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THE CONFLICTIn the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in theUnited States, many people have asked the question “why?”Why did those who hijacked four passenger airliners with theintent to fly them into buildings, killing thousands—includ-ing themselves—do what they did? The question of whatmotivated these men to willingly, determinedly, and vio-lently give up their lives is an important one for many seek-ing to understand what happened.

Psychological• Prior to September 11, few people could imagine that

such a shocking and large-scale terrorist attack could occur on U.S. soil. After September 11, few could com-prehend what motivated the attackers. With responsi-bility linked to the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda,possible religious motivations or hatred for the Westwere considered by those surviving the chaos. A man-ual used by the attackers reveals that hate was not a dri-ving force behind the terrorists’ actions. Rather, thehijackers focused on their belief and devotion to theircause as they carried out their plan.

Foreign Policy• What motivated the hijackers may not be the same as

what motivated their leader, Osama bin Laden, head ofthe al-Qaeda network. Bin Laden has a history of anti-Western, and particularly anti-American, statements andactions. In a taped video after September 11, bin Ladenacknowledged that the attacks were a success. It can beguessed that causing a large number of deaths and in-stilling chaos and fear in the United States was part ofhis goal.

Social• Most people can not fathom an environment or belief

system that would support a person’s desire to partici-pate in a suicide attack. Suicide is not condoned by anyof the world’s major religions, including Islam. Underextremist beliefs and interpretations, however, suicideattacks—or martyrdom operations—have become in-creasingly common.

Four groups of Muslim Arabs hijacked fourcommercial aircraft on the morning of Sep-

tember 11, 2001. Two of these groups succeededin flying their planes into the World Trade Centerin New York City; one group succeeded in flyingits plane into the Pentagon near Washington, DC;and the fourth group crashed its plane in westernPennsylvania when the passengers tried to takecontrol of the plane back from the hijackers. Aboutthree thousand lives were lost, including the livesof nineteen hijackers.

Americans were shocked that nineteen menwere willing to give their lives to kill Americans.Why did they do it? No terrorist group took creditfor the attack or issued any demands. The mysteryonly deepened when it was learned that fifteen ofthe nineteen attackers had Saudi passports. SaudiArabia has been a long-time ally of the UnitedStates; indeed the Gulf War (1991) can be seen asa response not only to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait butto the threat this invasion represented to Kuwait’sneighbor Saudi Arabia. When Osama bin Ladenwas seen on videotape admitting that the collapseof the World Trade Center on September 11 (9/11)was more than he had hoped for, Americans finallyhad a clear enemy but still no clear explanation ofthe behavior of the nineteen attackers.

These were not men who had lost all sense ofself in a cult that occupied their every waking mo-ment; before the attack the men were dispersed,living in separate apartments in different towns.They were not living under the political power ofa regime that controlled their lives; before 9/11 theyspent months, even years breathing the free air ofthe United States. It cannot be maintained thatthey attacked what they did not know; their ex-tended experience living in the United States means

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that they did know the country and its people. Yetthey chose to die in order to kill thousands ofAmericans. A variety of explanations for this puz-zle have been offered since 9/11: They were crazy.They were suicidal. They hated Americans. Theseexplanations, and the attackers’ view of themselvesas martyrs for Islam, will be explored here from apsychological perspective.

Are They Crazy?It is difficult to see the 9/11 attacks as an ex-

pression of mental disorder. The attacks were bril-liantly planned and executed with strikingcoordination, and the quality of planning and ex-ecution offer a strong argument that the attackerscould not be crazy in any serious sense. Crazy ina serious sense means suffering from some form ofpsychopathology represented in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and StatisticalManual (DSM-IV). Psychopathology, however, isassociated with unrealistic appraisal of the world,including disturbed perceptions of self and others.In other words, psychopathology is pathology, adisease or disorder, and pathology gets in the wayof effective performance rather than explaining it.

A particular kind of psychopathology might atfirst glance seem a more promising explanation.Sociopaths, sometimes called psychopaths, are peo-ple who do not feel guilt or shame. They do not

feel normal social attachments; they use and ma-nipulate others as means for their own ends. Suchpeople, one might think, can kill civilians—includ-ing women, children, and the elderly—without re-morse. Perhaps this kind of pathology is what makesterrorists able to do the terrible things they do.Unfortunately for this explanation, the hallmark ofsociopathy or psychopathy is selfishness. No onestudying this kind of pathology has ever suggestedthat it can be expressed in self-sacrifice or suicide.Even if the self-sacrifice is risk-taking short of self-destruction, a pathology of selfishness cannot ac-count for the group cohesion and trust which arethe essential foundations of terrorist groups.

A third kind of pathology that can be invokedto explain 9/11 is the pathology that leads to sui-cide. Were the attackers suicidal? Certainly theywere in the sense that at least some of them, in par-ticular the pilots who flew the planes into build-ings, intended to die. But if “suicidal” is to be anexplanation of their behavior, then describing the9/11 attackers as suicidal again implies that therewas something wrong with them. Suicide is usu-ally associated with depression, a form of psy-chopathology recognized in the DSM-IV. Again,however, there is no reason to believe that the at-tackers were suffering from depression and goodreason, in their success, to believe that they werenormal by any psychiatric standard.

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CHRONOLOGY

August 1996 Osama bin Laden issues a “Declaration ofWar” against the United States.

February 1998 Bin Laden announces the creation of theWorld Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews andCrusaders, an alliance of terrorist groups intent onattacking the United States, its allies, and civilians,wherever they can be found.

May 2000 During an investigation into Osama binLaden, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigationuncover a terrorist manual, “Military Studies in theJihad Against Tyrants,” in Manchester, England.Among its instructions, the manual details how toblend in while awaiting the time of attack.

