277

Part Four

Two Hard Cases

Although very serious consequences are associated with the pro-liferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ofballistic missiles, the number of states aggressively pursuing these

capabilities is remarkably small. In fact, only two new countries—

North Korea and Iran—are now moving toward producing nuclear

weapons in the next decade. These two hard cases are the focus of

major international nonproliferation efforts. Each of these countries is

pursuing nuclear capabilities for various reasons, which need to be

understood to shape effective nonproliferation policies.

The primary danger of this spread of nuclear capabilities is not that

each country would use nuclear weapons to attack the United States

or other nations but that its acquisition of nuclear weapons would

force neighboring states to reconsider their own nuclear options. A

nuclear chain reaction could spread from the Middle East or North-

east Asia, resulting in several, or perhaps many, new nuclear nations.

The success or failure of nonproliferation with these two nations could

decide the future of the entire nonproliferation regime.

CHAPTER 14

North Korea

279

Nuclear Weapons Capability

North Korea has an active nuclear weapon program and may already possessenough separated plutonium to produce as many as nine nuclear weapons (seetable 14.1 at the end of the chapter). It is unclear how many, if any, weaponsNorth Korea has built. U.S. intelligence agencies have stated that “in the mid-1990s North Korea had produced one possibly two, nuclear weapons,”1 but thisestimate may be based on assumptions about Pyongyang’s intentions and capa-bilities rather than direct evidence.

North Korea continues to operate a small plutonium production reactor atthe Yongbyon nuclear center that can produce enough weapons-grade pluto-nium for one nuclear weapon every year. In addition, there is evidence that NorthKorea may be pursuing a uranium enrichment centrifuge program that couldincrease its access to weapons-grade nuclear material in the coming years. Theexact scale of the North Korean centrifuge program, however, is not publiclyknown, and it is unclear when North Korea will be able to begin production ofweapons-grade uranium. U.S. intelligence has yet to publicly identify any cen-trifuge enrichment facilities in North Korea.

Aircraft and Missile Capability

North Korea has an advanced ballistic missile capability, having tested and de-ployed missiles with ranges of more than 1,000 kilometers and conducted a singletest of a longer-range system that, if fully developed, may be able to deliver asmall payload to the United States. Reliable estimates indicate that North Koreahas deployed approximately 100 of its most advanced ballistic missile, the me-dium-range No Dong.2 Pyongyang continues to abide by a self-declared suspen-sion of its missile flight tests but retains the ability to resume tests at any time.North Korea is the leading exporter of short-range ballistic missiles in the world,and it has sold missiles or missile production capabilities to Egypt, Iran, Libya,Pakistan, and Syria. North Korea may also be gaining important flight test infor-mation from missiles being tested in other countries, such as Iran, and it continuesto conduct ground-based testing of missile engines and components.

Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability

North Korea is believed to possess large stocks of chemical weapons and precur-sor chemicals, as well as an infrastructure that can be used to produce biological

Two Hard Cases280

weapons. Although it has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con-vention, it has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. U.S. officialsbelieve that North Korea has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the1960s and is able to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for mili-tary purposes within weeks of a decision to do so.3 The U.S. Defense Depart-ment believes that North Korea would use chemical weapons against U.S. orSouth Korean troops in combat.

The Strategic Context

North Korea’s unchecked nuclear weapons capabilities represent a serious threatto regional security; to several key U.S. allies, including South Korea and Japan;and to the global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This isolatedand highly secretive country has developed a largely indigenous nuclear weap-ons and ballistic missile production capability, and in the coming decades itcould produce large amounts of nuclear materials for its own weapons and pos-sibly for export to others. Other nations possess a limited set of tools to influ-ence North Korean behavior and convince its enigmatic leadership to abandonits unconventional weapons production and export activities, and the possiblecollapse of this poor and reclusive country cannot be discounted. Past effortsthat have alternated between enticing and pressuring North Korea to abandonits nuclear program have been unsuccessful.

The continued military confrontation between North Korea and South Ko-rea (and its ally the United States) represents the main source of instability inNortheast Asia—a standoff exacerbated by North Korea’s pursuit of nuclearweapons and ballistic missiles. The parties remain, to this day, in a technicalstate of war. The United States has long-standing treaty and political commit-ments to defend South Korea from North Korean attack. The United Statescurrently deploys more than 30,000 troops in South Korea, although it has plansto realign and reduce its troop presence on the peninsula in the coming years.North Korea’s alleged possession of nuclear weapons and its continued produc-tion of nuclear materials threaten the United States’ ability to deter North Koreaactions that undermine U.S. or South Korean interests. There is increasing con-cern that as North Korea consolidates its nuclear position, it may become moreadventurous in its attempts to extract concessions from other countries and todrive a wedge between the United States and its allies in the region. The key tothe U.S. approach to stability on the Korean peninsula is to make clear to theNorth that any attack against the South would fail and present unacceptablecosts to Pyongyang.

