paying for pharmaceutical regulation warren kaplan richard laing boston university school of public...

13
Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health http:// heapol . oupjournals .org/ cgi /reprint/18/3/237. pdf

Upload: amice-parsons

Post on 02-Jan-2016

221 views

Category:

Documents


2 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 2: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

ABSTRACTWe analysed DRA new drug registration fees for 34 countries

Many DRA registration fees for new drug applications for developing/non-OECD countries are less than the current GNP/capita of that country.

For many countries new drug application fees are between 1–5 times GNP per capita or between $17 000 and $80 000 for each $1000 spent per capita on healthcare.

There is little relationship between DRA registration fees and drug approval times in developing countries.

Drug regulatory authority user fees are an important policy instrument to improve access to medicines but for the most part, they are underutilized.

Page 3: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

The financial sustainability of a DRA is critical to implementing its regulatory functions but financial sustainability of a government DRA

DRAs can collect registration fees and various other charges for the services they provide. There are 50 registration fees for the United Kingdom DRA and over 90 for Australia. These DRAs rely entirely on registration fees for their support

Policy tradeoffs are important. Differential registration fees, presumably designed to encourage locally produced versus imported products, may violate international trade regulations. Moreover, certain DRA registration fees may provide perverse incentives for the pharmaceutical industry.

Developing countries should require that DRA registration fees be based on accurate accounting of the cost of services provided. At present levels, these fees could probably be increased without disincentive to the pharmaceutical industry.

BACKGROUND AND SETTING

Page 4: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

Study Aims ON WHAT BASIS DO DRAs SET THEIR

REGULATORY FEE STRUCTURE? ARE THEY REALLY DESIGNED AS COST RECOVERY TOOLS?

Analyze the relationship between aggregate economic indictors and DRA drug registration fees in developing and some developed countries

Provide recommendations with regard to appropriate fee levels, differential fees for generics, and the policy consequences of registration fees for improving DRA effectiveness and improving access to generic drugs.

Page 5: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

Methods (II)Based on a questionaire sent to 71 DRAs and from

the literature, we analyzed several indices for new drug registration fees.

Ratio of the DRA registration fee to the GNP per capita (GNP/capita: World Bank, calculated by the Atlas method)

Ratio of DRA registration fee to total amount per capita spent on healthcare (WHO 2000: data in international dollars) to new drug registration fee

Ratio of DRA registration fee to total pharmaceutical market size for the various countries (in retail value; over-the-counter plus prescription sales). (Market size information came from the US Department of Commerce Commercial Service (United States Department of

Commerce 2002) and the IMS-HEALTH websites (IMS-HEALTH 2002)).

Page 6: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

GNP/capita, total healthcare/capita and DRA fees for selected countriesGNP/capita Total healthcare/capita Initial registration fee (US$) (2002)

Fee index(US$) (A) US$ (B) NEW DRUG GENERIC (B/A)Algeria 1560 122 6410 3850 4.1

Argentina 7460 823 12000 4000 1.6

Australia 20240 1601 126500 2500 6.3

Bulgaria 1520 193 1124 9370.74

Costa Rica 3810 489 500 5000.13

Cuba 800 109 700 7000.91

Denmark 32020 1940 8406 81420.26

Japan 35620 17596 66764 48641.91

Malaysia 3380 202 100 1000.03

Singapore 24740 750 500 2200.02

South Africa 3020 396 2873 975–12320.95

Uganda 300 44 300 300 1

UK 24430 1193 102933 2680 4.2

USA 34100 3724 309647 0 0 9.1

Zimbabwe 460 64 1000 10002.2

Notes: South Africa: range is for generics on EML ($975) and not on EML ($1232)

United States: No registration fees for generic products

Page 7: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

RESULTS (II) Registration fees for new chemical entities are

often higher than those for generic products. Median approval times of Canada, Australia,

Europe and the United States for non-fast track procedures tend to converge on 15 to 20 months. Japan is the exception.

