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Wagging the Doves?

Peace-Promoting Actions as a Source of Presidential Support

David T Burbach

MIT Security Studies Program*

Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association

August 28, 2003

Philadelphia, PA

ABSTRACT Dramatic uses of force are widely thought to increase public support for national leaders, but less attention has been given to the possibility of “uses of peace” as sources of rallies. Media and public opinion theories suggest that, as visible and popular events, diplomatic activities should also be status-enhancing. This study tests that proposition by measuring the impact of “peace-promoting actions” on the approval ratings of U.S. Presidents from 1953-2000. A dataset of 85 dramatic peace events is constructed, and statistical tests used to measure the magnitude and duration of approval changes following them. Peace events cause an average 2% increase, and just over 5% for the 25 largest events, decaying with a half life of 3 months. Media quantity and elite opinion strongly influence the response, with gains >10% or losses of nearly 5% being possible. Despite these political gains, there is no evidence of “diversionary peace”: peace events are not more frequent in response to low approval ratings, recessions, scandals, or impending elections.

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Introduction

One of the most deeply ingrained views in the conventional wisdom on U.S. politics is

that uses of force have a powerful – and unique – ability to increase the public’s support of the

president. Although some academic studies challenge that view, there is still a widespread belief,

even among many scholars, that the use of force makes for good polls and good politics. As a

result, there is much concern about the attractiveness of diversionary war to U.S. presidents,

though fortunately, most studies suggest it is uncommon if not absent altogether.

The appeal of diversionary war would be much lower if presidential actions other than

war can produce the same sorts of increases in presidential support. Not much is known about

the effect of other dramatic presidential activities, yet in theory, force is not the only potential

way to boost presidential ratings. In particular, “peace promoting” activities, such as diplomatic

initiatives, summits, or the de-escalation or termination of wars are headline grabbing,

presidentially-focused events that are likely to be popular with the public. There is every reason

to think that peace activity could help presidents, though few tests of the possibility have been

conducted.

This study argues that dramatic peace-promoting activity is a source support for U.S.

presidents. Major peace events from 1953 to 2000 have caused temporary increases – rallies – in

presidential approval much like those following uses of force. The potential gains are modest,

approximately a 5% initial increase on average decaying over a few months, but that is of the

same scale as reactions to uses of force. Gains can be greater or lower depending on media

coverage and elite opinion.

Presidents do not appear to make use of the peace tool, however. The rate of

peace activity was unaffected by presidential approval, the state of the economy, scandals, or

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elections – parallel to the common finding that such domestic variables have little effect on use

of force rates.

The argument proceeds through five sections. First, a “media priming” model of rallies is

introduced, and reasons are given why this model predicts that peace events will be causes of

rallies. Next, the methods that were used to construct a dataset of peace events and code them on

relevant variables are described, as are the statistical techniques that are used to measure the

impact of these events on presidential approval. Results from regressions measuring the impact

of peace events on presidential standing are then presented; this is followed by a section that

analyzes how the frequency of peace events is affected by political variables. Finally, the

implications of these findings are discussed.

A New Model of “Rally Events”

Most authors agree that U.S. uses of force are usually followed by increases in

presidential approval (Mueller 1973;Kernell 1978;Marra; Ostrom, and Simon 1990;Lee

1977;Baum 2002;DeRouen 1995), although some point out that these increases are smaller and

less consistent than traditionally thought (Lian and Oneal 1993). The “conflict-induced

cohesion” effect is commonly invoked to explain this effect. Drawing on research in group

psychology, this theory predicts that when facing foreign threats, citizens rally around their

leader (Coser 1956;Simmel 1955); see also (Levy 1989;Stein 1976). This unifying ability is

seen as unique to external conflict, and so most studies of “rally effects” have either looked only

at the response to uses of force ((Baum 2002;Oneal; Lian, and Joyner 1996;Lian and Oneal

1993;DeRouen 1995;Edwards and Swenson 1997)) or to crises/militarized disputes ((Baker and

Oneal 2001;Oneal and Bryan 1995;James and Rioux 1998;James and Hristoulas 1994)). Others

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have claimed to look at foreign policy events generally, but in practice have heavily weighted

their events towards conflict ((Mueller 1973;Kernell 1978;MacKuen 1983;Ostrom and Simon

1985)).

There is also a vast literature on the diversionary use of force (Levy 1989;Fordham

2001;Fordham 1998b;Prins 2001;Goemans 2000;DeRouen 2000;Gowa 1998;Meernik

2001;Davies 2002;Enterline and Gleditsch 2000;Dassel and Reinhardt 1999;Gelpi 1997).

Relatively little attention has been given, however, to political timing of other dramatic foreign

policy actions, with some exceptions (Brace and Hinckley 1993;Marra and others 1990)).

The narrow focus on force as a source of short-term political gain may not be

theoretically justified. The conflict-cohesion model privileges force, but there is mounting

evidence that public reactions are not adequately explained by that theory. For example,

“rallies” do not automatically follow uses of force ((Lian and Oneal 1993;Hugick and Gallup

1991;Edwards 1990)), and the strength of public support depends on variables such as media

coverage and reaction of opinion leaders ((Brody 1991;Brody 1984;Baker and Oneal 2001)), on

the goals of the president’s action ((Oneal and others 1996)). These variations are not consistent

with the predictions of the conflict-cohesion model, but are consistent with a “media priming”

model of presidential support – and presidential rallies.

The Media-Priming Model of Rallies

The “media priming” model explains rallies as the result of sudden changes in media

attention shifting the basis of presidential evaluation to issues more favorable to the president.

The basic framework was suggested by Iyengar and Kinder (1987), who argue that presidential

approval can explained as a weighted average of a president’s rating on individual issue areas,

with the weights determined by recent media coverage. In this view, individuals do have stable

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preferences ((Page and Shapiro 1992) and assess presidential performance with respect to them,

but at any given moment the salience of issues generally follows the media agenda – if crime has

been in the news lately, then individuals are “primed” to think of the crime issue if asked

whether they approve of the president’s performance. This priming effect is well established

((Gilliam and Iyengar 2000;Iyengar 1991;Iyengar and Kinder 1987;Zaller 1992;McCombs and

Shaw 1972;Rogers; Hart, and Dearing 1997)), and Iyengar and Kinder’s findings on priming and

presidential support has been borne out by later studies ((Pan and Kosicki 1997;Krosnick and

Kinder 1990;Miller and Krosnick 2000;Edwards; Mitchell, and Welch 1995)).

Rally events can be explained in the terms of the media priming model though the

following process: 1) a dramatic event takes place which causes of rapid change in news media

attention; 2) the change in focus causes the salience of that issue area to increase; 3)

individuals’ ratings of the president will give more weight to the issue at hand than before the

dramatic event; 4) if the president’s support on that issue is higher than the average of their

support on other issues, then their ratings will increase (conversely, drawing attention to an

unfavorable issue will lower presidential ratings). Presidential ratings would then shift back to

their previous levels as coverage of the event declined.

This analysis suggests that there are two requirements for an event to cause a rally: it

must significantly capture media attention, and, the presidential action must be popular, or at

least more popular than the president’s current performance on other issues. Whether a given

action will be popular or not depends on a number of factors. First, events will receive more

support when they are congruent with existing public preferences. Second, events will be more

popular when they receive the support of opinion leaders ((Popkin 1994;Zaller 1992;Brody

1991;Miller and Krosnick 2000)).

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Uses of force generally meet the prerequisites for producing “rallies”. Whether due to a

“patriotism” effect or due to rational evaluations of presidential actions, foreign conflict often

receives both strong public support and heavy media coverage. The use of force is not the only

presidential activity which could have such an effect, however. Presidential health crises

(Eisenhower’s heart attack, Reagan shooting) have usually been followed by approval spikes, for

example.

Beyond personal tragedies, another category of events that could be expected to produce

rallies are dramatic “peace-promoting” foreign policy activities, such as superpower summits,

arms control breakthroughs, or the ends of wars. These events involve presidents, are highly

publicized, and are likely to be popular. The next section explains in detail why peace-

promoting foreign policy activity is a likely source of “rally events”.

Peace-Promoting Events as Candidates for Rallies

The idea that major cooperative international events could be sources of presidential

support is not new. Mueller, examined “dramatic international events”, not only wars; the events

in his study included U.S.-Soviet summits and the end of the Korean War ((Mueller 1973): 211).

Lowi is even more explicit in arguing that foreign policy activity generally, not only the use of

the military, has rallying power for presidents; he suggests that major economic summits could

boost presidential poll numbers, for example ((Lowi 1979). Neither Lowi nor Mueller offered

theoretical justification for their views, but the following section argues that peace events –

diplomatic activity and actions to end or de-escalate conflicts -- meet the criteria for rallies: they

receive extensive media coverage, they directly involve the president, and they are likely to be

popular.

