pakistan's isi behind the accusations
TRANSCRIPT
Jeanette Harper
PS 505: Final Exam
Pakistan’s ISI:
Behind the Accusations
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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to become familiar with Pakistan’s top intelligence
organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and consider the way it, and Pakistan’s regime,
officially deals with the accusations that the country overtly supports all forms of terrorism. This
essay narrows in on the subject of Pakistan’s involvement, support, and/or disregard for
terrorism and how the country defends itself to the international community in light of these
allegations. Since this subject is quite complex and, at times, has a tendency to get convoluted,
this paper is broken into five large sections with several sub-sections within each. This is done to
help the reader navigate the intricate and confusing web that has been spun by Pakistan’s alleged
custom of duplicitousness and deceit.
The first major section discusses Pakistan’s support of terrorism in all its forms,
specifically suicide terrorism. Three questions are answered in this section and they cover the
matter of whether Pakistan does, in fact, support terrorism, whether Pakistan is aware of, and in
fact, is in support of camps set up by the Taliban (and/or other extremist, militant groups) to
recruit and train suicide bombers to help carry out their missions, and whether another viewpoint
exists in regards to Pakistan’s suspected tendency to lie and cover up their activities. In addition
to these, there are other concerns that are addressed such as what the consequences will be to the
United States – and to other countries – if this threat is left unchecked, what consequences this
threat has already produced on American and global society, whether other countries treat this
issue as a threat, and whether this threat evolved over time.
The following section presents the findings on U.S. current policy towards Pakistan and
how long it has been in place. In addition to providing an account of any changes that have
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occurred over the years, an in-depth analysis about the policy’s effectiveness (or lack thereof) is
offered. The section also forecasts the short and long-term ramifications of these same policies,
provides a short list of the allies and adversaries found to be in connection to them, and a brief
(but important) description of the relationship between Pakistan and the United States and how
they view one another.
Section three discusses the countries or regions of the world that are concerned with this
same threat issue and which ones are not, the current policies being employed by them, and what
some of their successes and failures have been. Since it is imperative to understand how these
countries communicate with one another, this section includes not only which areas of joint
communication/operation/cooperation exists across these countries, it gives a suggestion on what
should be done in case there is a change in plan. Finally, since there is one state in particular that
seems to be doing a better job than the United States in regards to the threat issue, that state and
its alternative policy is discussed here in detail.
In section four, an analysis can be found of the current academic research that exists on
this particular threat problem. Since it is vital to first consider what intellectual positions and
theoretical explanations are being circulated about this threat issue before one can determine the
best course of action, this paper explores many different ones. These have been outlined in the
first part of this section along with their strengths and weaknesses. This essay goes on to
summarize the theoretical/academic prescriptions discovered while researching this topic.
Finally, this threat issue will be explained as a general phenomenon along with an examination
of the theories or explanations I personally find compelling and which ones I find relatively
inaccurate.
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In the final section, I have openly shared my personal views on how current policy should
be changed, adapted, reformed, or replaced in order to deal with this particular threat problem.
The section goes on to address changes that should be made to U.S. policy, reforms that must be
embraced in regards to U.S. fiscal policy concerning aid as well as tariffs in Pakistan, the new
role Pakistan must be willing to assume, how the United States should change their approach to
the war on terror, how a resolution with Afghanistan can be achieved, and how the U.S. can help
promote deeper civil society in Pakistan. The goal is to show how these adjustments may help
solve or improve the flaws/problems in current policy.
Section One
Does Pakistan Support Terrorism?
When first starting my research for this paper, I had one specific question on my mind for
which I wanted to find an answer: does the evidence prove that Pakistan’s ISI does indeed fight
terrorism as it claims or does it verify that the country actually supports terrorism? The
information I found was not quite as easy to sort through as I initially thought it would be. I say
this because, on one hand, it appears that ISI has in fact done quite a bit to counter terrorism. For
example, prior to 2004, the ISI arrested half a dozen senior leaders of Al Qaeda, and at that time
appeared to still be playing an important role in the War on Terror. According to Todd & Bloch
(2003), “Agents of the recently purged ISI were quick to seize suspected killers of US journalist
Daniel Pearl” and “in April 2002, more than 60 Al-Qaeda operatives were arrested in
Faisalabad,” Pakistan (pg. 18). According to Andrew, Aldrich & Wark (2009), “Pakistani
security forces captured one of Osama Bin Laden’s chief lieutenants, Abu Zubaida, along with
19 other al Qaida operatives in the eastern Pakistani city of Faisalabad” and also “arrested
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September 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and another key al-Qaeda operative,
Mohammad Ahmed al-Hawsawi while they slept” (pg. 65). The ISI and the Pakistani military
have worked effectively with the United States to pursue the remnants of Al-Qaeda and
following 9/11, Pakistan stationed eighty thousand troops in the troubled province of Waziristan
near the Afghan border in order to help break the back of the Al Qaeda network (Pakistan’s Vital
Role, 2006).
