Part II

Negotiating ConflictsThe Count of Monte Cristo Syndrome:Retributive Conflicts

Since 1976, a very large number of case studies using the Analytic HierarchyProcess have been developed. The hope in this work was that, by teaching peopleto analyze their conflicts and to lay bare the structure, reason would prevail andantagonists would be motivated to come to a reasonable and just solution.

But in a conflict, particularly one of long duration, reason rarely prevails.Instead, positions become entrenched and people seek not only to satisfy theirown needs but also to punish their opponents for having opposed them-or, atleast, to pay a price for their opposition.

New light may often be shed on a conflict. Experience has shown that aconflict may be alleviated by the use of a mediator who introduces "bargainingchips" into the negotiations. If A and B are the participants, A will look at thisparticular item and evaluate not only the incremental benefits to be received butalso the cost to the opponentof providing the concession: The greater each value,the greater the gain.

Thus A's gain for a given item may be described as the product of A's benefitsand B's costs (as A perceives them). We have the following ratios for the twoparties A and B:

A'sratio

(as perceived by A)

gain to A - I A's benefits x B's costs - gain to AA's perception of gain to B - I B's benefits x A's costs - loss to A

where I is the sum taken over all concessions by B in the numerator and by A inthe denominator. A's perceived ratio for B is the reciprocal of the above.

,..

_..

;.;::."

..,,~

188CONFLICT RESOLUTION

(as perceived by B)

B's gain to B - !, B's benefits x A's costs - gain to Bratio B' s perception of gain to A - ! A's benefits x B' s costs - loss to B

where 2.:is the sum taken over all concessions by A in the numerator and by B inthe denominator. B's perceived ratio for A is the reciprocal of the above.

If both A and B perceived costs and benefits in the same way, these ratioswould be reciprocals of each other. This almost never happens, however.

Obviously, each party would like its ratio to be as high as possible. If A's ratiofor some package is less than I, then A will perceive B' s ratio as being greaterthan 1 and will feel that it has not been treated fairly. The aim must be to findsingle concessions and groups of concessions where each party perceives its ownratio to be greater than 1. This requires skilled mediation.

It is wise to involve the parties and to gain their trust so that the necessaryestimates may be made. If this is not possible, then the analyst must use his orher best judgments for these.

The technique is used here for two case studies: the South African problem andthe free-trade discussions between the United States and Canada. In each casevery practical and specific suggestions are made for the negotiating process.

This theory of retributive conflict resolution was developed by T. L. Saaty inthe winter of 1986 and applied during that year to the two cases discussed here. Athird application, to the Punjab, has also been made but is not included here.

11South Africa Revisited

"

INTRODUCTION

In an earlier chapter we described an analysis of the conflict in 'South Africa thatwas carried out in 1980. This conflict continues and has moved to the center ofthe world stage. The new approach, which takes into account not only one'sincremental benefits from a concession but also the cost incurred by one's oppo-nents in yielding that concession was applied in a 1986 analysis of the SouthAfrican problem by Saaty, with assistance from Sethi.

In this analysis, possible "packages" of concessions are developed in such away as to provide tradeoffs that appear fair to the opposing parties. The role ofthe negotiator is highlighted in this discussion. It is shown here how the nego-tiator can help develop such tradeoffs.

Further, the use of a timeline is developed. Some exchanges of concessionsare beneficial for short-term improvements and can lead to an improved climateof opinion for the short-range and long-range negotiations. Possible negotiatingstrategies are suggested here also.

