peacebuilding as the link between security and development

Peacebuilding as the Linkbetween Security and

Development: Is the Windowof Opportunity Closing?

DECEMBER 2003 ■ NEW YORK

International Peace AcademyStudies in Security and Development

Necla Tschirgi

Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the governments of Australia,Canada (DFAIT and CIDA), Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, and the United Kingdom (DfID) for the Security-Development Nexus Program. This IPA program also greatly benefits from core support from the govern-ments of Sweden and Denmark as well as from the Ford Foundation and the William and Flora HewlettFoundation.

About the Author

Dr. Necla Tschirgi is Vice President of IPA and Director of the Security-Development Nexus Program.Previously, she was the Team Leader of the Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Programme Initiative at theInternational Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada, where she was actively involved in the designand management of research projects on peacebuilding in the Middle East, Central America, and SouthernAfrica.

Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. Security and Development after the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. Peacebuilding in Practice: Responses at the International Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Normative Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Policy Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Operational Responses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Institutional Reform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5New Institutional Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

III. Peacebuilding in Practice: Responses at the Country Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Review of the Impact of Development Strategies and Aid on Conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7New Sectoral Programming: Supply vs Demand-driven Approaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Beyond Sectoral Programming: New Models of Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Peacebuilding Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

IV. Moving the Agenda Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Political Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Institutional Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Operational Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Aligning Priorities and Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Selected Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

PEACEBUILDING AS THE LINK BETWEEN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: IS THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY CLOSING?

Contents


Executive Summary

Since the end of the Cold War, it has become common-place to assert that peace and development areintimately linked and that the United Nations (UN) andother international actors need to address the twinimperatives for security and development throughintegrated policies and programs. Shedding its earlydefinition as “post-conflict reconstruction,” the term“peacebuilding” has broadened its scope in the 1990sto encompass the overlapping agendas for peace anddevelopment in support of conflict prevention, conflictmanagement and post-conflict reconstruction.

While there has been some progress at both theinternational and country levels to operationalizepeacebuilding, the results are ad hoc, tentative anduneven. This paper examines peacebuilding practicesince the 1990s with a view to understandingachievements made to date, as well as identifyingoutstanding political, institutional and operationalchallenges. The paper argues that the window ofopportunity that had opened in the 1990s enablingthe UN and other international actors to begin dealingwith security and development through integratedpeacebuilding approaches might close in the changedinternational climate after September 11, 2001, unlessserious efforts are made to move the peacebuildingagenda forward.

Peacebuilding at the International Level: There havebeen five important developments supporting the newpeacebuilding agenda:

Normative Developments: Throughout the 1990s, amore comprehensive normative framework began totake shape, which recognized that peacebuilding is animportant area of international concern. The securityagenda was broadened to include human security, withglobal campaigns to ban anti-personnel landmines, toregulate small arms and light weapons, and to createan international criminal court. Human rights, justice,reconciliation, humanitarian protection, goodgovernance, and rule of law were increasingly acceptedas important dimensions of peacebuilding.

Policy Developments: An impressive number of policyinitiatives gave impetus to the need to promote humansecurity alongside state security. Conflict prevention,the uses of development assistance to address violentconflicts, more effective peace operations forpeacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstructionbecame officially declared goals and objectives at theinternational level.

Operational Responses: In response to a series of ethnicconflicts, complex humanitarian emergencies, civilwars, state failures and genocide, the UN and otherinternational actors launched a growing number ofmulti-dimensional humanitarian, peacemaking andpeacekeeping operations, and undertook transitionaladministrations in Kosovo and East Timor.

Institutional Reform: There was considerable institu-tional re-organization throughout the internationalsystem. New departments and coordinationmechanisms were created at the United Nations.S i m i l a r l y, many governments and donor agenciesestablished conflict prevention and peacebuildingunits. Several multi-governmental and non-govern-mental peacebuilding networks were created. Regionaland sub-regional organizations were restructured ortheir mandates broadened to address violent conflicts.The creation of the International Criminal Court in2002 capped the peacebuilding and human securityagendas.

New Institutional Arrangements: With an everincreasing number of crises around the world, newtypes of institutional arrangements were constructed todeal with different conflicts. Involving a variablegeometry of functional collaboration among achanging set of actors (such as the “coalitions of thewilling” or the “UN plus” models), these flexibleinstitutional alliances sought to respond to increasingdemand for international assistance.

Peacebuilding at the Country Level: While seeking toenhance their own capacities to respond to violentconflicts, international actors also sought to addressthe root causes of civil wars and other violent conflictson the ground through various strategies:

Executive Summary i

Review of the Impact of Development Strategies andAid on Conflict: Conventional development strategiesand models increasingly came under scrutiny. Closerattention was paid to donor roles and responsibilitiesin ignoring the sources of violent conflicts, or indirectly or indirectly contributing to the exacerbationof conflict through their programming.

New Sectoral Programming: Innovative programs wereinitiated in support of non-traditional sectoral areassuch as post-conflict reconstruction, governance,security sector, transitional justice and rule of law.

New Models of Collaboration: There was growingrecognition that, going beyond new sectoral program-ming, external and internal actors needed a commonpeacebuilding framework to guide their collectiveefforts. Unified UN missions and multi-donor trustfunds were created to facilitate joint planning andcloser alignment of efforts, especially in post-conflictpeacebuilding.

Peacebuilding Evaluations: Concurrently, there wereserious efforts to track the impact of newpeacebuilding approaches and strategies throughevaluations and “lessons learned” studies.

Moving the Agenda Forward: The growing interna-tional consensus and collaboration since the 1990saround the new peacebuilding agenda was shaken afterSeptember 11 and further undermined by the U.S. waron Iraq. The peacebuilding agenda faces several majorchallenges in the current international environment:

Political Challenges: The wars in Afghanistan and Iraqnot only signaled a revival of predominantly militaryapproaches to security; they also led to deep cleavageswithin the international community about the legiti-mate use of military power. As the world’s sole

superpower, the U.S. has taken a strongly unilateralistapproach which has created dangerous rifts within theSecurity Council and portends the derailment of themultilateralist consensus about the importance ofconflict prevention and peacebuilding that was gainingground at the United Nations in the aftermath of theCold War.

Institutional Challenges: Despite several dramaticfailures during the 1990s, the UN had come to beconsidered a key instrument in legitimizing interna-tional intervention in the domestic affairs of states insupport of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Withthe war on Iraq, the UN’s relevance and credibility arein grave jeopardy, yet there are no other internationalinstitutions that can play a global role in pushing forththe peacebuilding agenda.

Operational Challenges: Meanwhile, there is continuingneed to improve the effectiveness and impact ofongoing peacebuilding programs and activities. Theserequire the deployment of a new generation of interna-tional staff with a better understanding of theinterlinkages between development and security, andthe ability to work in difficult conflict contexts.