Historically, Pakistan has shown the international community its willingness to cooperate
and according to Smashing Lists (2010), they “worked with the CIA to train 100,000+
Mujahedeen to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, destroyed KGB interests in Central Asia,”
played a role in the Cold War that led to the independence of fifteen Central Asian states from
the USSR, was partially responsible for the coming down of the Berlin Wall in the aftermath of
the fall of the USSR in Afghanistan, “foiled an Israeli/Indian attack on Kahuta nuclear research
centers, and cooperated with NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo.” According to Todd & Bloch (2003),
“The CIA was close to Pakistan’s intelligence service during the Cold War and this relationship
has been rekindled” (pg. 18).
And then on the other hand, there is plenty of circumstantial evidence to suggest that
Pakistan does, in fact, support terrorism. Despite the fact that they are thought to have
approximately 10,000 agents worldwide, none of its personnel have ever been caught on camera;
this makes it difficult to prove conclusively that they have been involved in terrorist attacks
(Smashing Lists, 2010). For example, Indian officials implicated the ISI for the November 2008
terrorist attacks in Mumbai that killed nearly two hundred people. India’s foreign ministry said
that the ISI had links to the planners of the attacks (the banned militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba),
which New Delhi blames for the assault. “Islamabad denies allegations of any official
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involvement, but acknowledged in February 2009 that the attack was launched and partly
planned from Pakistan” (Rotella, 2010).
Then there’s the issue of the Taliban and Pakistan’s attitude towards Osama Bin Laden.
After the U.S.-led invasion toppled the regime, they “regrouped in Pakistan, where its central
leadership led an insurgency against the Western-backed government in Kabul” (Kelley, 2002).
In addition to the suspicion that Pakistan was continuing to “provide Taliban militants sanctuary
in the country’s western tribal areas,” Osama Bin Laden was found “hiding out in a Pakistani
military town not far from Islamabad which raised new questions over army and ISI support for
the Al Qaeda leader and the legitimacy of their counterterrorism efforts” (Rodriquez, 2011).
“Sources told India Abroad that Panetta had acknowledged his frustration and anger over
Pakistan’s claimed ignorance over Bin Laden’s whereabouts, and that he too found it incredulous
that the Pakistani military and the ISI were unaware that Bin Laden was holed up in the
suspicious $1 million mansion and that the Pakistani intelligence were either ‘involved or totally
incompetent,’ and that ‘neither was acceptable’ (Haniffa, 2011). Pakistan’s refusal to label Bin
Laden a terrorist is also not too comforting.
Todd & Bloch (2003) said in their book, “The extent of a genuine desire for cooperation
with the US on the part of even a reformed ISI is uncertain” and “a great many Taliban and
‘Arab Afghans’ found ready sanctuary in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province after the start
of US military operations” (pg. 18). Also, what is strange about the cooperation regarding the
Daniel Pearl incident is the fact that, as Todd & Bloch (2003) pointed out, “The leading figure in
the Pearl investigation, former British public schoolboy Ahmad Sheikh, had surrendered
voluntarily to a retired ISI officer under circumstances which remain unclear” (pg. 18).
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Although there was a “crackdown on terrorists groups, it appears to have been done quite
selectively and when it comes to the Taliban, the Pakistani military has largely ignored their
fighters on their soil” (Bajoria & Kaplan, 2011). It seems that only the terrorist groups that the
ISI has no influence over are the ones that get targeted and they seem to only “tighten pressure
on groups whose objectives are out of sync with the military’s perception of Pakistan’s national
interest” (Bajoria & Kaplan, 2011).
Suicide Bombers
On the issue of suicide bombers in particular, there is much speculation that the Taliban
is under control of ISI and they “keep Pashtuns and ethnic Afghans backwards to rule over them
and use them to kill soldiers in Afghanistan” (Chinoy, 2012). In her film “Children of the
Taliban,” Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy shows how the Taliban recruits children from poor families,
ships them hundreds of miles away from their families, gives them months of military training,
forces them to read the Koran eight hours a day, feeds them pure propaganda all day long, denies
them access to any other forms of information, beats and practically starves them so they hate the
world in which they live, gives them hope that martyrdom for Islam is glorious, and teaches them
how to do a suicide bombing (Chinoy, 2012).