PROPOSED CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The conflict in South Africa between the minority white government and theblack majority has become a major cause of concern for the world. Though manyof the issues, as described in Tarbell and Saaty (1980), remain the same. otherissues related to the lifting of the state of emergency imposed on July 20, 1985,the release of Nelson Mandela, extending constitutional refom1 not only to themixed race "coloureds" and Indians but also to the blacks, acceptance of theSullivan code by U.S. corporations in South Africa, the suspension of Frenchinvestments, near collapse of the economy with the declining value of the Randto $0.35 (as compared to $1.00 in 1981)and a four-month freeze on most foreign

---------------------------------------

190 CONFLICT RESOLUTIONSouth Africa Revisited

loan repayments, major riots in Durban and other areas around Johannesburg, thethreat of disinvestments by a growing number of U.S. universities and otherinstitutional investors, and the ban of sale of gold Krugerrands in the UnitedStates are the present focus of attention. But at the root of the conflict remainissues of the abolition of apartheid, political power and citizenship to the blacks,economic equality between the blacks and whites, and black social freedom.

The conflict in South Africa has also seen an increasing turn to violence byboth the blacks and the white government leading to an unacceptable toll of lives.The images of black rioters and black victims, policemen wielding whips andclubs, burning cars and looted homes, white politicians promising reform butproducing more repression-all are seen regularly on television. As reported inNewsweek (September 16, 1985), despite nearly 700 deaths, a fiery new genera-tion of angry black youths is keeping the violent protests alive. Black politics isbeing shaped, not by the moderates such as Bishop Desmond Tutu and ChiefButhelzi, but by black students, many of whom believe that reconciliation withthe whites is not possible. The white government is responding to black violenceby sending heavily armed patrols into townships and arresting any black leaderswho have been identified; it is reported that regular soldiers were used, for thefirst time in recent history, for riot control in Sebokeng. The white government'sefforts to crush black protests is, in turn, making the blacks more radical; and,because of this polarization of interests, Oliver Tambo, the exiled African Na-tional Congress (ANC) leader, is predicting a blood bath in the region.

Due to this escalation of violence, any conflict resolution strategy has to takeinto account the acts of retaliation by parties against each other. These acts ofvengeance, born out of repression and frustration, may not lead to any benefit toa party. Rather, they might be undertaken to make the other party suffer. Theretributive conflict model would therefore be more applicable than the rationalmodel of conflict resolution.

As explained earlier, each party calculates its gain as the product of its benefitsand its perceived value of the costs to the opponent and its loss as the product ofits cost and its perceived value of the benefits to the opponent. Thus, in a conflictresolution scenario, wherein each party has a set of concessions to make, partyA, for example, calculates the benefits it will accrue from B's concessions, itsperception of the costs B will pay, its costs for making concessions to B, and itsperception of the benefits to B from these concessions.

Thus, there will ordinarily be four such calculations for each party and manymore for a mediator, for example, who would use the judgments the parties givehim and would compare them with his own perceptions; the mediator would thenattempt to alter their perceptions or convince them that certain concessions aremore to their advantage and advise them of the order in which such concessionsshould be made.

For the South African conflict, for both the white government and the blackmajority, four hierarchies each were developed to calculate the above-describedbenefits and costs. In all, therefore, there were eight hierarchies constructed: four

191

for the whites and four for the black majority, as shown in Figures 11.1 and 1J.2.A list of seventeen concessions were clustered into six groups for the whitegovernment and eighteen concessions were clustered into another six groups forthe blacks. These concessions formed the alternatives or bottoIn level of thehierarchy. .

One hierarchy in Figure 11.1 is shown in ejetai!together with the accompany-ing calculations to illustrate the general method employed. The conflict resolu-tion method uses the results from several hierarchies; we explain how to combinethese results.

The list of concessions for the black majority and the white government andthe justification for choosing these concessions a~ediscussed in Table 11.1. Thefirst hierarchy in Figure 11.1 represents the white government's estimate of itsbenefits from black majority concessions.

