peace in the wake of disaster secessionist conflicts and the 2004 indian ocean tsunami

Peace in the Wake of Disaster? Secessionist Conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean TsunamiAuthor(s): Philippe Le Billon and Arno WaizeneggerSource: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sep.,2007), pp. 411-427Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4626258 .Accessed: 12/10/2013 04:14

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Peace in the wake of disaster? Secessionist conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami

Philippe Le Billon* and Arno Waizenegger** This paper explores the impact of 'natural' disasters on armed conflicts, focusing on the evolution of secessionist conflicts in Aceh and Sri Lanka following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Most studies suggest that 'natural' disasters exacerbate pre-existing conflicts. Yet whereas conflict did escalate in Sri Lanka within a year of the tsunami, in Aceh hostilities unexpectedly ended within eight months. Drawing on a comparative analytical framework and semi-structured fieldwork interviews in Aceh, the study points to the importance of spatial dimensions in explaining diverging political outcomes in Aceh and Sri Lanka, focusing on the reshaping of governable spaces following the tsunami.

key words natural disaster war conflict resolution political geography Aceh Sri Lanka

*Department of Geography and Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2, Canada email: [email protected] **Department of Geography, University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany

revised manuscript received 19 February 2007

Introduction On 26 December 2004, a sub-marine earthquake 150 kilometres west of Sumatra triggered a tsunami that directly affected about 2 million people (TEC 2006). Among the estimated 227 000 people who lost their lives in the disaster, nearly 90 per cent lived in Aceh or Sri Lanka. Structural poverty, profit-driven coastal exposure and a criminal neglect of disaster prevention had increased vulnerability along many coastal areas of the Indian Ocean (Glassman 2005). In Aceh and Sri Lanka, vulnerability also reflected decades of civil war and military repression (Lawson 2005), and the tsunami raised hopes of peace for both places (Renner and Chafe 2006). Disasters can bring about political transformation (Pelling and Dill 2006), but they appear to be more frequently followed by political unrest than peace (Olson and Drury 1997; Brancati and Bhavnani 2006), and the conflict resolution effects of 'disaster diplomacy' are rarely lasting (Kelman and Koukis 2000; Kelman 2006).

Whereas hostilities escalated in Sri Lanka within a year of the tsunami, the conflict in Aceh ended eight months after the disaster. Taking a geographical perspective, this paper examines these diverging paths.

Political violence and 'natural' disasters are intensely geographical phenomena, in both their material and imaginative spatialities (Pelling 2003; Wisner et al. 2004; Flint 2005; Gregory and Pred 2006). Geographers have studied various aspects of the relationships between environment and conflict, but 'natural' disasters and armed conflicts have received limited attention (see Dalby 2002). Similarly, geographers studying hazards and vulnerability have given only limited or recent attention to armed conflicts (Pelling 2003; Korf 2004), with the notable exception of wartime vulnerability to drought (see Wisner et al. 2004), and the politics of humanitarianism (Hyndman 2000). Few studies have bridged these two literatures, although political ecology suggests interesting approaches and areas of convergence (Watts and Bohle 1993; Pelling

Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 32 411-427 2007 ISSN 0020-2754 @ 2007 The Authors.

Journal compilation @ Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers) 2007


412 Philippe Le Billon and Arno Waizenegger 2003). Drawing together these literatures and political sciences studies suggesting that pre-disaster political trends play a major role in the outcome of disasters, we suggest a conceptual framework to examine the impact of 'natural' disasters on armed conflicts and present a geographically focused analysis of the cases of secessionist conflicts in Aceh and Sri Lanka following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

We first outline debates on disaster-related conflict transformation, and then present a geographically informed framework engaging with the impact of disasters on conflict transformation, with a focus on its spatial dimensions. The conceptual approach first distinguishes between different types of conflicts and disasters and then analyses disaster effects through three lines of inquiry: the location- specific spatialities of disasters and conflicts (i.e. which areas and populations were affected by conflict and/or disaster); the transformation of 'governable space' (i.e. shifts in territorialized power relations); and the transformation of public discourse about disaster-struck and conflict-affected areas. We do so through three main dimensions: military, socio-political and socio-economic. In the second section, we draw on this framework to explain divergence in conflict transformation in Aceh and Sri Lanka. Drawing on 62 field-based interviews, the study focuses on the 'Acehnese' exception and examines Sri Lanka for comparative purposes (see methodology note below).

Our findings confirm that pre-disaster political trends played a major role in post-disaster conflict outcomes, but we also suggest that the specific spatialities of conflicts and disasters, as well as the reshaping of governable spaces and public discourses in the wake of disaster influenced the diverging political fallouts of the tsunami in Aceh and Sri Lanka.

Political fallouts of 'natural' disasters and conflict transformation The political character of 'natural' disasters and disaster-related activities is well documented (Birkland 1998; Olson 2000; Wisner et al. 2004). Disaster risk has 'political roots', notably (unequal) power relations and (under) development processes (Peacock et al. 1997; Pelling 2003). Hurricane Katrina, for example, renewed attention to inter- racial and class-based inequalities, prejudices and tensions in the United States (Bakker 2005; Frymer

et al. 2006). Politics, rather than the strict 'needs' of disaster victims, also influence responses to disasters (de Waal 1997; Fielden 1998; Drury et al. 2005). Interpretations of disasters represent political choices with political impacts, particularly from a gender perspective (Enarson and Morrow 1998), and for disaster recovery or future risk mitigation (Harwell 2000).