Aligning Priorities and Resources: The current distribu-tion of global resources for peace and security on theone hand, and for socio-economic development on theother, reflects distorted international priorities in favorof military expenditures. If conflict prevention andpeacebuilding are to address the deep-rooted structuralproblems that fuel violent conflicts, new and creativeways must be found for generating resources forpeacebuilding. Moreover, the role of the UN’s develop-ment agencies, bilateral donors, and the Bretton Woodsinstitutions in influencing peacebuilding outcomes inthe 21st century need to be considered as part of theMonterrey Process on Financing for Development.


ii Executive Summary

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, it has become common-place to assert that peace and development areintimately linked and that the United Nations and otherinternational actors need to address these twin goalsthrough concerted and integrated policies andprograms. Shedding its early definition as “post-conflict reconstruction,” the term “peacebuilding” hasbroadened its scope in the 1990s to encompass theoverlapping agendas for peace and development insupport of conflict prevention, conflict managementand post-conflict reconstruction. Yet, peacebuildingremains an amorphous and evolving project thatcontinues to be tested, contested, and challenged bymany quarters.*

This paper starts with an effort to bring some clarity tothe basic assumptions underlying the newpeacebuilding agenda—focusing specifically on thelinks between security and development at both theinternational and domestic levels. It then reviewspeacebuilding practice that developed in the 1990s,and finally, it examines the challenges that confrontthe international peacebuilding agenda during the firstdecade of the 21st century.

It is a dangerous undertaking to view internationalaffairs in ten-year slices. It is even more dangerous totry to summarize a decade of peacebuilding practicewhich remains a work in progress. However, theinternational peacebuilding agenda is an ambitiousproject that carries with it the promise of importantchanges in international priorities and institutions thathave evolved in the last sixty years. Thus, it becomes aspecial challenge to understand its achievements andidentify the obstacles it faces—especially since thespecial window of opportunity that made it possiblerisks being closed in the post-September 11 environ-ment unless serious efforts are made to move theagenda forward.

I. Security and Development afterthe Cold War

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era ininternational affairs. Not only did the threat of amilitary confrontation between the two Cold Warpower blocs dissipate with the collapse of the SovietUnion, but many protracted proxy wars of the ColdWar era also ended with the withdrawal of the externalsupport that kept them fueled. The dominant securitydoctrines of the Cold War had averted war on a globalscale, opening the door for the settlement of otherlower-level wars and armed conflicts.

H o w e v e r, the anticipated peace dividend did notmaterialize for hundreds of millions of people aroundthe world. Instead, the early 1990s was a period ofintense insecurity, ethnic conflict and genocide, deadlyviolence with overwhelming civilian deaths andcasualties, widespread suffering, and massive refugeeand population flows within and across borders. Therewas a disconnect between the peace that was to arrivewith the end of the Cold War and the insecurity thatprevailed in many countries and regions.

This inevitably led to a rethinking of internationalpriorities in the immediate post-Cold War era,including the separation between development andsecurity concerns, between inter-state and intra-stateconflicts, and between the international and thedomestic spheres. The concept of peacebuilding—bridging security and development at the internationaland domestic levels—came to offer an integratedapproach to understanding and dealing with the fullrange of issues that threatened peace and security.

During the Cold War two parallel but separate sets ofarchitecture were established to address socio-economic development on the one hand, and peaceand security on the other. Promoting socio-economic


IntroductionSecurity and Development after the Cold War

1

* The term “peacebuilding” entered the international lexicon with former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agendafor Peace, where it was identified as one of several instruments available to address violent conflicts. Initially, it was defined quitenarrowly as post-conflict “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapseinto conflict.” However, it was gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to address violent conflict at different phases ofthe conflict cycle. Thus, conflict prevention and peacebuilding are often considered two sides of the same coin.


well-being and addressing basic human needs laywithin the sovereign domain of nation-states and wassupported by a range of international agenciesincluding the Bretton Woods institutions, bilateral andmultilateral donors, and the socio-economic organsand specialized agencies of the United Nations.Po v e r t y, social injustice, extreme vulnerability,inequality, disease, hunger and civil and political rightswere considered areas of domestic jurisdiction andreceived international support through officialdevelopment assistance or humanitarian aid.

Meanwhile, the lion’s share of international financialresources as well as political and military efforts wasdevoted to the preservation of peace and security,which was narrowly conceived as the protection of theterritorial integrity, sovereignty and vital interests ofnation-states. Both at the national and internationallevels, an elaborate system of security doctrines,instruments and institutions was created to deal withconflicts among states and between the two powerblocs. Created as the highest organ for the protectionof international peace and security, the United Nationswas quickly relegated to a minor role as other securityorganizations such as the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact werecreated outside the UN’s framework.

The end of the Cold War offered an opportunity forinternational actors to revisit dominant conceptions ofsecurity and development at both the international anddomestic levels, and to devise integrated and coherentpolicy instruments and programs to address violentconflicts from a peacebuilding perspective.

At its core, peacebuilding aims at the prevention andresolution of violent conflicts, the consolidation ofpeace once violence has been reduced, and post-conflict reconstruction with a view to avoiding arelapse into violent conflict. Going beyond thetraditional military, diplomatic and securityapproaches of the Cold War era, peacebuilding seeks toaddress the proximate and root causes of contemporaryconflicts including structural, political, socio-cultural,economic and environmental factors.

Not all development impacts the security environment.Conversely, not all security concerns have ramifica-

tions for development. Where the two come together—to cause, perpetuate, reduce, prevent or manage violentconflicts—is the appropriate terrain for peacebuildingat the domestic or international levels. Lying at thenexus of development and security, peacebuildingrequires a willingness to rethink the traditionalboundaries between these two domains and to expandthese boundaries to include other related issue areassuch as defense budgets, international trade andfinance, natural resource management and interna-tional governance, insofar as these may impact on theoccurrence of violent conflicts. Peacebuilding alsorequires a readiness to change the operations andmandates of existing political, security, and develop-ment establishments. Most importantly, it requires theability to make a difference on the ground inpreventing violent conflicts or establishing theconditions for a return to sustainable peace.

II. Peacebuilding in Practice:Responses at the InternationalLevel

Most of the violent conflicts that confronted theinternational community in the aftermath of the ColdWar were not products of power relations amongstates. Instead, they arose from and found fertileground primarily in countries with poor governance,ethnic or religious tensions and structural inequities—issues falling within the development arena.

From an international or macro perspective,peacebuilding therefore meant that the elaboratedoctrines, strategies and institutions that were developedduring the Cold War to deal with issues of internationalpeace and security were inadequate for dealing withmany of these conflicts. Instead, appropriate strategies

2 Peacebuilding in Practice: Responses at the International Level

At its core, peacebuilding aims at the preven-tion and resolution of violent conflicts, theconsolidation of peace once violence has beenreduced, and post-conflict reconstruction witha view to avoiding a relapse into violentconflict.


had to be found to deal with a new range of problems:civil wars, state failure, natural resource conflicts,complex humanitarian crises involving drought,p o v e r t y, HIV/AIDS, the spill-over effects of intra-stateconflicts, the operations of non-state actors or globalcriminal networks fueling armed conflicts through theircontrol of arms, drugs, finances, or illicit trade.

In other words, it was recognized that what happenedwithin the sovereign domain of states had an impact oninternational peace and security, especially as a resultof the cumulative processes of globalization. With thesecurity arrangements and controls of the bipolar worldgreatly eased, the forces of globalization quicklytraversed national borders, linking the local and theglobal in positive as well as negative ways. Trade, aid,private investments, cross-border movement of armsand populations, and global political, legal or criminalnetworks had immediate and direct impacts at thedomestic and global levels. Advances in informationand communication technologies brought the local tothe global consciousness, and in turn exposed the localconsequences of global actions and institutions. Newnon-state actors were thrust upon the internationalstage to demand action on a whole range of issues.Human rights, environmental protection and socialjustice had both local and global dimensions that couldnot be dealt with through either domestic or interna-tional policies or instruments. The international stagewas set to take a holistic look at the complex problemsailing the global community beyond the stability of theinternational system and the security of states.