The world has already experienced consequences from the impact of suicide bombers that
were most likely trained in Pakistan. In 2009 alone, there were 500 bomb blasts across Pakistan
(Chinoy, 2012). The 2008 Mumbai attacks that were carried out by members of Lashkar-e-Taiba
were traumatizing for Indian citizens; the only attacker who was captured alive confessed upon
interrogation that the attacks were conducted with the support of Pakistan’s ISI (Anand, Bahree
& Sharma, 2011). Then there were the 7/7 attacks in London that are commonly believed to have
been carried out by extremists that were supported by ISI (Laville, 2007). And then who could
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forget the 1993 World Trade Center bombing that was carried out by a small group of Muslim
extremists living in the U.S. led by a Pakistani national (Andrew, Aldrich & Wark, 2009)? There
are many more examples but these are enough to show that if this threat is left unchecked, there
will be more devastating consequences like these for both American and global society.
A Different Viewpoint
There are other viewpoints that deserve further consideration here. For one, ISI may not
even define what they’ve done in the past as ‘terrorism.’ It may be that the ISI has just lost
control of militant groups. It also appears that there are divisions within the ISI that work against
each other and they may even be working against the government’s control while pursuing its
own foreign policy. If ISI does indeed have a staff of ten thousand, I can certainly understand
how rogue elements could exist within its framework. Many of these agents have ethnic and
cultural ties to Afghan insurgents and naturally sympathize with them (Sylvia, 2012). Bajoria &
Kaplan (2011) point out, “While some within the agency continue to sympathize with the
militant groups, they realize they cannot follow a policy contradictory to that of the army, which
is directly involved in counterterrorism operations in the area.”
Section Two
U.S. Policy on Pakistan
As research began on this project, it was a shock to learn that, according to the Center for
Global Development (2012), not only has the United States been a major player in Pakistan for
more than sixty years, it has been providing economic assistance along with military aid (to the
tune of $67 billion between the years 1951 and 2011) to the country since shortly after its
creation in 1947. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Taliban and al-
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Qaeda were formed as resistance movements with the intention to drive Soviet troops out of
Afghanistan. The United States, along with Saudi Arabia, was in full support of these
Mujahedeen factions and provided them with substantial financial aid. As a result, the Taliban
and al-Qaeda became very strong and many credit their success of the 9/11 attacks and their rise
to becoming the biggest threat for global peace on the support they received. After 9/11, the U.S.
declared a war on terror and swiftly changed their policies on terrorism.
Since 9/11, U.S. policy in regards to Pakistan has mainly been to dismantle the Taliban,
al-Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations, use drone strikes on suspected terrorists in Pakistan’s
tribal areas, and pursue engagement with Pakistan, including “maintaining access for tracking
global terrorists sheltering on its territory, encouraging Pakistan’s leadership to pursue a
moderate, democratic path, and maintaining a degree of leverage with the military leadership to
ensure that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons remain safe and secure and out of the hands of
extremists” (Curtis, 2013).
The Obama administration made some changes to this policy since 2009 when it adopted
“AfPak.” This policy change was designed to combat the problem of the tendency of the U.S. to
separate Afghanistan and Pakistan and view them as separate regions and to address what was
occurring across the porous border separating the two countries (Shamsie, 2009). President
Obama also announced that he was moving away from the Bush Administration’s policies
because, after the invasion of Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the
United States had a hard time finding allies for two wars and their global war on terror. The
perception of America during the Bush years was extremely negative and the Obama
Administration “ran in part on the promise to restore American credibility by complying with
domestic and international law” (Feldman, 2010).
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What about drone strikes? According to one count, the U.S. has used the drones in 378
lethal strikes since 2004 and, as of this 2013 article, 327 of which were ordered by President
Obama after 4 ½ years of being in the Oval office (Ochse, 2013). According to Pakistan’s
Defense Ministry, these have killed 2,160 terrorists and only 67 civilians (Yusufzai, 2013).
Despite the international community’s growing criticism of drone strikes, these have been
remarkably effective in putting al-Qaeda groups in Pakistan on the defensive (Riedel, 2013).
So how does Pakistan play a role in this policy and what is the relationship it has with the
United States? Since 9/11, Pakistan has – or at least appeared to have – cooperated with the
United States in its war on terror and is expected to continue in the future. As mentioned in the
previous section, Pakistan’s ISI has in fact done quite a bit to counter terrorism. However, there
is evidence that Pakistan has not been as forthcoming as they appear. For one, while they have
cracked down on many terrorist organizations and individual terrorists, they may have ignored or
even supported many others. It is also worth mentioning that Pakistan is completely obsessed
with India and has designs to contest it (Ashraf, 2013). This has led to “over-projection of power
externally and under-projection of state resources and attention to deal with internal crises which
has caused the country to fall into ruins” (Perkovich & DeYoung, 2011).
