《释量论·成量品研究》英文概要.pdf

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<释量论·成量品>研究》英文概要 木村俊彦 1 / 陈龙 2 In the field of the history of Indian philosophy, we are enjoying the results of previous scholars’ textual publications. In addition to many Brahmanical texts, several Buddhist philosophical treatises were dramatically brought to India in photo-copies by Pt. Sānkrityāyana from Tibetan temples,and published in comparison with other sources from Jaina temples and Nepal temples by Sānkrityā, Malvania,Thakur and other scholars, many of them concerning Dharmakīrti (c.600-660). In particular, the text and comm. entaries of his magnum opus, the prmān avarttikam, have been presented to world academic circle, so we are now able to progress in the sudy of Dharmakīrti’s philosoph. 在印度哲学史之领域,我们正受益于前辈学者出版物的成果。除了大量的婆罗门文献外, 一些佛教哲学的影印本引人注目地被 Pt. Sānkrityāyana 从西藏寺庙传入了印度,同时, Sānkrityā, Malvania,Thakur 以及其他学者也出版了一些佛教哲学文献用以和来源于耆那教 寺庙和尼泊尔寺庙的文献进行比较。其绝大部分都是关于法称菩萨(DharmakIrti)的著作。 值得注意的是,法称的巨著《释量论》(prmANavArttikam)也已广为国际学界所知悉,因此, 现在我们才能在法称哲学研究领域有所进展。 The study of the prmān avarttikam, one of the most difficult text of Indian philosoph, has only started in recent years. This book is composed of four chapter corresponding to four fields of philosobhy, viz. the first: logics, the second: religious philosophy, the third: epistemology, the fourth: dialectics. As such, there is the tendency in the academical circle to treat each chapter separately according to schcolars’ interests as we ourselves. The second chapter has the peculiar character of having a religious and practical system by a great logician such as Dharmakīrti. For this reason we would like to study this content through the textual analysis of the Pramān asiddhi chapter by the help of the commentaries. 《释量论》是印度哲学最困难的文献之一,其研究仅开始于最近几年。全书有四个组成 部分,相应的分为四个哲学板块,亦即第一部分:逻辑;第二部分:宗教哲学;第三部分: 认识论;第四部分:辩证法。 3 因此,按照学者们的学术研究兴趣也就相应地在学术圈形成 了四块研究领域。《释量论》的第二部分是法称作为伟大的逻辑学家具有宗教与实践体系的 最独特的贡献,为此之故,我们凭借注释的帮助通过对《成量品》章节的文本分析来探讨其 内容。 1 木村俊彦(1940— ),日本著名的法称研究专家,1941 8 26 日生于京都,1961 年东北大学文学部 毕业,1973—1977 任东北大学文学部讲师,兼任编外梵语教师,1976—1981 任正眼短期大学副教授, 1981 年后任东海女子大学副教授。发表论文 20 余篇,出版译著《梵语文学史——古印度宗教文献概说》 (山喜房佛书林 1975 年版),1981 年由东京木耳社出版《法称宗教哲学之原典研究》,全书由《序论》 (介绍法称之生平、法称著作梵文、藏文本简介、法称研究之历史)、《本论》(依梵藏文本将《释量论·成 量品》全部译述为日文)、《附篇》(法称《正理滴论法上注》全本的日文译述)三部分构成,该书是日 本学界法称研究划时代的著作,本文所译即是该书的英文概要。 2 陈龙(1976—),贵州大学人文学院中文系讲师。 3 此是用西洋概念进行“格义”的说法,实质即是“为自比量品”、“定量品”、“现量品”、“为他比 量品”。——译者注

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    In the field of the history of Indian philosophy, we are enjoying the results of previous

    scholars textual publications. In addition to many Brahmanical texts, several Buddhist

    philosophical treatises were dramatically brought to India in photo-copies by Pt. Snkrityyana

    from Tibetan temples,and published in comparison with other sources from Jaina temples and

    Nepal temples by Snkrity, Malvania,Thakur and other scholars, many of them concerning

    Dharmakrti (c.600-660). In particular, the text and comm. entaries of his magnum opus, the

    prmnavarttikam, have been presented to world academic circle, so we are now able to progress in the sudy of Dharmakrtis philosoph.

    Pt. Snkrityyana Snkrity, Malvania,Thakur DharmakIrtiprmANavArttikam

    The study of the prmnavarttikam, one of the most difficult text of Indian philosoph, has only started in recent years. This book is composed of four chapter corresponding to four fields of

    philosobhy, viz. the first: logics, the second: religious philosophy, the third: epistemology, the

    fourth: dialectics. As such, there is the tendency in the academical circle to treat each chapter

    separately according to schcolars interests as we ourselves. The second chapter has the peculiar

    character of having a religious and practical system by a great logician such as Dharmakrti. For

    this reason we would like to study this content through the textual analysis of the Pramnasiddhi chapter by the help of the commentaries.

