ozguc orhan paradox of turkish secularism

8/12/2019 Ozguc Orhan Paradox of Turkish Secularism

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TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 Summer 2013

zg Orhan

Fatih University, [email protected]

Te Paradox of urkish Secularism

Abstract

Tis article argues that urkish secularism known as laiklik presents a paradox due to severalpractices that contradicts the principle of separation of religion and state. urkish secularism hasbeen implemented as the state control of religion, and, therefore, has resulted effectively in a pecu-liar blend of state and religion. Much of the secular paradox of urkey is explainable by the statecontrol of religion. However, this factor alone does not account for the full nature of the paradox.Laiklik must be framed within the context of a larger project, namely, the construction of urkishnational identity to be made sense of. Tis article maintains that the paradox of urkish secular-ism can be better understood if it is viewed as an outcome of this historical process.

Keywords

Secularism, Laicism, Kemalism, National Identity, Religion, Islam.


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Introduction

Te issue of laiklik(laicism) or secularism

is often taken to be the key to the under-standing of urkish politics (Jung 2008).1Until recently the image of urkey as a sec-ular state since its foundation in 1923 wasalmost uncontested and firmly establishedat both academic and popular levels. urk-ish politics, both domestic and foreign,has often been interpreted in light of thislong-standing secular image. It is common-ly held that the urkish Republic divergedfrom the rest of the Islamic world and as-sumed a Western identity due to its secularcharacter. References to urkey as a secularstate in the academic literature are legion.2Te received view is that with the disestab-lishment of Islam in the foundational yearsof the Republic urkey became legally andconstitutionally, a lay state, secular andmodern in her constitution, her laws, andher aspirations (Lewis 1968, 276).

Domestic politics has usually been inter-preted through this lens as well. Te politi-cal panorama of the last decade is typicallyframed as a struggle between the Islamistand the secularist (laik) segments of urk-ish society over its secular identity. Onlythree years ago, the NY imes columnistTomas Friedman, for instance, observedthat there was an on-going internal strug-gle between those who would like to seeurkey more aligned with the Islamic world

and values and those who want it to remainmore secular, Western and pluralistic.3

1 I use the terms urkish secularism andlaiklik interchangeably without necessarily assumingtheir conceptual identity; see Davison (2008) for hisargument that secularism and laicism are concep-tually different.

2 For the academic literature characterizing

urkey unequivocally as a secular state, see Davison

(1998, 182-83).

3 Tomas L. Friedman, Letter From Istan-

Te dualist reading of the developments ofthe last two decades of urkish politics, asFriedman does, presupposes that urkey is

unequivocally a secular state. Tis narrativeonly shows that urkish secularism, laiklik,which is the central tenet of urkeys officialideology, is still not sufficiently understood.

Tis received view of urkish secularismhas increasingly come under scrutiny withinthe last decade. As one scholar puts it, theclassic Western image of urkey as a secularstate has long been a comforting but unex-amined myth (Fuller 2004, 51). Te task ofthis article is to contribute to the question-ing of this myth, and shed further light onthe peculiar model of urkish secularismknown as laiklik. I shall do so by approachingthe issue through its paradoxical aspects.Some scholars of urkish and Middle Eastpolitics have often identified a paradox ora series of contradiction(s) concerning theurkish system of laiklik. Various scholarsunderstand the lack of complete separa-

tion of state and Islam in urkish politicalsystem as a contradiction, which is due tothe regimes goal to control and manipulatethe role of Islam in public policy and poli-tics (An-Naim 2008, 219). Tis control isnecessarily paradoxical because it cannot beachieved without violating human rights.Te urkish model of secularism, defendedand legitimized by its proponents as an in-dispensable prerequisite of democracy andcivilization, necessarily undermines consti-

tutionalism and human rights in the nameof upholding these principles (ibid.).

Te questioning of urkish secularismis not merely of academic interest as theofficial discourse of laiklikhas played a Fou-caldian disciplinary role in urkish politics.It has been systematically used to de-legit-imize and criminalize actors, practices, and

bul, Part 2,New York imes,June 19, 2010.


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institutions of urkish politics that do notfit into the official discourse. Tese illiberalpolicies have all been followed in the name

of safeguarding urkish secularism anddemocracy from irtica (religious reaction),which is portrayed from within this discur-sive frame as the principal threat to urkishdemocracy and modernity (E. Aydn 2007;Bilgin 2008; Cizre and nar 2003).4 Tisarticle argues that the paradoxical natureof laiklikcan be better understood if consid-ered in relation to the question of urkishnational identity (Gle 2010, 44-6; Yavuz

2009, 26-7; Haynes 2010). Te peculiaritiesof laiklikor its contradictions can be madesense of by the exigencies of this identityproblem. Te first section of the article dis-cusses the nature and extent of what I callthe paradox of urkish secularism. Tesecond section examines the Kemalist rootsof this paradox, and the third section looksat the Diyanet institution as the keystoneof this paradox. Te last section maintainsthat the question of national identity must

be taken into account to account for the par-adox of urkish secularism.

Te Secular Paradox of urkey

urkeys secular identity has come underincreasing scrutiny in recent years. Astuteobservers of urkish politics have pointedout the peculiar character of urkish modelof secularism. Seyla Benhabib, for instance,

points out that certain state policies andpractices in urkey conflict with secularismunderstood as the separation of religion andstate. In particular, the state role in the edu-cation and employment of Muslim religious

4 Te 1960 coup and the most recent 1997military intervention were justified on this basis; see,for instance, Stephen Kinzer, In Defense of Secular-ism, urkish Army Warns Rulers,New York imes, 2March, 1997.

officials as well as the informal restrictionson non-Muslim urkish citizens barringthem from governmental posts stand out

(2009, 25-8). Tese and many other similarcontroversial practices indicate a consid-erable level of governmental involvementin religious affairs. Te Religion and State(RAS) Project Dataset measures the extentof this involvement (for the year 2002) witha score of 47.21 out of 100 (Fox 2008, 219).Tis is quite a high score for a state knownas secular. o put it into perspective, thescores of Western European countries such

as the US, the UK, Germany, and France are0.00, 27.67, 19.88, and 22.92, respectively.urkeys score is even higher than that ofGreece, 33.31, which is the highest scoreamong Western/European democracies, andthis is primarily because of the recognitionof Orthodox Christianity as official religion(ibid., 108).