Two main arguments are generally presented regarding the political fallouts of disasters. First, disasters can foster political change (Birkland 1998; Prater and Lindell 2000), notably because they result in grievances among the affected population and a more acute sense of identity. Disasters offer possibilities of enhanced legitimacy for the political leadership, and generally result in greater scrutiny over dominant institutions and development policies, a repositioning of political actors at multiple scales, and 'spontaneous' post-disaster collective action (Pelling and Dill 2006). Collective action can also result from the mobilization and representation of place-based and disasters-affected populations by external 'contentious supporters' eager to leverage grievances to challenge the political status quo (Shefner 1999). Post-disaster collective action faces a risk of repressive backlash by authorities (Drury and Olson 1998; Pelling and Dill 2006). Conflicts also undermine disaster prevention and mitigation by eroding the trust between citizens and their government, and have enduring effects on the vulnerability of politically marginalized groups (Wisner et al. 2004). If disasters are found to generally aggravate 'political unrest', especially so in countries already affected by conflicts (Drury and Olson 1998; Wisner et al. 2004), disasters are also perceived as a 'window of opportunity' for peace, notably through the alteration of value structure among survivors, the need for mutual relief assistance and collaboration between belligerents, enhanced local political socialization and mobilization, as well as international involvement and 'disaster diplomacy' (Quarantelli 1978; Kelman 2006; Renner and Chafe 2006). In this respect, early studies observed much variability in outcomes but noted a higher prevalence of conflicts during 'reconstruction' than 'emergency' phases of disasters (Quarantelli and Dynes 1976).

Second, the political fallouts of disasters largely reflect pre-disaster contexts and trends (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002; Lindell and Prater 2003). Post-disaster conflict transformation would thus represent an acceleration and amplification of

Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 32 411-427 2007 ISSN 0020-2754 @ 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation @ Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers) 2007


Secessionist conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 413

pre-disaster social and political dynamics, rather than a 'new departure' brought about by a devastating disaster. Economically, the higher the pre-disaster Gross Domestic Product and income inequality in a country, the less political systems seem affected by a disaster (Drury and Olson 1998). Among low and middle-income countries, democracies tend to face higher levels of violent unrest following disasters than autocracies (Drury and Olson 2001). Studies based on rational-choice conflict resolution bargaining models, however, give relatively limited attention to context beyond elitist politics, macro- economic indicators and third party interventions (see Sundberg and Vestergren 2005). In contrast, theories of conflict transformation - arguing that transforming interests, social relationships and discourses are key to ending violent conflicts - engage with a broader contextualization (Miall et al. 2005).

Geographical approaches can contribute to this contextualization, notably with regard to spatialized identities and spaces of vulnerability (Watts and Bohle 1993; Cutter 1996; Wisner et al. 2004; Rigg et al. 2005; Stokke 2005). Pelling and Dill (2006) emphasize the greater risk of tensions resulting from the pre-disaster political marginality of affected regions and post-disaster exacerbation of pre-existing inequalities. Hyndman (forthcoming) stresses the importance of overlapping geographies of war, disaster and relief resulting in new spaces of solidarity, hatred, hope and fear transforming conflicts. Simpson and Corbridge (2006) also demonstrate how the politics of 'place-making' in Kachchh-Gujarat following the 2001 earthquake challenged established authorities by reasserting regional political identities and projects. So far, geographical approaches have not been systematically incorporated in research (see Greenhough et al. 2005; Sidaway and Teo 2005), and the spatialities of conflicts and disasters often remain under-specified.

Early sociological studies of disasters and conflicts, for example, often considered 'natural' disasters as 'consensus building crises' compared to divisive 'technological' or 'social' disasters (Quarantelli 1978). Systematic specification of types of conflicts and disasters helps to determine whether different types of disasters (e.g. catastrophic or chronic) have different impacts in specific conflict types (e.g. territorial/successionist or governmental). For example, the combination of drought and secessionist conflict has proved particularly deadly, as demonstrated in Sudan in the late 1980s (Keen 1994). Inquiries into the conflict and disaster

nexus can also specify the location of conflicts and disasters. Taking the spatiality of disasters and conflicts into account should improve the robust- ness of analyses (Buhaug and Lujala 2005), and allow hypothesis testing (Waizenegger and Le Bil- lon 2007). Beyond location, spatial attributes should also include place-based, scalar and discursive dimensions. Drawing on Michael Watts (2004), we use the concept of 'governable spaces' - defined as spaces of territorialized rule (see also Rose 1999) - to engage with processes through which spaces are made governable, or not, by some social networks rather than others. Although an emphasis is placed on governmental rule, this definition acknow- ledges multiple networks, scales and temporalities at which rule can, or cannot, be territorialized and exercised.

Like armed conflicts, 'natural' disasters can dramatically affect the territorialization of rule. Materially, catastrophic disasters can destroy infrastructures critical to the enactment of governmental territorialization, such as communication infrastructures, and affect the spatial distribution and 'governability' of populations. Institutionally, disasters can result in international interventions challenging domestic territorial sovereignty through the creation of 'humanitarian' space, or more broadly trustee- ships (Debrix 1998). Disasters can also contribute to the transformation of public discourse on conflict- affected areas. The representation of the 'enemy' population and territory as 'victims', for example, may strengthen support for peace within the con- stituency of the opposing party (Evin 2004). The victimization of the disaster area and disaster- affected population, however, can also reinvigorate sectarian interpretations and nationalist calculations of suffering and injustice, notably with regard to bias in territorialized aid allocation. In this regard, transition from a political economy of war to one of 'reconstruction' also often entails a re-territorialization of rule, following for example the registers of democratization and 'neo-liberal' re-regulation prescribed by international donors and development agencies.

Building on this conceptual approach, we refine our analytical framework through the articulation of three dimensions of the reshaping of governable spaces during 'post-disaster' conflict transformation: military, socio-political and socio-economic. Rather than being discrete, these dimensions are often closely related and embedded or revealed through particular spaces.




414 Philippe Le Billon and Arno Waizenegger Disasters and conflict transformation Two main conditions are generally required to end armed conflicts. The 'ripeness' of the conflict and the 'willingness' of belligerents to end it as a result of a 'mutually hurting stalemate' are often perceived as a precondition (Zartman 1989). The second is the resolution of incompatibilities, distrust, and lack of commitment preventing negotiations and their successful implementation, between conflicting elites and within society more generally (Wallensteen 2002), addressing territorial incompatibility being crucial to secessionist conflicts. These two main conditions in turn relate to military, socio-political and socio-economic transformations.