    3

    11940 1941 8 26 1961 19731977 19761981 1981 20 1975 1981 2 1976 3

  • Dharmakrti theory of religious philosophy has not been fully understood, because there has

    been logical and epistemological appreciation to Dharmakrti together with the lack of the study of

    the Pramnasiddhi chapter of the prmnavarttikam. But when we are confronted by the critique on the proofs of the God iva used by Naiyyikas, we could understand its unique

    position in Indian philosophy. The critiques by Buddhist philosophers continued until the last days

    of Buddhism in India, thereafter also the Naiyyikas tried proofs of the God. Pramnasiddhih means the proof (siddih) of the Buddhas authority (pramnam), and Dharmakrti discusses against all other sects, especially the of the ivaism of the Naiyyikas, the Vedism of the Mmmsakas, and the asceticism of Jainas. In the course of the testifications, he talks the practical philosophy of Buddhism, and connects it with five epithets of the Buddha, that is, pramnabhtah, jagaddhitaisi, st, sugatah and tyi. These epithets were sung by the great Buddhist logician Dignga (c.480-540) in the verse of namaskra

    in his Pramnasamuccayh, viz.pramnabhtya jagaddhitaisine pranamya stre sugatya tyine / pramnasiddhyai svamatt samuccayah karisyate viprasrtd ihaikatah //(Saluting Him, who is the Authoritative Being, the Merciful One, the Teacher, the

    Well-Gone-One, the Protector, I shall compose this compilation from my various papers for the

    establishment of cognitional means.)

    Naiyyikas(pramnam)(siddih)ivaismMmmsakasVedismpramn abhtah jagaddhitaisistsugatah tyi(C.480-540)4 pramnabhtya jagaddhitaisine pranamya stre sugatya tyine / pramnasiddhyai svamatt samuccayah karisyate viprasrtd ihaikatah //

    The chapter name,pramnasiddhih, might be accepted from the words of this verse. Dharmakrti took the form of review (vrttikm) on these epithets, but enlarged the meaning of the

    words according to his system. For example, he uses the word pramnm as also pramnabhtah . Thus the chapter name pramnaiddbhih will be understood easily as meaning the proof of the authority ness of the Buddha.

    4 1982 1

  • pramnmpramnabhtah

    The last four epithets serve to testify to the Pramnabhta-ness . As such, the word pramnaiddbhih denotes that the chief thesis of this chapter is to prove the Pramnabhta-ness of the Buddha.

    Pramnabhta-nesspramnaiddbhih

    Accordingly the logical and epistemological system of Dharmakrti plays a great part, so that,

    we have appended the full Japanese translation of the Nyyabinduh of Dharmakrti and its

    commentary by Dharmottara. This is the first full Japanese translation based on Malvanias edition

    and Durvekamiras sub-commentary (TSW. Vol.2). Our book comprises the following contents

    and general comment about the history of the studies on Dharmakrti: (1) The Krik text

    comparing Snkritynas edition in the appendix of JBORS. Vol.24 Pts.1-2 to Bhs ya edition(TSWS.Vol.1), and Vrtti editions (JBORS. Vol.24 Pt.3-, and BBS.1) as well as the Tibetan translation(Derge ed.); (2)Japanese translation based on three commentaries by Devendrabuddhi(Derge ed.), Prajkaragupta(TSWS.Vol.1)and

    Manorathanandin(BBS.1); (3)its interpretation based on commentaries and other texts of Indian

    philosophies; (4)sectional division according to the content of this chapter.

    NyyabinduhDharmottara Malvania Durvekamira [=TSW5] 21Krik Snkrityna -=JBORS6 24 12 []= Pramnavarttikakrik BhASya =TSWS 1 []= Pramnavarttikabhsyam VRtti - 24 3 = BBS7 1 []= Pramnavarttikavrtti2 Devendrabuddhi=Prajkaragupta= Manorathanandin=834

    The summary of the content of the Pramnasiddhi chapter is as follows. (1) Definition of cognition(v.1a)9

    5 TSW= Tibetatn Sanskrit Work Series 6 JBORS= Journal of the Bihal and Orissa Research Society 7 BBS=Bauddha Bharati Series 8 =Pramnavarttika-Vrtth= Pramnavarttikabhsyam= Pramnavarttika-Vrtth 9 V prmnavarttika-Vrttih(JBORS. vol.24 Pt.3vol.26

  • 1(v.1a) pramnm is defined as valid cognition, and valid means to have a real object which has

    its functional ability. These argument are in connection with the Buddhas epithet pramnabhtah.

    pramnmvalid cognitionvalidpramnabhtah

    (1a)Cognition to language(v.1b-2)

    (1a) (v.1b-2)

    The cogonition concerning language as its object is very limited in reference to validness.

