Int. J. Middle East Stud. 33 (2001), 383409. Printed in the United States of America

Hakan O zoglu

N AT I O N A L I S M A N D K U R D I S H N O TA B L E S I NT H E L AT E O T TO M A N E A R LY R E P U B L I C A N E R A

The era culminating in World War I saw a transition from multinational empires tonation-states. Large empires such as the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman searchedfor ways to cope with the decline of their political control, while peoples in theseempires shifted their political loyalties to nation-states. The Ottoman Empire offers afavorable canvas for studying new nationalisms that resulted in many successful andunsuccessful attempts to form nation-states. As an example of successful attempts,Arab nationalism has received the attention that it deserves in the field of MiddleEastern studies.1 Students have engaged in many complex debates on different aspectsof Arab nationalism, enjoying a wealth of hard data. Studies on Kurdish nationalism,however, are still in their infancy. Only a very few scholars have addressed the issuein a scholarly manner.2 We still have an inadequate understanding of the nature ofearly Kurdish nationalism and its consequences for the Middle East in general andTurkish studies in particular. Partly because of the subjects political sensitivity, manyscholars shy away from it. However, a consideration of Kurdish nationalism as anexample of unsuccessful attempts to form a nation-state can contribute greatly to thestudy of nationalism in the Middle East.

The aim of this study is to explore the nature of Kurdish nationalism in its formativeperiod. It offers five principal conclusions. Kurdish nationalism emerged as a responseto the collapsing Ottoman Empire during and after World War I. Therefore, it was nota cause but, on the contrary, the result of the empires disintegration. The political andmilitary activities of Kurdish notables in the pre-World War I period were not national-istic; they reflected the desire of powerful Kurdish lineages to consolidate, expand,or recover their regional influence. Kurdish leaders, exclusively of landed-notableorigin, were mostly members of Ottoman high bureaucracy and as such an integralpart of the Ottoman state. Their well-being depended heavily on the existence of thestate. It was only after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire seemed unavoidable thatthey actively promoted nationalism. In its infancy, Kurdish nationalism was heavilyaffected by pre-existing ties and rivalries. These ties were shaped by the Kurds ownprimordial ties and religious affiliations. Struggles among the most powerful Kurdishnotables continued in the form of opposing factions in Kurdish nationalist politics in

Hakan O zoglu is a Lecturer in Turkish, University of Chicago, 5828 S. University Avenue, Chicago, Ill.60637, USA; e-mail: aozoglu@midway.uchicago.edu.

2001 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/01 $9.50

384 Hakan O zoglu

the era immediately following World War I. The goals and tactics of these factionswere also influenced by their leaders religious commitmentor lack of such com-mitment. Their understanding of and commitment to the idea of nationalism variedconsiderably. In the era under review, Kurdish nationalism emerged simultaneously asa secessionist and an autonomist movement. Finally, the study shows that despitehistoric and contemporary enmities, the leaders of the opposing factions were unitedby one distinct emotion: their suspicion for, and even hostility toward, KemalistTurkish nationalism. In sum, this study shows that early Kurdish nationalist politicswas highly factionalized and analyzes the ways in which Kurdish nationalist leadersresponded to the collapsing Ottoman state and the emerging Kemalist regime.

In present scholarship, several significant issues about Arab nationalism are beingdebated, but two of them are directly related to this study: the role and motivationsof notables and the period of origin. As a preface, the definition of the term notables(ayan) should be examined. The term ayan was widely used in the Ottoman Empireto refer to local notables who exercised authority over local populations and possessedsome sort of political power in their relationship to the state. Particularly during theRusso-Ottoman War of 176874, when the Ottoman state requested their service toraise funds and recruits for the army, the ayan received official recognition from thesultan and began functioning as semi-official advisers in Ottoman local governments.With the declaration of the first constitution in 1876, a new institution, the OttomanParliament, was introduced. The Ottoman Parliament consisted of two houses: thelower house (Meclis-i Mebusan) whose members were elected, and the upper house(Meclis-i Ayan) whose members were appointed. Through these houses, local notablesfound a new way to participate in Ottoman politics.3 The role of the ayan in thepolitical realm of the Ottoman Empire did not become a center of academic attentionuntil Albert Houranis article Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables, inwhich Hourani analyzed the ayan from a functionalist point of view.

To understand the function of Kurdish notables in the Middle Eastern context, abrief examination of Houranis paradigm is helpful, for it provides the field with aworking definition with which comparisons can be made. According to Hourani, nota-bles were urban intermediaries between the government and the people. Three mainsubcategories of ayan, Hourani suggested, were: the ulema, representing the religiousfunctionaries; local military leaders; and secular traditional notables whose powerdepended mainly on primordial relations with the local population.4 Although Houra-nis paradigm has some merit for the Ottoman Empire as a whole, it specifically refersto the Arab provinces. In the Kurdish context, for example, Houranis categories ofthe ayan require a slight modification. In the Kurdish provinces of the Ottoman Em-pire, one can readily omit the category of local military leaders, for it did not existseparately. Although some military forces were appointed from the center and led bythe governor (vali) of a given province, religious leaders and the secular traditionalnotables were the leaders of local forces. Therefore, one cannot speak of a separateclass of local military leaders in the Kurdish areas, as in Arab lands. Furthermore,local military forces consisted mainly of the Kurdish tribesmen who seemingly out-numbered the military force of the governor of the province. In military operations,the governor enjoyed the service of these tribal forces at his disposal.5

Another modification of Houranis model pertains to the term ulema, which in-

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 385

cludes but is not limited to the Sufis. Madrasa-educated religious functionaries are infact the centerpiece of Houranis categorization of the religious class. In the Kurdishprovinces, the ulema were almost entirely Sufis. Contrary to the suggestion by Hour-ani, in some cases the distinction between the traditional notables and the Sufis wasnot very clear. Finally, one can argue that Kurdish notables who functioned as interme-diaries between the state and the people did not always come from an urban back-ground. Although most of the Kurdish notables engaged in nationalist activities in theurban centers, they are hardly qualified to be considered entirely urban notables, fortheir origins and power bases were rural. With these points in mind, in this study Ishall use the term notables in a way similar to that in Hourani in a modified form,attributing to notables a minimum quality of exercising political authority in and col-lecting respect from their communities due to their genealogical and religious back-grounds. Although not always local or urban power, Kurdish notables certainlyfunctioned at various degrees as intermediaries between the state and the people.

Regarding the function of notables in Middle Eastern nationalisms, it is importantto determine the role of Arab notables,6 for it enables us to understand the motivationsbehind Arab nationalism. After the 18th century the notable families of the OttomanEmpire became very active politically in determining the future of their regions. Inthe case of Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, several studies exist to illustratethe political power of notables. Following the footsteps of Hourani, Philip Khouryuses Houranis paradigm of notables in the context of Damascus and discusses therole of notable families in the emergence of nationalism. Khoury claims that greatnotable families in Damascus, such as the Azm, played a significant role in the emer-gence and development of nationalist movements in that city. While acknowledgingthe contributions of Islamic modernists and Christian secularists to the growth ofArabism, Khoury claims that it was the notablesparticularly, the absentee landown-ing classwho attended Ottoman professional schools and served the state as civilservants or in the army and who translated the idea of Arabism into a political move-ment with nationalist dimensions before World War I.7 Not surprisingly, Khoury seesthe loss of privileged position in the Ottoman state as the main motivation for theemergence of notables as nationalist leaders.

A well-known example that demonstrates the role of notables in the emergence ofArab nationalism comes from the Hijaz. The famous Arab revolt of 1916 that endedOttoman sovereignty in most of the Arab land was led by Sharif Husayn, the sharifof Mecca, and his two sons Faysal and Abdallah. The leaders of the revolt enjoyedthe prestige belonging to the Hashemite dynasty, which claimed direct lineage to theProphet Muhammad. This revolt soon spread outside the Hijaz and was regarded asone of the cornerstones of Arab nationalism. Most historians agree that Arab national-ism was born in the Fertile Crescent among the urban notables that had lost theirprivileges due to the centralization policies of the Committee of Union and Progress(CUP).8 Certainly, the first organized movement arose in the Hijaz and was led by anurban notable family, the Hashemites. Ernest Dawn demonstrated convincingly thatHusayn was motivated by his disagreement with the CUP elite that aimed at removingthe sharif of Mecca from power. With British instigation, Sharif Husayn and his sonswere looking for ways to consolidate their local power and eliminate the CUPs threatto their traditional authority over Arab society.9 In conclusion, one can state that na-

386 Hakan O zoglu

tionalism provided Arab notables with an ideology to intensify their dissatisfactionwith central government. With their personal charisma and the ability to mobilizelarge groups, notables assumed leadership in the emergence of Arab nationalism. Aswill be seen in this study, this is not unique to Arab nationalism.

Just as scholars debate the importance of the notables in the emergence of national-ism, they debate the time frame of the origin of Arab nationalism. In recent scholar-ship there seems to be a consensus that Arab nationalism was a more recent phenome-non than previously thought.10 Rashid Khalidi, an authority of Arab nationalism,observes that the term Arabism, implying proto-nationalism rather than full-fledgednationalism with concomitant desire for separation of the Arabs from the OttomanEmpire, is now accepted as more appropriate to describe the pre-war movement.11Dawn pushes the time frame toward the end of World War I, claiming that most Arabsremained Ottomanist until 1918 and that separatist anti-Ottoman movements remainedinsignificant until this time.12 William Cleveland expresses similar views, stating thatthe majority of the Arab elite sought survival within the framework of a strengthenedOttoman state, not in separation from it.13 Defining nationalism as a majority move-ment aimed at separation from the Ottoman state, students of Arab nationalism seemto agree that Arabism turned into Arab nationalismor, in other words, proto-nation-alism became nationalismtoward the end of World War I, after which the OttomanEmpire ceased to exist. Therefore, one can claim that Arab nationalism emerged asthe most viable, if not the only, political means for local notables to govern theirregions, and it emerged just before the Ottoman state disintegrated.