The military dimension of post-disaster conflict transformation is, at first glance, obvious: disasters can kill or incapacitate military personnel (physically or psychologically), destroy military equipment and infrastructures, as well as disrupt transporta- tion networks and supply channels. Military forces can also be redirected to disaster relief efforts, rather than combat. A reduction in fighting capability may affect all or only some of the armed groups, with two main possible consequences: the intensity of hostilities may decline as forces attempt to cope with the impact of the disaster; or hostilities may increase as the warring parties opportunistically seek to benefit from the relative weakness of the adversary. As a hypothesis, we suggest that stronger forces are more likely to act opportunistically and seek to escalate the conflict, while weaker ones will attempt to reconstitute their forces, using the post-disaster context as a 'cease-fire' period to achieve political gains and possibly re-arm. As such, the spatiality of disasters can directly and selectively affect territorialized military rule in a conflict.

The socio-political effects of disasters, and more specifically the transformation of civilian rule and political relations, can also reshape governable spaces. Disasters can affect the perception of those affected through trauma and the psychology of the 'near miss', while more pressing issues of survival take precedence over broader struggles (Quarantelli 1978). Disaster-induced suffering might also help to overshadow and alleviate previous suffering inflicted by war. At an interpersonal and inter- communal level, 'goodwill', mutual assistance across a conflict's fault-lines, and work towards common tasks can reduce prejudice and contribute to the emergence of 'therapeutic community' (Barton 1969), changing the socio-political dynamics of

conflict (Renner and Chafe 2006). At an institutional level, as discussed above, there is much evidence that disasters can destabilize political systems, thereby offering opportunities of conflict transformation (Cuny 1983; Albala-Bertrand 1993). Many governments have exploited disasters to increase their strength, improve their image and maintain the status quo, notably through major foreign contributions to relief efforts and occasionally under false pretence of post-disaster 'transformation' of society rather than the 'reconstruction' of previous inequalities (Brown 2000). In turn, increases in legitimacy potentially enable authorities to contribute more decisively in negotiations and peace building.

By reducing the capabilities of governments while increasing the number of citizens' demands on the political system, disasters can create a 'highly charged, politically embarrassing environment' (Birkland 1998, 57). External assistance can help local authorities in this regard, but windfalls in relief and reconstruction aid can also increase the risk of (perceived) fraud, corruption, mismanagement and dispossession by the government and its cronies, aggravating the plight of the most vulnerable and grievances against authorities. By enhancing local political socialization and mobilization, disasters also frequently strengthen civil society and social movements for peace, at least momentarily. How government and rebel authorities react to such opening up of 'political space' affects in turn the relative level of tensions: a repressive backlash is likely by authorities perceiving political change as subversive (Drury and Olson 2001; Pelling and Dill 2006). Disasters also transform the international geopolitical context of a conflict by directing attention to the disaster- and conflict- afflicted region. The deployment of domestic and international civil society groups, the support of donors, as well as public mobilization through demonstrations, can also open up and broaden 'public space' in which 'civilian rule' thrives. This new context may open the political system, making it more inclusive (Fuentes 2003). Critics, however, point to the opportunistic instrumentalization of disasters to pursue ideologically driven or self-interested agendas with negative effects on vulnerability of local populations (Duffield 2001; Wisner 2001). Moreover, interventions in disaster-affected areas often entail processes of identity construction (e.g. 'Internally Displaced Persons') and territorialization (e.g. 'refugee camps' and 'resettlement programs'),



Secessionist conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 415 with ambivalent political consequences (Hyndman 2000).

A third aspect of governable spaces relates to socio-economic processes, most notably the transformation of endowments and entitlements, such as the allocation of relief and reconstruction assistance (e.g. territorialized processes of aid 'beneficiaries' selection, resettlement, reconstruction planning or reshaping of the 'war economy'). Spaces of military repression, disaster, relief and reconstruction all differ in how rules shaping the political economy are defined and territorialized. Disasters and disaster-related activities are prone to causing or deepening inequalities along pre-existing fault lines in societies, increasing grievances and disaffection and possibly heightening the risk of (renewed) conflict (Cuny 1983; Wisner et al. 2004). Post-disaster changes in endowments and entitlements, including land and land holding, as well the allocation of relief and reconstruction assistance, frequently proves a source of conflict, especially when landmarks have been changed, property knowledge and titles destroyed, and disaster mitigation and adaptation processes manipulated. Indirect economic effects such as inflation in rents and food prices increase hardships and discontent- ment among vulnerable households, while benefiting particular segments of the population. Moreover, relief assistance has occasionally sustained belligerents, thereby prolonging the conflict (Keen 1998).

Tsunami and conflict transformation in Aceh and Sri Lanka

All Aceh people really yearn for peace in the wake of the natural disaster.1

Both Aceh, Indonesia's most northern province, and Tamil Eelam, Sri Lanka's northeast claimed as Tamil 'homeland', have been the territorial objects of secessionist conflicts over the past three decades. The Acehnese struggle for independence dates back to 1873, when the Dutch first took control of the sultanate. Post-independence, hostilities opposed Acehnese pro-Islamic forces against the centralized and secular Indonesian regime during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Initiated in 1976, the contemporary phase of the conflict has opposed the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - GAM) to Indonesian security forces, resulting in the death of an estimated 15 000 people and widespread human rights abuses (Reid 2006). In 1998,

the 'metaphorical economic quake' affecting Southeast Asia precipitated the fall of President Suharto and brought hope of peace and greater autonomy for the Acehnese (Sidaway and Teo 2005, 1; Reid 2006). Special autonomy legislations by the Government of Indonesia (Gol) fell short of GAM's expecta- tions, however, and cease-fire agreements had twice broken down when President Megawati declared Martial Law in Aceh in May 2003. The Indonesian security forces then embarked on the largest military operation since East Timor, with 40 000 military troops (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - TNI) and 12 000 national police (POLRI) present in Aceh, closing the province and severely affecting the living conditions of the Acehnese people (Tapol 2004). By the time the tsunami struck, this latest period of hostilities had displaced at least 125 000 persons (see Figure la; IOM 2004; Mahdi 2006a).

The contemporary Tamil secessionist conflict in Sri Lanka was also initiated in the mid-1970s, following failed negotiations over a federal system dividing power between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil populations, sectarian riots, and liberalization reforms supplanting a politics of redistribution between classes with one based on ethnicity (Stokke 1998; Wilson 1999; Hyndman 2003). The conflict escalated into civil war in 1983, opposing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against the Sinhalese- dominated Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), while also affecting Muslim communities (notably those evicted from LTTE-controlled territories in 1990). An estimated 60 000 lives were directly lost to the conflict until both parties agreed to a cease-fire in 2002. Despite a drastic reduction in the level of hostilities, an estimated 375 000 persons remained displaced by the conflict when the tsunami struck. Six districts in the north were largely under control of the LTTE, while another four in the northeast had significant LTTE presence (see Figures lb and 2b).