U.S. Policy toward North Korea

The United States has no formal diplomatic relations with North Korea. U.S.policy toward the reclusive state has alternated in the past two decades from oneof open engagement to outright confrontation. In 1991, the United States be-gan an initially cautious and then more active strategy of engagement with

North Korea 281

Pyongyang, with the goal of ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons activitiesand encouraging improved relations between North Korea and South Korea.This process included a high-level meeting in 1991 between then–undersecretaryof state Arnold Kantor and North Korean representative Kim Yong Sun thatconvinced North Korea to complete the legal process of adhering to the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992.

This process continued and expanded under President Bill Clinton, whichalso featured several periods of crisis including one that almost led to war withNorth Korea. That crisis eventually resulted in the completion of the 1994 AgreedFramework, which froze North Korea’s nuclear material production for eightyears. The final months of the Clinton administration saw an intense negotiat-ing effort to end North Korea’s ballistic missile program, including a prolongedset of discussions dating from the mid-1990s. Then–secretary of state MadeleineAlbright traveled to Pyongyang in 2000 and became the highest-ranking U.S.official ever to meet with Kim Jong Il. But the details of a missile eliminationagreement could not be concluded by the time George W. Bush was inauguratedin January 2001.

Upon assuming office, the Bush administration undertook a wholesale reas-sessment of U.S. policy toward North Korea. Many incoming officials had ac-tively opposed the 1994 Agreed Framework and were highly skeptical of NorthKorea’s commitment to give up its nuclear weapon programs. Other officials,most notably Secretary of State Colin Powell, sought to “pick up where Presi-dent Clinton and his administration left off ” with North Korea,4 a desire thatwas quickly countermanded by more conservative elements of the Bush teamand the president himself. On June 6, 2001, the White House completed itspolicy review and issued a presidential statement announcing that the UnitedStates should “undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agendato include: improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to NorthKorea’s nuclear activities; verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile pro-grams and a ban on its missile exports; and a less threatening conventional mili-tary posture.”5

Despite this stated desire to pursue discussions, the fabric of the U.S.–NorthKorean relationship was steadily deteriorating. Confronting the North Koreanregime and other “rogue” states was a clear priority for the new administrationeven before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Attempts by South Koreanpresident Kim Dae Jung to win President Bush’s endorsement for his engage-ment or “sunshine” policy toward the North was bluntly rejected during a Wash-ington summit between U.S. and South Korean leaders in March 2001. Lessthan a year later, President Bush included North Korea as a charter member ofthe “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union address. The National SecurityStrategy Statement of the United States released in 2002 talked about the pos-sible need to take preemptive military action against states like North Korea.These and additional statements made it clear that the Bush administration in-tended to pursue a more assertive policy of confronting hostile states such asNorth Korea; openly called for regime change in these states; and held open thepossible use of nuclear weapons against North Korea, despite pledges in the Agreed

Two Hard Cases282

Framework to provide Pyongyang with assurances against the use of these weap-ons.

The situation remained tense in 2002. For more than a year, the administra-tion made no concrete progress on its stated desire to pursue comprehensivetalks with North Korea. In the summer of 2002, U.S. intelligence agencies con-cluded that North Korea had been secretly trying to acquire a uranium enrich-ment program for at least two years. The assessment was based primarily onefforts by North Korea—some successful—to buy and import enrichment-related equipment through the A. Q. Khan network of black market nuclearsuppliers. The assessment, summed up in an unclassified summary submittedto Congress in 2002, also stated that the United States had recently learnedthat the “North had begun construction of a centrifuge facility,” although nosuch site has been publicly identified. At the time, intelligence reports indi-cated that North Korea’s uranium enrichment efforts stretched back to 1999or 2000. The enrichment program violated the spirit of the 1994 Agreed Frame-work and the stated interpretation by the United States of that arrangement,as well as the 1992 North–South denuclearization agreement. It may also,depending on how far the program had advanced, have constituted a furtherviolation of the NPT, which requires that all nuclear facilities be declared tothe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placed under safeguards.The intelligence findings confirmed doubts about North Korea’s intentions inthe minds of those government officials who were skeptical of engagementwith North Korea and reinforced their desire to adopt a different approachtoward Pyongyang.6

In October 2002, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia, James Kelly,traveled to Pyongyang for long-postponed discussions with his counterpart, KimGye Gwan. During the talks, Kelly confronted Kim over the North’s uraniumenrichment effort and informed him that any improvement in United States–North Korea relations would be conditional on the immediate and verified elimi-nation of the enrichment program.7 During the two days of meetings, NorthKorean officials consistently denied the enrichment allegation, until Kang SokJu, the vice foreign minister, joined the talks and, according to all U.S. partici-pants, admitted that the enrichment effort did exist. Since then, North Koreanofficials have consistently denied the admission, claiming that their words weretranslated incorrectly. U.S. officials maintain that Kim not only admitted to theprogram’s existence but also claimed that North Korea had the right to possessnuclear weapons because of the hostile policies of the Bush administration. ViceMinister Kang reportedly had no response when confronted with the allegationthat the enrichment program predated the election of George W. Bush.