Clearly, the definition of the term nationalism is central in determining the originof nationalist movements. Therefore, the definition that this study uses must be madeclear. There exists no consensus among the scholars in defining nationalism.14 How-ever, without at least a working definition of the term, any argument regarding nation-alism remains pointless. In this study, nationalism is used inclusively and refers toa political movement of a community that distinguishes itself from others as a separatecultural and political group. Its main objective is political self-determination througheither secession or autonomy. A political movement becomes nationalist when itmakes political demands for secession or autonomy in a region that is regarded as thehistorical homeland and where the majority of the population belongs to the samecommunity. Not all autonomous movements, however, are nationalist. Nationalistmovements that demand autonomy are concerned more with the self-rule of a commu-nity than a territory. The definition is important to determine the origin of nationalismin the Middle East generally, and specifically in the Kurdish case.

K U R D I S H N O TA B L E S

Like that of the Arabs, Kurdish nationalism emerged as a political movement afterthe collapse of the Ottoman state, and Kurdish notables played an important rolein promoting the idea and assuming the leadership. To illustrate Kurdish nationalistleadership, I have selected Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti, or the Society for the Advance-ment of Kurdistan (SAK). Although the Kurds organized themselves into several cul-tural clubs early in the 20th century,15 their organizations became political and beganmaking nationalist demands only in 1918 with the formation of the SAK, which was

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 387

established on 17 December 1918. I chose this organization to represent the Kurdishnationalist leadership not only because it was the best organized and most inclusiveKurdish organization. More important, its activities can clearly be defined as national-istic, for its leaders openly asked for independence, or at least autonomy. No officialmembership list of the SAK exists, but primary sources provide us the names offounders and active members of the society.16 The data are not perfect, but they aresufficient to demonstrate the nature of the early Kurdish nationalist leadership.

Two years after the foundation of the SAK, a split occurred in the organization,causing an ideological polarization among the members. This split is significant be-cause it demonstrated the importance of primordial ties in determining ones loyaltyor adherence to the secessionist or autonomist brand of nationalism. The two groupswere led by Sayyid Abdulkadir of Semdinan and Emin Ali Bedirhan (see later), andthey identified themselves as autonomists and secessionists, respectively. As this studywill argue, pre-existing feuds between these families contributed greatly to this ideo-logical split. The followers of these factions cohered based on their kinship ties ortheir Sufi connections. These two families, recognized in the primary sources as themost influential Kurdish leaders, had earlier provided leaders of revolts in Kurdistanthat are seen as nationalistic by some scholars.17 Hence, in the sections on the Semdi-nan and Bedirhani families, I shall first discuss whether the 19th-century Kurdishmovements led by these families were nationalist in nature and then move on todiscuss kinship and religious ties among the members of the SAK.

T H E N A K S I B E N D I S E M D I N A N FA M I LY O F N E H R I

The Semdinan family (Figure 1) emerged as political and military leaders of the Kurdsin the second half of the 19th century and controlled a vast region (Figure 2) insoutheastern Anatolia and northwestern Iran. The rise of this family, headed by SayyidUbeydullah in the 1870s and 1880s, marks an important era in Kurdish historytheera in which political power changed hands from tribal leaders to the NaqshbandiSemdinans. Until this time, the Sufi shaykhs generally functioned under a tribal leaderas spiritual advisers. Although they had long enjoyed personal charisma and trans-tribal influence, the Naqshbandi shaykhs became political and military leaders onlywith the rise of the Semdinan family.

As a respected Naqshbandi family, the Semdinans became great landowners andaccumulated a vast amount of land around the Hakkari region in the 1880s. Britisharchival documents indicate that Sayyid Ubeydullah (d. 1883), internationally the bestknown member of the family due to his revolt in 1880 (see later), was purchasingland from the Qajar and the Ottoman states. Confirming the land-owning status of theSemdinans, a letter dated 15 July 1880 by British Consul General Abbott in Iran read,I learn that [Sayyid Ubeydullah] is purchasing villages both in Turkey and Persia,which will greatly increase his influence [in the region].18 Unfortunately, we do notknow precisely how much land the Semdinans owned, but we do know that theirholdings were large enough to attract the attention of the British officers stationed inthe region.19

What sort of income did the Semdinans have to become great landowners? Consid-ering that the Semdinans were one of the greatest Naqshbandi families in Kurdistan,

388 Hakan O zoglu

FIGURE 1. The Semdinan family, based on a handwritten family tree provided by Hzr Geylan.Names in bold indicate membership in the SAK.

it is conceivable that this family accumulated income from the donations of theirfollowers. Although visible to the European powers in the second half of the 1880s,this family had enjoyed high prestige, particularly in the Hakkari region, due to itsreligious genealogy prior to the 19th century. Connected to the silsila (spiritual geneal-ogy) of the Khalidiyya branch of the Naqshbandi order, the family traces its originback to Adb al-Qadir Gilani, a 12th-century Baghdadi mystic and the founder of theQadiri order. The family line of the Semdinans reaches to the Prophet through hisdaughter Fatima.20 With such a pedigree, the Semdinans were spiritual leaders of localcommunities and advisers to Kurdish emirs, and seemingly this spiritual leadershipgenerated sufficient income to become a great landowning family.

As indicated earlier, Semdinanl Ubeydullah emerged not only as a distinguishedreligious figure but also as a prominent and able political and military leader. Thereseem to be several reasons for the rise of Sayyid Ubeydullah. The most importantreason is concerned with a power vacuum that was created after the destruction of

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390 Hakan O zoglu

Kurdish tribal leadership. Desperate for income to compete with the European powers,Sultan Mahmud II (r. 180839) initiated a centralizing policy to collect taxes directlyfrom the areas controlled by local rulers. In Kurdistan, the Kurdish leadership con-sisted mainly of tribal chiefs who ruled over vast areas by paying only lip service toIstanbul. The most notable of these tribal confederacies were the Botan, Baban, andHakkari, all of which competed with one another. After a series of military expedi-tions, the Ottoman state crushed the authority of these powerful tribes in the first halfof the 19th century. The last semi-independent emiratethe Botan, headed by theBedirhan familywas removed from power in 1847. From this time to the Russo-Ottoman war of 187778, we do not have any record of a powerful Kurdish leadershipin the region. In the aftermath of this brutal war, which paralyzed the region, we seethe rise of Shaykh Ubeydullah of Semdinan filling the political and military powervacuum and assuming the Kurdish leadership not only in most of Ottoman Kurdistanbut also in Iran.

We have a wealth of primary sources21 indicating the power of Sayyid Ubeydullahin 1880, when he led an uprising against the Qajar Persia and the Ottoman Empire.Concerned with the well-being of the Christian (mainly Armenian and Nestorian)population, Britain was monitoring the uprising very carefully. British correspondenceconfirms that Ubeydullah was the paramount chief of the Kurds in 1880, and hispolitical control extended beyond Hakkari into a vast region that was once controlledby the Botan, Bahdinan, Hakkari, and Ardalan confederacies.22

It seems that the main reason for the revolt was the promise made to Armeniansafter the Treaty of Berlin, signed on 13 July 1878 by the Ottoman Empire. Article 61of the treaty stipulated that the Sublime Porte would undertake necessary steps toprotect Armenians against the Circassians and the Kurds.23 To show his dissatisfactionwith the treaty, in July 1880 Ubeydullah warned Tosun Pasa, the Mutasarrf (governorof a subdivision) of Baskale:What is this I hear, that the Armenians are going to have an independent state in Van, and thatthe Nestorians are going to hoist the British flag and declare themselves British subjects. I willnever permit it, even if I have to arm the women.24

Hence, Wadie Jwaideh, the author of a comprehensive study on the Ubeydullah move-ment, is correct when he states that fear of the Armenian ascendancy in Kurdistanappears to have been one of the most powerful reasons behind [Ubeydullahs] attemptto unite the Kurds and led them for an uprising.25 It should be added here, however,that Ubeydullah also publicly presented his movement as an attempt to restore peaceand order in the region and sought support of the Nestorian Christians against thePersian and Ottoman states. Ubeydullah complained that these two states had donenothing to stop the aggression of rival Kurdish tribesnamely, the Shekak of Persiaand the Herki of the Ottoman Empire. To achieve this aim, for a short time, localChristians provided him with a military support.26

Hoping to enforce law and order in the area where he had ambitions to rule andwhere the Armenians were receiving British and French support for self-rule, Ubey-dullah invaded the northwestern territories of the Qajar state in September 1880, ex-panding his sphere of control in the Persian territories. However, Ubeydullahs militia,consisting mainly of Kurdish tribesmen, was easily defeated by the Qajars. Upon his

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 391

return to the Ottoman territories in early 1881, Ubeydullah surrendered to the Ottomanauthorities, who exiled him to Istanbul and then to the Hijaz, where he died in 1883.

