PAKISTAN

REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEFT BANK OUTFALL DRAIN STAGE I

(KPOD, DPOD, Tidal Link and Cholri Weir)

REPORT OF THE WORLD BANK INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EXPERTS

South Asia Region, Agriculture and Rural Development

May 2005 ii

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADB Asian Development Bank AWB Area Water Board CARW Creation of Assets for Rural Women CIF Community Investment Fund DCO District Coordination Officer EDO Executive District Officer FAO Food and Agriculture Organization GDP Gross domestic Product GOP Government of Pakistan GOS Government of Sindh HANDS Health and Nutrition Development Society ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources LBOD Left Bank Outfall Drain MAF Million Acre Feet NCHD National Commission for Human Development NGOs Non Governmental Organizations NIO National Institute of Oceanography NRSP National Rural Support Program OFWM On Farm Water Management PEPA Pakistan Environment Protection Agency PFF Pakistan Fisher Folk Forum PMU Project Management Unit RBOD Right Bank Outfall Drain SCDRP Sindh Coastal Rehabilitation Project SRSP Sindh Rural Support Program SPO Strengthening Participatory Organizations SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Organization TMA Tehsil Municipal Administration WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority WWF World Wildlife Fund

May 2005 iii

PAKISTAN

REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEFT BANK OUTFALL DRAIN STAGE I

(KPOD, DPOD, Tidal Link and Cholri Weir)

REPORT OF THE WORLD BANK INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EXPERTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. v

I. Background................................................................................................... 1

II. Introduction.................................................................................................. 4

III. Results of Mission Analysis of Available Data .......................................... 10

IV. Findings of the Mission................................................................................ 21

V. A Restatement of the Problem and the Objectives .................................... 29

VI. Developing Strategy...................................................................................... 31

VII. Recommended Strategy............................................................................... 35

VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................... 39

IX. Next Steps ..................................................................................................... 42

Annexes

Annex 1. Persons Met by the Mission...................................................................... 46

Annex 2. References ................................................................................................. 49

Annex 3. Program for World Bank Mission............................................................. 53

Annex 4. Concepts in Tidal Link Design.................................................................. 56

May 2005 iv

List of Tables

Table 1. Decisions and Actions of the Government in Response to Damages to LBOD ................................................................................................. 10 Table 2. Content of SMO Monitoring Reports ......................................................... 11 Table 3. Content of NIO Annual Physical Monitoring Report .............................. 12 Table 4. Earlier Salinity Measurements in the Tidal Liink Area (mS/cm) ............... 25 Table 5. Number of Birds Recorded in the Annual Waterfowl Census by SWD..... 26 Table 6. Selected Parameters from the Analysis of Sugar Factory and KPOD Effluent .................................................................................................... 27

List of Figures

Figure 1 Bed Level Longitudinal Section at the Tidal Link................................... 13 Figure 2 Cross Section at RD-125 as Compared to Design Section...................... 13 Figure 3 Measured Water Current al RD-93 (NIO, 2004) ..................................... 14 Figure 4 Boundary Condition................................................................................. 14 Figure 5 Tidal Levels at RD-93 (NOI, 2004)......................................................... 15 Figure 6 Water Salinity at RD-30 (NOI, 2004) ...................................................... 15 Figure 7a Salinity in Dhands Area (NOI, 2004) ...................................................... 16 Figure 8a 24-Hours Rainfall Frequency .................................................................. 18 Figure 8b Monthly Rainfall Frequency Analysis ..................................................... 19 Figure 9 Salinity Evolution in Dhands Area (NOI, 2004) ..................................... 25 Figure 10 Tidal Link Channel--Typical Cross Sections ........................................... 59

List of Maps

Map 1: LBOD Outfall System.............................................................................. 2 Map 2: Schematic Diagram of LBOD Outfall ..................................................... 43 Map 3-6: Satellite Images of the Indus Delta .....................................................43-46

May 2005 v

PAKISTAN

REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEFT BANK OUTFALL DRAIN STAGE I

(KPOD, DPOD, Tidal Link and Cholri Weir)

REPORT OF THE WORLD BANK INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EXPERTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

LBOD Stage I project was executed during 1984-1997 to relieve water logging and salinity in 1.27 million acres in Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, and Nawabshah Districts. The project included a Tidal Link Canal to carry the saline drainage effluent from a spinal drain 42 km across the coastal zone to the Arabian Sea in view of the international and environmental dimensions of the Rann of Kutch. Soon after completion some of the banks and weir structures in the Tidal Link failed mainly because of the silty loam material of the soil in the area used in the construction which is highly sensitive to flow velocity which scoured the bed and breached the embarkments. In 2001 a WB fact finding mission concurred with the government that the damages were beyond repair. In July 2003 storms resulted in extensive damages and losses in the Lower Badin District in the vicinity of LBOD which galvanized the Government of Pakistan and the population in the Badin District to find and implement a solution to this problem.

The World Bank organized a mission in March 2005 to review the present conditions at the outfall and identify the possible alternatives to mitigate the damages and secure the benefits of LBOD. The mission concluded that the Tidal Link carried a flow at least two times the design discharge of 4,400 cusecs during the floods of July 2003. A combination of factors that caused damages and loses in the lower basin were identified by the mission: a) the storm that affected the area combined with a typhoon and sea high tide; b) water coming to the area from the irrigation canals and irrigation refusals; c) breaches occurred in the upper LBOD basin; d) lack of maintenance in the LBOD system; f) institutional weakness and lack of preparedness for an emergency flood management. These conditions were not foreseen at design stage.

Sea water was not expected to penetrate more than 19 km from its outlet upstream into the Tidal Link, to an area about 11 km downstream of the Cholri Weir. At present both tidal fluctuations and sea water intrude into the dhands and KPOD, and the drainage and environmental functions of the Tidal Link portion of the LBOD outlet is impaired. The result is that there is now an open connection between the dhands and the Tidal Link, exposing the dhands to tidal fluctuations, sea water intrusion, sedimentation, and excessive drainage during low tide. A small tidal creek type system of drainage channels has now developed in Cholri Dhand, which is closest to the Tidal Link. No tidal fluctuations are evident in Sanhro and Mehro Dhands.

May 2005 vi

During the July 2003 storm, Badin received 218 mm of rain and Nawabshah in the upper part of the LBOD basin received 191 mm. LBOD canals were overtopped and numerous breaches occurred, in part because farmers in the upper LBOD basin cutting the banks of the drains to hasten the drainage of rain water from their fields. Equally important, the discharge into KPOD and the Tidal Link Canal were more than twice the design discharge, resulting in severe scour of the Tidal Link Canal as well as breaches in both its right and left embankments. As a result local people have felt the LBOD outfall scheme increase the vulnerability of their already fragile livelihood system.

The present conditions of the outfall system do not provide the hydrological, environmental and social functions that were originally considered at the design phase.

The LBOD can now be described as a “new river” that is forming an estuary and is an integral part of creek formation into the coastal area. The Tidal Link has invited the sea to approach the land and now the tidal fluctuations are visible. This process will continue, and its progress is difficult to predict. Adapting to this new process requires continuous hydraulic and environmental monitoring in a learning by doing approach.

The mission believes that the present actions taken by the Government, namely repairs to parts of the drainage system and lowering the DPOD weir, are considered appropriate for those site conditions, but do not constitute a comprehensive and sustainable solution. Other actions should be further analyzed before implementation.

The mission recommends a combination of “hard” structural measures and institutional “soft” actions to address these objectives. Most of the agencies concerned with some aspect of LBOD drains and the Tidal Link have undertaken missions to examine the conditions on the ground, and have made proposals, including so called immediate measures, to alleviate the situation. A comprehensive strategy or plan to solve the current problems has not yet been prepared, particularly a plan that would respond the wide range of challenges and objectives.

In view of the mission estimate that a 24 hrs storm event similar to that experienced in July 2003 has a 56% probability of occurring in a five-year period, the mission recommends to initiate without further delay the implementation of the institutional and structural following proposed actions:

1. Develop and agree in a Flood Management Plan to compliment the emergency contingency plan proposed by the Badin DCO;

2. Establish a professional O&M program for the main drains and outfall system;

3. Implement the World Bank’s proposed concept for a the livelihoods relief and improvement program in the coastal areas of Badin and Thatta;

May 2005 vii

4. Re-design the outfall system, considering the alternative proposals identified by the mission to reduce the flood risk problems and the impact of the discharge of saline effluent.

• Reinforcement of the LBOD right embankment, and the construction of escapes from the left bank of the Spinal Drain and KPOD in the direction of the Thal using to the extent possible the ancient Dhoro Puran river bed. Install flap-gates in the drains discharging into LBOD drain.

• Diversion of the Seerani drain and other Kotri drains into the dhands.

• Possible connection of the Pateji and Mhero dhands

• Construct a gated structure at the DPOD and KPOD to control the flows in both directions.

• Analyze the location of the tidal control structure in the KPOD and possible control structures in the drains.

The proposal to extend the drainage system by studying LBOD Stage II & III in light of the present outfall conditions of the outfall should be postponed until the existing problems are adequately address and solved. Moreover, the strategy to manage the storm drainage in the upper basin needs to be organized and tested. This approach would avoid aggravating or increasing social unrest, vulnerability and anxiety in the Badin District that might result from a decision to go ahead with premature studies at a time when people participation is most needed.

Given the complexity of the system and its present evolution and dynamics, the proposed physical interventions require continuous monitoring as a part of the learning by doing process, and the collection of data essential for adequate analysis of problems and options. These studies and follow up actions, if the Sindh Government agrees, will be included in the Sindh Water Sector Improvement Project presently in advance stage of preparation.

May 2005 viii

PAKISTAN

REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEFT BANK OUTFALL DRAIN STAGE I

(KPOD, DPOD, Tidal Link and Cholri Weir)

REPORT OF THE WORLD BANK INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EXPERTS

I. BACKGROUND

1. Beginning in the 1960s, the Government of Pakistan (GOP) undertook a major program to provide drainage to relieve water logging and salinity in the 18 million hectares irrigation system in the Indus River plain. By the early 1980s it became clear that a sustainable and environmentally sound strategy was needed to permanently remove the accumulating salt in the basin. The first stage of the strategy was to develop the Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) in Sindh near the tail end of the Indus irrigation system. The Rs44,924 million (US$1, 021. million)1 LBOD Stage I project would relieve water logging and salinity in 1.27 million acres in Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, and Nawabshah Districts, and the eastern part of the Badin District, and would include a Tidal Link Canal to carry the saline drainage effluent from a spinal drain 42 km across the coastal zone to the Arabian Sea (Map 1)2. The World Bank Implementation Completion Report of June 1998 reported that the economic benefits and performance of LBOD Stage I Project under normal circumstance and within the target area of these three districts as well as eastern Badin is positive and substantial. The World Bank Implementation Completion Report (ICR) estimate of economic rate of return at the forecasted completion date of 2002 was 13%3 in comparison to the World Bank estimate of the opportunity cost of capital in Pakistan at that time of 12%. However, within a short time of completion of the Tidal Link Canal, problems of erosion in the canal and deterioration of the Cholri Weir began to appear.

1 The total estimated cost of the project at appraisal in November 1984 was US$635.7 million.

2 Maps, Charts, Figures and Tables, unless they appear in the text, are located at the end of the report.

3 The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) mission estimated that unquantifiable benefits (for example, non-farm benefits such as storm water drainage or the multiplier effects of the project’s substantial employment benefits) that were not included in this estimate of the economic IRR could increase the IRR to 15-20%.

May 2005 2

Map 1: LBOD Outfall System

Source: Panel of Experts Drainage Master Plan, November 2004

2. Continuation of the erosion of the Tidal Link Canal bed and banks, destruction of the Cholri Weir intended to protect environmentally important coastal zone areas, and the penetration of tidal fluctuations and sea water upstream to where it could threaten ecosystems and the drains, was worsened and accelerated by major storms associated with the southwest monsoon in 1999 and 2003. Overloading of the LBOD drains during the July 2003 storms worsened the impact of the heavy rain that caused widespread damage. Although the Tidal Link continues to function, its many breaches, changes in canal cross section, and movement of the tides and seawater into the drains and dhands have called into question the long term sustainability and functionality of the LBOD outlet works. Moreover, it became clear after the 2003 storm that LBOD outlet system could not handle or be secured against the effects of the large volume of

Kotri Basin (Left Bank, Fuleli, Pinyari Canals)

May 2005 3

storm water runoff that results from the large, intense monsoon season rain storms like those that have occurred recently in this region in 1994, 1999 and 2003.

3. Purpose and objective of the mission. After the July 2003 storms, which resulted in extensive damages and losses, the Government of Sindh and the Federal Government were anxious to find a strategy to secure the benefits generated from LBOD Stage I Project in its upper reaches and prevent the recurrence of damages in the outfall from such events. The concerned agencies at Federal and Provincial level undertook studies and site visits and presented proposals for action by the Government. The Provincial Government the 30 of September, 2004 in the meeting held to present the conclusions of the Drainage Master Plan, asked the World Bank to organize an International Panel of Experts (POE) to review the hydrologic, ecological, water quality data that had been gathered since 1999, to assess the current performance of LBOB and the Tidal Link and identify the associated problems, and to recommend a course of action to the Government. The World Bank sent an official request to the Federal Government on November 8, 2004 to inform about the objectives of the mission and prepare the necessary arrangements to facilitate the implementation of the mission with the participation of the different government agencies involved in the LBOD Stage I Project. The mission wants to acknowledge the full support given to the mission and the full access to the information ready available. Nevertheless the efforts genuinely displayed some information was not accessible in the offices visited and will require a detail search in the future, particularly in view of the further analysis of the mission’s proposed actions

4. The POE4 undertook a mission to Pakistan from March 7 to March 2005. The mission visited Islamabad, Karachi, Hyderabad, Badin and Thatta to learn about the project area and review the LBOD outfall system performance since its completion., and to discuss the issues with government officials, technical staff of the concerned agencies and Institutes, local government officials, stakeholders in the project area including fisherman and farmers, and NGOs5. Government and non-government officials and technical experts were extremely generous with their time and provided considerable data and background information and reports to the mission. The World Bank Country Office, the PC of NDP, the staff and management of the Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA), and the Additional Secretary, Sindh Irrigation and Power Department (IPD), provided important logistical support and substantive guidance to the mission. The mission is very grateful to all these officials and experts for their hospitality and assistance. The mission initial findings were presented to the Minister of Irrigation and Power Mr. Nadir Leghari on Friday 18 of March.

4 The POE consisted of Dr. Fernando Gonzalez, Mission Leader and water management expert; Dr. Javier Aparicio, coastal engineering expert; Mr. Santiago Funes, social and institutional expert; and Dr. Walter Garvey, environment and water resources expert.