September 11, 2001 Nineteen men hijack four passen-ger airliners. In a suicidal mission, two of the planesare flown into the towers of the World Trade Center

in New York City and a third plane is flown into thePentagon near Washington, DC; the fourth planecrashes in a Pennsylvania field after the passengersrevolt against the hijackers.

September 12, 2001 A car hired by Mohammed Atta andleft in the parking lot of Boston’s Logan airport isfound. It contains a flight manual in Arabic and acopy of the Qur’an.

September 28, 2001 Mohammed Atta’s suicide letter isfound; it contains a reference to shine your shoesbefore meeting your maker.

December 22, 2001 Richard Reid boards an AmericanAirlines flight from Paris to Miami. He is overpow-ered by passengers and crew when he tries to lightan explosive hidden within his shoe.

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Mohammed Atta is thought to have been theleader of the 9/11 attacks and his background hasbeen extensively investigated. His middle-class par-ents have been interviewed in Egypt, his school-mates and acquaintances have been interviewed,and his German employers in Hamburg have beeninterviewed. None suggested that Atta showed anysigns of depression or any other form of psycho-pathology.

In short, explanation of 9/11 as the work ofnineteen crazy individuals cannot be taken seri-ously. Any attempt to translate this kind of talkinto specific psychiatric diagnoses quickly runs intothe fundamental inconsistency between disorder—any kind of mental disorder—and the demon-strated organization and effectiveness of the 9/11attackers.

Was 9/11 a Hate Crime?Did the attackers hate America and Ameri-

cans? Osama bin Laden has issued numerous state-ments justifying violence against Americans, andhe has consistently leveled three accusations. First,American troops have been stationed in SaudiArabia since the Gulf War against Iraq; the pres-ence of these “infidels” is a desecration of theMuslim holy land that includes the cities of Meccaand Medina. Second, the U.S.-led boycott of Iraqsince the Gulf War has resulted in half a millionIraqis, mostly children, dying from lack of food andmedicine. Third, Americans have armed and sup-ported Israel in its domination of the Palestinians,who were forced from their lands in the foundingof the Jewish state in 1948. These are grounds foranger and hatred, and many have explained the9/11 attacks as an expression of hatred.

In a speech to his nation on September 20,2001, U.S. President George W. Bush (2001–)asked the question, “Why do they hate us?” His an-swer: “They hate what they see right here in thischamber: a democratically elected government . . . .They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion,our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and as-semble and disagree with each other.”

A new organization, “Americans for Victoryover Terrorism” (AVOT), has offered the same in-terpretation. The AVOT, chaired by WilliamBennett (former U.S. secretary of education), of-fers ten Fundamental Principles. The second prin-ciple is a confident statement of the hate-crimehypothesis: “The radical Islamists who attacked usdid so because of our democratic ideals, our beliefin, and practice of, liberty and equality. AVOT willtake to task those who blame America first and whodo not understand—or who are unwilling to de-

fend—our fundamental principles” (“Americans forVictory over Terrorism,” 2002).

A quick search of the Lexis-Nexus databaseof newspaper articles indicates that literally thou-sands of news stories since 9/11 have linked “ter-rorism” and “hate.” Unfortunately for this kind ofexplanation, polling data from Muslim countries donot indicate widespread hatred of the UnitedStates. Fifteen of the nineteen men who attackedon 9/11 had Saudi passports. To the extent thatthese fifteen represent or draw inspiration from theopinions of other Saudis, we can learn somethingabout their motivations from polls in Saudi Arabia.

A much-misunderstood Gallup poll of nineMuslim countries, released February 26, 2002, of-fers further evidence that Muslim views of theUnited States have more to do with politics thanhatred. The nine countries polled were Pakistan,Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon, Morocco,Kuwait, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The headlineresults of the poll were that 53 percent of Muslimshad unfavorable views of the United States; 58 per-cent had unfavorable views of President Bush; 61percent did not believe that the 9/11 attacks werecarried out by Arabs; and 77 percent believe thatU.S. military action in Afghanistan is morally un-justified. It is worth noting, however, that these re-sults are not as negative as many of the headlinesled readers to believe; they imply, after all, thatmore than 40 percent of Muslims are not negativetowards the United States and President Bush.

By way of context, Gallup polling in theUnited States between March 1–3, 2002, found 41percent of Americans unfavorable toward “Muslimcountries in general.” Thus Americans are nearly asunfavorable toward Muslim countries as Muslimcountries are toward the United States. (41 percent


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of Americans unfavorable toward Muslim coun-tries; 53 percent of Muslims unfavorable towardsthe United States). Asked about specific Muslimcountries, Americans were most unfavorable to-wards Iran (72 percent) and least unfavorable to-wards Morocco (21 percent).

In the Gallup poll of nine Muslim countries,perhaps most important for judging hatred of theUnited States is the question about the 9/11 at-tacks. A surprisingly large 67 percent of Muslimssaid the 9/11 attacks were morally unjustified. Thatis, for two-thirds of respondents in nine Muslimcountries, hatred of the United States does not riseto the level of justifying the attacks of 9/11.

Even if hatred of the United States is not wide-spread among Muslims, it might yet be the casethat hatred motivates the few hundreds or thou-sands of Muslims who are members of al-Qaeda.In particular it may have been what motivated the9/11 terrorists. To evaluate this possibility, it is nec-essary to be a little more specific about how hatredcan explain suicide terrorism.