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Media Attention

It is easy to see that peace events meet the rally requirement of capturing media focus.

Historically they have received extremely high levels of coverage, as great as most uses of force.

For example, Eisenhower’s 1955 summit meeting in Geneva generated 35 front-page stories in

the New York Times in 14 days.1 More recently, Reagan’s meetings with Gorbachev all

generated 20 to 30 front page stories, and even with the end of the Cold War the Clinton-Yeltsin

summits still attracted front page attention for several days. Peacemaking efforts in third-party

conflicts also receive attention, whether 20 front-page stories about Kissinger’s shuttle

diplomacy with Egypt and Israel in January 1974, or more recently, 15 stories on Clinton’s

unsuccessful Mideast peace summit in Wye, Maryland in the fall of 1998. Even with a

presidential scandal competing for attention, presidential diplomacy is big news: television

news stories devoted to the Lewinsky scandal declined dramatically during Clinton’s Africa trip

in March of 1998, and his July 1998 trip to China was by far the number one topic for network

news that month ((Center for Media and Public Affairs 1998)). Arms control advances such as

the 1963 nuclear test ban receive significant attention, and peace treaties to end the Vietnam and

Korean wars dominated the headlines for weeks.

Popularity

The popularity of peace is not a new suggestion. One foundation of Kant’s democratic

peace was that given the cost of war in lives and money, war would be highly unpopular to

voters ((Kant 1949)).2 Public opinion data confirms that Americans support peace, at least in the

abstract. Arms control has almost always enjoyed strong support ((Page and Shapiro

1992;Hinckley 1992;Graham 1989)). Even during the late 1970s chill in U.S. Soviet relations

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support for the SALT II treaty remained above 50%, and in wake of Sputnik citizens by 3 to 1

still wanted Eisenhower to propose a nuclear test ban (Roper Center, question USGALLUP.57-585,

R003A). Actions to end, avoid, or de-escalate conflicts also receive support, particular if wars are

not going well. By late 1969 majorities were in favor of withdrawing from Vietnam, and

throughout Nixon’s first term those who thought troops were coming home too slowly

outnumbered those who thought the pullout was too fast by 4 to 1 ((Mueller 1973)). Support

remained stronger for the Korean War, but polls also made it clear that by 1951 Americans were

eager to see the war end. Prior to the first Gulf War, large majorities wanted President Bush to

make every possible effort to get Iraq out of Kuwait through negotiations rather than war

((Mueller 1994), pp 237-241). Similarly, even as Americans supported the younger president

Bush’s preparations to invade Iraq in 2003, they hoped Saddam Hussein could be removed

without war, and wanted to see the U.N. involved in the dispute.

Historical evidence reveals that presidents and their advisors often thought of peace as a

winning political formula. For example, the acclaim for Eisenhower’s April 1953 speech calling

for better U.S.-Soviet relations convinced the White House that it was advantageous to be seen

on the side of peace, and there was an explicit strategy in 1960 to portray Eisenhower as the

“Man of Peace” (via foreign travel, speeches, a summit with Khrushchev, etc) in order to

improve the GOP position in the elections that year ((Hughes 1962), pp 106-117; (Adams

1961)). Kennedy too saw an opportunity in the public enthusiasm for the nuclear test ban in

1963, and before his assassination there had been talk of seeking additional arms agreements in

1964 – an election year ((Halberstam 1972a), pp 361-363).

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Lyndon Johnson never saw war in Vietnam as a political plus; he kept the issue generally

quiet during the 1964 election ((Beschloss 1997)). Bombing pauses, international conferences,3

and peace proposals were driven largely by concerns for domestic public opinion ((Karnow

1983b;Halberstam 1972b;Small 1988)). Every major address by Johnson on Vietnam concerned

peace proposals, not escalation. Many observers suspect that Johnson’s cessation of bombing

North Vietnam on the eve of the 1968 election was calculated to help Hubert Humphrey.4 Most

audaciously, Johnson may have hoped to reenter the presidential race after a surprise U.S.-Soviet

summit he had arranged for the week before the 1968 Democratic National Convention

((Beschloss and Talbott 1993), p. 113)5

Nixon may have believed that a “silent majority” supported the Vietnam war, but he

nonetheless felt that escalation would be rejected by the public. Fear of backlash led him to drop

his plans for a massive bombing campaign in the fall of 1969 ((Sagan and Suri 2003)) The pace

and timing of his administration‘s troop withdrawals were calculated to maintain public support

for Nixon ((Karnow 1983b), pp 594-596; (Bundy 1998), pp 63-67). Beyond Vietnam, the

Administration’s interest in arms control came partly because it was perceived to be a popular

political issue ((Garthoff 1985), p. 115; (Kissinger 1979), pp 399-402; (Knopf 1998)). Nixon

was also very conscious of the boosts he received from high-profile summits with foreign

leaders; as the Watergate scandal approached its conclusion in the summer of 19754, Nixon

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hoped his trips to Moscow and the Middle East would improve his poll numbers ((Nixon 1978),

p. 1017)

The Reagan Administration expected political gains from peace activities. From late

1981 to early 1983, for example, Reagan’s advisors believed public fear of nuclear war was

harming Reagan’s approval rating, and the opening of START talks and the Strategic Defense

Initiative came in part to counter that political problem (Talbott 1984;Knopf 1998;Fitzgerald

2000).6 Reagan’s 1984 campaign strategists identified the peace and arms control issue as

Reagan’s key vulnerability, and they recommend the withdrawal of troops from Lebanon,

dropping the confrontational stance in Central America, and making progress on arms control

and improving U.S.-Soviet relations generally (Oberdorfer 1991;Cannon 1991). Reagan heeded

this advice: he proclaimed 1984 a “year of peace” and dramatically softened his tone towards

the Soviets (Garthoff 1994); by September, Reagan had taken the peace issue away from

Mondale.

Hypotheses To Be Tested

Dramatic peace events have generated strong media interest and appear to be popular – at

the least, presidents themselves have expected political gains from them. Since peace events

meet the criteria for rally events as predicted by the media priming model, we make the

following three predictions about the public reaction to peace events and presidential timing of

them:

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Table 1: Hypotheses To Be Tested

H1 “Peace-Promoting” activity by presidents leads to increases in presidential approval ratings (i.e., they create “rallies” as uses of force often do)

H2

Peace activities will cause greater increases in presidential approval when A) media coverage is more intense

B) the presidential action is successful

C) the president’s actions receive support from Congress and

opinion leaders in the media

H3

Peace activities should be more frequent during periods of presidential political need, such as:

a) low approval ratings,

b) recessions,

c) scandals

d) impending elections.

Hypothesis 1: “Peace-Promoting” activity by presidents leads to increases in presidential approval ratings (i.e., they create “rallies” as uses of force often do)

Hypothesis 1 simply summarizes the argument of the previous section: since they meet

the criteria for producing “rallies”, we should observe increases in presidential approval

following dramatic peace-promoting activities by presidents.

Hypothesis 2a: Peace activities will cause greater increases in presidential

approval when media coverage is more intense Hypothesis 2b: Peace activities will cause greater increases in presidential

approval when successful Hypothesis 2c: Peace activities will cause greater increases in presidential approval

when supported by opinion leaders Hypothesis 2 derives from the “media-priming” model, identifying conditions that will

produce larger or smaller approval increases for presidents. More media coverage should lead to

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higher salience for the peace activity or foreign policy generally, and so should lead to larger

increases in approval. On the other hand, drawing attention to a disaster will not be helpful:

successful initiatives should produce more favorable results for presidents. Citizens can also be

expected to follow the lead of experts, such as members of Congress or media commentators, in

evaluating presidential actions.

Hypothesis 3: Peace activities should be more frequent during periods of presidential

political need, such as low approval ratings, recessions, scandals, or impending elections

If peace activity can boost presidential ratings, then we would expect presidents to avail

themselves of the opportunity to improve their poll numbers during times of political misfortune.

This prediction does not come directly from the media priming model, but instead applies the

logic of the diversionary war theory to peacemaking: politically-motivated presidents will use

the tools available to them to improve their standing and reelection prospects, and thus we should

see an increase in the frequency of peace events when presidents face domestic difficulties.

Diversionary war studies have come to mixed conclusions about the existence of diversionary

motivations behind U.S. uses of force, so it would be worth extending the analysis to see if the

timing of other foreign policy actions by presidents appears to be politically inspired.

