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Participation and Politics: Sub-national governments and Federally funded Social Organizations in Argentina. Jujuy 1990-20091

Lorena Moscovich (Universidad de Buenos Aires-

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas/ Universidad de San Martín)

lorenamoscovich@gmail.com

Abstract The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between social actors and government levels within the local political field of an Argentinean province. It focuses on a case study of an organization that manages federal funds: the Tupac Amaru organization in the province of Jujuy. This organization supports the national government, manages federal funds and is highly politicized. The paper identifies the interactions and strategies of the organization and local government levels, and analyzes how they affect the constitution of the political field, the agents’ legitimacy and political representation. Over the last few years, different federal governments have transferred funds to social organizations, particularly when the local government was opponent (either from different parties or different factions within the same party). During the 1990s, this funding was used for local public management within the process of state downsizing. After 2003, these organizations became part of the federal government’s political project – as an instrument to accumulate votes and political power –, which transferred funds for them to manage locally, even in cases where the sub-national governments were their allies. For the local government, these organizations were autonomous political agents with access to an important amount of resources, compared to the ones they managed. These funds, in turn, allowed the organizations to establish links with citizens, increase their human capital and compete with sub-national government.

1 This paper shows the first results of a social sciences doctoral research undertaken by Universidad de Buenos Aires. The research is financed by a CONICET doctorate research grant and is developed in the context of a research group directed by Pedro Pirez and subsidized by UBACYT and CONICET PIP programs. I would like to thank all the people interviewed; without them, this research would have never been possible. I would also like to thank Ana Skiendziel for her work as a research assistant. An earlier version received the comments from several colleagues: Pedro Pirez, Ernesto Calvo, Ivana Socoloff and Guillermo Jajamovich. Thanks to all of you. Finally I am grateful to Natalia Rybak for doing what she could with my basic translation from Spanish into English of a draft of this paper. .

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“Milagro I congratule you and your people on doing what you do; this really shows the work done and we, the national government, will keep on supporting this growth” Words of President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner during her visit to the recently

inaugurated Tupac Amaru organization´s head office, April 6, 2009, San Salvador de Jujuy

Introduction The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between social actors and government levels within the local political field of an Argentinean province. The idea is to explore the way in which the presence of a powerful2 social actor of popular origin is linked to decision-making centers of Argentinean political federalism. In other words, the way it is linked to the nation, the provinces and the municipalities, through the analysis of the Tupac Amaru organization, with its head office in the province of Jujuy and is present- though not fully developed- in other provinces.3 There is a political process unexplored by the literature: the relationship between a contentious organization, which expresses through protest in the local public space, and different government levels. At present, this social organization is regarded by the federal government as a means to allocate public resources in the territory and as a tool to mobilize militants. Even though the provincial government is a political ally, it is the organization the one that provides the national government with the human capital it needs. As a result of this kind of political coalition building, the organization has strengthened due to its access to public resources and its greater influence on politics in the role of provincial veto player. In order to identify different junctures, problems and challenges posed by national interventions (either public policies or direct interventions) on provincial politics, I am going to reconstruct the story of a social organization, the Tupac Amaru. I have chosen three stories that show the influence of national public resources on the organization consolidation, on provincial public policies and on the political challenges posed. Each story involves economic, political or legitimacy resources.

2 It is powerful because it receives a lot of money from federal public resources; it has an important number of activists ready to be mobilized overnight and with an effective power of agenda setting, and sometimes with veto power, in the provincial politics. 3 The present work is a case study research. I interviewed key informants and actors interacting in relationships between different government levels and the civil society. They constitute the core of the analysis. Not only did I consult specific bibliography, but I also consulted online and printed press and made several participatory observations. The people interviewed were leaders and members of some organizations in Jujuy, provincial government and local officials ( (City of San Salvador de Jujuy), and bureaucrats working at national level for the Social Development Ministry and the Federal Planning, Public Investment and Service Ministry. So far, I have interviewed 21 people, I have participated in a national meeting of social organizations (the "Constituyente Social", in October 2008) and I carried out a field work visit in February 2009.

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I will begin by explaining the implications of the research problem, its background and the related literature. After that, I will address the first of the three stories; in this account I talk of the organization born under the light of the 1990s struggle tradition in Jujuy and its consolidation thanks to the management of housing public resources... In the second account, I will analyze the development of the building emergency enactment process, an example of the direct intervention of the organization in the governmental agenda and the disputes over other social, economic and political actors that this process has brought about. Through this case I will also illustrate the way in which the organization intervenes in political life and struggles. Next I will present the challenges posed to provincial government political legitimacy on account of the dispute over the provincial valid spokesperson for the nation. I will study this matter through the reconstruction of two political events in which the executive power took part. Lastly, I will highlight some important items which may be inferred from the analysis.

Context of the research problem The Argentinean democratic period initiated in 1983 has been characterized by two phenomena which have not been studied together: the increasing importance of new social movements4 and organizations, and the dynamics and transformation of territorial politics. Social movements and organizations do not only emerge as a result of the global processes linked with welfare state transformations (Offe 1990, Rosanvallon 2007), but also as local consequences to cope with the negative effects of a reduced workers´ income and larger unemployment rates, in a context of a growing economic crisis (Svampa y Pereyra 2003, Schuster et al. 2005). Before 1976, Argentina had been considered a model country due to its social homogeneity. After that time, there was a process of negative income redistribution and cycles of fiscal adjustments and economic crisis, whose epitome was the crisis of December 2001. Thus, since the nineties there has been a new social expression related to the protests of the unemployed who were deprived of union representation (either because they did not have a job, or because union leaders betrayed their interests in exchange for governmental benefits). In parallel, self-organization was encouraged by assistance policy models which focused on policy beneficiaries as fully responsible for their fate and stressed the need to empower personal, local and communal skills seeking to promote informal economy initiatives (Chiara 2005, Soldano y Andrenacci 2006). Thus, self-management and the implementation of social assistance policies have been encouraged through social organizations which replaced the bloated public bureaucracy with the neoliberal state reform. 4 The literature on social movements is vast and well-known; some of its main exponents are Tarrow 1998, Tilly 2004, Touraine 1987, Cohen s/d, Pizzorno 1975, MacAdam, Mc Carty and Zald 1999, Castells 1975 and 1986. Some authors have stressed the importance of cultural factors in the mobilization process, while others have highlighted the interaction between resources and political opportunities. Some scholars study national levels, whereas others concentrate on transnational networks. They study the contentious repertoire, the use of violence or the degree in which they are either integrated into the state or rejected by it.

