pedro albizu campos: strategies of struggle and strategic struggles

7/28/2019 Pedro Albizu Campos: Strategies of Struggle and Strategic Struggles

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the presidency of the Nationalist Party,

Albizu had defined the strategies ofstruggle he was to follow for the rest ofhis life. Albizu believed in the nullityof the Treaty of Paris, a thesis he hadbeen developing since 1926. He postu-lated that all forms of struggle were

legitimate to eradicate an illegal regimeborn and maintained by force. Further-more, Albizus global strategy was alsofounded on the premise that thestruggle against U.S. imperialism wasan unequal battle that could not beexclusively undertaken nationally. Thefight had to be taken to the very heartof the metropolis by every means nec-essary. It was also essential that the

struggle go beyond the confines of thecolonial meuopolitan context, and that

it be connected to the debate over thenew world order that began to developafter the First World War.9 On thehemispheric level, Albizu had to dem-onstrate to Latin America that the his-torical mission to serve as a wall of con-tention against U.S. imperialism be-

longed to Puerto Rico. His analysis,correctly or incorrectly, of theconjunctural forces on all three lev-els-national, metropolitan and inter-national-drove him to favor certainforms of struggle over others at differ-ent moments.

Albizu understood that PuertoRico presented a serious international

problem for the United States. Thecolonial reality of Puerto Rico stood incontrast to the rhetoric on Pan-Ameri-canism and hemispherical brotherhood,respect for national integrity, and theinternational forum that the UnitedStates administration was promoting.The isolation of our nation from therest of Latin America and from the restof the world had to be broken; the con-

tradictions between the official dis-course and the practice of U.S. imperi-alism had to be unmasked; and the

formation of common fronts in everypossible sphere had to be achieved inorder to exert pressure on the UnitedStates to end colonialism in PuertoRico.

Thus, as soon as he became editor

in chief offi/

NacionakstadePo r n

in

1924, Albizu began to mail copies ofthe newspaper and official declarationsof the Nationalist Party to the authori-ties in Washington, to the differentforeign embassies in the United States,and to high officials of Latin Americanand European governments.0 At thesame time, he began an intense cam-paign to get the support of famousLatin American leaders, writers and

journalists to promote hemisphericsolidarity with Puerto Rico. Albizusfirm belief that the case of Puerto Ricohad to be taken before the interna-tional community was also reflected inthe actions he took as vice-president ofthe Nationalist Party (1925-1930). Dur-

ing this period, he played an importantrole in the Nationalist Partys decisionto send a representative to the FirstAnti-Imperialist Congress in Brusselsin 1927, where the first internationalresolution supporting the indepen-dence of Puerto Rico was passed.Also, Albizu supported a motion in theGeneral Assembly of the Nationalist

Party in 1926 to send a delegate to theLatin American republics to promotethe Nationalist cause. His decision to

personally undertake this mission,which lasted over two years (1927-1930), is incontrovertible proof of thetremendous importance internationalwork had in his global strategy.12

At the same time, Albizu did notreject the possibility that the UnitedStates would peacefully withdraw fromPuerto Rico. He preferred it, recogniz-ing the terrible human cost that warinvolved. However, he insisted cor-rectly that no empire had ever volun-tarily abandoned its subjugated territo-ries. Armed struggle was one of thehistoric means that oppressed nations,including the United States, had uti-

lized to achieve their independence.Its use, however, would depend a greatdeal on the capacity of the people to

act united, for example, through a con-stituent assembly, and on the responseof the U.S. government and its repre-sentatives in the colony.

The use of different pressure tac-tics, in Albizus view, had UI be devel-oped to unveil the true face ofcolonial-

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ism to his countrymen and to the restof the world. While Ghandi in Indiachose non-violence as a strategy forstruggle, Albizu maintained early themOre flexible strategy of civil disobedi-ence. * This ranged from the refusal to

pay taxes to disobeying colonial lawsand armed confrontation. The formsthat these could take would be deter-mined in the final instance, by concreteconditions.