5 A list of organizations and officials that met with the mission is given in Annex 1 and the detail program mission is given in Annex 3.

May 2005 4

II. INTRODUCTION

5. The LBOD Stage I project6. The area served by LBOD was proposed by the Government of Pakistan because of the acute problems of salinity and waterlogging which severely affected the productivity, income and livelihood of the population living in this area. The Badin District in the lower LBOD basin consists of extremely flat land that is traditionally exposed to extensive inundation during heavy rain because of low infiltration rates and slow runoff (this cond ition prevails to a somewhat lesser degree in many areas of the upper basin as well). The natural drainage is also impeded in the monsoon season by the high tides and extensive flooding of the coastal zone, which is the natural outlet for this slow and shallow overland flow. The upper basin of LBOD, Nawabshah, Sanghar and Mirpurkhas Districts in central Sindh Province receive irrigation water from the Indus River by means of the Sukkur Barrage and the Nara and Rohri canals. The purpose of the LBOD scheme was to relieve water logging by lowering the water table and remove saline water from this irrigated area. The LBOD Stage I project7 provided drainage tubewells and tile drains to lower the water table and collect saline water as well as new and remodeled surface drains to collect and transfer this saline water to a new spinal drain8. The accumulated discharge of the spinal drain was connected downstream to two older drains9 (Map 1): Kadhan Pateji Outfall Drain (KPOD) (a drain built to collect saline discharge from numerous small drains in the Kotri basin of eastern Badin District and carry this drainage discharge into Pateji Dhand and the Rann of Kutch); and the Dhoro Puran Outfall Drain (DPOD) (an old natural channel thought to be a remnant of an ancient Indus River channel that flowed into Shakoor Dhand near the Rann of Kutch). This brought the brackish and in some cases saline agricultural drainage water of LBOD Stage I Project to the edge of the coastal zone – a wide, flat plain consisting of mud and partly salt encrusted flats, shallow depressions some of which are lakes perennially filled with brackish to hyper-saline water, and a zone of active tidal creeks that connect this plain to the sea.

6 This report does not contain a complete description of the LBOD Stage 1 project. A full description can be found in the World Bank Implementation Completion Report (ICR), June 1998, Report No. 18037

7 In 1980 the GoP proposed to the Bank the LBOD project which covered 10 districts served by Sukkur Barrage, in view of the financial and time constraints the project was divided in different stages. Stage I project included the priority districts of Nawabshah, Sanghar and Mirpurkhas Districts. Stage II and III were intended to extend the coverage to the other Districts.

8 The Project also provided important irrigation improvements including the remodeling of two major canals, construction of an off-channel storage reservoir, and watercourse lining and land leveling.

9 The bifurcation of the Spinal Drain flow was made just upstream of the connection with KPOD by means of an uncontrolled broad crested weir located in a side channel excavated in the left bank so that a portion of the spinal drain discharge would be diverted through the Dhoro Puran Link to the Dhoro Puran, an moribund natural channel that empties into Shakoor Dhand.

May 2005 5

6. Shakoor Dhand and the Rann of Kutch lie astride the Indian-Pakistan border. The Sindh dhands10 (lakes) lie entirely in Pakistan and are generally connected to the Rann of Kutch especially at high tide. Since the 1960s, when the Kotri Basin drains (which lie west of the LBOD basin) were built to discharge into the dhands they have become an important local fishery, and a waterfowl habitat of international importance. Portions of two of the Sindh dhands (Sanhro and Mehro) have been declared Ramsar sites, and the Rann of Kutch, which also contains a large Ramsar site partly in Pakistan, is included on the WWF list of the 200 globally most important biodiversity hot-spots. The natural pattern of surface drainage and overland flow, especially of storm runoff, from this coastal and near-coastal zone in Badin District is south and southeastward towards the Rann of Kutch. To avoid discharging LBOD through KPOD directly into this environmentally sensitive international wetland, a Tidal Link Canal was built 42 km southwestward across the dhands and the Rann of Kutch from KPOD to the nearest active tidal creek, Shah Samado Creek. The Tidal Link Canal was isolated from the Rann of Kutch and the dhands by high embankments. An 1800 ft weir, called the Cholri Weir, was built where the Tidal Link Canal passes through Cho lri Dhand in order to attenuate high water levels in the Tidal Link Canal during high tide by allowing water to flow into the dhands during this period, and to protect the dhands from excessive drainage during low tide when the water would flow back into the Tidal Link Canal. Since sea water was not expected to come closer than about 11 km downstream of the weir, the negative effects of the intrusion of the much more saline sea water would also be minimized. The outlet works of LBOD thus consist of the DPOD, which discharges through the Dhoro Puran natural channel into Shakoor Dhand, the enlarged KPOD drain, the Tidal Link Canal connected directly to the sea, and the Cholri Weir.

7. The National Drainage Program (NDP). The National Drainage Program11 (NDP) was launched in 1998 to improve the efficiency of the irrigation and drainage system in Pakistan. NDP was deliberately “frontloaded” with institutional and policy reforms and “backloaded with an investment program. NDP represented a major change in the water resources development strategy in Pakistan shifting the priority from physical interventions to emphasize the need to improve management of the existing infrastructure. NDP financed the completion of irrigation improvement works including the remodeling of the Nara and Jamrao irrigation canals, and water course improvements including lining and precision land leveling. Numerous existing drains and drainage structures in the LBOD and Kotri basins were rehabilitated to take care of the deferred maintenance, and operation of the drainage tubewells improved. NDP

10 There are four important dhands in this part of the Sindh coastal zone: Sanhro, Mehro, Cholri, and Pateji. These shallow lakes and lagoons are inter-connected at high tide in the wet monsoon season when most of the eastern coastal zone is a vast shallow water body. Sanhro and Mehro Dhands contain Ramsar sites. Shakoor Dhand, is a shallow depression in the Rann of Kutch south and east of the Tidal Link that has no direct link to an active tidal creek (WAPDA Note, undated).

11 The National Drainage Program was financed by the Government of Pakistan, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). Its was estimated to cost US$785 Million at appraisal.

May 2005 6

financed the monitoring program including the work of the National Institute of Oceanography and the SCARP Monitoring Organization (SMO) of WAPDA as well as an extensive research program and a number of critical policies and planning studies including the National Drainage Master Plan (DMP) that is now under preparation. At the request of the Government the Bank organized a Panel of Experts to provide recommendations for the implementation of the Plan. At sub-project level Environmental Scoping and Screening Procedure was developed and applied to all NDP investments. This Procedure played a major role in steering NDP investments away from environmental sensitive areas and costly land acquisition problems. Although the World Bank components of NDP have been completed, the JBIC and ADB components have been extended. In particular, with ADB assistance the long delayed implementation of the LBOD Environmental Management and Monitoring Plan (EMMP) is about to be implemented12. Substantial progress was made under NDP to increase the participation of farmers in the operation and maintenance of the irrigation and drainage system. In Sindh, this process has supported the emergence of local leaders such as elected members of Area Water Boards (AWBs) and elected officers of Farmer Organizations (FOs) who have played an active and constructive role in the LBOD debate that continues to the present.

8. Summary of issues associated with the operation of LBOD, KPOD and DPOD drains and the Tidal Link. LBOD drain passes through the eastern part of Badin District and discharges to the KPOD and DPOD spinal drains. The eastern portion of Badin District, which encompasses the coastal zone – namely the Talukhas of Badin, S.F. Rahu and Tango Bago – suffered prolonged flooding and extensive damage during the July 2003 storms.

9. The Tidal Link Canal bed and banks were constructed with the soil obtained from the canal excavation and consisted mainly of silty loam in which scour and erosion processes are highly sensitive to flow velocity. The design phase of the Tidal link Canal included both physical and mathematical model studies, for a more detailed description of concepts in design see Annex 4. These analyses determined that tidal fluctuations would be felt all the way up the Tidal Link Canal form Shah Samando Creek to a point somewhere near the terminus of KPOD, but sea water was not expected to penetrate more than 19 km upstream to an area about 5 km downstream of the Cholri Weir, the main connection between the Tidal Link and the dhands. At present both tidal fluctuations and sea water intrude into the dhands and KPOD, and the

12 The Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA), the focal point for implementation of the LBOD EMMP, has submitted a PC-I to the Government to finance the functioning of an Environmental Management Unit (EMU) that has been operational within SIDA since 2003. The EMU will be responsible for implementation of this program. A PC-II to finance the associated studies and monitoring program has also been submitted to the Government. The EMU will coordinate implementation of the program in collaboration with a number of cooperating Sindh agencies, universities and organizations with experience and expertise in the relevant areas ensuring that a shared knowledge base is developed along with the human resources to sustain the program over the long term.

May 2005 7

drainage and environmental functions of the Tidal Link portion of the LBOD outlet are impaired.

10. The Cholri Weir was constructed in the right bank of the Tidal Link Canal where it crossed the dhands to prevent damage to this area that could be cause by tidal fluctuations. Within months of the completion of the weir, erosion around the structure became evident. Despite attempts to repair this damage, monsoon storms in 1998 and 1999 led to the complete destruction of the weir due mainly to scour of its foundation and erosion of its abutments. The result is that there is now an open connection between the dhands and the Tidal Link, exposing the dhands to large tidal fluctuations, sea water intrusion, sedimentation, and excessive drainage during low tide. A small tidal creek type system of drainage channels has now developed in Cholri Dhand, which is closest to the Tidal Link. No tidal fluctuations are evident in Sanhro and Mehro Dhands.

11. Upstream, LBOD’s canals were designed to carry the relatively modest quantities of agricultural subsurface drainage with about 4 ft of freeboard. Design criteria assumed that these drainage sources would be cut off (tubewells and tile drain sump pumps would be turned off) so that the canals would be free to carry runoff from rainfall. However, the design criteria provided an available capacity to drain a 125 mm rainfall of 5 days duration in a 5 days period. During the storm of the July, 2003, Badin received 218 mm of rain and Nawabshah in the upper part of the LBOD basin received 191 mm. LBOD canals were overtopped and numerous breaches occurred, in part because farmers in the upper LBOD basin cutting the banks of the drains to hasten the drainage of rain water from their fields. Equally important, the discharge into KPOD and the Tidal Link Canal were more than twice the design discharge, resulting in severe scour of the Tidal Link Canal as well as breaches in both its right and left embankments.

12. The mission received several comments from local people, especially those who live in the lower LBOD basin in Badin, and a number of experts which do not agree with the LBOD outfall scheme. For example, the report of the Panel of Experts, reviewing the national Drainage Master Plan (DMP) noted that during their recent visit to Badin that drainage issues play an important role and are heavily debated in the area. Local people believed that the LBOD outfall design cut across rather than following the natural drainage pattern. They felt its orientation southwestward would expose the structures to the persistent high winds, wave action and high tides that occur in the area during the southwest monsoon. As a result local people have felt the LBOD outfall scheme would increase the vulnerability of their already fragile livelihood system.

13. Response of the Government – GOS Technical Review Committee. After the damages to the LBOD outfall system in 1999, the Government of Sindh appointed a high- level Technical Committee in early 2000 to review available project documents and monitoring data, inspect the facilities in the field, and recommend actions to be taken. Among the Committee’s key findings and observations were: 56 breaches in the southern and northern embankments of the Tidal Link; severe erosion of the Tidal Link canal banks; evidence of scour of the canal bed and erosion of a considerable part of the berm on top of the canal embankments; most of the northern embankment along with

May 2005 8

the entire berm was eroded away; the section of the channel has been widened considerably in several places; the Cholri Weir had been destroyed; and the water level in the Dhands had been lowered and Cholri Dhand drained by tidal fluctuations in the Link. The judgment of the Committee was that the Tidal Link was continuing to function and the ongoing channel evolution would stabilize sometime in the future with a section that would generally follow the current alignment. However, in light of the uncertainties concerning the factors governing the ongoing changes within the Tidal Link, and the uncertain viability of conventional mitigation options, the Committee recommended that no repair should be carried out in Tidal Link as damages done by cyclone are beyond the repair limit, and that surveys and monitoring should be continued.

14. World Bank Fact Finding Mission. In March 2001, the World Bank organized a Fact Finding Mission to understand the technical details, system performance and the damages to the Tidal Link; also to understand the possible technical, environmental and social consequences, and to suggest to the Government of Sindh further steps to be taken. The mission concurred with the view of the GOS Technical Committee that the “no-action” recommendation of the committee is justified not only because the damage is beyond repair by conventional methods, but also because the scour of the channel bed and erosion of the embankments are still active under the influence of the uncontrolled tidal flow through the tidal link and flow to and from Rann of Kutch and the Dhands. The mission believed these conditions would render any attempt to repair the damages useless using conventional methods until such time as there is more knowledge of the processes underway in the Tidal Link area. The mission stressed that intensive monitoring of the physical and environmental conditions in the Tidal Link area should be continued to provide a basis for formulating further action. This included continuation of the hydrologic and hydraulic monitoring being carried out by the National Institute of Oceanography (NIO), water quality and LBOD Stage I Project operational monitoring by the WAPDA’s SCARP Monitoring Organization (SMO), and full implementation of the Environmental Monitoring and Management Plan (EMMP) prepared for LBOD Stage I Project in 1998 (which included extensive study and monitoring of ecological, fisheries, avifauna, water quality and hydrology, and socio-economic conditions in the dhands and the wider Tidal Link area).

15. GOS – Environment Committee. In July 2001, the Government of Sindh appointed an inter-agency Committee to formulate an environmental package for rehabilitation of affected areas of the Tidal Link. After reviewing the situation on the ground and discussion with local stakeholders, the Committee recognized that the Tidal Link and the coastal wetland through which it passes is of strategic national and provincial importance, but could say little of a specific nature about the actual environmental damages since no data was available except for a few baseline studies carried out in 1996 and 1997. The Committee recommended in October 2001 that a permanent institution be set up under the Managing Director of SIDA, staffed by multi-disciplinary specialists, to carry out the analysis of the monitoring data and coordinate the activities of cooperating agencies. The Committee agreed with the recommendations of the Technical Committee and the World Bank Fact Finding Mission for additional monitoring and data collection including water quality

May 2005 9

monitoring. The Committee recommended improvement of the roads in the area and improvement of communications systems that would enable more rapid and effective response to disaster and crisis events. The Committee recommended that stakeholder participation be increased in any future activities to ensure social acceptance of plans and measures, and that any future proposed actions be subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in accordance with Sindh EPA regulations including an ecological risk assessment.