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In terms of territorial politics, there is an increasing relevance of some actors with clearly different political projects regarding the executive power, both at provincial and national levels. Argentinean political assemblage is defined to a great extent in terms of municipal and provincial territories. The provinces were very important even before the Electoral College had been abolished in order to choose a president. The tension among government levels opens up new opportunities for social movements which establish different relationships with one another. To analyze these links it is vital to consider the resources and responsibilities granted by governments to social organizations and to understand the consequences of this practice for territorial political alliances. Public resources allocated to a territory become a political capital for the government level closer to the citizens.5 When governors belong to the opposition, the national government does not often allocate as many resources to their provinces as it does to provinces that support the executive. Yet this practice is not uniform: some provinces in the opposition party negotiate with national bodies and get some benefits; other provinces demand the same access to resources of officialist provinces; and another group of provinces which turn down federal resources.

“There was no agreement with the provincial governments of Neuquén and San Luis owing to incompatibility. San Luis behaves like the nation, or at least I thought it behaved like the nation. Now that I am working in the Patagonian region, there are some hints that are indicative of an approach with the government of Sapag and the idea is to work together. Local governments, however, work hand in hand with everybody. Sometimes town mayors came to you and said: “I really don’t know. Nobody cares much here. But if you play the role of national authority, we join in." It was the same old story. And then you turned around and they made an agreement with the province. It all has to do with discourse perception” Interview with Maria, civil servant working at the Ministry of Social Development With some relevant municipalities, national authorities follow a similar logic to the one used with the provinces: they allocate resources to political allies. However, local administrations are more flexible when they seek money. The national government may allocate resources to its local counterpart independently of the political inclination of the latter because of the need to reach certain target groups with social programs; this implementation does not depend on the political affiliation of the local government. However the tendency to use public money as a bargaining chip in coalition building is maintained beyond existing differences. One of the main traits of the nineties is the spread of “partnerships”, private –public alliances through which social organizations implement social assistance policies focusing on poverty reduction. During the presidency of Menem (1989-1998), social organizations became a tool for public management. De la Rua (1999-2001), who did 5 The problem of the use of public resources as a tool for building political alliances and collecting votes is widely discussed by the literature. For example, some papers analyze public resources distribution according to amount or kind (public jobs or social plans) and they study their influence according to their clients’ economic level (Calvo y Murillo 2004). Whether delivery is focused on loyal supporters or outsiders, or on whether the “patron” benefits from or is damaged by this practice is also dealt by in the literature (Nazareno, Brusco y Stokes 2006). Fiscal federalism focuses on the relationship among different government levels in the context of a specific tax system and fiscal resources distribution to build electoral and legislative alliances. A recent and innovative contribution (Lodola y Bonvechi, 2009) does not only analyze the amount of benefits granted by the national government to the provinces, but also discretionary distribution of resources in territory.

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not belong to the Peronist Party, let non-state actors administer public resources without even holding office or having government involvement. The reason why this happened was the territorial weakness of his political party. President Duhalde (2002-2003) incorporated civil society organizations into public decision spaces in a context of a deep social crisis. Things changed with the arrival of Kirchner. Since civil society organizations (i.e. grassroots organizations, confessionals, professionals, the unemployed, former political militants or just community groups) have began to manage public resources, some provinces, municipalities and the national government have used them as a tool to avoid delivering resources to governments belonging to the opposition. These organizations are also used to reach people in territory so as not to appeal to local public administrations. This practice widens in the nineties and represents a window of opportunity to consolidate some social organizations and the picket movement. Since Kirchner and Fernandez took office, however, this practice has significantly changed (Svampa 2008). They also appeal to the organizations but disregarding the level of commitment with the local and the provincial government. They work with social organizations for ideological reasons- because it is worth working with an organization of the poor- and for strategic reasons as they build territorial alliances. This work with social organizations strengthens the latter and brings about new challenges to local and provincial administrations where these groups work. These studies analyzing the impact of government levels and decentralization processes are relevant to the discussion of the research problem (Wilson, Ward et. Al, 2008); also pertinent to the research is the presence of social actors in public resources management (Cardarelli y Rosenfeld 2008 Acuña, Jelin et. Al. 2006; González Bombal 2003) and other studies that explore social movements and pro-market economic reforms (Portes, Roberts et. Al 2005). However, the field where government levels, public resources and social movements converge is not explored. Social organizations mobilize people and manage resources, but lack the required structure to collect enough votes. Territorial politics is crucial in Argentina. The coalition with governors is vital to any national political project. In this paper I propose the analysis of a case study of the conflictive coexistence of two different ways of building political power: one supported by social actors and one refers to the traditional and well known territorial coalitions between presidents (or candidates) and the provincial governors.

Federal policies and social struggle consolidation in Jujuy

… And in the beginning was neoliberalism

The Tupac Amaru organization was born in the first years of this decade within the framework of the Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA). The CTA is an independent federation of labor unions created in 1992. It has no government recognition, has a tradition of opposition to traditional unions and has a different