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Between 1924 and 1934, Albizuaccepted participation in the electoralprocess as a strategy. In fact, he ran asrepresentative from the district ofPonce in 1924 and as senator-at-large in1932. A study of that era reveals howthe Unionists, and later the Socialists,saw the Nationalists as a potentialstumbling block, and did everything

possible to impede the NationalistPartys attempts to open up a space inthe electoral arena.

In 1932, as in 1924 and 1928, thistime with Albizu in the presidency, the

Nationalist Party participated in thecolonial elections. Al bizu ran as a can-didate for senator-at-large. As had oc-curred in 1924 and 1928, the National-ist Party received few votes. For many,the Nationalists poor showing was dueto corruption. The prevailing view has

been that, with this electoral defeat,Albizu changed his tactics and choseviolence.

Contrary to those that defend thisthesis, the decision of the NationalistParty to withdraw from the electoral

process and establish the tactic-and itwas a tactic and not a principle--ofnon-cooperation with the regime, wasnot an automatic one. Two years hadpassed between the elections and theNationalist Partys new tactic, whichwas proclaimed on September 23,1934. In addition, there were still twomore years before the next election.The question we should be asking is:what happened between 1932 and1934 to convince Albizu and the Na-tionalist Party that they should rejectthe electoral process as an arena of con-tention? The answer is complicatedand requires exhaustive study. Never-theless, it can be argued that until

March 1934 the Nationalist Party stillintended to use the electoral process toexpose American colonialism in PuertoRico. With that in mind, Albizu filed a

petition in the Legislature requestingthat the Nationalist Party be officiallyrepresented in the Insular Board ofElections.*5 In response to the de-mands of the Socialist Party, who alsodemanded electoral space, the Legisla-ture reformed the Board. The Nation-

alist Partys petition, however, wasdenied.

There are other factors to considerregarding the Nationalist Partys rejec-tion of the electoral arena. For in-stance, there was increased govern-mental repression between 1932 and1934. The writing on the wall was obvi-ous. With the arrival of Colonel FrancisE. Riggs in 1933, the police of PuertoRico began to modernize and were

better equipped. Months later, in Feb-

ruary 1934, the National Guard ofNicaragua, organized and armed by theU.S. government, assassinated GeneralCCsarAgusto Sandino, the principalanti-imperialist leader of LatinAmerica.r6

Finally, the decision of the FederalRehabilitation Administration (1934) tofavor the Liberals over Coalitionistelements, granting the latter adminis-trative positions in the Puerto RicanReconstruction and Rehabilitation Ad-ministration (PRRA), intensified thepolitical crisis in the colony. Onceagain, the impotence of the colonialLegislature, controlled by the Coali-tionists, vis a vis the power of the fed-eral authorities was unveiled. Thus,Albizu argued, the illusion thatthrough elections one can attain

power was finally dispelled.Moreover, we must remember that

Albizus dismissal of the electoral pro-cess was determined within the con-text of an economic crisis of intense

proportions. The nation was experienc-ing a general discontent that affectedall classes and was being expressedthrough nationwide strikes. The crisiswas systemic. The Nationalists intensi-fied their agitation in the streets, atsugar cane fields, work centers, and


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schools, including the University. Al-bizu, along with other Nationalist lead-ers, had come to the conclusion thatthe regime had lost all legitimacy.

It is important to emphasize thatthe tactic of non-cooperation with the

regime did not imply the rejection ofpeaceful and legal forms of struggle, asit has been commonly understood. Upto the moment of his imprisonment,Albizu continued to promote the for-mation of a Constituent Assembly rep-resented by all political parties to endcolonialism in Puerto Rico.

The period between 1934-1936was one of violent confrontation be-tween the Nationalists and the colonialregime. By 1936, the federal authoritieshad decided to stop the Nationalists atall cost That year Albizu was arrestedand accused of conspiring to over-throw the United States government inPuerto Rico by force. Although Albizu

had rejected the electoral process, hehad not done the same with the

juridico-legal process. Contrary to theexpectations of many, Albizu defendedhimself. He attempted to demonstratethe illegality of the United States judi-cial system in Puerto Rico.* In a clearlypolitical trial, Albizu was found guiltyand sentenced to ten years at the Fed-eral prison in Atlanta.9

In the six years Albizu would re-

main in prison, the national and inter-national situation changed dramati-

cally. In 1939 the Second World Warbegan. The Allies, seeking interna-tional support in their struggle against

the Axis forces, promised through aseries of treaties such as the Atlantic

Charter and the Treaty of Teheran, thecreation of a just international order

that would recognize the indepen-dence of all the nations that unitedbehind the democratic cause.