Against a background of civil war and widespread poverty, the 9.2 submarine earthquake and ensuing tsunami physically, materially and psychologically affected about two-thirds of the population in Aceh. An estimated 167 000 people died (or 4 per cent of Aceh's population) and about half a million people were displaced (BRR and International Partners 2005; Gol 2005; TEC 2006). Although the tsunami nearly exclusively affected Aceh and the neighbouring island of Nias, recently elected Indo- nesian President Yudhoyono declared the catastrophe a 'national disaster' on the following day, and called for 'those who are still fighting to come out




416 Philippe Le Billon and Arno Waizenegger (a) Aceh Displaced persons (b) Sri Lanka

Tsunami f Conflict Bireuen j laffna

Banda Aceh 3,7120 49,803; 20,333 Number of displaced persons (tsunami; conflict) 41,006; 63,801 49,921; 779 O Lhokseumawe Killinochchi

85,860; 3,472 Aceh Utara 1 Mulattivu

27,112; 20,894 20,000 40,000 80,000 oo22,557; 58,519 Bener

Meria-

648; 3M543 Circles are proportional Vavuniya Aceh Timur to total displaced persons 0; 38,950 Aceh Timur Mannar

Aceh Besar 13,709; 15,225 0; 30,613 Trincomalee 97,485; 2,929 Langsa 82,136; 19,465

6,156; 248 Anuradhapura Polonnaruwa 40,422; 11,290 Aceh Tamiang0;20,078 0; 3,173

."

3,224; 6,056 Batticaloa Aceh Barat

.

Puttalam 57,049; 20,451 72,689; 9,293 66; 46,528 Matale

Nagan Raya ( Aceh Tengahb Kurunegala 0; 2,761 17,040; 1,031 5,288; - 0; 3,188 Kegalle Kandy

Aceh Barat Daya " Gayo Lues 0; 41 0; 62 3,480; 1,247 *

.234; -

Gampaha Ampara Simeulue Aceh Tenggara 1,449; 2,319 127,623; 18,009; 0 611; 368 Colombo 8,402

Aceh Selatan 32,100; 2,928 16,148; 26,999 Badulla

SKalutara 0; 248 2935,053; 844 Ratnapura

"

9 1 0; 149 le HamanGalle ota 0 QA) Aceh Singkil 121,934; 569 a m n 24,742; 1,159 \ Matara 39,637; 108 8,755; 1,248

Figure la,b Conflict and post-tsunami population displacement per district Sources: la: Ramly (2005); ib: UNHCR (2005)

Uncleared area

(a) Aceh Percentage dead or (b) Sri Lanka (LTTE-controlled) Banda Aceh Sabang missing per district Jaffna 7?

_

Partially uncleared 68,356 133(0.5%) Lhokseumawe > 10 (0.54%) Killinochchi area (LTTE pockets) (26.0%) 200 (0.1%) 687 (0.5%)

Pidie Bener Meriah 01 - 09 Mulattivu 5,278 Bireuen Aceh Utara 132 (0-0.09 4,741 (3.4%)

Aceh Besar (0.1%) (0.3%) none Vavuniya 54,380 Aceh Timur 2,212 (1.6%) (1

8.0%) A2ehOTimur 52 (

Secessionist conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 417 400 I

c I wA

- Aceh -

S300 - -

Sri Lanka 0

VI-- . 0E 0) -

01

2 00- i

418 Philippe Le Billon and Arno Waizenegger In Sri Lanka, the 2002 cease-fire agreement had

suspended the 'mutually hurting stalemate' of civil war, but the focus of the peace process was placed on 'post-conflict' reconstruction and development rather than substantive negotiations over core political issues (Goodhand and Klem 2005). The immediate aftermath of the tsunami was characterized by 'good will' from the leadership on both sides and marked by spontaneous local cooperation between the GoSL and the LTTE forces (Uyangoda 2005a). Some belligerents even initially perceived the tsunami as a 'blessing in disguise',2 but hostilities escalated within a year (see Figure 3). The politicization of disaster relief also undermined the pre- existing, but already collapsing cease-fire agreement (Stokke 2005). Later negotiations resulted in the creation of a coordination mechanism 'independent' from both the Gol and GAM in the case of Aceh, while in Sri Lanka international NGOs channelled much of the aid in the absence of a joint-mechanism (Stokke 2006), and were later denied access to some areas due to renewed fighting.

Explaining divergent outcomes in Aceh and Sri Lanka Much of the divergence in conflict transformation between Aceh and Sri Lanka can be explained by the pre-disaster political and military context and its implications for disaster relief and peace negotiations. Indonesia was in the midst of a favourable process of democratization and decentralization. The disaster struck Aceh only three months after Yudhoyono's victory in Indonesia's first direct democratic presidential election, and the new leadership was committed to end the conflict, if possible through negotiations. In Sri Lanka, an older democracy remained in the stranglehold of a unitary and centralizing constitution, and both the Sinhalese coalition in power and LTTE frustrated the on-going peace process. Militarily, GAM was at its weakest following Martial Law and counterinsurgency. By the time the tsunami struck, GAM was already eager for a political exit (ICG 2005; Reid 2006; interviews 37 and 62). In contrast, the tsunami hit Sri Lanka after nearly three years of a cease-fire between the LTTE and the GoSL under the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), but the peace process had stalled. The LTTE also had to address increasing dissent, notably by the 'Karuna' faction in the east, and a return to war was politically expedient. Such

diverging political and military contexts help to explain different political outcomes in Aceh and Sri Lanka after the tsunami, but they do not explain if, and how, the disaster itself possibly transformed these conflicts. We now seek to do so by using the framework outlined above.