The Ubeydullah revolt is important not only because it demonstrates the emergenceof new political leadership in Kurdistan but, more important, because some studentsof Kurdish nationalism identify this revolt as the origin of the Kurdish nationaliststruggle, for the shaykh demanded a Kurdish state (either independent or autonomous)governed by himself.27 British documents seem to attest that, from time to time, Ubey-dullah entertained the idea of separation from the Ottoman and Persian empires. In aletter dated October 1881 to Earl Granville, Ronald Thomson, a British officer inTehran, states:

The Sheikh . . . states that he and all the Kurdish Chiefs are not agreed as to necessity ofestablishing a united Kurdistan [emphasis added] in order that they may be in a position tomanage their own affairs without the interference of either Turkish or Persian authorities. . . .There seems to be no doubt from . . . the proclamations and correspondence which [Ubeydul-lah] has lately sent to various Kurdish Chiefs along the lines of the Persian border that hisdesign is to detach the entire Kurdish population from their allegiance to Turkey and Persiaand to establish under his own authority a separate autonomous Principality.28

However, the most convincing evidence of Ubeydullahs nationalist aim comes froma letter that he himself wrote. In a letter to an American missionary named Cochran,Sayyid Ubeydullah states:

The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their religionis different [from that of others], and their laws and customs distinct. . . . We are also a nationapart. We want our affairs to be in our hands, so that in the punishment of our own offenderswe may be strong and independent, and have privileges like other nations. . . . This is our object[for the revolt]. . . . Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands,as they are unable to put up with these continual evil deeds and the oppression which theysuffer at the hands of the [Persian and Ottoman] governments.29

Researchers such as Arsak Safrastian and Wadie Jwaideh seem to be convinced thatSayyid Ubeydullah sought independence and hence was a nationalist.30 Relying onthis letter to demonstrate the secessionist fervor of Ubeydullah, Jwaideh states thatUbeydullahs statements certainly [leave] no doubt as to his strong nationalist senti-ment.31 However, primary sources contain confusing, if not contradictory, evidenceabout the nature of Ubeydullahs secessionist aim. A good example to show this con-fusion can be found in a British letter dated October 1880 written by Major HenryTrotter, the British consul general in Erzurum:

I believe the Sheikh to be more or less personally loyal to the Sultan; and he would be readyto submit to his authority and pay him tribute as long as he could get rid of the Ottomanofficials, and be looked at de lege as well as de facto the ruling Chief of Kurdistan.32

As demonstrated in this excerpt, primary sources do not consistently testify that Say-yid Ubeydullahs movement had well-defined political goals. Ubeydullah entertainedthe idea of an independent state, yet he was ready to settle for the recognition of hisauthority in Kurdistan within the Ottoman state. He wanted to be the ruler of a princi-pality similar to those of the earlier Kurdish emirates but greater in its territory tomatch his influence in the region. Ubeydullahs aim to rule an autonomous Kurdish

392 Hakan O zoglu

principality similar to that of Bedirhan is evident in an earlier British report (11 July1880) to Henry Trotter from Emilius Clayton, vice-consul of Van:The Sheikh [Ubeydullah] was going to send his son to Constantinople with the following pro-posal. He will point out the large sum paid to the Sultan by Beder Khan Bey, when semi-independent, and will offer to pay a still larger sum if his authority over Kurdistan is recog-nized, and his rule is not interfered with.33

Although Sayyid Ubeydullah wanted to be the ruler of greater Kurdistan, it seems veryunlikely that the participants in his revolt, who at one point included some NestorianChristians, were motivated by nationalist designs. This revolt can simply be seen asSayyid Ubeydullahs demand for greater control in the region. However, it undoubt-edly provided the Kurdish nationalist movements in the 20th century with a symbolfor a struggle against a dominant state and led scholars mistakenly to identify him asa nationalist.

The Ubeydullah revolt of 1880 was more like a trans-tribal revolt than a nationalone. With his religious appeal as a Naqshbandi shaykh, Sayyid Ubeydullahs authoritytranscended the tribal boundaries. Sayyid Ubeydullah, either directly or through hiskhalifas (deputies), spread his influence through a vast area where the Kurds weredivided by their tribal loyalties but united by their respect for Sayyid Ubeydullah.Therefore, when Sayyid Ubeydullah preached an uprising in 1880, he enjoyed remark-able support from the members of local tribes and was able to exercise political au-thority over a large territory that included formerly powerful Kurdish emirates (seeFigure 2).

Sayyid Abdulkadir (18511925)In later years, the Semdinan family contributed greatly to the Kurdish nationalistmovement. For example, Sayyid Ubeydullahs son Abdulkadir34 became the presidentof the SAK and represented the autonomist camp against the secessionist Bedirhanis.

Abdulkadir was born in the district of Semdinan in Hakkari in 1851.35 He waseducated in the Naqshbandi tradition in his hometown, under his fathers supervision.Interestingly, no entry exists about him in the Ottoman Sicill-i Ahval records, eventhough Abdulkadir later served the Ottoman state at the highest levels. However, fromhis education in the Naqshbandi order, it is likely that he spoke Turkish, Arabic, andPersian in addition to Kurdish. A letter written in French and signed by Abdulkadirto British authorities exists, so he may even have known a European language, thoughperhaps it was a translation.

Abdulkadir represented the autonomist faction of Kurdish leadership; hence, hisposition and activities in the SAK need close examination. After the suppression ofUbeydullahs revolt by the Ottoman state, Abdulkadir was sent into exile with hisfather to Medina in 1881. In 1905, Abdulkadir moved to Beirut. After the Young Turkrevolution of 1908, Enver Pasa asked for Abdulkadirs service in convincing the Kurd-ish tribes to accept the authority of the CUP regime. Meeting with Enver Pasa, Abdul-kadir agreed to send telegrams to the Kurdish tribes, persuading them to recognizethe CUP. It was in this period that Abdulkadir became a member of the CUP and wasallowed to come to Istanbul.36

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 393

Upon his arrival in Istanbul, Sayyid Abdulkadir became one of the founders of theKurd(istan) Teavun ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Kurdish Society for Mutual Cooperationand Progress) established on 2 October 1908. Influenced by the liberal atmosphere inthe Ottoman Empire following the Young Turk revolution, Abdulkadir and such otherKurdish notable families as the Babans and the Bedirhans formed this urban-basedcultural society. As paternalistic as it was, however, the society did not intend to reachthe rural areas or the common Kurds in Istanbul. It functioned for the most part as acultural club for the Kurdish nobility of Istanbul.37

Hzr Geylan, a grandson of Abdulkadir, states that Abdulkadir served in the revivedHamidiye Light Cavalry as a second lieutenant.38 Hence, the process in which Abdul-kadir was integrated into the Ottoman state began. In the following years, Abdulkadiremerged as an Ottoman bureaucrat and was appointed to the Ayan Council (Meclis-iAyan) by the Ferit Pasa cabinet of 1919 and became the chair of the Sura- Devlet, asubcommittee in the Ottoman Senatea very prestigious position indeed in the Otto-man bureaucracy.39 During and after the formation of the SAK, Abdulkadir kept hisposition in the Ottoman system and was involved in Ottoman politics.40 This participa-tion is noteworthy because it exemplifies undisputedly the close link between Kurdishleaders and the Ottoman state.

Abdulkadir derived his authority among the Kurds of Istanbul partly from his posi-tion in the Ottoman state and partly from his religious pedigree. Early in the 20thcentury, the Kurdish population of Istanbul, estimated at around 10,000, did not con-sist solely of the notables and their children as students; many were laborers. Due tohis religious appeal, Abdulkadir was particularly popular among the lower-class Kurd-ish workers in Istanbul. These workers were mainly porters who came to Istanbul toreplace the Armenian porter population.41 Secondary sources suggest that Abdulkadircommanded authority over these migrant laborers in Istanbul.42 This support of anuprooted Kurdish population in Istanbul also contributed to Abdulkadirs strengththere when it was challenged by the Bedirhani family.

In 1918, Abdulkadir assumed the presidency of the SAK despite Emin Ali Bedir-hans covert opposition (see the next section) and actively sought an autonomousKurdish state in which he could be the ruler. Like his father, Sayyid Ubeydullah,Abdulkadir entertained the idea of establishing an autonomous Kurdish state with thebacking of Britain. During the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, which resulted in theTreaty of Sevres, he tried to influence international opinion about the Kurdish ques-tion.43 In his memoirs, Kadri Cemil states that Abdulkadir and his friends visited therepresentatives of the American, French, and British governments in Istanbul in sup-port of the Kurdish cause. Because American policy particularly favored an indepen-dent Armenia at the expense of Kurdistan, the SAK did not find a sympathetic hear-ing. Only the British promised Abdulkadir recognition of Kurdish national rights.44The British view of Sayyid Abdulkadir can be followed in a 1920 memorandum byMr. Ryan, the British High Commissioner in Istanbul. The commissioner indicatedthat Abdulkadir had asked for British support to install him as the Kurdish ruler andmaintained:Abdul Kadir Effendi was offering . . . the collaboration of Kurds who claimed to be very dis-tinct from the Turks. . . . [However,] the religious motive weighs a great deal with him, and I

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think it is for that reason that he now favors autonomy under the Turkish flag, as he is probablyfaithful at heart to the Caliphate, though disloyal to the Sultanate.45

The excerpt is important, for it reveals Abdulkadirs autonomist tendencies but showsthat he was restrained by his religious concerns. In a report to Earl Curzon, the actinghigh commissioner in Constantinople and Ryans successor, Richard Webb clarifiesAbdulkadirs position:

In private conversations [Abdulkadir claimed that] what Kurdistan needs is administrative sepa-ration under British auspices, and that, if this were assured, independence from Turkey wouldnot be essential. If the British government met his wishes and gave him a leading position inthe kind of Kurdistan he advocates, he would be prepared at any moment they wish to declareindependence. Meanwhile, he does not wish to compromise himself unduly and he is undoubt-edly actuated a great deal by veneration for the Caliphate.46

It is clear from the report that Abdulkadir respected the office of the Caliphate, andthus he did not favor secession. To receive British support, however, Abdulkadir wascautious not to rule out complete independence entirely but wished to be set up as theruler of Kurdistan by Britain.