Extensive governmental involvement inreligious affairs clearly put urkish secular-

ism at odds with the so-called Anglo-Amer-ican model of secularism based on theprinciple of separation of religion and state.Tis principle, best epitomized in the First

Amendment of the American Constitution(Congress shall make no law respecting anestablishment of religion, or prohibiting thefree exercise thereof . . .), embodies threecomponents: (1) freedom of religion, (2)state impartiality toward different religions,and (3) state neutrality toward the questionof (ir)religion (Audi 2000). Te former part(the Non-establishment Clause) of theFirst Amendment meets the second and ar-guably the third requirement, while the lat-ter clause (the Free Exercise Clause) aimsat the protection of the freedom of religion.

Te compliance of urkish secularismwith any of these three fundamental re-quirements is a mixed bag. Numerous irreg-

ularities have occurred in the past and still


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do occur with respect to religious freedomand state neutrality. When these irregulari-ties are viewed altogether, we encounter a

paradoxical situation. We find, on the onehand, certain restrictions on both minorityreligions (such as the missionary activitiesof Christians or the denial of official statusto the Alevite cem evi as a house of wor-ship) and the majority religion Sunni Islam,and, on the other hand, certain practices anddecisions that can easily be interpreted asstate favoritism toward Sunni Islam.

Te contradictions of urkish secularismin this regard are so conspicuous that somescholars have actually raised doubts aboutthe secular character of the urkish state:it is unclear if such countries should becalled secular (Keddie 2005, 2194). Anoth-er scholar even goes further to declare thatwhat urkey never had genuine secularism(Fuller 2004, 52). Even Binnaz oprak char-acterized the urkish regime in her seminalwork as semi-secular (oprak 1981, 47).5

How can we explain the peculiar brandof urkish secularism, which conflicts withthe separation doctrine so much so that forsome scholars it does not even exist? Tecontradiction in a paradoxical situation canbe resolved by a plausible explanation. Re-cent scholarship on secularism emphasizesthat there is no single model of secularismin the world but rather different patterns orversions of secularism that have emerged

under specific historical circumstances toregulate the relationship between religionand state. Scholars who take this relativistor pluralist approach classify states accord-ing to their varying degrees of state and reli-gion dynamics.

5 See also Murat Belge, 2010 sonunda din

ve laiklik, [Religion and secularism at the end of

2010], araf, 14 November 2010.

Such comparisons typically come downto two main types of secularism: the Frenchlaicisim and the Anglo-American secular-

ism.6 urkish laiklik comes out in thesecomparisons as quite similar to the formerand dissimilar to the latter (Kosmin 2007,3).7 But laiklik actually goes even beyondFrench laicism in its more extensive involve-ment in religious affairs (Parla and Davison2004, 118; Stepan 2000, 51-2). Whereas theFrench lacit is faithful to the principle ofseparation, laiklikin urkey is implementedas the state control of religion and gives

rise to a peculiar blend of state and religion.Hence, laiklik is characterized as a lim-ited, inconsistent, and ambivalent form of[French] laicism (Davison 2003, 333, 339).

Te empirical multiplicity of secular-ist models is often used in explaining thesecular paradox in urkey. It is emphasizedthat laiklikis comparable to or modeled afterthe French tradition of laicism due to theircommon anti-clerical stance toward religion

(Kuru 2006; 2007). But such explanations donot discuss the responsible factors behind itspersistence in later periods of the republic.Kuru, for instance, explains the emergenceof urkish secularism as resulting from theideological struggle between Kemalists andIslamists during the state-building period ofthe urkish Republic (from 1923 to 1937),which concluded with the former groups

6 Recent scholarship has also drawnattention to the variations in Western secularism.

Variations in the implementation of the separation ofreligion and state can result in different models of sec-ularism. An absolute separation of religion and stateis hardly the case anywhere in the world (Madeley &Enyedi 2003; Bader 2007, 49-62; Fox 2008; Jakobsenand Pellegrini, 2008; Monsma & Soper 2009).

7 As we shall see later, a version of this rela-tivist argument is defended by Kemalist intellectuals,who argue that the distinctive model of urkish secu-larism had been necessitated by the unique historical

conditions of urkey.


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victory (2007, 589).8Even though this maybe a plausible account of the origins of urk-ish secularism, an adequate account of urk-

ish secularism must go beyond its ideologi-cal and historical origins and shed light alsoon its later history. For it is not obvious thatthe paradoxical aspects of urkish secular-ism were all determined by the ideologicalstruggle in the early years of the republic.rue, ideological struggle continued evenafter the initial Kemalist victory but theoutcomes of this ideological struggle in laterdecades of the republic were by no means

decided solely by the agency of the Kemalistactors.