Methods and Sources of Data

The effect of peace events on presidential approval was measured using the same general

strategy that has been employed by studies of the “rally effect” that supposedly follows uses of

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force: a set of relevant events was identified, then statistical tests were used to measure the

changes in presidential approval ratings following those events.

Identifying Peace Events

Although there are a number of existing datasets of uses of force or conflicts more

generally, that is not the case for peace initiatives. Earlier presidential approval studies that

included cooperative actions did so on an ad hoc basis (Mueller 1973;Kernell 1978;MacKuen

1983), or did not provide a list of their events at all (Marra and others 1990;Brace and Hinckley

1993). More general datasets of conflict and cooperation such as COPDAB (Azar ) and WEIS

(McClelland 1999)are also inadequate, due to their limited years of coverage (neither extends

past 1978), their inclusion of many small, low-visibility events, and the fact that they focus on

actual international actions, rather than political initiatives (which would include proposals that

do not ultimately bear fruit). For similar reasons, using treaties and agreements would not be

satisfactory, since in may cases initiation or changes of position in talks are the more relevant

political event than the actual signing of an agreement.

Therefore, a new dataset was constructed of presidential events that were visible, dramatic,

and “peace promoting”. These criteria were operationalized as follows:

• Visibility: events had to receive five or more New York Times front-page stories in a 14 day period.

• Dramatic: events had to be:7

- A specific, significant accomplishment or action, such as completing a treaty, cessation of bombing, etc

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- A Presidential initiative that represented a new or changed policy, rather than

promotion of existing policy.

• “Peace”: events had to involve one of the following:8

- Arms control or other steps to make nuclear war less likely (i.e., “de-targeting” of missiles).

- De-escalation or termination of a conflict in which the U.S. is engaged, or about

to be engaged.

- Improvement of relationships with adversaries (in particular, the U.S.S.R. and China)

- U.S. high-level involvement (president or cabinet member) to end a prominent

conflict between third parties. A set of candidate events was compiled from a variety of standard sources on U.S.

diplomatic and presidential history. 9 After assembling this candidate list, the New York Times

Index was consulted to measure the number of front page stories related to each event that

occurred in a 14 day period surrounding the event, and only those meeting the five-day

requirement were kept. Using these criteria a total of 85 events were selected between 1953 and

2000; they are listed in Appendix A. Figure 1, below, shows the distribution of the events over

time.

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2

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Figure 1 -- Peace Events by Year To illustrate the sort of events that were chosen and the approval changes that followed

them, Table 2 lists representative events and their associated change in presidential approval

ratings (measured from the last poll prior to first poll after). Some significant gains have been

seen; Richard Nixon’s numbers went up 16 points when the Vietnam War finally ended. On the

other hand, presidents have not always benefited from diplomatic activity: George Bush’s

diplomatic forays in 1991 and 1992 did nothing to help the steady erosion of his poll numbers,

and Eisenhower actually lost more than 10% when the Korean War ended.

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TABLE 2: Approval Changes Following Selected Events

EVENT Date Approval Change

End of Vietnam War 1/73 +16%

Initiatives to improve relations with Soviet Union 5/89 +14%

“Atoms for Peace” proposal 12/53 +10

Johnson attends Manila Conference, offers Vietnam peace plan 10/66 +5

Reagan reopens arms talks with USSR 11/81 +5

Nixon’s visit to China 2/72 +4%

Ford attends Helsinki CSCE Summit 7/75 -8%

Bush attends Middle East peace conference in Madrid 11/91 -10%

To show the full spectrum of immediate changes, figure 2 presents a histogram showing

the distribution of approval changes over the whole set of peace events. These measures are

from the last poll prior to first poll after, and so are not strictly comparable – sometimes days

have elapsed since an event, sometimes weeks to months. The statistical analysis to follow will

take those timing issues and other factors into account, but figure 2 does suggest that peace

events have helped presidents more often than not, but on the average have been followed by

only minor immediate increases in approval.

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-1 0 -5 0 5 10 15 2 0 2 5

P o st-E ven t C h an g e in Ap p ro val (% )

0

2

4

6

8

1 0

Num

ber

of E

vent

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Figure 2 – Distribution of Approval Changes Following Peace Events Variables and Coding

Each event was coded on the following variables:

PEACE_EVENT

1 for each event

DATE

The date that the principal U.S. activity was reported in the New York Times.

COVERAGE

An ordinal variable representing coverage in the New York Times:

1 5 to 15 front-page stories in 14 days

2 15 to 25 front-page stories in 14 days

3 More than 25 front-page stories in 14 days

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PEACE_MAJOR

1 for each event that met the following criteria: a medium or high level of media coverage (COVERAGE = 2 or 3), and either a major presidential statement (e.g., prime-time speech) or foreign trip associated with the event.

. SUCCESS

coded +1, 0, or –1 depending on whether the event (in its initial stages, at least), appeared to be successful for the U.S. The judgment was based on actual outcomes, not assessment of Presidential activity (i.e., if the dominant media message was that the President had done well but something bad still happened, that would be coded –1). For example, the 1960 Paris and the 1986 Reykjavik summits were coded as failures, while the 1972 Moscow and 1987 Washington summits were successes.

OPINION

Variable indicating the balance of reaction in editorials and columns to each event, as reported in the New York Times. If the majority of editorials and columns were favorable, +1. If the majority are negative, -1; if there is no clear majority or if no opinion is expressed, 0.

CONGRESS_OWN, CONGRESS_OPP (H2c) Congressional reaction by the president’s own party, and by the opposition. Coded +1 if the majority of reactions expressed by members of the party were supportive, -1 if the majority were negative, and 0 if mixed or none were recorded. The source for Congressional opinion is also the New York Times Index,10 but opinions were counted even if they were not reported on the front page.

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CONGRESS_EXPECTED, CONGRESS_REVERSE (H2c) Opinions expressed in Congress should carry more weight when they are not in the expected direction. To capture this effect, these two variables were coded as follows CONGRESS_EXPECTED is the sum of: +1 if CONGRESS_OWN=+1 -1 if CONGRESS_OPP=-1 CONGRESS_REVERSE is the sum of: -1 if CONGRESS_OWN=-1 +1 if CONGRESS_OPP=+1

OPINION_INDEX Sum of OPINION, CONGRESS_EXPECTED, CONGRESS_REVERSE (i.e., a –3 to +3 scale).

WAR_TERMINATION, DE-ESCALATION, ARMS_CONTROL, RELATIONS, MEDIATE

Each event was assigned into one of these five categories. Events are coded 1 for their assigned category, 0 for the other two. WAR_TERMINATION events were the termination of major wars, which meant Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, and Kosovo. DE-ESCALATION included events that reduced the level of American involvement in an ongoing conflict, or constituted steps towards a negotiated end to the conflict, such as the initiation of peace talks. Most events in this category related to Vietnam, such as bombing pauses, troop withdrawal announcements, and progress in peace talks. ARMS_CONTROL events were summits where major arms control treaties or agreements took place, initiation of new talks, completion of treaties when a dramatic event in and of themselves (not taking place at a summit), or announcement of major proposals for arms control or other actions to make nuclear war less likely (de-targeting, “hotline”, etc). RELATIONS events signified improvements in relations with adversaries– meaning principally China and the USSR. Included summits with no specific arms control agreements, or policy changes by the U.S. that mark improved relations (e.g., recognition of China). MEDIATION events were cases of the U.S. engaging at the White House level to serve as intermediary in conflicts not involving the U.S. (principally, the Middle East)

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Statistical Approach The effects of dramatic peace events on presidential approval were modeled as

exponentially decaying shocks superimposed on an underlying level of approval set by economic

conditions and other control variables. This approach was chosen for several reasons. First, the

duration of any gains from peace activities are important to a president’s political calculations: a

gain of 5% that lasts for months may be more significant than a gain of 10% that lasts for days.

Relatively few studies have estimated both the magnitude and duration of approval changes from

events,11 and so this is a useful methodological contribution. This approach also controls for

background trends in approval ratings, such as when peace event happens as the economy is

rapidly worsening or improving. Finally, the approach is less sensitive to sampling error or

errors in the dating of events than the commonly used method of using the change from the last

approval poll prior to first poll after an event (i.e., using only two polls per event).