At the macro level, the response to the newpeacebuilding agenda was fragmented, ad hoc andincremental. In retrospect, however, certain importantdevelopments can be identified, including theemergence of the United Nations as an important arenafor, and an active supporter of, peacebuilding. As aresult, the general overview provided below focuseslargely on the United Nations while highlightingselected initiatives by other international actors.

Normative Developments

Throughout the 1990s, there was a gradual elaborationof an expanded normative framework for internationalaffairs under the UN umbrella. In the early part of thedecade, a series of international conferences sought togenerate a global agenda on issues ranging frompopulation and sustainable development to humanrights and gender. These conferences served tounderline the importance of multilateral approaches toaddressing global problems and affirmed the role of theUnited Nations as an important instrument of globalgovernance. The Millennium Declaration gave expres-sion to the deepest aspirations of the global communityand provided a plan of action to deal with the world’smost persistent problems.

In tandem with developments at the United Nations,several governmental and non-governmental actorschampioned a number of issues which came to besubsumed under the new “human security” agenda.The campaigns to ban anti-personnel landmines, toregulate small arms and light weapons, and to establishan international criminal court were part of theemerging international commitment to humansecurity. The landmines campaign and the call for aninternational criminal court led to new internationaltreaties which were ratified in record time.

Meanwhile, the Security Council saw an expansion ofthe range of issues brought before it, including humanrights abuses, protection of civilians in war, smallarms, and natural resources in armed conflict. Perhapsthe most remarkable among the issues the SecurityCouncil considered was HIV/AIDS as a security threat.Since many of these issues had traditionally beenviewed as falling within the sovereign domain ofmember states, the Security Council’s willingness toconsider them represented an important development.Breaking away with its tradition of dealing withindividual crises, the Council passed a number ofthematic resolutions on such issues as human rights,small arms, and children and armed conflict.Subsequent Council resolutions were drafted to takeinto account these international commitments. In linewith its new interest in human security, the SecurityCouncil devoted an increasing proportion of itsdeliberations to crises in Africa. It also began

Peacebuilding in Practice: Responses at the International Level 3

The international stage was set to take aholistic look at the complex problems ailing theglobal community beyond the stability of theinternational system and the security of states.


4 Peacebuilding in Practice: Responses at the International Level

employing traditional instruments such as sanctions innovel ways in an effort to end various conflicts.

The international public reaction to the tragic conflictsaround the world led to growing calls for “humani-tarian intervention” in sovereign states, causingconsiderable unease among the UN’s member states.Although the United Nations refrained from dealingwith it formally, the report published by theindependent International Commission on Interventionand State Sovereignty (ICISS) entitled Responsibility toProtect was groundbreaking, offering a normativeframework for humanitarian interventions.

In short, throughout the 1990s, a more comprehensivenormative framework began to take shape, whichrecognized that human security and peacebuilding areareas of legitimate international concern. It also servedto legitimize both coercive and consent-based activitiesin support of those goals—although the militaryinterventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan stretched thelimits of the newly emerging normative framework.

Policy Developments

At the United Nations, a series of policy documentsunderpinned the new security agenda. An Agenda forPeace (1992) forcefully linked the imperatives for peaceand development and identified the various instru-ments for linking them. The Supplement to An Agendafor Peace (1995) and An Agenda for Development(1995) went further in elaborating these linkages. Thesewere followed by a series of high level reports,including Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report onPrevention of Armed Conflict (2001) and the August2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations PeaceOperations (otherwise known as the Brahimi Reportafter the Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary-GeneralLakhdar Brahimi). In July 2003, after considerablepolitical groundwork and heated debate, the GeneralAssembly adopted a resolution on conflict prevention,clearly signaling its cautious acceptance by the UN’smember states.

Outside the United Nations, the single most importantpolicy initiative was the formulation and publicationof the Organization for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) Development Assistance

Committee’s The DAC Guidelines: Helping PreventViolent Conflict (1997), which was supplemented in2001. The Guidelines were pathbreaking in offeringdonors new ways of thinking about how to addressviolent conflict; they provided both the rationale andthe conceptual framework for linking development andsecurity. The OECD DAC’s work was influential at boththe multilateral and national levels, preparing theground for further policy development. For example,the communiqué issued after the December 1999meeting of G-8 Foreign Ministers committed the G-8 toconflict prevention by serving as a catalyst forassisting other relevant actors as well as takingconcrete steps to deal with specific issues includingchild soldiers, mercenaries, illicit conflict trade,organized crime and weapons proliferation.

Key governments began to revise their own securityand development policies with a view to incorporatingpeacebuilding objectives by bringing together relevantdepartments and ministries responsible for defense,trade, foreign affairs and development assistance.Ironically, the National Security Strategy of the UnitedStates, published in September 2002, is perhaps themost comprehensive document in establishing thelinkages between military, diplomatic and develop-mental objectives and instruments.

Operational Responses

The 1990s witnessed a series of violent crises, each ofwhich required a range of operational responses. TheSecurity Council, whose activities had been paralyzeddue to the predictable vetoes of the superpowers from1945 to 1989, became the primary arena for interna-tional efforts in crisis management and peacebuilding.With only eleven vetoes from 1990 to 2001, theCouncil considered and authorized a series ofpeacekeeping operations. Currently the UN is runningthirteen peacekeeping operations and twelve peace andpolitical missions in post-conflict societies. Two typesof UN missions deserve special attention since theyrepresent peacebuilding in practice.

Multifunctional Peace Operations: These missions areradically different from traditional peaceke e p i n goperations since they involve a combination ofmilitary and civilian tasks and are often deployed in


Peacebuilding in Practice: Responses at the International Level 5

contexts where there is little peace to keep. Instead,they are part of a broader commitment to ending warsand promoting longer-term peacebuilding through amix of instruments and tools. Some ninety countrieshave been involved in UN peace operations, providingover 40,000 political and military personnel. In light ofthe tragic failure of several of these missions, theBrahimi Report was commissioned to provide an in-depth critique of the conduct of these operations sinceit is recognized that demand for these types of missionsis unlikely to decrease in the coming years.1

Transitional Administrations: Transitional administra-tions are considered the most complex operationsundertaken by the United Nations since they involvedirect UN administration of territories and populationsin the absence of a sovereign government. Kosovo(1999– ) and East Timor (1999–2002) are the two mainexamples of transitional administrations, withAfghanistan (2002– ) representing a hybrid case. Thereis considerable research and analysis documenting theshortcomings, as well as the achievements, of theseunique missions. What is remarkable, however, is thatthe UN agreed to undertake them and, in the case ofKosovo, has continued its engagement with no definiteend in sight.2

Despite their rising numbers, the UN-led peacemissions were inadequate to meet rising demands. As aresult, other international or regional organizations,including NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS), as wellas individual governments, assumed active roles inresponding to selected conflicts through specialarrangements, such the NATO-led operation in Kosovo,the provision of the Standby High Readiness Brigade(SHIRBRIG), the British intervention in Sierra Leone,the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) inAfghanistan and the more recent Operation Artemis inthe Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Thesemissions were generally launched in support of UN-endorsed resolutions, even when they were not directlyenforced or implemented by the UN.