The white government would benefit if (I) the white community is appeased,(2) the whites maintain their rule, (3) the economy improves, (4) the whitegovernment gains sympathy from the Western World, (5) the threat of retaliationagainst the whites by the blacks decreased, and (6) the white government createsan acceptable policy for the independence of the blacks. While some benefits,such as Appease Whites, Gain Sympathy, Improve Economy, were further sub-divided, others led straight to the leaf nodes consisting of the list of blackconcessions. Comparative judgments were made at each level and these judg-ments for level 1 in the hierarchy are shown in the following matrix:

It is believed that maintenance of their rule is the main objective of rhe whitegovernment and is thus much more important than the other objectives. Thesecond most important concern of the white government is (0 appeasethe whitecommunity. The white community pressured President P. W. Botha to declare a

-----

HelativeAW MP EC GS 011 131' \V!'ight

Appease White Icommunity (AW) 1 1/2 5 6 4 3 .29JIMaintain power

I(MP) 2 ] 4 5 5 6 .377Improve economy I(EC) ]/5 ]/4 ] 7 4 3 .155IGain sympathy

]/7(GS) I ]/6 ]/5 I 1/6 1j:J .032Decreaseretaliation I(DR) ]/4 1/5 ]/4 6 J I .078IFormulate acceptable

1/3Black policy (BP) I 1/3 1/6 3 1 I .OG7

Figure 11.1Four Hierarchies for Calculating Whites' Ratio

GOAL: White Government Benefits for Black:Concessions

= :: --....---Maintain Majority Improve Economy Gain World Decrease Threat Establish an Accep-Control & Power Sympathy of Retaliation table Black Policy

~ ~ Against Whites/ '" - ~ ------

Increase Decrease Increase Give Power Decrease Decrease GrantForeign Strikes Western to Blades Police Violence HumanInvestml by Blacks Trade Attrocities in Region Rights

Appease WhiteCommunity

Improve Improve Decrease MaintainWhite Economy Threat of PoliticalBusiness Retaliation Control

GOAL: White Government Perception of Black:Costs

- I --- .In Fighting Among Revival of SA Economy Stoppage of Violence

Blacks Strikes, & OtherViolent Actionsby Blacks

Support to Whites byWestern World &Withdrawal ofSanctions Against SA

Blacks Agreeingto United Represen-tation & thustheir loss of poli-tical Power

GOAL: White Government Perception of Black:Benefits .

:: "" ~ ---:::-PowerSharing ReduceWhite ForceWhite Economic HumanRights

Political& Government EqualityEconomic to NegotiatePowers

DenounceWhites

Majority Rule

GOAL: White Costs from Their Own Concessions

: / ~ =::

Loss of Economic Loss of Investments Persecution Collapse World IsolationEducational, & Wealth of Blacks of EconomyEmploymentS.uperiority

Loss of PoliticalPower

...

Figure 11.2Four Hierarchies for Calculating Blacks' Ratio

Majority RuleIn SA

GOAL: Black Majority Benefits from White Concessions

== / ~ :Agreeing to Power Economic Equality Black Human Internal Unity Reduce EconomicSharin,gthan with Whites Rights Among Factions Disparity AmongMajonty Rule Blacks Themselves

Middle Class &Lower ClassBlacks

GOAL: Black Majority's Perception of White Costs

Isolation from World Loss of Political Power Loss of Economic Dissatisfaction of WhiteSuperiority Community with White

Government Policies in SA

"-........

GOAL: Black Majority Perception of White Benefits

/ ~ ---=Black Oppression Cottsolidation Discredit Black Promoting

of Apartheid by Projecting SA Racial" Struggle as Discord

Communist AmongBacked BlackS

White Majority RuleMaintain EconomicEducationalSuperiority

GOAL: Black Costs from Their Own Concessions

In Fighting Among Blacks Withdrawal of WesternSupport to Blacks

Decrease of BargainPower

No Hardships to Whitesand W9ite Community

South Africa Revisited 197

Table 11.1White and Black Concessions

Table 11.1 (continued)

Concessions by the white government

(2) Abandon violence:(a) Nelson Mandela appeals to his followers to stop violence.(b) All leaders in South Africa appeal for abandoning violence.(c) ANC agrees to end violence.

(3) Stop strikes and boycotts:(a) Stop the boycott of white businesses. ,(b) Stop all strikes.(c) Stop school boycotts by students.

