physical objects, is an attempt to answer a misguided

problem.

(8) now follows as before.

The crucial premisses are (2) and (3). Vesey argues in detail for (3). We examine those arguments below. What can be said for (2)? If (2) is

false, that is, if the question of justification can be raised with respect to

claims which are not hypothetical or assumptive, then even if (3) were




acceptable, it would not follow that there was no place for a theory

(like the CTP) which was designed to justify the claim 'Physical objects exist' in some way. It seems to me that (2) may very well be false. It seems

analogous to the claim 'the question of explanation is raised only with

respect to what is out of the ordinary or unexpected.' This latter claim is

clearly false unless it is taken to mean that ordinarily people do not, as a

matter of course, ask for the familiar and commonplace to be explained.

But, this fact, if it is a fact, does not preclude trying to explain the ordinary and the commonplace. Many scientific advances are the result of challeng

ing the obvious. Similarly, what is obvious may not seem to be in need of

justification, but this does not preclude us from inquiring into what kind

of justification, if any, might be given. To insist that we are so precluded smacks of an appeal to the proprieties of the situation. We do not ordi

narily challenge a person in good health, and in good lighting conditions to

justify his assertion that, e.g., his pen is black. That does not necessarily mean that no justification can be given, only that asking for one is rude.

On the other hand, (2) might simply be construed as the claim that just as

there is no question to be raised about proving the axioms of a system, so

no questions can be raised about justifying something non-hypothetical or assumptive. Even so, what is taken as axiomatic from one point of

view, might, in the context of another system be construed as in need of

proof. In this context, 'Physical objects exist' might be construed as non

hypothetical but in another it may not. The burden of the argument thus

shifts to establishing (3). With respect to (3), Vesey must establish two

claims, one with respect to 'Physical objects exist' construed as a claim

'internal' to a framework which talks about physical objects, and one with

respect to 'Physical objects exist' construed as a claim 'external' to a

framework which talks about physical objects. We may distinguish these

by means of subscripts, i.e., we want to consider There arej physical

objects' and There areE physical objects.' In order to establish that There arej physical objects' is not a hypoth

esis or assumption, Vesey employs a Moorish argument. ([8], 62)

I : (1) There arej physical objects' is an empirical proposition as

is This is my hand' or There are cats.'

(2) There arej physical objects' follows from the truth of any

empirical proposition such as This is my hand.'




(3) It would be absurd to say that This is my hand' is only an

assumption or a hypothesis.

Therefore,

(4) It would be absurd to say that There arej physical objects' is

an assumption or hypothesis.

The basic argument seems to be of the form

P1 : B follows from A

P2 : It would be absurd to say that A is Q.

Therefore,

C: It would be absurd to say that B is Q

Is this argument form valid? Suppose the property Q is 'follows from A\

Then if Px and P2 were true, the conclusion C would be false. The force

of this counter-example rests on how one is to construe the operator, 'It

would be absurd to say.' Nevertheless, even if the argument is valid, the

key premise (3) is questionable. For even if it were absurd to say This is my hand' is only an assumption or a hypothesis, it does not

follow that This is my hand' is not an assumption or hypothesis. We move to a consideration of There areE physical objects.' In order

to give a sense to this claim, Vesey proposes to distinguish between two

kinds of statements : ̂ -statements (epistemic appearance statements) and

r-statements (reality statements). An e-statement is one which reports an

epistemic appearance, e.g., 'It (epistemically) appears red.' An r-statement

is one of the form 'It is red' as in 'It is red because it looks red.' E

statements, insofar as they report what is characterized and identified by 'would-be' judgments, which in turn are 'expressed in reality statements,'

are parasitic on r-statements. ([8], 66.) The connection between ^-statements and r-statements is developed by

Vesey as follows: given an ^-statement, e.g., 'It lookse round', there are

two correlated r-statements :

r + -statement: 'It is round.'

r ?statement: 'It is not round.'

In the case of moving from 'It lookse round' to one or the other correlated

r-statements, we know how to tell whether it is round or not round by




determining that the looke of one sense-modality is confirmed by the

appearancee of a second sense modality. There are a number of such

'logical truths' which relate e-statements to r-statements. Vesey gives one:

X being a quality that can be apprehended by more than one sense..., other things

being equal, the judgment based on something's looking X, that it is X, is confirmed by its feeling X. ([8], 67.)

The question 'Are thereE physical objects?' then becomes the question 'Do we use a language L in which ^-statements and r-statements are

related by these logical truths?' The answer, according to Vesey is yes.

Vesey continues

It might be said that we 'unthinkingly know' the logical truths of the physical object

language. But to pass from saying this to saying that we 'unthinkingly assume' or

'instinctively believe' there are physical objects would be to confuse the question about

the realm of physical objects with the question within the realm. ([8], 68.)