16. The National Drainage Master Plan (DMP). At a request of the GOP the WB organized a POE to review the DMP from August to November 2004. The Panel observed that the DMP contains a good and clear overview of the past developments with respect of drainage developments. The approach, which is based on drainage basins, is useful. The Drainage Atlas promised to be an excellent publication and presents the most relevant drainage information available in the country. The Panel was critical in terms of the proposals presented in the DMP, regarding the physical interventions, salt balances, Initial Impact Environmental Assessment and particularly objected the Trans Boundary Outfall Drain (TBOD). The Panel recommended that the TBOD option may not be considered anymore. The Panel visited Sindh Province and conducted a practical training in the DRAINFRAME methodology and organized a stakeholders consultation in Kotri Basin and made recommendations to develop a Drainage Development and Water Management Plan for this basin. The Panel prepared terms of reference for this study and the Government of Sindh agree in the proposed methodology and the time-framework to finalize it. The report of the POE of the DMP was available for the Outfall of LBOD mission and was an useful element in the preparation of this report.

17. Recent actions taken by the Government. The losses suffered in the Badin District during the 2003 rainfall, galvanized the Federal and Provincial Governments into action. As of 20th August 2004 the Government has decided upon a number of actions in connection with LBOD and the aftermath of the 2003 events. These decisions provided a substantive framework for the Mission. They were made available to the members of the mission before it began its work in Pakistan. Table 1 synthesizes the main decisions and actions that have been taken.

May 2005 10

Table 1. Decisions and Actions of the Government in Response to Damages to LBOD

Measure Decision

Study of alternative disposal locations in Thar desert (east of the LBOD spinal drain) for diversion of storm water

analysis and eventual implementation after review

Study of the construction of a gated structure either on spinal drain or DPOD

analysis and eventual implementation after review

Slashing off of the fixed weir on DPOD (to lower the invert of the crest of the weir)

Implemented

Reinforcement of at least 10 km of the right bank of Sirani drain, of the KPOD up to RD –38

under construction

GoS to strengthen institutions as Irrigation and Power Department and SIDA in revamping of the irrigation system and lining of the water courses in future

to be implemented

Better coordination among concerned departments to avoid discharging [17,000 cusecs of Fuleli canal??] into KPOD during heavy down spur –

to be implemented

Redesigning LBOD spinal drain for a 50 years return period of 150 mm rainfall – Preparation of a proposal, if feasible, to be submitted to the GoP

to be implemented

Ensuring that farmers upstream LBOD would not be allowed breaching the infrastructure

to be implemented

Improved pre-monsoon arrangements – better coordination between provincial departments and the Irrigation Department

to be implemented

Regularly monitoring of high tide in the Tidal Link and other geographical changes

to be implemented

Provision to SIDA, as an apolitical institution, of expertise, manpower, funds, machinery and equipment for LBOD operation and maintenance

to be implemented

Seawater intrusion and tidal effects: analysis and technical recommendations

to be implemented

Planning Commission to evaluate the LBOD Stage-II proposal in consultation with WAPDA and GoS on priority basis

to be implemented

May 2005 11

III. RESULTS OF MISSION ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE DATA

18. Physical monitoring information available to the mission. The Mission had access to a considerable amount of new data which is still in the process of being analyzed by the Pakistan Authorities. Nevertheless, as the discussion below points out there remain important data gaps that will impede needed analysis and decision making. The mission had no access to topographic maps of the region, the topography of Shakoor Dhand, or complete rainfall data and storm analysis except for the 1994 storm.

19. WAPDA’s SCARP Monitoring Organization (SMO) annually publishes extensive LBOD Stage I Project monitoring data that concerns primarily groundwater and internal drains. The general content of the SMO reports is summarized in Table 2. Physical data related to the Tidal Link are mainly available in the Annual Physical Monitoring Report of the National Institute of Oceanography (carried out under contract to the SMO), which contains results from monitoring campaigns made from 1999 to 2004. Table 3 shows the type of data collected and reported by NIO form their annual physical monitoring of the Tidal Link.

Table 2: Content of SMO Monitoring Reports

1 G r o u n d w a t e r T a b l e M o n i t o r i n g 2 H y d r o l o g i c M o n i t o r i n g o f D r a i n a g e a n d S c a v e n g e r T u b e w e l l s 3 I n t e r c e p t o r D r a i n s M o n i t o r i n g 4 T i l e D r a i n s M o n i t o r i n g 5 S o i l M o n i t o r i n g 6 W a t e r Q u a l i t y M o n i t o r i n g 7. P e r f o r m a n c e T e s t o f 4 4 4 D r a i n a g e T u b e w e l l s w h i c h a r e recen t ly ins ta l l ed in

M i r p u r k h a s C o m p o n e n t o f L B O D S t a g e I P r o j e c t a r e a 8. W a t e r Q u a l i t y o f t h e a b o v e s a i d t u b e w e l l s

9. S o i l s a m p l i n g o f t h e a b o v e a r e a a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n i n p r e v i o u s M O U

10 . O b s e r v e d D e p t h t o W a t e r t a b l e f o r i n s t a l l i n g p i e z o m e t e r p i p e o f t h e s a i d a r e a

11 . D e t a i l m o n i t o r i n g a n d s u r v e y o f C h o t i a r i R e s e r v o i r d i s c h a r g e , w a t e r q u a l i t y a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l s t u d i e s o f t h e a r e a

12 . D e p t h t o w a t e r t a b l e s u r v e y o f t h e C h o t i a r i R e s e r v o i r a r e a f o r i n s t a l l i n g l i n e s

o f p i e z o m e t e r s

13 D e t a i l e d M o n i t o r i n g o f T i l e D r a i n b y i n s t a l l a t i o n o f p i e z o m e t e r s c l o s e t o t h e d r a i n t o f i n d o u t t h e i m p a c t o f f i l t e r e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e t i l e s . S o i l t y p e a n d i t s p h y s i c a l c h e m i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c o n s i d e r a b l y e f f e c t t h e d e s i g n a n d d r a i n a g e e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e d r a i n

14 D e t a i l e d M o n i t o r i n g o f I n t e r c e p t o r D r a i n b y i n s t a l l a t i o n o f p i e z o m e t e r s c l o s e

t o t h e d r a i n t o f i n d o u t t h e i m p a c t o f f i l t e r e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e i n t e r c e p t o r d r a i n . S o i l t y p e a n d i t s p h y s i c a l c h e m i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c o n s i d e r a b l y e f f e c t t h e d e s i g n a n d d r a i n a g e e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e d r a i n

May 2005 12

20. Analysis of information concerning the performance of the Tidal Link. From cross- and longitudinal sections reported by NIO, erosion is observed all along the Tidal Link and in KPOD, particularly near the discharge of the Tidal Link Canal into Shah Samando Creek (Figures 1 and 2). The most severe changes in the longitudinal profile of the channel are observed in the breached zone, downstream from RD – 38 (Figure 1). Both measured data and computer simulations suggest that maximum velocities in the Tidal Link are around 1.2 m/s (Figures 3 and 4) at the time of NIO measurements. This velocity is greater than the permissible velocity of the loam material forming the channel, which should be less than 0.9 m/s for silt loam. Velocities caused by ebb flows were even greater than when the Tidal Link was recently built. Therefore, the channel cross sections and longitudinal profile are continuously changing, due both to erosion produced by the above mentioned high velocities and the relatively high load of sediments brought from upstream sections. Erosion is especially intense at the outlet of the channel to the Shah Samando Creek. It is likely that these high velocity flows were the primary cause of the Cholri Weir failure in 1998.

Table 3 Content of NIO Annual Physical Monitoring Report

1. Meteorological Observations (1999-June 2004)

1.1 Temperature and wind speed

1.2 Surface Water Temperature (1999-June 2004)

2 Oceanographic/Hydraulic Observations (1999-June 2004)

2.1 Water Currents (1999-to June 2004)

2.2 Tidal Levels (1999- June 2004)

2.3 Water Salinity (1999-June 2004)

2.4 Suspended Load (1999-June 2004)

2.5 Survey of Dhands (1999-June 2004)

2.6 Bathymetry (1999-June 2004)

2.6.1.1. Bed Level Cross-Section Survey

2.6.1.2. Bed Level Longitudinal Section Survey

May 2005 13

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

RD'S

HE

IGH

T (m

)

HE

IGH

T (m

)

-56 -58 -60 -62 -64 -66 -68 -70 -72 -74 -76 -78 -80 -82 -84 -86 -88 -90 -92

DEC. DEPTH 2002

SEP. DEPTH 1998

BED LEVEL LONGITUDINAL SECTION FROM RD -56 TO RD -93 AT THE TIDAL LINK DURING SEPTEMBER 1998 AND DECEMBER 2002 BY ECHOSOUNDING

Figure 1

RD-125

-6.00

-4.00

-2.00

0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

-100 0 100 200 300 400 500

Figure 2. Cross section at RD-125 as compared to design section (NIO, 2004)

May 2005 14

Boundary Condition a=-1.5 m

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

600 1600 2600 3600 4600 5600 6600 7600

Main channel distance (m)

Vel

oci

ty (

m/s

)

Q=850 m3/s Q=500 m3/s Q=350 m3/s Q=250 m3/s

Figure 3 . Measured water current a l RD -93 (NIO, 2004)

Figure 4. Boundary Condition

May 2005 15

20. The mission concluded from the data available that the tidal influence extends considerably upstream in the Tidal Link and into KPOD. NIO reports that the tidal amplitude at RD -93 (see Figure 5) is about 2 m. Moreover, during October 1999 the tide levels recorded at RD –22 were 1.4 to 2.46 m, and during November – December 1999 the tide levels recorded at RD –21 were 0.31 to 1.84 m (NIO, 2004). NIO further reports that the influence of tidal fluctuation is noticeable up to RD +2, within KPOD and near the outfall of Seerani drain into KPOD.

21. Another indication of the extent to which the tide has penetrated the Tidal Link is salinity. According to NIO (2004), the high saline sea water from Shah Samando Creek which previously was detected up to RD -125 and RD -95 has now extended up to RD -38 and possibly beyond. Figure 6 shows a clear influence of the tide cycle on the salinity as far from Shah Samando Creek as RD -30. The mission noted that in Pateji Dhand, formerly the outfall of KPOD, salinity is extremely high, around 68,000 ppm (Figure 7), due to high evaporation in the area and the fact that this dhand does not currently receive water from any drain nowadays while the other dhands do.

0

1

2

3

4

5

H O U R S

HE

IGH

T (

m)

HE

IGH

T (

m)

0 0 : 0 0 0 8 : 0 0 1 6 : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 8 : 0 0 1 6 : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 8 : 0 0 1 6 : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 8 : 0 0 1 6 : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 8 : 0 0 1 6 : 0 0

H e i g h t ( m )

T I D A L L E V E L S A T R D - 9 3 D U R I N G 0 7 T O 1 1 - 0 2 - 2 0 0 1

F i g u r e 5 . T i d a l l e v e l s a t R D - 9 3 ( N O I , 2 0 0 4 )

35

40

45

50

55

60

HOURS

SA

LIN

ITY

(pp

t)

SA

LIN

ITY

(pp

t)

12:00 07:00 13:00 19:00 05:00 11:00 17:00 07:00 13:00

Salinity (ppt)

Water Salinity at the Tidal Link Drain at RD -30During 04 to 07-07-2000.

Figure 6. Water salinity at RD -30 (NOI, 2004)

May 2005 16

22. The Tidal Link left bank is attacked from the Rann of Kutch by tides and storm surges, and is directly exposed to wave action generated by strong storm and southwest monsoon winds and waves in the zone of influence of tides (Map 3). These factors .are especially amplified during high storm surges, such as those produced by the 1999 cyclone and the 2003 storm13.

13 There is a high time variability involved in the process at the outfall area. Water quality and water levels in the Dhands have hourly variations with the tide, monthly seasonal variations and annual differences with the droughts. The comparison among the different measurements or satellite images taken at different times could proved misleading.

32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 Longitude (minutes of 68 Deg.)

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

L a t i t u d e ( m i n u t e s 0 f 2 4 D e g . )

. Figure 7 . Salinity in Dhands area (NOI, 2004)

May 2005 17

23. The mission concluded that the Tidal Link carried a flow much greater than the design discharge. Interviews, presentations and the reports of the LBOD consultants (1984 and 1994) indicate clearly to the mission that the LBOD channel design discharge was set considering only drainage rates of 1.5 cusec/sq mile or 1.4 mm/day (this number changed for different project areas), leaving a free board of around 2 ft . This would correspond to a design capacity of 2400 cusecs and a maximum carrying capacity of 4440 cusecs corresponding to a 125 mm rainfall of 5 days duration, which would result in flood duration of 5 days. The disposal of storm water into the surface drainage was to be limited using control inlets sized assuming a ponding depth of around 1 foot and discharge restricted to 1.8 cusecs. Analysis of available data indicates that the maximum discharge experienced in KPOD and Tidal Link in 2003 was around 10,000 cusecs that resulted from rainfall of 218 mm recorded at Badin, which occurred after two other storms earlier in the same month. July 2003 resulted in the largest monthly rainfall recorded at Badin station in 67 years. From statements made by several officials, it was assumed in the design of LBOD canals that the channel system would not be allowed to carry base flow during heavy rainfall, but the Mission found that it was not the case during the 2003 storms. Not only was base flow present in the system but irrigation water refusals were also diverted directly to the drain system and additional inlets were provided by farmers breaching the embankments.

24. Assessment of changes and conditions using remote sensing. The LBOD and Tidal Link are quickly becoming both a new river and an upstream extension of the Shah Samando Creek. Satellite images (Map 3-6) show that several tidal fingers have developed around the channel from breaches left by past floods and cyclone events. It is expected that this situation will continue to develop until a new equilibrium is achieved in which sediment load carried by the tidal wave and upstream flow is compensated by sediment detachment brought about by the ebb phase of tide. Existing tidal fingers have also extended further in the northern direction and in some cases have joined those connected to the Tidal Link. Satellite images also show a reduction of the surface area of the Dhands, although it is not clear whether this effect has been due to changes in the Tidal Link or, as reported anecdotally by many people, to drought conditions. Apart from that, satellite images show small changes in the overall coastal plain and geomorphology during the last few years (Map 3-6). IMTA will provide more detail information and confirm this assessment as part of the on-going work performed by the Institute for this mission.

25. Analysis of storm conditions in the LBOD basin. The Mission had access to a limited amount of rainfall data. There are eight storms at least as intense as the 1994, 1999 and 2003 storms in 67 years. From these data a simplified frequency analys is of annual maximum 24 h and monthly precipitation at Badin Station was made. The

May 2005 18

results are shown in Figures 8a and 8b14. For a rainfall duration of 24 hours, the 2003 storm has a return period of 6.6 years. This implies a probability of 56% of having at least one similar or grater storm to occur in a period of 5 years. With respect of the monthly rainfall, the graph shows a return period of 67 years. Factually the July 2003 monthly rainfall is the highest recorded rainfall in Badin.