As a result, “Pakistani citizens lack a singular national identity and the institutions of a
progressive modern state and the army has done too little to redress domestic injustices,
economic failure, and poor governance” (Perkovich & DeYoung, 2011). Has the United States
contributed to this problem? Many believe it has.
Ramifications
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There is a perception among members of the Obama Administration that suggests this
policy has not been effective because, rather than deal with extremism, Pakistan has actually
allowed it to grow (Stavis, 2010). Pakistan may, in the short-term, interrupt some terrorist
activities in the area – which will benefit its local population. However, in the long-term,
Pakistan will most likely continue to provide support to other terrorist organizations that are
aligned with their goal of “curbing Indian regional influence” (Curtis, 2013). Pakistan is a
“nuclear-armed state led by corrupt and unaccountable leaders and institutions, with a weak
economy, growing population, and a youth bulge” (Qazi, 2012). Moreover, it suffers from
“resource scarcity and mismanagement” (especially in water, gas, and electricity) and will need
resources to provide “post-conflict stability” in many parts of the country (Pakistan.., 2012).
Many hold the opinion that the policy of continually overlooking Pakistan’s inaction
against extremist groups on its territory will have long-term negative consequences for U.S.
interests in the region – namely, its plans to “maintain sizable bases and a military presence in
Afghanistan beyond 2014” and its interest in Central Asia because of its “vast reserves of oil and
natural gas” – and will increase the chances for additional terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland
(Qazi, 2012).
Allies and Adversaries
The United States does enjoy support for its policies on the war on terror in some
countries around the world; these include Israel, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, the
Philippines, and South Korea (Bryen, 2010). However, in predominantly Muslim nations, its
anti-terrorism efforts are still wildly unpopular. Some of these countries include Turkey, Egypt,
Jordan, Pakistan, and the Palestinian territories (Cullen, 2014). We can also safely add Iran and
Russia to this list. It is also worth mentioning that, in nearly all countries in the world, there is
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considerable opposition to drone strikes. According to Drake (2013), the only countries where
more than fifty percent of the population approves of drone strikes are Israel, Kenya, and the
United States.
Section Three
Concerns
There are a few countries that are concerned with the threat of Pakistan, its possible
support of terrorism, and its denial that it is involved in suicide bombings and other forms of
terrorism. While many Western countries are concerned about Islamic jihad, terrorism, and
suicide bombings (where many extremists are thought to have originated and/or trained in
Pakistan), the United Kingdom and several other European countries are of note. We can add
Bangladesh (formerly known as East Pakistan) to the list. However, the two countries that are
most concerned with Pakistan’s aggression are Afghanistan and India.
Even though Afghanistan and Pakistan may possibly be trying to cooperate with each
other by sharing intelligence to combat terrorism, there have been many problems between them
over the Durand Line issue. The Afghan government has long suspected that Pakistan’s ISI has
been aiding the Taliban and other aggressive militants who cross the border back and forth
harming civilians in the process (Arnoldy, 2010). Pakistan denies this but does admit that it
doesn’t have full control over the ISI. To further aggravate the situation, Pakistan’s Haqqani
network has staged many large scale attacks across Afghanistan – which they also blame the ISI
for (Dilanian, 2012).
India and Pakistan also have some major disputes including the violent partition of
British India in 1947 to the Kashmir dispute to the frequent conflicts that take place between
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them, including terrorist attacks (Naidu, 2000). Even though they share many similarities, their
relationship has been soured by resentment and mistrust. As far as terrorism is concerned, there
have been several terrorist attacks against India that are generally attributed to the ISI even
though Pakistan tries to deny any responsibility. Some of these include the hijacking of an Indian
flight in 1999, the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, and the 2008 Indian embassy
bombing in Kabul.
The countries that do not place a high priority on this threat issue are Iran (who supports
Pakistan in its conflicts with India), Turkey (who has long-standing military ties with Pakistan),
and Saudi Arabia (also a supporter of Pakistan in regards to the Indian dispute). Pakistan also
enjoys good diplomatic and economic relations with Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, North
Korea, and China (Pakistan.., 2014).