As an explanation of 9/11, hatred has to bestronger than fear. Hatred is a strong emotion andcan perhaps be strong enough to drive out fear ofdeath. Most of us have had the experience of be-ing so angry that we did something stupid, some-thing that cost us heavily. Taking a swing atsomeone bigger and stronger than we are, for in-stance. Anger and hatred are strong emotions andcan overwhelm good sense and even self-interest.Anger and hatred over perceived wrongs by theUnited States could conceivably lead men to giveup their lives for revenge. With this possibility inmind, we are fortunate to have a document thatgives access to the minds and motives of the 9/11attackers.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

“Atta’s Manual”Found in the personal belongings of several of

the 9/11 attackers were copies of the same hand-written document, a kind of manual for the attack.The author of the document is not known with cer-tainty, although it has sometimes been attributedto Mohammed Atta as the presumed leader of the9/11 operation. As published by the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI), this document has fourpages. The first page of the document does not be-gin with the usual Muslim invocation or prayer,however, and the first line of this page seems to re-fer to something earlier. Thus the published doc-ument appears to be pages two through five of an

original from which the first page has either notbeen found or has not been released by the FBI.

The “manual” has been independently trans-lated by two scholars, Hassan Mneimneh andDavid Cook, each of whom has offered a discus-sion and interpretation of his translation (Mneim-neh, 2002; Cook, in press). The discussion here isbased on the work of both scholars, to whom thisauthor owes many thanks for providing access totheir work before publication.

The manual is divided into three sections:“The last night” in an apartment before the attack,“the second phase” from the taxi to the airport un-til boarding the plane, and “the third phase” fromboarding the plane to welcoming death and the endof the mission. In each of these sections, by far thegreatest attention is given to prayer; much smallerattention is given to group solidarity among the at-tackers and to practical details of carrying out theplan of attack; and almost no attention to the en-emy or justification for the attack.

HatredThe first and perhaps most surprising aspect

of the manual is that it does not incite or even



A MAN HOLDS SOME AL-QAEDA LITERATURE AS HEWALKS OUT OF A TUNNEL FROM A TERRORISTTRAINING CAMP IN AFGHANISTAN. A MANUAL WITHINSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS INTHE UNITED STATES WAS FOUND AMIDST THEBELONGINGS OF ONE OF THE ATTACKERS.(© AFP/CORBIS. Reproduced by permission.)

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approve of hatred of the enemy. There is no list ofoutrages to justify the mission. There is no men-tion of infidels in Saudi Arabia, or children dyingin Iraq, or U.S. support for Israel.

On the contrary, the manual argues explicitlyagainst individual motivation based on personalfeelings: “Do not act out of a desire for vengeancefor yourself. Let your action instead be for the sakeof God.” The manual reinforces this injunction withthe example of Ali ibn Abi Talib, as described inMuslim sacred writings from the seventh century.Ali was fighting with an infidel who spat on him.Rather than strike the infidel in anger, Ali held hissword until he could master himself and strike forAllah rather than for himself. The importance ofthis example is increased by the paraphrase that fol-lows. “He might have said it differently. When hebecame sure of his intention, he struck and killedhim.” This reference to intention resonates with thefirst line of the first section, which asks for a mu-tual pledge to die and a renewal of intent. The in-tention of the attackers is crucial and is an issue thatwill be explored later in this essay.

Here it suffices to note that, not only does themanual not encourage hatred of the enemy, it actu-ally warns against acting out of hatred or vengeance.Indeed the manual does not identify any specific en-emy. There are a few general references to the “en-emy” (e.g. second point in first phase), but no directreference to the United States or to any other coun-try. Perhaps most explicit is the reference, in thesecond phase, to “the followers of Satan”—“Theseare the admirers of Western civilization.” More al-lusive are references to the enemy as “the factions”or “the confederates,” using a term, ahzab, that ap-pears in the Qur’an, Islam’s holy book, and in theHadith, the secondary literature of sayings of theProphet Mohammed and his Companions, to referto Mohammed’s enemies. This historical term ismore specific than it may appear, however, becausethe term is commonly used among radical Muslimsto refer to the United States and the West. Beyondthese indirect references are phrases even less direct:“we seek refuge from their evil, “place a bar in frontof them,” “blind them,” “all their technology doesnot do benefit or harm.”



MANUAL FOR A RAID

The handwritten manual found in the belongings of sev-eral of the September 11 attackers is not, as many maysuppose, filled with talk of hate, vengeance, and death.To the contrary, the manual consistently focuses on de-votion to God as it leads the reader through threephases: (1) preparations on the last night before theraid; (2) on the way to the airport; and (3) boarding theplane.

The first phase, as translated by Hassan Mniemnehin “Manual for a ‘Raid’” (New York Review of Books, January 17, 2002) details fifteen steps discussing atti-tude, focus, and faith. From its first step—a mutualpledge to die and a renewal of intent—to its last—morning prayer—the manual offers encouragement to remain positive and optimistic. “God is with thosewho persevere.” One’s remaining hours should be de-voted to forgetting earthly amusements and makingoneself closer to God. In the face of the adversity tocome, trust in God and remain steadfast. At the endof this preparation, one should make sure that every-thing is in order, including passports, plane tickets,clothing, and weapons. After morning prayer, phasetwo begins.

The manual’s second phase offers spiritual encour-agement and more prayer on the way to the airport.“Smile and feel secure, God is with the believers.”Assurances in God, dedication and invocations to Him,and phrases supporting group cohesion are stressedthroughout phase two. “[D]o not show signs of confu-sion or tension. Be happy and cheerful, be relaxed andfeel secure because you are engaged in an action thatGod loves and is satisfied by it.”