C o n c u r r e n t l y, regional organizations began tostrengthen their own rapid response capabilities. Forexample, on the European side, consistent with efforts

to design a common European security and defensepolicy, the European Union began to develop anautonomous capacity to launch and conduct EU-ledmilitary operations in response to international crisesand to develop the necessary non-military capacities insupport of the EU’s commitment to conflict prevention,crisis management and peacebuilding.

Institutional Reform

A range of institutional reforms throughout theinternational system accompanied the above changesin policy and practice. There were numerous proposalsfor fundamental overhaul of the UN system to respondto new challenges. Predictably, these quickly ran intopolitical obstacles among the UN’s member states. Withlittle likelihood of political reform, there were severalwaves of bureaucratic reforms that led to the creationof the Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (OCHA), the Department of Political Affairs(DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO), and the Office of the High Commissioner forHuman Rights (OHCHR). Although each of thesedepartments continued to have separate mandates andfunctioned largely in isolation from the UN’s develop-ment agencies, various ad hoc mechanisms wereestablished to encourage inter-departmental and inter-agency cooperation or collaboration, such as theExecutive Committee for Peace and Security (ECPS).3

There was a corresponding revision of institutionalstructures within individual governments and inter-governmental organizations. Major aid agencies andforeign affairs departments established conflictprevention or peacebuilding units, such as the Post-Conflict Unit at the World Bank, the Office ofTransition Initiatives at USAID, the Conflict andHumanitarian Assistance Department at DFID, andtheir counterparts in other donor capitals. There was aserious effort on the part of several Western govern-ments to align their foreign, security, and developmentpolicies and programs to respond to the conflictprevention and peacebuilding agenda. Perhaps themost innovative effort was undertaken by the UnitedKingdom government, which created two multi-departmental funding pools, the Africa Pool and theConflict Pool, to support peacebuilding activities aspart of a common governmental strategy.4

S i m u l t a n e o u s l y, new inter-governmental networks,such as the OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace andDevelopment, and the Conflict Prevention andReconstruction (CPR) Donors’ Network, were created tobuild upon and further consolidate innovations amongdonor countries. These were complemented by nationalor regional NGO networks in Europe and NorthAmerica, including the European Platform for ConflictPrevention and the Canadian Pe a c e b u i l d i n gCoordinating Committee, both of which establishedclose relations with their governmental counterparts.

Regional and sub-regional organizations also foundtheir mandates greatly affected by conflicts in theirregions. In Africa, for example, where there were fewrobust security institutions, organizations whoseprimary mandates were economic development orregional integration were tasked with conflict preven-tion, peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. TheOrganization of African Unity (OAU) established itsConflict Management Unit; sub-regional economicdevelopment organizations such as the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC), ECOWAS, and theIntergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)stepped in to address the mushrooming conflicts in theirregions. The more recent creation of the African Union(AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development( N E PAD) represent significant innovations by Africangovernments to deal with the continent’s security anddevelopment problems in an integrated way.

No single initiative reflects the new mood at theinternational level better than the process that led tothe creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC).During the Cold War, it would have been unthinkablefor the United Nations to mobilize the political will tocreate the ICC. But the Rome Treaty was signed in 2002and the new court was created with unusual speed,giving international legitimacy to the human securityand peacebuilding agenda.

New Institutional Arrangements

The range and complexity of the crises that erupted inthe 1990s, as well as the increasing demand forinternational intervention, put a serious strain on thecapacities of the United Nations. Moreover, after tragicfailures in Somalia and Rwanda, there was growing

reluctance at the Security Council to undertakeadditional peace missions on its own. As a result, newtypes of institutional arrangements were created todeal with different conflicts. These involved a variablegeometry of functional collaboration among achanging set of actors, such as the “coalitions of thewilling” or the “UN plus” models involving a leadnation and/or regional partner organizations. Forexample, the international presence in Kosovo restedon a four-pillar structure involving the UN, NATO, theEU and the OSCE. Inevitably, these hybrid arrange-ments have led to important questions about theimplications of the regionalization of peacebuildingand the emergence of a hierarchy of regional crises andresponses in the new international order.5

III. Peacebuilding in Practice:Responses at the Country Level

The Cold War did not only distort the internationalagenda, it also distorted the domestic priorities andprospects of many developing countries. One of themost profound legacies of the Cold War is that the post-colonial struggles for national liberation that led to thecreation of many newly independent states did not alsolead to economic independence. In fact, many newlyestablished states, closely aligned to one of the twosuperpowers, became client states, depending heavilyon external military assistance and economic aid fortheir survival. National governments that attemptedradical reforms, such as Iran and Guatemala, saw theirefforts quickly blocked when these reforms threatenedthe vital interests of the superpowers or their allies.Non-aligned states that sought to preserve some degreeof independence from the East-West conflict, such asEgypt and Indonesia, found themselves trapped in afutile arms race to ensure regime stability and security.State security institutions, including armies, police andintelligence forces, amassed great power and the lion’sshare of resources while basic socio-economic needswere left unaddressed. Unrepresentative, corrupt orrepressive governments that failed to address the mostbasic needs of their populations were nonetheless artifi-cially propped up in the name of international peaceand security. The disconnect between political/securitypriorities and developmental goals could not have beeng r e a t e r.


6 Peacebuilding in Practice: Responses at the Country Level

Created in the early years of the Cold War, the interna-tional development aid system further reinforced thegap between the political/security interests of govern-ments and the socio-economic needs of their popula-tions. Many governments were rewarded for theirpolitical allegiances through military or developmentassistance despite their dismal domestic records.

The end of the Cold War and the resultant disengage-ment of the major powers from countries that had beenin the frontlines of superpower rivalry exposed thevulnerability of many post-colonial states. Deprived ofexternal support, a number of states were seriouslyweakened and began to implode. The reasons for thehollowing-out of the state and its institutions in thesecontexts could no longer be ignored. A closer look atcrisis countries revealed a dangerous mix of factors:failed economic policies which had often beenvigorously supported by donor governments orinternational financial institutions; over-stretchedsocial services that could not cope with populationgrowth, rapid urbanization, or pandemics such asHIV/AIDS; corrupt, repressive and self-serving govern-ments or shadow states run by criminal networks; andwidespread poverty, marginalization and absence ofhope for the future.

Peacebuilding at the country level posed specialdifficulties in light of the strong injunctions againstexternal intervention in the sovereign affairs of states.The new international agendas for conflict prevention,humanitarian intervention, transitional administra-tions and post-conflict reconstruction were receivedwith varying degrees of suspicion or outright rejectionby many governments. Some were concerned that thepeacebuilding agenda represented a new “missioncivilisatrice” and feared that the ascendancy of liberalmarket economies would further marginalize them.From a radically different perspective, other govern-ments feared that the new international focus onviolent conflicts would detract from the commitmentsmade to the achievement of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals by diverting scarce financialresources for political purposes. Still other govern-ments expressed skepticism about the double standardsand the emerging hierarchy of priorities in certainregions, such as the Balkans, in the post-Cold Warenvironment.

Despite these political sensitivities, the linkagesbetween security and development came to the fore inmany developing countries in light of their dismalrecords in providing either security or development totheir populations and also as a result of domestic andexternal pressures. At the country level, peacebuildingmeant supporting policies, activities, programs, andprojects which would allow war-prone, war-torn, orpost-war countries to transform and manage theirconflicts without violence in order to address longer-term developmental goals. International actors haveembraced a range of policies and strategies to supportpeacebuilding at the country level.