24 h Rainfall, Badin Station

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1 10 100Return period (years)

Rai

nfa

ll, m

m

2

50205

2003

Figure 8a: 24-hour Rainfall Frequency

14 The reduced variate R shown in Figure 8a and 8b is related to the return period T by the equation

−−=

1lnln

TT

R

May 2005 19

Monthly Rainfall Badin station, mm

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

1 10 100

Return period (years)

Rai

nfa

ll, m

m

2 5 20 50

2003

Figure 8b: Monthly Rainfall Frequency Analysis

26. Environmental monitoring. Having brought LBOD drainage water through KPOD to the edge of the coastal zone, the designers of this scheme were faced with major dilemmas. They were seeking a safe, sustainable and environmentally sound place to dispose of the salt and other pollutants in the drainage water. The coastal zone in this part of the Indus plain is a vast, dynamic and complex wetland with large areas of global ecological importance, and economically valuable resources especially fisheries. Its consists of shallow lakes (dhands) formed in numerous depressions, broad mud flats that often have a salt crust, and a dynamic delta region that consists of numerous active tidal creeks that connect the upland areas of the coastal zone to the sea. Despite its harsh appearance, scientists who have visited the area report that it is ecologically rich, and a major, high quality habitat for resident and migratory birds and waterfowl that arrive along the Indus flyway. The coastal zone is also shared with India, the border actually coming within sight of the lower KPOD canal. Throughout the 20th century, major changes were made in the hydrology and sediment load of the Indus River, and it is generally agreed, by knowledgeable specialists carrying out studies in the Indus delta region, that this has set in motion macro- level change processes within the delta and this coastal zone about which there is inadequate knowledge at present on which to base the formulation and implementation of effective management plans. The Indus Treaty which basically allocated three Eastern Rivers to India and three Western Rivers to Pakistan allowed this country to develop its water

May 2005 20

resources and the expansion of the irrigated water supply capacity from 67 MAF to 104, including the construction of Tarbela and Mangla dams. The benefits for Pakistan have allowed the country meeting the basic needs of its population and double the irrigation acreage. Of particular concern are the problems of the deltaic areas of Sindh. The country is now engaged in studying the environmental flows required to maintain the ecological and productive functions of the estuary.

27. In view of the international dimensions of the Rann of Kutch, and the economic and ecological importance of the dhands, the designers decided to transport the LBOD discharge through a new canal directly to an active tidal creek where the flow would be diluted and discharged to the sea during low tide. Measures were implemented that would protect the valuable dhands (Cholri Weir), and the canal was designed (high embankments topped by a berm) to withstand the forces it would encounter (wind and waves) as it crossed the Rann of Kutch. However, very little real data and information were available on which to base the formulation of additional environmental and ecological management measures. In 1997 baseline studies of the fishery (Univ. of Jamshoro) and avifauna (Zoological Department of Pakistan) of the dhands along with a socio-economic assessment of the fishing community (Univ. of Jamshoro) were carried out to add to the physical monitoring data being gathered by the NIO and the SMO (hydraulics and salinity among other things). The Environmental Monitoring and Management Plan (EMMP) for LBOD Stage I Project, prepared by the consultants in 1998, stressed the implementation of a well designed monitoring program that would build the knowledge base and help authorities to spot adverse trends and formulate mitigation measure. Unfortunately this EMMP could not be implemented due in large part to the disputes between GOS and WAPDA, and the lack of a committed institutional focal point in Sindh that could persuade policy makers of the importance of providing the necessary resources and financial support such a program requires. Fortunately NIO monitoring of salinity in the dhands and the Tidal Link have continued from 1999 to June 2004 (discussed in the next chapter).

28. The monitoring system in place is still limited and does not fully help to understand thoroughly the impacts that have occurred and the mitigation measures to be implemented. A more sustained effort in monitoring and data collection is needed to face today GOS challenge to mitigate the damages to the outfall system, to fully understand the long term changes (over the last 50 years) in the coastal zone that appear to have affected the dhands and to define the mitigation measures to be implemented.

29. Socio-economic information. The Mission received detailed information from the World Bank team preparing a Proposal for Livelihoods Improvements: Badin and Thatta Districts. The ongoing study provided most of the social-economical data and related information used by the POE. As pointed out by the authors, extreme weather events and natural disasters as well as a generally poor natural resource endowment have persistently plagued the coastal areas of Sindh, especially Badin and Thatta Districts. Reports prepared by UN Agencies suggest that the impact of natural calamities in this area has been severe for the low income and vulnerable groups, and resulted in a disruption in livelihoods and increased their vulnerability.

May 2005 21

30. However despite emigration and the difficult living conditions to which the people of this area have been confronted with, the coastal population of Badin increased from 450,000 in 1998 to an estimated 520,000 in 2005 (15.5% in 7 years, meanly from natural growth). The extreme climatic events of the last four years including continuous droughts and two major storms have affected this area, and have become the center of discussion in the Sindh society. The people of the area have demonstrated considerable resilience and coping capacity over the years particularly during these extraordinary circumstances.

31. Notwithstanding the favorable and important repercussions of the drainage provided in the upper areas of the district, the system has not significantly benefited the lower rural areas in coastal Badin tha t have some access to land. At the tail end of the irrigated area, having access to degraded cultivable land, people are living in fragile conditions. Farming is an underdeveloped and increasingly risky activity, because of uncertainties of the availability of water, which as usual depends on the volume not used in the higher parts of the system. Because of increased population pressure over diminished natural resources, fishing in the dhands is also an unstable base for rural livelihoods. The capacity of local households to own and maintain a few heads of livestock is also limited. Most of the households in the coastal tazims are more food-insecure than other neighboring areas.

32. Several investments in agro- industry in recent years have increased employment in the zone. Nevertheless recent WB diagnostic in the area reports that 70% of the rural population is earning less than Rs. 4,000 ($70) per month.

33. Concerning basic services, clean water and electricity, schooling and health, the improvements, if any, have not been significant so far. An increased vulnerability has worsened poverty conditions for the population in the area.

34. As per the events in July 2003 local elected authorities firmly indicated to the Mission that the amount of water received at the lower Badin was unprecedented. The main reasons, in their views were: the additional volume collected by the drainage system at the higher lands and the performance of the outfall system.

IV. FINDINGS OF THE MISSION

35. The dynamic context of the LBOD scheme. The present conditions of the outfall area are quite different form the ones observed when LBOD outfall system was in the stage of preparation and before it started operations. With the information available to the mission about the initial state of the area, key changes are now recognized in the topography, batimetry and cross sections of the Tidal Link and the KPOD. There are also important deviations from the original project estimations of the salinities, velocities and water levels at several places.

• Since well before the contribution of the LBOD Stage I Project, the Indus Delta has been in a complex and delicate transition from the original equilibrium to a

May 2005 22

new state, with serious perturbations due to the drastic changes in the Indus River hydrologic and sediment regimes. Increased water use in the Indus River basin mainly for the expansion of irrigated agriculture has changed the water flow and the sediment load that had built the delta over geologic time. According to the National Oceanographic Institute, the fragile equilibrium among tidal and litoral currents, river flow and sediment transport has been drastically changed. The river was dry during last year’s kharif season below Kotri barrage. The observed changes at macro scale have been interpreted by some experts (interviewed by the mission, including scientists from the Institute of Oceanography), as a shrinking of the Indus delta. This seems to be confirmed by the finding of purely oceanic origin organisms in the tidal creeks by the same scientists. NIO scientists and others studying the Indus delta also believe that the estuary, which is the most productive part of this delta, has also shrunk with negative impacts to livelihoods, commercial activities and fisheries,.

• Construction of agricultural drainage in the lower part of the Kotri basin changed the equilibrium of the dhands especially Sanhro and Mehro since the 1960s, creating new ecosystems in some cases. The salinities in these drains, reported by the LBOD Stage I Project EMMP Report (1998), were much lower than seawater salinities, especially during the rainy season. This contributed to the establishment of brackish or estuarine conditions with lower salinity in these dhands, resulting in the reported high productivity and favorable bird habitat. This condition has been changed as Figures 7 & 9 amply demonstrate.

• The combined effects of runoff from heavy rainfall and the tide, brought higher velocities than the erosion limits for the soil material in the Tidal Link. These effects have widened the original excavated channel to more than double the original design width. They have also increased dramatically the depth of the Tidal Link up and within KPOD. The new section and slope in the Tidal Link have changed the anticipated tidal effect in the outfall resulting in marine water intrusion in the drains and dhands, and tidal fluctuations much grater than estimated in the original design.

• Furthermore, the Tidal Link and its embankments altered the previous streamflow pattern in the tidal area of the dhands. The new pattern modified the water velocities in the dhands and caused erosion and siltation that are difficult to quantify with the present information. The breaches that resulted from the failure of the Cholri Weir and the embankments concentrated the flow in some areas facilitating new connections from the dhands and the Tidal Link to the sea. The combined effect is facilitating the drainage of the dhands and increasing the amplitude of the tidal fluctuations in KPOD and its connected drains up to about RD 80. These conditions were not expected to extend into KPOD during the design phase.

36. Why did the Cholri weir and the Tidal Link embankments fail? The report describing this original design (Delft Hydraulics, 1989) considered scouring a distant event, predicted an annual dredging requirement of 70,000 m3 and even suggested the

May 2005 23

purchase of dredging equipment and the construction of a dredger service depot at Ali Bandor. The original geometric setup of the Tidal Link Canal has suffered considerable changes because of the flows produced by the 1999 and 2003 storms. A preliminary analysis of the recently collected data suggests that the stable slope is different from that adopted in the original design.

37. The mission did not have access to precise written information including observation notes about the causes of the failure of the Chori weir and the embankments of the Tidal Link. Nobody was at the site during these events, but it is clear that the causes were different for the weir and the embankments. Damage to the weir began within a few months of its completion, and it failed in 1998 and 1999 probably from scouring of the foundation along the canal bed and from water flowing over the crest of the weir. The embankments failed in 1999 probably from the combined effect of scouring in the Tidal Link Canal bed and banks due to high velocities, overtopping (due to storm flow in the channel greater than the design flow) and the wave action in unprotected slopes during high tides. Any alternative considering future rehabilitating the TL should consider these adverse site conditions in designing the new structures.

38. Were the 1999 and 2003 rainfall events too rare to be considered the basis for the design of the system?. The accumulated rainfall in July 2003 is the record highest for any given month. Severe 24 hour duration storms, similar to the one of the 24 hrs duration of July 2003 storm, occurred in 1994 and 1999. A similar storm will occur in the next 5 years with a probability of 56% (8 similar 24 hrs storms have occurred in the last 67 years). Of course, in the 80s when the studies were prepared the 1994, 1999 and 2003 storms have not been recorded. In any event, the principle underpinning the design criteria was to control the water inflow to the drains in the farmer’s fields. It is clear that the changes observed in the delta are caused by a combined effect of the LBOD Stage I project and the extraordinary events in 99 and 2003. River and coastal systems do not usually change during ordinary conditions. They incur substantive change during large storms and floods. In deltas, like the one of the Indus, they tend to deposit sediments along the bed until a large storm or flood occurs. During large extreme events one can expect to have more changes than in many years of relative small storms and flows.

39. What will be the future equilibrium condition? Can we predict a future equilibrium of this very complex system? The system is still evolving (even under a no action alternative) and it is difficult to have a clear vision about what new equilibrium state of the area would be. It appears that the erosion pattern will continue upstream into the drainage system forming a wider and deeper channel and widening the connection to the sea (see figure on evolution of cross sections and bed profile). Under these circumstances the tidal effect would continue traveling upstream the present position into the drainage system and the dhands would have a more direct connection to the sea with a probable reduction of their area. This trend could lead to form a new small estuary that would have a base flow from subsurface drainage and storm flows during the rainy season.

May 2005 24

40. Behavior of the LBOD drainage system. The Badin District in the lower LBOD basin consists of extremely flat land that is susceptible to extensive inundation during heavy rain because of low infiltration rates and slow runoff (this condition prevails to a somewhat lesser degree in many areas of the upper basin as well). The natural drainage is also impeded in the monsoon season by the high tides and extensive flooding of the coastal zone, which is the natural outlet for this slow and shallow overland flow. The LBOD spinal drain and its associated collector drains were designed to carry agricultural and subsurface drainage. The designers assumed that these sources of water would be cut off during heavy rainfall, so that the canal and its full free board of 4 ft could be used to carry runoff from heavy rain. However, this capacity could drain a total of only 125 mm of rainfall over 5 days with a 5 days flood duration with inlet controls to 1.8 cusecs and ponding depth of one foot. Larger amounts of runoff that would result from larger rainfall would have to be stored on the farmer’s land for longer periods. However, two things happened during the particularly heavy rainfall experienced in July, 2003: first, except from most of the tubewells, the baseflow of agricultural drainage water was not cutoff and it continued to flow into the drains; second, farmers in the upper LBOD basin quickly cut the drain embankments to allow their field to drain more rapidly increasing the amount of runoff flowing into the drain and increasing the discharge; and third, diversions into the irrigation canals was not stopped leaving them full and causing several breaches when additional water entered the canals from the rainfall. During such periods farmers commonly allow flow in their water courses15 to go directly to the drains since their field are being inundated by the heavy rain further increasing drain discharge. The resulting high discharges overloaded the LBOD system downstream causing numerous canal breaches that poured water into the already clogged drains and compounded flooding in eastern Kotri Basin and Badin District. During the mission visit, the affected population reported damages from breached canals and informed about the rapid rise in water levels that caused severe damage in this area.

41. Environmental damages. The only new data of real relevance to environmental damages in the dhands area is the salinity data collected by NIO. Data on the evolution of salinity in the dhands at 18 stations over the period 2001 (after the 1999 cyclone) to 2003 (after the 2003 monsoon storm) are shown in Figure 9. Salinity contours covering the four Sindh dhands for the period 2001-2003 is shown in Figure 7. In 1998 the LBOD consultants EMMP Report summarized the salinity data available at that time from surveys carried out between 1983 and 1989 (the time of the first environmental assessment of LBOD Stage I Project) and 1997, as shown in Table 4.

15 Generally there are not sufficient controls to prevent canal flows from entering the distributaries, minors, and watercourses, and even if there were, there is generally not sufficient escape capacity to handle the very high discharges that would result if water is not taken in the distributaries. Hence, timely decisions to reduce diversions into the irrigation canals, is a critical part of the overall response to heavy rain and flood risk management.