During this time a split occurred in the SAK between the secessionists and autono-mists. Sayyid Abdulkadir, pressured by the other members of the Ottoman Senate,gave an interview to the newspaper Ikdam on 27 February 1920. In the interview, hedenied accusations that he wanted to secede from the Ottoman Empire and establishan independent Kurdistan, but he stated that today Kurds are residing in five or sixprovinces (vilayet); [we want] the [Turkish] government to give autonomy to theseprovinces. Let us elect our own administrators, but Turks can take part in this autono-mous administration.47

Such a bold statement against independence triggered the Bedirhani faction to takea position against the autonomists as they identified themselves as secessionists. EminAli Bedirhan dismissed Abdulkadir from the presidency and expelled him from theSAK; in response, however, Abdulkadir dissolved the SAK and called for re-elec-tion.48 A British report indicates the victory of Abdulkadir:

The elections for a new committee of the Club [the SAK] ended in a complete victory for SeidAbdul-Kadir, as was to be expected from the fact that he has the support of the bulk of theKurds of the working class in Constantinople.49

Soon after Abdulkadirs victory, Emin Ali Bedirhan and the secessionist group splitfrom the SAK. This split very much hindered the political activities of the SAK. Inthe following five years (192025), Abdulkadir watched closely the emergence of thenew Turkey and at one point offered his help to the British to destroy the Kemalistmovement. This was also the period in which both factions began to oppose Kemal-ists. In a memorandum, British High Commissioner Ryan states, Abdul Kadirs doc-trine some months ago was that the Kurds could be used to destroy the Kemalists andto bar Bolshevik progress.50 Abdulkadir was not happy with the emergence of Kema-list power against the Istanbul government. This excerpt is extremely significant inthat it reveals the hostile attitude of Abdulkadir toward the Kemalists, for they threat-ened the possibility of a Kurdish state and Abdulkadirs leadership. Compared withthe Istanbul government, the Kemalists in Anatolia were intolerant of Kurdish auton-

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 395

omy and were bitterly hostile toward Kurdish secession. Aware of the slim chance ofa Kurdish state under a Kemalist regime, Abdulkadir apparently offered his help toBritain to destroy the Kemalist movement in Anatolia.

Correspondingly, the Kemalists were not happy with the religious authority Abdul-kadir represented and were undoubtedly aware of Abdulkadirs hostile feelings towardthem. The right time for revenge arrived in 1925, when the new Republican govern-ment suppressed a Kurdish revolt in Kurdistan. This revolt, known as the Shaykh SaidRevolt, created the first major internal challenge to the new Turkey. Said, a Naqsh-bandi shaykh, revolted against the Kemalist regime in the Bingol region, requestingthe restoration of the sharia (Islamic law), and to this end he established contact withAbdulkadir in Istanbul. The Ankara government took the revolt very seriously fromthe beginning on 8 February 1925 and deployed its military forces in the region.Although Shaykh Saids militia was successful in capturing several towns near Diyar-bakr, the government forces were able to recapture the towns and Shaykh Said him-self on 15 April 1925. After the suppression of the Shaykh Said Revolt in the follow-ing months, Shaykh Said was tried and hanged on 29 June 1925. The new TurkishRepublic also tried Sayyid Abdulkadir in the Diyarbakr Independence Tribunal forhis alleged connection to the revolt, which gave the Kemalist government a chance toget rid of Abdulkadir, who was proved to be an anti-Kemalist. Abdulkadir, along withhis son Mehmet, was found guilty of treason and condemned to death by the Indepen-dence Tribunals on 27 May 1925, even before Shaykh Said. The other son, Abdullah,managed to escape to Iran. The execution of Abdulkadir can readily be seen as therevenge of the Kemalists against an influential Naqshbandi shaykh who collaboratedwith the British against Mustafa Kemal. In the following period, none of the survivingmembers of the family took part in the Kurdish nationalist organizations in Turkey.

The Semdinan family represented the autonomist strain of Kurdish nationalism.Sayyid Abdulkadir personified their attitudes. He was typical of most religiously ori-ented Kurdish political leaders in that he stopped short of advocating secession oroutright independencethe position of his most significant rivals, the Bedirhani fam-ily. Yet Abdulkadir typified Kurdish nationalist leaders of all factions in two importantrespects. First, he actively began working for Kurdish autonomy only when the Otto-man Empire was near collapse. Second, he opposed KemalistTurkish nationalistsbecause they advocated a unitary Turkish national state and consequently demandedthe integration or subordination of the Kurds and other ethnic minorities.51

T H E B E D I R H A N I FA M I LY

The major rival of the Semdinan family for Kurdish leadership was the Bedirhanifamily (Figure 3). This family alleges decent from the Umayyad General Khalid ibnWalid.52 Serefhan, a 16th-century Kurdish ruler, claims in his book Serefname, thefirst book on Kurdish history, that the forefathers of the Bedirhani family practicedthe Yezidi religion before Islam.53 The family belongs to the Azizan or Azizibranch of the Botan emirate in Cezire (Cizre) and was highly regarded by Serefhan,who himself belonged to this family.54

Without a doubt, the most important member of the family was Bedirhan Pasa(1802/31869/70), who became the ruler of the Botan emirate in 183555 and ruled this

396 Hakan O zoglu

FIGURE 3. The Bedirhan family, based on a document in B. A., Irade Dahiliye, 1286/41717. See also Lutfi, Emir Bedirhan (Cairo: Matbaa-i Ictihad). For moreinformation about the members of this family, see Malmisanj, Czira Bo-tanl Bedirhaniler ve Bedirhan Ailesi Derneginin Tutanaklar (Sweden:APEC, 1994). Names in bold indicate membership in the SAK.

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 397

strong emirate for the next twelve years. Bedirhan carried an Ottoman title, mutesellim(tax collector), suggesting that he was a part of the Ottoman administration. It appearsthat Bedirhans authority surpassed in many ways the authority of the Ottoman gover-nors in the region. This, however, does not mean that the Ottoman state did not haveany control over the emirate. Available evidence suggests that the Ottoman Empirewas in fact responsible for installing Bedirhan in power. Two American missionaries,Wright and Breath, spent four weeks at the court of Bedirhan and observed in Novem-ber 1846 that:

[Bedirhan] told us that eight years ago, when he was weak and Turkey strong, he entered intoan engagement with the latter; and that now, though the power changed hands, he did notviolate his word. . . . He is an uncommon man. Eight years ago he was poor, without power,and little known. The Turkish government then took him by the hand; and now his wealth isincalculable.56

It is possible, as the missionary report suggests, that Bedirhan received aid from theOttoman state to maintain himself as the ruler of the Botan emirate. In 1838, the yearthat the missionaries were referring to, there seems to have been an internal powerstruggle in the Botan emirate. We know that in 1838 the Ottoman state deployed somemilitary forces to Cizre in Botan against local disturbances. We also know that Bedir-han aided the Ottoman forces in stabilizing the region.57 Contrary to the general beliefthat Ottoman authority in the region was nominal at best in the 18th and early 19thcenturies, this report indicates that the Ottoman Empire was powerful enough to influ-ence the internal politics of the emirate at least in the early 19th century.

A loyal subject until 1842, Bedirhan seemed very agitated with the new Ottomanadministrative policies in the following five years and revolted against the Ottomanstate in the summer of 1847.58 This revolt, provoked by the centralization policies ofthe Ottoman state in the Tanzimat Period,59 caused so much chaos in the region thatupon its suppression on 29 July 1847, a new medal, the Medal of Kurdistan, wasissued to those who had fought against Bedirhan.60 Bedirhan was arrested and sent toIstanbul with his large family two weeks after his capture.61

Kurdish nationalists claim that Bedirhans revolt was a nationalist uprising.62 How-ever, an argument can be made against this claim. Nazmi Sevgen, in a study on theBedirhan family, cites several Ottoman documents to demonstrate that this revolt wasnot nationalist in orientation. The Ottoman archives indicate that Bedirhans primaryreason for the revolt did not stem from a nationalistic purpose in any real sense ofthe term, but from a new administrative system enforced by the Ottomans that aimedat dividing Bedirhans land. According to the new system, as Botan, the general nameof the emirates core territory, remained in Diyarbakr Province, Cizre, a sub-district,was attached to Mosul, whose governor, Mehmed Pasa, was at odds with Bedirhan.A letter dated 10 December 1842 from the governor of Diyarbakr, Vecihi Pasa, toBedirhan demonstrates this arrangement:

We have heard that there exists disharmony and quarrelsomeness between you and the governorof Mosul, Mehmet Pasa, stemming from the attachment of Cizre district to Mosul, and that youare in anxiety [vesvese]. . . . As long as you serve and stay loyal to the Ottoman state, MehmetPasa cannot do you harm. The matter was written to Istanbul and to the governor of Mosul,Mehmet Pasa. Hence, you should refrain from such anxiety.63

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As this document indicates, Bedirhan was agitated by the attempt to divide his emirateadministratively. Similar pieces of correspondence in the Ottoman archives conclu-sively demonstrate that Bedirhan revolted to keep his emirate administratively intact.64Hence, sufficient data do not exist to support the assertion that Bedirhan was a Kurd-ish nationalist; rather, Ottoman sources suggest that he was a notable who just wishedto protect his own interests against the increasing Ottoman centralization. Bedirhansdisagreement with the Ottoman state arose due to new Ottoman administrative policiesreconfiguring the Botan emirate, which aimed to generate more income for the state.Prior to 1847, Bedirhan seems to have been loyal to Ottoman interests and helpedlocal governors to govern the Kurdish land. For this, he was a well-known and re-spected figure in the Ottoman provincial administrative structure.