A sound understanding of urkish secu-larism needs to consider its contextual fac-tors during the formative years of the repub-lic as well as those that are responsible forits later trajectory. Te original conditionsof laiklik are not the only relevant factorsbehind the secular paradox. As students ofhistorical institutionalism point out, new

functions or reasons can be invented for so-cial and political institutions or practices ascontextual circumstances change: changesin the socioeconomic context or politicalbalance of power can produce a situation inwhich old institutions are put in the serviceof different ends, as new actors come intoplay who pursue their (new) goals thoughexisting institutions (Telen and Steinmo1992, 16).9 Even if the initial ideologicalstruggle may have been won by the Kemalist

cadre, as Kuru asserts, the institutions andpractices that they instituted have not been

8 Kuru contrasts the assertive type ofurkish secularism with the more passive secularismof the American model. Assertive secularism is iden-tified through its hostility to the presence of religionin the public sphere and passive secularism throughits main concern with state neutrality toward variousreligions (2007, 571).

9 For a brief overview of this compara-

tive-historical approach, see Steinmo (2008).

deployed simply for the project of moderni-zation. Te turn of events in later decades(from the 1950s to the present) is to be ex-

pected as institutional outcomes need notreflect the goals of any particular group;they may be the unintended outcome of con-flict among groups or the result of ambigu-ous compromises among actors who can co-ordinate on institutional means even if theydiffer on substantive goals (Mahoney andTelen 2009, 8). Te argument of this articleis that such an ambiguous compromise hasindeed developed with respect to the insti-

tutions and practices of urkish secularism.Te paradox of urkish secularism is

multi-faceted. First, urkish secularism con-tradicts the separation principle of Westernsecularism due to various practices that re-quire state involvement in the conduct of re-ligious affairs. Most scholars (except the die-hard Kemalists) would concede this much.Te second dimension of the paradox, whichis primarily the courtesy of the Kemalist

narrative, is determined by the voluntaristicclaim that urkey has a unique homegrownbrand of secularism, namely, laiklik. Tosewho firmly believe in the uniqueness of ur-keys model of secularism deny the allega-tion of contradiction, asserting that the so-called contradictions are either transientor tolerable but more importantly are neces-saryaberrations from the separation norm.Tese two dimensions shall be elaborated inthe next two sections.

Finally, the third dimension of the par-adox is owing to a series of historical con-

junctures that have influenced the makingof urkish national identity (Azak 2010,66-7, 155). As mentioned earlier, there isthe Kemalist/republican project of nation-state in the first few decades of the republic.

A crucial turning point was the deploymentof this project against the leftist threat inthe Cold War era during which it acquired


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overtones of religious nationalism. By reli-gious nationalism, I mean the blending ofethnic (urkish) and religious (Sunni Islam)

sentiments giving rise to a distinct senseof urkishness, as well as the develop-ment of urkish citizenship in relation tothis religio-national identity. As we shall seelater, religio-nationalist themes in urkishpolitical discourse have been at work evenin the early republican era but they becameincreasingly influential during the Cold Warera and made its public debut only in the1980s after the 1980 military coup under

the name of urk-Islam Synthesis with theconsent of the urkish state and army (atleast until the early 1990s).10I shall discussthis dimension in the last section.

Te Kemalist Origins of theParadox

An example to this strategy from recenthistory is the mass demonstrations stagedagainst the nomination of Abdullah Gul to

the office of the President of the Republicin 2007, which were portrayed in the inter-national media as public protests defendingsecularism and sparked by the rising Isla-mist threat, that is, the ruling Justice andDevelopment Party (hereafter JDP) govern-ment.11 A casual outside observer exposedto this coverage would be led to sympathizewith the protesters believing that the ero-sion of Western-style secularism is at stake.However, Western type of secularism is more

consistently defended by center-right politi-

10 urkish nationalism is not unique in thisrespect as the blend of religion and nationalism canbe seen in most countries and ideologies where eth-no-nationalism prevails. See Hastings (1997), Safran(2003), and Barker (2009) on the role of religion in theconstruction of nationhood.

11 See the BBC coverage of the street demon-strations in 2007: Secular rally targets urkish PM,BBC News, April 14, 2007; urks step up pro-secular

protest, BBC News, May 5, 2007.

cal actors in urkish politics (Kuru 2006; seealso Cizre 2008). Te Kemalist intellectualson the other hand de-legitimize the sup-

port of Western-style secularism in urkeyby arguing that it is merely a disguised Is-lamism, a ploy of religious reactionaries tocontinue their activities in freedom (Berkes1964, 479-80). In accordance with this log-ic, the Chief Prosecutors indictment, in the2008 Constitutional Court lawsuit broughtagainst JDP, refers to the public statementsof its leading party members in support ofWestern secularism as an evidence of the

partys anti-laik stance.12

Despite the ambiguities in the Kemalistdefense of laiklik, it is not completely amissto interpret urkish laiklikas different fromthe separationist type of secularism. Laik-lik was indeed intended to serve differentpurposes. Te primary Kemalist goal wasnot the securing of religious freedom butto achieve states independence from Islam(but not vice versa) for the sake of moderni-

zation and secularization. In the republicanparlance this goal was expressed as attain-ing the contemporary level of civilization(Jschke [1951] 1972, 19-37). For Kemaliststhen and now, religion must be subordinat-ed to state to reach this goal (L. Kker 1990,166-69; oprak 1981, 2).

Modernization was practiced in the earlyrepublican era as the adoption of Westernculture and civilization in totofor which the

cultural grip of Islam on society had to bebroken (oprak 1981, 38-40; see also Lan-dau 1984; Zrcher 2004, 186-95; L. Kker1990, 161-66). As Shaw notes, the urkishmodel of secularism involved not just sep-aration of the state from the institutions ofIslam but also liberation of the individual

12 See the urkish Constitutional CourtDecision, Case Number: 2008/1, Resolution Number:

2008/2, Date of Ruling: July 30, 2008.