    This communicates really only the consciousness of narrators. The metaphysics of language will

    be stated afterwards, but we can ascertain that Dharmakirtis argument about language is against

    the Vedism of the Mimamsakas and other Brahmancial sects, which assert that the language of the

    Vedas are absolute and eternal.

    (1b)General remarks on cognition(v.3-6)

    (1b)(v.3-6) The cognition in daily life consists of consciousness having an image in accordance with the

    present object. This cognition has a definite object which is not yet cognized, and the already

    cognized object which has an universal character is considered to be unreal.

    (1c)The authoritativeness of the Buddha(v.7-9)

    (1c)(v.7-9) Religiously speaking, the Buddha is the pramna. pramnm means here religious authority.

    The author says that the epithet pramnabhtah means authority arisen in the world, and the authority arisen will perish, and is nonaternal. This thesis is against that of the Vedism an ivaism

    which argue pramnm to be eternal. Dharmakrti standpoint which is contrary to them is authorized by the theory of momentousness of real objects.

    pramnmpramnabhtah

    (2) Critique of the proof of the God iva 2 The Naiyyikas in the latter half of the 6th century attempted the proof of the God iva as the

    Creator of this world from the standpoint of the Pupata sect. Dharmakrti refutes them out of his

    Pt.3 ed. by R. SnkritynaPatna 19381940)V

  • logical standpoint. Especially, the imperfection of the major premise is criticized; because the

    concept of the Creator is ambiguous, whether it means the God immortal or men mortal. On

    details, see my article sakalajagadvidhtranumnam ()(JIBS.xx-1) p.500-501 6 NaiyyikasPupata sect10

    =sakalajagadvidhtranumnam[=JIBS=Journal of India and Buddhist StudiesTokyo]-1 500-501

    (2a)Logics and language(v.17-20)

    2a(v.17-20) In relation to the critique of the proofs of the God, the correct employment of reason is advised.

    E.g death (maranam) stated by the Jainas on the trees is not given approval by the Buddhists, who define death as the destruction of the consciousness (vijnam ). Thus it cannot been used

    as reason for psyches (jivh) of the tree.

    Jainas(vijnam )(jivh)

    (2b)Critique of the concept of the Creator(v.21-28)

    (2b)(v.21-28)

    The concept of the Creator which is seen in the Pupata theology is criticized here generally.

    According to Dharmakrtis metaphysics, the ability to effect should exist in momentous beings.

    Eternal beings such as God cannot effect at all, because he is constant and does not have any

    operational function.

    Pupata sect

    (3) Critique of the Vedism of the Mmmsakas(v.29-33) 3(v.29-33) Dharmakrti refutes the Vedas anthority which the Mmm sakas school and other

    Brahmanical schools advocate. He believes that the anthority of salvation from earthly miseries

    becomes pramnm for the suffering beings. And the Four Noble Truths for salvation are extolled.

    (4) Argument of the transmigration(v.34-62) 4(v.34-62)

    10 1994 358

  • From this section the comment on the Merciful One must being, but really the

    transmigration (samsrah) is argued against the materialists (the Crvkas). Because, if the transmigration be impossible, men will abandon the exercise of mercy etc. for its non-sense.

    (samsrah)(the Crvkas)[]

    (4a)Arising and annihilation without cause(v.63-72)

    (4a) (v.63-72)

    A real thing arises without any cause and annihilates without any cause. Thus momentous

    existences follow regularly and stream (santnah). This formula proves that the mind (not psyche)

    does not rely upon the body, and does not so decay as the body.