Governable space: military dimensions The spatiality of military control in Aceh largely determined the relative impact of the tsunami on the belligerents. The effects of the disaster heavily affected both the Gol security forces and GAM, but to a different degree and in different ways. TNI and POLRI were largely stationed in coastal areas and were more severely affected than GAM forces located in the hills, with 2698 security personnel killed against 70 GAM combatants (GoI 2005; interview 40). A hundred GAM members, among approximately 2000 jailed at the time, also drowned while in prison (Merikallio 2005). Yet GAM was militarily weakened after the death of up to one quarter of its combatants and many others leaving the province over the past two years (Reid 2006; interviews 4 and 62). Moreover, whereas the TNI could draw on its nation-wide resources, GAM's lines and support systems were further undermined by the disaster, and GAM's willingness to fight after the tsunami was also reduced psychologically (Prasodjo 2005).

Space continued to be ruled through the military following the tsunami. About 80 per cent of the TNI were initially redirected to humanitarian and security tasks, while 20 per cent continued combat operations against GAM (Laksamana 2005a; interview 4). Yet three weeks after the tsunami only 5 per cent of security forces were still officially assigned to the 'humanitarian' effort, mostly in highly media-visible Banda Aceh and as humanitarian military escorts (Davies 2005; Sukma 2006). The Gol also sent 6173 more troops to Aceh, a move interpreted by a US security analyst as guarantee- ing Yudhoyono the ability 'to clean [GAM] out ... if GAM does not agree to settle the problem peace- fully' (Roberts 2005). Indonesian military control of 'humanitarian space' in Aceh undermined GAM's ability to participate in relief, with Gol forces portraying GAM as a criminal and terrorist organization in order to undermine its legitimacy, justify continued counter-insurgency and control movements by relief agencies until the MoU was signed. GAM repeated its commitment to a cease-fire to facilitate aid provision, while denouncing repeated




assaults on their units by the TNI. Continued militarization also constrained GAM to the 'space of political negotiation' and reduced its bargaining power by further reducing its military leverage. The discursive impact of this violent territorialization of 'humanitarian space' was more ambivalent, however, with many aid organizations recognizing an historical pattern of military propaganda and coercion - thereby giving GAM greater political legitimacy for its negotiations with the Gol (Flor 2005; Laksamana 2005b).

While some in the LTTE initially perceived the tsunami as a 'blessing in disguise' that could consolidate a failing peace process, others in the GoSL perceived it as a military opportunity, wrongly assessing that the tsunami significantly weakened the LTTE (Uyangoda 2005a). To sum up, the tsunami weakened the military capacity of some of the belligerents but did not challenge military rule. Yet whereas GAM and the Gol seized the opportunity of a political exit negotiated under TNI 'military pressure', the Sri Lankan parties acted opportunistically, by seeking to improve their relative bargaining position by military means.

Governable space: socio-political dimensions Three major tsunami-related socio-political processes influenced the evolution of the Acehnese conflict following the tsunami: the moral imperative of peace, domestic political transformation and internationalization of conflict resolution. These three dimensions, in turn, transformed public discourse on, and governable space in Aceh. These were ambivalent processes, however, when considering that the victimization of the Acehnese as a result of a 'natural' disaster and the recasting of disaster as a 'historical opportunity' obscured questions of responsibility, impunity and political instrumentalization for Acehnese suffering.

The tsunami killed ten times more people in Aceh than three decades of conflict. Compassionate interpretations of this disaster and acts of solidarity transformed the Indonesian public discourse on Aceh from a space of threat and danger into one of 'national' commiseration and solidarity. A year before the tsunami, 50 per cent of Indonesians supported 'some form of military intervention in Aceh' (Valentino and Sharma 2003). Following the tsunami, a military 'solution' to the conflict became widely opposed by Indonesians and Acehnese. Indonesian television was full of tears and prayers, under such titles as 'Indonesia is Weeping' (Indonesia

Menangis), with prominent politicians and business tycoons opportunistically seizing this shift (see below).

The widespread interpretation of the tsunami as a divine act provided another moral dimension reshaping governable space in Aceh, giving impetus to end the conflict. In the words of an Acehnese aid worker, 'as followers of Islam, we believe that with every event, even more so a calamity, Allah always gives us a hikmah [lesson]; among other things, this is a way used by Him reminding us to return to the right path' (interview 38). According to Acehnese sociologist Humam Hamid, the second 'bitterness' brought upon people in Aceh by the tsunami might also help to overcome the 'first bitterness' of war, thereby contributing to reconcili- ation (Prasodjo and Hamid 2005). The implications of these moral arguments were that military means and conflict-related grievances had to be left behind. There remains the risk, however, that the tsunami adds to the victimization process of the Acehnese population, creating one more layer of 'martyrdom', especially in light of past government responsibility in their vulnerability.

The second socio-political dimension resulted from the interplay of Acehnese disaster victims and a 'democratizing' and 'decentralizing' Indonesian political and civil society. Victims in Aceh relied predominantly on other individuals for help, receiving minimal support from the government, NGOs or religious and community organizations in the first 48 hours, especially when compared to victims in Sri Lanka and India (Thomas and Rama- ligan 2005). Unsurprisingly, victims in Aceh were also the most dissatisfied with relief services in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami (IOM 2005). The catastrophic impact of the tsunami on many infrastructures and administrative organizations explains in part why many coastal areas in Aceh were 'ungovernable' in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. This collapse, however, also reflected the broader disorganization and competition within the post-Suharto bureaucracy (Aspinall 2005a), giving further impetus to demands of governance reforms in Aceh.

In contrast, Indonesian political leaders benefited from media reports of their handling of the crisis - with 83 per cent of Indonesians assessing the response of the GoI as 'good' or 'very good' - thereby contributing to their popularity (IFES 2005). Civil society groups, mostly from religious or business backgrounds, also (re)developed




420 Philippe Le Billon and Arno Waizenegger expressions of 'national' solidarity. Domestically, the tsunami thus transformed governable space in Aceh in two main ways. At the local level, the tsunami exposed the failings of a discredited and militarized rule by Indonesian authorities, calling for greater Acehnese autonomy. At the national level, the tsunami enabled the engagement of a more diverse and thriving civil and political society calling for enhanced Indonesian 'national' solidarity (Aspinall 2005a). This tension was in part expressed and addressed through the governable space negotiated under the MoU: that of a 'self-ruled' Aceh firmly remaining within a more 'democratic' and 'decentralized' Indonesia.