Alternative Policies
According to Ahmad (2011), the United Kingdom’s policy towards Pakistan is
“essentially focused on counter-terrorism” which arose out of “Pakistan-linked instances of
radicalization and terrorism involving British Muslim/Pakistani communities.” He says they
“tend to mostly follow the US lead in its dealings” with the country (Ahmad, 2011).
As far as Afghanistan’s policy, the country refuses to recognize the Durand line as the
international boundary which is the major source of conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan
(Gregorian, 2001). Not to suggest that Pakistan is justified in carrying out acts of terrorism
because of this issue but many experts believe that Afghanistan would most likely experience
less conflict – especially amongst the Pashtuns – if they would reconsider this policy. According
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Afghanistan does spout the usual rhetoric that its highest
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priority is fighting terrorism and becoming an equal partner with its neighbors (namely
Pakistan); however, Afghanistan itself is known as one of the countries of the world that openly
supports and provides refuge for terrorists (Fredholm, 2011).
India’s policy towards Pakistan is to expose their state-sponsored terrorism and impress
upon the international community to apply more pressure on the country (Perl, 2007). They
believe that more aggressive measures must be applied such as isolating Pakistan in the
international community, and sending a strong message to them that it means business by
utilizing any means necessary - mainly in the areas of “diplomacy, trade, sports, and the
military” (South Asia Intelligence Review, 2014).
Although many do, many other scholars believe that the policies being employed by the
UK or Afghanistan have not been nor will be effective in the future. The UK’s policy is in line
with US policy which has not been considered effective (Blum, 2008). It is also unlikely that an
attitude change of Afghanistan towards the Durand Line will really make that much of a
difference (Khan & Wagner, 2013). Pakistan will more than likely continue to be aggressive
towards them. The only policies that may actually be effective are either the one suggested by
India – to have the international community pressure Pakistan and force them to behave – or a
policy that stays out of Pakistan’s affairs and focuses on their own border security. The
successful isolationist foreign policies of countries like Denmark, Norway, Finland, and
especially Sweden are good examples of this. It is also worth mentioning that the Founding
Fathers of the United States also wanted a similar foreign policy; the one she has today is a far
cry from what they wanted. Research shows that the countries that have seen the most failures in
regards to their foreign policy are the ones that simply meddled too much in the affairs of other
countries.
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Joint Communication
Since terrorism exists in several countries, the problem is considered a global one. The
countries that have been affected by terrorism communicate with one another via mediums such
as the media and the internet in order to gather and share intelligence and to come up with ideas
to combat terrorism. Because they all have a common goal and many of them have serious trust
issues with Pakistan, they should continue to communicate and cooperate with each other as
much as possible. However, if the international community were to decide instead to stay out of
Pakistan’s affairs, chooses to keep them isolated, or refuses to trade with them, the countries
should all put together a plan and stick to it together. Constant communication and frequent
updates should be utilized to keep them on the same page.
Getting it Right
So is there one country in particular that is doing a better job than the United States in
regards to foreign policy (and the issue of Pakistan)? I believe the answer to that is Switzerland.
The Swiss are especially known for their refusal to get involved in other people’s affairs and this
policy has been the hallmark for nearly 500 years (By, 2002). “The status of neutrality has not
only protected Switzerland from war, but has helped prevent the country from being torn apart
when its different language communities might have been tempted to side with different
belligerents in cases of conflict” (FDFA, 2014). Further, they have more money and resources to
spend on their own infrastructure, social programs, security, military, etc. The Swiss people have
a fiercely independent mentality, are very protective of their rights, and are very proud; these are
the trademarks of a people who live comfortably in a “stable and prosperous economy with a
government that is responsive to the grassroots needs” (Bachmann, 2012). This country has also
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proven that it is possible to play a major role in peacekeeping operations around the world while
conducting business with other countries without making too many enemies.
Section Four
Current Academic Research
In the academic arena, there are many intellectuals that hold intellectual positions and
have theoretical explanations about whether or not Pakistan’s ISI presents a threat to the United
States and other countries. Within the academic community, there is also both support and
opposition about the idea that Pakistan denies allegations that they clearly support all forms of
terrorism as being a true threat.
The intellectuals that believe Pakistan is a threat argue that they have these views because
of the reports of terrorist activity that are consistently coming from that country and the
reputation it has of having established a ‘terror industry’ (Yousafzai & Sharif, 2011). The
existence of suicide bombing training camps, the suspicion that the ISI was behind the terrorist
attacks in Mumbai, London, and other places around the world, the fact that Bin Laden was
captured in Pakistan (and their government’s refusal to label him a terrorist), and the “great many
Taliban and ‘Arab Afghans’ that find ready sanctuary in Pakistan’s North West Frontier
Province” are all good reasons why intellectuals hold these views (Ahmad, 2005). It is no secret
that, while cooperating with the United States in the ‘War on Terror,’ Pakistan has been a
“critical facilitator of the Taliban and other violent, radical jihadist organizations attacking US
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troops, seeking to undermine the Afghan government, and conducting terrorism against her
allies” (Haniffa, 2011).