The control model was similar to specifications used by previous studies of presidential

approval (Kernell 1978;Marra and others 1990;MacKuen; Erickson, and Stimson 1992;MacKuen

1983). The form chosen was a linear, autoregressive (i.e., AR1) specification (Erickson;

MacKuen, and Stimson 2002;Beck 1992). The principal control variables were economic

conditions, along with early term “honeymoons”, and the impact of war deaths and major

scandals. One slight difference is that individual polls, rather than monthly averages, were the

unit of analysis.12 This has little effect on the control model but is important to allow more

accurate modeling of rally dynamics. The specific variables and functional form were:

��';�� = ��00+%��4 ��6��#�00(>1 �� $��#�� $�� =��6��C��/++�%C��00*%C��#��009%F ��C��00(>1C�� $��#�� = ��0,(%I��0,)>1-��5�� $��#��#��$�� ='� �6��/++/% ��I��0)(>1�/H�� 1:��$��09+��0)+��#5��#� ��#$��#�� # ��5 ��$��1��5��$��% �� 5��$��# ��1-��

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APPROVAL

The share of the public indicating that they approve of the way the president is handling his job according to each Gallup survey. Expressed in percentage points – that is, 0 to 100, rather than fractions for ease of interpretation.13

UNEMPLOYMENT

The national unemployment rate for the month in which a given poll took place.

QUARTERLY_INFLATION

Three-month moving average of the annualized monthly change in the Consumer Price Index. A moving average is used because of the volatility of the series.14

CONSUMER_EXPECT

Index of the “Business Conditions Expected in the Next 12 Months” item from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers. 15

INAUGURATION

Takes on 1 for the first poll after a new President takes office, zero otherwise

VIETNAM_SQRT

The square root of the cumulative casualties (in thousands) during the Vietnam War, from January 1965, to the end of Johnson’s term. From Mueller (1973).16

WATERGATE

Dummy variable for the Watergate scandal: 1 starting March of 1973, and 2 from the “Saturday Night Massacre” in October of 1973 until Nixon’s resignation in August 1974.

��5�� 5�� 5��;�� #��@�� #�� 5��6�� .� ��B��<��#�� $��# �-��00)1��$�� 5�� 5��6��5��6�#��5��1:��00+��='�5��00+>%��#��1�(��$�09(��0)0��$'�5��%��@��#��$��8��$��#$��.�!� ��5�� #��$��G1"1��$��F��B��F��"�� 1=5551��1��>�9�� ;��$��; $��#(+��)+%� �� $�� $ �$1G� �� #�� "��#&��.��2JJ5551��1 ��1�$ ��1��J1K��#��0,)�$��#��1�* �� $�� $�� %�@�� 11�� $�� A��L�� 7 ��$��#��0*9%��@�� 5�#�� 0*,1?�� 5��C��$ �� 5��1

�� //

IRANCONTRA

Dummy variable for the Iran-Contra scandal; 1 from November of 1986 until the end of August 1987 (when Congressional hearings concluded).

The model without any effect from events is specified in equation 1:

1-t1t

8

7654

210

Control*Approval:1

*

****

**:1

φ

θθθθθ

θθθ

+=

+++++

++=

t

t

tttt

ttt

Controlb

IranContra

WatergatetVietnamSqronInauguratipectConsumerEx

nflationQuarterlyIntUnemploymeControla

Where t represents each poll in the 1953-2000 sequence, and φ1 is the coefficient on the

autoregressive term. Also, the control coefficients are shown as � rather than � to distinguish

them from coefficients on event effects. For brevity, Controlt will be used in place of the

individual control variables and their coefficients in subsequent equations.

Event effects are added as exponentially decaying shocks, with an initial magnitude that

is a function of the independent variables. To allow for the possibility that “rally” effects decay

more rapidly than do approval changes from changes in economic conditions, a separate decay

constant φ2 is estimated. The model does not treat polling periods as equal for event effects.

Instead, event effects decay according to the actual time between polls – the model will predict

that virtually all of a shock should still be present if the first poll is just a day later, while much

of the effect will have diminished by the time of the first poll if weeks or months have elapsed.

The time between polls is termed Intervalt, measured in months of 30.5 days. The magnitude of

the disturbance at time t is thus equal to φ2Intervalt times the disturbance at time (t-1). Moreover,

the magnitude of the disturbance at the first poll after an event will not be equal to the

instantaneous effect, since polls sometimes come weeks after an event. The first observed

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magnitude is thus a function of Delayt, where Delay is the time (in months) between an event

and the first poll following the event.

iDelayt 21-t

Interval2t *tEventEffec* tEventEffec:2 t φφ BX+=

Where Xt and B are vectors of independent variables and coefficients, and EventEffectt-1

is the residual effect of previous events. A final complication is the possibility that multiple

events will happen within one polling period – each with a different delay until the next poll. To

allow for this, the equation is re-specified, with the independent variables using events as the unit

of analysis and i representing a given event, and during a polling period t the new disturbance is

the sum of the disturbance from all events i that take place between poll (t-1) and poll t:

��

��

�+= �

=

it

t

DelayLastEvent

FirstEventi21-t

Interval2t *tEventEffec* tEventEffec:3 t φφ BX i

Finally, this disturbance is added into the approval model. Since it seems unlikely that

one president’ s “ rally” would carry over to the next, the term (1-Inaugurationt) is added, and

used to null out prior event effects at any polling period when a new president takes office.

εφβββ

φθθθθθ

θθθφ

++++

−++

+++++++

=

�=

it

t

DelayLastEvent

FirstEventiini

tt

tttt

tt

VariableNVariable1

onInauguratiIranContra

WatergatetVietnamSqronInauguratipectConsumerEx

nflationQuarterlyIntUnemployme

210

1-tInterval

28

7654

2101-t1

t

*)*...*(

)1(*tEventEffec* *

****

**Control*

Approval:4

t

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Or, using Controlt to signify the control variables, and setting EventMagnitude equal to the sum of the independent variables and coefficients:

( )

VariableNVariable1tudeEventMagni

where

tudeEventMagni

onInauguratiControl

nii

DelayLastEvent

FirstEventii

tt

it

t

*...*

*

)1(*tEventEffec* Control*

Approval:5

10

2

1-tInterval

21-t1

t

t

βββ

εφ

φφ

++=

++

−++

=

�=

In the form of eq 5, the only terms that change with different independent variables are

the components of EventMagnitude. Therefore, for brevity when describing specific regressions

only the form of EventMagnitude will be given, but in each case that term is a component of

equation 5, which is the actual equation being regressed. This form can not be estimated using

the standard AR(1) extensions to OLS, but it behaves much like a standard linear auto-regressive

model and can be readily estimated with maximum likelihood methods .17

Analysis (I): Presidential Gains from Peace Events General Effects of Peace Events To test Hypothesis 1, that peace events are generally followed by increases in

presidential approval, three regressions were run. In each case, the full model was as specified in

equation 5; only the EventMagnitude term changed from one regression to another. For the

initial attempts to measure the average effect of peace events, event magnitudes were specified

as:

�,��$�; $ E�� 5�� -MF!I��6��H-G""=-��"#��$�>�� 6�� 5� ��#��1.�� @��1

�� /9

iii

iii

ii

MAJORFORCEMAJORPEACEtudeEventMagnic

EVENTFORCEEVENTPEACEtudeEventMagnib

EVENTPEACEtudeEventMagnia

_*_*:6

_*_*:6

_*:6

21

21

1

ββββ

β

+=+=

=

The first specification simply measures the mean initial effect of peace events. An

important consideration, though, is that peace events often take place not long before or after

uses of force, which also can affect presidential approval (for example, the end of the Vietnam

war a few weeks after the 1972 “ Christmas bombing” , or Clinton’ s 1998 China summit a month

before the cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan). It is important, then, to control for

effects of uses of force. This is done by adding a set of use of force events to the model; these

are listed in Appendix B.18 Finally, another regression was run using only the “ major” events –

those receiving especially heavy press coverage and a connection to the president.

�)�� 6��$=��/++(>��181�� $ ��=:��$��"��/++�>�5 �� $�� D ��# �� #��?�5N��6� $��D �� 5�� #��/+++1

�� /*

Table 3: Effects of Peace Events on Presidential Approval

Peace Events (eq 6a)

Peace Events + Force Events (eq 6b)

Major Peace/Force (eq 6c)

Variable Estimate(ββββ) Std. Err Estimate(ββββ) Std. Err

Control Variables

Constant 2.342 0.380 1.731 0.482 1.835 0.263

Unemployment -4.930 2.081 -2.684 2.090 -2.751 1.743

QuarterlyInflation -1.894 1.138 0.225 2.717 0.079 10.736

ConsumerExpect 0.016 0.002 0.019 0.003 0.018 0.002

VietnamSqrt -0.458 0.038 -0.479 0.044 -0.449 0.042

Watergate -1.013 0.113 -0.995 0.129 -1.168 0.167

IranContra -1.004 0.385 -1.151 0.390 -1.017 0.901

Inauguration 21.876 1.132 23.363 1.309 24.231 1.704

Time constant φ1 0.928 0.925 0.926

Event Variables

PeaceEvent 3.918 1.347 1.873 0.556

ForceEvent 1.933 0.655

PeaceMajor 5.408 1.671

ForceMajor 6.248 1.569

Time Constant φ2 0.297 .805 0.794

(half life) 17 days 96 days 90 days

Std. Error 7.088 6.974 6.708

N 838 838 838

Log-likelihood -2060.1 -2053.2 -2014.4

95% confidence intervals for effect predictions. Variables in bold significant at a .05 level or above. Coefficients on the control variables show the expected signs, are mostly significant, and

are generally consistent with the findings of earlier presidential approval studies.