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conception of the relationship between trade unions and their members (Armelino 2005). Milagro Sala, Tupac Amaru’s leader, is a former provincial state employee; she is a Peronist Party activist and rose to the highest position at the Asociación de Trabajadores del Estado (ATE), a state workers’ union enrolled in the CTA. The emergence of this organization must be seen in the context of the social struggles of the 1990s. Structural reforms implemented by the national government in that decade had a negative impact on the decaying local economy and provoked the collapse of the provincial political system. The inefficiency of the provincial state in Jujuy and the Peronist Party's difficulty to overcome its internal divisions led to a cycle of protests whereby four governors left office before their term ran out. The remaining four were elected to complete their predecessors’ terms and none were able to complete a four-year term (Lagos and Gutiérrez 2007). The actions of a “Multisectorial” that grouped state workers - whose unions led the protest - shop-owners, teachers and industrial workers, played a central role in the governors’ early resignations (Gómez and Kindgard 2007). The protest took on a national dimension and one of its visible faces, Carlos "El Perro" Santillán, became an icon of opposition to President Carlos Menem’s market reforms at the national level. In 1994 Santillán created the Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC), an organization closely linked to the Revolutionary Communist Party, which became active throughout the country. Another milestone in the struggle was the 1994 Federal March against hunger, which took provincial demands to Buenos Aires. The march also called attention to unemployed workers’ new forms of organization, which only appeared in the metropolitan area towards the end of the decade. Milagro Sala, current leader of Tupac, was responsible for the logistics of those protests and mobilizations. Social protest processes in the province of Jujuy in the nineties were different from other Argentinean provincial processes. Contrary to Santiago del Estero, where there was a strong social upsurge that eventually died out (Farinetti 2000), the protest was permanent in Jujuy; it had a national impact and led to the birth of two social organizations that have spread throughout almost the whole country: first the CCC and then the Tupac in the present times. Another remarkable difference with Santiago del Estero is that while in this province traditional local politicians returned to office soon after the protest ended, in Jujuy there is an elite rotational change, although their profile of politician has not changed (people who belong to local upper-middle class, with close ties with economic power and members of the Peronist Party). Jujuy protest processes were also different from other processes of national relevance which influenced social struggles, like Salta and Neuquen, were the mobilization was powered by those people who had been fired from privatized public companies. In Jujuy, those who fueled the protest were civil servants (bureaucrats, nurses, and others) and, at least for a short time, they were supported by the rest of the society and other private actors. The coming to power of Eduardo Fellner in 1999 inaugurated a period of political stability and redistribution of forces in the field of social organizations. Social activism was present in both of Fellner´s administrations, but it is expressed in a cycle of social protest on the one hand and political concessions on the other, always within the scope of the province. By the late nineties the unemployment rate reached 16.2% in October 1999 (Golovanevsky 2001) and the percentage of homes with unsatisfied basic needs was 26% in 2001 (INDEC 2009). Victor de Gennaro, head of the CTA, suggested

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Milagro that union activism should be rethought. The work in territory with unemployed people in the same neighborhoods in which they resided was consolidated. “Víctor, in his role of ATE leader, gave us the idea of going to the neighborhoods because at that time I was a union secretary at ATE and, at the same time, because here in Jujuy there was a fierce struggle going on: five governors had been forced to resign due to their inefficiency, and also because of the theft, the many thefts in the province. We forced many [governors] to leave. Also because at that time many "compañeros" who worked for the state had been laid off.” Interview Milagro Sala In 2001 the CCC started to fracture and has now virtually disappeared. As the crisis got worse and poverty levels increased, Milagro Sala began to expand a territorial network of “copas de leche”- soup kitchens, where an afternoon snack is served to children in poor neighborhoods. Milagro used her experience as a militant activist of the Peronist Party, the party which she later left after the internal fracture driven by the so-called "group of eight"6 (though she blamed it on the privatization of the railway system, simultaneous with the party fracture, as the main reason for her departure). Milagro also appealed to her trade union “compañeros”7, like the well-known CTA Nando Acosta. She gained experience in the field of struggle and organization from her path through prison8, when she asked for the improvement of prisoners’ food and was granted permission for the prisoners to cook for themselves9. The first followers and organizers of her “copas de leche” were those inmates she met in the prison and the "barra brava"10 at the soccer club’s Gimnasia y Esgrima de Jujuy as well as those adolescents she literally rescued from the streets, took home and, in some cases, adopted; they were adolescents with problems of family neglect and drug abuse problems. When Kirchner became president in 2003 she had an unknown number of “copas de leche”, though most probably there were about hundreds of them, which were supported with their own resources11 until 2002. Between 1999 and 2001 the Tupac Amaru organization transformed into a new organization, combining the logic of unionism with the territorial logic in a particular way. Tupac Amaru is a rara avis, an organization linked to the central union which does

6 This refers to a group of eight Peronist national deputies, Carlos "Chacho" Alvarez, Germán Abdala, Darío Alessandro, Juan Pablo Cafiero, Brunatti Luis Franco Caviglia, José Ramos and Moises Fontellas, who left the Peronist party legislative block because they questioned the neoliberal content of national government decisions. They left in the hope that the lower classes would identify with their option. But, contrary to all expectations, they created first a political party and an electoral alliance coalition afterwards that reflected the discontent of urban middle classes See Torre 2003 7 For an analysis of the link between the former political party militancy of unemployed-organization leaders and the availability of organizational resources, please refer to the work of Andrés Schipani (2008) 8In her youth Milagro left her adoptive family and lived on the street for some years. In her early twenties she spent eight months in prison. 9As told by director Diego Pereyra in his documentary “Milagro en Jujuy” de 2007. 10 The “Barra brava” is a group composed of ardent football fans that use violence and engage in other dirty businesses, from political wall graffiti writing during electoral campaigning to physical threat on behalf of any powerful actor; they are also linked with the resale of football match tickets, drug trafficking, etc. In Jujuy, these groups are also invited to participate in social protests; for example, they are invited to lead the activity and to play percussion instruments, which are always present in any Argentinean protest. 11 People in poor neighborhoods owned meager resources, but they put their own pocket money, picked up firewood from the forest, built their own cooking pit and, sometimes, received bags of food from the provincial state.

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not subordinate to its leadership. It is an organization which has been enriched not only by its leader’s personal background but it is also an emergent of the bond with the state.

Building bridges: the administration of federal resources

In the early 2000s, the organization mobilized to pursue resources from a variety of social assistance policies, bags of food provided by the government for the “copas de leche” and social assistance programs to administer, including the “Jefes y Jefas de Hogar”12 Program. It always obtained benefits through protest, but never taking part of government-civil society consulting groups or formal application processes. Though there is no exact data, reports suggest that in those years, thanks to several factors (its workload in the metropolitan San Salvador de Jujuy districts, the levels of conflict or harmony with the provincial government, and the resources they manage) the Tupac Amaru was an important provincial organization among many. In 2003 the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services began to implement the Programa Federal de Emergencia Habitacional (Federal Housing Emergency Program HEP); since then it has deployed resources for self-building and has provided sanitary sewers through cooperatives. The CCC had a territorial network in different parts of the country and contacts with the national government: this is the case of the interaction between "El Perro" and former interim president Eduardo Duhalde. As a result of this interaction, the CCC got 600 HEP homes to be built. Shortly after Milagro learnt this, she demanded housing for the Tupac and put her claim forward during a business committee conference. In October 2003, the Unión Industrial Argentina held a congress at Alto La Viña Hill, one of the few charming neighborhoods in San Salvador de Jujuy. President Kirchner and half of his cabinet members attended the meeting. The protest was successful; Milagro was granted some houses to build on condition that the houses were completed within five months. At first, the organization asked the Banco Cooperativo for technical assistance to constitute the cooperatives and train their members. The training process would take about five months and they could not wait. They considered the possibility of a partnership with the Provincial Engineers Association and the Architects Association to acquire basic building skills and to be able to start with the construction; however, both charged for their professional fees in terms of a percentage of the final building cost. But the organization did not accept that condition. Consequently, they decided to do what they have been doing since then: they just act. They set up the cooperatives, submitted the required forms, and acquired building skills integrating builders as cooperatives full members with the same working condition as the other workers13. At that time the Tupac Amaru organization, founded by a leader of a civil servants union and later on transformed into an organization of the unemployed, had hundreds of “Copas de leche”. Its members neither had building experience nor were organized in cooperatives but managed to build the houses in record time and created its foundational myth: its efficiency and expert knowledge disregard. Therefore, the organization