(d) Stop the threat of unions making political demaqds (such as those by the Con-gress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU), which has about 500,000 mem-bers. Black membership in trade unions has increased threefold from 1980 to1983).

(4) Protect white interests in the future:(a) Protect white political power.(b) Protect white investments.(c) Agree to make a peaceful transition of power without any violent retaliations

against whites.(5) Agree to a sharing of political power rather than majority rule:

(a) Sharing of power to start immediately.(b) A gradual evolution to power sharing within two years.

(6) Cooperate with the white government for economic growth.

(l) Release political prisoners:As of March 1986, this concession can be further subdivided into (a) Release onlyNelson Mandela and (b) Release all prisoners.

(2) Draw up an agenda for a national convention (The Economist, July 27, 1985):(a) Invite all leaders including those from the banned African National Congress

(ANC). .

(b) Invite only Bishop Tutu.(c) Invite all but Nelson Mandela unless he condemns violence.

(3) Maintain Neo-Apartheid: Defined by Martin and Johnson (1985) as meaning "theweakening of classical apartheid through economic change, the dismantling of somebits of petty apartheid and the extension of limited political rights to the coloreds andIndians coupled with the retention of a racially biased franchise, harsh implementa-tion of influx control through forced removals and continued restrictions governingwhere people work and live." This concession was further subdivided into(a) Remove petty apartheid (in buses, for example).(b) Remove restrictions at beaches.(c) Make other cosmetic changes.

(4) Abandon the proposal of new regional councils; it consists of (Slabbert, 1983):(a) Give local government in black areas more autonomy and money.(b) Accept the reality of urban migration and develop a rational urbanization policy.(c) Abolish forced removals of people and the break-up of family life.

(5) Decentralize industries to black areas and black education:(a) Decentralize industries to black homelands.(b) Promote black education (government spending on education is $87 per pupil for

blacks and $659 per pupil for whites).

(c) Grant greater money for black improvement in the budget.(6) Make a declaration of intent that wiII grant full citizenship, under one constitution, to

all colors:(a) Within one year.(b) Between one to two years.(c) In greater than two years.

Black majority concessions

state of emergency (Newsweek, August 5, 1985). Its discontent has also led tothe rise of the Afrikaaner-Ied Reconstituted National Party, which is threateningBotha's ruling Nationalist Party.

Improving the economy was considered more important than gaining sympa-thy, and gaining sympathy was considered more important than decreasing thethreat.

Similar subjective judgments were made at each level to complete the hier-archy. The results were aggregated to calculate the,white government's benefitsfrom each of the black concessions. While the preceding hierarchy demonstratesthe calculation of benefits, the calculation of costs can be done in a similarfashion and is now discussed for the white government's estimate of the extent ofblack costs from black concessions shown in the second hierarchy of Figure11.1.

The overall importance of each of the five criteria was calculated as(1) Decrease Western pressure:

(a) Persuade the United States against disinvestment (without foreign investmentonly a growth rate of 3.5 percent compared to 5.5 percent otherwise will bemanaged) .

(b) Lift United States military sanctions (South Africa critically needs missile guid-ance systems, airplane and helicopter spares, reconnaissance aircraft, and ulti-mately a new generation of fighter bombers).

(c) Lift Western trade barriers.(d) Abandon United States corporations' involvement through acts like Sullivan

principles in South Africa's internal affairs. .-- --- -- - -- -- --- -- -- - - -- - - -- ----

NS=0.189lB = 0.080

EC = 0.062VL = 0.036PP = 0.627

200CONFLICT RESOLUTION

column 1, the costs to whites; column 2, perceived benefits to blacks; column 6is the product of column 4, the benefits to blacks, and column 5, perceived coststo whites. Similarly, in Table 11.3 columns 3 and 6 show respectively from theblacks' perspectives the total gain to whites and the total loss to blacks fromblacks' concessions. Again column 3 is the product of columns 1 and 2, andcolumn 6 is the product of columns 4 and 5.