The results show that peace events are followed, on average, by increases in presidential

approval ratings. A positive and statistically significant effect is found in all three regressions.

Without controlling for uses of force, an average 4% increase is seen – but that effect decays

�� /,

rapidly; only a 1% increase would remain after a month. With a control for uses of force, only a

2% increase is expected, though with a half life of three months (about the same half life as has

been found for uses of force alone). Though that 2% result is statistically significant, it is not of

much political significance.

More dramatic effects are seen when only the 25 largest events are included in the

regression. As results for equation 6b show, major peace events can be expected to provide

presidents a 5.4% boost (+/- 3.4%) – nearly as large as the 6.2 (+/- 3.2%) gain from major uses

of force. In either case, the “ rally” is expected to decay with a half life of three months. Figure 2

illustrates the expected decay patterns.

0 2 4 6��

-10

-5

0

5

10

��

��

��

Figure 2: Predicted Peace Event Effects

0 2 4 6��

-10

-5

0

5

10

��

��

��

0 2 4 6��

-10

-5

0

5

10

��

� ��

��

Figure 3 – Predicted Effects of Peace Events Dramatic “ uses of peace” apparently affect presidential ratings in a manner similar to that

of uses of force. The size of these rallies is modest: the 2% gain from an average peace event

would hardly be noticeable given the other influences on presidential ratings. A sudden 5% gain,

however, is politically meaningful, but even so the effect is small and short-lived compared to

major negative factors such as a recession or major scandal. From the coefficients in table 3, for

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example, the Iran-Contra scandal had a long term impact of about –13% on Reagan’ s approval

ratings.

Media/Opinion Variables and Peace Events

As stated in Hypothesis 2, the media priming model predicts that the public reaction to

events will be conditioned by the coverage, success, and elite reaction of those events. To test

this, regressions were run with the media and opinion variables as shown in equations 7a and 7b:

ii

iiii

iii

iiii

ForceMajorexOpinionInd

SuccessCoveragePeaceEventtudeEventMagnib

ForceMajorposeCongressOpnCongressOwComment

SuccessCoveragePeaceEventtudeEventMagnia

**

***:7

****

***:7

54

321

7654

321

βββββ

βββββββ

++++=

++++++=

Unfortunately, the opinion variables showed classic signs of multicolinearity:

coefficients showing unexpected sign, high instability under specification changes, and

substantial correlation between each other. Therefore, regressions were also done with the

OpinionIndex variable, which is the sum of the editorial and Congressional variables, producing

an index that ranged from –3 to +3. This variable was much better behaved, as demonstrated in

the results in Table 4.

�� /0

Table 4: Event Effects by Media/Opinion, Event Type

Opinion Variables (eq 7b)

Event Type

Event Type – MAJOR ONLY

Variable Estimate(ββββ) Std. Err Estimate(ββββ) Std. Err Estimate(ββββ) Std. Err

Constant 2.120 0.3739 2.1088 0.4126 2.2391 0.3441

Unemployment -2.2267 2.2363 -1.972 2.456 -4.0442 1.9828

QuarterlyInflation -1.1379 1.1202 -1.1499 1.1958 -1.2943 1.0369

ConsumerExpect 0.0195 0.0017 0.0197 0.0018 0.0177 0.0015

VietnamSqrt -0.4778 0.0407 -0.4717 0.0408 -0.4701 0.0379

Watergate -1.0162 0.1194 -0.9608 0.1174 -1.014 0.1208

IranContra -1.3693 0.3948 -1.2062 0.3872 -1.1245 0.3744

Inauguration 23.5561 1.1517 23.0409 1.1328 22.5353 1.0982

Time constant φ1 .9193 0.9188 0.9248

Event Variables

PeaceEvent -1.9398 1.1011

CoveragePE 2.6199 0.8349

SuccessPE 0.4861 1.1359

OpinonIndexPE 1.7388 0.5085 1.1102 0.4385 1.8041 1.2362

Deescalation 0.2924 0.7768 8.9544 4.3456

ArmsControl 2.0308 1.4119 2.9783 6.9229

Relations 1.2334 1.0014 5.5444 2.4015

Mediation -4.6462 2.513 -8.072 8.4339

WarTermination 23.2568 4.3921 33.1624 6.2376

ForceMajor 6.5019 0.9617 5.5664 0.9239

Time Constant φ2 .6489 0.6564 .5066

(half life) 47 days 49 days 31 days

Std. Error 6.743 6.597 6.717

N 838 838 838

Log-likelihood -2018.37 -1999.1 -2015.1

95% confidence intervals for effect predictions. Variables in bold significant at a .05 level or above. As predicted, the peace activity produces larger approval gains for presidents when

coverage is more intensive, and when supported by opinion leaders. Success, on the other hand,

did not matter much, though studies of the use of force have also found that.

�� (+

The effect of coverage is particularly strong: if elite opinion is neutral, then an event just

meeting the 5-day threshold for New York Times coverage would have an expected effect of just

0.7% on the president’ s ratings, which a high coverage event (more than 25 stories) would have

an expected 6.0% immediate increase. Elite opinion can also make a substantial difference in the

public’ s reaction, adding or subtracting 5.1% with 100% support or 100% criticism. In practice,

unanimous support or opposition is rare; the average value for OpinionIndex is 0.5. There were

eight cases of full support (OpinionIndex = +3), and three of total criticism (OpinionIndex = -3).

The net result is that in the best possible case – high coverage, success, complete support

– a president’ s ratings would be expected to increase 11.5% initially, decaying by half every

seven weeks. In a worst-case scenario, unsuccessful, criticized peace activity could lower a

president’ s ratings by 5%. Figure 4 shows these predicted effects over time.

0 2 4 6��

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

��

��

Figure 2: Peace Effects by Media/Opinion Variables

0 2 4 6��

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

��

��

0 2 4 6��

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

��

��

Figure 4 – Predicted Effects by Media/Opinion Variables

Effect of Different Types of Peace Activity

Further regressions were run with peace events disaggregated by type. The media

priming model predicts that presidential approval will show greater increases when presidential

�� (�

actions are more in line with public preferences. Studies suggest this is true for uses of force:

intervention for internal change is less popular than other missions ((Jentleson and Britton

1998;Jentleson 1992)), and internal change events due lead to smaller increases (or even losses)

in approval ((Oneal and others 1996;Burbach 2003)).

Columns 2 and 3 of table 4 show results from regressions run by type of event, with all

peace events and major events only. The most striking result is the huge coefficient on War

Termination, with an instantaneous approval increase of 20 to 30% predicted. The end of wars

are important events, but such a large coefficient seems unreasonable, and there are reasons to

doubt the result. Most importantly, there are only four cases of war termination, and so the result

is based on very few data points. The four cases and their immediate approval changes were:

Korea –15, Vietnam +16, Gulf War +9, Kosovo 0%. Note that fairly rapid half-lives were found,

so that a 23% immediate prediction would typically mean a 15-20% by the time of the first

subsequent poll. The large WarTermination effect is probably driven by the extraordinary rally

of the Gulf War in 1991; Bush’s ratings went up more than 25%, far more than the 6% predicted

by the MajorForce variable. With the Gulf War making up 1/4th of the WarTermination variable,

and the end-of-war event happening so quickly after the start of the war, WarTermination picks

up much of the excess war-related rally. Looking at the individual data, with only four examples

about all we can say is that the ends of wars do not have a consistent effect, though they can

cause significant changes in presidential ratings for better or for worse.

Looking to other types of peace activity, there are some differences, though not as clearly

as with uses of force. Most activities provide modest gains on average. ARMS CONTROL

gives a consistent 2 or 3% immediate increase. DEESCALATION and IMPROVED

RELATIONS activities have little effect when events of all magnitudes are considered, but

�� (/

highly prominent reductions in conflicts or improvements in relations are followed by gains of

5% or more.