12 In May 2002, amid a context of social mobilization and political instability, the program allocated widespread unemployment benefits to a large number of beneficiaries, creating the conditions for social calm in the poorest neighborhoods. 13 Another innovative trait of the organization in terms of cooperatives assembling and management is the integration of 50% female staff for the building tasks, an area monopolized by men.

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consolidated the protest as a tool to access public resources and it tailored a way of work to suit its needs, optimizing resources and disregarding middle-class expert knowledge. As a result of this, the organization gained the necessary autonomy to keep on growing from the skills and resources of its members- very poor people from Jujuy’s popular neighborhoods without formal education14. After some time, the Tupac Amaru was entrusted with the construction of an Integrated Community Center (ICC)15 over a six-month period; the organization completed the building in half the time. Social Development Minister Alicia Kirchner, also president Kirchner´s sister, personally opened the Center. Since then the federal government has allocated resources to the Tupac Amaru on a constant and ever-increasing basis. “four months later everything was already done. Not surprisingly, Kirchner came and gave a public speech; he thanked the “compañeros” who had built the houses in record time... the CCC has yet to finish the construction of 600 houses; we have already built about 2,000 of them or so , I don’t know exactly how many. Once the construction is over, they come and check it all, check their quality and all that, and then give you another 200-bunch of them. This is the methodology we have used, we move on, and we now have widespread national recognition.” Interview with Raul Noro, one of organization leaders. The same happened with housing. As the organization successfully carried out the building plan and excel in accomplishing objectives, new houses were allocated to be built by new cooperatives. The cooperative has already built 2,000 houses. Its efficiency is based on the management ability of the organization leaders as well as on the relationship they build with their members. The workers are paid for building houses, but they are fully committed to the organization. The Tupac Amaru promotes its members’ personal commitment to the task, their personal development, the needs of its peers and the organization itself.16 One of the distinctive traits of the organization, compared to other social and public actors, is its ability to achieve results and to do so maximizing its resources. “we are given 20 houses and we not only build them but also build squares, we do things... as some money is left... nowadays there´s a lot of money if you are involved in building. Mind you, it depends on who manages the money. For instance, the place where you are sitting, this building, is a surplus which belongs to the cooperative. The building across the street and the high school building have also been constructed with the cooperative’s money. We have also been given money to build houses, we have built sports centers, the ICC, a swimming pool...” Interview with Milagro Sala

Not only do they achieve goals but they excel to the extent that they reach them in less time than required and spend less money, reinvesting the surplus in new construction works for the community.

14 The integration of its members to the educational system has become the priority of the organization over time. 15 Integrated Community Centers depend on the National Social Development Ministry. These are spaces built to coordinate the care provided to social assistance policies beneficiaries, to provide certain primary health care services and cultural activities for municipality residents. In this was they promote the integration of local governments and the community aiming to identify and solve the inhabitants’ problems. 16 Besides the building task, cooperative members have to carry out other tasks such as participating in demonstrations or attending classes at the end of their working day at the organization schools. Those who fail to comply with this requirement are reported for their behavior by their superiors or peers, and run the risk of being reprimanded or directly expelled from the organization, consequently losing all right to the social assistance policies administered by the organization.

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At the beginning of this decade the Tupac was an organization ingrained in the nineties’ public union struggle tradition. Yet, it did not stand out among other social expressions in Jujuy. The organization’s distinctive component was its leadership. Milagro Sala is a very charismatic person, she is equally respected, feared and criticized by many sectors of the establishment; her charisma goes hand in hand with an inexhaustible capacity for work.17 The sense of obligation is the motto for its constant mobilization. “... you just don’t come and take classes on how to become a leader; you come and join the work going on, you make yourself responsible for the “compañeros”; you just don’t decide whether you do this or that. Here, if the "compañero" is in need, you must stand by him, guide him to prevent them from making mistakes, it’s not so easy. I stand up and deliver a speech but not everybody applauds.... you must be responsible for your "compañeros.” Interview with Alejandro Mansilla The sense of obligation justifies the idea that nothing is enough, that they are never satisfied because they must keep on fighting for the "compañero" in need. The job is not done over when the organization has access to national resources. As it will be seen, Milagro Sala has an unquestionable authority anchored both in her efficiency as leader and in the fear she arouses. The relevance of the Tupac Amaru organization must be analyzed not only in terms of the resources it has access to, but also in terms of Jujuy’s traits in its struggle history and Milagro Sala´s strong leadership. During the nineties Jujuy was the cradle of social leaders and today there are several organizations that fight for the rights of the socially and politically excluded people. However, the Tupac Amaru stands out from the rest, thrives on its past, its background, its human resources and skills. And the Tupac Amaru organization goes for more, pushing the line of the "acceptable" in the horizon of possibilities of a provincial social actor to intervene in politics. We will now illustrate this with an example.

Balance of forces in the local political field As if climbing steps two by two, the organization has taken positions on a constant basis. Sala is a clever resources hunter and a very motivating leader. As her organization started to administer larger amounts of money, she went a step forward on each project she achieved.