In December 2002, after having been confronted by the United States over itsalleged uranium enrichment program, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectorsfrom the country and removed all IAEA monitoring equipment and seals fromits nuclear facilities, including the seals on the 8,000 fuel rods stored at Yongbyon.In addition, on January 10, 2003, North Korea announced that it was immedi-ately withdrawing from the NPT. North Korea claimed on February 10, 2005,that it had “manufactured” nuclear weapons as a deterrent to U.S. hostility.8 The

North Korea 283

5-megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor at Yongbyon was restarted in 2002 and op-erated for more than two years. The reactor shut down in April 2005 and couldprovide North Korea with an additional 12 to 19 kilograms of plutonium.

Since confronting North Korea in October 2002, the United States has soughtto convince the country to admit to and eliminate its uranium enrichment pro-gram, and also to eliminate all its nuclear weapons capabilities under effectiveverification. This process has centered on what are known as the six-party talks,which convened in August 2003 and then again in February and June 2004 inBeijing. The talks include representatives from the United States, North Korea,South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. China was instrumental in creating thetalks, and it has been influential (according to both Chinese and American offi-cials) in persuading North Korea to participate in them.9

The first two rounds of the six-party talks produced little agreement. TheUnited States has sought to use the talks largely as a vehicle to bring coordi-nated, international pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear activitiesand has refused to provide anything to North Korea that could be deemed as areward for Pyongyang’s participation in the talks or any interim moves on theNorth’s nuclear program. The United States has also rejected calls to engage inany formal bilateral negotiations with North Korea, something Pyongyang haslong sought and that might also be interpreted as a reward for its past behavior.North Korea, for its part, has tried to use the talks as a way of extracting conces-sions from the United States and other countries and has also tried to leveragethe talks by demanding rewards simply for participating in them.

The U.S. posture at the talks changed significantly at their third round, whichbegan on June 21, 2004. At the urging of South Korean and Japanese officials,the United States offered a detailed proposal for ending North Korea’s nuclearprogram. This proposal included U.S. support for incentives for North Korea tobe provided by other states—particularly South Korea and Japan, a major changefrom previous U.S. policy. The proposal called for a new declaration to be madeby North Korea, to include all plutonium production and uranium enrichmentcapabilities, nuclear materials, weapons and related equipment, and for the elimi-nation of all of these to begin after a three-month preparatory period.

In exchange for agreeing to this proposed approach, non-U.S. parties wouldprovide North Korea with heavy fuel oil, and once the declaration was given bythe North and deemed credible, the other parties would provide North Koreawith multilateral security assurances, which would become more enduring asthe process proceeded; begin a study on North Korea’s energy requirements tosee how to best meet them with non-nuclear energy programs; and begin a dis-cussion of lifting all remaining U.S. sanctions against the North. In describingthe talks before Congress, Assistant Secretary Kelly stressed that as North Koreaundertook its obligation, the moves by the other parties would be temporaryand “would only yield lasting benefits to [North Korea] after the dismantlementof its nuclear program had been completed.”10 No new talks have been heldsince the third round, as of April 2005. North Korea’s February 2005 announce-ment that it possesses nuclear weapons and the apparent shutdown of its 5-MWe reactor at Yongbyon make an early resumption of the talks unlikely.

Two Hard Cases284

Nuclear Analysis

As of the spring of 2005, North Korea may have possessed enough separatedplutonium to produce up to nine nuclear weapons. The 5-MWe research reactorat Yongbyon can produce enough plutonium for one more nuclear weapon eachyear. The United States and several other countries are also convinced that NorthKorea is developing the ability to produce weapons-grade uranium through cen-trifuge enrichment. It is unclear when North Korea might be able to start pro-ducing enriched uranium. Although there is no conclusive, public evidence thatNorth Korea possesses any actual nuclear weapons, several top officials have statedthat it already possesses such weapons. And on February 10, 2005, North Koreadeclared for the first time that it possesses nuclear weapons. Pyongyang is thoughtto be capable of building a first-generation nuclear device, given its current stateof technology. North Korea’s access to the A. Q. Khan black market has onlyenhanced the assessment that it can produce nuclear weapons. At least one otherKhan customer, Libya, obtained complete and detailed nuclear warhead designsfrom Pakistan.