The third and final phase of the manual continuesto focus on group cohesion, as well as the action of theattack itself. Be mindful and purposeful, it says, in tak-ing action not for vengeance, but for the sake of God.Once the plane has boarded and taken off, the man-ual encourages the attackers to act against the non-believers. “Defeat them and cause them to tremble.Recite supplications that you and all your brothers begranted victory, triumph, and the hitting of the target.Do not be afraid . . . . When the moment of truth comesnear, and zero hour is upon you, open your chest wel-coming death on the path of God.” In the final sec-onds before hitting the target, the attackers are advisedthat their last words be an invocation to God.

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The manual’s references to the enemy thus donot support the idea that the 9/11 attackers weremotivated by hatred of the enemy; indeed refer-ences to the enemy are relatively few, general, andindirect. Overall, the emotional quality of the man-ual is positive, rather than negative. Hate, anger,and vengeance are discouraged while submission toGod and sacrifice in accord with God’s will are en-couraged. The nature of this encouragement be-comes clearer in considering the importance ofprayer in the manual.

PrayerPrayer is generally understood as lifting up

one’s heart and mind to God, and at least ninetypercent of the lines in the manual fit this descrip-tion. Simply counting lines, however, will under-estimate the consistency of content and style. Thereare many direct quotations from the Qur’an, whichMuslims believe to be the word of God, and fromthe Hadith. There are also many paraphrases andallusions to the Qur’an and the Hadith that are eas-ily recognized by most Muslims. Finally, there arerepeated injunctions to recite “invocations” or “de-votionals” in the situation of travel, entry of townor building, facing enemies, and so forth. These areformulas of brief prayer for various occasions thatare widely published in Muslim countries. Likewiseprayer is enjoined at every point in the manual, in-cluding the instruction to stay awake the night be-fore the attack to spend the whole night in prayer.

In style as well as in content, the manual is aprayer and is written almost entirely in the vocab-ulary of the seventh century. References to modernnouns such as airport, or airplane, are given only asthe first initial of the relevant modern word inArabic. The result is that the document conveys afeeling of connection to the roots of the Muslimfaith, in the same way that some Christians findthe language of the King James version of the Biblemore powerful than versions that use modernEnglish.

The manual, however, is more than spiritualencouragement. It describes a contract, or at leasta compact, between the attackers and their God.The attackers will be martyrs in the Muslim tradi-tion of martyrs; one who dies with the correct in-tention, that is, doing the will of Allah, is broughtimmediately to paradise. The manual refers to thisparadise in three different aspects (here this authordepends particularly on Mneimneh’s insight anddiscussion). The first aspect is social: “to start thehappy God-pleasing life with the prophets, saints,and martyrs, who are the best of companions.” Thesecond aspect is a physical paradise: the beautiful

garden in which “heavenly brides” await. This isthe most common representation of paradise inIslamic literature. Finally, a third aspect is themeeting with God in “the highest paradise.”

The alternative to paradise is hell and humanweakness and sinfulness will lead to this punish-ment. A martyr, however, is purified of his sins andenters paradise without impediment or punish-ment. This may be the explanation of reports thatsome of the 9/11 attackers had frequented lap-dance bars and other impure places during their so-journ in the U.S. A man on his way to martyrdomneed have no fear of punishment for sins. On theother hand, frequenting bars rather than mosquescould be a part of the “tradecraft” by which the 9/11attackers avoided FBI attention to pious Muslimswhen seeking radical Muslims. Of course it is alsopossible that “tradecraft” and a pass to paradisecame together in the barroom.

In sum, the contract advanced in the manualis this: a man who gives his life in the path of Allahis a martyr who trades the pain and disappoint-ments of human existence for release from sin andglory in heaven. Considered strictly as a contract,this is an attractive proposition. Life can be moredifficult than death; “ . . . to Some, Not to be mar-tyrs, is a martyrdom” (John Donne). Death in theflash of impact and explosion can be easier thanwithstanding torture in an enemy’s prison and eas-ier than watching loved ones suffering pain, shame,or disease.

Group CohesionIn addition to encouraging prayer, the manual

aims to build group solidarity and unity among theattackers. The first line of the first section calls fora mutual oath to the death on the last night. Laterthe manual asks its reader to remember to pray andto remind others in the group to pray, and, at theend of the first section, directs its readers to praythe morning prayer as a group. The second section,instructions for the trip to the airport, and prepar-ing to board the airplane, contains no explicit ref-erence to the group. This should not be surprisingbecause the attackers needed to avoid giving anyclues to their relationship at the airport; conversa-tion among them, mutual recognition, or evenphysical proximity could create the perception of asuspicious group of young Arabs. The third sec-tion, however, which dealt with taking over theplane, returns to building group solidarity andunity. The manual warns against disagreement atthe point where passengers may have to be killed;rather the injunction is to “listen and obey.” Thiswarning indicates a predetermined ranking of the



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attackers, as to who would command and whowould obey, and the ranking would need to be com-plete enough that loss of one or more individualswould not leave authority uncertain.

Once in control of the plane, the attackers areasked to be glad with their brothers, to make themfeel secure, and to encourage them. In order to ap-preciate the need for this encouragement, considerthe situation of the attackers at this point. For ex-ample, they are few in relation to the number ofpassengers and crew. They are likely to have killedin taking over the plane, probably by cutting thethroat of one or more passengers, resulting in greatvolumes of blood around them and on them. Thebodies of their victims are before them. Normal re-actions to this situation might include feelings ofdisgust and guilt, and, in looking at the lifeless bod-ies of their victims, fear at the fast approach of theirown deaths. In this situation some encouragementis called for, and the manual suggests somethingnot unlike the “infield chatter” of a baseball team:praying, talking, supporting, and caring.