These estimates of gains and losses are used by each party in deciding whetherit should make a concession in return for a concession by the other party. Forinstance, the total white losses from the white government's concession of Re-leaseNelsonMandelahavethevalueof 1,860(column3, Table11.2).Thewhitegovernment will agree to make this concession in exchange for any concessionby the black majority that will give the white government gains greater than

Table 11.4Gains and Losses

Dl8.CkConcessiOIl9

Whi~e

f;ainBtColl)

BI8.Ck1088eS(Col 2)

White ra~io:

~ain/l088(ColljI860)

Black ratio:~ain/l088(561/Col 2)

l(a). Induce Western world to lift trade barriers against SA:

4(a). Agree to White political rights in future:

2442 704 1.31 0.79

6(a). Cooperate for economic growth:

24252 14620 13.03 0.038

The numbers in CoIUIDDB1 and 2 of Table 4 are priorities that have beenmultiplied by 100000.

I

I

South Africa Revisited 201

1,860. A list of black concessions satisfying this criterion (from column 3, Table11.2) is shown in Table 11.3. But the black majority will agree to make any ofthe concessions identified in Table 11.4 if, and only if. the gain to them from thewhite concession Release Nelson Mandela of 561 (column 6, Table 1L2) isgreater than their loss from making any of the black concessions. As shown inTable 11.4, the black losses from any of the black concessions are always greaterthan 561. The ratios of gains to losses are also calculated by each party anu forthis particular case are shown in Table 11.4. As can be seen, while this ratio isalways greater than 1 for the whites, it is less than 1 if the blacks exchange any oftheir concessions of Table 11.4 with the white concession Release Nelson Man-

dela. Thus, the black majority would not agree t() this exchange.This impasse is reached because each party wants its gains to be greater than

its losses. The ratio of gains to losses is'less than I for the blacks; tillIS, anegotiator is needed for reconciliation, for otherwise the blacks IIlay attempt toraise the cost for the whites.

THE ROLE OF THE NEGOTIATOR

We now discuss the role of the negotiator. First we show how the negotiator canuse the various estimates of the gains and losses by the conrticting parties toanalyze what sets of concessions, in terms of exchanges of particular blackconcessions with particular white concessions, might be acceptable to both par-ties. Next, we discuss how the goals of the negotiator can be incorporated in thenegotiation process. We develop a decision hierarchy for the negotiator. Itspurpose is to assist the negotiator in choosing between different sets of feasibleconcessions that depend on whether the focus is Oil long-run, middle-run, orshort-run objectives to resolve the conflict. A computer program. which derivesthe sets of feasible concessions based on estimates of gains and losses, is alsodescribed.

The objective of the negotiator is to ensure that each party's gain-loss ratio isgreater than 1 and that one party does not perceive the other party's ratio to bemuch greater than its own. Specifically, in the preceding example, the negotiatorhas to devise means of making the gain-loss ratio of the black majority compara-ble with that of the white govemment on at least one bla~kconcession. As can beseen from Table 11.4, the white govemment's gain-loss ratio is smallest for tileblack concession of agreeing to white political power in the future. The blackmajority's gain-loss ratio for this alternative is 0.79. The negotiator can now tryeither to decrease the white ratio or to increase the black majority's ratio. Let LISassume that the latter altemative is chosen. The black majority's ratio can beincreased by either increasing the total gains or by decreasing the total losses tothe blacks. The former can be done by increasing black gnins from white conces-sions (column 4, Table 11.2) or increasing the black perception of the cost to thewhites for their concessions (column 5, Table 11.2). The latter can similarIy bedone by decreasing the blacks' costs of their own concessions (column 4, Table

--

4559 8556 2.45 0.065

I(e). Pressure US against any form of disinvestment:

28314 53457 15.22 0.01

2(b). All SA leaders appeal for nonviolence:

24990 11660 13.43 0.048

3(a). Stop all boycotts:

6864 2494 3.69 0.225