Over the long run, North Korea has the potential to become a full-fledgednuclear weapon state. Before its decisions to freeze its nuclear program in 1994,Pyongyang was on the verge of becoming a major producer of weapons-gradeplutonium. Though there are no public signs that North Korea has resumedconstruction at other known nuclear facilities, it was previously pursuing nuclearreactors, fuel-fabrication, and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities able to produce275 kilograms of plutonium a year, enough for 50 weapons annually.11 Thiswould provide it with enough nuclear materials to build its own nuclear arsenalsand to export substantial quantities of plutonium to other states. It was thisexport capability that, as much as anything, led to the negotiation of the AgreedFramework in 1994.

Previous Plutonium Production

North Korea’s nuclear research program is reported to have begun as early as the1950s.12 Because it was a Soviet client state, its nuclear engineers were largelytrained at Soviet scientific institutes and it received a small research reactor fromthe USSR that began operation in 1965. Concerns over North Korea’s nuclearweapons program did not fully emerge until the mid-1980s. During this period,U.S. intelligence satellites reportedly photographed the construction of a researchreactor and the beginnings of a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon.13 In 1989,open press sources indicated for the first time that North Korea possessed a plu-tonium production reactor and extraction capability.14

Also in 1989, North Korea was reported, based on intelligence sources, tohave shut down its main research and plutonium production reactor for ap-proximately 100 days.15 This would have given it enough time to refuel the en-tire reactor and provide it with a source of enough nuclear material to build anuclear device. At the time, neither the United States nor any other countrytook direct action in response to these activities. The strategy pursued was to

North Korea 285

press North Korea to join and then come into full compliance with its obliga-tions under the NPT, and to make that compliance a condition of progress ondiplomatic issues.

Pyongyang acceded to the NPT on April 18, 1985, after a concerted effortled by the Soviet Union, which hoped to sell North Korea light-water-powerreactors (which were never built). North Korea completed the negotiation of asafeguard agreement with the IAEA within the eighteen months required by thetreaty, but it was not until April 9, 1992, that Pyongyang finally approved itsIAEA safeguard agreement. Initial inspections to verify the accuracy of NorthKorea’s initial declaration began in May 1992. These long-awaited developmentscame after the United States signaled that it would withdraw its nuclear weap-ons from South Korea as part of a global tactical nuclear withdrawal in 1991.North Korea had publicly made the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons fromSouth Korea a condition of its completion of a safeguard agreement. The UnitedStates had stationed a large number (more than 700 in some years) of nuclearweapons in South Korea as part of its alliance with South Korea and its Cold Warstrategy of flexible response to a possible attack by the Soviet Union or its allies.

In all, six official IAEA inspection missions took place in North Korea from1992 to 1993. The initial inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities includedtours of the completed 5-MWe reactor and of the 50-MWe plant still underconstruction, as well as of the incomplete “radiochemical laboratory,” describedby the IAEA as a plutonium-reprocessing facility. Subsequent inspections fo-cused mainly on the plutonium-reprocessing facilities in North Korea, includ-ing some small-scale extraction equipment, referred to as hot cells.

North Korea informed the IAEA as part of this initial inspection process thatit had conducted a one-time plutonium extraction experiment on “damaged”fuel rods removed from the 5-MWe reactor at Yongbyon in 1989. The IAEA wasgiven access to the small amount separated by North Korea (approximately 90grams,16 or less than 1/40th of the amount required to build a nuclear device).The IAEA’s chemical analysis of samples taken from the radiochemical labora-tory and hot cells, however, contradicted North Korea’s claims that it had previ-ously separated only the 90 grams of plutonium on one occasion. Instead, theIAEA results indicated that the North had separated plutonium in four cam-paigns over a three-year period, starting in 1989.17 The samples taken by theIAEA showed a variety of radioactive by-products that suggested numerous in-stances of reprocessing activities. In describing the findings, IAEA director gen-eral Hans Blix explained, “We found two gloves, a waste glove and a plutoniumglove, and they don’t match.”18 This means that North Korea’s statements re-garding its past plutonium production were not consistent with what the samplesrevealed and indicate that North Korea possesses more plutonium than it hasdeclared to the IAEA or to the international community.

The findings added weight to the allegation that North Korea had removedsignificant amounts of fuel from its 5-MWe reactor during the observed shut-down in 1989. U.S. intelligence analysts believed that the reactor’s core mighthave been completely replaced during a 100-day shutdown. Intelligence infor-mation provided to the IAEA also indicated that waste products from the North’s

Two Hard Cases286

plutonium extraction campaigns may have been stored at two nearby sites, whichappeared to be linked to the radiochemical laboratory by underground pipescapable of transporting liquid wastes. The North Koreans had unsuccessfullycamouflaged the sites and the underground pipes.