Review of the Impact of Development Strategiesand Aid on Conflict

The peacebuilding agenda was launched at a timewhen socialist or command economies were largelydiscredited and the Washington consensus on marke tliberalization reigned largely unchallenged.Nonetheless, with many developing countries experi-encing violent conflicts, there was a proliferation ofresearch examining the links between violentconflicts and failures of development. Going beyonda narrow concern for aid effectiveness, new research(often funded by donor agencies) explored thedestabilizing consequences of globalization; the roleof trade, investments and the private sector in conflictzones; and the failures of land reform, structuraladjustment policies and financial crises contributingto social unrest and civil wars. There was growingevidence of the complex interplay between faileddevelopment strategies, the impact of globalization,the expansion of global criminal networks, and civilwars. This led to a better understanding of thepolitical economy of armed conflicts and the need totailor development strategies with a view topreventing violent conflicts and promotingp e a c e b u i l d i n g .


Peacebuilding in Practice: Responses at the Country Level 7

Created in the early years of the Cold War, theinternational development aid system furtherreinforced the gap between the political/security interests of governments and thesocio-economic needs of their populations.

It is too early to point to any radical changes indevelopment policies. However, there is growinginterest even in the bastions of liberal orthodoxy, likethe World Bank, in paying closer attention to the“conflict trap.”6 Given the role of internationalfinancial institutions and donor agencies in shapingdevelopment strategies around the world, anyrethinking of development policies from apeacebuilding perspective is bound to have long-termrepercussions in conflict-prone, conflict-torn, andpost-conflict countries.

Similarly, the pervasiveness and intensity of intra-stateconflicts and complex humanitarian emergencies haveled to a re-assessment of existing donor agencypolicies and instruments of aid. Traditionally, develop-ment actors have adopted one of three approaches indealing with conflict. The predominant approach hasbeen to work “around conflict”—treating it as a“negative externality” to be avoided. In cases wherethe conflict has not been avoidable, developmentagencies have either stopped their developmentassistance or resorted to humanitarian assistance, orhave tried to continue their work “in conflict” whiletrying to minimize conflict-related risks to theirprogramming. In exceptional cases, developmentactors have deliberately worked “on conflict” byacknowledging and setting out to address the interlink-ages between conflict and development programming.7

Recent research, including the pioneering studies on“Do No Harm,” the OECD DAC study on the incentivesand disincentives of development assistance, andvarious conflict analysis frameworks or peace andconflict impact assessment (PCIA) methodologies, havegenerated compelling evidence that development aid isneither neutral nor necessarily peace-inducing.8 As aresult, and in line with the aforementioned OECD DACguidelines, there have been pioneering efforts on thepart of some donors and UN agencies to undertake“conflict-sensitive development.”9

New Sectoral Programming: Supply vs. Demand-driven Approaches

The rethinking of mainstream development models forpromoting peacebuilding led into areas that weretraditionally beyond the realm of development

assistance, such as governance, human rights, justiceand reconciliation, demilitarization, demobilizationand reintegration, and security sector reform. Donorsand international agencies responded to the challengeof peacebuilding primarily by designing andimplementing new projects, activities and programs.10

Many of these programs were supply-driven and weredeveloped by international actors whose roles andmandates were overtaken by profound changes in theinternational environment in the 1990s and whowanted to carve out a new niche for themselves.Concurrently, there was a smaller set of demand-drivenprograms and project which evolved as ad hocresponses to emergent crises or conflicts when conven-tional approaches proved inadequate or inapplicable.11

Human rights organizations, development NGOs likeOXFAM and CARE, regional economic organizationssuch as SADC and ECOWAS, and even the internationalfinancial institutions, including the World Bank, havebegun to identify ways in which they could betterimplement their current mandates or expand them inorder to respond to the multiple peacebuilding require-ments of conflict-torn, conflict-prone or post-conflictcountries. Notwithstanding internal debates, there hasbeen a significant shift in thinking on the part of manyhumanitarian aid agencies to identify a peacebuildingrole for humanitarian actors in complex politicalemergencies.12

There are three sectors where international actors havebegun to design and develop new programs and activi-ties or have revised their ongoing programs to respondto peacebuilding objectives. These are governance,security sector, and rule of law. Programming in thesesectors is largely experimental in nature and notintegrated either vertically within each sector orhorizontally across the three sectors. Even moreproblematically, they are often treated as technicalproblems to be solved instead of part of a largerpeacebuilding framework. Nonetheless, they areimportant in highlighting how the development andsecurity agendas can be linked at the programminglevel.

Governance Programming: Governance shapes asociety’s capacity to reconcile conflicting interests and


8 Peacebuilding in Practice: Responses at the Country Level

manage change peacefully; it thus lies at the heart ofconflict prevention, resolution and management. Ye t ,traditionally neither development nor security agenciesconcerned themselves directly with governance. With aseries of weak, failing or vulnerable states, bothdevelopment and security communities have begun todevelop an interest in governance programming. The UNis increasingly aware of the need to integrategovernance issues into its diplomatic, peace-making andpeace-enforcement operations through the provision oftechnical assistance for constitution making, electionmonitoring, and public sector reform. Similarly, interna-tional development agencies are giving greater weight togovernance issues through support for democratizationprojects, elections monitoring, civil society support,transparency and anti-corruption initiatives, as well asconflict resolution programming.

Security Sector Programming: Traditionally, thesecurity sector fell within the exclusive domain ofpolitical and security institutions. However, develop-ment actors have increasingly moved into areas suchas security sector reform, disarmament, demobiliza-tion and reintegration of former combatants, and theprotection of vulnerable and war-affected popula-tions. Recognized as central to peacemaking, peaceimplementation and post-conflict rebuilding, securityis now defined to include both military and non-military threats such as criminal violence and theeconomic activities of peace spoilers. In tandem, therehas been a growing interest in addressing securityissues through a fundamental restructuring ofsecurity institutions such as the police and the army,and instituting civilian oversight to advancedemocratic control and accountability. A great deal ofwork, both practical and analytical, has beenu n d e r t a ken in the past decade in the area of securitysector reform.

Rule of Law Programming: Rule of law has emerged asanother new area of programming, embracing multipleaspects such as the promotion of human rights, consti-tution-making, transitional justice mechanisms, andlegal and penal reform. While its centrality topeacebuilding is acknowledged, its links to governanceand security programming are still not fullyunderstood or adequately exploited. Instead, there hasbeen a proliferation of rule of law initiatives and

activities in peace operations, in post-conflictreconstruction, and in supporting governments tostrengthen their legal institutions without a longer-term peacebuilding agenda.

Beyond Sectoral Programming: New Models ofCollaboration

While the programming innovations described aboveare important, they are insufficient to yield sustainablepeacebuilding outcomes. Peacebuilding is ultimately apolitical exercise and one of the main challenges thatall external actors face is how to influence thatpolitical process in a constructive way. Peacebuildingrequires a fundamental rethinking of the terms ofengagement between the “internationals” and nationalor sub-national actors, including governments,communities, NGOs, and other social or politicalgroups in conflict zones. It is not obvious that this typeof fundamental rethinking has begun to take placedespite the impressive policy statements and guidelinesemerging from the United Nations and the OECDDevelopment Assistance Committee’s work on conflict,peace and development cooperation. With fewexceptions, there is little evidence that peacebuildingas political engagement is being mainstreamed into thethinking, planning or operations of the key donoragencies, or that it is being taken on board effectivelyby governments of recipient countries.