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mind from the restraints imposed by thetraditional Islamic concepts and practices,and modernization of all aspects of state

and society that had been molded by Islamictraditions and ways (1977, 384). Te Ke-malist justification of this project is built ona narrative of enlightenment: Te urkishintelligentsia led by Atatrk sought secular-ism as a modernizing principle as well as aprogressive idea covering not only the polit-ical and governmental life but a whole socialand cultural milieu which was, in its verynature, dominated by superstitions, dogmas

and ignorance (Daver 1988, 29).o modernize and secularize the society,

a series of reforms were enacted in the statestructure, law, culture, social life, and ad-ministration using authoritarian means (see. Kker 2010). Among others, we can men-tion the abolition of the Caliphate (1924),the Unification of Education (1924), and theadoption of a number of western practices(the Latin alphabet, the Gregorian calendar,

dress code, civil law). oprak identifies fouraspects of the Kemalist project of seculariza-tion (symbolic,institutional, functional, andlegal) and points out that all of them weredesigned to minimize the role of Islam ininstitutional and cultural life (1981, 40).

Tis top-down approach to social and cultur-al change has been characterized by schol-ars as secularization from above (Deliba2006; Ergil 1975; Pace 1998).

Te main obstacle to modernization wasperceived as religion (i.e., Islam) and/or tra-dition: Te Kemalist attack on Islambasicallystemmed from an understanding that reli-gion had played a conservative role in thesociopolitical structure of the Ottoman Em-pire, conservatism being defined by the Ke-malist elite as anti-Westernization (oprak1981, 38). Te Kemalist suspicion or fear ofIslam stemmed from their acceptance of theinterpretation of Islam as inherently a po-

litical religion (oprak 1981, 39). Accordingto this view, Islam is politically dangerous(i.e., if Islam is left alone it will invade the

public sphere) and needs constant super-vision so as not to undermine laiklikor therevolutionary project of modernization.

Hence, the official understanding of thelaiklik principle of the constitution is ada-mant that the living of Islam in urkey mustbe kept strictly as a private affair, whichis made clear in a decisive ConstitutionalCourt ruling from 1971: (1) Religion shouldneither influence nor dominate the state af-fairs; (2) With respect to the part of the re-ligious faith pertaining to the spiritual lifeof the individuals, religions are protected byconstitutional guarantees giving them un-limited freedom without any discrimination;(3) With respect to the part of the religiousfaith pertaining to the actions and behaviorof the individual affecting social life beyondthe spiritual life, restrictions can be made toprotect public order, security, and interest;

and the abuse and exploitation of religionis prohibited; (4) As the guardian of publicorder and rights, the state has supervisoryauthority over religious rights and liber-ties.13 Tis official interpretation of laiklikhas resurfaced in urkish politics on numer-ous occasions, prominently in the lawsuitsbrought against the ruling parties WelfareParty in 1997 and the Justice DevelopmentParty in 2008 with the allegation that theiractivities violated the constitutional princi-

ple of laiklik(Hale and zbudun 2010, 22; S.Yldrm 2010).

Te State Control of Religion

Tere are only a handful of officiallysecular states in the world one of which is

13 urkish Constitutional Court Decision,Case Number: 1970/53, Resolution Number: 1971/76,

Date of Ruling: October 21, 1971.


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urkey (Safran 2003, 4). Interestingly, theofficial stamp of secularity in Article 2 of thecurrent 1982 constitution did not exist in

the early years of the republic. Te 1924 con-stitution stated instead that the religion ofthe urkish State is Islam. Tis clause of

Article 2 was excised with an amendment in1928, and a further amendment of the samearticle in 1937 proclaimed laiklik as one ofthe six principles of the urkish Republic, allof which were adapted from the party pro-gram of the Republican Peoples Party (RPPhereafter) (Weiker 1973, 219-57). Te later

1961 and 1982 constitutions preserved thislaiklikprinciple.

Te 1928 and 1937 constitutionalamendments were reinforced by the afore-mentioned secularizing reforms in socialand political life. As the republican cadresbelieved that modernization and secular-ization could only be achieved by a policyof control towards Islam rather than itscomplete institutional separation from the

state, they needed instruments of control.Of strategic importance was the Presidencyof Religious Affairs (Diyanet leri Bakan-l;hereafter Diyanet) founded in 1924 asan agency of public service attached to theoffice of the Prime Minister for the explicitpurpose of coordinating and regulating thereligious needs of the citizens (Berkes 1964,484-85; Jschke [1951] 1972, 57-68). Teofficial mission of Diyanet is stated in itslaw as follows: to execute matters related to

Islams beliefs, prayers and morals, educatesociety about religion and administer prayerlocations (Karaman 2008, 285).

Te implicit and perhaps more import-ant mission of Diyanet, however, was to pro-mote secularization by propagating modernvalues regarding social issues, to struggleagainst the backward or reactionary ten-dencies in society, and thereby to secure thesecular character of the state. Diyanets in-

formal role in this sense is to educate andsocialize new urks according to the needsof the Republic (Yavuz 2003, 49-50). o

this purpose, it has effectively functioned asan agent of control especially vis--vis theSunni Islam (Gzaydn 2009, 216-17; Kara2008, 98; ank 2005).14Te hope of the Ke-malist republican cadre was that reaction-ary Islam would wither away if people wereexposed to true Islam, a religion withouthurafe(superstition) (see nc 2006). Iron-ically, the Kemalist project of secularizationhas resulted in the recognition of a semi-of-

ficial religion in an avowedly secular state(Ylmaz 2005, 386-90).