Therefore, it should not be very surprising that even after his revolt was suppressed,Bedirhan was not condemned to death but placed on the Ottoman payroll.65 Immedi-ately after the revolt, Bedirhan was sent to Istanbul, arriving on 12 September 1847,66and then to Crete with his two brothers and three children, the oldest of whom (Hamit)was eleven in 1848.67 In Crete, Bedirhan remained ten years and was instrumental inarbitrating local disputes between the Christians and Muslims on behalf of the centralgovernment. For his service, upon his return to Istanbul in 1858, Bedirhan wasawarded with the title pasa at the rank of mirimiran68. After seven years in Istanbul,Bedirhan Pasa moved to Damascus, Syria, and when he died there in 186970, hehad twenty-one daughters and twenty-one sons.69 How many of them were with Bedir-han in Damascus when he died is not known, but we do know that some of his olderchildren were already working in Istanbul.70

Although Bedirhans sons were critical of Sultan Abdulhamid,71 most of them wereemployed by the state during his reign (18761909) and afterward. Seven of themcarried the title pasa. Some of his sons became governors of Ottoman sancaks (muta-sarrf), public prosecutors, and judges.72 At the turn of the century, the family carriedall traits of the Ottoman elitethey were members of the Ottoman bureaucracy andinvolved in new political formations in the empire. After the Young Turk revolutionof 1908, the family participated in the formation of several Kurdish cultural societies,such as the Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress of 1908 (Kurt Teavun veTerakki Cemiyeti) and Kurdish Hope of 1912 (Hevi). These Kurdish societies operatedlegally and promoted Kurdish identity among the Kurdish student population of Istan-bul. In addition, in 1898, two of Bedirhans children, Mikdad Midhat and later Abdur-rahman, published a KurdishTurkish newspaper, Kurdistan, in Istanbul, Cairo, and,later, England.73 This was the first newspaper published in the Kurdish (Kurmanc)language. Although the major theme in the newspaper was not to promote Kurdishnationalism but to criticize the regime of Sultan Abdulhamid II, it made the Kurdsmore visible in the Ottoman intellectual life.

Emin Ali Bedirhan (18511926)Although Bedirhan Pasa should not be seen as a nationalist figure in Kurdish history,some of his children and grandchildren played very significant roles in the develop-ment of Kurdish nationalism. Many children of Bedirhan Pasa played active roles in

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 399

the Kurdish cultural organizations mentioned earlier, which provided the future Kurdishnationalists with the organizational structure. In the wake of World War I, when Kurdishnationalism emerged as a political movement, Emin Ali, one of the elder children ofBedirhan, and his children became ardent advocates of Kurdish independence.

Emin Ali Bedirhan was undoubtedly the most devoted and well-known exponentof Kurdish nationalism. Emin Ali (a.k.a. Mehmet Emin) was born in Crete and wasone of the twenty-one sons of Bedirhan Pasa.74 Of Bedirhan Pasas children, Emin Alidistinguished himself as one of the better educated. Literate in at least Turkish, Arabic,Kurdish (Kurmanc), and French, Emin Ali studied law and became a public prosecu-tor in the Ottoman judicial system. As an Ottoman civil servant, Emin Ali served theOttoman state as a public prosecutor, a judicial inspector, and a judge in Adana,Selanik, Ankara, and Konya.75 In 1906, when his cousin Abdurrezzak76 (Abdulhamidsformer head court chamberlain, or Basmabeynci) and his brother Ali Samil (the mili-tary governor of U skudar) became involved in the killing of Rdvan Pasa, the mayorof Istanbul who seemed to have close contact with the palace, Emin Ali was sent intoexile in June 1906 with other members of his family by Sultan Abdulhamid II.77Nazmi Sevgen states, based on research in the Ottoman archives, that Sultan Abdul-hamid II paid very careful attention to the killing of Rdvan Pasa, suspecting that thiswould be a sign of a plot against him.78 Although this claim was not substantiated,the Bedirhanis remained exiled until the CUP takeover. Subsequently, Emin Ali, afterhis exile to Isparta and Akka in 1906, was allowed to return to Istanbul.79

In 1908, Emin Ali became a founding member of what may have been the firstKurdish organization, the Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress.80 This orga-nization was a cultural club for the Kurdish nobility in Istanbul, which was aimed atenhancing Kurdish culture and helping needy Kurds. The organization did not pursueany political agenda and disintegrated before or during World War I. It was typical ofthe early phases of nationalism in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, where theformation of cultural societies usually preceded the organization of political or overtlynationalist groups.

In 1918, Emin Ali joined Sayyid Abdulkadir in forming the SAK and became vice-president of the society. However, when Abdulkadir identified himself as an autonomist,Emin Ali deposed Abdulkadir from the presidency of the SAK and expelled him. Inreturn, Abdulkadir dissolved the central committee of the SAK and announced that newelections would be held.81 The new elections, as mentioned earlier, resulted in Abdul-kadirs complete victory and consequently in the breakup of the SAK.82 Upset with theresult, Emin Ali formed another organization, the Kurt Teskilat- Ictimaiye Cemiyeti(Society for the Kurdish Social Organization), in 1920.83 In contrast to Abdulkadirsposition advocating autonomy, this society promoted complete independence.

Although it seems at first glance that this split was a result solely of ideologicaldifferences, primary sources suggest that pre-existing rivalry between the Semdinan andthe Bedirhan families was a major contributor to this split. British sources observe:

The organizers of [the Society for the Kurdish Social Organization] profess to have joined issuewith Seid Abdul-Kadir on a question of principle, namely, the question of independence versusautonomy. In reality personal rivalry counts for a great deal on both sides.84

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Supporting evidence for this view comes from Kadri Cemil, a member of the SAK.In his memoirs, Kadri Cemil mentions the family feud between the Bedirhanis andthe Semdinans in Kurdish organizations prior to the SAK. For example, Kadri Cemilargues that the formation of Kurdish organizations stemmed from personal and fac-tional interests:

During the time of chaos that the Ottoman Empire was facing [in the early 20th century]when the Ottoman state was not able to sustain them properly, Kurdish pasas and notables[umera] who belonged to and were paid by the Ottoman systempanicked, and saw the pro-motion of Kurdish nationalism as the only remedy. These people, who carried with them theirpersonal conflicts [emphasis added], formed the Kurt Teavun ve Terakki in 1908. Unfortu-nately, this organization did not last long, for its members had personal enmities.85

Kadri Cemil sees the same weakness persisting in the SAK and claims that pre-exist-ing enmities were the reason for the split of the SAK.86 The very same point is ob-served by Ismail Goldas, a Kurdish researcher, when he states that the existing hostil-ity of the families . . . reflected itself, willingly or not, in their contradictory politicalbehavior. . . . They were not able to go beyond this feudal conflict and to establish ademocratically based Kurdish national consciousness.87

It seems very likely that the family feud between the Bedirhani and the Semdinanfamilies originated in the second half of the 19th century, when Ubeydullah, the fatherof Abdulkadir, extended his influence over the areas formerly controlled by the Bedir-hanis. As discussed earlier, we do not know whether the Semdinans owned any Bedir-hani land as their private estates; we do know, however, that in the 1870s and 80s,the Semdinans had great influence over the area that was formerly controlled by theBedirhanis (see Figure 2).88 This appears to be a reason for the origin of the conflictbetween these families, which resulted in the competition for the rulership of Kurdis-tan. Primary sources clearly indicate that Abdulkadir and Emin Ali fiercely competedfor the Kurdish leadership.

Until the end of his life, Emin Ali was active in Kurdish affairs. However, evenduring his Kurdish nationalist days, he maintained his Ottoman identity and partici-pated in politics in the Ottoman Empire. For example, in 1920 Emin Ali was in theOttoman political system; he joined Ottoman political parties, such as the decentralistAhrar Frkas (Party of the Free, est. 1908) and later the Hurriyet ve Itilaf Frkas(Freedom and Harmony Party, est. 1911, reopened 1919), both of which were knownfor their opposition to the CUP.89 As a bureaucrat, Emin Ali took part in the Ottomanjudicial system in different capacities. Furthermore, an interesting note in the diary ofCeladet, a son of Emin Ali, suggests that until 1923, Emin Ali was on the Ottomanpayroll. In his entry dated 5 May 1923, Celadet notes that My fathers [retirement]salary is cut; national government [the Ankara government] has passed a bill stoppingthe payments of the retirees living abroad.90 Therefore, it is a mistake to think thatEmin Ali withdrew from the Ottoman administrative and political system to conducthis secessionist activities until the creation of Turkish Republic. On the contrary, EminAlis livelihood depended very much on the Ottoman state.

Emin Alis secessionist activities originated at the end of World War I, after whichthe Ottoman state disintegrated. It was only then that Emin Ali challenged Abdulkad-irs autonomist view and pursued a secessionist agenda, hoping to establish an inde-

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 401

pendent Kurdistan. It is very likely that Emin Ali saw complete independence fromthe Ottoman Empire as the only way to regain and recover his familys territory,wealth, and legacy.

Although Emin Alis position in terms of the nature of a Kurdish state differedfrom that of Abdulkadir, they were united against the Kemalists, who, Abdulkadir andEmin Ali thought, constituted a great danger for their nationalist aspirations. Clearly,the Kurdish leaders were aware that the Kemalists fully intended to implement thefirst article of the National pact (Misak- Milli), which rejected the separation of anyterritory where the majority were Muslims.91 The boundaries of the Turkish stateconflicted with that of Kurdistan as promoted by the SAK. In other words, bothleaders were aware that Turkish nationalism would not give any chance to Kurdishnationalism, which aimed at creating a Kurdish state in Anatolia. Seen from this angle,it is understandable that Emin Ali, like his rival Abdulkadir, was an ardent opponentof the Kemalist movement. In the post-World War I period, Emin Ali, convinced ofthe Ottoman Empires collapse, offered collaboration to Greece against the emergingKemalists. In a letter to Earl Curzon, Sir H. Rumbold, the British high commissionerin Istanbul, documents this assertion. The letter indicates that Emin Ali contacted theGreek representatives in 1921.I have the honour to state that on the 25th instant Emin Ali Bey, the head of the Bedrhanfamily, called on Mr. Ryan, accompanied by his son Jeladet Bey, who is one of the more activepromoters of Kurdish national movement. Emin Ali Bey said that, in view of the present situa-tion, he and his friends had come into touch with the Greek representative here, who hadlistened favourably to the suggestion of a Kurdish movement against the Kemalists, which,without any formal co-operation, would promote the interests of both Greece and Kurdishnationalists.92

This document reveals the extremes to which the Bedirhanis were willing to go tochallenge the establishment of the Kemalist state, the extremes that even conflictedwith the Islamic Kurdish background.93

It was probably before the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 that EminAli left Turkey for Egypt, where he died in 1926. After Emin Alis death, his chil-drenparticularly, Sureyya, Celadet, and Kamranbecame very prominent spokes-people for Kurdish nationalism. Sureyya spent most of his time in Syria and Cairoafter World War I, published newspapers, and became heavily involved in Kurdishnationalist activities; however, primary sources do not mention Sureyya as a memberof the SAK.