In addition to its political sensitivities, one of the mostserious limitations in moving the peacebuilding agendaforward at the country level is the lack of a commonpeacebuilding framework that can guide multipleexternal and internal actors. In cases where there is aunified UN mission as in Sierra Leone or Afghanistan,this problem is partially addressed. However, inconflict or post-conflict contexts where governmentsare weak or dysfunctional, the presence of multiple


Peacebuilding in Practice: Responses at the Country Level 9

Peacebuilding requires a fundamentalrethinking of the terms of engagement betweenthe “internationals” and national or sub-national actors, including governments,communities, NGOs, and other social orpolitical groups in conflict zones.

external actors with different agendas oftencontributes negatively to peacebuilding.

Compounding the lack of a common peacebuildingframework, the new programming areas which involvegreater intrusion in the domestic affairs of statesrequire engagement with a new cast of actors andappropriate mechanisms among external and internalactors. Perhaps the most useful tool in this regard is themulti-donor reconstruction trust funds that werecreated to align donor and national government priori-ties. Nonetheless, despite much rhetorical progress, it isdifficult to demonstrate that there has been afundamental change in the power relations betweendonors and recipients, especially in conflict contexts.

F u n d a m e n t a l l y, development assistance has notchanged at the core, and practical instruments such asconflict analysis tools or peace and conflict impactassessment methodologies remain experimental.Despite lip service being paid to the centrality of localownership of peacebuilding, it is not clear that interna-tional actors have developed effective strategies forassessing local needs, setting priorities, allocatingresources and establishing accountability.

Thus, one of the overarching challenges is how to gobeyond established patterns and relationships betweendonors and recipients to achieve peacebuildingoutcomes.

Peacebuilding Evaluations

U l t i m a t e l y, peacebuilding needs to be judged by itsoutcomes rather than its objectives. The United Nationssystem, donor governments, regional organizations,international NGOs and other international actors haveindividually and collectively started to document whatare collectively called “Policy Guidelines,” “LessonsLearned,” and “Best Practices” in peacebuilding. Theseinclude, for example, sectoral studies on ke ycomponents of the new peacebuilding agenda such aspeace implementation and peace enforcement; securitysector reform; truth and reconciliation; gender andpeacebuilding; governance and participation. They alsoinclude operational lessons on inter-agency collabora-tion and coordination, institutional and individual skillsdevelopment and training, new funding mechanisms,timing of interventions and exit strategies.

H o w e v e r, peacebuilding evaluations remain anunderdeveloped area.1 3 Unless there is growingevidence that changes in programming, institutionalreform, and more effective collaboration and coordina-tion among different actors serve to promote conflictprevention, conflict management and post-conflictreconstruction, the peacebuilding agenda will not besustainable politically or in terms of deploying thenecessary resources. There are compelling reasons whyit is difficult to evaluate peacebuilding. Nonetheless,given the recent demands for aid effectiveness and newmodels (such as the Millennium Challenge Account) toreward countries with a strong performance record,countries in conflict zones might be penalized for theirpoor development performance, further exacerbatingtheir developmental and security problems, unlessthere is robust evidence that peacebuilding makes adifference on the ground.

IV. Moving the Agenda ForwardThe growing international consensus and collaborationin the 1990s on the importance of the peacebuildingagenda were shaken by September 11 and furtherundermined by the U.S. war on Iraq. After September11, there has been a rapid return by numerouscountries, and most importantly the United States, tostate-centric conceptions of security with human


10 Moving the Agenda Forward

Despite lip service being paid to the centralityof local ownership of peacebuilding, it is notclear that international actors have developedeffective strategies for assessing local needs,setting priorities, allocating resources andestablishing accountability.

However, in conflict or post-conflict contextswhere governments are weak or dysfunctional,the presence of multiple external actors withdifferent agendas often contributes negativelyto peacebuilding.

security, conflict prevention and peacebuilding movingto the back of the international agenda.

Yet the key lesson of the 1990s is not that state-centricsecurity is unimportant. On the contrary, the failed andfailing states that came to threaten peace and securityin the last decade clearly demonstrated the need forviable states that can protect their own security andthat of their populations. The key lesson of the 1990sis that many of the new threats that confront theinternational community do not lend themselves totraditional security approaches and require integrated,longer-term strategies.

However, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq militaryresponses have crowded out effective strategies forpeacebuilding. Similarly, the war on terror is treatedprimarily as a military threat. Yet terrorism is a diffuse,multifaceted threat, perpetrated mostly by mobile non-state actors. While it utilizes military tools, its primarytargets are civilian and it is designed to create psycho-logical damage. Most significantly, terrorism growsexceptionally well in environments of underdevelop-ment, political repression, poor governance, socialinjustice and deep-rooted grievances. None of theseconditions are amenable to traditional security instru-ments. While terrorist activists can be pursued anddealt with through police or military methods,terrorism itself needs to be addressed through socio-cultural, economic and political instruments totransform the conditions that allow terrorism to growand terrorists to operate.

Taking a narrow view of terrorism and many of thenew threats that confront the international communityin the 21st century would be a great error. Already,military priorities and responses have dwarfed otherpriorities on the international agenda. Cleavages

between the United States and its allies and other keyplayers have relegated other crises such as the DRC orLiberia to the sidelines. The international resourcesallocated to Afghanistan and Iraq are at the expense ofunmet needs and emergencies in other parts of theworld—especially in Africa.

One of the most dangerous consequences of therenewed focus on state-centric security is the willing-ness of the U.S. and some other governments toconsider retreating from hard-gained commitments tohuman rights, good governance, and rule of law. Thereis growing evidence that countries around the worldare asked to redouble their efforts in the fight againstterrorism through the use of traditional security instru-ments. Security agencies that were gradually beingbrought under democratic oversight and accountabilityare, once again, given the green light to place statesecurity above other concerns. Military establishments,intelligence services, and defense budgets are beinggenerously rewarded through foreign aid. Meanwhile,long-term investments in peacebuilding are diverted toincreasing military expenditures. The prospects of anintegrated security and development agenda ischallenged on several fronts:

Political Challenges

As the world’s sole superpower in a unipolar world, theUnited States embraced a unilateral policy of pre-emptive use of force after September 11. This has notonly created dangerous cleavages within the SecurityCouncil and caused serious strains in trans-Atlanticrelations. It has also weakened the multilateralistconsensus that was gaining ground at the UnitedNations on the limits of military force in internationalaffairs and the expanded concept of collective security.These developments are likely to undermine thecredibility and relevance of the United Nations as auniversal organization with global reach and legiti-macy, especially in the Arab and Muslim world, wheresome of the new security threats currently emanatefrom, as well as in Africa, where human securityremains a major area of concern. The High Level Panelestablished by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan toaddress the crisis in international security can play animportant role in leading to a collective understanding


Moving the Agenda Forward 11

One of the most dangerous consequences of therenewed focus on state-centric security is thewillingness of the U.S. and some other govern-ments to consider retreating from hard-gainedcommitments to human rights, goodgovernance, and rule of law.

of, and commitment to, both a human and globalsecurity agenda. Without concerted, serious andsustained efforts to address the political challengesdescribed above, the world is likely to be an even moreinsecure place in the coming years.