The third major dimension was the internationalization of the disaster response, which, beyond the disaster's scale, resulted from its mediatization and instrumentalization. The tsunami was a 'perfect media event' reaching international coverage equiva- lent to '9/11' during its first 45 days (Jones 2005). Like '9/11', the tsunami dwarfed other disasters in part because of the large number of 'white deaths' (Olds et al. 2005). Although few reports emphasized the conflict-related suffering of the Acehnese, international public sympathy affected the 'geopolitical' significance of the conflict and governance in the province. In turn, the GoI and GAM were put under greater pressure and scrutiny to achieve a negotiated end to war and efficiently manage relief and reconstruction (interview 4). Despite TNI's efforts at maintaining its rule over Aceh - in part due to weariness of an 'East Timor scenario' following foreign intervention - the disaster opened up political space within Aceh. Civil society and international relief organizations stepped into and broadened the governable space of 'civilian rule' between local populations and (military) rule from Jakarta (Tjhin 2005; Eye-on-Aceh and Aid Watch 2006; ICG 2006). The creation of an 'independent' Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR - Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi) not only secured more easily foreign assistance, but also insulated the Gol from conflicts induced by aid misallocation, mismanagement or fraud (Kuncoro and Resosudarmo 2006).

International presence was crucial to conflict transformation in Aceh, notably by providing GAM a favourable bargaining position and hopes of agreement implementation that could not be wasted. Before the agreement on the MoU, there was little sense that foreigners significantly improved the security of GAM members, while the Acehnese

feared that continued fighting could lead foreigners to leave. After the MoU, and in light of previous failures, many Acehnese feared that once foreigners departed 'suffering of the Acehnese will increase again' (Vltchek 2006). The presence and intents of foreigners nevertheless proved controversial, most notably with critics of opportunistic US and EU involvement, as well as religious proselytism by Christian organizations (Prasodjo 2005; Tjhin 2005; Sukma 2006). Critics denounced the 'self-interest' characterizing some of the international solidarity, notably the 'opportunistic use of Asian suffering by US leaders' (Glassman 2005, 169-70). Secretary of State Colin Powell publicly argued that disaster relief

dries up those pools of dissatisfaction that might give rise to terrorist activity ... [and] ... does give to the Muslim world ... an opportunity to see American generosity, American values in action ... [so that] ... value system of ours will be reinforced [in the region]. (Aljazeera 2005)

This exposure reportedly reduced opposition to the US and support for Osama bin Laden in Indonesia (Sukma 2006). The EU also sought to gain visibility as a 'world actor' capable of taking over large peace-building responsibilities in cooperation with other regional associations such as the ASEAN (interview 44). Hence, the disaster not only reshaped Aceh as a local and national governable space, it also enabled foreign actors - particularly the US, EU and IFIs - to more directly consolidate their governance of the 'borderlands', in this case a petroleum-rich and 'Muslim' province strategically located near the Malacca Straight.3

Socio-political setting differed between Aceh and Sri Lanka.4 Although there was little prospect for a rapid peaceful settlement of the conflict in Aceh before the disaster, many expected that conflict in Sri Lanka would shortly resume (Ganguly 2004). No progress had been made towards bringing flexibility to the unitarist Sri Lankan constitution, thereby making any power-sharing agreement unconstitutional - including that necessary for aid allocation (see below) (Uyangoda 2005b). Rather, political discourses of homeland 'purity' and the necessity of force and a state of exception against the ethno-religious 'rogue others' remained prevalent in political discourses despite the official cease-fire (Korf 2006). Moreover, while popular support for GAM in Aceh had receded after the failure to obtain a referendum for independence and the imposition of martial law, support for the LTTE in



Secessionist conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 421 the North had remained relatively strong (Human Rights Watch 1999; Orjuela 2003). On the government side, decade-long president Chandrika Kumaratunga was succeeded in November 2005 by her former Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse, who took a harder line against the LTTE (Ratnayake 2004).

The political consequences of the tsunami also diverged significantly. In Aceh, many civil society organizations focused their activity on political issues, including human rights, freedom of speech and organization, as well as self-government, with the encouragement of foreign agencies and tacit acceptance of the Gol and GAM. The legal authori- zation of regional, rather than nation-wide, political parties in Indonesia also constituted a precedent that many Indonesian provinces want to emulate, thereby consolidating demand for decentralization. In comparison, on-going rights-based work and political activities were reported as more severely repressed in Sri Lanka (TEC 2005), and a pattern of political assassination started in 2006.

At an international level, both Aceh and Sri Lanka received attention and relatively similar levels of international assistance (TEC 2006). The tsunami, however, provided a 'new' opportunity for peace-building in Aceh, especially so for the European Union, while in Sri Lanka, the involvement of the Norwegian-led peace process was already approaching its third year, without political progress. Latter negotiations since the disaster have all stalled and the EU's threat of listing the LTTE as a 'terrorist' organization in May 2006 jeopardized the Norwegian-led cease-fire monitoring mission (SLMM) as the LTTE demanded the withdrawal of all EU monitors and refused further negotiations in June 2006. The SLMM also contrasted with the AMM through its numbers and mandate. Covering a roughly similar area, SLMM's monitors numbered 65 compared with a 226 person strong monitoring force including both EU and ASEAN officers tasked with a much broader mandate relating to the MoU implementation and better adapted to deal with conflict and disaster issues (Sundberg and Vestergren 2005).