May 2005 25

Table 4. Earlier Salinity Measurements in the Tidal Link Area (mS/cm)

Location 1983-89 Jan-Feb 1997 Mehro Dhand 4.3-12 1.5-8.7

Sanhro Dhand 4-15 1.7-11.8 Cholri Dhand 15-77 7.7-20 Pateji Dhand 15-80 18-38 Tidal Link channel NA 10-25 Rann of Kutch 5.5-80 15-170 Shah Samando Creek 5.5-? NA Open Sea 54 54

42. Only Pateji Dhand had persistently high salinity in both the 1980s and in 1997, and the NIO data indicates that that is also the case today. The hyper-salinity of the Rann of Kutch is remarkable, and indicates that it may be influencing salinity in the Tidal Link and the dhands where it flows through the existing breaches in the Tidal Link Canal left bank. Comparison of the above table with Figures 7 & 9 demonstrates clearly the substantial increase in salinity throughout the dhands since 1997. Up to 1997 at least, salinity conditions remained very favorable for the basically brackish or estuarine ecosystem that had developed over the years in the dhands. At present, salinity conditions range from those typical for sea water to the hyper-saline Pateji Dhand (Figure 7). The anecdotal evidence seems to conflict over whether the dhand surface area has shrunk, or the depth has substantially decreased because of the direct connection between Cholri Dhand and the Tidal Link. Other than the obvious intrusion

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 2 3 2 5 27 29 31 33 35

Dhand Stations

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Salinity (ppt)

Salinity (ppt) January 2001Salinity (ppt) January 2002

Salinity (ppt) December 2002Salinity (ppt) December 2003

Surface Water Salinity in Dhands Area

Figure 9. Salinity evolution in Dhands area (NOI, 2004)

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of sea water into Cholri Dhand, it is therefore difficult to say what the primary causes are of this drastic change in salinity. But the effects are evident: a major decrease in birds and waterfowl, absence of the distinctive vegetation and other fauna that existed in the shallower areas of the dhands, and a major decrease in the yield specie composition of the fishery.

43. Changes in the number of birds in the two Ramsar sites located in Sanhro Dhand (Jubho Lagoon) and Mehro Dhand (Nurri Lagoon) respectively as recorded by the Sindh Wildlife Department (SWD) in their annual census is summarized in Table 5. Little or no trend is indicated by the Nurri Lagoon data but the data for Jubho Lagoon shows a substantial decline. The total combined number of birds in the two adjacent and inter-connected lagoons also shows a substantial decline of about 46% between 1990 and 2002.

Table 5. Number of Birds Recorded in the Annual Waterfowl Census by SWD16

Year Jubho Lagoon Nurri Lagoon 1990 68,548 71,335 2001 24,448 43,115 2002 13,712 50,997

44. The analytical problem is that there is not sufficient data to understand the current water balance of the dhands in terms of both water quantity and water quality, and hence to determine what are the primary causes of these changes and how any imbalances could be corrected or their effects mitigated. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the flow in the two major Kotri drains that discharge into Sanhro and Mehro Dhands, the Karo and Fulelli drains respectively, have greatly diminished because of the shortage of irrigation water but there is no measured data to support this. The mission observed very heavy pollution in the Karo Gungro drain reported to be caused by wastewater discharges from sugar mills and towns in the sub-basin (though piped sewerage system coverage in area is thought to be very low). The 1998 LBOD Stage I Project EMMP Report compared water quality data collected by LBOD drains in 1994 for sugar factory effluent with similar data at two points along KPOD. This comparison is shown in the Table 6. KPOD used to discharge into the more isolated Pateji Dhand but this source of brackish water has been diverted into the Tidal Link. It seems from the available data therefore, that the major influences on the water quantity and quality balance has shifted to evapotranspiration (ET) and sea water intrusion with a consequent increase in overall salinity.

16 As shown in the Drainage Master Plan POE Report, Annex II, after Shahid Amjad and Samina Kidwai, Freshwater, brackish water and coastal wetlands of Sindh: Status Paper, Karachi, NIO.

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Table 6. Selected Parameters from the Analysis of Sugar Factory and KPOD Effluent

Analysis Sugar Factory Effluent

KPOD Effluent @ RD 84

KPOD Effluent @ RD 21

Color Dark brown Colorless Colorless Odor Pungent Odorless Odorless Ph 6.4 7.6 7.4 Electrical Conductivity (mS/cm) 480 685 624

Total Solids (mg/l) 142,000 396 5000 Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) (mg/l)

12,693 580 340

45. Social perceptions of the LBOD system and the events of 2003. From the perspective of most of the concerned stakeholders, LBOD did not fulfill expectations in the lower Badin. Introducing the District’s Contingency Plan to Combat Cyclones and Flood/Rain 2004-2005 it is said that “Although Government has provided maximum relief and other agencies have also substantially contributed…. but area and population affected is of such a large scale that people are still not satisfied”.

46. Fishermen and farmers interviewed at their villages vividly described the succession of events in 2003 and alluded to the deterioration of the local livelihoods. A vision for the future could be extracted from them, altogether with needs and demands for relief and immediate support.

47. To some extent the population in the area is accustomed to the impact of climatic calamities but worrying increased because of uncontrolled floods in the future. These communities are expecting more efficient and expeditious early warning, preparedness and relief support.

48. Fishermen are aware on the need for a strengthened organization concerning access to resources and markets, and started a process in that direction. Employment, basic services, better communication infrastructure, improved access to water in agriculture are the longstanding needs in the perception of rural population in coastal Badin.

49. The impact from the heavy rains in 2003 seems to have galvanized the opinion of an important part of the local population in Badin and the neighboring district of Thatta. It is however evident that civil society concerns on the outfall structures emerged pretty soon after the Tidal Link inception (i.e. Sindh Chamber of Agriculture and Sindh Abadgar Board on 15/02/1996).

50. The mission had the opportunity to receive a number of well articulated queries from representatives of the civil society organizations active at district, provincial and national level. Some of the expressions were in line with queries submitted to the World Bank Inspection Panel. However some representatives of farmer groups also informed the mission of the benefits derived from LBOD in both agricultural

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productivity and in the time the floods recede from their lands, which was usually 2 months while in the July 2003 storm it was only 10 to 15 days.

51. A number of elected representatives at the level of Union Council and Nazims presented extensively their views to the mission; elected representatives broadly coincided on the need for de-linking the Tidal link and the KPOD drain, some of them emphasized that local communities would not accept any further expansion of the LBOD system to northern areas, nor they would permit any civil work at the disposal level contrary to the natural flow of the run-off in the coastal plain. In general there is a consensus in most of the proposals to discharge the LBOD storm drainage into the former course of the DPOD.

52. The mission noted that member farmers of the Area Water Board organized under NDP enjoying credibility in the area and affected by the floods, underscored the positive benefits of the LBOD Stage I Project in the agricultural sector as well as the need to further improvements and corrections in the outfall structures. Other farmers pointed out the “lack of discipline and organization” in some parts of the drainage system that opened free course to the water in their plots cutting the drains, thus originating an unexpected increase in the flow to the lower areas.

53. President Musharraf stated in 2004 that “[…] people of Badin and Thatta had suffered a lot because of the absence of the proper floodwater disposal system. [That] the primary objective of LBOD system was to save the people of Sindh from adverse effects of the extraordinary rains. [That] the people of Sindh have, therefore, lost faith in LBOD”. The President instructed the Army and WAPDA, SIDA and the IPD of Sindh to start the implementation of the actions presented in Table 1. The President visited the area shortly after the mission departed and personally stated the commitment of the Government of Pakistan’s solution to the problems following detailed analysis and recommendations from the concerned institutions at the federal and provincial levels.

54. The present institutional setup and its consequences. Reflecting on its discussion with a wide variety of stakeholders, the mission identified the following issues: i) weaknesses in operation and maintenance of LBOD Stage I Project major components, particularly but not exclusively at the outfall level; ii) need to improve the structural and non structural components in the flood management arrangements at all levels; iii) unexpected behavior of the drainage users, particularly farmers located in the upper levels of the system that deteriorated the infrastructure and contributed, to an additional and non expected run off; iv) insufficient arrangements concerning preparedness and information in connection with flood rela ted disasters; and v) insufficient arrangements to organize and implement the immediate relief activities.

55. The mission concluded that the institutional arrangements and capacity to address events such as the heavy rains that occurred in 2003 were not adequate and that a number of institutional-related issues should be improved. The process of transfer of operation and maintenance responsibilities from the central level to the provincial SIDA should be completed, so as to reduce the risk of discontinuation of crucial

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activities and record valuable knowledge. It is important for the Province to reduce the uncertainties in the availability of financial resources for the sector.

56. Government is committed to solve the problems and has developed a series of proposed remedies to the outfall structures referred in other parts of this report. Officials are fully aware of the difficulties emerging from institutional weaknesses and indicated the need for a rapid and efficient completion of the ongoing process of devolution and decentralization, as well as strengthening the capacity for operation and maintenance of the drainage system at all levels.

V. A RESTATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THE OBJECTIVES

57. LBOD Stage I Project has had positive results in Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, and Nawabshah Districts, and in eastern Badin District. It has increased agricultural production stimulating the development of agro- industries in the basin. However, institutional weaknesses persist in the capacity of the system to perform efficiently under storm events, including increased flood risk downstream in Badin District. There are also impacts related to expansion of the area affected by tides and sea water (for example, measured salinity at RD-30, Figure 6, just downstream of where KPOD joins the Tidal Link varies between 40 and 50 ppt), and increased salinity in the Dhands located in the Sindh portion of the Rann of Kutch (measured salinity in the Dhands, Figure 7, varies from 35 to 68 ppt).

58. The Dhands. Salinity has increased in the dhands (Figures 7 & 9). The open connection between the Tidal Link and the dhands has introduced significant tidal fluctuations at least in Cholri Weir, and caused the gradual silting of this Dhand. A tidal creek type drainage network has developed where the erstwhile Cholri Weir was located; facilitating rapid and excessive drainage of Cholri Dhand at low tide (it is not known how far this effect extends into the dhands). The increased salinity of the dhands is probably caused by a combination of decreased flows in some of the Kotri drains (Kora and Fuleli) that flow into the Sanhro and Mehro Dhands, diversion to KPOD (which collected the eastern Kotri drains and emptied into Pateji Dhand) into the Tidal Link, and the inflow of some sea water through the open connection with the Tidal Link. Evaporation may also be a more important part of the water balance of the dhands than in previous times. The mission observed that the dhands may now be under threat from pollution by sugar factories and other polluters upstream on the drains that outfall into the dhands.

59. Runoff from heavy rainfall. The storm drainage capacity was overwhelmed during the July 2003 storms that occurred in the area. Subsurface drainage is now improving the conditions and the sustainability of the irrigated agriculture of the LBOD basin. But it presented major problems in parts of the LBOD basin and large areas of the Kotri basin in Badin District in July 2003 due to a combination of factors: i) the high intensity of the rainfall; ii) storm drainage of such magnitude was not considered in the design of the drainage that was primarily constructed to manage subsurface drainage flows; iii) inadequate operation of canal and drainage structures; iv)

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uncoordinated and lack of preparedness of institutions; v) lack of maintenance of relevant structures; and vi) farmers behavior providing additional outlets to the drains.

60. The Tidal Link Canal. The Tidal Link Canal, which constitutes the most important part of the LBOD outfall has been submitted to higher stress than originally expected, especially during the storm events of 94, 99 and 2003. Cholri weir and the embankments of the Tidal Link failed and are at present in a state “beyond repair”. This failure was partly due to design issues and the magnitude of the storm flows being well beyond the design parameters and criteria. The end result is a completely changed outfall condition leading to a process that is forming a new estuary configuration. This ongoing process has widened and deepened the Tidal Link sections and increased the tidal fluctuations and the penetration of sea water much farther upstream in the Tidal Link Canal than was thought to be possible at the time it was designed. This process is still active and evolving, and appears to be moving upstream into KPOD.

61. The challenges ahead. The problem today is to define near term and long-term effective and cost efficient alternatives that contribute to meeting the following objectives:

• Diminish the flood risk of the lower basin in Badin District area for villages and agricultural land,

• Ensure that local officials are prepared to act locally in a coordinated, effective and timely manner in case of an extreme event like the one in July 2003, to diminish economic losses and prevent loss of life of the local population

• Contribute to improved livelihoods in the lower Basin District.

• Improve the safety and security of the LBOD drainage system

• Improve the capacity of Dhoro Puran (DPOD) to act as an effective component of the LBOD system,

• Limit sea water intrusion and tidal fluctuations in the Kotri drains along KPOD, and within KPOD itself

• Restore salinity conditions and limit the influence of tidal fluctuations and sediment accumulation in the Dhands

• Control the estuary development process in the outfall and limit its adverse effects.

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VI. DEVELOPING A STRATEGY

62. Summary of the options available. The mission recommends a combination of “hard” structural measures and institutional “soft” actions to address the objectives described in paragraph 60. Most of the agencies concerned with some aspect of LBOD drains and the Tidal Link have undertaken missions to examine the conditions on the ground, and have made proposals, including so called immediate measures, to alleviate the situation. A comprehensive strategy or plan to solve the current problems has not yet been prepared, particularly a plan that would respond the wide range of challenges and objectives outlined in the previous chapter.

63. Structural options . To facilitate discussion of the structural options presently available, Map 2 shows a schematic diagram of the LBOD outfall system including the basic elements of the system and the various options.

“A” – Regulating structure at the junction of KPOD and the Tidal Link. Nearly everyone has a strong feeling that measures should be taken to prevent tidal fluctuations and sea water from entering KPOD. This would commonly be accomplished by construction of a gated regulator across KPOD. At high tide in the Tidal Link the gates would be closed to prevent intrus ion into KPOD. At low tide, the gates would be opened to allow the water in KPOD to flow downstream into the Tidal Link Canal. There are several considerations and issues that cast doubt on the viability of this option. First, a very large structure with many gates would be needed. The two abutments of the structure in this area appear to the mission to be weak with a significant risk that KPOD could erode a path around the structure. Second, the gates of such a structure would have to be operated with discipline for it to be both safe and effective, and present experience in Sindh suggests that this may not be possible. Third, measured data are not available as yet to show what the tidal amplitude and salinity are in the lower reaches of KPOD, and hence whether a structure is really needed and would provide substantial benefit commensurate with the high cost of such a structure. The mission believes that if further data collection and analysis demonstrates the need and value of such a structure, that it should be locate well upstream of the junction of KPOD and the Tidal Link Canal.

“B” & “C” – Control structures at the bifurcation of the Spinal Drain. An uncontrolled weir was built in the Dhoro Link in the left bank of the Spinal drain where it meets KPOD. The purpose of this structure was to allow a substantial portion of LBOD peak flows (2000 cfs out of 4600cfs) to be diverted through the Dhoro Link to the old Dhoro Puran River (referred to as DPOD) and thence to Shakoor Dhand17. As an immediate measure the weir crest has been lowered 2.5 ft, and the capacity of the Dhoro Link increased, to facilitate the diversion of a larger percentage of the peak flow

17 In the LBOD design this was referred to as the diversion of freshwater (storm runoff) flowing in LBOD. However one would expect the flow (saline agricultural drainage water (baseflow) and storm runoff) to be completely mixed by the time it reaches the diversion point, though the resulting salinity of the flow would certainly be lower than the baseflow. The design was based on the operating assumption that the flow from all tubewells and tile drains would be stopped during a storm..