Te intent of control is evident not onlyin the establishment of Diyanet, but alsoin the opening of state schools to train re-ligious officials in 1940s, a policy which wasinitially adopted by the RPP government inthe late 1940s and embraced and expand-ed by the subsequent center-right govern-ments (Reed 1955; akr, et al. 2004). Due

to its political usefulness, Diyanet has beenvulnerable to politicization either by thestate elites or the competing groups in soci-ety (Gzaydn 2009, 221-24). Te Kemalistmotive in maintaining the policy of controlwas to propagate the true interpretationof Islam and counteract the rival religiousgroups. Te state employment of imams(re-ligious leaders) as civil servants would be in-strumental in this battle for the hearts andminds of people. Later developments in do-

mestic and international politics would en-hance and transform this ideological mis-sion. Te increasing emphasis on preservingthe national and spiritual values of the na-tion, which combines the motifs of urkish

14 For the controversy over Diyanet, see akrand Bozan, Sivil, effaf ve Demokratik, 106-119;and the special issue of Te Muslim WorldVol. 98.2/3(2008) on the Presidency of Religious Affairs, andespecially tar Gzaydns piece Diyanet and Politics

in this volume.


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nationalism and Islam, must be viewed interms of the ideological services demandedby the varying political aspirations and con-

junctures (Landman 1997, 223-24).

Te ideological role of Diyanet has beenmost obvious in its contribution to ques-tionable attitudes and policies toward the

Alevis that range from clear hostility tocondescending misunderstanding (Bozkurt1998; Hamrin-Dahl 2006; Massicard 2006;zdalga 2008). Te resentment felt towardsuch discriminatory attitudes and practicesas well as the compulsory religion coursesin secondary education brought by the 1982Constitution underlies the Alevi criticism ofDiyanet and staunch defense of laiklik (Ko-can and nc 2004, 476-79).15On the otherhand, the Alevi stance on laiklikand Diyanetis not without paradox. Most Alevi groupsin urkey are impassioned supporters oflaiklikand Kemalism at the same time. Tefollowing statement issued against the JDPgovernment is typical of Alevis position on

laiklik: Laiklik, which means the separa-tion of religion and state as well as the stateneutrality to faiths and the communities offaith, and is the foundation of the urkishRepublic, will not be opened to debate inthe execution of state policies.16 Leavingaside the ignorance of the control accountof laiklik in this statement, the Alevi criti-cism of Diyanet contradicts their alliancewith Kemalists given the latters explicit jus-tification for Diyanets status and mission

(Gzaydn 2009, 275-78). Te Alevi struggle

15 Te 1971 Constitutional Court ruling citedabove was made in response to a lawsuit brought by apro-Alevi political party concerning the state employ-ment of religious officials.

16 Tis statement takes place in the FinalDeclaration of a conference organized by a leading

Alevi NGO (Cem Foundation) in response to the newlyre-elected JDPs plans for a new constitution. SeeFreedom of Faith and Assessment of the Constitu-tion, October 28, 2007, http://www.cemvakfi.org/

basindan_detay.asp?ID=88.

for recognition also comes into conflict withthe Kemalist nation-state project, which isaimed at creating a homogeneous identi-

ty without ethnic or religious differences(Dressler 2008, 289; Kocan and nc 2004;zdalga 2008, 194-95).

Te institutional status of Diyanet andits ideological mission has been a contro-versial political issue throughout the histo-ry of the republic (Gzaydn 2009, 284-87).wo years after the aforementioned 1928constitutional amendment that droppedthe reference to states religion, Halide Edipcriticized the contradiction that she saw ina secular states involvement in religious af-fairs (1930, 229-32; 1935, 119-20). Ali FuadBagil, a prominent intellectual and poli-tician in the 1950s, similarly warned thaturkey could not be considered truly laikgiven the official status of Diyanet (1954,219-22). Bagil believed that laiklik was anecessary element of modern state and soci-ety but state intervention in religion cannot

be sanctioned in the name of laiklik. Bagilproposed autonomy for Diyanet to protectreligion against the corrupting influence ofpolitics.17 More recently, mavericks such as

Ali Bardakolu, the former director of Diya-net, and Mehmet Aydn, who held the cabi-net position responsible for Diyanet in theJDP government between 2003 and 2007,defended institutional autonomy for Di-yanet: urkey needs to gradually progressfrom the model in which Diyanetfunctions

as a state institution to a model in which itoperates as a fully autonomous institution(M. Aydn 2008, 172).18

17 Similar views have been presented inthe urkish media especially after the onset of themulti-party era in 1946. See, for instance, Sedat Oksal,Laiklik Prensipleri ve Inkilap [Principles of Secular-ism and Revolution], Milliyet, May 11, 1950; smail H.Danismend, Laiklik Meselesi [Te Problem of Secular-ism],Milliyet, October 20, 1950.

18 Ahmet nsel, Diyanet zerklik istiyor


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On the other hand, there is not muchto object in Diyanets status given the offi-cial understanding of laiklik. As Berkes sees

it, Diyanet is a legitimate institution thatserves laiklik (1964, 484-85). In the samemanner, the aforementioned ConstitutionalCourt ruling from 1971 also concludes thatthe status of Diyanet does not contradictlaiklik:

Tat an unlimited, unchecked re-ligious freedom and the idea of anindependent religious organizationpose serious danger to our countryhas been understood from historicalexperiences . . . For this reason, theframers of the constitution did notconsider unlimited religious free-domas autonomy of the templeor the men of religion outside statecontrolbeing compatible with theregime of laiklik and the principlesaffirmed by the constitution.19

A former official of Diyanet expresses hisagreement with this security perspective:Leaving religious services to their own de-vices or to sects and cults . . . could resultin polarization and disrupt national urkishunity and solidarity (Karaman 2008, 209).

As we shall see in the next section, the refer-ence to national urkish unity and solidar-ity is of crucial importance to understandthe nature of the secular paradox of urkey.o protect Diyanets role, the current Politi-

cal Parties Law stipulates that political par-ties must not oppose the institutional statusof Diyanet. Defiance of this law constitutesa legal ground for party closure (akr andBozan 2005, 113-14; Koak 2010, 259-60).