A long series of discussions and negotiations ensued over these issues, includ-ing an unusual visit to North Korea by Blix. Yet the talks did not enable theIAEA inspectors to gain the unfettered access to sites and information consid-ered necessary to resolve the discrepancies that had been discovered. On Febru-ary 11, 1993, Blix officially requested a “special inspection” of the two suspectedwaste sites, marking the first time in the IAEA’s history that it had used its rightto conduct such visits. Although these sites had been visited by the IAEA duringthe third inspection mission to North Korea in September 1993, North Koreadid not permit full access to the sites, which were not included in its “initialdeclaration.” Ten days later, North Korea’s atomic energy minister informed Blixthat the North was refusing the IAEA’s special inspection request. And on March12, in a letter to the three NPT depositary states and the other NPT members,North Korea said that it was exercising its right of withdrawal from the NPT, totake effect in 90 days as spelled out in article 10, which permits such action on90 days’ notice if a party’s “supreme national interests” are jeopardized.

After a round of negotiations with the United States in June 1993, NorthKorea agreed to “suspend” its withdrawal one day short of the 90-day count-down. However, North Korea asserted that it was no longer a full party to theNPT and that the IAEA no longer had the right to conduct even normal routineand ad hoc inspections. During the ensuing nine months, Pyongyang severelyconstrained the IAEA inspection activities that are needed to preserve the “con-tinuity of safeguards.” This led Blix to declare in December 1993 that IAEAsafeguards in North Korea could no longer provide “any meaningful assurances”that nuclear materials were not being diverted to weapons uses.19

Negotiations between the IAEA and North Korea continued. In March 1994,as part of a complicated package deal with the United States, North Korea ini-tially agreed to an IAEA inspection of its declared facilities, but it then blockedthe IAEA from taking key radioactive samples at the plutonium extraction plantat Yongbyon.20

More Plutonium

The crisis escalated further in mid-May 1994, when North Korea announcedthat it was going to defuel its 5-MWe reactor. The need for the IAEA to gainaccess to the fuel to be removed from this reactor immediately became of inter-national concern, for two reasons. First, the fuel contained up to 30 kilogramsof plutonium, which could be used to produce several nuclear weapons. Second,by getting access to the fuel and taking appropriate samples, the IAEA coulddetermine whether the fuel had been in the reactor since its initial operationbegan in 1986 or whether the fuel was a secondary batch, indicating that NorthKorea had indeed removed an entire load of fuel from the reactor during the1989 shutdown.

North Korea 287

North Korea steadfastly refused to implement procedures demanded by theIAEA to segregate 300 carefully selected fuel rods from the 8,000-rod core, claim-ing that it was not a fully bound member of the NPT or of its safeguard agree-ment.21 As Pyongyang accelerated and completed the defueling, Hans Blix de-clared in a letter to the U.N. Security Council on June 2, 1994, that the “agency’sability to ascertain, with sufficient confidence, whether nuclear material fromthe reactor has been diverted in the past, has been . . . lost.”22 Some controversysurrounds this point, because other ways to determine the reactor’s history havesince been developed and put forward.

These developments prompted the United States to circulate a proposal tothe U.N. Security Council on June 15 calling for two phases of sanctions againstNorth Korea. The first phase of the sanctions, which were to be activated after agrace period, consisted of a worldwide ban on arms imports from, and armsexports to, North Korea, along with a downgrading of diplomatic ties. In thesecond phase, to be triggered if the North continued to reject the IAEA’s de-mands, a worldwide ban on financial dealings with Pyongyang would be imple-mented.23 Moreover, the United States publicly began discussing plans to rein-force its military presence in South Korea, and there were growing calls for U.S.military action against North Korea to prevent it from gaining full access to theplutonium-bearing spent fuel.

The crisis eased after former U.S. president Jimmy Carter met with NorthKorean president Kim Il Sung on June 16 and 17. The North Korean leaderagreed to freeze his country’s nuclear program if the United States would resumehigh-level diplomatic talks. These negotiations took place in July but were sus-pended until early August because of the sudden death of Kim Il Sung on July 9.These talks eventually led to the negotiation of an Agreed Statement on August12, 1994, under which, in broad terms, North Korea agreed to dismantle theelements of its nuclear program linked to the production of nuclear arms inreturn for the supply of two, less proliferation-prone, light-water reactors (LWRs)and a number of other energy- and security-related inducements.24

The Agreed Framework

The United States and North Korea engaged in several months of negotiationsin the summer and fall of 1994, a process that resulted in the Agreed Frame-work, which was signed on October 21, 1994.25 The deal contained a basic tradeof obligations, with North Korea agreeing to freeze and eventually dismantle itsnuclear facilities and eliminate its nuclear weapon capabilities in exchange forthe construction of two modern nuclear power reactors and normalized rela-tions with the United States.26

The agreement required North Korea to remain a member of the NPT and tocome into full compliance with its IAEA safeguard agreement once a “signifi-cant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclearcomponents.” This delay postponed the question of North Korea’s past produc-tion of plutonium until the final stages of the agreement’s implementation, leav-ing open the question of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities while its existing

Two Hard Cases288

capabilities were frozen. Moreover, it established North Korea’s obligation toaccept whatever steps the IAEA decides are necessary to verify the accuracy ofthe country’s nuclear declaration.