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of the Spinal Drain. The mission believes that the critical factor in the safety and security of the LBOD outfall system is the maximum discharge in KPOD, and that this should not exceed 5-6,000 cfs. Presently there is no data that would support assuming that a flow greater than about 2000 cfs can be diverted through the Dhoro Puran Link because of the downstream water levels in Shakoor Dhand and the condition of the Dhoro Puran River. Hence the maximum allowable flow in the Spinal Drain under these conditions would be about 7-8,000 cfs. If because of excess storm runoff upstream in the LBOD basin, the flow would be higher than this limit, escapes must be built into the left bank of the Spinal drain to reduce the discharge. These escaped flows could be routed to the upper portion of the ancient Dhoro Puran River so long as the tailwater conditions of the Dhoro Puran Link were not worsened. The point where the Spinal Drain bifurcates is clearly a critical point in the LBOD outfall system. The mission believes that two gated structures are needed to ensure operating flexibility and the safety of KPOD. The first structure (“B”) would be located downstream of the bifurcation within the KPOD channel to enable strict control of the discharge in KPOD. The second structure (“C”) would be a gated structure in the Dhoro Puron Link replacing the present uncontrolled weir. The combination of these two control structure would provide maximum operating flexibility and control of LBOD flows. For example, not only would gated structure “B” ensure that the maximum flow in KPOD was below the limit, but at non peak times, the gates would permit significant flows to be sustained in the Dhoro Link helping to resuscitate the ancient Dhoro River and possibly improve groundwater and drinking water supplies in that area (flow simulations would need to be carried out and detailed water quality data would have to be available and analyzed to consider this possibility). Provision of uncontrolled escapes in the KPOD left bank, in addition to those mentioned above for the Spinal Drain, would enhance the safety of KPOD. In both the Spinal Drain and KPOD, the height of the top of the right bank must be at least 22 ft based on the mission’s estimate of the water surface profile at the point where the flow bifurcates18. This right bank must also be strengthened and all zones and points of weakness eliminated, especially around existing structures where drains enter the main canals.

“D” & “E” – Measure to protect the Kotri Drains. The intrusion of tidal fluctuations and saline water into the small Kotri drains that flow into KPOD is a major concern of farmers in the eastern portion of Badin District (mainly in the Left Bank Canal sub-basin). Suggestions have been made to provide small gated regulators or tide gates near each of these drain inlets to prevent back flow into the drain at high tide in KPOD. Escapes could also be constructed in Seerani drain to divert water into the

18 A preliminary estimation of water levels at DPOD and KPOD/Tidal Link channels was done using the HEC/RAS program from the US Corps of Engineers. The level at the DPOD/KPOD bifurcation was calculated assuming a common tide level at the discharge of both channels. Results suggest an embankments level of about 22 ft around the fork. It should be noted that this is only a crude estimation of the levels, due to the fact that no topographical information in the zone around Dhoro Dhand, data on the precise conditions at the outfalls and the discharge coming from upstream at the Dhoro Puran old river course was available. Also, discharge into Cholri and Pategi Dhands was not taken into account.

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waste land that separates this drain from the dhands in order to control the water level in these drains. The same approach might also be an attractive option in some of the other Kotri drains that outfall into KPOD if they are threatened by high water levels and there is similar waste land available. So far there is no data available to the mission that tidal fluctuations or sea water intrusion is a problem in the lower parts of these drains. If new data showed that the penetration of tidal fluctuations and sea water actually causes harm, then such structures may be a viable option. However there is another option. The mission noted that one of the main causes of increased salinity in the Dhands is the reduction of drain inflow, caused in part by the prolonged drought in the Indus River basin and the consequent reduction in the availability of irrigation water. Before the LBOD outfall system was constructed KPOD acted as a collector drain and carried these drain flows into Pateji Dhand. Diversion of the Kotri drains that enter (or all of them as before) towards Pateji Dhand, and possibly Mehro Dhand, would, if the salinity of these drains is generally lower than the present salinity of the Dhands, contribute significantly to their improvement. A sound analysis is needed to insure that this action will not evolve in the formation of a new creek.

“F” - Control of Tidal Link access to the Dhands. One of the most important and complicated problems arises because of the open connection between the Tidal Link Canal and the Dhands created when Cholri Weir was destroyed. The mission believes that reconstruction of the Cholri Weir, even based on a new design, should not be considered at this time in part because of the still active scour and erosion processes ongoing in the Tidal Link. Recent remote sensing studies carried out by SUPARCO on behalf of WAPDA suggest that the main effect of the open connection appears to be the sedimentation of Cholri Dhand and the formation of a tidal creek within this dhand that facilitates its rapid drainage at low tide. No data or evidence has so far come to light that these tidal and sediment effects have extended further into Sanhro and Mehro Dhands where two Ramsar sites exist (Pateji Dhands is isolated from the other three dhands by low silt barriers). Not enough is known about the overall water and salinity balance of the dhands to say at this point which are the dominate causes of the high salinity although it seems sure that sea water intrusion from the Tidal Link has contributed significantly. Nor can one say for sure whether recovery of normal drain flows from Karo and Fuleli drains combined with restoration of the inflow from the other Kotri drains would be sufficient to lower salinity in Sanhro and Mehro Dhands to levels similar to the past when it was a highly productive fishery and good waterfowl habitat. Those conditions were more brackish or estuarine with a maximum salinity of 20 ppt and a significant salinity gradient.

Other Possible options to conserve and improve the dhand ecosystems. The mission discussed a number alternative measures that might contribute to the recovery of the dhands.

• One obvious option is to construct a low embankment or bund separating Cholri Dhand from Sanhro Dhand. The viability of this option might be questioned because of the likelihood of severe wave erosion, but low cost measures might be formulated to adequately protect the embankment. However, this option should be viewed as a serious step because it cuts off all opportunity for water

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to circulate between the dhands and it prevents the recruitment of juvenile fish, shrimp and other fauna. Moreover this option should not be chosen until the dynamic water balance and patterns of water movement within the dhand system are well known and a verified model of these dynamics can be used to assess the feasibility and impact of this option.

• Second, most experts and the mission agree that increased flow of brackish, relatively low salinity water into the dhands is the best restoration strategy assuming this would shift the water and salt balance toward a lower salinity environment, something that can be determined by a comprehensive monitoring program designed to provide the data needed to analyze the dynamic water quantity and quality balance in the dhands. At present studies have begun to provide data and analysis to support ongoing negotiations concerning the allocation of Indus River flow to the Indus River and delta below Kotri Barrage. Should these negotiations prove successful from Sindh’s perspective, a percentage of the flow available should be diverted into the Kotri canals and drains to the dhands. This would likely have a significant impact on the restoration process.

• Third, experts suggested to the mission a number of non-structural natural measures that might attenuate the influence of the Tidal Link on the dhands and in particular slow or stop its progression beyond Cholri Dhand. A belt of mangroves generally along in the alignment where Cholri Dhand joins Sanhro Dhand has been suggested as a way of trapping sediment and attenuating any tidal pulses or effects that might enter Sanhro Dhand. However, past attempts to establish extensive mangrove belts or forests in this area of the coastal zone have not been successful probably because of the soils (they are reported to be flourishing in the area of Shah Samando Creek though over harvested by local people). A third possibility is to try to establish appropriate specie of reeds and other grasses that are well adapted to the prevailing salinities in the shallow silted area between Cholri and Sanhro Dhands. Such a reed and grass belt would behave much like a constructed wetland19 filtering both sediments , pollutants and nutrients moving from Cholri Dhand to Sanhro Dhand. Care would have to be taken to not prevent the recruitment of fish fry and young shrimps from the Tidal Link or the movement of breeding fishes toward the delta and the marine environment. If the dhands were to begin a slow recovery initiatives would have to be undertaken to organize fisherman and provide training and awareness

19 Constructed wetlands have not been tried in Pakistan as a low cost method of treating wastewater or polluted water. This method possibly combined with other low cost methods should be piloted as a way of treating the agricultural drainage water (if this would improve the viability of an option such as diverting LBOD flows into parts of the Rann of Kutch) and in particular, as a method of treating sugar factory and other wastewater discharges to the drains that threaten the dhands. Global experience with constructed wetlands and other low cost wastewater treatment options has greatly increased in recent years, and Pakistan could benefit from this experience since its experience with command and control regulatory approaches have been unsuccessful.

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to stimulate their management of the fishery by preventing over- fishing and use of fine mesh nets that take excessive quantities of young fish and shrimp.

• The mission believes that for the time being the best strategy is to ensure increased flow of brackish water into the dhands from the Kotri drains including the diversion of those drains that currently flow into KPOD, and to intensify the monitoring of water levels, tides, sediment, bathometry, salinity and drain flows in the Dhands to improve the understanding of the water balance and to detect any negative trends that emerge in order to formulate mitigation measures.

64. Institutional Actions common to all infrastructure alternative options. Regardless which combination of physical options are selected from possibilities described above, there are a number of critical institutional actions and steps that must be taken in all cases. These include:

• Prepare a flood management plan including: a forecasting and awareness system, operation program for canal and drain structures during heavy precipitation events and a contingency plan to assist local population in case of an emergency.

• Review the design of the system for storm drainage and construct the entrances to the drains, synthesize the hydrographs at relevant points and review capacities in critical spots. Introduce a sound storm design analysis using appropriate models calibrated with past events including the July 2003 storms.

• Study the structures to modify present trend and diminish the flood risk to lower Basin villages and farmers. Consider the natural drainage pattern and the long evolution of the system at feasibility stage.

• Monitor, analyze the data, and learn.

• Define a responsible agency with resources (expertise, funds and equipment) and power to deal with O&M of main drains and outfall.

VII. RECOMMENDED STRATEGY

65. Finding a sustainable solution. The Government of Sindh with Federal assistance is implementing actions to rehabilitate the system and to solve some of the problems. In particular; an embankment is under construction to protect low agricultural land around the dhands, measures to protect some embankments in KPOD and the Kotri drains are being implemented, and repairs are being made to gates in outlet structures. There is also progress in preparing plans for the evacuation in case of floods as well as compensation of persons affected by the 2003 floods.

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66. However a more consistent and well-defined strategy is needed in order to cost efficiently and effectively improve the present condition and performance of the system.

The mission recommends that the Government:

• Adopt an adaptive approach that emphasizes learning by doing,

• Prioritize actions according to cost efficient solutions,

• Encourage people’s participation,

• Carefully apply sound engineering practice,

• Undertake more coordinated efforts among all agencies,

• Provide clear definition of responsibilities, authority and accountabilities, and

• Strengthen coordinated international cooperation.

Learning by doing. The monitoring program is essential to have a final tidal and drainage system that can work according to the identified objectives. The costal environment has proven to be a complex and difficult environment with interactions of: tidal fluctuations, density gradients, sediment transport and a highly variable stream flow in the rainy season. For example, equilibrium conditions for the new estuary that is now developing and for the present trend or ultimate result of connections between the Tidal Link and the dhands are extremely difficult to understand and forecast, especially with the information now available to the mission. Recent experience shows that the structures are subject to: wave action, high water velocities and tidal currents that made them fail soon after their completion. An adaptive approach is therefore recommended in order to learn at the same time the structures are built. Recording rainfall, water levels and discharges during floods can give more information about the real hydrographs along the drains. The mission recognized the efforts of the Government in getting information through the NIO, but the effort was discontinued since June 2004.

Cost effective solutions need to be implemented by assigning priorities to investments considering costs and economic and social and environmental benefits of the related actions. During the visit to the lower Badin area the mission observed the works being done to protect the low lands around the Shanro and Mahro dhands and the stone pitching being installed to protect the right embankment at the end of the Seerani drain near to KPOD. These works have high investments cost compared with the value of the property they are trying to protect. An approach is needed to carefully evaluate priorities, propose schemes and designs, and make the right decisions about the most efficient allocation of scarce resources and available funds.

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People’s participation needs to be stimulated in order to find better solutions and to induce the cooperation of local authorities and population in the operation of the system, particularly during high intensity rains and floods. At present there are uncertainties and anxieties due to the experience during the 2003 flood. In the past, people did not substantively participate in the design of the project according to their perceptions, which in turn, were not reflected in the design of LBOD drains. A special program including a multi-dimensional communications strategy with the participation of provincial and local authorities is key to have sustainable solutions to the problems in the system.

Sound engineering practice. Failure of flood control dikes and structures are dangerous events that can cause extensive damages and losses. Design and construction need to endure under adverse conditions. The mission was concerned that some of the remedial civil works under construction by the Government, be subject to more careful review and supervision; e.g. building an embankment circling the dhands to control flooding, construction of roads in the lower flats and considering a different type of gates to control sea water intrusion into the drains.

Coordinated effort needs to be fostered. There are a number of organizations that need to interact in order to have a balanced project according to the objectives identified in Chapter V. An important effort by Sindh Government is now underway to increase coordination among all stakeholders but there is still a long way to go in order to insure a correct design and effective operation of the system.

Definition of responsibilities and authorities within the framework of the irrigation institutional reform is needed. At present there is not a clear allocation of responsibilities and accountabilities of the different organizations acting in the sector. GoS has made progress in the institutional reform to improve irrigation efficiency and increase user participation in O&M of the system. SIDA, the AWBs and the FOs are being formed, but budgets for O&M are not allocated and the abiana collected by FOs are not been used to improve the irrigation service. In case of heavy rains a contingency plan needs to be implemented including the control of the discharges of the barrages and main canals in a real time basis.

International cooperation. Pakistan has established strong links with donors, NGOs and other international organizations, and the case of LBOD Stage I Project is an important example. Establishing partnerships with international organizations, including environmental organizations could contribute to bring the necessary expertise and funding for the implementation of the actions the mission is recommending. It is suggested that the necessary studies to resolve the outfall problems of LBOD be part of the DMP and Sindh Water Sector Improvement Project.

67. Improving livelihoods in the Badin District. The project proposal for improving the livelihoods of people in Thatta and Badin Districts, discussed earlier would promote: i) better access to basic services; ii) higher income generation through improved production and marketing of saline agricultural crops, fisheries and livestock; iii) secure access to and better management of natural resources; iv) viable community organization; v) improved access to education, information, training and better nutrition

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and health. The Mission agrees with the proposal under preparation in the sense that “looking beyond the immediate and medium term problems and their possible solutions, what appears to be a logical and sustainable proposition is integration of coastal communities with the rest of the economy”. In particular, the POE agrees that integrating the coastal economy with the developed areas of the province would be the way to address the problem in the long run.