[Diyanet wants autonomy], Radikal, October 23, 2010;Nuriye Akman, Diyanete ksm otonomi verilmelibakan da ilahiyatlar semeli [Limited autonomymust be granted to Diyanet and its head must be elect-ed by theologians],Zaman, November 24, 2002.

19 See footnote 12 above.

Te Question of NationalIdentity and the Secular Paradox

of urkeyTe Kemalist project of secularization

from above discussed above (with its sub-ordination of religion to state and the Ke-malist intellectuals rationalization of thisrelation) accounts for part of urkeys sec-ular paradox. Tere is also relatively a ne-glected dimension of the paradox concern-ing the question of urkish national identityand citizenship. Te question of who is a

urk? or how the category of urkishness(rklk) should be defined has been an im-portant consideration for the state elitesthroughout the republican era (aaptay2006; Eissenstat 2005; duygu, et al. 1999;Kadolu 1996; Kirici 2008; achau 1963).Te answers formulated in response to thisquestion have had implications for the per-ception and implementation of laiklik. Manyof the past and present practices in urkeyconflicting with the separationist secularism

can be explained by a modus vivendireachedon this question.20o make sense of this pe-culiar situation, laiklikmust be understoodin relation to other aspects of the dominantideology in urkey, most importantly, na-tionalism that is widely shared by both sec-ularists and their conservative rivals (Azak2010; Karabaolu 2009; Parla and Davison2004, 100-25).

Te third dimension of the secular par-adox has been shaped by the persistent and

20 One such practice is the mandatory iden-tity cards, which contain a box for religion. Recently,a urkish citizen of Alevi religious identity applied tothe European Court of Human Rights for appeal afterthe urkish Courts rejection of his request to replacethe word Islam with Alevi on his identity card. TeECHR found the plaintiff right and the urkish statein breach of the States duty of neutrality and impar-tiality in such matters. See the European Court of Hu-

man Rights, Case of Sinan Isik v. urkey, 02/02/2010.


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critical role of Islam in the re-production ofurkish national identity and citizenship.Te political view of Islam as a bond or an

element of national identity has its originsin the late Ottoman era. Islams politicaluse began with the Ottoman sultan Abdul-hamid II (r. 1876-1908), whose Pan-Islamistpolicy was aimed at saving the empire fromdisintegration, and continued in an am-biguous way with his political nemesis, the

Young urks, and their political organiza-tion, the Committee of Union and Progress(CPU) (r. 1908-1918), which, for reasons of

state, maintained the Islamic identity ofthe regime, yet endorsed secularism [and]espoused urkism (Haniolu 2006, 130,202; see also Karpat 2001; Kayal 1997, 211;

Yavuz 2003, 43-5). Despite their strong an-tireligious attitudes, viewing religion as thegreatest obstacle to human progress, theCPU did not refrain from using Islam for po-litical purposes: first, as a protonationalistdevice to agitate the Muslim masses againstthe sultan; second, to attack European im-

perialism; and third, to delegitimize the sul-tans position from an Islamic point of view(Haniolu 2001, 306).

Te political use of Islam for nationalunity continued in the republican era in aninconsistent and ambivalent way. Te bondof religion was perceived as instrumentalto the making of a single urkish nationwhose slogan has hitherto been unity andtogetherness (birlik ve beraberlik). It is well

known that Mustafa Kemal during the yearsof Independence War (1919-22) resorted tothe symbolic power of Islam for legitimationpurposes (Parla and Davison 2004, 109-111;

Yavuz 2003, 45). With the abolition of theCaliphate in 1924, these references recededfrom the public sphere for the most part.One would think that religion would haveno place in the first few decades of the re-public before the onset of the multi-partydemocracy in 1950 given the nature of the

Kemalist project of secularization. Indeed,the scholarly consensus in this regard is thatwith the establishment of the Republic,

urkish nationalism de-emphasized Islamas part of the urkish identity (nar andDuran 2008, 21).

Tis view is partially correct as Islamcontinued to be a hidden parameter in theconstruction of national identity and citi-zenship even during the RPP years (1923-1950); though its influence was subtle, in-direct, and ambivalent (duygu, et al. 1999,195). As Shankland points out, while theRepublic was founded upon the premise thaturkishness would be a suitable and suffi-cient channel through which national iden-tity may be formed, it has gradually permit-ted Islam to play a greater role in the publiclife of the country. oday, these sentimentstogether, and not just urkishness consti-tute an intertwined but dominant concep-tion of what it means to be a citizen of theRepublic (2003, 15). Tere have been two

competing versions of nationalism shapingthe question of national identity through-out the history of the urkish Republic:secular ethno-linguistic and religious-com-munal (Yavuz 2003, 47, 52). Te formerled by Mustafa Kemal and the like-mindedmembers of the republican cadre exclud-ed any reference to religion (duygu, et al.1999, 194-95), while the latter championedby communitarian-minded republicans andlater by the conservative critics of laiklikas

they saw Islam as an indispensable elementof national identity (Azak 2010, 175).