“I always tell la Milagros, sometimes you have to wind down a bit as your own “compañeros” have to sift the wide scope of topics coming out of you head. They have already become used to it, or at least the CTA has, even when it refers to changes made on the spur of the moment. The whole thing has opened everybody´s mind. We’ve learnt. Out of necessity.... out of necessity and out of Milagros´ peculiar character and personality. But mostly out of necessity, as the need for management was vital and someone had to do it. Milagros can’t leave things undone.” Interview with Raúl Noro

The organization now manages a monthly fund of about six million pesos made up of public resources allocated from several building programs (housing, etc.) and other programs related to infrastructure and machinery financing. The budget surplus has

17 The following sentence can be read in all of Tupac’s buildings: "When there is no will, there are thousands of excuses; when there is a will there are thousands of resources"

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been used to build a head office holding their own CIC18, textile, metallurgical, and brick factories, which they later use for their own construction work, recreation centers in several neighborhoods19, a school – with a building in the city and decentralized presence in neighborhoods where cooperatives work-, a grocery store, a “Locutorio” (shops with telephone booths and PCs where you can make phone calls or use internet at a very low fare), a shop in the city where textile factory products are sold. They also used the budget surplus to buy an ambulance, several private vehicles and trucks for building tasks. The organization has expanded geographically and has autonomous local branches in seven provinces. Each political field is different; political relationships differ from one another and pose other challenges. Mendoza is the only province where the local organization has begun to build houses. The experience of the Tupac organization is difficult to be replicated in the absence of strong leadership in local organizations, the lack of struggle tradition and, according to the people interviewed, certain aspects of local idiosyncrasies that contributed to the consolidation of the organization. As a result of popular field reorganization in Jujuy and the successful experience of the Tupac, many other groups have tried to join the organization. Yet, rather than integrate them, Milagro has encouraged other leaders to create their own organizations; to that end, she mobilizes public resources to manage and coordinate protest actions. This has led to the formation of the “Red de Organizaciones Sociales de Jujuy” (Jujuy´s Social Organization Network) integrated by the Tupac and other eleven groups. The network is composed of CCC’s divisions, which the Tupac has violently clashed with in the past, and other eclectic groups. This is the strategy used by Milagro Sala to avoid the incorporation of social leaders who can challenge her leadership and/or meddle in her organization- and to gain human capital; in exchange for this, she shares the resources she has access to and supports the demands of other network members. The 1990s social struggle and the consolidation of the Tupac organization since 2003 have resulted in the legitimization of trade unions and social actors as political valid spokespersons. Both, Milagro and CTA general secretary, Nando Acosta, are consulted by the media about issues concerning the provincial public agenda.

“They are consulted about almost anything: the construction works, the governor’s actions, elections... You see, just like here [in the City of Buenos Aires] the media embody discourse, in Jujuy they are consulted about everything. The reporters seek the opinion of the governor, the people involved or the leader or the civil servant in the spotlight and also of the CTA [....] Nothing is ever possible if the CTA does not agree with it. Milagros and Nando have managed to earn this reputation. As regards the CTA, this does not happen in any other place in Argentina. The CTA consolidated its place on the accounts of its 50,000 members, their power to mobilize them in the streets, and their discipline, as vertical as it is [with its members] and on a horizontal basis. There’s strong solidarity with the rest of the organizations.” Interview with Inés at CTA

18 In the organization head office there are also some class rooms, the third tomograph and the second heated swimming pool in the province. 19 All recreation centers have a swimming pool, which has a strong symbolism since in Argentina only middle -class families have access to this service; they are highly appreciated in Jujuy where poor inhabitants are heat oppressed. Milagro often refers to this in her speeches.

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Resources do not stop coming from national government, civil servants wish the Tupac would manage their programs. Everyone wants to work with the Tupac. Milagro says “yes” to all the resources offered, and then she selects them.

“Milagros is always fishing for resources, you tell her “I am such and such and would like to do such and such” and she says “Yes, go ahead”. Later on, she changes her mind or maybe she does not, and two days later she changes her mind once again. She never rejects anything; she is a great resource-hunter. She first analyses whether you may come in handy or not.

[...]

“There’s a game-like strategy, a sort of “Tupac Amaru strategy”, based on which they know that people fight to be there, to participate, to be where they are summoned. The programs in the different Ministries try to help the organization...” Interview with Inés at CTA

The trade union militancy is motivated by Jujuy’s experience and seeks to reproduce it in other places. In the multitudinous event that gathered thousands of CTA militants in Jujuy in October 2008, the “Constituyente Social”, all the participants were perplexed over the host organization’s ability to rally support and to see the works built in the neighborhood of "Alto Comedero" on the city outskirts. This feeling was evident in their speeches.

“the most important thing is what other provincial Tupac organizations learn from the Tupac Amaru in Jujuy when we visit their provinces; their achievement is greater from one visit to the other. There’s a permanent revolution going on, a whirl of constructive, rather than destructive, activity. It’s not a miracle, it’s the organization. What you learn from Jujuy is that there should be a will to build and a vital need for a collective debate with your “compañeros”, you must always move forward.” Manuel, leader of the Tupac Amaru organization in Buenos Aires How does the dimension of a social actor such as the Tupac Amaru organization impact on provincial politics? What are the implications of its local politics? In the next sections of the paper I will tell two stories, i.e. two events which took place in the political arena of the province of Jujuy. It is my intention to analyze the organization’s cross-sectional relationship with different government levels and its consequences.

An example: the provincial Building Emergency Law enactment

In 2008 the Tupac Amaru organization set an unattended issue in the public agenda: the poor conditions of many public schools. It urged the provincial government to address this issue but, in the absence of any answer, after some time the Tupac proposed that the Red de Organizaciones Sociales should be responsible for the school repairs. Governor Walter Barrionuevo rejected this on the grounds that public works law states that private companies should be responsible for repairs and there should be an open bidding process. Those who were awarded construction orders were small construction companies that did not meet the requirements to compete in larger works. In view of this, the Red mobilized to demand the enactment of a new law allowing them to handle the repairs. Thus, a period of protests started, the “Acampe" being one of the most relevant; hundreds of people with their families settled in the provincial main city square until their most desired goal had been achieved: a legislative treatment of the building

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emergency law (i.e. law 5574) providing neighbor cooperatives with the possibility of repairing school buildings. “…this emergency law was debated over, this law about school buildings; for many it was crazy, but we are sure this goes hand in hand with… I mean, it is sometimes a teachers´ problem..., I mean, it is true that school buildings are in bad condition, the toilets are also in bad condition, ceilings are falling apart and the children are not safe; it’s cold in winter and extremely hot in summer. This is why we have drafted this law to be debated over at the legislative body, and deputies have proved us right: it was the reality of Jujuy. And this school building emergency law was enacted and, nowadays, these organizations are in charge of refurbishing school buildings. In other words, if we had not debated the whole thing, there would be a whole bunch of schools in bad condition, many kids studying in schools in bad condition and a lot of “compañeros” even lacking the chance to work.” Interview with Pilo, a member of the Tupac Amaru