68. Operation and maintenance. The mission recommends to support SIDA to finalize, as soon as possible, the process of transfer of LBOD Stage I Project operation and maintenance related responsibilities form WAPDA, and to activate organizational arrangements as needed. Maintenance and operation activities in SIDA are to be performed, when necessary, within a collaborative framework at the level of AWBs and other organizations involved in the management of water resources at the district and Nazim levels. For instance, as indicated by the existing regulations, Drainage Beneficiary Groups dully established could help operation, management, improvement and rehabilitation of the drainage system. Financial resources need to be allocated to SIDA so as to cover LBOD Stage I Project O&M annual requirements.

69. Crisis management unit. The unit should be established and empowered to provide a coordinated timely response to the concerns emerging from the consequences of the 2003 floods and similar future events, with the aim of reducing the impacts from floods in the area served by LBOD system. The unit would be responsible for the preparation, updating and implementation of a Flood management program and for organizing and supporting the local development of preparedness and response plans, and effective warning system, and the requisite training and awareness building at all levels.

70. Amongst the main issues and actions to be considered by the Crisis management unit, would be:

• Disaster management policy and planning (with special reference to contingency plans),

• District-specific hazard and vulnerability mapping,

• Linking disaster management plans and strategies with periodical development planning aiming at disaster preparedness at village, Nazim and district level,

• Local-specific disaster preparedness and response plans,

• Integrated disaster preparedness planning at the district level,

• Promotion of collaborative arrangements between government line departments, local institutions, NGOs, media and at-risk communities for coordinated and supplementary counter-disaster measures,

May 2005 39

• Promotion of community level groups to address disaster preparedness and relief related activities, and

• Promote training for communities and local officials and organizations in risk areas, NGOs, and in line departments at Nazim, District and provincial levels to build the disaster response capacity.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

71. The present conditions of the outfall system do not provide the hydrological, environmental and social functions that were originally considered at the design phase. The LBOD- KPOD can now be described as a “new river” that is forming an estuary and is an integral part of creek formation into the coastal area. The Tidal Link has invited the sea to approach the land and now the tidal fluctuations are visible in the KPOD. This process will continue, and its progress is difficult to predict. Adapting to this new process requires continuous hydraulic and environmental monitoring in learning by doing approach.

72. The mission believes that the present actions taken by the Government, namely repairs to parts of the drainage system and lowering the DPOD weir, are considered appropriate for those site conditions, but do not constitute a comprehensive and sustainable solution to the problems. The concept of preventing the intrusion of the sea and tidal influence through the reinforcement of the left bank of the Seerani Drain should be further analyzed. The proposal to build an embankment encircling the Sindh dhands should be abandoned. Also the idea of building a gated structure in the KPOD close to the Tidal Link should be carefully evaluated considering previous experience.

73. The proposal to extend the drainage system by studying LBOD Stage II & III in light of the present outfall conditions of LBOD Stage I should be postponed until the existing problems at the outfall are adequately address and solved. Moreover, the strategy to manage the storm drainage in the upper basin needs to be organized and tested. This approach would avoid aggravating or increasing social unrest, vulnerability and anxiety in the Badin District that might result from a decision to go ahead with these premature studies at a time when people participation is most needed. In any case, a hypothetical implementation of LBOD Stage II or III would imply increases in the capacity of the present system.

74. Objectives for performance of the LBOD outfall. Under the strategic approach described in Chapter VII, the Mission identifies the following objectives that the outfall should achieve in the a long term:

• Secure the drainage benefits of LBOD

• Reduce the flood risk in Badin District

• Control the sea intrusion in the lower part of the existing drains

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• Restore the conditions of the dhands or mitigate the present damages

• Control the evolution of the estuary at the outfall and limit its adverse effects

• Improve the livelihoods of the population in lower Badin

• Strength the institutional capacity for preparedness in case of emergencies

75. Recommended actions by the Government of Sindh. In view of the mission estimate that a 24 hrs storm event similar to that experienced in July 2003 has a 56% probability of occurring in a five-year period. The mission recommends to initiate without further delay the implementation of the institutional and structural following proposed actions:

Develop and agree in a Flood Management Plan to compliment the emergency contingency plan proposed by the Badin DCO;

Postpone the implementation of LBOD II and III unless and until the existing problems with the sustainability and performance of the outfall are solved;

Establish a professional O&M program for the main drains and outfall system;

Implement and adequately fund the World Bank’s proposed concept for a the livelihoods relief and improvement program;

Re-design the outfall system, considering the alternative proposals identified by the mission to reduce the flood risk problems and the impact of the discharge of saline effluent:

• Reinforcement of the LBOD right embankment, and the construction of escapes from the left bank of the Spinal Drain and KPOD in the direction of the Thal using to the extent possible the ancient Dhoro Puran river bed. Install flap-gates in the drains discharging into LBOD drain.

• Diversion of the Seerani drain and other Kotri drains into the dhands.

• Possible connection of the Pateji and Mhero dhands

• Construct a gated structure at the DPOD and KPOD to control the flows in both directions.

• Analyze the location of the tidal control structure in the KPOD and possible control structures in the drains.

76. Given the complexity of the system and its present evolution and dynamics, the proposed physical interventions require continuous monitoring as a part of the learning

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by doing process, and the collection of data essential for adequate analysis of problems and options. The following table illustrates the problems and proposed infrastructure “hard” actions. The options mentioned in the table below are also shown in schematic diagram of the LBOD outlet system in Map 2.

SEASON STRUCTURE

DRY SEASON RAINY & STORMY

Drainage - Cholri and Pateji dhands PROBLEMS

AND ISSUES Salinity - Mehro and Sanhro dhands

Tidal Link and creeks

OUTFALL

Options Divert Seerani & other drains to dhands

Monitor before taking action

TIDAL FLUCTUATION PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

Sea water intrusion

Flood risk

DPOD – structure

KPOD – structure

Spinal Drain and KPOD – Right bank; escapes in left bank; structures in drains

DRAINS

OPTIONS

Tidal structure (study location) Structure in drains (flap gated)

Dhoro Puran revival

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IX. NEXT STEPS.

77. During the final meeting of the mission with the Sindh Minister of Irrigation and Power Sindh, the mission was able to discuss the next steps that the Government of Sindh could consider. These included:

Discuss, agree and approve the proposed strategy among the concerned agencies at the Federal and Provincial levels.

Funding. Considering the long lasting relations of the World Bank with the Sindh Province and the advanced status of preparation of WSIP20, it could be possible to include the proposed monitoring actions, studies and investigations, designs and capacity building initiatives identified by the mission in this project. The Government of Sindh could consider this possible funding or decide among other alternatives and include its final choice in the Provincial Budget.

An immediate action that can be taken is to extend the SMO monitoring contract with NIO encompassing an expanded and well design program of data collection and analysis in the Tidal Link, KPOD, the Rann of Kutch, Shakoor Dhand and Dhoro Puran, and enter into agreements with IUCN and WWF along with cooperating Sindh environmental agencies and universities to monitor and study the affected ecosystems and wetlands in the dhands and Tidal Link area, including field testing of mitigation measures in the dhands as discussed in Chapter VI.

The IPD needs to define TORs for feasibility studies and design of the physical interventions proposed above. This step is critical to ensuring timely budget approvals consistent with the results of feasibility studies;

Finally, a phased and detailed plan of implementation of the approved actions needs to be organized.

20 Water Sector Improvement Project

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“D”

“E” DPOD (Old Dhoro Puran River)

Diversion Escapes

“A”

TIDAL LINK

LBOD SPINAL DRAIN

KOTRI DRAINS

KPOD

“B”

“C”

RANN OF KUTCH

KOTRI DRAINS (Karo & Fululi)

SINDH DHANDS (Cholri, Pateji, Sanhro &Mehro)

SHANKOOR DHAND

Escapes

MAP 2 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF LBOD OUTFALL Alternative Measures

Escapes

“F”

SEA

Map 3

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Map 4.

Map 5

May 2005 45

Map 6

May 2005 46

Annex 1. PERSONS MET BY THE MISSION

Mr. A. Sattar Hindaro, Director Engineering, NDP

Mr. Abdul Hameed Memon, Senior Engineer SMO South WAPDA

Mr. Abdul Haque, NDP Coordination Cell Sindh

Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Abro, Director Technical WAPDA

Mr. Abdul Qadir Qureshi, Superintendent Engineer, Electrification LBOD WAPDA

Mr. Adbul Rehman Mallah, Nazim Union Council Buhgra Memon

Mr. Aija Ahmed, Deputy Director General WWF Sindh

Mr. Aijaz Qureshi, SIDA

Mr. Akash Ansari, N.G..O. Badin

Mr. Akber Bajkani, Director Provincial Coordination Cell, WAPDA

Mr. Ali Mohammad Baloch, Managing Director, SIDA

Mr. Anwer Ali Baloch, Director (SMO) South WAPDA

Mr. Asghar Ali Halipota, Matli

Mr. Asif Chama, Nazim Union Council Khosk

Mr. Aslam Rahoo, Golarchi

Mr. Aslam Rahu, Taulka Nazim Shahced Fazil Rahu

Mr. Bahadur Khan Lund, Abadgar Badin

Ms. Constance A. Bernard. World Bank.

Mr. Fida Hussain Mandro, Nazim Union Council Seerani

Mr. Ghulam Hyder Qureshi, Deputy Director NDP Sindh

Mr. Ghulam Murtaza Abro, Deputy Director Engineering NDP

Mr. Ghulam Qadir Shah, Conservation Manager WWF Sindh

Mr. Habib Ursani, Deputy General Manager Operation, SIDA

Mr. Haji Abdul Ghafoor Nazamani, Chairman Abadgar Board Badin

Mr. Hazi Imayal, Nazim Union Council Thari

Mr. Jahen Khan Chandio, Union Council Kadhan

Mr. Khadim Ali Memon, Additional Secretary, IPM, Sindh

Mr. Khadim Hussain Talper, Save the Cost Action Committee

May 2005 47

Mr. M. A. Sohag, GM (Research and Development), SIDA

Mr. Mahd Issa Mahad, Nazim Union Council Badin III

Mr. Manuel Contijoch. World Bank. TTL NDP & WSIP

Mr. Mir Abdul Qadir Jilani, Badin

Mr. Mohammad Mithal Mallah, FisherFock Badin

Mr. Mohammad Suleman, Abadgar Board Badin

Mr. Mohd Ramzan, Nazim Union Council Lowari

Mr. Moula Bux Mirbahar, General Manager, Operation, SIDA

Mr. Moula Bux Mirbahar. GM (Operation), SIDA

Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Memon, General Secretary Abadgar Board Badin

Mr. Mukeem Ahmed Bhambro, SMO South WAPDA

Mr. Mumtaz Ahmed Sohar, General Manager, Research and Development, SIDA

Mr. Musarrat Hussain Khawaja, Badin

Mr. Mushtaque Ali Sangi, Chief Engineer Water, WAPDA

Mr. Mussaral Khoja, Taulka Nazim Badin

Mr. Nazeer Ahmed Memon, Director Provincial Coordinator Cell, WAPDA

Mr. Nazeer Essani, SIDA

Mr. Noor Mohammad Baloch, Consultant

Mr. Pir Hamid Shah, Badin

Mr. Qasim Soomro, SDO, Left Bank Canal Area Water Board

Mr. Qazi Azmat Isa, World Bank. Islamabad Office

Mr. Raghib Abbas Shah, WAPDA

Mr. Riaz Ahmed, Special Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power

Mr. S. H. Niaz Rizvi, Principle Scientific Officer, National Institute of Oceanography

Mr. S. Muozzam Ali, S.R.O., National Institute of Oceanography

Mr. Sadiq Rajper, EDO Revenue Badin

Mr. Salahuddin Abbasi, XEN, Left Bank Canal Area Water Board

Mr. Sardar Kamal Khan, Zila Nazim Badin

Mr. Sardar Nadir Akmal Khan Leghari, Minister Irrigation and Power, Sindh

Mr. Syed Mumtaz Ali Shah, DCO Badin

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Mr. Tahir Qureshi, Director Coastal Programme of IUCN Sindh

Mr. Talpur, NGO Badin

Mr. Tekola Dejene, World Bank Office Islamabad.

Mr. Tufail Ahmed Abro, Assistant Director Operation, SIDA

Mr. Umer Farooq, Retd. Major Abadgar

Mr. Usman Qamar. World Bank Islamabad Office.

Mr. Zaffar Ali Shah, Vice President, Abadgar Board Badin

Ms. Medam Najma Junejo, Member District Council Badin

Ms. Samina Kidwai, Marine Biologist, National Institute of Oceanography

May 2005 49

Annex 2. REFERENCES …, Drainage Master Plan, Islamabad, 2004

…, Terms of Reference for the Formulation of a Drainage Development and Water Management Plan for Kotri Left Bank Drainage Basin

ActionAid, Disastrous effects of the Left Bank Outfall Drainage, Islamabad, 2003

ActionAid, National Drainage Program A Curse for Coastal Communities, Islamabad, 2004

Arcadis BMB, Opinion on the Performance of the Surface Drainage System in Sindh under Extreme Rainfall in July 2003

Asian Development Bank, Challenges in the Water Sector, a presentation at the Pakistan Development Forum, Islamabad, 2004

Asian Development Bank, Project Completion Report on the LBOD Project (Stage I), 2000

Delft Hydraulics under assignment by LBOD Consultants. Left Bank Outfall Drain. Stage 1 project, Pre-design study for tidal link and outfall. 5. Final Report, 1989

District Badin, Contingency Plan to Combat Cyclones and Flood/Rain 2004-2005, Badin, 2004

Government of West Pakistan, Irrigation and Power Department, Sukkur Zone. Flood Drainage Project for Sanghar, Tharparkar & Hyderabad Districts. Project Report, 1964

Haq, B.L., Milliman, J.D. Marine Geology and Oceanography of Arabian Sea and Coastal Pakistan, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York, 1984

Hussein, M. H., Inception Report Scoping Exercise and DiagnosticStudy on Livelihood Improvemients in the Districts of Thatta and Badin in Sindh, December 2004

ICID, The Dilemma in the Humid Tropics: Conflicts in Drainage Needs for Food Production and the Environment, presentation, 2003

Imtiaz, A., Global Climatic Change and Pakistan’s Water Resources, w/d

Irrigation and Power Department, Sindh, Comments on Executive Summary Report and Main Report of the Drainage Master Plan, Karachi, 2004

Irrigation and Power Department, Sindh, Presentation on LBOD, 2004

IUCN Pakistan, Environmental Degradation and Impacts on Livelihoods – Sea Intrusion- A Case Study, Karachi, 2003