At the same time that the federal

authorities in Puerto Rico repressedand imprisoned the Nationalist leader-ship, they negotiated a solution to thepolitical crisis in Puerto Rico with the

recently created Democratic PopularParty, where pro-independence forceshad regrouped. If the Popular Demo-cratic Party supported them, Washing-

ton promised to help resolve the politi-cal status of Puerto Rico as soon as thewar ended. In the 1940 elections, thePopular Party established a precariouscontrol of the colonial legislature. Fouryears later, it overwhelmingly won the

elections. During this period, thePopular Party, under the skillful lead-ership ofMuAoz, rapidly distanceditself from the goal of independence.

Meanwhile, in spite of the limita-tions imposed by prison authorities,Albizu tried to keep abreast of all newevents. During his imprisonment, Al-bizu shared his analysis of the newsituation with other political prisoners,including Earl Browder, President ofthe Communist Party of the UnitedStates (CPUSA). By 1942, Albizu hadconcluded that a favorable juncturehad been created for the United Statesto withdraw peacefully from PuertoRico.ZO New political fronts had to beopened in the Island, the United Statesand on the international level.

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Albizu saw the necessity to createin the United States a powerful solidar-ity movement with the independenceof Puerto Rico. Initially, he counted onthe help of the Communist Party of theUnited States, who had committeditself to financially and organizationalsupport the undertaking. At that mo-ment, the CPUSA, following the politi-

cal line of the Third International, op-posed the European war as an inter-imperialist war. The case of PuertoRico was a factor it could exploit: TheCPUSA sought to encourage internalopposition in the United States to pre-vent that countrys entry in the military

conflict. Albizu understood that theCommunist Party was a national party

that was well organized and had impor-tant influence in the organized labormovement. Also, as the only party inthe United States committed to theindependence of Puerto Rico, its sup-

port was well received.zIn Puerto Rico, Albizu understood

that the ideal of independence was stillstrong despite the repression against

the Nationalists. Even though thePopular Party followed an increasinglyambiguous line regarding indepen-


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dence, the independence sector withinthe party was considerable and influen-tial. The unity of thendependentiktasabove party loyalties was essential. In1943, the same year Albizu was re-leased from Atlanta, the Pro-Indepen-

dence Congress was created in PuertoRico. Although the Nationalist Partydid not officially take part, some of itsleaders participated as individuals inthe deliberations that helped constitutethe Congress.

In the meantime, Juan Antonio

Corretjer, Secretary General of theNationalist Party, accepted a sus-

pended sentence on orders from Al-bizu, and moved to New York, themain center of Nationalist activity inthe United States. His mission was to

pursue the new political line.= As soonas he arrived in New York, Corretjercontacted the Communist Party whosupplied him the necessary funds topublish a newspaper promoting ananti-imperialist line and supporting theindependence of Puerto Rico. In P U G -b l o s Hispanos, an intense campaign,waswaged to support the Pro-Indepen-dence Congress. Corretjer, in spite ofthe official position of the NationalistParty of non-cooperation, became therepresentative of the Congress in theUnited States. Later, Albizu set inmo-tion the necessary steps to bring the

case of Puerto Rico before the newinternational forum created at the endof World War II.

However, Albizus new strategy

soon failed. After Germany invaded theSoviet Union, the Communist Partyabruptly changed its position on thewar. What was a struggle between im-

perialists suddenly became a struggle

between democracy and fascism. Nowthe Communist Party maintained thatthe immediate task of the progressiveforces was to support the Allies.

From Albizus perspective thesituation had not changed. The princi-pal enemy continued to be U.S. impe-rialism. The rupture was inevitable.

After an unsuccessful attempt to con-

vince Albizu to accept the new line,the Communist Party finally withdrewits economic and political supportU

This precipitated a crisis and a divisionwithin the ranks of the Junta of the

Nationalist Party in New York.Corretjer, who supported the politicalline of the CPUSA, left the NationalistParty, followed by other activists that

identified with the new political line.2SThis signified the loss of a series ofrespected leaders and valuable activ-ists, and Puddos Hispanosceased torepresent the Nationalist position.