Te boundaries of the urkish nation-al identity have been determined by theconvergence and divergence of these twonationalisms. Mustafa Kemals preferencewas clearly for the secular type (Bali 2006,43). But his preference alone did not settlethis issue once and for all as there were oth-er notable figures of the republican cadre


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such as Hamdullah Suphi, Ahmet Aaolu,emseddin Gnaltay, and Fevzi akmak,who were not willing to forsake Islam (Kara

2008, 252-53; Shissler 2002, 171-84). Terewere also those who subscribed to extremeethno-nationalism (e.g., Mahmut Esat Boz-kurt), who harbored deep suspicion towardnon-Muslims (Kieser 2006; Parla and Davi-son 2004).21As Yavuz points out, even forthe secular intellectuals, there always hasbeen an ironic ambivalence surroundingthe Islamic component of urkish identity(Yavuz 2003, 47; see also Bali 2006, 48-9;

Kirici 2008, 179).Te Association of urkish Hearths (rk

Ocaklar) (1912-1932), whose co-founderwas Hamdullah Suphi, promoted a urco-Is-lamic identity and emphasized historicalroots with the Islamic past as well as withthe outside urks (Weiker 1973, 169-71;

Yavuz 2003, 54).22In this sense, they agreedwith Ziya Gkalps cultural-cum-communi-tarian vision of nation as a group com-

posed of individuals who share a commonlanguage, religion, morality and aesthetics([1920] 1968, 15). Hence, for Gkalp, asfor the aforementioned political and intel-lectual leaders of the republic, the urkishnation was effectively the totality of urk-ish-speaking Muslims (Heyd 1950, 99-

21 It is often noted that Mustafa Kemalsnationalism (known in urkey as Ataturk national-ism) is of civic type of nationalism, which is inclusive

toward people of different ethnic backgrounds. Butas Parla and Davison note, there were two faces ofurkish nationalism: one that posits membershipin thenation as a membership that transcends particularethnic or religious identities, and one thatposits it asan ethnic, or even racial, trait (2004, 71).

22 Te urkish Hearths, founded in 1912,were a civil society organization with close ties tostate authorities. It had multiple chapters across thecountry, and its purpose was to develop and dissem-inate the urkish national culture through culturalactivities. It was shut down in 1931 and its belongingswere transferred to the Republican Peoples Party; it

was reopened in 1949.

101).

Many foreign scholars recognized the

ambivalence in the formation of urkishnational identity. Hodgson remarked that inthe republican period being a urk was stilldefined more by religion than by languageas Islam continued to be influential in de-termining basic cultural allegiance, withina local context (1974, 262, 263). BernardLewis agreed with this view: One mayspeak of Christian Arabsbut a Christianurk is an absurdity and a contradiction interms ([1961] 2002, 15; see also 354-57).Lewis further noted that things were not sodifferent in later years: Even today, afterthirty-five years of the secular Republic, anon-Muslim in urkey may be called a urk-ish citizen, but never a urk (ibid., 15).

Te connection between religious affil-iation and national identity was inscribedin the Lausanne reaty (1923), the peacetreaty between urkey on the one side andGreece and the other Allied Powers of WorldWar I on the other. One of the most conten-tious issues during the diplomatic negoti-ations was the status of minorities withinthe borders of urkey (Aktar 2009, 35-8).Te urkish position was to deny the exis-tence of any minority group, and if this werenot possible then to keep the percentageof legally recognized minorities to a min-imum. After hard bargaining, the urkishside grudgingly agreed to confer the status

of minority only to non-Muslims (gay-ri-Mslim) (Yldrm 2006, 63, 110-13). Teagreed solution was in a way the continua-tion of the Ottoman milletsystem, which or-ganized the people along confessional lines.Te immediate effects of this compromisewere felt in the ensuing compulsory popu-lation exchange between Greece and urkey(1923-33) as stipulated by the treaty.23

23 For a discussion of the population ex-


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Tis decisive moment entailed the ironicacknowledgment of religion as a criterion ofcommon identity for the majority group, and

had critical repercussions for the self-under-standing of both the majority group andthe remaining non-Muslims minorities inurkey (Greeks, Armenians, Assyrians, andJews) (Alexandris 2003; Birtek 2005, 40-41;Eissenstat 2005, 245-53). Te insecure civicstatus of the non-Muslim minorities with re-spect to identity and citizenship originatesfrom this foundational moment. Duringthe negotiation of the 1924 Constitution in

the National Assembly, heated debates tookplace over the legal status of the non-Mus-lims (aaptay 2006, 14-5; duygu, et al.1999, 196; Kirici and Winrow, 1997, 96).Te compromise solution recognized themas urks by law or citizenship but not na-tionality. Tis understanding informs thecontinuing tension between national identi-ty and citizenship and the ambivalence felttoward the non-Muslims (aaptay 2006,14-5).

Te official recognition of non-Muslimsin the Lausanne reaty provided them ini-tially with some legal protection, but thisdid not last long as they were soon forcedby the state authorities to renounce therights granted by the treaty, and numerousincidents of persecution or discriminatorylegislation targeting them ensued in lateryears (Aktar 2009; Bali 2006; see also Lew-is [1961] 2002, 357). Among others, we

can mention the following: the 1926 CivilServant Law, the 1934 Settlement Law con-cerning the Jews of Trace, the 1942 Wealthax, and the 1955 pogroms of September6-7 (Aktar 2009; zkrml and Sofos 2008,165-70). All these cases were due to theethno-religious difference of non-Muslims.Whether the ultimate motivation was reli-giousor economic, they all contradicted the

change and its consequences, see Yldrm (2006).

logic of secularism that calls for state neu-trality with respect to the religious affilia-tion of its citizens.