These intellectuals believe that, no matter what Pakistan says, their actual intention is to
continue utilizing terrorism as a tool in order to further its strategic ambitions in India and
Afghanistan (Ashraf, 2011). They believe Pakistan is trying to secure its own perceived
‘strategic interests’ at any cost and will continue to appease extremists and terrorist organizations
in order to do so (Garman, 2014). They predict that Pakistan will continue to practice policies
that endanger the “integrity of the Pakistani state” in order to ensure India does not become more
powerful (Kim, 2010).
The strength of this argument lies in the evidence that has been presented to support this
belief such as the testimonies of failed suicide bombers who assert that they were trained in
Pakistan (Pakistan’s Army, 2011). However, what is weak about this argument is that Pakistan
has a deep mistrust of the United States and the reason they behave the way they do is because of
the way they feel they have been mistreated.
Those that do not believe Pakistan is a threat argue that the country has done a lot to
combat terrorism. They have foiled several plots and arrested numerous terrorists and, as
mentioned earlier, they acted quickly when investigating the murder of Daniel Pearl, captured
one of Osama Bin Laden’s chief lieutenants, and worked effectively with the United States to
pursue the remnants of Al-Qaeda after 9/11 (Todd & Bloch, 2003). They have shown the
international community their willingness to cooperate on several different occasions. Besides,
on a grand scale and compared to other countries like China, Iran, or even the United States
herself, Pakistan is small potatoes – even if she does have nuclear capabilities. Besides, they
argue, why shouldn’t Pakistan do what it feels it needs to do to protect its own interests? Pakistan
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insists that it is a sovereign state and should be treated as such. These intellectuals believe that it
is only Pakistan’s genuine desire to improve itself and enhance its international standing by
focusing on its economic growth, its search for energy and water security, and relations with
Afghanistan even if that means negotiating with the Taliban and any other terrorist organization
(which they don’t label all of them terrorists).
The strength of this argument is, again, the evidence that supports Pakistan’s assertion
that it is interested in helping the international community combat terrorism. However, where the
argument is weak is that it fails to take into account that Pakistan has only targeted specific
terrorist organizations – the ones that are not in sync with their own interests – while supporting
others (Bajoria & Kaplan, 2011). It is also difficult to trust Pakistan because they have been
caught lying and covering up their activities. Thirdly, if one looks at the evidence, they would
argue that Pakistan has not made domestic stability a priority at all; in fact, their obsession with
India has been partly responsible for the country’s descent into chaos.
Recommendations
The same intellectuals that hold these differing views also offer suggestions on how to
deal with Pakistan. Some believe that it is best to simply cut them off. They believe that the
United States has no business there and, as an example, its “drone strikes violate Pakistan’s
sovereignty” (Charbonneau, 2013). Others believe that cutting Pakistan off would ultimately be
counterproductive and that the United States should “continue to engage Pakistan where
possible” (Charbonneau, 2013). This would include continuing to hold Pakistan accountable for
its dangerous policies and their consequences. Yet others believe the answer is to continue
providing weapons systems and training in order to help Pakistan deal with terrorists and to try to
divert them from their goal of dominating India (Fair, 2012). Another group believes that
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containment is the answer; however, the idea is containment of the threat rather than the country
itself. This approach would include “increasing pressure on Pakistani intelligence, military,” and
other entities that “enable nuclear proliferation or terrorism” by applying sanctions to specific
persons rather than agencies in general (Khan, 2014).
Section Five
Changes to U.S. Policy
The current policy of the United States in regards to dismantling the Taliban, al-Qaeda,
and other terrorist organizations should remain but the US should approach Pakistan in a way
that conveys its understanding that it is, unfortunately, a vulnerable state in an unstable region of
the world and that, no matter what the United States wants, Pakistan must continue to pursue its
own national interests. It already feels threatened by its traditional rival and neighbor, India,
which is a lot bigger, has a stronger military, and a more efficient economy. It is afraid that if it
loses control over Afghanistan, other “regional powers will fill the void and they may end up
being encircled by their adversaries” (Curtis, 2012). The country is also afraid that the Pashtun
tribe (the strongest tribe in the region) will switch loyalties from Pakistan to Afghanistan. If that
were to happen, Afghanistan would easily “pose a threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity” (Two
Threats, 2008).