Albizu did not allow this to stophim. He immediately developed a newbase of support with liberals,

progressives and non-communist radi-

cals. This group formed the AmericanLeague for the Independence of Pu-erto Rico.% However, the group lackedboth a strong social base and a solidorganizational apparatus. Although itswork was very important, it was alsolimited. After the loss ofPueblosHispanos, the Nationalist Party devel-oped another publication, the monthlyPuert o Ri coaimed at the Puerto Ricancommunity in the United States. Lack-ing economic support, the publicationlanguished.

Nevertheless, Albizu proceeded totake the case of Puerto Rico before theinternational community. In 1945, offi-cial discussions began in San Franciscoto create an international organizationthat would peacefully mediate interna-

tional conflicts-the United Nations.Albizu Campos was prepared to openanother battlefront against U.S. imperi-alism.

From his hospital bed, Albizu es-tablished contact with various anti-colonial activists. Under his influenceand with the active participation of the

Nationalist Party, these activists cre-

ated the Provisional World Congress ofDominated Nations in 1945. The pur-

pose of the organization was to take thecase of colonized nations to the SanFrancisco Conference and demand thecomplete elimination of imperialism.

The delegates to the Congress inSan Francisco-among them JulioPinto Gandia representing the Nation-alist Party-succeeded in convincingthe Philippines representative to

present their case at the Assemblys


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plenary. The opposition of the colonialpowers was intense. After long debatesthe delegates reached a compromise.The inclusion of independence wasaccepted as one of the objectives in theConstitution of the United Nations butit was limited only to those territoriesthat were to be administered and su-

pervised under a system of interna-tional trusteeships. For the other terri-tories, Puerto Rico among them, theAssembly approved a clause establish-ing that colonial powers were to beresponsible for their administration.Even so, it established that the admin-istrative nation had to periodically pro-

vide information on the economic, so-cial and educational conditions of theterritories under its jurisdiction.

The activities of the ProvisionalWorld Congress proved to be an em-barrassment for Washington. Once theconference ended, the federal authori-ties unleashed a wave of repression. Onhis return to New York, Pinto Gandia

faced arrest for violating the selectiveservice laws.

Although recognition of PuertoRicos right to independence was notimmediately obtained, Albizus strat-egy yielded fruit. The case of PuertoRico had been brought before and in-cluded in the agenda of the recently

created United Nations. When the UN

began to officially function, the Nation-alist Party obtained recognition and

accreditation as a non-governmentalorganization with the right to observerstatus in all the sessions of the GeneralAssembly, including its committeesand subcommittees.

Meanwhile, new developments inthe Island dealt another blow to

Albizus formulations. Divisions withinthe Pro-Independence Congress werebecoming more evident, endangeringthe possibility that the organizationwould become a broad independencefront. In 1946 the leading body of thePopular Democratic Party forced a cri-sis within its ranks by declaring that itwas incompatible to be a member ofboth organizations. A large number ofPopulares abandoned the Congress.The remaining majority supported thetransformation of the Congress into a

political party; thus was born the Pu-erto Rican Independence Party (PIP).The participation of the PIP in the

electoral process created a new ob-stacle for Albizus plans, since it servedto legitimize the new colonial arrange-ment then being developed, and offi-cially sanctioned in 1952 under the

name of the Commonwealth of PuertoRico.

Albizu had to start anew. In De-cember 1947, a few months after com-

pleting his sentence, Albizu returnedto Puerto Rico to initiate the reorgani-zation of the Nationalist Party and tocontinue the revolutionary processagainst colonialism. At that moment,the possibility of achieving indepen-dence seemed to have dissipated.However, it was necessary to developnew strategies to prevent the consum-

mation of the new colonial state and toassure that Puerto Rico would neverbecome a state. When asked by thecustom inspector if he had broughtseeds with him, Al bizu Campos an-swered with the now famous words:The same seeds I took are the onesI bring back 0


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pedro albizu campos: strategies of struggle and strategic struggles

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