Celadet Ali and Kamran Ali BedirhanThe other two sons of Emin Ali became involved in SAK activities with their father.94They were both educated in Europe. Celadet, Emin Alis second-oldest son, was bornin Kayseri and lived most of his life in France, Germany, and Syria. He held a mastersdegree in law from Istanbul University and completed his studies in Munich.95 Priorto his activities as a Kurdish nationalist, Celadet was conscripted during World WarI.96 He served faithfully in the Ottoman army as an officer and, like other Kurdishnationalists, Celadet turned against Turkey after the war. In the following period,Celadet became an ardent anti-Kemalist, for he believed that the new Turkish regime

402 Hakan O zoglu

would not allow an independent Kurdistan. It is well documented that he and hisyounger brother Kamuran accompanied Major Noel, a British intelligence officerwhose main assignment was to assess the possibility of the creation of Kurdistan, inhis travels in Kurdistan during 1919. Major Noel was as pro-Kurdish as he was anti-Kemalist. Aware of the Bedirhanis activities, Mustafa Kemal, in his famous Speech,correctly accuses Celadet and his brother Kamuran of opposing the Kemalist move-ment in Anatolia.97 It was, then, not a surprise that Celadet had left Turkey for Egyptin 1923 when the Kemalists declared the new republic.98

In 1927, Celadet was in Syria and became the first elected president of the Hoybun,a Kurdish nationalist organization that was formed in Syria.99 The Hoybun activelysupported the Kurdish revolts in Turkey during the 1930s.100 However, these revoltsdid not succeed; on the contrary, as a result, Turkey responded very aggressively toany Kurdish movement in Turkey. Kadri Cemil Pasa, another Kurdish nationalist andthe contemporary of Celadet, claims that Celadet Bedirhan always entertained the ideaof being the king of an independent Kurdistan. Celadet Bedirhan had a desire to restorethe Botan emirate, Kadri Cemil states, and himself as the ruler; he even wished to bethe king of Kurdistan.101 Clearly, Celadet was one of the most ambitious grandchildrenof Bedirhan pasa and a very passionate supporter of Kurdish independence.

Celadets devotion to Kurdish nationalism is even reflected in his family life. Hiswife Rusen, a Bedirhani herself,102 also took part in Kurdish nationalist activities dur-ing the Turkish Republican period in Syria.103 Rusen continued to be a supporter ofKurdish nationalism even after Celadets death in a 1951 traffic accident in Damascus.Celadet and Rusen had two children, Cemsit and Sinemhan. As another member ofthe European educated notable class, Celadet spoke Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish, Ger-man, French, and possibly Greek.104 Like the other members of the Bedirhani family,he contributed to the Kurdish intellectual life by publishing a journal, the Hawar, inKurdish and French, in addition to Rohani and Roja Nu (with his brother Kamuran).He was also credited with producing Latin characters for the Kurmanci dialect ofKurdish.

Kamran Ali (18951978), another son of Emin Ali, was probably the most recog-nized member of the Bedirhani family in Europe. Kamran Ali received his degree inlaw from Istanbul University. He was an active member of the SAK and an ardentanti-Kemalist. At exactly what point he left Turkey is unclear, but he was in Syriahelping his brother Celadet in Hoybun and publishing the Kurdish journal Hawar after1923. From 1943 to 1946, Kamuran published another journal, Roja Nu (in Kurmanciand French), in Beirut. Kamuran spent his later years in Germany and France. In 1948he moved to Paris and became a faculty member in the Institute of Oriental Languages(INELCO). After the revolt of the Iraqi Kurds in the 1960s, Kamran became thespokesperson for the Iraqi Kurdish movement in Europe. He presented the Kurdishmovement to the United Nations. After Kamrans death in 1978, the Kurdish Instituteof Paris recorded his name as the honorary founder.105 From Paris, Kamran was alsoinvolved in the Kurdish movements in Turkey and sponsored several Kurdish studentsin France.106 He was married to a Polish princess and did not have any children. TheBedirhani family had several other members of the SAK. Due to their relatively pas-sive role in the organization, I will not discuss them here.107

Representing the traditional landed and urban notable class, the Bedirhanis assumed

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 403

leadership in the secessionist branch of Kurdish nationalism. Clearly, a great numberof Bedirhanis received non-religious education and participated in the SAK, and themost active nationalists were educated in Europe. A majority of Bedirhans sons andgrandsons were the members of the Ottoman elite. Some of them went as high as tocarry the title pasa, one of the highest ranks in the Ottoman state. Children of Bedir-han committed themselves to Kurdish nationalism only after the World War I, whenthe Ottoman Empire ceased to exist. Adopting nationalist rhetoric, which seemed tobe the most attractive and legitimate ideology of the time, this family wanted to ruleKurdistan.

As indicated earlier, some of the Bedirhanis were exiled in 1906 from Istanbul toother parts of the empire, but after 1908 they reobtained their governmental posts asadministrators and military officers. After the establishment of the Turkish regime,however, most of the Bedirhanis remained silent, and their children seem to have beenintegrated into and served the republican government in different capacities. However,Emin Ali and his three sons Celadet, Sureyya, and Kamuran did not return to Turkeyafter 1923, for they were condemned to death by the republican regime. They stayedabroad and fought against Turkey and for Kurdish independence in the internationalarena.

C O N C L U S I O N

The role of notables in nationalist movements has been a subject of much scholarlyattention because it reveals significant clues about the social and political structure ofMiddle Eastern nationalism. An examination of this role in the case of the Kurds hasbeen the principal aim of this study. Because Houranis notable paradigm has providedthe field of Middle Eastern studies with a prominent theoretical framework about thestructure, function, and politics of notables, this study has begun by analyzing thevalidity of Houranis proposition in the context of the Kurds. Exploring the social andfamilial background of two significant Kurdish families, this research has determinedthat, as is true of early Arab nationalism, Kurdish notables, or ayan, were the catalystfor social and political change among the Kurds and played a major role in the emer-gence and subsequent development of Kurdish nationalism. However, this study hasalso argued that Kurdish notables did not constitute a harmonious group; on the con-trary, Kurdish nationalism was fractured by the long-standing disputes of notable fami-lies and limited by the Islamic concerns of the Naqshbandi shaykhs.

In addition, this research has revealed the Kurdish attitude toward the Istanbul(Ottoman) and Ankara (Kemalist) governments. Kurdish nationalist leaders were di-vided by their adherence to divergent visions of the political future of Kurdistan;however, they were united in their hostility against the rising Turkish state. The Kurdswere comfortable with and experienced in interacting or negotiating with the Ottomangovernment, for many of them occupied significant posts in it. However, they werequite suspicious of the Kemalists. Emin Ali Bedirhan and Abdulkadir of Semdinanopposed the new Turkish regime, which threatened their authority as Kurdish leadersand their hopes for a Kurdish state. They both offered their service to Britain indestroying the Kemalist movement in Anatolia. Kurdish leaders saw the Kemalistregime as the continuation of the CUP, which imposed Turkish nationalism on them.

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They were undoubtedly aware of the formulation of the new Turkish nationalism,theorized by, among others, Ziya Gokalp, himself a Kurd from Diyarbakr. They werealso aware of the inevitable conflict caused by two competing nationalisms in oneterritory, for they had had a similar experience earlier with Armenian nationalism.Kurdish leaders feared that Turkish nationalists were determined to crush Kurdishnationalism and international help for the fragile Kurdish nationalism would nevermaterialize. It is noteworthy that the conflict caused by the two competing national-isms in one territory laid the very foundations of the modern Kurdish problem inthe Middle East and, particularly, in Turkey. Such a conflict is definitely not uniqueto Anatolia. A similar collision can readily be observed in the dynamics of the Pales-tinianIsraeli conflict, in which two nationalisms compete for the same territory.

This study has also contributed to the ongoing debates on the origin of nationalistmovements in the Middle East. Scholars of Arab nationalism have engaged in livelydebates on the issue, and there seems to be a consensus that Arab nationalism is amore recent political phenomenon than was previously thought. Establishing an accu-rate time frame for the emergence of Kurdish nationalism is also important, for itallows us to make more precise observations and reliable comparisons in understand-ing the dynamics of Middle Eastern nationalisms. In accordance with this goal, thepresent study has concluded that Kurdish nationalism emerged as a full-fledged politi-cal movement only after World War I, when political loyalties were defined largelyin terms of homogeneous nation-states. Prior to World War I, none of the Kurdishnotablescertainly not the Bedirhan and Semdinan familieswere nationalists. Onlywhen the Ottoman state began to collapse did Kurdish notables begin to articulate anationalist ideology as a way to legitimize the perpetual desire for self-rule in Ana-tolia. Therefore, this study has concluded that Kurdish nationalism was not a causebut, rather, a result of the Ottoman Empires disintegration.