The United States could do a much better job of reassuring Pakistan that its concerns are
legitimate, that once it either tires of or completes its nation-building business, it will not
withdraw (leaving the country to deal with Afghanistan alone), and to stop pressuring and
funding it to conduct military operations along the Afghan border (which Pakistan does not
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particularly enjoy). Plus, it is important for the United States to understand that, even though it
contradicts their interests, encouraging radical Islam is an important part of Pakistan’s strategy to
continue pursuing their own interests. This is most likely the reason Pakistan continues to deny
their involvement and support of terrorist organizations in the region. Until it feels secure that the
balance of power will not unfairly shift in Afghanistan’s favor, they will most likely continue to
behave in this way. So what should the United States do in order to make them feel this way? As
stated previously, the answer is to assure both Pakistan’s government and the Pakistani people
that the U.S. will remain engaged there diplomatically, financially, and militarily by maintaining
a “robust, residual presence in Afghanistan” at least until the situation is stable (Entous & Lee,
2014). This would show Pakistan that the United States is committed to finishing the job they
started and, if the U.S. were successful in this endeavor, Pakistan might realize that the extremist
organizations in the region don’t offer as much security as Pakistanis think they do. They may
even stop offering their support to them.
Pakistan’s New Role
So how would the United States go about getting Pakistan to play a “constructive, instead
of destabilizing, role in Afghanistan and the region” (Mitton, 2010)? Javaid & Fatima (2012)
believe that a new policy towards India is the key. Pakistanis get the impression that the United
States values Indian lives and interest over theirs. When there are terrorist attacks against India,
the United States is quite vocal; however, when there are Pakistani losses, they don’t make the
same kind of noise. This must change if Pakistan is to feel more secure in their relationship with
the West. Also, in order to foster constructive dialogue between India and Pakistan, the United
States should offer its support but refrain from acting as a mediator. The U.S. should remain firm
21
that it seeks to help both Pakistan and India prevent global terrorists from setting up new safe
havens in Afghanistan.
Changes to Fiscal Policy
Going back to the issue of U.S. aid, it would be best if, in order to squelch opposition to
the much detested conditions imposed by the United States in order for Pakistan to receive the
aid, the U.S. simply just temporarily halted assistance in order to look for a different way to do
business. Clearly, the way it is being done now is not looked upon favorably by either country.
This break would give the United States a chance to evaluate the problems with the old system
and put together a new one.
Another policy that needs to be changed is one the United States has in regards to
imposing extremely high import taxes. If the U.S. would consider lowering these tariffs, it would
help “attract investment and spur economic growth” (Pakistan calls, 2010). This would go a long
way in helping establish a more trusting relationship between Pakistanis and the United States.
The War on Terror
As mentioned previously, Pakistan has cracked down on some terrorist groups but
appears to have done so selectively especially when it comes to the Taliban. The reason for this
may be because Pakistan has not yet worked out a strategy that protects its regional interests
while simultaneously withdrawing support for terrorist activities and ideology. What the United
States must do is impress upon Pakistan that the bigger threat to their stability will be to “lose
credibility with the international community for continuing policies that encourage terrorism and
endanger the safety of civilized nations” (Curtis, 2012). If the United States is successful in their
22
approach, Pakistan may perhaps utilize the resources they have to force the Taliban to
compromise in Afghanistan rather than continue to embolden them.
If the United States really wants to push Pakistan to reject all forms of terrorism, it must
place strict conditions on any further military aid and must change the language from assisting
the United States to fight its ‘war on terror’ to specifically address that it expects the country to
crack down on specific extremist groups, including the Taliban and the Haqqani network. U.S.
Senators from both sides have already expressed frustration and in 2012, had a “rare moment of
bipartisanship” in regards to Pakistan. Even though, in this particular case, it was about the
treatment of one individual, they made it clear that they were all disenchanted with Pakistan’s
government, military, and intelligence services’ actions throughout the war in Afghanistan. They
agreed that the “U.S.-Pakistan relationship is currently arranged as dysfunctional and
undermining U.S. national security interests” (Rogin, 2012). This is the first step in correcting
the impression the United States has given that it has gotten soft in regards to Pakistan being in
support of U.S. enemies; it is not in the best interests of the U.S. to remain divided on this issue.
Resolution with Afghanistan
To address the issue of a reconciliation with Afghanistan, there should be a greater focus
placed on splitting the Taliban from al-Qaeda so they can become part of the political process.