As the preceding discussion shows,urkish national identity and citizenshiphas been imbued with an ethno-religioussense of urkishness that excludes thenon-Muslims but includes the ethnicallynon-urkic Muslim minorities (Kurds andother Muslim groups such as Laz or Cerkez)as well as Alevis, who are ethnically eitherurkic or Kurdish but religiously differ fromSunni Muslims in rituals (Baer 2010). Terepublican strategy of the 1930s, similar tothe policies of the Young urks, was to usenominal Islam (the Muslim identity andculture shared by these groups) as the gluethat bonded them [the Muslim minorities]to the urkish nation (aaptay 2006,123). So even under staunch secularism Is-lam was an indispensable instrument of thenationalist project of urkifying the Muslimminorities (aaptay 2006, 123; duygu et

al. 1999, 195-97).Te seeds sown in the first few decades of

the republic were harvested in later decadesby more conservative-minded governmentsbeginning with the Democratic Party of the1950s and continuing with its successorcenter-right political parties. Emphasis onreligion as an element of national identityhas increased with the changing dynamicsof international politics. Te international

context of the Cold War justified the increas-ing visibility of religion in domestic politicsas an antidote to the threat of communism(Pelt 2008, 95-6). Te center-right politicalparties have inherited the states involve-ment in religious affairs and built on thisfoundation. In the end, laikliks originalstate-centered and control-oriented defini-tion was maintained by all Islamic groups,political actors, and the state (nar andDuran 2008, 28). Tis ironic development


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has been a constant source of complaintamong Kemalists who wanted to maintainthe state involvement in religion as a means

of repressing religious reaction. Tese com-plaints fail to understand the logic of de-mocracy, which allows for changing leader-ship and policy in state affairs.

Te common view on the convergence ofurkish nationalism and Islam in the after-math of the 1980 military coup, crystallizedin the urkish-Islamic Synthesis, is that itrepresents a radical departure from Kemalistsecularism (Eligur 2010, 85, 95). Tis view isnot completely wrong but it does not showus the full picture. Te urkish-IslamicSynthesis supported by the coup leaders aswell as the center-right political elite of the1980s, who repeatedly declared their alle-giance to the principles of Ataturk, is indeeddifferent from the indifference or hostilityto religion (depending on ones perspectiveon the reforms instituted in this era) in theRPP years. However, to see the decisions of

the military and state in this period as thebetrayal of true Kemalism overlooks thehighly flexible and pragmatic character ofKemalism, due to which it has been adapt-able to the changing circumstances.24

It is more realistic to interpret the urk-ish-Islamic Synthesis as an outcome of thepolitical conjuncture at a time which, in theminds of the generals, necessitated the useof religion for national unity, especially to

fight against the leftist tendencies as wellas to stem the rising tide of political Islam(cf. Hale and zbudun 2010, 10). As Yavuzpoints out, the urkish-Islamic synthesis

24 Te non-doctrinaire view of Mustafa Kemalis enthusiastically accepted by most non-leftist Kemal-ists even though it is a contested issue in the academicscholarship. For Mustafa Kemals pragmatism andfamous negative response to the question about theneed for doctrinization, see Aydemir (1965, 473-74,

502-03), Belge (2001, 36-9), and Weiker 1973 (221).

was meant to co-opt socially powerful Is-lamic movements, whose emergence priorto the 1980 military take-over was evident,

and to use them against what in hindsightwas a much-exaggerated leftist threat(2003, 38). Contrary to what the leftist sec-ularists tend to believe today, this policy wasnot intended as concession to Islamism evenif it might have had a catalyzing effect ontheir resurgence. It was rather another caseof the instrumental use of Islam for politi-cal purposes (Kaplan 2002; Zrcher 2010;see also Parla and Davison 2004, 91). Oth-

erwise, one would have to explain how theurkish army known for its staunch defenseof laiklikturned to become sympathizers ofpolitical Islam overnight. Te truth of thematter is that they remained loyal to thespirit of laiklikby contradicting secularismin the Western sense.

Conclusion

Tis article has discussed the paradoxicalnature of urkish secularism: Is there or isthere not secularism in urkey? As we sawabove, some scholars think that there is; ac-cording to others, however, there is not. Ihave tried to argue that one source of thisparadox is the project of secularizationfrom above. Laiklikwas not established inurkey merely to separate religion and stateas in the American case of secularism. It wasrather an attempt at divesting the world

affairs of the influence of Islam in the sensethat it was intended and implemented as aproject of secularization, which in turn wasequated with modernization. Hence, theeight-decade long historical trajectory ofurkish secularism has turned out to bequite problematic because the socio-politicalresistance to this project of secularizationfrom above has been perceived and pro-

jected by its advocates (be it within the statebureaucracy or among the intelligentsia) as


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resistance to the constitutional principle ofsecularism. Since religion is a diffuse socialinstitution, the project of secularization

from above depended upon the continualexercise of state power for its enforcementand maintenance.

Te above description of urkish secu-larism has actually become familiar terri-tory by now for most students of urkishpolitics. However, the Kemalist project ofsecularization from above or what somescholars alternatively call authoritarianor assertive secularism alone is not suffi-cient to account for the whole paradox.Tecontribution of this article to contemporarydiscussions of urkish secularism is to pointout that the paradoxical aspect of urkishsecularism is not caused by the Kemalistproject of secularization alone. As the schol-ars of historical institutionalism point out,new functions or reasons can be inventedfor socio-political institutions or practicesas contextual circumstances or dynamics

change. I have attempted to illustrate thisfluid nature of socio-political institutionsin relation to urkish secularism.

Te foremost among these institutionsis, of course, Diyanet. Numerous examplescan be given to various types of paradoxi-cal practices such as the mandatory identitycards, which notoriously contain a box forreligion. Tis particular example is indica-tive of the role of Islam and thereby the key

to the paradoxical nature of urkish secular-ism. Te whole complex of state intuitionsand practices has evolved beyond its Kemal-ist project of secularization into an ambigu-ous compromise of the urkish politicalsystem.

In sum, the crux of the paradox lies inthe fact that Islam has been used or seen asan element of national identity in the his-tory of urkish politics; a policy that first

emerged in the late period of the Ottomanstate, continued in the early years of theRepublic, and has been happily embraced

by the center-right political actors of urk-ish politics since the 1950s. oday, there ismuch complaint from all quarters of soci-ety about the way laiklikis put into practicebut it is important to acknowledge that theparadox of urkish secularism has not beenplotted by a single political actor, ideology,or institution. It has rather evolved as anambiguous political compromise of urkishpolitics.

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