The Agreed Framework also included a U.S. pledge not to use or threaten touse nuclear weapons against the North, and a North Korean commitment toimplement the 1992 North–South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization ofthe Korean Peninsula, which banned uranium enrichment and plutonium re-processing on the entire peninsula.

Uranium Enrichment

The full scope of North Korea’s efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment pro-gram is unknown. As noted above, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded in thesummer of 2002 that North Korea had embarked on a uranium enrichmentprogram, was buying centrifuge equipment from outside suppliers, and had begunthe construction of a uranium enrichment centrifuge facility. At the time, theCentral Intelligence Agency reported to Congress that “North [Korea] is con-structing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two ormore nuclear weapons per year when fully operational—which could be as soonas mid-decade.”27 Other sources claim that North Korea was able to obtain partsfor just over 2,000 centrifuges, but it was not clear if the North had acquiredenough complete centrifuge kits to assemble that many units, or if it had thetechnical training or assistance needed to assemble and operate a full-scale ura-nium enrichment cascade.28 Moreover, there is no publicly available evidencethat North Korea can produce large amounts of uranium hexaflouride, which isthe feed material needed to enrich uranium through the centrifuge process.

The majority of publicly available evidence surrounding North Korea’s en-richment effort comes through tracking Pyongyang’s foreign procurement ef-forts.29 North Korea’s continued refusal to publicly acknowledge that it possessesa uranium enrichment program, and the United States’ inability or refusal topublicly identify uranium enrichment sites, had initially led South Korea andChinese officials to express doubts about the U.S. claims of a uranium programby the North. These doubts have been reduced by American sharing of informa-tion with both of these countries, but many questions about the scale, progress,and eventually completion of North Korea’s uranium efforts remain unanswered.It is also possible, though not yet proven, that North Korea purchases centrifugeequipment for the purpose of selling or transferring it to other customers of theA. Q. Khan network and no longer possesses any uranium enrichment equip-ment.

Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis

North Korea possesses chemical weapons and a large quantity of chemical precur-sors for the production of such weapons. It is likely to have the ability to pro-duce “bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agent.”30 Moreover,North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, and it has not

North Korea 289

acknowledged that it possesses chemical weapons or agreed to eliminate its hold-ings. North Korea is thought to possess the means to deliver chemical weaponsby ballistic missile, as well as by conventional artillery or aircraft. North Koreantroops have also been trained to fight in contaminated areas, according to theU.S. Defense Department.31

North Korea maintains facilities involved in producing or storing chemicalprecursors, agents, and weapons. It has at least eight industrial facilities that canproduce chemical agents. The production rate and types of munitions, however,are uncertain. Presumably, adamsite, phosgene, prussic acid, sarin, tabun, and afamily of mustard gases—constituting the basis of North Korea’s chemical weap-ons—are produced there. According to the assessment of U.S. intelligence ser-vices, North Korea’s reserves, accommodated at perhaps a half dozen major stor-age sites and in as many as 170 mountain tunnels, total at least 180 to 250metric tons, with some estimates of chemical stockpiles running as high as 5,000metric tons.32

North Korea possesses a rudimentary biological weapons capability and hasengaged in biological research since the 1960s. Its biological weapons programis not nearly as advanced as its nuclear, chemical, or ballistic missile programs,but it is believed to have the basic infrastructure to produce several biologicalagents, including anthrax, cholera, and plague. It could deliver such weapons byseveral means, including artillery or possibly ballistic missiles.33

Missile Analysis

North Korea has an extensive ballistic missile program, based primarily on tech-nology derived from Soviet-designed Scud-B missiles. North Korea acquired anumber of Scud missiles from Egypt in the 1970s. It either successfully reverse-engineered the system (improving its range and accuracy) or received substan-tially more equipment and assistance from the Soviet Union than is publiclyknown. With substantial financing from customer states, including Iran, NorthKorea has developed and deployed the Scud–Mod B (with a 320- to 340-kilometer range and a 1,000-kilogram payload), the Scud–Mod C (with a 500-kilometer range and a 700-kilogram payload), and the No Dong (with a 1,000-kilometer range and a 700–1,000 kilogram payload).

In addition, North Korea tested a ballistic missile/space launch vehicle knownas the Taepo Dong I on August 31, 1998. Although the third stage of the missilefailed to boost its payload into orbit, the system demonstrated North Korea’saccelerating ability to launch a multistage missile and to develop a system withthe potential for intercontinental range. The system is believed to use a No Dongas its first stage and a Scud-B as its second stage. The third stage is thought to bea solid rocket “kick motor” of unknown origin.