IUCN, Sindh Programme Office, Status Paper on Agriculture in Sindh, w/d

Jaffrelot, Christophe, Le Pakistan, Fayard, Paris, 2000

May 2005 50

Junejo, S. A., Improving Water Resources Management in Pakistan, w/d

Kahlown, M. A. et al, Water Resources in Pakistan: Challenges and Future Strategies, Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources, Islamabad, w/d

MacDonald and Partners and Hunting Technical Services (MMP/HTS). LBOD Stage 1 Project Preparation, Annexes 9, 10 and 11, Spinal Drain and Surface Drainage Network, 1984

MacDonald and Partners in association with National Engineering Services Pakistan and Associated Consulting Engineers ACE (MMP/NESPAK/ACE). LBOD Stage 1 Project, Mid Term Review, Supporting Reports (Volume 2) 6. Drainage, 1993

MacDonald and Partners in association with National Engineering Services Pakistan and Associated Consulting Engineers ACE (MMP/NESPAK/ACE). Performance of Drainage Systems on the Left Bank of the River Indus during the 1994 Monsoon, Final Report, 1994

MacDonald and Partners in association with National Engineering Services Pakistan and Associated Consulting Engineers ACE (MMP/NESPAK/ACE). LBOD Stage 1 Project, Review of the Morphology of the Tidal Link, 1995

Memon, A. A., Evaluation of Impacts on the Lower Indus River Basin due to Upstream Water Storage and Diversion, Salt Lake City, 2004

Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, Crops Area Production 2000-01 to 2002-03, Islamabad, 2004

Ministry of Water and Power, Pakistan Water Sector Strategy, Islamabad, 2002

Ministry of Water and Power, Water Sector Development, a presentation at the Pakistan Development Forum, Islamabad, 2004

National Institute of Oceanography. Bed Level Survey of LBOD Tidal Link, KPOD, DPOD and Shah Samando Creek at Outfall of Tidal Link by Eco/Sounding, 2002

National Institute of Oceanography. Annual Physical Monitoring Report, Karachi, 2004

Nizamani, Aifaz, et al, Population and Water Resources, w/d

Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Left Bank Outfall Drain, Stage-I Project, January 2004

Primer Minister Secretariat (Public), Minutes of President’s Meeting Held at Sindh Governor’s House Karachi on 20th August 2004

Save Coast Action Committee, Reparation of Communities Affected by LBOD Project and Suspension of National Drainage Program, Letter to the World Bank Country Director, March 2004

May 2005 51

SCARPS Monitoring (South) WAPDA. Physical Monitoring Left Bank Out Fall Drain Stage I Project Under National Drainage Programme. Final Report (Mar 1999 to June 2004), 3 Vols., 2004

SIDA, IRC, Area Water Board Brochure, Karachi, 2003

SIDA, IRC, Business Plan SIDA 2002-2003, Karachi, 2002

SIDA, IRC, Business Plan SIDA 2003-2004, Karachi, 2004

SIDA, IRC, Diagnostic Study Water Management Left Bank Canal Area Water Board, Karachi, 2003

SIDA, IRC, Farmers’ Organization Brochure, Karachi, 2003

SIDA, IRC, Performance of the Surface Drainage System in Sindh under Extreme Rainfall in July 2003, Karachi, 2003

SIDA, Performance of Left Bank Outfall Drain During Monsoon 2003, Hyderabad, 2003

SIDA, Water Sector Improvement Programme in Sindh, a presentation at the Pakistan Development Forum, Islamabad, 2004

Sindh Abadgar Board, LBOD…a Mega Project, but Failure!, Badin, w/d

Sindh Development Studies Centre, Patterns of Land Tenure and the Distribution of Land Ownership in the LBOD Project area: Implications for the Distribution of Project Benefits, Jamshoro, 1991

Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan, 1998 District Census Report of Badin, Islamabad, 1999

UNDP, Pakistan, National Human Development Report 2003, Islamabad, 2003

UNDP/Rural Development Policy Institute, Multistakeholder Workshop on Disaster Preparedness and Management, District Badin, 2003

Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Chief Engineer & Project Director. Review of functioning of LBOD Stage-I System, Islamabad (Undated)

Water and Power Development Authority, Physical Monitoring of LBOD Stage I Project under National Drainage Programme, Islamabad, 2005

World Bank Inspection Panel, Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection. Pakistan National Drainage Program Project, Washington, 2004

World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Washington, 2002

World Bank, Country Director Pakistan, NDP Project Final Completion Implementation Review Mission-Aide Memoire, Islamabad, 2005

World Bank, Diagnostic Study and Proposal for Livelihoods Improvements: Badin and Tata Districts, Sindh, Pakistan, Islamabad, 2005 (draft)

May 2005 52

World Bank, Drainage for Gain, Washington, 2004

World Bank, Implementation completion report

World Bank, Project Appraisal Document, NDP

World Bank, Reclaiming Drainage, Toward and Integrated Approach, Washington, 2004

World Bank, Reforming Governance Systems for Drainage in Pakistan, w/d

World Bank, Sindh Water Sector Improvement Project (WSIP). Diagnostic Survey and Preparation of Investment Component , Draft Final Report, 2005

World Bank/CBNRM Initiative, Community-Based Institutions for Local Management of Water Resources: Results from Initial Efforts in Pakistan, Washington, 1998

World Bank/Netherlands Water Partnership Program, Panel of International and National Experts, Pakistan Drainage Master Plan, Panel Consultation, Review Report, Delft, 2004

May 2005 53

Annex 3. PROGRAM FOR WORLD BANK MISSION

STUDIES IN THE COASTAL AREAS OF SINDH

(March 7, 2005 – March 20, 2005)

Sunday 6 March, 2005

Mission assembles at Serena Hotel, Islamabad

Review of mission program and documents send to the Mission by MCE

Monday 7 March, 2005

Mission meets at World Bank Office in Islamabad.

Usman Qamar, Tekola Dejene, Qazi Azmat Isa.

Internal Meetings and discussions.

Tuesday 8 March, 2005

1030 Meeting with Mr. Riaz Ahmed, Special Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power and concerned WAPDA officials (Mr. Raghib Shah and other concerned with LBOD). Initial discussion of the LBOD and the Tidal Link Outfall issues.

Venue: Ministry of Water & Power, Block ‘A’, Pak Secretariat, Islamabad, Tel: 9202335

1430 Meeting with Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Talpur, NGO (Actionaid)

Venue: World Bank Office

Wednesday March 9, 2005

AM Mission departs for Karachi. Stay at Marriott Hotel.

1330 Meeting with Mr. Sardar Nadir Akmal Khan Leghari, Minister and Mr.

Ashfaq Memon, Secretary of Irrigation and Power Department

Venue: Tughlaq House, Karachi, Tel: 021/9211957

1500 Meeting with Brig. Abdul Haque, NDP Coordination Cell and SIDA

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Venue: National Drainage Program, Planning & Development Department, Sindh Bureau of Statistics Building, Ch. Khaliquzzaman Road, Block 8, Clifton, Karachi, Tel: 9205864-65

Thursday March 10, 2005

0930 Meeting with Dr. M.M. Rabbani, , Director General, National Institute of Oceanography, ST-47, Block-1, Clifton, Karachi, Tel: 021/9251172-8 Dr. Niaz Rizvi Principal Scientific Officer.

Friday March 11, 2005

AM Mission travels to Hyderabad (transport requested to be arranged by SIDA/IPD and WAPDA)

Accommodation: WAPDA Rest house in Hyderabad (GM Water South is requested to kindly book five rooms at the Rest house).

Saturday March 12 - Tuesday March 15, 2005

Meetings with GM Water South WAPDA, SMO, MD SIDA, Chairman Area Water Board, district Nazim of Badin, farmers, fishermen and other stakeholders (MD SIDA is requested to kindly arrange)

Field visits to the LBOD, KPOD, DPOD, Seerani Drain, Tidal Link, Cholri Weir, dhands (Ramsar sites) areas, Karo Gungro Outfall Drain and Point Zero. Visit to Thatta District Kinjher Lake, Jamshakro Drain and outfall structure.

Meeting in Badin with Distric Nazim, DCO, Union Council Members of the Lower Badin Area, NGOs, LB AWB. Ex Eng Left Bank CCA.

(WAPDA South and SIDA, and IPD to kindly arrange)

Mission returns to Karachi

Wednesday March 16 -, 2005

10:00 Meeting with NOI. Dr. Niaz Rizvi

12:00 Meeting with Additional Secretary IPD Khalid Memmon.

1300 Meeting with Dr. Abdul Latif Rao, IUCN Country Representative, 1-Bath Island, Karachi, Tel: 5861540-3 and Ms Catherine Mackenzie.

14:00 Meeting with Mr. Ijaz Ahmed, Deputy Director General, WWF, Fortune Center, Room 606, 6th Floor, Block-VI, PECHS, Shahra-e-Faisal, Main Nursery, Karachi, Tel: 4544791 & 2

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Thursday March 17,2005

Mission prepares its report.

Friday March 18, 2005

12:00 Joint meeting with Mr. Sardar Nadir Akmal Khan Leghari, Minister for Irrigation and Power Department, Additional Chief Secretary (Development), Secretary IPD, MD SIDA, GM (Water) South WAPDA, DG EPA, and other concerned officials: Mission presents its findings

Venue: Tughlaq House, Karachi, Tel: 021/9211957

Saturday March 19, 2005

10:00 Mission works in finalizing its report and pending activities.

Sunday March 20, 2005: Mission departs Pakistan

Monday March 21- May 15. IMTA Initiate the study on Satellite interpretation of the area and hydraulic modeling of the identify alternatives.

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ANNEX 4. Concepts in Tidal Link Design

Review of Channel -Design Concept.

Design Approach

The proposed channel design is based mainly on the three following criteria:

- The tidal link must be designed as narrow as possible, with a limited hydraulic capacity to prevent a strong tidal intrusion and to reduce the construction costs;

- The tidal link must have sufficient drainage capacity to prevent backing up and raising of upstream water levels;

- The channel must possess a long-term shoaling tendency to prevent progressive tidal intrusion over a period from years to decades.

The main threat for the feasibility of the tidal link is formed by the presence of the northern dhands area. This area has an enormous potential storage volume and has to remain free of tide induced water level variations. Therefore in the design it is considered of primary importance to prevent long-term scouring (and the dander of propagating tidal intrusion). This is affected by a relatively wide channel design with slightly shoaling characteristics. This concept assures a long-term stable drainage system without the necessity of artificial bottom or bank protection.

Outfall Location.

The proposed outfall location is the Shah Samando Creek near the junction of Jati outfall drain (see also Figure 3). The choice is based on the shortest connection with the KPOD in combination with a relatively large tidal creek having sufficient hydraulic capacity such that the additional tidal volume created by the connection of the tidal link increases the tidal volume of the existing creek only by an order of percents.

Longitudinal Section

An important criterion for the longitudinal channel slope is the minimum available water depth of the channel entrance in the outfall area near RD-152. The available water depth should be sufficient to prevent supercritical flow during any flow conditions or tidal phase. The erosive velocities should be limited to prevent the entrance from extensive widening by erosion. Initial erosion will enhance tidal motion in the drainage system which results again in increasing tidal velocities.

In general it is to be preferred to maintain a constant longitudinal channel slope since the sediment transport in stable channels is relatively sensitive to bed slope variations.

A stable channel is alluvial material is on in which scour of banks, and changes in alignment do not occur. The degree of meandering is related to the ratio of natural

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ground level slope to channel bed slope. If this ratio is less than I, the chance of meandering by scouring banks is negligible and sedimentation processes will prevail.

Regarding the foregoing the choice is made for a continuation of the remodeled KPOD channel slope of 7,18.10-5 resulting in a bed level of 5.3 m- SPD (17.4 ft –SPD) at RD-152. This relatively steep slope is advantageous with respect to tidal damping and necessary to minimize the possibility of meandering.

Channel Cross-section.

From the field survey in the tidal creek area it is found that local bank erosion/instability can form a potential threat for the cross-sectional stability. For cohesive banks and berms formed by the deposition of fine material, bank failure occurs as a slip circle prompted by toe erosion. To reduce the perimeter of the slip circle it is usual to design a relatively gentle bank slope of 1:3.

Furthermore it is essential in the design to link up with the geometrical characteristics of the existing channels up and downstream of the tidal link. Generally the width/depth ratio of a channel is related to the type of bottom material.

Since the soil samples of the creek area and the tidal link alignment show a high percentage of silt and clay (70-80%), a relatively low width/depth ratio is required. The cross-section of the smaller tidal creeks have a bed width/depth of 10-15 and have remained stable for many years. The cross-section from the upstream part of the tidal link (the remodeled KPOD) has a design width/depth ratio of approximately 20.

With a bed slope of 7,18.10-5, a constant bed width of 28m (92ft) and side slopes 1:3, the design width/depth ratio along the tidal link will gradually change from 20 to 11 in downstream direction.

Southern Embankment.

Along the south side of the tidal link alignment a dike is included in the design with sufficient height to isolate the Kotri drainage system and the northern dhands from high storm flood levels from the Rann of Kutch.

In general the essential conditions governing dike construction are: A height adequate to prevent overtopping, a base-width sufficient for protection against destructive foundation seepage and a cross-section sufficiently massive for safety against the massive movement of soil against a slip surface.

The seepage is minimized by the properties of the basic material of the dike, originating from the tidal link dredge spoil. The cores of the dike are nearly impervious.

Attention has to be paid to failure of the dike slope caused by weathering of the top layer. In non-monsoon season this top- layer will dray out, forming cracks in horizontal

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and vertical direction. The penetration depth of the depth is 1-2 m (3.3 – 6.6 ft). This zone is obviously not impervious. The cracks form a network in the dike, allowing seepage. Due to the seepage local sliding of the slope surface can occur. To minimize chances of local sliding a slope of 1:3 is required.

For additional protection against the forementioned soil mechanical failures of the north slope of the embankment, it is recommended to extend the reservation width from the toe of the embankment until the beginning of the channel slope to a distance of about 10 times the dike height above local ground level. This criterion results in a maximum reservation width of 50 m (160 ft) from the lower parts along the tidal link alignment. The possibility of local channel bank failure, as discuss in paragraph 6.3 also requires extra berm width. To protect the toe of the embankment against propagating bank erosion, an overall berm width of 100 m (328 ft) is expected to be sufficient.

For a ground level of 0.00 SPD, the embankment will be:

Design water level of Rann of Kutch 2.65m + SPD (+8.7 ft)

Consolidation dike 0.70m ( 2.2 ft)

Consolidation soil beneath dike 0.35m ( 1.2 ft)

Weathering of top layer of dike 1.50m ( 4.9 ft)

Expected sea level rise 0.20m ( 0.7 ft)

5.40m +SPD (17.7 ft +SPD)

In the next figure three typical cross-sectional profiles are shown.

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Figure 10. Nidal Link Channel—Typical Cross-Sections