The import of this remark is not entirely clear. If Vesey's distinction

between 'internal' and 'external' questions can be taken as similar to that

of Carnap, then he may mean to suggest that There areE physical

objects' is not, in fact, a statement about physical objects at all. [11] It is,

instead, about the concept 'physical object.' There areE physical objects' is roughly equivalent to 'In L, the concept 'physical object' plays a role.'

So even if we assume there areE physical objects, this amounts to an

agreement to use a certain language, and in not, in fact, an assumption

(in the ordinary sense) about physical objects at all.

The argument is clouded by the basic unclarity of the distinction be

tween 'internal' and 'external' questions with respect to linguistic frame

works. Indeed, the very idea of a linguistic framework is one which

requires much elucidation. While it is true that statements about linguistic frameworks are not to be justified in the same ways as those which are

internal to such frameworks, this is not to say that some kind of justifica tion is not necessary. More importantly it is not clear that causal factors

will not play a role in such justifications. If, following Carnap, we see the

adoption of a particular framework as a pragmatically determined deci

sion to talk in certain ways, then it seems quite clear that theoretical

considerations can play a role in such decisions. In the case of things and

the way they appear, this might take the form of considering how our

'conceptual' truths are to accord with other, perhaps causal considera




tions. The net effect is, there seems no reason in principle why the connec

tion between the way things are and the way they normally appeare

cannot, on these grounds, be conceived of a causal connection. Exactly what the relevant considerations might be and how the argument would

proceed in detail are beyond my ken. But Vesey's arguments do not seem

to permanently close the door to construing the connection between

appearance and reality as a causal connection.

To recapitulate. Vesey argues that the CTP is a misguided attempt to

explain or account for the connection between appearance and reality. This connection is to be viewed, according to Vesey, as a connection

between the way things are and their epistemic-appearances. He then

tries to argue that epistemic appearances are not the right kinds of things to be the product of causal processes. Instead he tries to argue that epis temic appearances are conceptually related to the way things are in such

a manner as to preclude any question of a causal analysis of the relation.

His arguments are compact and convoluted. By trying to make them

explicit, I have tried to show that they are not completely convincing.

IV

Hamlyn's view, as set forth in [2], rests heavily on the Wittgensteinian tradition. In particular, his case rests on the Wittgensteinian notion of a

language game and the notion of criteria. The task of the philosopher, as

he sees it, is to explore the relations between the concepts in terms of

which a subject matter is defined. ([2], 73.) Such an exploration leads,

Hamlyn argues, to the conclusion that the relationship between

perception and the external world is not merely contingent. ([2], 178f.) In order to get at Hamlyn's argument, a few preliminary remarks about

his view on concepts and criteria are in order. ([2], ch. 3, esp. 3d.) The

notion of criteria is one of the most controversial and obscure of those

notions which make up the Wittgensteinian heritage. Hamlyn sees the

connection between concepts and criteria as follows: "To have a concept of F," he says,

" is to know what it is for something to be F." ([2], 54.)

To have a full understanding of a concept, to have the concept in the

fullest sense, requires knowing two kinds of conditions, defining condi

tions and applicability conditions. These conditions are a product of

social life. Hence, in order to have a concept, in order, in fact, for the




notion of 'concept' to make sense, there must be, as Wittgenstein put it, an "agreement not only in definitions but also... in judgments." ([9],

1242.) Hamlyn puts it:

There must be agreement because without it the conditions for the concept could not be

objective; intersubjective agreement is a necessary though not sufficient condition for

objectivity. The conditions for the concept to which I have referred constitute its

criteria; they establish the sense of the concept in question, they establish what has to

be known if it is to be known what it is for something to be an X. ([2], 69.)

It is not entirely clear from what Hamlyn says whether both defining conditions and applicability conditions are to be taken as criteria, or

only the latter. However, for the problem of perception, the key point in

Hamlyn's argument is that perceptual concepts must have applicability conditions. That is, the concept 'red', for example, gets its sense only because there is a general agreement on what things are to be counted as

red. This general agreement is expressed in the proposition that 'Normally, red things look red.' A lot is built into that 'normally.' Hamlyn tries to

get some of it out in section d of Chapter 3 of his book ([2], 68-76.) We are now in a position to examine, what is for our purposes,

Hamlyn's main argument. He tries to establish two points. First, he tries

to establish that the existence of an external world must be presupposed if

the notion of a language is to be intelligible. Second, he argues that the

relation between perception and how the world is cannot be merely

contingent. If the existence of an external world must be presupposed if the notion

of a language is to be intelligible, then the empiricist tradition in the

philosophy of perception, which seeks to 'construct' the external world

from private data, is on the wrong track. The correct way to approach the

problem of how perception is related to the world is to examine "the

relationship of sense-experience to that common, independent world, the

existence of which is a precondition of the very intelligibility of discourse

itself." It is this relation which Hamlyn tries to show is not merely con

tingent. If he succeeds, what follows for the CTP? The CTP posits a

causal connection between the world and sense-experience. Insofar as

causal connections are contingent connections, the least that follows is

that the CTP cannot be the whole story. Whether it can even be part of




the story hinges on whether when Hamlyn says the relationship between

perception and the world is "nota merely contingent 'relationship', "the

"merely" merely means "contingent plus some conceptual relation."