The manual specifically suggests that the mu-tual encouragement should include sharing somefood or water. “Do not forget to take some of thespoils, even if only a cup of water, to drink fromit and offer it to your brothers to drink, if possi-ble.” This seems at first a bizarre idea. If you areto die in a few minutes, why do you need a drinkof water? As noted, however, particularly byMneimneh in his discussion of the manual, thisinjunction has been prepared for in an earlier partof the third section: “If you slaughter you shouldplunder.” This injunction appears in a context ofpreparing the reader to do his part in slaughteringpassengers.

Despite the non-sequitur quality of sharing adrink of water while racing toward death, it is worthconsidering how this advice may be very practical.As the sharing of water occurs in the context of mu-tual encouragement, the most obvious possibility isthat the sharing is a contribution to group cohe-sion. Sharing of food and drink is one of thestrongest rituals of relationship. Another possibil-ity is the value of distraction. Getting and sharingfood or even a glass of water during the minutesapproaching death offers a concrete group activity,a gesture of normalcy in an extreme situation, anda distraction from thinking about oncoming death.A third possibility is the value of decreasing fear byfocusing on nurture. Psychological research indi-cates the incompatibility of appetitive motives andfear. Many have noticed how fear gets in the wayof feeling hunger and thirst, but the reverse is alsotrue; motives of hunger and thirst can suppress fear

in the presence of the food and drink. This is anold idea, at least as old as the antidote to fear in thetwenty-third Psalm: “You prepare a table before me,under the eyes of my enemies.” In short, the man-ual’s injunction to try to share at least a glass of wa-ter in the last minutes of the mission may not beso bizarre after all. Whether by building cohesion,distracting from fear or actively inhibiting fear, thissharing can be very practical advice.

ActionIn comparison with praying and supporting the

group, the manual contains only a few referencesto the practical requirements of the plan of attack.The first section enjoins some basics for the nightbefore the attack: knowing the plan well, checkingclothes, knife, ticket, passport and other papers,and dressing neatly. The second section suggestsreassuringly that, at the airport, prayer will lead toa smile and to feeling secure. This suggestion ispsychologically sophisticated: the best way to lookrelaxed and unsuspicious is to feel secure. Tryingto look relaxed is less likely to succeed. The thirdsection contains a reminder that the critical mo-ment in the plan is to take control of the plane af-ter takeoff; they should strike as heroes, and shoutthe name of God in order to instill terror in the infidels. This last can have the practical effect ofmultiplying the surprise of the attack with discon-certing noise in the same way that soldiers aretaught to scream through a bayonet charge. Andthat, surprisingly enough, is the extent to which ac-tion is discussed. Physical action of the plan is rep-resented only in outline and in no more than adozen lines, whereas the action and varieties ofprayer appear in nearly every line.

It is possible that the lack of action detail wasintended as a security precaution, in case the docu-ment were uncovered before the attack. This possi-bility is made less likely, however, by noting that thereferences to suitcase, knife, ticket, and passportshould alone be enough to give away the plan if thedocument were found by U.S. security personnel.Having said as much as it does, why does the doc-ument not have any clue to such key pieces of co-ordination as what the signal will be to get out oftheir seats to take the plane, and who will give thissignal? Why no warning against proximity or mu-tual recognition while waiting to board at the air-port? Why nothing about whether the attack shouldbegin with taking over from the pilots in the cock-pit, or the passengers in the cabin? Why nothingabout what to do with the passengers after takeover,whether to keep them in their seats or move themto the back of the plane? The most natural inter-pretation of this document is that it is not a man-



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ual for action but a manual for motivation and con-trol. The author of the manual is not concerned withsecurity and coordination among the attackers, butwith strengthening their resolve when it comes tokilling passengers first and then themselves.

In brief, the manual is more a manual of prayerthan a manual of action. It offers several kinds ofmind-control mechanisms, notably a focus of at-tention in prayer and the promise of martyrdom. Itaims to maintain a martyr’s intention, not forvengeance or hatred, but for satisfaction of God’swill. These same goals and many of the same mech-anisms are found in the preparation of Palestiniansuicide bombers.

Palestinian MartyrsNasra Hassan, a Pakistani woman and a Mus-

lim, has interviewed over 200 Palestinians involvedin “martyrdom operations” against Israel (“An Ar-senal of Believers,” New Yorker, November 19,2001). Interviewees included young men who hadvolunteered as suicide bombers, organizers andtrainers of the bombers, and the families of suc-cessful bombers. Young men are not so much re-cruited for martyrdom as selected from a flood ofapplicants that rises with every Israeli military incursion against Palestinians and with every Mos-sad (Israeli secret service) assassination of Pales-tinian militant leaders. Those selected must beover eighteen, unmarried, and without family re-sponsibilities. Until recently the bombers were allmale, but this barrier fell in January 2002 with thefirst suicide bombing carried out by a female, WafaIdris, a 27-year-old nursing-aide from a refugeecamp near Ramallah in the West Bank.

Each Palestinian martyr is prepared for his mis-sion by a ‘trainer’ and accompanied everywhere dur-ing his last week by two ‘assistants’ to support hisresolve. A member of HAMAS described the prepa-ration to Hassan.

We focus his attention on Paradise, on being in thepresence of Allah, on meeting the Prophet Moham-mad, on interceding for his loved ones so that they,too, can be saved from the agonies of Hell, on thehouris, and on fighting the Israel occupation andremoving it from the Islamic trust that is Palestine.

With the exception of specific reference toIsrael and Palestine, this might equally be a sum-mary of the content of Atta’s manual. Thus the mo-tivation of Palestinian volunteers is very similar tothat represented in the “manual”: a promise of im-mediate reward in heaven and remission of punish-ment for sin.