North Korea is also reportedly working on a longer-range Taepo Dong IImissile that could enable it to deliver a nuclear-sized payload to the continentalUnited States. The threat from this untested missile is the main justification forthe U.S. development and deployment of missile defense interceptors in Alaskaand California. However, North Korea is observing a self-declared moratorium

Two Hard Cases290

on missile flight tests, which was established as part of its discussions with theUnited States on a broader agreement to end Pyongyang’s missile productionand export activities.

North Korea is the leading exporter of ballistic missiles to the developingworld, and its exports have continued despite its flight-test moratorium. Statesthat have received missiles from North Korea include Iran, Libya, Pakistan, andSyria. Egypt may also have received some systems from Pyongyang. Iran is alsobelieved to have received North Korean assistance in establishing its own missileproduction capabilities and may intend to enter the missile export market. Iran’sand Pakistan’s missile capabilities are thought to be highly dependent on NorthKorean technology and equipment.

NOTES

1. National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through2015 (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 2001), p. 12.

2. Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, and Joshua Handler. “North Korea’s Nuclear Program,2003,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2003, pp. 74–77.

3. John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, “Remarks to theFifth Biological Weapons Conventional Meeting,” Geneva, November 19, 2001.

4. Secretary Colin L. Powell, U.S. Department of State, “Press Availability with Her Excellency AnnaLindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden,” March 6, 2001; available at www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/1116.htm.

5. “Bush Statement on Undertaking Talks with North Korea,” available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-4.html.

6. The Agreed Framework contains no legal prohibitions against the construction of new nuclearfacilities by North Korea. Moreover, purchasing uranium enrichment equipment does not, byitself, constitute a violation of the North–South agreement or the NPT. The start of constructionof a uranium enrichment facility without providing design information to the IAEA would be aviolation of safeguards and therefore the NPT. North Korea claimed at the time it was not fullybound by the NPT and was under a special status having “temporarily suspended” its withdrawalfrom the NPT, a status rejected by the United States.

7. For details of the controversy surrounding these issues, see Kenneth Pollack, “The United States,North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework,” Naval War College Review, vol. 56, no. 3,Summer 2003, pp. 11–49.

8. KCNA, “DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-Day Talks for IndeterminatePeriod,” February 10, 2005; available at www.kcna.co.jp.

9. See Pollack, “United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework.”

10. “Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Programs,” prepared testimony of James A. Kelly before theSenate Foreign Relations Committee, July 15, 2004.

11. “Statement of Hon. Robert Gallucci, Ambassador-at-Large, to Senate Committee on Foreign Re-lations, December 1, 1994.”

12. Mike Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York: St. Martin’sPress, 1995), p. 25.

13. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Lexington, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1997), p. 250.

14. John Fialka, “North Korea May Be Developing Ability to Produce Nuclear Weapons,” Wall StreetJournal, July 19, 1989.

15. Les Aspin, McNeil-Lehrer Newshour, December 1993.

16. R. Jeffrey Smith, “N. Korea and the Bomb: High-Tech Hide-and-Seek,” Washington Post, April 27,1993.

North Korea 291

17. Mark Hibbs, “IAEA Special Inspection Effort Meeting Diplomatic Resistance,” Nucleonics Week,February 18, 1993, p. 16; Smith, “N. Korea and the Bomb”; Hibbs, “U.S. Might Help NorthKorea Refuel Reactor,” Nuclear Fuel, November 8, 1993, p. 1; and Smith, “West Watching Reac-tor for Sign of North Korea’s Nuclear Intentions,” Washington Post, December 12, 1993.

18. Smith, “N. Korea and the Bomb.”

19. David Sanger, “U.N. Agency Finds No Assurance North Korea Bans Nuclear Arms,” New YorkTimes, December 3, 1993. For a detailed examination of the IAEA’s relations with North Korea,see Leon Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1998).

20. R. Jeffrey Smith, “N. Korean Conduct in Inspection Draws Criticism of U.S. Officials,” Washing-ton Post, March 10, 1994; Smith, “Inspection of North Korea’s Nuclear Facilities Is Halted,” Wash-ington Post, March 16, 1994; David E. Sanger, “North Korea Said to Block Taking of RadioactiveSamples from Site,” New York Times, March 16, 1994; and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Goes toU.N. to Increase the Pressure on North Korea,” New York Times, March 22, 1994. For a compre-hensive assessment of the March 1994 inspection, see Sigal, Disarming Strangers, pp. 95–108.

21. Mark Hibbs, “Fuel Readiness Means North Korea Can Start Reactors Up on Schedule,” Nucleon-ics Week, April 7, 1994, p. 14; and R. Jeffrey Smith, “N. Korea Refuses Demand to Inspect ReactorFuel,” Washington Post, April 28, 1994.

22. “Letter from the Director General of the IAEA Addressed to the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations Relating to North Korea,” June 2, 1994.