Governable space: socio-economic dimensions The tsunami had major socio-economic effects on Aceh. Productive losses were estimated at US$1.2 billion and reconstruction needs (including upgrades) at about US$7 billion, with assistance pledges reached $8.8 billion (BRR and International Partners 2005; Mahdi 2006b). This burden and the

benefits of reconstruction were not equally shared amongst the Acehnese, with those on northern and western coastal areas being the most heavily affected. Balancing tsunami losses and windfalls is a precarious exercise, with high risks of corruption, unfair allocations and mismanagement, potentially aggravating the conflict given its economic dimensions (Ross 2003; Athukorala and Resosudarmo forthcoming). More optimistic scenarios hoped that the disaster would provide the opportunity for 'rebuilding a better Aceh', and improve governance (World Bank 2005). Overall, the economic dimensions of the tsunami did contribute to promoting a resolution of the conflict, notably by offering major business and political opportunities for the local and some national elites that rely in part on peace to be sustained, while reducing (but not ending) TNI's lucrative activities (Schulze 2004; Reid 2006).5

Allegations of fraud and corruption in reconstruction projects, along with inflation, poverty and inequalities, are exacerbating grievances and tensions (Diani 2006; Eye-on-Aceh and Aid Watch 2006). Wealthier and more educated people have benefited from reconstruction, while many of the poorest mostly bear induced costs such as inflation (Oxfam 2005; Athukorala and Resosudarmo forthcoming). Demonstrations in front of the BRR office have repeatedly raised these issues and politically sensitive variations in the geography of aid allocation have contributed to grievances (Acehkita 2006). Problems relating to land and ownership also constitute a major difficulty and potential source of conflict. In addition, exclusionary and top-down practices and approaches in the design and implementation of projects (e.g. hous- ing) have led to disempowerment, frustration and anger against implementing agencies and donors (Eye-on-Aceh and Aid Watch 2006).

As noted above, there was a stronger and more divisive politicization of aid and disaster mitigation policies in Sri Lanka than Aceh. Prior to the tsunami, donors had politicized their assistance by making it conditional upon progress in the peace process (Goodhand and Klem 2005; Sriskandarajah 2005). The 'peace conditionality' imposed on US$4.5 billion pledged in June 2003, however, had failed to influence the political decisions of the GoSL and the LTTE (Uyangoda 2005b). This strategy further collapsed as a massive influx of unconditional aid reached Sri Lanka following the tsunami, but aid politicization remained. About 70 per cent of the dead or missing (which included




422 Philippe Le Billon and Arno Waizenegger an estimated 7000 Muslims) were located in predominantly Tamil areas, and up to 30 per cent in areas under LTTE control - a contested figure since the GoSL was in control of 'cleared' coastal strips in several districts otherwise controlled by the LTTE such as Batticaloa (PDMIN 2005). Relief and reconstruction assistance was politicized through accusations of GoSL discriminating against Tamil victims of the tsunami. On one side, devastation in LTTE-controlled areas slowed down relief provision as the GoSL set up a centralized relief mechanism and opposed any bypassing of its authority (Uyan- goda 2005a). On the other, the LTTE requested more direct control of foreign assistance, and thereby political recognition. A joint mechanism agreement to share US$2.5 billion of foreign aid was reached after six months of delay and its territorial application restricted to tsunami-affected areas within a 2-kilometre-wide coastal strip in the six districts under (partial) LTTE control. The agreement triggered a major political crisis in government and was blocked by a defecting coalition party through Supreme Court suspension on grounds of partial unconstitutionality (Uyangoda 2005b).

Disaster mitigation and prevention policies also proved controversial and politicized, most notably the initial Buffer Zone policy creating 'exclusion zones' of 200 metres from the shoreline in the East and North (Tamil areas) and 100 metres in the South (Siriwardhana et al. 2005). Buffer zones were perceived as discriminative and punishing mostly Tamil coastal populations, even though the LTTE at one point advocated for an even wider buffer zone (Uyangoda 2005b; Hyndman forthcoming). In short, spaces of relief and reconstruction in Sri Lanka were deeply and antagonistically politicized, both parties fearing that letting the other side territorialize 'its' aid would undermine their broader political struggle. Unlike GAM, LTTE's pre-tsunami territorial control gave it the capacity to territorialize rules of relief provision and reconstruction within its areas, while the GoSL was able to do so with the rest of the country and to some extent in its dealings with the international donor community. It is argu- ably in response to the failure of territorializing an alternative 'sovereign' and truly 'humanitarian' space that the logic of war ultimately prevailed.

Conclusion

The tsunami was an undeniably tragic 'window of opportunity' for conflict transformation in Aceh

and Sri Lanka. This paper confirmed that pre- disaster political trends were crucial in shaping the divergent conflict outcomes of this disaster, but it also pointed at the impacts of the disaster itself and their spatial dimensions. Rapid and lasting transition to peace would have been less likely in Aceh without the tsunami, even if GAM was at its weakest militarily and both parties were seeking to end the conflict in a context of democratization and decentralization (Ellwein 2003; Aspinall 2005b 2005c). Pre-disaster political transformation was necessary for this transition to occur, but democracy in Indonesia may not have been already powerful enough to bring about peace, notably because of the marginalization of civil society and autonomy of the army (Mietzner 2006; Tornquist 2006; Abidin Kusno, pers. com. 2006). In turn, sustained peace in Aceh will be an indicator of Indonesia's performance in its transition to democracy (Prasodjo 2005), and more research is required to assess the impact of the tsunami disaster on Indonesian politics. In contrast, the escalation of political violence in Sri Lanka was likely, even in the absence of the tsunami. Nationalist interpretations and calculations around the tsunami further undermined an already failing peace process, as the GoSL and LTTE reasserted 'exclusive' sovereignties over contested territories, thereby accelerating a return to war. These divergent political outcomes, we suggest, reflected different representations of the disaster and the calculations of belligerent parties, as well as the specific spatialities of the 'dual disasters' of war and tsunami (Roosa 2005; Hyndman forthcoming).

Although both conflicts in Aceh and Sri Lanka are secessionist, the geographies of the conflicts were different. At the time the tsunami struck, the LTTE, or some of its factions, was in control of several districts where it ran a de facto government. In contrast, GAM was confined to remote forest areas and had lost much of the governing capacity it had gained prior to the imposition of martial law. The geography of the disaster was also distinct. In Indonesia the tsunami mostly affected Aceh and the Acehnese, while in Sri Lanka it affected about two- thirds of the coastal areas of the country and all three major ethno-religious communities. In return, these two characteristics influenced the geography of aid provision and the dynamics of the conflict.