Again as in Atta’s manual, intention is crucial.Hassan quotes the spiritual leader of HAMAS,Sheikh Ahmen Yassin, as follows: “But these re-wards are not in themselves the goal of the martyr.The only aim is to win Allah’s satisfaction. Thatcan be done in the simplest and speediest mannerby dying in the cause of Allah. And it is Allah whoselects the martyrs.” When Hassan asked whethermartyrs might act from feelings of personal re-venge, a trainer responded that if personal feelingsalone motivate the candidate, “his martyrdom will



A GROUP OF HAMAS SUICIDE BOMBERS PARADE WITHFAKE DYNAMITE STRAPPED TO THEIR CHESTS.SUICIDE IS DISCOURAGED IN MUSLIM TEXTS, BUTMARTYRDOM MAY BE ACHIEVED IF ONE DIESFIGHTING THE ENEMY. (AP/Wide WorldPhotos/Mohammed Zatari. Reproduced by permission.)

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not be acceptable to Allah.” This response is con-sistent with the lesson of Ali ibn Abi Talib: themartyr must strike, not from personal feelings, butfor Allah.

The similarities linking Atta’s manual to thepreparation of Palestinian martyrs suggest a re-consideration of the origin of the manual. In itscombination of religious and psychological so-phistication, the manual points, not to Muham-mad Atta, an architecture student, but to someonewith considerable experience in preparing youngmartyrs. If not from among the trainers of Pales-tinian martyrs, the writer is likely to have comefrom a similar background in preparing martyrs inAfghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, Kashmir, Leba-non, Pakistan, or Yemen. Although little noted inthe Western press, all of these countries have seenmartyrdom operations organized by radical Islamicgroups since the dissolution of the Soviet Unionin 1989. Perhaps best known is the suicide bomb-ing in Afghanistan that assassinated the leader ofthe Northern Alliance, Amad Shah Masud, justprior to 9/11.

Perpetrators Versus SupportersOur discussion of the manual began with the

question of whether the 9/11 attacks can be un-derstood as a result of hatred, in particular hatredfor the United States. Close examination of themanual does not support this interpretation, andneither does Hassan’s description of the prepara-tion of Palestinian martyrs. The martyr is not en-couraged toward anger and hatred and indeed isexplicitly warned against these feelings as incorrectintention. Although it seems plausible that oneemotion can overwhelm another, that anger or ha-tred can be so strong as to overwhelm fear of death,the evidence suggests that this popular interpreta-tion is simply not correct. It is not hatred of theenemy that conquers fear, it is love of God and thepromise of paradise.

A paradox still remains in this understanding.There is no doubt that many Muslims feel shamedand humiliated by Western policies, including notonly Western actions in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, andIsrael but also support for corrupt governments inthe band of mostly Muslim states that extend fromMorocco to Indonesia. After every Israeli provoca-tion, for instance, Palestinian militants in HAMASand Islamic Jihad are pressured for action. Hassan(2001) quotes a militant leader: “Fending off thecrowds who demand revenge and retaliation andinsist on a human bombing operation—that be-comes our biggest problem!” The paradox there-fore is that there is great anger in the street but notin the hearts of the martyrs.

This statement of the paradox is already thekey to its resolution. The motivation of the mar-tyrs is not the same as the motivation of the peo-ple they come from. The anger of Muslims againstthe West is the background that brings martyrs for-ward and remembers them as heroes, but angerdoes not suffice to drive out fear. The peculiar re-sult is that the Muslim in the street feels more angerthan the Muslim giving his life.

This interpretation is consistent with what isknown about men who risk their lives as combatsoldiers. Interviews with men directly from thefront lines of World War II (WWII, 1939–45)found that only about 20 percent mentioned ha-tred of the enemy as helping them “when thingsgot tough.” Most often mentioned as helping were“thoughts of God” and “not wanting to let my bud-dies down.”

Sentiments of civilians at home during WWIIseem to have been much more blood oriented.From her reading of memoirs and letters fromWWII, Bourke (An Intimate History of Killing,1999, p. 148) argues that, compared with those incombat, “Civilians were more prone to articulatevirulent hatred toward the enemy, leading manycommentators to conclude that reading or writingabout killing was more likely to stimulate hatefulfeelings than actual participation in the slaughter.”Bourke offers examples of civilians who wrote totheir friends and relatives in combat about ‘brutalHuns’ and enemy ‘devils,’ only to be rebuked by re-turn mail from soldiers who found patriotic talkand hatred of the enemy to be a naïve glorificationof the depressing realities of combat. Similarly, sur-veys in England during the blitz found that reprisalbombing of German cities was more popular in un-bombed rural areas than in London and other citiesthat actually suffered the bombing.

The psychology of this negative correlation be-tween sacrifice and hatred must await a differentessay than this one. Here it is only important tonote that there is evidence to support the idea, how-ever paradoxical, that those sacrificing the most fora cause are least motivated by hatred. The attacksof 9/11 are not to be understood, at least for theattackers, as a form of hate crime.

Islamic MartyrdomThe critical concern with intention, both for

the martyrs and their trainers, requires explication.The issue at the bottom of this concern is the dis-tinction between martyrdom and suicide. Suicideis forbidden to Muslims, and Hassan’s intervieweesin Palestine would speak with her only on condi-



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tion that she did not refer to suicide bombers. Thepartisan nature of the term, suicide bomber, is ap-parent in the fact that Europeans, who generallysympathize more with the Palestinians than Amer-icans do, more often refer to Palestinian bombersas kamikaze bombers. A suicide bomber is linked to the psychopathology of suicide, whereas akamikaze-bomber is linked to the desperation ofWorld War II Japanese attacks on U.S. forces inthe Pacific.