Data is limited for developing countries but average approval times are often nearly twice as fast major market countries

The limited data for developing countries suggests little or no relationship between the magnitude of the new drug registration fees and DRA approval time

Page 8: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

RESULTS (I) DRAs partly or completely financed via full

cost recovery/user fees: United States and the United Kingdom, the DRA fee for an initial new drug filing is between 4 and 10 times the GNP/capita, for Australia and Zimbabwe it is about 6 and 2, respectively.

For all other countries, most new drug DRA fees are between only 0.21 and 2.1 of GNP/capita.

DRAs partly or completely financed via full cost recovery/user fees: Between $17500 and $80000 new drug fee for every $1000 spend on healthcare per capita

For non OECD countries, $5283 fee for each $1000 per capita healthcare spent

For OECD countries, about $10000 fee for each $1000 per capita healthcare spent

Page 9: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

Results (III) Range of DRA new drug fees by national health/economic indicator

Indicator Country Scaling factorGross National Product OECD countries Median fee = 1.25 times GNP per capitaPer capita Interquartile range: 0.4–2.4 times GNP

Non OECD Countries Median fee = 0.45 times GNP per capita

Interquartile range: 0.07–1.0 times GNP Total healthcare expensesPer capita OECD Countries Median fee: $10 983 for each $1000 Interquartile range: $4372–37 905

Non OECD Countries Median fee: $5283 for each $1000 per capita

Interquartile range: $760–11 029

Total National Pharmaceutical All countries Fee: $1000 for each $384 million of national marketMarket (Sales) Excluding $1B Markets Fee: $1000 for each $85 million of national market

Notes:OECD Countries: Australia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.Billion dollar markets: Argentina, Australia, Denmark, India, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela.

Page 10: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

Total Pharmaceutical Market ($) and New Drug Registration Fee ($)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5

LOG(Total Pharmaceutical Market)

LOG

(New

Dru

g R

egis

trat

ion

Fee)

US

UK

AUSTRALIA

GUATEMALA

OMAN

INDIA

MALAYSIA

ALGERIA

NETHERLANDS

NEW ZEALAND

JAPAN

SOUTH AFRICA

Page 11: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

Summary DRAs of developing countries charge

lower new drug registration fees in relationship to their per capita national income than do developed countries

No empirical evidence that DRA new drug registration fees are actually set by policy according to either the GNP per capita, the total healthcare expenditure per capita, the size of the pharmaceutical market – or in fact any other national level economic indicator

Page 12: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

Discussion Higher drug registration fees could easily be charged by

developing country DRAs. This would not unduly increase costs for either the pharmaceutical industry, the government or the consumer.

If new and higher fees were to be charged, it is critical that these additional financial resources go back to the DRA to improve quality of services. In cases where the generated revenue ends up in the central government account, it is far more difficult to make a case for increased fees.

On balance, increased fees (from whatever source) must provide the DRA with sufficient resources to retain competent staff and pay outside consultants and experts to meet DRA performance standards. Without more staff, there is likely to be an increased workload which causes high staff turnover. Poor staff retention can also result in a loss of critical ‘institutional memory’.

Differential (i.e. lower) registration fees for generic drugs would encourage most manufacturers to submit registration dossiers as the cost would be minimal. It is possible that such fees may also encourage low quality manufacturers as well, who might submit applications haphazardly.

Page 13: Paying for Pharmaceutical Regulation Warren Kaplan Richard Laing Boston University School of Public Health

Conclusions and Recommendations

For most developing countries DRA registration fees probably bear little relationship to the true drug regulatory costs required for the drug approval process.

Promoting generics through differential, reduced fees should be encouraged in developing countries as a matter of public policy.

To justify increased fees, stakeholders must be able to document improvements in service and cost efficiencies.

Key DRA policy discussions should focus on the magnitude of the registration fees and on the balance between the registration fee portion and the budgeted or appropriated portion to avoid the DRA becoming entirely dependent upon the industry it is meant to regulate.