23. Ann Devroy, “U.S. to Seek Sanctions on N. Korea,” Washington Post, June 3, 1994; MichaelGordon, “White House Asks for Global Sanctions on North Koreans,” New York Times, June 3,1994; David Ottaway, “N. Korea Forbids Inspections,” Washington Post, June 8, 1994; and JuliaPreston, “U.S. Unveils Proposal for Sanctions,” Washington Post, June 16, 1994.

24. T. R. Reid, “Leaders of 2 Koreas Seek First Summit,” Washington Post, June 19, 1994; and MichaelGordon, “Back from Korea, Carter Declares the Crisis Is Over,” New York Times, June 20, 1994.For a detailed account of the Carter-Kim meeting, see Sigal, Disarming Strangers, pp. 150–162.

25. Mark Hibbs, “U.S., DPRK to Meet in Berlin on LWR Transfer, Spent Fuel Details,” NucleonicsWeek, September 8, 1994, p. 17; “North Korea Rejects Special Nuclear Inspections,” Reuters,September 16, 1994; and “Agreed Framework between the United States of America and theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea,” October 21, 1994.

26. For a complete history of the negotiation and contents of the Agreed Framework, see Joel S. Wit,Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

27. “Unclassified CIA Fact Sheet,” November 19, 2002.

28. Author discussions with Korean government officials.

29. Joby Warrick, “U.S. Followed the Aluminum: Pyongyang’s Effort to Buy Metal Was Tip to Plans,”Washington Post, October 18, 2002.

30. Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of TechnologyRelating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through31 December 2003,” available at www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003.htm#5.

31. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Depart-ment of Defense, 2001), pp. 11–12.

32. Federation of American Scientists, Weapons of Mass Destruction web site, www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/cw/index.html.

33. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, pp. 10–11.

Two Hard Cases292

Table 14.1. North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure

Name/Location of Facility Type/Status

IAEA Safeguards

Power Reactors

Sinpo-1 Kumho1 Light-water, PWR, 1,040 MWe, construction suspended

No

Sinpo-2 Kumho Light-water, 1,000 MWe, construction suspended

No

Yongbyon Gas-graphite, nat. U, 5 MWe, operating No

Yongbyon Gas-graphite, nat. U, 50 MWe, construction halted, no evidence that it has resumed

No

Taechon Gas-graphite, nat. U, 200 MWe, construction halted, no evidence that it has resumed

No

Research Factors

IRT Yongbyon

Pool-type, HEU (80 percent), 8 MWt, operating

No2

Yongbyon Critical assembly, 0.1 MWt No

Pyongyang Subcritical assembly No

Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction)

Radiochemical Laboratory Yongbyon4

Operational3 No

Pyongyang Soviet-supplied laboratory-scale hot cells, status unknown5

No

Uranium Processing

Pyongsan Uranium ore processing, status unknown No

Sanchon-Wolbingson mine Pakchon

Uranium ore processing, status unknown No

Pyongsan Uranium ore processing, status unknown No

Pakchon Uranium ore processing, status unknown No

Yongbyon Uranium purification (UO2) facility, operating

No

North Korea 293

Yongbyon Fuel-fabrication facility, partially opera-tional, partially under maintenance

No

Yongbyon Pilot-scale fuel-fabrication facility, disman-tled, according to North Korean officials

No

ABBREVIATIONS:HEU highly enriched uranium nat. U natural uranium MWe megawatts electric MWt megawatts thermal PWR pressurized water reactor

SOURCES:IAEA, “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information Systems.” Available at www.nfcis.iaea.org/

NFCISMAin.asp?Region=The%20World&Country=All&Type=All&Status=All&Scale= All&Order=2&Page=1&RightP=List&Table=1. Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook (Sidcup, U.K.: Wilmington Publishing, 2004). “Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea, Testimony of Sieg-fried S. Hecker, senior fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratory, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2004.”

NOTES:1. The Sinpo-1 and Sinpo-2 light-water reactors were being constructed by the Korean

Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Construction has been sus-pended since the breakdown of the Agreed Framework and North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in late 2002 and early 2003, respectively.

2. According to the IAEA, because the IRT research reactor and the critical assembly located at Yongbyon were acquired from the Soviet Union, both are subject to safe-guards regardless of whether or not North Korea is a party to the NPT. (See IAEA Infor-mation Circular 66 for more). Neither of these facilities is currently under safeguards, however, because North Korea has not permitted inspectors to return to the country since expelling them at the end of 2002.

3. According to Siegfried Hecker, a senior fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory who visited the Yongbyon nuclear facility in January 2004, North Korean officials claimed that they had successfully extracted plutonium from all 8,000 spent-fuel rods stored at Yongbyon between January and June 2003.

4. According to North Korean officials, capable of reprocessing 110 tons of spent fuel per year.

5. Jared S. Dreicer, “How Much Plutonium Could Have Been Produced in the DPRK IRT Reactor?” Science & Global Security, vol. 8, 2000, pp. 273–286.

ABBREVIATIONS

SOURCES

NOTES