Both Mneimneh and Cook, in their discussionof Atta’s manual, show that suicide—taking one’sown life—is if anything more discouraged in Islamictexts than in Christian texts. A Muslim martyr doesnot take his own life, but loses his life in fightingand trying to kill the enemy. Although massacresof prisoners and civilians can be found in the earlyhistory of Islam, even under the direction of theProphet Muhammad, later commentaries and in-terpretations developed Islamic prohibitions againstkilling prisoners or civilians.

Mneimneh (in press) cites a reaffirmation ofthese prohibitions, issued by the Islamic ResearchCouncil at the Al Azhar University in Cairo on 4 November 2001. “Islam provides clear rules andethical norms that forbid the killing of non-combatants, as well as women, children, and theelderly, and also forbids the pursuit of the enemyin defeat, the execution of those who surrender,the infliction of harm on prisoners of war, and thedestruction of property that is not being used inthe hostilities.” More recently, however, Arab re-actions to Israeli operations in the West Bank havebegun to undermine the prohibitions of the IslamicResearch Council. Sheikh Tantawi, the leadingcleric of Al Azhar University, changed his mind tosupport martyrdom operations against Israeli chil-dren, women, and teenagers until the people ofPalestine regain their land.

The Islamic Research Council in Cairo is of-ten considered to be the highest moral authority inSunni Islam, but Muslims, like Protestants, recog-nize no central teaching authority such as the popeprovides for Catholics. As Protestant authority isthe Bible, Muslim authority is the Qur’an. AsProtestant church leaders influence their followersby their scholarly status in interpreting the Bible,so Muslim leaders influence their followers by theirscholarly status in interpreting the Qur’an and theHadith. This status is subject to challenge, and theinterpretation offered by the Islamic ResearchCouncil is challenged by an interpretation pub-lished by anonymous Muslim scholars under the title of “The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibilityof Martyrdom Operations” (www.minna.com/

html/aarticlesmartyrops.htm). Cook (in press)translates the key passage as follows.

“These examples, all based upon the hadith ‘Verily,actions are only according to intentions . . . ’ clearlysupport the notion that the verdict concerning theshahid [martyr] does not differ based upon who thekilling party is, provided the intention is pure. So,one who has a bad intention and is killed by theenemy is deserving of the Fire, as would be the caseif he kills himself out of pain. And one who has a sin-cere intention will be in Heaven, whether he is killedby the enemy or kills himself in error. And, one whohelps in killing himself for the good of the religionwill be in heaven.

In the end, the authors of the PermissibilityRuling conclude that classical Islamic texts implyapproval for martyrdom operations so long as theact is based in correct intention and will inflictlosses and fear on the enemy while strengtheningthe hearts of Muslims. The key to martyrdom isintention, and the emphasis on correct intention inAtta’s manual is consistent with and likely flowsdirectly from the Permissibility Ruling.

Comparison of Islamic and ChristianUnderstandings of Martyrdom

The Ruling justifies suicidal attacks, includingattacks on civilians, in a way that is likely to seemstrained and illogical to non-Muslims, as indeed itseems to the majority of Muslims whose views arerepresented by the Islamic Research Council. Infairness, however, it must be recognized that Chris-tianity has had its own problems and divisions indefining martyrdom.

Jesus put himself in harm’s way by going toJerusalem at the Passover holiday and challengingthe Jewish authorities by calling the Pharisees andscribes “blind guides” and “whitened sepulchres”and by driving the moneychangers from the tem-ple. The account, however, of his last night has himsweating and praying “Father, save me from thishour.” Betrayed and accused before the Sanhedrin,Jesus is asked whether he is the Son of God andanswers only elliptically: “You have said so.” Pilateasks him if he is a king and he answers that hiskingship is not of this world.

Although the original meaning of martyr is“witness,” Jesus is surprisingly unassertive as a wit-ness. Instead he makes his enemies work to con-vict him.

In the first few centuries after Jesus’s death,some of his followers showed more enthusiasm forsuffering than Jesus had. St. Ignatius, on his wayto Rome to be executed (117 CE), wrote Romanfriends to ask them not to intercede for him. St.



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Perpetua (203 CE) is described guiding the swordto her throat. St. Euphus (304 CE) rushed into theRoman prefect to declare that he was a Christianand wanted to die. Whether these stories are liter-ally true is less important than the attitude towarddeath that they convey; the early Christian martyrswere not just indifferent to death, they reached forit. The understanding behind their enthusiasm wasmuch like the compact described in Atta’s manual:although others might be saved, only the martyrcould be sure of Paradise. According to Tertullian,the early third century Christian theologian, “Theonly key that unlocks the gates of Paradise is yourown blood.”

Christian enthusiasm for martyrdom was laterseen to need tempering with recognition that deathshould be God’s call rather than human pride; mar-tyrdom had to be better distinguished from thepride and sin of suicide. According to St. Cyprian(257 CE), “Since our discipline forbids anyone tosurrender voluntarily,” Christians “may not givethemselves up. But if they are sought out by you,they will be found.” Clement of Alexandria, anearly third century bishop, found it necessary toteach actively against volunteering: “who does notavoid persecution, but out of daring presents him-self for capture, becomes an accomplice in the crimeof the persecution.”



IT IS DIFFICULT FOR MANY PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND THE MOTIVATIONS BEHIND USING ONESELF AS A HUMANEXPLOSIVE. YET SUICIDE BOMBINGS SUCH AS THIS ONE ON AN ISRAELI BUS HAVE OCCURRED THROUGHOUTHISTORY. (AP/Wide World Photos/Jerome Delay. Reproduced by permission.)