([2], 178.) Hamlyn's argument for the need to presuppose the existence of an

external world is as follows. Given that intelligible communication is

possible, then the concept of an external world must be intelligible and the

external world must exist. The concept of an external world must be

intelligible, because it is in terms of agreement in judgments about

whether certain objects have certain properties that concepts (which are

indispensible for intelligible communication) get their sense. If the ex

ternal world did not exist, then the agreement in judgments would be

impossible and language would not get off the ground. I am not convinced

that arguments like this really succeed in ruling out solipsism or phenom

enalism, but we may let that pass. The second premise is that intelligible

communication, is in fact, possible. It follows that the concept of an ex

ternal world is intelligible and that we must accept that the external world

exists. The necessity for accepting this last claim undercuts scepticism and

the empiricist tradition, within which the existence of the external world

is sometimes held to be doubtful. ([2], 182f.) The problem of perception then shifts from the problem of how we can

know that the external world exists on the basis of our perceptions to the

problem of explicating the connection between perception or our sense

experience and the world (the existence of which is no longer a matter of

doubt). According to Hamlyn, perception is the way we find out about the

world. In other words, perceptual information is the sort of information

which we use to validate claims about the external world. Perception is

the principal criterion for our concept 'objective external world.' "Thus,"

Hamlyn says, "perception must provide a basis for objective claims

about the world." ([2], 178.) From this, Hamlyn argues that the relation between perception and

how the world is cannot be merely contingent. That is, the relation between

This appears red under normal conditions' and This is red' cannot be

contingent. If it were only contingent, then, Hamlyn feels, This appears red under normal conditions' could not serve as a basis for This is red.'

Hamlyn's argument that the connection is not merely contingent is a

reductio. ([2], 179ff.)




(1) The relationship between perception and the world is merely

contingent. (Supposition)

Therefore,

(2) It makes sense that all that appears red (under any conditions, to anyone) might not be red.

(3) Under these conditions, that all that appears red (under any

conditions, to anyone) might not be red, the concept of redness

has lost all application.

(4) "Since our understanding of what red is presupposes some

amount of general agreement about what is to count as red, to

imply that nothing really counts as red is to suggest that there

is, in fact, no understanding of what red is, that there is no

such concept."

From this Hamlyn argues it follows that

(5) We do not understand concepts like redness.

But, of course

(6) We do understand concepts like redness.

(5) and (6) are contradictory, hence (1) must be false.

This argument is invalid. From the key premise (2), it only follows that

it is possible that all that appears red (under any conditions, to anyone) is

not red. But, as a matter of fact, 'all that appears red (under any condi

tions, to anyone) is not red' is false. As a matter of fact, there is general

agreement about what is to count as red and, hence, (5) does not follow.

Not only that, we know to a certain extent why that general agreement exists. It exists because the world is the way it is and we (as perceiving

organisms) are the way we are. And our knowledge about these facts is a

result of our scientific investigations. Thus, not only is it left open that the

relation between perception and the world m'ght be merely contingent, the potential role of science in spelling out that connection is made mani

fest. In particular, it seems left open that the relation between perception and the world be explained and accounted for in terms of some causal

analysis.




V

Conclusion. The main thrust of this article is negative. While no viable

CTP has been expounded and defended, several lines of criticism which

suggest that no such account is viable have been blocked. The way is left

open for a causal analysis. Two major issues loom in the background, (1) What is the significance and relevance of scientific evidence for philosoph

ical analysis, (2) What is the purport of a philosophical analysis. It would

be nice but vain to hope that these issues should be settled prior to the

attempt to construct a viable CTP. Any attempt to do justice to the CTP

must, however, come to grips with them.

Bowling Green State University

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] Grice, H. P., The Causal Theory of Perception', in G. W. Warnock (ed.), The

Philosophy of Perception, Oxford, 1967.

[2] Hamlyn, D. W., The Theory of Knowledge, Anchor, New York, 1970.

[3] Price, H. H., Perception, 2nd ed. Methuen, London, 1950.

[4] Quinton, A., The Nature of Things, Routledge & Kegan, Paul, London, 1973.

[5] Russell, B., Human Knowledge, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1948.

[6] Smythies, J. R., Analysis of Perception, Humanities Press, New York, 1956.

[7] Smythies, J. R. (ed.), Brain and Mind, Humanities Press, New York, 1965.

[8] Vesey, G. N. A., Perception, Anchor, New York, 1971.

[9] Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, Macmillan, New York, 1953.

[10] White, A. R., The Causal Theory of Perception,' in G. W. Warnock (ed.), The

Philosophy of Perception, Oxford, 1967.

[11] Carnap, R., 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology', in R. Carnap, Meaning and

Necessity, Chicago 1956.



perception i || the causal theory of perception

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