MEDIATION actually hurts presidents; the coefficient was consistently negative in all

specifications that were tried. The negative effect of serving as a mediator for third parties is

surprising, given that presidents seem eager to play the role of peace maker. Looking at the data,

though, only in the case of Carter’s 1978 Camp David summit was mediation followed by

approval gains for a president. This would be consistent with a public focus on direct U.S.

interests in foreign policy – solving other nations’ conflicts may not be seen as relevant by many

Americans.

Summary: “ Rallies” From Peace Events The results generally confirm hypotheses 1 and 2: peace events do have positive effects

on presidential approval, and are affected as predicted by media coverage and elite opinion. The

gains from diplomacy are generally modest; even for events receiving heavy media coverage, the

expectation is for only a 5% initial gain lasting for a few months. Such approval gains would not

rescue a failing president, but on the other hand, they are not much less than the gains available

from the use of force. If the relatively small approval increases resulting from most uses of force

generate fears that presidents use military force to boost their poll numbers, then it does seem

plausible that the gains from diplomacy found here would also inspire manipulation. The next

section tests that proposition.

�� ((

Analysis (II): Political Timing of Peace Events

Hypothesis 3 predicted that presidents would engage in “ diversionary peace” Since

peace activity yields political benefits, there would appear to be opportunities for presidents to

exploit statesmanship for their own personal gain.

Methods and Variables

To test for political motivations in the timing of peace activities, the frequency of peace

activity was modeled as a function of politically relevant variables, and control variables, using a

Poisson event-count model for the number of peace events observed in any given polling

interval, an approach that has often been used in the diversionary war literature (Gowa

1998;Waterman and Meernik 1996;Fordham 1998a;Brace and Hinckley 1993).19 In addition to

the variables described earlier, these regressions required the following additional variables were

used:

USSR_TENSION

Coded 1 for periods of heightened tension, -1 for periods of unusual cooperation,

zero otherwise, per the following table:

�0:��6�� $��=I ��0))%.�$�� 00)>1:�� @�� $��$�� $�� ;�� =:��$/++�>

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Table 5: US-Soviet Tension

START END Description (signal event) VALUE 1/1953 3/1955 Immediate Post-Stalin period 0 4/1955 2/1959 “ Spirit of Geneva” (Austrian treaty) -1 3/1959 6/1963 Crises in Berlin, Cuba, U2 (Berlin “ deadline” ) +1 7/1963 10/1969 Quiet 1960s (nuclear test ban agreement) 0

11/1969 6/1975 Détente (SALT negotiations begin) -1 7/1975 11/1980 Post-Détente (Helsinki summit) 0

12/1980 12/1984 Cold War Revival (invasion of Afghanistan) +1 1/1984 10/1987 Regan Thaw (“ Year of peace” speech) 0

11/1987 12/1991 Gorbachev reforms/rapprochement (Washington summit)

-1

1/1/1992 1/29/2001 End of cold war (USSR disbanded) 0

WARTIME 1 during periods when the U.S. was at war. Specifically, 1953 up to the Korean

armistice, February 1965 to January 1973 (Vietnam), August 1990 to March 1991 (Gulf War), March to June 1999 (Kosovo).

ELECTION YEAR 1 for the 12 months prior to a Presidential election ELECTION PRESIDENT 1 for the final three months prior to a presidential election ELECTION MIDTERM 1 for the three months prior to a midterm election POST COLDWAR 1 for the period after December, 1991 (the breakup of the Soviet Union). EISENHOWER …. CLINTON Dummy variables for each president SCANDALS

�� (9

1 during periods of major scandals, as identified from (Schultz 1999).20 3MONTH APPROVAL 3 month moving average of presidential approval, up to the poll prior to the polling

period in questions (approval immediately before each event is not used to avoid the possibility that approval ratings are affected by the run-up to the events).

The following equations were regressed, with and without individual presidential effects

included:

��

��

�

+++++++

+++

=

rPostColdWarmElectMidte

esidentElectarElectionYeScandals

WartimeTensionUSSRMoApproval

pectConsumerExntUnemployme

IntervalCountPeaceEvent tt

**

Pr***

*_*3*

**

exp*:8

109

876

543

210

βββββ

ββββββ

��

��

�

++++++++

+++

=

ClintonJFKrmElectMidte

esidentElectarElectionYeScandals

WartimeTensionUSSRMoApproval

pectConsumerExntUnemployme

IntervalCountPeaceEvent tt

*...**

Pr***

*_*3*

**

exp*:9

18109

876

543

210

ββββββ

ββββββ

Note that Intervalt is used as a weighting factor due to the unequal polling periods.

EISENHOWER is not included in the presidential effects since a constant term is included (i.e., each presidential dummy represents their difference from Eisenhower), and POST COLDWAR is dropped when presidential effects are included since it is almost identical to CLINTON (POST COLDWAR would effectively be a dummy variable for the 1992).

Analysis of Results Regression results from equations 8 and 9 are shown below in table 6.

/+��5��2"��$��-��$��09)=.� ��"�� $�� >%�:M��5��0*/=�� $�<�� >��#��6��0*8=�� F�A�-��:��0*)=$�� :��B��$ �� "��$�.��>%��%��F��0,,=C �� 6 �H�� .��$�� >%'�-�0)(=��'�-�� $��5��"��5�� 5��>%!��.��%.��$��00�=��;��$�� B�"��$�.��$ ��>%��008=-�6�� $.� ��$�� 5�$��%��5�� 5�� 5��>%F�5 ��6#1��-��5 �� $��J�� 5��1

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Table 6: Rates of Peace Events Peace Event Rate

(eq 8)

Peace Event Rate Presidential Effects

(eq 9)

Variable Estimate(ββββ) Std. Err Estimate(ββββ) Std. Err

(Intercept) -2.2524 1.3150 -0.9498 1.5925

Unemployment -3.3669 11.9898 -9.6978 13.3053

ConsumerExpect -0.0068 0.0049 -0.0055 0.0062

3MoApproval 0.0143 0.0123 -0.0046 0.0158

USSR_Tension -0.5579 0.2218 -0.3727 0.2769

Wartime 0.6296 0.3101 0.5982 0.4287

PostColdWar 1.0582 0.2926

JFK 0.4316 0.7520

LBJ -0.2255 0.6426

Nixon -0.0079 0.5566

Ford -0.5044 0.8753

Carter -1.0466 0.8951

Reagan 0.2997 0.4057

Bush41 0.7258 0.4673

Clinton 0.8913 0.4333

Scandals 0.1511 0.2690 0.0937 0.2993

ElectionYear 0.0103 0.3009 0.0926 0.3089

ElectionPresident -0.9526 0.7148 -0.9611 0.7164

ElectionMidterm -0.1128 0.3927 -0.0880 0.4011 N 704 704

Log-likelihood -139.6 -137.3 Likelihood ratio

test (Pr(Y|�=0))

0.0009 0.0076

Variables in bold significant at a .05 level or above; Variables underlined at a 0.30 level. Dummy variable for Eisenhower omitted since constant included; read as if Eisenhower effect is zero.

The control variables for the current U.S. international situation have the expected

effects: peace events are more common during wars (when peace proposals and de-escalation

are possible), less common when U.S./Soviet tensions are high, and become significantly more

�� (,

common after the end of the Cold War (though this could be a Clinton effect as much as a post-

Cold War effect).

Political variables generally have insignificant effects, and often in the direction opposite

that would be predicted for “ diversionary peace” . This can be seen more clearly in Figure 4,

below, which shows peace event frequency predicted for the unit changes (unless otherwise

specified) in variables, with all other variables held constant. The reference line shows the

predicted rate for Eisenhower, during a non-wartime, non-election period, with USSR TENSION

at 0, and approval and economic variables at their means.

E ise nho w erE lectY e ar

M idterm 3 m oP resid ent 3m o

S can dalW artim e

U S S RC lin ton

C arterR eces sio n

Ap rv -1 5%0 .0

0 .1

0 .2

0 .3

0 .4

0 .5

Pea

ce E

vent

s / M

onth

Figure 5 – First Differences On Peace Event Rates Presidential elections campaigns appear to depress diplomatic activity; the frequency

drops dramatically in the last months before an election, as does the rate of uses of force.

Presidents may fear charges of “ October surprises” , the White House may be too focused on the

�� ()

campaign to conduct major policy initiatives, and potential diplomatic partners may prefer to

wait until after elections when it is clear who their future negotiating partner will be.

Scandals, recessions, and low approval ratings have little effect on the frequency of peace

activity. Presidents are no more likely to conduct dramatic diplomacy when their poll numbers

are down than they are at other times. Presidents are also no more likely to do so during

recessions, which is an interesting finding: most authors report that the use of force does become

more common during recessions. It is not clear why no evidence of political timing is seen.