As demonstrated in the study, the Kurds, Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire,were the last group to put forward nationalist claims. Arabs were successful in realiz-ing their dream of self-government, which resulted in the establishment of many Arabnation-states particularly after World War II. Like other multi-ethnic empires, such asAustro-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire suffered greatly from the rise of nationalistmovements in the era preceding the Great War. Christian subjects of the empire weresuccessful in creating national consciousness, in receiving Western assistance, and ingaining independence. Since Christian groups, such as Greeks, Serbs, and Romanians,constituted different millets in the empire, their separation came relatively more easily,at least in the ideological sense. This was not the case for the Kurds, whose leaderswere of tribal and Sufi origin and were the members of the Ottoman elite. Kurdishnationalism did not and could not demand the termination of the pre-existing loyaltiesin favor of a national one; instead, Kurdish nationalist leaders utilized the pre-existingties to mobilize Kurdish people. However, by doing so Kurdish nationalism becamesusceptible to pre-existing rivalries. Compared with Arab nationalism, the emergenceof Kurdish nationalism as a political movement was belated, although the Kurds wentthrough a similar process of cultural renaissance, particularly early in the 20th century.One of the reasons for this delay was that until the end of World War I, Kurdishleaders who were also members of the Ottoman bureaucracy still had hopes of reviv-ing the Ottoman state. Obviously, the impact of this delay on the success of Kurdish

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 405

demands requires more research, but it stands out as a major distinction between Araband Kurdish nationalism.

Another significant point for comparison is the distinction between the leadershipof these two Muslim groups. While most Arab leaders resided in Arab lands, theKurds had limited access to Kurdistan and to the local population. Some Kurdishleadersfor example, most of the Bedirhanswere born and raised outside Kurdis-tan. Their access to the area was restricted and closely monitored by the state. Finally,one can assert that, unlike Arab nationalism, Kurdish nationalism did not receivemuch international support. Great Britain was not convinced that Kurdish nationalismin the long run would help British interests in the region.

To conclude, I suggest that we will have a better understanding of Kurdish national-ism when we take into consideration its relationship with the Ottoman Empire, for itwas born out of the political and intellectual environment in the late Ottoman era.Therefore, students of Kurdish nationalism should pay appropriate attention to theinteraction between Kurdish nationalism and the Ottoman state. On the other hand,because the Kurds greatly contributed to the social, economic, and political life of theOttoman Empire and later Turkey, I believe we can no longer afford to ignore thesubject matter in Turkish studies and Middle Eastern history.

N O T E S

Authors note: I express my profound gratitude to Professor Stephen Dale for his guidance and encour-agement throughout this research. I am also grateful to the ARIT Fellowship for financial support.

1Palestinian nationalism is, of course, an exception to this claim, for it has yet not been successful informing a Palestinian state.

2See Robert Olson, Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Revolt (Austin: Universityof Texas Press, 1989, 1991); Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and PoliticalStructures of Kurdistan (London: Zed, 1992). Olsons praiseworthy study is based exclusively on Britisharchives and can also be criticized for this reason. The present work revises Olsons argument about theorigin of Kurdish nationalism. Bruinessens book is based on his fieldwork in Iran and Turkey in the 1970sand contains very valuable anthropological information on Kurdish tribes and Sufi brotherhoods. However,his references to Kurdish nationalism are of secondary importance to the reader, for the book does not dealwith nationalism directly. Although they lack the depth of analysis that Olson and Bruinessen enjoy, otherinformative studies are available on the Kurds, such as D. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds(London: I. B. Taurus, 1999); K. Kirisci and G. Winrow, Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of aTrans-State Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Lale Yalcin-Heckmann, Tribe and Kinship amongthe Kurds (Frankfurt and New York: P. Lang, 1991). None of these works deals directly with the composi-tion of early Kurdish leadership that the present work intends to explore.

3Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd. ed., s.v. Ayan (H. Bowen). Meclis-i Ayan was first established in 1876in Istanbul and, along with Meclis-i Mebusan, was suspended from 1878 to 1908. It was after 1908 thatthe Ottoman Parliament became a forum for notables to insert their influence into the government.

4Albert Hourani, Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables, in The Emergence of the ModernMiddle East (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 3666.

5The governor would always request assistance from the central government if he needed it to controlhis region.

6Here, however, the reader should be warned against seeing Arab nationalism as a single movement.Corresponding to the different political and intellectual environments of the area, Arab nationalism showsdifferent characteristics in terms of ideology, leadership, and motivations. Hence, regional variations ofArab nationalism should be taken into account. However, it seems clear that Arab notables assumed bigresponsibilities in all regions in the process of nationalisms growth.

406 Hakan O zoglu7Philip Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 18801920 (New

York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 7, 96.8Mary C. Wilson, The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism, in The Origins of Arab

Nationalism, ed. Rishad Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 204.9See Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 331.

10Previous generations of historians put the origin of Arab nationalism much earlier; see George Anto-nius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, 3rd ed. (London: Kegan Paul, 2000).

11Rashid Khalidi, Ottomanist and Arabism in Syria before 1914: A Reassessment, in The Origins ofArab Nationalism, 51.

12Ernest Dawn, Origins of Arab Nationalism, in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, 331.13William Cleveland, Islam against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Arab Nationalism

(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 24.14There is a growing body of literature on the theories of nationalism, but I do not intend to review

those works here. For an extensive review, see Ronald Suny and Geoff Eley, Becoming National: A Reader(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Needless to say, the theoretical foundation of this study ismodernist and agrees with the assumption that nationalism is a modern phenomenon. This argument wasstated forcefully in Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism (London, New York: Verso, 1991); Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York Univer-sity Press, 1997).

15Starting with the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the Kurds, like other members of the Ottomansociety, established several organizations, such as Kurt Terakki ve Teavun Cemiyeti (the Society for Kurd-ish Progress and Cooperation of 1908). See Tark Zafer Tunaya, Turkiyede Siyasi Partiler, vol. 1 (Istanbul:Hurriyet Vakf, 1984). Although claims exist, we do not have any data to support the claim that a Kurdishorganization was established in 1900.

16For example, in his memoirs, Kadri Cemil (Znar Silopi) gives the following list: president, SayyidAbdulkadir; vice-presidents, Emin Ali Bedirhan and Fuad Pasa; secretary-general, Hamdi Pasa; accountant,Sayyid Abdullah; founding members, Halil Bey, Mehmet Ali Bedirhani, Mehmet Emin, Ali Efendi, ShaykhSefik, Sukru Babanzade, Fuat Babanzade, Fetullah Efendi, Dr. Mehmet Sukru Sekban: Doza Kurdistan(Ankara: O zge, 1991), 5657. Ismail Goldas cites 167 names in Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti (Istanbul: Doz,1991), 3045.

17See Olson, Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism.18Consul-General Abbott to Mr. Thomson, 15 July 1880, in Parliamentary Papers (Turkey, 1881) 5:9.19Melik Frat, a grandson of the famous Naqshbandi Shaykh Said, also confirmed that the Semdinan

family owned considerable land in Kurdistan: personal interview with Melik Frat, fall 1996, in his resi-dence in Yalova.

20Although ardently Sunni in orientation, most of the Naqshbandi families, including the Semdinans,did not see a contradiction in including Fatima in their genealogy, although Fatima is seen as a majorfigure in Shii Islam. Bruinessen, Agha, 217, traces the Qadiri origin back to Muhammad through Ali;however, the family tree of the Semdinan family (Figure 1) uses Fatima as the link to the Prophet.

21For example, British Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence Respecting Kurdish Invasion of Persia,1881, paper no. C.2851, vol. C.361; microfiche no. 87.873-874; the same document was published inParliamentary Papers, 5:182.

22Parliamentary Papers, 5:182; see also Wadie Jawaideh, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: ItsOrigin and Development (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1960), 214.

23Full text of the Treaty of Berlin can be found in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and MiddleEast: A Documentary Record: 15351914 1 (Princeton, N.J.: D. van Nostrand, 1956), 1:18991.

24Vice-Counsel Clayton to Major Trotter, Baskale, 11 July 1880, in Parliamentary Papers, 5:7.25Jwaideh, Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 231.26Clayton to Trotter, 27 November 1880, in Parliamentary Papers, 5:74. See also Clayton to Trotter, 2

November 1880, in ibid., 5:54: The Sheikh tried very hard to get the Christian to join him. . . . Some 400or 500 Nestorians accordingly joined his force.

27See Olson, Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, and Jwaideh, Kurdish Nationalist Movement.28Ronald Thomson to Earl Granville, Tehran, 31 October 1881, in Parliamentary Papers, 5:45.29Ubeydullah to Dr. Cochran, 5 October 1880, in Parliamentary Papers, 5:4748. The letter is mentioned

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 407

in Arsak Safrastiyan, Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Arwell, 1948), 6263. However, the citation is incorrect.30Jwaideh, Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 22633. In fact, using the British reports and memoirs of

American missionaries, Jawaideh argues that Ubeydullah wanted an independent Kurdish state. Relying onJawaideh, Olson places the Ubeydullah Revolt as the first stage in the emergence of Kurdish nationalism.See also, for example, a transcript of Sayyid Ubeydullahs sermon to his fellow Naqshbandi halifes andshaykhs, published in Mehmet Bayrak, Kurtler ve Ulusal Demokratik Mucadeleleri (Ankara: O zge, 1993),12526). Bayrak cites a book written by a Russian captain, Avriyanov, as his source but fails to givecomplete citations.