Confusing the relationship between the two has led to some catastrophic consequences, such as
being one of the reasons the United States chose to invade Iraq. The purpose of the Taliban is to
build an Islamist state in Afghanistan, not to murder and terrorize like al-Qaeda. However, the
Taliban does pose a threat to the United States by seizing power at the “expense of other ethnic
groups” and by trying to reverse the progress the people of Afghanistan have made over the past
decade (Raqib, 2011). This works against United States interests in the region – which is to help
23
stabilize Afghanistan and drive global terrorists from its borders. The threat from these global
terrorists remains a “core U.S. national security concern as a multitude of different extremist
groups with varying degrees of ties to al-Qaeda operate in and from Pakistan” and, if the United
States fails to engage successfully with Pakistan, this could “set the stage for future attacks on
the U.S. homeland” (Curtis, 2012).
Promoting Deeper Civil Society
Last but not least, it is important for the United States to promote “deeper civil society
engagement between Americans and Pakistanis” by supporting initiatives in the fields of “media,
the arts, education, business, and agriculture development” (Curtis, 2012). One such initiative is
the U.S.-Pakistan Leadership Forum which bring together American private sector leaders and
Pakistanis that are working hard (and risking their lives) to bring about democracy and good
governance for the people of Pakistan.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s threat is viewed as a general phenomenon because it is perceived as “evil” by
much of the world. This is because it is known internationally as being a country that harbors
and/or funds terrorists, has high levels of corruption, is utterly lawless, double deals, has false
aspirations, doesn’t value the lives of its citizens, is weak, and/or because it is “paranoid about
India” (Jaine, 2012).
So how should the United States manage Pakistan from here on out? The solutions
offered throughout this paper by the experts are all interesting but I do not agree that the United
States should simply cut off Pakistan nor continue to provide weapons systems and training to
24
the country. I also don’t believe containment is the answer as such an endeavor would further
drain the resources of and test the patience of the United States. I think the best solution offered
would be to continue trying to engage Pakistan where possible and holding them accountable for
their actions, especially involving acts of deception or omission. I believe that if we shut down
our embassies and consulates, Pakistan could possibly become like Iran or North Korea which
“remain opaque to U.S. diplomatic, military, and intelligence agencies” (Charbonneau, 2013). If
the U.S. were to isolate Pakistan, it would be like the late 80’s all over again when they withdrew
from the region after the defeat of the Soviet Union. If it isn’t clear to Washington at this point
that Pakistan is not interested in pursuing domestic stability, I don’t honestly know what else it
would take. If the United States were to continue to engage the country, they would be wise to
engage the Pakistan that exists now rather than the one they wish it could become.
If the United States were successful in making the changes outlined within this paper, it
could engage Pakistan on “multiple dimensions and create partnerships to encompass the
government, business, financial sector, and civil society,” and could convince Pakistan it won’t
just “cut and run,” I believe Pakistan might no longer feel the need to be so dishonest – or at
least, appear to be dishonest, in order to continue receiving U.S. aid while trying to keep their
country stable (Qazi, 2012). It would no longer need to give extremist groups too much
autonomy within its borders. Its commitment to pursuing terrorist organizations would be
renewed and the rooting out of the terrorists who are operating training camps for suicide
bombers would take place. If it ceased obsessing over India it could possibly free up enough
resources to deal with its internal problems, including the corruption within its government. This
might even include regaining control over the ISI.
25
The fact is that the United States and Pakistan need each other because they are fighting a
common enemy (Raja, 2011). However, they cannot work together effectively if they continue to
be wary of each other. To Pakistanis, the United States gives off the impression that everything it
does revolves around its obsession with these terrorist organizations and that it doesn’t really
care about the country of Pakistan itself (Dyer, 2002). One only has to look at the way the two
countries see each other. Washington describes Pakistan as dishonest and deceitful while
Islamabad describes the United States as uncaring and aggressive. The United States thinks it’s
being reasonable with Pakistan but Pakistan views its relationship with the U.S. as unequal and
humiliating because they feel they’ve been “mistreated and ordered around” (Gearan & Gannon,
2012). The thought is that the U.S. essentially “coerced Pakistan to join the global war on terror
and since then often forced it to act against its own perceived interests” (Qazi, 2012). One could
make the argument that this may not be the case because Pakistan was more than willing to
accept Washington’s monetary incentives but then turned around and undermined the U.S. effort
by providing safe haven to its enemies (Pakistan Divided, 2003). Only time will tell if Pakistan is
merely pretending to support U.S. policy and whether they really are sympathetic to some
terrorist organizations that may pose a threat to their supposed ally.
26
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