    (4b)Argument of the transmigration, contd(v.73-83)

    (4b)(v.73-83)

    The self-attachment is the motive for the migration to the next existence. The materialist think

    that the healthy body gives rise to the mind with attachment, bit it proves only that the mind has

    the body as its object through the medium of the kya-vijnam.

    kya-vijnam

    (4c)The refutation to the Naiyyikas thesis(v.84-89)

    (4c)Naiyyikas (v.84-89)

    Here the so-called avayavin-thesis of the Naiyyikas is refuted, and the mind is denied to be

    the part (avayavah) of the body. Naiyyikasavayavin-thesis11

    (4d)The refutation to the Vaiesikas thesis(v.90-102) (4d)VaiZeSika(v.90-102)

    The Vaiesika think that the substance has many qualities (gunh) by way of the function of union (samavyah). But Dharmakrti criticizes it from the contradiction in their thesis that a guna cannot have other gunas. The sour milk already has the guna of gathering (of atoms). He himself

    interprets universal qualities from the standpoint of his apoha-theory. Man recognizes one denial

    11 1994 211

  • of other qualities (anypohah).

    apoha-theory12anypohah

    (4e)The argument of the transmigration, contd(v.103-119)

    (4e)(v.103-119)

    The impulse of the transmigration is the previous mind, especially the action (karma) from the

    self-attachment. Therefrom the mind (not psyche) takes the body and goes into the transmigration

    (samsrah). Thus the Crvkas view that the material is the principle of the world and the other world does not exist is denied.

    (karma)(samsrah)

    (4f)Original purity of mind(v.120-131a)

    (4f)(v.120-131a)

    In the section the original purity of the mind which is the thesis of the Mahayana Buddhism is

    argued If man realizes the cultivation of mind, he may exclude many hinderances to the original

    purity and will no more return to dirtiness. The renowned thesis prabhsvaram idam cittam prakrty / gantavo malh/ is stated by Dharmakrti.

    prabhsvaram idam cittam prakrty / gantavo malh/

    (5)The Teacher-ness of the Buddha(v.131b-138)

    (5)(v.131b-138) The author comments upon the third epithet of the Buddha mentioned by Dignga. The

    Buddha strives to set people in the direction of sufferinglessness, for he is the Merciful One. Thus

    he knows the path for the removal of suffering and the other three Noble Truths. Therefore he is

    called the Teacher (st). The path for the removal of suffering is the abandoning of

    self-attachment, so people must exert the unselfishness.

    12 Apohaapoha-parksa pariccheda apoha

  • (st)

    (6)The Well-Gone-One-ness of the Buddha(v.139-145a)

    (6)(v.139-145a)

    The three meanings of the epithet, the Wall-Gone-One (sugatah) by Dignga are here commented by the standpoint of Dharmakrti. That is, the Buddha is so called because of his lack

    of selfishness, attachment and action.

    (7)The Protector-ness of the Buddha(v.145b-146)

    (7)(v.145b-146)

    He is called the Protector, because he preaches the path (mrgah) for the removal of suffering.

    The Protector (tyi) who is awakened to the Four Noble Truths is understood to be the

    Authoritative One (pramnabhtah).

    (8) The Truth of suffering(v.147-176a)

    (8) (v.147-176a) From this section, Dharmakrti argues the practical system of Buddhism. Its central principle is

    the Four Noble Truths (ryasatyacatustayam), so considers Dharmakrti, and divides the content according to these themes. The five parts (paca-skandhh) of beings are suffering, because of

    exerting of attachment and other mental functions which are sinful (dosh).

    (ryasatyacatustayam)(ryasatyacatustayam)13

    (8a)Four characters of the Truth of suffering(v.176b-179a)

    (8a)(v.176b-179a)

    The non-eternality (anityah), suffering (duhkham), nothing-ness (nyat) and non-self (nairtmyam), which are the primary theses of Buddhism, are commented upon as the four

    characters of the Truth of suffering, and considered from the standpoint of the system of

    Dharmakrti.

    (anityah)(duhkham)(nyat)

    (9) The Truth of the cause of suffering(v.179b-190a)

    (9)(v.179b-190a)

    13 1994 128

  • The cause of suffering is the attachment to life (bhava-vch).This selfishness plays more

    important part than ignorance (avidy) and action in transmigration. He comments the renowned

    passage the gama, yyam tanh ponabhavik nandirt-gasahagatt tatra tatrtbhinandim / seyyathidam kmatanh bhavatanh vibhavatanh / .

    bhava-vch yyam tanh ponabhavik nandirt-gasahagatt tatra tatrtbhinandim / seyyathidam kmatanh bhavatanh vibhavatanh / .

    (10)The Truth of non-suffering(v.190b-205a)

    The attainment of non-suffering is possible by the annihilation of the cause of suffering. The

    self-consciousness which is the main cause of suffering and transmigration cannot be annihilated

    by the egoist, but is not troublesome according to our standpoint where the constant psyche (tm)

    is not approved.

    (11)The Truth of cause of non-suffering(v.205b-211a)

    As we have already stated, the Teacher instructs us in the application of the path to

    non-suffering. The practice of non-selfishness depends on mind. The mind (cittam=vij nam) is

    originally luminous one (prabhsvaram) as the Mahyna stras states, and will degrade no more,

    if it can attain such a state.