Whereas the LTTE leveraged this territorial control to consolidate claims of 'sovereignty' over Tamil Eelam by demanding a direct channelling of



Secessionist conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 423 international aid through its administration, GAM was unable to territorialize aid delivery for such political advantage. The challenge to Indonesian sovereignty over Aceh thus remained confined to political negotiations with GAM, and engagements with domestic civil society and international relief organizations. In Sri Lanka, despite an initial consensus for cooperation at the local level and between the Sri Lankan President and LTTE, party politics and nationalist agendas quickly challenged the exclusive sovereignty of both parties, as well as the marginalization of the Muslim community. Both governable space and public discourse reflected these tensions. In Aceh public discourses of compassion and solidarity remained dominant in Acehnese and Indonesian politics, and governable space was reshaped through 'civilianized' and reformed territorial practices and institutions, especially after the MoU. The disaster created a context within which both GAM and the Gol compromised on a political exit to the conflict, while international scrutiny created a favourable environment for its negotiation and implementation. In Sri Lanka, sectarian public discourses long promoted by nationalist parties were exacerbated, and governance was once again territorialized through physical violence.

Disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami not only create a historical necessity for facilitating relief provision and opportunity for negotiating peace, they also challenge the discourses and practices of belligerents through the material impacts, institutional changes and moral interpretations brought about by the devastation. As such, disasters reshape 'governable spaces' within which the legitimacy, sovereignty and impunity of belligerents are transformed, if only momentarily. International relief and civil society responses, for example, influence the territorialities of belligerent parties, by opening-up political and public spaces. This reshaping of the spatiality of conflicts, as a function of disaster-related perceptions and activities, remains highly contingent upon the political context, interpretations, and calculations of belligerents and intervening parties. In this respect both Aceh and Sri Lanka confirm the two main arguments in the literature: disasters can foster political change, and change largely reflects the context in which disasters take place. The politicization of overlapping or disjointed geographies of war, disaster and relief can exacerbate conflict, for example through discriminatory processes of disaster

mitigation. The transformation of public discourse on conflict-affected areas through the disaster may strengthen 'political will' for peace by 'humanizing' the enemy and its territory. But it can also reinvigorate sectarian interpretations and nationalist calculations of suffering and injustice. These ambivalent effects imply the need for context-sensitive interventions in disaster-struck and conflict-affected regions.

Acknowledgements We would like to thank the Aceh Institute, AcehKita and PDRM for valuable print sources and research assistance, Renate Korber, Klaus Schreiner and Tim Bunnell for accommodation, Eric Leinberger for graphics, and Karen Bakker, Abidin Kusno, Jim Glassman, Jennifer Hyndman, Potter Pitman, Jon Tinker, as well as four referees for their comments on earlier drafts. Hampton grant (University of British Columbia) and the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada supported this research.

Notes 1 Father Severi, cited in http://www.cathnews.com/

news/508/100.php (Accessed 15 February 2007). 2 Seevarathnam Puleedevan, Secretary General of the

LTTE Peace Secretariat, 22 November 2005, cited in Sundberg and Vestergren (2005, 45).

3 See, for example, Luft and Korin (2004), published in Foreign Affairs a few weeks before the tsunami and associating al-Qaeda threat and GAM 'piracy'.

4 Religious difference between the vast majority of Tamils (i.e. Hinduism), Sinhalese (i.e. Buddhism) and Muslims is noted but falls beyond the scope of this study.

5 Negotiations led by Kalla with GAM prior to the tsunami had already mostly focused on economic incentives and an amnesty for GAM members (ICG 2005; Schulze 2005).

6 Two datasets are used for Aceh: 2000 to December 2004: Koalisi HAM, Crimes against humanity journal in Aceh, pers. com. 2006 (figures probably underesti- mated); January 2005 to August 2006: Clark (2006). Sri Lanka: SAIR (2006). Figures for 2000 to 2003 are annual monthly average.

Methodology note The study included 62 formal interviews conducted in English or Bahasa Indonesia in Aceh (Banda Aceh and cities on the east coast), as well as in Medan, Singapore and Vancouver between May




424 Philippe Le Billon and Arno Waizenegger and September 2006, with a broad range of informants selected for their role as participants or observers in conflict transformation. Voices remained 'elitist' and 'masculine' (58), reflecting in part the gender bias of the peace process in Aceh itself (Felten-Biermann 2006). These included representa- tives of Acehnese and Indonesian civil society organizations (13), provincial and national tsunami- related government agencies (5), political movements including GAM (14), foreign governments and international agencies (12), and Acehnese academics (9) and journalists (5). Informal discussions were also held with 'ordinary' people, and four formal interviews conducted with tsunami-affected fisher- men and plantation workers. Interviews focused on perceptions of conflict transformation, with a focus on tsunami-related factors, and used open-ended questions tailored to the background and mandate of informants. Only 26 interviews were taped due to self-censorship concerns. The study focused on Aceh, and interviews were not conducted in Sri Lanka for budgetary and security reasons. The comparative part of the analysis thus draws on secondary sources, including international and domestic media and policy reports, as well as academic literature.

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Issue Table of ContentsTransactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 279-438Front MatterPapersFluvial Geomorphology and Semiotics: A Wittgensteinian Perspective of the 'Divide' between Human and Physical Geography [pp. 279-294]Circulating Economic Geographies: Citation Patterns and Citation Behaviour in Economic Geography, 1982-2006 [pp. 295-312]Islamic Banking and Finance: Postcolonial Political Economy and the Decentring of Economic Geography [pp. 313-330]Expatriate Experts and Globalising Governmentalities: The New Zealand Diaspora Strategy [pp. 331-345]Environmental Movements in Space-Time: The Czech and Slovak Republics from Stalinism to Post-Socialism [pp. 346-362]How Awkward Encounters Could Influence the Future Form of Many Gardens [pp. 363-376]Regulatory Risk and Farmers' Caution with Pesticides in Costa Rica [pp. 377-394]Stories around Food, Politics and Change in Poland and the Czech Republic [pp. 395-410]Peace in the Wake of Disaster? Secessionist Conflicts and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami [pp. 411-427]

CommentaryBattleground Geographies and Conspiracy Theories: A Response to Johnston (2006) [pp. 428-434]On Duplicitous Battleground Conspiracies [pp. 435-438]

Back Matter

peace in the wake of disaster secessionist conflicts and the 2004 indian ocean tsunami

Documents

aceh hostilities

indian ocean tsunami

wake of disaster

liu institute

indian ocean tsunamiauthors

indian ocean glassman

armed conflicts

preexisting conflicts