Presidents might simply refuse to let domestic political calculations affect their foreign policy

decisions. The White House may have a wide range of other political tools at its disposal that are

more effective than overtly diversionary uses of peace or force. It also seems likely that there is

strategic interaction involved: Presidents are well aware that potentially self-serving actions

during times of political need are widely criticized by the press and opposition politicians.

A variety of alternative specifications were tried using higher order terms for approval,

and interactions between approval and economic conditions.21 These specifications did not

significantly outperform the simple model shown in table 6, but in no case did the “ diversionary

peace” pattern appear. Instead, a majority of the models showed peace activity being more

frequent when presidential approval was already high, and for peace activity to become

particularly uncommon during the combination of low presidential approval and poor economic

conditions. In no case was there anything like the strong relationship that has been observed

between economic slowdowns and an increased use of force.

If the greater propensity to use force during recessions is due to diversionary motivations,

it seems odd that peace events do not also become more common, since they too can enhance

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presidential support. Why shouldn’ t presidents make use of all the tools at their disposal,

especially since peace events would probably be less risky, less costly, and possibly less

damaging if the illegitimate motives became known. One explanation, of course, is that uses of

force during recessions may not be diversionary: the observed correlation could be a

coincidence. Alternatively, there could be a missing factor that is a common cause of both, such

as shared connections to the electoral calendar. The relative effectiveness of peace and war may

also vary under different economic conditions – uses of force might be relatively more popular

when economic conditions are poor, for example. Future research is planned that will investigate

these possibilities.22

Conclusion

Dramatic presidential peace activity has resulted in increases in presidential approval.

On average, major peace events – those receiving a story per day or more in the New York Times

for two week – give presidents about a 5% increase. This compares to 6% for similarly

publicized uses of force. This confirms Hypothesis 1. In addition, there is a systematic variation

between the effects of difference peace events: more coverage means larger gains, and elite

opinion can have a profound influence on the response. Presidential actions which are heavily

criticized might actually cause the president to lose support. This generally confirms Hypothesis

2, although success did not matter as expected.

Taken together, these results suggest that the media priming model has greater

explanatory power than the conflict-cohesion theory. Similar changes in approval result from

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similar levels of attention and elite support for either uses of force or peace events. There have

been a relatively small number of conflicts that have been followed by extreme changes in

presidential approval, such as the 1991 Gulf War, the 1979 Iranian Hostage Crisis, or the Sept.

11th attacks in 2001, all of which caused increases of 20% or more. In these cases there might be

a patriotism effect at work, or perhaps using New York Times story counts doesn’ t truly capture

the effect of the saturation TV coverage seen with those events. In general, though, the same

processes seem at work in shaping the public response to peace events as uses of force.

Given that “ uses of peace” often help presidents, it is surprising that there was so little

evidence of political timing. Hypothesis 3, that the rate of peace activity will increase with

political negatives such as low approval ratings or scandals, was not confirmed. Presidents do

not appear to use the diplomatic tool to try to rebuild lagging support. What this means is that

there is little evidence for political timing of either uses of force (according to previous studies)

or peace events. The one exception is the correlation of force with recessions, but the fact that

peace events do not show a similar correlation calls into question a simple diversionary

explanation for that relationship.

One question, though, is how to explain the presidential talk of using peace for political

purposes, given that there does not appear to be politically-motivated timing. One possibility is

that presidential talk is just that – talk. Also, a careful reading shows that the periods when there

is the most evidence of potential gains from peace activities being discussed in the White House

are periods when presidents were in political trouble precisely because of an unpopular war

(Johnson, Nixon, and the Vietnam War) or because of heightened U.S.-Soviet tensions (e.g.,

Reagan’s first term). Presidents have considered the potential to use dramatic peace gimmicks to

head off anti-war sentiments or to reassure anxious voters, but there is not much evidence of

them suggesting the use of “ diversionary peace” to counter losses from recessions, scandals, or

�� 8�

other unrelated causes. This suggests that peace activity might not follow macro-political

indicators, but it could be that presidents strike peaceful poses when public war fears or

dissatisfaction with an ongoing war are high; this will be explored in a future project.

When Henry Kissinger was in secret negotiations with the Chinese for Nixon’s historic

visit, the Chinese leadership reportedly took it for granted that Nixon would want to schedule the

trip in the spring or summer of 1972, in order to enhance his image and steal press attention

away from his challengers in the run-up to the presidential election that year (Hersh 1983). The

Chinese Communists had American politics partly right: summits, treaties, and de-escalation of

conflicts do generate media attention and do improve presidential standing. The gains from

peace are modest, but so generally are the political returns from using force. Dramatic peace-

promoting activities are a potential source of presidential support. Whatever Nixon’s thinking in

the China case, in general the timing peace events does not appear to be motivated by broad

political conditions. Paired with the lack of diversionary war findings, U.S. presidents may be

less cynical in their foreign policy actions than is often suspected.

�� 8/

APPENDIX A: Peace Event Data

Date Event Type NYT page1 Opinion

Index Success

04/16/53 "Chance for Peace" Speech summit 15 3 0

07/27/53 End of Korean War WarTerm 35 1 0

12/08/53 Atoms for Peace initiative ArmCtl 11 2 1

05/15/55 Austrian State Treaty (US troop withdrawal) ArmCtl 6 0 1

07/22/55 Geneva Summit, Open Skies proposal summit 35 1 1

06/20/57 Nuclear test moratorium / fissile cutoff proposal ArmCtl 19 -1 0

08/22/58 Nuclear test moratorium / test ban negotiations ArmCtl 9 0 0

09/15/59 Washington Summit summit 54 -2 1

05/16/60 Paris Summit summit 41 -2 -1

06/03/61 Vienna Summit summit 11 0 0

06/10/63 American U speech: testing moratorium ArmCtl 5 2 0

07/25/63 Nuclear test ban agreement reached (signed one week later) ArmCtl 27 1 1

04/07/65 Peace plan for Vietnam (Johns Hopkins speech) DeEsc 8 1 0

12/25/65 Vietnam bombing pause / "Peace Offensive" DeEsc 16 1 -1

10/25/66 Peace plan for Vietnam at Manila Conference DeEsc 10 1 0

02/08/67 Vietnam bombing pause (Tet) DeEsc 6 0 -1

06/24/67 Glasboro Summit summit 10 0 0

09/29/67 Proposal for bombing halt if N. Vietnam negotiates DeEsc 8 -2 -1

12/20/67 Xmas bombing pause, LBJ ready to open peace talks DeEsc 5 0 -1

04/01/68 Vietnam bombing cut to DMZ area only DeEsc 25 2 0

10/31/68 Vietnam bombing of N. Vietnam stopped DeEsc 6 2 0

05/14/69 Nixon peace offer -- mutual troop withdrawals DeEsc 10 2 0

06/10/69 Nixon announces troop withdrawals (Midway) DeEsc 9 -1 0

09/16/69 Troop withdrawal (35,000) DeEsc 8 0 0

11/03/69 Nixon "silent majority" speech: more withdrawals, eventually end US ground role DeEsc 16 1 0

11/17/69 Strategic arms talks open in Helsinki (+NPT signed days later) ArmCtl 8 1 0



06/04/70 Cambodia incursion to end; troop withdrawals resume DeEsc 12 -1 0

08/07/70 Withdrawal acceleration / draft calls reduced (Laird) DeEsc 5 0 0

�� 8(



Index Success

10/07/70 Nixon speech: "standstill ceasefire" proposal DeEsc 15 1 0

04/08/71 Troop withdrawal (100,000) DeEsc 4 -1 0

04/15/71 Relaxation of embargo, travel, etc on China relations 14 1 1

07/15/71 China trip announced relations 16 3 1

01/25/72 Kissinger negotiations with N. Vietnam made public DeEsc 10 3 -1

02/21/72 China visit relations 29 1 1

05/22/72 Moscow Summit, SALT I and ABM treaties relations 31 0 1

10/27/72 Pre-Election Push for Vietnam Peace ("peace at hand") DeEsc 29 -1 -1

01/24/73 End of Vietnam War WarTerm 35 3 1

06/18/73 Washington Summit relations 22 0 1

01/19/74 Kissinger brokers Israel/Egypt ceasefire mediate 20 1 1

06/27/74 Moscow Summit relations 23 -2 0

11/23/74 Vladivostok Summit, SALT II framework relations 8 0 0

08/01/75 Helsinki Summit -- CSCE Treaty relations 13 -3 0

03/24/77 SALT II negotiations begin ArmCtl 7 -1 -1

09/17/78 Camp David accords, Egypt and Israel mediate 20 3 1

01/29/79 Deng Xiaoping visit to US, normalization of relations relations 15 0 0

06/15/79 Vienna summit / SALT II Signed ArmCtl 11 -1 0

11/18/81 INF -- Zero option ArmCtl 12 3 0

05/10/82 Reagan offers initial START proposal; announces 5/31 that START talks to being ArmCtl 8 1 0