    (cittam=vij nam)

    (11a)Selfishness and transmigration(v.211b-251a)

    (11a)(v.211b-251a)

    Sins are caused by the main cause called self-attachment (tmasnehah), and they differ

    mutually. We can annihilate them by the destruction of the main cause. The ascetic practice such

    as yogins do cannot destroy the self-attachment.

    tmasnehah

    (11b)Non-selfishness and emancipation(v.251b-258a)

    (11b)(v.251b-258a)

    The Buddha declared that the ascetic practice is indispensable for emancipation. For he

    depends on the standpoint that all arise depending on others as causes (pratyayotpattih), therefore we suffer. That is, the world stands on the causality (pratityasamutpdah).

    He ultimately teaches us non-selfishness as the fundamental principle of emancipation, so says

    Dharmakrti.

  • (pratityasamutpdah)

    (11c) Critique of the Vaiesika system of salvation(v.258b-270a) The Ritualism of Brahmanism declared by the Vaiesika is criticized here. Sins cannot

    be decreased by such rituals (diks) because of the sacrificers selfish mind, and the latter causes sins and next life.

    (11d)Critique of Jaina practice(v.270b-280)

    (11d)(v.270b-280)

    The Jainas endeavour to practice asceticism, and aim to annihilate karmans. But karmans are

    various, so that, cannot be annihilated only by stereotyped asceticism. The primary cause of

    karmans is the self-attachment.

    karmans

    (12)Summarization of the authenticity of the Buddha(v.281-286)

    12

    Thus the authoritativeness of the Buddha is proved, for he teaches us the way of the

    annihilation of suffering, and we can understand him as the Protector, then as the Well-Gone-One,

    the Teacher, and as the Merciful One. Finally we understand him as the Authoritative One

    (pramnabhtah). Epistemologically also, he can intuit very well and moreover he shows excellent proofs (anumnam), e.g. what has arisen will inevitably decay. Viz. he proved that all

    beings will decay and are non-eternal from the ground that they occurred. This provement

    (ksanikatvnumnam) is tried by Buddhist logicians after Dharmakrti. It is very notable that the passage of the Pli gama, yam kici samudayadhamman tam sabbam nirodhadhamman ti , is cited in Sanskrit as the argument of the Buddha stating the major premise (vyptih) of the

    proof of impermanence. This proof continued to be refined by later Buddhist logicians.

    (pramnabhtah)(anumnam)yam kici samudayadhamman tam sabbam nirodhadhamman ti

    Dignga himself is a mentalist (vijaptivdi), and declared that yad abhasam prameyam tat

    pramanaphalate punah / grahakakarasamvitti trayam natah prthakkrtam / in his Pramn

  • asamuccayah,10. Dharmakrti accepted this Yogcra thesis in the Pratyaksa chapter of the Pramn avrttikam stating that avibhgo pibuddhytmviparysitadaranaih / grhyagrhakasamvitti bhedavn iva laksyat e//. But various employments of logics for Buddhist theses are deviced by Dharmakrti, and we can understand it in the Pramnasiddhi an Svrthnumna chapters.

    Pramnasamuccayah 10 yad abhasam prameyam tat pramanaphalate punah / grahakakarasamvitti trayam natah prthakkrtam /Pratyaksaavibhgo pibuddhytmviparysitadaranaih / grhyagrhakasamvitti bhedavn iva laksyat e//YogcraSvrthnumna

    Conclusively speaking, he takes a Mahyna attitude. He considered the epithets of the

    Buddha, the Authoritative One and the above mentioned four epithets, as denoting his mercy and

    intelligency according to the Mahyna Buddhology. And he stresses upon the

    original-purity-of-mind thesis and the tathgatagarbha theory. In relation to this problem, it is

    noted that he uses the metaphor of serpent and rope seen in the Mahynasangrahah of

    Asanga, by whom he is influenced. Dharmakrti affirms that the pure mind practising the

    Mrgasatya does not fail to cognize objects rightly, as if man who cognizes a rope as such no more

    misunderstands it as a serpent.

    MahynasangrahahMrgasatya

    He declares that he argues his religious philosophy according to reason and the canons

    (yuktygambhym). The content of the Pramnasiddhi chapter reveals this method well. In

    conclusion, I would express my gratitude for the kindness of the late Prof. Dr. Erich Frauwallner

    and his successor Prof. Dr.Ernst Steinkellner who has encouraged me by correspondence.

    (yuktygambhym)