“But they are so determined; when there is something in their way, they start fussing about it for a long time, even a month and a half… they have demonstrated in the square for a week or so: they come, they settle down, they do the same when mobilizing; they have a whole mechanism, they pick up the phone, they have a whole mechanism: mattresses, tents... they just go and settle down in the square… the square opposite the Provincial Government House… they camp out for a week, they bring down the tents, the kids, dirtiness, all...…they stay there and people start protesting, they want them out; and they say “no” to the 100 pesos salary increase for teachers... and the whole Tupac organization mobilizes; though the Tupac is not directly affected by this situation, they get organized in order not to abandon the work in their neighborhoods and ensure the occupation of the square because they know that, if they succeed in this occupation, they will succeed in all of them.” Interview with Inés de la CTA

Once the law was enacted, social organizations were given the list of buildings with infrastructure problems and subsidies for repairs. Each Red member was responsible for repairing the buildings in their neighborhood. Professional associations demand that the law should be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it awarded the works to both cooperatives and municipalities without a price bid or direct intervention of competent professionals, but through “technical agents”, in order to ensure the quality of the work performed. On the other hand, the characteristics of the awarded companies, small companies with few employees, suggest a distributive struggle on a field with close interests. “They are not creating new work sources for the unemployed; most probably, someone will become unemployed and someone else will get a job; the problem would be the appearance of certain funds that supposedly did not exist before. This would be a mistake made by the Executive Power. If there are funds, there are many small companies with professional human resources which gathered through time under the conditions set by the Public Works Law and which fail to build large buildings because of economic reasons; these small companies are in charge of repairing school buildings.” Interview with provincial deputy Agustín Perassi 20 In this experience the organization’s various forms of action can be identified: the poorest interest vindication, the pressure on the government, the mobilization in the public space, the advocacy to enact a law and the threat of the use of violence over those actors opposing their demands.

“it was known that the Argentinean Construction Chamber filed criminal charges on the grounds of threats posed to one of its directors by the Tupac Amaru Organization leader. A Milagro Sala phoned the

20 El Libertario (julio de 2007) “La Ley de emergencia es un avance totalitario sobre las instituciones” (http://www.ellibertario.com/2008/07/07/perassi-la-ley-de-emergencia-es-un-avance-totalitario-sobre-las-instituciones/) consulted on April 16, 2009

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director and urged him to withdraw- within 48 hours- his statement against the controversial law and the body which enacted it. If he failed to do this, she would “mobilize three hundred people into the streets”, a close source explained to El Libertario.com ” (2007-07-03)21

In this short account we can see how the Red de Organizaciones Sociales set an item for discussion in the public agenda. The issue was a legitimate demand of the poor, the ones sending their children to provincial public schools. The governor was summoned to solve the problem, but the organization leaded the negotiation process: it marked the pitch and limited the game duration. A bill of law was put forward for debate. This bill would improve public school building. As a result, it opened a new dispute within the political field because cooperatives and organizations were in charge of the works. The works quality was questioned and the government was accused of not acknowledging other actors, such as professional associations and small businessmen in the construction industry. Something had changed in the local field: the Tupac, and the network it leads, do not only have the ability to protest and to enact a law, but they have also acquired other skills, construction skills, which they use in the negotiation game.

“Who governs?” Representation and legitimacy problems

In February 2009, I finished making the arrangements for my second fieldwork trip to Jujuy with a call from Buenos Aires City airport. Then, I contacted Tupac Amaru people. Few hours after that, they picked me up from the hotel in San Salvador de Jujuy. I did not know where we were going; I only knew that, wherever we were going, Milagro Sala would be there. We got to a low-class neighborhood in the metropolitan area. We stopped in front of a middle-class house with the eighties’ typical construction, an A-frame roof, ceramic floor and eclectic decoration. Large sliding doors overlooking a balcony revealed a beautiful view of the valley. Beyond any doubt, it was Milagro’s home. The first thing I spotted when I entered the house was a small living-room; to my right, a wooden table where four boys in their twenties were watching a movie. When I arrived, I was welcomed by Raúl, Milagro’s partner and a journalist, a man who might be considered an organic intellectual because of his clarity of thought and his influence on Milagro; but the Tupac does not need intellectuals. I was talking to Raul when Milagros appeared with other guys and invited me to have lunch. We sat at the table and had lunch; there were about ten people in the house, though not everybody joined for lunch. We were talking about a celebration that would take place that week, the Comadres’ Thursday, a women's meeting prior to the “desentierro del diablo”, a ritual that formally inaugurates the carnival in the north of the province and in Bolivia. Milagro reviewed various issues with the people sitting at the table. One of the guys showed her the draft of a flag design, which was going to be used in a mobilization.

21 El libertario (Julio de 2007) Ley de Emergencia de Edificios Públicos levanta más polvareda (on line: http://www.ellibertario.com/2008/07/03/ley-de-emergencia-de-edificios-publicos-levanta-mas-polvareda/) consulted on April 16, 2009.

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The head of the Peronist Party, the former president and president Cristina Fernandez’s husband, Néstor Kirchner would come the following day. A meeting with the members of the provincial Peronist Party would be held. Milagro told me she had spoken with the presidential secretary, Oscar Parrilli, and he had secured her a place on Kirchner’s agenda. However, Milagro suggested going to meet him at the airport. The mass meeting had been organized by the Red de Organizaciones Sociales. They had already made an appointment with the former president; though still unknown, they would show their power at the airport reception. The guy who was making the flag asked Milagro about her opinion of its design; she approved of it but suggested adding Che Guevara and the Cacique Amaru’s faces on the flag22. Then she answered the phone, stood up and left, taking me with her. There were many things to do: in the afternoon Pilo met a group of people introduced to him by “Copas de leche”´s delegates; the aim of the meeting was to sign up a list and create a new cooperative. In the meantime, he checked the making of the flag. Later that night, I met Alejandro (one of the guys who had had lunch with us) in the organization’s head office. He was arranging the hiring of the buses which would take the people to the airport where the mass meeting would be waiting for the former president over the route. Logistics are complex but the organization is trained for that. “we know about the struggle by heart, as we are continuously struggling; it ´s not difficult for the Tupac organization to organize a 10,000-people demonstration... you let me know in the morning and in the afternoon there are 10,000 people available for you in the street. We are highly trained in this respect." Interview with Tupac Amaru leader, Raul Noro