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Perhaps the clearest expression of the Chris-tian balance was the martyrdom of St. ThomasMore at the hands of Henry VIII. Henry wantedan annulment of his childless marriage to Catherineof Aragon, but the pope wouldn’t agree. Henry pro-claimed himself supreme head of the Englishchurch, and an obliging Parliament declared Hen-ry’s marriage annulled. All English subjects wererequired to swear an Oath of Succession that rec-ognized the annulment. Thomas More, Henry’sfriend, ghostwriter, and Lord Chancellor, refusedthe oath and was subsequently beheaded.

In the manner of his refusal, however, Moredid everything he could to avoid death. His was asilent witness. He did not argue the oath waswrong, or immoral, or indeed tell anyone that herejected the oath. He only refused to sign it. Heargued that in the law, silence is construed as con-sent. In the end, his lawyerly defense was notenough to save him, but his effort to make his en-emies work to convict him was notable. In his re-luctant approach to death, he was more Christ-likethan the eager martyrs described in the centuriesimmediately after Jesus.

In sum, the Christian idea of martyrdom hasundergone some fluctuation over the centuries, andthe distinction between martyrdom and suicide hassometimes been not very different from that urgedin the Permissibility Ruling. Similarly, Christianwarfare has not always distinguished civilians fromenemy warriors; examples go back at least to themassacre that accompanied the crusaders’ captureof Jerusalem in 1099, and extend into the twenti-eth century with the deaths of millions in citybombing during WWII. Even today, the primacyof intent over effect is invoked for military actionsthat kill civilians; the current description of suchcasualties, as in the bombing of Slobodan Miloso-vec’s Serbia or the Taliban’s Afghanistan, is “col-lateral damage.”

RECENT HISTORY ANDTHE FUTURE

The 9/11 attacks are not to be understood asthe product of individual pathology or pathologicalhatred. Polls suggest that only relatively fewMuslims may hate the United States, but even ifthe 9/11 attackers came from among those few, theattackers themselves, as judged by Atta’s manual,did not act out of hate. Rather they understoodthemselves to be doing God’s will; they gave theirlives in a rush for paradise rather than for the sat-isfaction of punishing their enemies. This may be acommon pattern, in which those not personally atrisk feel more animosity toward the enemy than

those actually fighting and dying against the enemy.Finally, the crucial difference between suicide andmartyrdom is, for both Muslims and Christians, amatter of intent. Most Muslims do not agree thatintent can justify taking one’s own life or killingcivilians, but, for both Christians and Muslims, itis an old and difficult question as to when good in-tention can justify killing one’s self or others.

This question signals what is usually under-stood as a sophisticated level of moral judgment, inwhich actions are judged by intention rather thanby effect. Most adults would agree that mistakesand accidents do not deserve punishment or re-ward, or at least deserve less punishment or rewardthan choices made on the basis of foreseeable con-sequences. The difficult case is one in which achoice, such as the choice made by the 9/11 at-tackers, has multiple foreseeable results, some eviland some good. Gaining paradise is positive, as isdiscouraging the enemy and heartening one’sfriends. Killing women, children, and the elderly isnegative, as is taking one’s own life.

The success of the 9/11 attacks reinforces thejustification of suicide terrorism. Quite simply ter-rorism works. It does hurt the enemy and it does en-courage the terrorists’ friends. The increase inPalestinian suicide bombings against the Israelis,including in early 2002 the novelty of female sui-cide bombers, indicates how widely this justifica-tion is appreciated. Even this novelty is only local.The Tamil Tigers, in their fight for an indepen-dent Tamil state carved out of Sri Lanka, have foryears been famous for their female suicide bombers.One of whom killed Rajiv Gandhi, former primeminister of India and another of whom nearly killedthe prime minister of Sri Lanka.

There is no mystery about why and how peo-ple kill others for political causes; the mystery is tounderstand how people can be ready to kill them-selves for such causes. Most of us who are livingcomfortable lives cannot take the first step in beingready: we cannot imagine killing ourselves. Recentexamples, however, make this kind of imaginationeasier. All of us are going to die; 9/11 means thatmore will be willing to die sooner for a cause thatcan give meaning to life. As the strong get stronger,the warfare of the weak will try to match high-techweapon systems with more human weapons.

BIBLIOGRAPHYBennett, W. J. “Americans for Victory over Terrorism,” New

York Times, March 10, 2002, p. 7.

Bourke, Joanna. An Intimate History of Killing: Face to FaceKilling in Twentieth Century Warfare. New York: BasicBooks, 1999.



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Cook, David. “Suicide Attacks or ‘Martyrdom Operations’in Contemporary Jihad Literature,” Nova Religio, inpress.

Hassan, Nasra. “An Arsenal of Believers.” New Yorker,November 19, 2001, pp. 36–41.

McCauley, Clark, and M. Segal. “The Social Psychology ofTerrorist Groups.” In Clyde Hendrick, ed., Review ofPersonality and Social Psychology, vol.9. Beverly Hills,CA: Sage, 1987.

Miller, J. “Arafat’s Wife Endorses Suicide Attacks AgainstIsraelis.” International Herald Tribune, April 16, 2002,p.4.

Mneimneh, Hassan. “Raid on an Indefinite Path,” New YorkReview of Books, in press.

Mneimneh, Hassan and K. Makiya. “Manual for a ‘Raid,’”New York Review of Books, January 17, 2002.

Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion inWar. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Sarraj, E. “Why We Blow Ourselves Up,” Time, April 5,2002, p. 39.

Smith, Lacey Baldwin. Fools, Martyrs, Traitors: The Story ofMartyrdom in the Western World. New York: Knopf,1997.

Stouffer, Samuel Andrew, et al. The American Soldier, Vol 2:Combat and Its Aftermath. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1949.

Telhami, Shibley. “Polling and Politics in Riyadh,” New YorkTimes, March 3, 2002, sec. 4, p. 4.

Clark McCauley



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