31Jwaideh, Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 227.32The letter was sent to Mr. Goshan and dated 20 October 1880: Parliamentary Papers, 5:17.33The letter was dated 11 July 1880: ibid., 5:7.34Unless otherwise indicated, the information presented here was gathered from an interview with Abdul-

kadirs grandson Hzr in Istanbul, Suadiye, 20 November 1996.35The area was also called Nehri.36Personal interview with Hzr Geylan, in Suadiye, Istanbul, 20 November 1996.37From letters in Takvim-i Vekai, an Ottoman newspaper, we know that this organization was also active

in the urban areas of Bitlis, Musul, and Diyarbekir: see Tunaya, Turkiyede Siyasi Partiler, 1:404, fn. 3.38Hzr Geylan did not give me a specific year for this claim. The Hamidiye Regiment was formed in

1891 and renamed Asiret Alaylar in 1908. It was deployed in Yemen and Albania in 1908 and 1911,respectively. Since Abdulkadir was in exile until 1908, he possibly joined the Asiret Alaylar after the CUPtakeover in 1908. It is quite possible, however, that he never participated in any military activities and wasa member only on paper to attract Kurdish soldiers. I was not able to locate any supporting evidence forthe claim that Abdulkadir was part of the Asiret Alaylar.

39Ali Fuad Turkgeldi, Gorup Isittiklerim, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yay, 1951), 195. Seealso Goldas, Kurdistan, 16. Clearly, Abdulkadir was an appointed bureaucrat rather than a politician, ashis position suggests. Members of the ayan were appointed by the government.

40He was also a member of the second Hurriyet ve Itilaf Frkas (Party for Freedom and Harmony) in1919: see Tark Zafer Tunaya, Turkiyede Siyasi Partiler, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Hurriyet yay, 1986), 264.

41For a better examination, see Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in theOttoman Empire, 18811908 (New York: New York University Press, 1983).

42See Olson, Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, and Jawaideh, Kurdish Nationalist Movement.43Goldas, Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti, 19; Zinar Silopi, Doza Kurdistan (Ankara: O zge, 1991), 57.44Silopi, ibid. The Ottoman government was aware of Abdulkadirs relations with the British. A thick

file is devoted to Sayyid Abdulkadir and the British: see B. A., Dahiliye Nezareti, Kalem-i Mahsusa (DH-KMS) 4403/28, Recep 1338 (1920).

45Doc. 160 [E 1776/11/44], 24 February 1920, printed in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reportsand Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, part 2, series B, Turkey, Iran and the Middle East:19181939, 28182.

46F.O. 371/5068, registry no. E.4396/11/44; the report is dated 20 May 1920.47Ibid. contains the full text translated from Ikdam, 27 February 1920. Siyamend Othman claims that

the interview was also printed in Tasvir-i Efkar and reprinted in the New York Times, 9 March 1920. SeeKurdish Nationalism: Instigators and Historical Influences, Armenian Review 42, 1/165 (1989), 53. Forhis denial of secession, see Meclisi Ayan Zabt Ceridesi, Special Session, 18 March 1920 (Ankara: TBMMBasmevi, 1992), 1:21013, 300303, 32425; also in Meclisi Ayan Zabt Ceridesi, vol. 1 (Ankara: TBMMBasmevi, 1991), 18th session, 11 March 1920, 18487.

48F.O. 317/5068; E. 4396/11/44.49F.O. 317/5069; E. 6148, no. 725/M.1743/5. The letter from High Commissioner J. H. de Bobeck to

Lord Earl Curzon was dated 20 May 1920.50F.O. 371/3346, 23 December 1920.51It should be noted that Mustafa Kemal, as result of his intense campaigning in Kurdistan, gained the

support of some Kurdish tribes. However, these tribes had never been involved in Kurdish nationalistactivities.

52Mehmed Sureyya, Bedirhan Pasa, Sicill-i Osmani (Istanbul: Tarih Vakf yay., 1996), 360.53Serefhan, Serefname: Kurt Tarihi, trans. M. Emin Bozarslan (Istanbul: Hasat yay., 1990), 135.

408 Hakan O zoglu54Ibid., 139.55A controversy exists, however, about the exact year of Bedirhans coming to power; some sources

suggest that the year was 1821, and others claim that it was 184041: see Malmisanj, Czira BotanlBedirhaniler ve Bedirhan Ailesi Derneginin Tutanaklar (Sweden: APEC, 1994), 276, nn. 45, 46. Basedon my research in the primary documents, I believe that the era 183538 is the period in which he estab-lished himself as the emir of the Botan emirate.

56Wright and Breath, Visit of Messrs. Wright and Breath to Bader Khan Bey, Missionary Herald, 42(1846), 381.

57In 1838, a German officer, Helmut Von Moltke, was in Cizre and was reporting to Istanbul. His report,dated 15 June 1838, was published in Nazmi Sevgen, Dogu ve Guneydogu Anadoluda Turk Beylikeri(Ankara: Turk Kulturunu Arastrma Enstitusu, 1982), 6266.

58There is no exact date for the revolt, but from 1842 to 1847, Bedirhan was paying only lip service toIstanbul. The Ottoman local administration in the region was very suspicious of Bedirhans loyalty andwas planning a military operation against him in 1846. However, we know the exact date of the firstmilitary clash between the government forces and Bedirhan: 4 June 1847 (17 Cemaziyelahir 1263).

59The Tanzimat (Reorganization) Period began with the declaration of Gulhane Hatt- Humayunu on 3November 1839. The main aim was to renovate the Ottoman state structure through a series of centralizationpolicies.

60B. A., Irade Dahiliye, 1265/10866, is a thank-you letter from the governor of Kurdistan upon hisacceptance of the Kurdistan Medal. See also Malmsanij, Czira, 68.

61The Ottoman archives provide rich but heretofore unexplored documents regarding this revolt. Forexample, one whole defter (Ayniyat 609) is completely devoted to the Bedirhanis. This defter, a collectionof correspondence between the central government and the Kurdish provinces regarding the aftermath ofthe revolt, indicates how much attention the Ottoman government paid to this revolt: see B. A., Ayniyat609. The defter is even titled On the Revolt of Bedirhan Bey.

62For example, Malmisanij, a Kurdish researcher, believes that the Bedirhan Revolt was a nationalistmovement: see Czira, 11; Mehmet Emin Zeki, Kurdistan Tarihi (Ankara: Beybun, 1992), 124. See alsoBedirhan Bey, Kurdistan, 7 April 1897, 1. This is the first Kurdish newspaper, and it was published bythe Bedirahni family. In 1991, M. Emin Bozarslan republished the whole collection with its modern Turkishtranslation, Kurdistan, 2 vols. (Uppsala: Deng, 1991).

63B. A., Mesail-i Muhimme, 1225; this document was printed in Sevgen, Dogu ve Guneydogu, appendix,doc. no. 31. For Sevgens transliteration, see pp. 7273.

64Sevgen presents several other documents in his chapter on the Bedirhans: ibid., 61134.65Ottoman documents indicating this point are published in ibid.66Ibid., 103, Malmisanij gives this date as 19 September 1847: Czira, 56.67Malmisanij, Czira, 58.68Technically, it meant provincial governor, but in the 19th century it became a civil-service rank. The

holders of this rank were called pasa. For Bedirhans promotion to this rank, Sevgen (Dogu ve Guneydogu,115) shows an Ottoman document: B. A., Irade Dahiliye 1858 (1274)/2108, dated 17 Zilkade 1274.

69An Ottoman document confirms this number and reveals the names of his children: see B. A., IradeDahiliye, 1286/41717. The document is a letter written by the children of Bedirhan to Istanbul (Makam-Mualla- Sedaret-i Uzmaya) requesting an increase in their salaries. In this document, the number of familymembers is indicated as 63 (altmsuc neferden ibaret bulunan evlad ve iyal ve ahfadn . . . ).

70For example, a son of Bedirhan, Necip, was working in Meclisi Vala Mazbata Kalemi in Istanbul in1867: see Sevgen, Dogu ve Guneydogu, 11415.

71For example, Abdurrahman, a son of Bedirhan, attended the Young Turk Liberal Congress held inParis in 1902; see Jawaideh, Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 293.

72See the family tree (Figure 3), and Lutfi, Emir Bedirhan (Cairo: Matbaa-i Ictihad). This book, pub-lished in Ottoman Turkish, does not have a publishing date.

73This newspaper, published between 1898 and 1902, was collected and republished by M. Emin Bozar-slan: see Kurdistan.

74Musa Anter claims that this number was 27: Hatralarm (Istanbul: Doz, 1990), 1:80.75Lutfi, Emir, 55.76Refering to a B. A., Meclis-i Vukela entry dated 15 Mays 1327 (28 May 1911), Tunaya points out

that Abdurrezzak also wanted to be the ruler of Kurdistan (Kurdistan Beyi): 1:406.

Nationalism and Kurdish Notables 40977Sevgen, Dogu ve Guneydogu, 11923.78This incident seems to be a result of personal conflict between the mayor and the Bedirhanis. Sevgen,

publishing the correspondence regarding the matter in the Ottoman archives, fails to support his claim andstates that this conspiracy is beyond the scope of his work: ibid., 12434.

79Malmisanj, Czira, 118, seems to subscribe to the claim that Emin Ali was in exile for three yearsafter 1906; this cannot be correct, for he was in Istanbul in 1908 establishing the Kurt Terakki ve TeavunCemiyeti.

80Some sources suggest that Kurdistan Kavi Cemiyeti, established in 1900, was the first Kurdish society:see Silopi, Doza Kurdistan. However, there is no supporting material for this claim.

81Report from British High Commissioner R. Bobeck, 20 May 1920, F.O. 371/5068, no. 620/M.1743/5.82F.O. 371/5068 E. 6148, no. 725/M.1743/5; Bobeck to Curzon, 20 May 1920.83The Society was announced in Vakit, 7 June 1920; for the excerpt, see Malmisanij, Czira, 127. How-

ever, since a British report (F.O. 371/5068 E. 6148, no. 725/M.1743/5) mentions the establishment of thisnew organization on 20 May 1920, we can assume that it was established sometime in May 1920.

84F.O. 371/5068 E. 6148, no. 725/M.1743/5.85Silopi, Doza Kurdistan, 28.86Ibid., 29.87Goldas, Kurdistan, 204.88Cf. Jaw