“the Tupac Amaru organization has to be organized in order to maintain this solidarity and this constant need of mobilization, of being visible, as this is part of its strength. The day when the Tupac stops being able to mobilize 25,000 guys, it will stop being what it is.” Interview with Inés, at CTA

Nestor Kirchner arrived at 3 pm; thousands of people gathered by the runway; it would have been impossible not to see them. People waited until the Peronist party meeting ended. In the evening the leaders of the Red de Organizaciones Sociales were received by the former president, who promised Milagro she would be invited to the refurbished Children Hospital opening next April 2009. The meeting between Kirchner and the social organizations received full graphic press coverage. While writing this paper I got in touch with Milagro’s husband one more time as I needed to check some information. But it was a bad time to call; it was the day president Cristina Fernandez would arrive to attend the opening ceremony at the Children Hospital. The organization, however, had not been invited. What had happened in the meantime, since the former president had invited Milagro? Some weeks before the event, Tupac members had contacted provincial officials to secure a place in the ceremony. At some point, the officials stopped answering phone calls from the organization. The provincial government refused to invite them to an official event. The reaction of the Tupac organization was to devise a two-front strategy. Firstly, in view of the provincial government’s indifference, they called the national government officials in charge of the president’s agenda and arranged a visit to the Tupac’s recently inaugurated head office in San Salvador de Jujuy. 22 Both pictures are always present in all of Tupac Amaru’s flags and audio-visual material, printed on the labels of their manufactured clothes and painted on the walls of their offices and recreation centers.

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Once in Jujuy, the president attended the opening ceremony of the Children Provincial Hospital, delivered a speech to ten thousand people and spent an hour and a half with the governor and his cabinet members. In politics, power is measured in terms of the number of people attending rallies. Tupac’s strategy was more important than the official one: according to the organization sources, forty thousand people were present at the organization rally and the president visit to the organization head office lasted three hours, just twice as long as the time she devoted to provincial authorities. In other words, the organization congregates more people and gets more attention from the president than the province. Jubilant Tupac leaders proved their organization could not be ignored. In this example, we have seen how national recognition of the organization also affects national-provincial relationship. On the one hand, the organization represents the executive arm of some national policies in Jujuy’s poor neighborhoods; it is a kind of mediator between the national state and Jujuy inhabitants; on the other hand, it has symbolic resources related to its legitimization as a provincial valid spokesperson. When the president in office and the former president invited the organization to take part in an official ceremony, they put the province in an awkward position. If the province accepted the participation of the organization, it would acknowledge a kind of co-government. If the provincial government refused to let it participate they would face the ability to rally support of different organizations, a struggle on the street that contests provincial government legitimacy because, as it can be seen, social organizations mobilize more people and get more of the president’s attention than the provincial government.

The present situation in Jujuy as regards the decision-making process The governor of Jujuy Eduardo Fellner had a good image among the citizens in his province. In December 2001 there was a national political crisis and the political establishment was deeply questioned. Jujuy, however, had experienced its own political crisis and this time the crisis did not reach Fellner´s administration. In 2006, governor Fellner´s second mandate was about to end. He sought to run for election one more time but, in order to be electable, he needed a constitutional reform in the province. At the same time, a referendum on the same matter was being held in the province of Misiones: citizens were consulted about a constitutional reform which would let the governor run for a third term in office. The governor lost the referendum and president Nestor Kirchner, who had backed the “re-electability” of the governor of Misiones, was questioned for his support. When the referendum was lost Kirchner came off badly because he had backed an attempt of power perpetuation that had been rejected by the citizenry. In this context, Kirchner discouraged Fellner from beginning the same process; instead, he suggested Fellner should make a run for national deputy. Fellner was elected and he was appointed by the president to lead the national congress. Once again we can see how national politics affects basic parameters within provincial politics.

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When Fellner’s term in office was over he handed in power his right-hand man, Walter Basilio Barrionuevo, as a candidate to succeed him. When Barrionuevo took office he found a polarized society, economic interests ingrained in the state in a permanent distributive struggle, social organizations which blocked streets and periodically occupied the public city square to make their demands heard. What he found, however, did not differ much from what his eight predecessors had found. But governor Barrionuevo also found the Tupac Amaru Organization and its present state of development. Its members reach 10% of the population. According to the organization sources, only in Jujuy the organization has 70,000 members and 10,000 other members in the rest of the country. Due to the fact that the organization employs 4,000 people in cooperatives in Jujuy and almost 1,000 more in other provinces, it has become the third provincial employer, following the provincial state and Ledesma refinery. As a result of this, the organization is now a new veto player in provincial politics. As regards the balance of forces in Jujuy political field, several points can be highlighted. In the first place, there are transformations in the popular field. All that is done by the organization is copied by other groups of citizens who also use its methods as long are they prove to be effective. This undoubtedly happens with the eleven organizations which make up the network alongside the Tupac, but its existence also strengthens social leaderships outside its field of influence. Even local governments are encouraged to create their own neighbor cooperatives seeing that it is possible for them to carry out the works.23 Secondly, there are consequences of both the 1990s struggle processes and the present work of the Tupac Amaru. For example, there has been a change in political culture as a result of which social organizations appear as a vehicle for demands and, through protests and mobilizations, they get resources and keep their human capital. A person interviewed said that popular neighborhoods in Jujuy have been transformed because people there know the way the Tupac works and they have learnt that even if Tupac’s territorial network has not reached them, it will do so some day. Even though protest is generally understood as an exceptional, temporal, and disruptive component of democracies, which tends to decrease after certain cycles, here it is a permanent tool of the provincial regime. In the third place, the political space that organizations occupy thanks to their relationship with the national government has brought about other consequences for provincial politics. Social pressure has become a relative counterweight of the economic powers beyond the organization’s rhetoric. For example, when the governor appeals to social claims as a way to stand up to the most influential actors in local politics. Popular demands have been one of the reasons cited by governor Barrionuevo to look through the provincial fiscal regime and other tax exemptions. “State actors are linked with the production sector, with the media sector, and with the industrial sector; therefore, those who work for certain actors, namely the tobacco industry, the sugarcane industry...these sectors should not be exempted from paying taxes, independently of their production level or magnitude.