Institutional Challenges

The institutional challenges relate to the role of theUnited Nations in international affairs as well as itsrelations with other regional or international organiza-tions. Despite its dramatic failures and shortcomingsduring the 1990s, there was a growing consensus thatthe UN provided the key instrument for legitimizinginternational intervention in the domestic affairs ofstates. Yet the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraqdemonstrated the limits of the United Nations inplaying an effective role in “first tier” securityproblems. In many ways, the UN is being left to dealwith the world’s neglected conflicts while importantsecurity problems are addressed outside the UN. Thecreation of a multi-tier security architecture, with theUnited States and major powers turning to other forasuch as the G-8 or NATO, might again relegate the UNto a secondary role in the security area. This isultimately bound to further weaken the UN’s alreadylimited institutional and financial resources andcapabilities.

The institutional reform issues require seriousattention. The UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panelis expected to examine the key institutional challengesto revitalizing the United Nations. Over the years, therehave been numerous proposals for UN reform. Insteadof generating another reform proposal, the Panelwould do well to focus on identifying ways ofgarnering the necessary political will to move aheadwith UN reform.

Concurrently, serious efforts are needed to strengthenother regional or international institutions, especiallythe newly created African Union and NEPAD, to ensurethat African conflicts do not fall off the internationalagenda. The G-8 and other donors have expressed theircommitment to these institutions. However, bothinstitutions need to demonstrate to the donorcommunity as well as to their publics how they intend

to address the developmental and security challengeson the continent.

However, beyond strengthening existing institutions,there needs to be a fundamental review of the currentdivision of labor between political, security anddevelopment institutions and agencies at the nationaland international levels. The international architec-tures for security and development that were created inthe immediate years after World War II are anachro-nistic at the start of the 21st century. The internationalaid system is particularly problematic as it has increas-ingly come to be shaped by donor priorities and vestedconstituencies instead of the needs of recipientcountries.

Similarly, at the international level, the absence of arapid reaction military or civilian force at the serviceof the United Nations remains a serious shortcomingwith grave consequences. The lack of accountability atthe international level for colossal acts of omission orcommission by the Security Council and other interna-tional organs has become an area of serious debate.There are numerous initiatives examining new modelsof global governance, but the political challengesdescribed above have made it even harder to reachagreement among the UN member states about how toreform the existing international institutions orconsider creating new ones.

Operational Challenges

The third set of challenges relate to operational issues.There is overwhelming evidence that the UnitedNations as well as other actors who deal with issues ofconflict prevention, conflict management, and post-conflict reconstruction are seriously under-resourcedand suffer from a serious disconnect between policiespromoted at headquarters and the implementation inthe field. There is urgent need for the deployment andtraining of a new generation of staff who have aholistic understanding of the new range of develop-mental and security challenges confronting theinternational community. There is also need for moreeffective mechanisms for cooperation and collabora-tion among diverse actors and institutions withdifferent mandates. This has to be supplemented with


12 Moving the Agenda Forward

better capacity for strategic analysis and knowledgemanagement, as well as better planning and delivery ofpeacebuilding programs on the ground. The develop-ment of more rigorous and reliable evaluation method-ologies is essential for this purpose.

Aligning Priorities and Resources

The final set of challenges deal with strategic prioritiesand resources which are intimately linked. The currentdistribution of global resources for peace and securityon the one hand, and for socio-economic developmenton the other, reflects the distorted international priori-ties of the Cold War era in favor of military expendi-tures. New and creative ways of generating resourcesfor the twin goals of peace and development arealready under consideration, including ways of tappinginto the global wealth being created through theimmense forces of globalization such as the Tobin Tax.More important than additional resources is the needto manage these resources from a strong conflictprevention and peacebuilding perspective. In thisregard, the roles of the UN’s development agencies,bilateral and multilateral donors, and the BrettonWoods institutions in influencing peacebuildingoutcomes in the 21st century need to be part of theMonterrey Process on Financing for Development.

Conclusion

An unusual window of opportunity opened in the1990s which provided the international community

with the promise and the potential for addressing theglobal search for security and development throughintegrated peacebuilding approaches. That window ofopportunity risks being closed while internationalattention again turns to issues of hard security. Theadvances made in the 1990s are not unimportant, butthey are fragile enough to be reversed. The challengesdescribed above require serious attention and commit-ment by a wide range of actors, including the memberstates of the United Nations, national governments,and non-governmental organizations and institutions.It would be a great mistake to underestimate the signif-icance of the normative, political, institutional andoperational changes that have been undertaken sincethe 1990s and to allow these gains to be overtaken bythe climate of fear that has marked international affairssince September 11. The case has to be made continu-ously that development and security need to bemutually reinforcing—especially when many of thethreats that confront the international communityemanate largely from failures of development.


Conclusion 13

An unusual window of opportunity opened inthe 1990s, which provided the internationalcommunity with the promise and thepotential for addressing the global search forsecurity and development through integratedpeacebuilding approaches. That window ofopportunity risks being closed while interna-tional attention again turns to issues of hards e c u r i t y.

Endnotes

1 William J. Durch, et. al., The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: TheHenry J. Stimson Center, 2003).

2 The most comprehensive work to date on transitional administrations is by Simon Chesterman, You, thePeople: Transitional Administration, State-Building, and the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,forthcoming). On Kosovo, see William O’Neill, Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace (Boulder, CO: Lynne RiennerPublishers, 2002). On East Timor, see Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, theBallot, and International Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).

3 For a very insightful account of the institutional changes at the United Nations to bring the UN’s conflictmanagement and development work in alignment, see Michele Griffin, “The Helmet and the Hoe: LinkagesBetween United Nations Development Assistance and Conflict Management,” Global Governance 9:2, 2003.

4 DFID has commissioned an evaluation of the Conflict Pool and Africa Pool which should be available in early2004. It will be interesting to learn to what extent the two pools have been able to overcome distinct institu-tional cultures to support a set of initiatives that reflect a common strategy.

5 See Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, eds., The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe andBeyond (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

6 See Paul Collier, et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, D.C.: TheWorld Bank, 2003).

7 Jonathan Goodhand with P. Atkinson, Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peacebuilding Impact of InternationalEngagement: A Synthesis of Findings from Afghanistan, Liberia and Sri Lanka (London: International Alert,2001).

8 Mary Anderson, Do No Harm (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); Peter Uvin, “The Influence of Aidin Situations of Violent Conflict” (Paris, OECD Development Assistance Committee, Informal Task Force onConflict, Peace, and Development Co-operation), available at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/pdf/synth_fin.pdf>.

9 Cynthia Gaigals with Leonhardt, M., Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development: A Review of Practice(London: International Alert & International Development Research Centre, 2001), available at<http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubdev/develop.pdf>.

10 The United Nations has recently released a report by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly (A/58/382)entitled “Review of Technical Cooperation in the United Nations.” It reviews the nature of technical coopera-tion in all of the UN’s numerous departments and agencies with a view to identifying how their mandates andfunctions overlap. The annexes on peacebuilding and rule of law programming cover some fifteen types ofactivities ranging from DDR to legislatures, elections, crime and drugs. These are delivered by a multitude ofagencies, including UNDP, DPA, DPKO, UNHCR, UNIFEM and others. It is difficult to understand the compar-ative advantage of each program or agency, and even more difficult to determine how these discrete programscontribute to a common purpose.