03/23/83 SDI Proposal ArmCtl 10 -3 0

01/16/84 Reagan Admin seeks better relations w/USSR relations 7 1 0

01/07/85 Resumption of arms talks in Geneva ArmCtl 13 0 1

11/19/85 Geneva summit ArmCtl 20 1 0

10/10/86 Reykjavik Summit relations 21 -1 -1

09/19/87 INF Agreement reached ArmCtl 10 3 1

12/10/87 Washington Summit / INF Treaty signed relations 29 2 1

05/29/88 Moscow Summit relations 25 1 0

12/08/88 Governor's Island mini-summit relations 10 0 0

05/12/89 Bush endoreses Gorbachev reforms, wants better relations ArmCtl 2

12/02/89 Malta Summit relations 13 0 0

05/30/90 Washington Summit relations 21 -1 0

�� 88



Index Success

07/07/90 NATO summit declares USSR no longer enemy relations 5 1 0

09/09/90 Helsinki Summit relations 8 1 1

02/28/91 Gulf War Ends WarTerm 35 3 1

07/31/91 Moscow Summit / START I Treaty relations 15 0 1

09/28/91 Unilateral nuclear cuts ArmCtl 12 3 1

10/30/91 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference mediate 17 1 1

01/04/93 Moscow Summit / START II Treaty signed ArmCtl 5 0 0

04/04/93 Vancouver Summit relations 9 1 1

09/14/93 Oslo Accords signed at White House mediate 20 1 1

10/08/93 US announces withdrawal from Somolia DeEsc 19 -3 -1

01/13/94 Moscow Summit / Detargeting Agreement ArmCtl 10 0 0


11/21/95 Dayton Accords end Bosnian War mediate 11 0 1


03/22/97 Helsinki Summit relations 6 0 1

10/29/97 Jiang Zemin visit to US relations 11 0 0

06/25/98 Bejing Summit (China) relations 15 0 1

10/15/98 Mid-East Peace Summit at Wye mediate 15 1 1

06/10/99 End of Kosovo War WarTerm 40 -1 1

�� 89

Appendix B: Use of Force Events Date Event Type Coverage Opinion

03/20/54 Assistance to French at Dienbienphu DEFENSE 2 -1

08/05/54 US/Chinese clashes after BOAC shootdown PROTECT 1 0

09/01/54 First Taiwan Straits crisis (US soldiers killed) DEFENSE 1 1

07/16/58 US Marines deployed to Lebanon INTERNAL 3 1

08/25/58 Second Taiwan Straits Crisis DEFENSE 2 -2

05/12/60 U2 shot down over Soviet Union PROTECT 2 2

04/21/61 Bay of Pigs Invasion DEFENSE 2 2

08/23/61 Berlin Wall Crisis DEFENSE 2 3

11/20/61 Dominican Republic show of force against Trujillo INTERNAL 1 0

05/10/62 Laos civil war; US deployment to Thailand INTERNAL 1 0

10/25/62 Cuban Missile Crisis PROTECT 3 3

01/20/64 Panama: US troops defend bases from rioters PROTECT 1 0

08/08/64 Vietnam: Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Strikes on N. Vietnam DEFENSE 2 3

02/09/65 Vietnam: US begins bombing campaign ("Rolling Thunder") DEFENSE 2 1

03/08/65 Vietnam: U.S. ground troops deployed DEFENSE 2 0

04/29/65 Dominican Republic invasion INTERNAL 2 1

07/25/65 Vietnam: Major expansion of ground commitment DEFENSE 2 1

06/30/66 Vietnam: bombing expanded to Hanoi, POL facilities DEFENSE 2 2

01/24/68 North Korea captures USS Pueblo PROTECT 2 2

02/01/68 Vietnam: Tet Offensive DEFENSE 3 -3

04/17/69 North Korea Shoots Down EC-121 PROTECT 2 3

05/01/70 Vietnam: Invasion of Cambodia DEFENSE 3 -3

11/23/70 Vietnam: Son Tay POW Rescue Attempt PROTECT 1 0

02/08/71 Vietnam: Invasion of Laos DEFENSE 2 0

05/08/72 Vietnam: Bombing of Hanoi ("Linebacker I") DEFENSE 2 -1

12/18/72 Vietnam: Bombing of N. Vietnam Resumes ("Linebacker II") DEFENSE 2 -2

10/26/73 Nuclear Alert during Yom Kippur War DEFENSE 1 0

05/16/75 Mayaguez crew rescued from Cambodia PROTECT 2 3

08/20/76 US Soldiers killed by North Korea in DMZ ("tree cutting incident") PROTECT 1 1

05/20/78 Airlift Belgian troops into Zaire combat, evacuate Westerners PROTECT 1 1

11/20/79 Iran Hostage Crisis, Show of Force in Persian Gulf PROTECT 2 1

04/25/80 Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt PROTECT 2 3

08/20/81 Libyan planes shot down DEFENSE 1 0

08/21/82 Lebanon: US Marines deployed to Beirut INTERNAL 1 0

09/21/82 Lebanon: US Marines deployed again to Beirut INTERNAL 1 0

10/28/83 Grenada invasion PROTECT 2 2

�� 8*

Appendix B: Use of Force Events Date Event Type Coverage Opinion

12/15/83 Lebanon: U.S. strikes Syrian forces INTERNAL 1 -1

10/12/85 Achile Lauro hijackers intercepted by U.S. forces PROTECT 2 3

03/26/86 Libya: Skirmishes in Gulf of Sidra DEFENSE 1 0

04/15/86 Libya: Bombing of Tripoli PROTECT 2 3

06/16/87 Reflagging / Escorting Tankers in Persian Gulf DEFENSE 2 0

10/15/87 Iranian boats/bases struck by U.S. DEFENSE 1 1

04/19/88 More raids against Iran DEFENSE 1 1

12/01/89 Show of force / possible air strikes against Philippine coup INTERNAL 1 0

12/20/89 Panama Invasion PROTECT 2 0

08/09/90 Iraq: Deployment to Protect Saudi Arabia ("Desert Shield") DEFENSE 2 3

11/09/90 Iraq: Major expansion of force in Saudi Arabia DEFENSE 2 -1

01/15/91 Iraq: Gulf War begins DEFENSE 3 2

02/26/91 Iraq: Ground campaign begins PROTECT 3 3

04/15/91 Iraq: Humanitarian Assistance to Kurds ("Provide Comfort") INTERNAL 1 3

08/26/92 Iraq: Imposition of No-Fly Zone DEFENSE 1 0.5

12/06/92 Somalia: Humanitarian Assistance Mission Begins INTERNAL 2 3

01/16/93 Iraq: Air Strikes Following Threats to Coalition Aircraft DEFENSE 2 3

06/17/93 Somalia: Expansion of Mission to Pursue Aideed INTERNAL 1 -1

06/27/93 Iraq: Missile Strikes Following Bush Assassination Plot PROTECT 1 3

10/04/93 Somalia: Major Mogadishu Battle INTERNAL 2 -3

04/22/94 Bosnia: NATO Air Strikes (Gorazde) INTERNAL 1 0.5

07/22/94 Rwanda humanitarian assistance INTERNAL 2 1

09/20/94 Haiti Occupation INTERNAL 2 -2

10/14/94 Iraq: U.S. Forces Deployed to Reinforce Kuwait ("Vigilant Warrior") DEFENSE 1 3

11/21/94 Bosnia: NATO Air Strikes (Bihac) INTERNAL 1 1.5

08/31/95 Bosnia: NATO Air Campaign ("Deliberate Force") INTERNAL 2 3

12/15/95 Bosnia: Deployment of IFOR Peacekeepers INTERNAL 2 0.5

09/03/96 Iraq: Missile Strikes after Kurdistan Incursion INTERNAL 2 -0.5

08/20/98 Sudan/Afghanistan Missile Strikes after Embassy Bombings PROTECT 2 -0.5

12/16/98 Iraq: Air Strikes After Inspectors Expelled ("Desert Fox") DEFENSE 2 -1

03/24/99 Kosovo War INTERNAL 3 0

06/12/99 Kosovo Peacekeeping (KFOR) INTERNAL 2 1

�� 8,

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peace promotion presid support

Documents

dramatic peace events

major peace events

impact of peace

peace tool

evidence of diversionary

rate of peace activity

presidential approval

presidential ratings