23 I understand this phenomenon as Tilly (2000) analyses it, with his idea of emulation used in his analysis of organizational forms.

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From a distributive point of view, one may wonder why certain industrial and production sectors should be exempted from paying taxes, and why those with meager incomes should pay. I believe that, and I sometimes discuss it with Walter [Barrionuevo, the governor], if state actors are the economic actors in the field it’s difficult to make decisions. It is difficult to make decisions to change this situation. When there is a well organized popular sector, such as the Tupac organization, to counterweight it all, sometimes the other sector... “ César Arrueta, advisor to the governor The governor uses social claims as a means to counterweight economic interests. The response from these sectors was the threat of massive layoff and social destabilization. Evidently, the balance of power is not easy for provincial administration. On the one hand, there is a permanent upsurge of social protest; on the other hand, private companies threaten to fire employees in an economy which lacks employment opportunities in the private sector. Entire villages became poor when private or public companies closed down. Jujuy knows about unemployment and impoverishment. The result is a state besieged by sectoral interests with no one caring about its transformation.

Reflections on the relationship between government levels and the provincial political field This document, which is far from supporting definite conclusions, is the first analysis of a field work which ended in February 2009. I will highlight some of the most relevant consequences of the relationship among social organizations and national and provincial levels. The analysis reveals that two very different political cycles at national level, Menem’s two presidential periods and the Kirchnerist period (Kirchner and Fernandez´s presidencies), brought about similar political consequences at local level, as regards the social protest impetus. The fiscal policies implemented by the national government in the nineties, during Menem´s presidencies, resulted in a provincial crisis that local elites could not face due to the dependence of the provincial economy on the national state. The provincial regime collapsed not only because of the demands of fiscal balance and public deficit reduction, but also because of company closures, unemployment increase and the lack of private job sources as an alternative to jobs offered by the state. Not only did social actors emerge and strengthen, which inspired and preceded the unemployed movement at national level, but they also played an important role in the provincial regime crisis (it would be a mistake to talk about a provincial regime transformation). Though the nation and the province belonged to the same political party in the nineties, national requirements made it more difficult for the sinking provincial economy to keep afloat, thus, triggering social protests. This also happened in other provinces. In a context of a weak state with ingrained economic powers, national fiscal policies had an impact at provincial level bringing about the development of a decade of struggle which incorporated a tradition of social struggle into a political culture 24. Contentious politics is understood as a tool to consolidate the link between the poorest and the provincial state. This is a complex relationship because protest leaders are organically related with the state.

24 To analyze the history of working class struggles prior to the nineties see Lagos and Gutierrez, op. cit and Fleitas y Kindgard 2007 .

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The influence of national policies and politics over provincial dynamics can be observed once more during Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez´s presidencies. By 2003 the economic crisis had been over, the governor was pro-government; however, the nation allocated public resources to several social organizations so that they would raise territorial political capital due to Kirchner’s weak position within the structure of the Peronist party. Since that time there has been a succession of ministers and policies in the social and infrastructure secretaries; there has also been a continuity of the relationship among national officials, the organization and the province. Thus national public resources and recognition consolidated Tupac Amaru action and its methods were emulated by other social actors. As a result, while protests of the unemployed have demobilized in almost the whole country (there are unionist, environmentalist and sectoral demonstrations), in Jujuy mobilizations are still being carried out and have consolidated as a regular tool for claiming. Official financing and recognition do not only contribute to the existence of a disproportionately powerful social organization, almost as powerful as the state, but also to the organizational management and success of other activists and leaders who may, or may no, be linked with the Tupac Amaru experience. Far from being disruptive, the protest process in Jujuy represents a provincial institution in the political field. Finally, it seems that the national government management conceals a paradox. Like other Latin American presidents of this decade, Kirchner and Fernandez de Kirchner have aimed at reverting to the neoliberal model, at integrating those groups whose interests are not represented, and at resorting to social movements and organizations to balance the struggle against powerful economic interest (Arnson, Armony Et. Al 2009 ). But, by delivering resources and recognizing organizations as political valid spokespersons, they reproduce the same neoliberal logic of the nineties. In other words, public social benefits are derived by the organizations and not by the state. It is the organizations the ones that integrate thousands of citizens from poor neighborhoods to public life. This dynamic has negative consequences for the social movement in itself: rather than being on the path to political and social integration of the poorest, they get closer to governments and social control technologies (Rose y Miller 1992, McLeavy 2009).

------*--------- Social policy delivery provides the opportunity for the emergence and consolidation of new social actors and it has consequences in terms of the management and the legitimacy of the provincial state. The links among public policy, the government and social actors can be compared to a variable geometrical relationship (Roberts y Portes 2006). This relationship gets even more complex when the consequences of interactions among the three levels of governments add to this. Roberts and Portes’ typology shows the relation between social mobilization and the degree of state intervention. In their analysis, proactive national states have a demobilizing effect on the civil society. However, in the case study analyzed in this paper, we have a present national state on the one hand, and an impotent and delegitimized provincial state on the other hand; this coexistence results in the increase and consolidation of contentious politics.

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The Tupac Amaru organization´s consolidation is based on Jujuy struggling tradition and on Milagro Sala´s great work capacity. But its growth can only be explained if we take into account the support of national public resources, which are permanently delivered, and the acknowledgement of the national government as a provincial valid spokesperson, consolidating its profile of provincial counter power. While other organizations have worked on a smaller scale or have been demobilized (for example, because of an upturn in the economy and the subsequent decrease of organization members, or the integration to the government or electoral alliances or failed political projects), the Tupac Amaru organization has not stopped growing. At present, the provincial government seems to be impotent to face the distribution of national resources to the organization. If it confronted this practice there would be two consequences: firstly, the opposition of the national government and some parts of the local elite (president Fernandez and former president Kirchner have close ties with the former governor of Jujuy and present leader of the chamber of deputies Eduardo Fellner and with his wife, senator Liliana Fellner); secondly, the Tupac Amaru organization would not give in until it got national resources and would claim them from the province with renewed energy. At present, the organization continues expanding its territorial presence and undermining the provincial government legitimacy, thus becoming a non-state veto player. Meanwhile, thousands of people who have never been part of the political and social provincial life now have a public space in their neighborhoods and experience participation.

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