11 Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar with Karin Wermester, Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace inFragile Societies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).


14 Endnotes

12 Manuela Leonhardt, Conflict Impact Assessment of EU Development Co-operation with ACP Countries: AReview of Literature and Practice (London: International Alert & Saferworld, 2000).

13 The peacebuilding evaluation literature is growing rapidly. Evaluation studies can be grouped into distinctcategories: a) project evaluations; b) program/sectoral evaluations; c) country-level evaluations and d) impactevaluations. There are several useful annotated bibliographies which provide an overview of the differenttypes of evaluation studies. Most recent among these is a study by Swedish Sida, Evaluation 00/37:1, entitled“Assessment of Lessons Learned From Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peace Building: State of theArt/Annotated Bibliography.” In addition, there is a growing number of reviews of donor activities and lessonslearned in different areas. The most recent ones were published by the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlandson “International Human Rights Assistance” by William G. O’Neill; “International Electoral Assistance” byBenjamin Reilly, and on “International Media Assistance” by Ross Howard. Collectively, they provideinteresting insights into donor objectives, activities, experiences and lessons learned.


Endnotes 15

Selected Bibliography

An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/48/935 (6 May 1994), available at<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agdev.html>.

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (Report of the Secretary-Generalpursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992), UNDoc A/47/277-S/2411 (17 June 1992), available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.

Anderson, M., Do No Harm (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the FiftiethAnniversary of the United Nations, UN Doc A/50/60-S/1995/1 (3 January 1995), available at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a50-60.htm>.

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000/809 (21August 2000), available at <http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/>.

Brown, M. E. (ed.), Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21st Century (Washington D.C.: GeorgetownUniversity Press, 2003).

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Force Framework (May 2002), available at <http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/framework.pdf>.

Chesterman, S., You, the People: Transitional Administration, State-Building, and the United Nations (Oxford:Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

Collier, P., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2003).

Compendium of Operational Frameworks for Peace Building and Donor Coordination, available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/peace>.

Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network, World Bank, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/peacebuilding>.

Cousens, E. and Kumar, C. with Wermester, K. (eds.), Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001)

DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict 2001, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD, 2001), available at <http://www.gtz.de/security-sector/download/DAC_Guidelines.pdf>.

DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2001),available at <http://www1.oecd.org/dac/pdf/G-pov-ex.pdf>.

Duffield, M., Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (New York: ZedBooks, 2001).


16 Selected Bibliography

Durch, W. J., et. al., The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: The Henry J.Stimson Center, 2003).

Gaigals, C. with Leonhardt, M., Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development: A Review of Practice (London:International Alert & International Development Research Centre, 2001), available at <http://www.interna-tional-alert.org/pdf/pubdev/develop.pdf>.

Goodhand, J. with Atkinson, P., Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peacebuilding Impact of InternationalEngagement: A Synthesis of Findings from Afghanistan, Liberia and Sri Lanka (London: International Alert,2001).

Griffin, M., “The Helmet and the Hoe: Linkages Between United Nations Development Assistance and ConflictManagement,” Global Governance, Volume 9, no.2 (2003).

International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Working Paper #7, What Kind of Peace is Being Built?Reflections on the State of Peacebuilding Ten Years after the ‘Agenda for Peace” (Spring 2003).

Jeong, H.-W., Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2000).

Kreimer, A., et al., The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction, (Washington, D.C.: The WorldBank, 1998).

Lund, M., and Rasmoelina, G. (eds.), The Impact of Conflict Prevention Policy: Cases, Measures and Assessments.SWP-Conflict Prevention Network Yearbook 1999/2000 , (London: International Alert and Saferworld, 2000).

Leonhardt, M., Conflict Impact Assessment of EU Development Co-operation with ACP Countries: A Review ofLiterature and Practice (London: International Alert & Saferworld, 2000).

Martin, I., Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot, and International Intervention(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001)

Mehler, A. & Ribaux C., Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in Technical Cooperation: An Overview of theNational and International Debate (Eschborn, Germany: Deutsche Gessellschaft fur Te c h n i s c h eZusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2000).

Nyheim, D., et al., Development in Conflict: A Seven Steps Tool for Planners (London: FEWER, International Alert& Saferworld, 2001).

O’Neill, W. G., Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

Paris, R., “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice,” Review of International Studies, 28 (October2002).

Prevention and Management of Violent Conflict: An International Directory, European Platform for ConflictPrevention and Transformation (July 1998).

Prevention of armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/55/985-S/2001/574, (7 June 2001),available at <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/404/64/PDF/N0140464.pdf?OpenElement>.


Selected Bibliography 17

Pugh, M., and Sidhu, W.P.S. (eds.), The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond (Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

Review of Technical Cooperation in the United Nations (Report of the Secretary-General), 19 September 2003, UNDoc A/58/382 (19 September 2003), available at <http://www.un.org/ga/58/documentation/list3.html>.

Uvin, P., “The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms,” Journal ofPeacebuilding and Development, vol 1, no.1 (2002).

Uvin, P, The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict, (Paris, OECD Development Assistance Committee,Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Co-operation), available at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/pdf/synth_fin.pdf>.

Von Hippel, K., Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2000).

Walter, B. F., and Snyder, J. (eds.), Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press,1999).

18 Selected Bibliography


Strengthening the Security – Development Nexus:Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st CenturyA Program of the International Peace Academy

About the Program

It is now widely recognized that contemporary violent conflicts require long term, integrated efforts that addressnot only their political and military aspects but also their humanitarian, human rights, economic and socialdimensions. A full decade after the United Nations’ Agendas for Peace and Development made clear the necessityof linking security and development in order to achieve peacebuilding, IPA’s new program examines the progressmade to date in achieving this goal and addresses the need to translate evolving policy into effective strategies,programs and instruments.

The specific program objectives are:• To examine how and with what impacts peacebuilding programming in the areas of security sector,

governance and rule of law are being implemented and integrated with other priorities within acoherent framework

• To assess the effectiveness and replicability of the collaboration between the UN’s development andsecurity organs/agencies and their relevant local, regional and international counterparts

• To support further policy development and reform of the UN’s operations at the nexus of developmentand security

• To establish a forum based at IPA where actors from the UN and the broader development and securitycommunities can exchange ideas and experiences

Research will proceed along both thematic and geographic tracks, seeking to integrate cross-sectoral and cross-country insights and experiences. The program aims to identify important innovations as well as existing gapsand to propose concrete strategies for more effective coordination of the work of agencies working in conflict-prone, conflict-torn and post-conflict areas. It will also review relevant changes in academic curricula, training,capacity building and institutional reforms that are necessary to underpin the changes in policy and programming.

To contribute to improved policy and practice, the program is structured to generate: • edited volumes pulling together key findings, sectoral best practices and policy recommendations• a series of state-of-the-art reviews, discussion papers, policy briefs, evaluations and strategy papers• an interactive web-based portal to serve as a repository of cumulative knowledge and best practice

The program will be implemented in collaboration with a broad range of partners both from within the UN systemas well as other institutions working in this area, especially in those countries affected by conflict.

For further information on this program, please visit us at www.ipacademy.org.

International Peace Academy777 United Nations PlazaNew York, NY 10017-3521Tel: (212) 687-4300Fax: (212) 983-8246www.ipacademy.org

peacebuilding as the link between security and development

Documents