a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v i e w o f p e a c e i n i t i a t i v e s

Issue Editor Catherine Barnes

Public participation in peacemakingOwning the process

Owning the process:public participation in peacemakingThe process for making a transition from war to peace providesthe opportunity to agree new political, constitutional andeconomic arrangements to address the causes of conflict. Oftenthese decisions are made exclusively by representatives ofgovernments and combatant groups – who do not necessarilyrepresent the interests of diverse constituencies in the widerpublic.This first thematic publication in the Accord seriesdocuments approaches developed by governments and civilsociety in order to open the process to a wider range ofparticipants. It reveals strategies for democratizing peacemakingthrough three basic modes of participation: representationthrough political parties, direct participation and publicconsultation.The opportunities for participation succeeded inwidening the range of issues addressed and resulted in broadlylegitimate agreements. Furthermore, the processesthemselves strengthened the capacity for inclusive political

participation in future governance and facilitated a degree ofpolitical reconciliation.

Three feature studies focus on mechanisms in South Africa,Guatemala and Mali, with additional examples from Colombia, thePhilippines and Northern Ireland.They highlight the possibleadvantages - and shortcomings - of public participation inpeacemaking and assess the influence of these processes on theagreements reached and their subsequent implementation.Thestudies are complemented by articles exploring the challenges ofdeveloping public participation and the interface withmainstream international peacemaking practice. The publication also includes relevant key texts and graphicillustrations of mechanisms.

Conciliation Resources and the Accord programmeConciliation Resources (CR) was established in 1994 to provide aninternational service in the field of peacebuilding and conflicttransformation. CR's Accord programme works collaboratively tosupport those engaged directly in reducing the number of livesaffected by armed conflict and transforming situations of violenceinto opportunities for sustainable human development.Theprogramme seeks to promote for learning from past andcomparable peace processes, by documenting specific conflictsand peace processes, as well as looking comparatively at cross-cutting issues in peacemaking experiences worldwide.

"I find the series useful as an analyst and practitioner, mainlybecause the issues are written by people with deep knowledgeof the topic under consideration."

Laurie Nathan, Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution,Cape Town

"The CR publications are of an extremely high quality, as well ascontinuing to breathe life into all our commitments to peaceprocesses and conflict resolution."

Vanessa Griffen, Asia and Pacific Development Centre,Kuala Lumpur

The full text of all issues in the Accord series can be found on theConciliation Resources website at http://www.c-r.org

Issue 13 2002

ISSN 1365-0742£17.00 or $26.00

Accord 13

Conciliation ResourcesPublic participation in peacem

aking

C o n c i l i a t i o n R e s o u r c e s

Featuring South Africa, Guatemala and Mali

Conciliation ResourcesLondon 2002

Owning the process

Public participation in peacemaking

Issue Editor: Catherine Barnes

Acknowledgements

Accord Series Editor Celia McKeonIssue Editor Catherine Barnes Accord Editor/Researcher Aaron GriffithsAccord Distribution Coordinator Nathalie WlodarczykAccord Programme Supervisor Andy CarlSpanish translation Jaime Casas

The focus of this thematic project was developed through an extensive worldwide consultationprocess with civil society peacemaking practitioners during Autumn 2001. It was further refinedduring a joint analysis workshop in February 2002. Conciliation Resources would like to extendgrateful thanks to our authors, peer readers, photographers and also those who contributed tothese consultation and analysis processes, especially: Adan Abokor, Hans Peter Bulloven, MattBryden, Rufa Cagoco Guiam, Madeline Church, Tyrol Ferdinand, Simon Fisher, Diana Francis,Sabine Freizer, Peter Gastrow, Juan Gutierrez, Fernando Hernandez, Mark Hoffman,Vernon Jantzi,Steve Kibble, Avila Kilmurray, Susan Collin Marks, Clem McCartney, Chris Mitchell, Mohamed AbdiMohamed, Batapola Nanda Thero, Laurie Nathan, Giselle Ober, Maria Lorenza Palm-Dalupan,Jenny Pearce, Jorge Rojas, Oumar Sako, Luis Emil Sanabria, Rachel Sieder, Zeidan Ag Sidalamine, K. Sithamparanathan, Richard Smith, Karen Tañada, Rosalina Tuyuc, Steve Williams and Sue Williams.

The publication was made possible thanks to the financial support of the United States Instituteof Peace and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Swiss FederalMinistry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).

Published byConciliation Resources173 Upper StreetLondon N1 1RGUnited Kingdom

Telephone +44 (0)20-7359 7728Fax +44 (0)20-7359 4081E-mail accord@c-r.orgWebsite http://www.c-r.org

© Conciliation Resources 2002

Permission is granted for reproduction and use of these materials for educational purposes.Please acknowledge your source when using the materials and notify Conciliation Resources.

Design www.hoopassociates.co.ukPrinted in the UK by Viking Associates

UK charity registration number 1055436

ISSN 1365-0742

Accord 13 3

ContentsForewordEd Garcia 4IntroductionCatherine Barnes 6South Africa feature study

South Africa’s negotiated transition: context, analysis and evaluation 14Eldred De KlerkSouth Africa’s National Peace Accord: its structures and functions 20Chris SpiesSouth Africa’s multi-party constitutional negotiation process 26Catherine Barnes and Eldred De KlerkSouth Africa key texts 34

Guatemala feature studyEnrique Alvarez with Tania Palencia Prado

Guatemala’s peace process: context, analysis and evaluation 38The Grand National Dialogue and the Oslo consultations:creating a peace agenda 44The Civil Society Assembly:shaping agreement 48Guatemala key texts 54

Mali feature studyKåre Lode

Mali’s peace process: context, analysis and evaluation 56The regional concertations process:engaging the public 64Inter-community meetings and national reconciliation:forging a pragmatic peace 66Mali key texts 72

Mogotes Municipal Constituent Assembly:activating ‘popular sovereignty’ at a local level: 74Monseñor Leonardo Gomez SernaNorthern Ireland Women’s Coalition: institutionalizing apolitical voice and ensuring representation 78Kate FearonPhilippines National Unification Commission: national consultation and the ‘Six Paths to Peace’ 82Miriam Coronel FerrerPersonal perspectives:

Public participation and international peacemaking 86Marrack GouldingDeveloping public capacities for participation in peacemaking 90Quintin Oliver

Further reading 94Accord series 96About Conciliation Resources 98Accord order form 99

4 Accord 13

A wall mural painted by children, Guatemala, days before thesigning of the peace agreement, December 1996.

Source: Edgar Romero/AFP

Foreword 5

Foreword Ed Garcia

People have waged peace in the midst of war indiverse situations throughout the world. Crafting aviable peace is the work of many hands, involving

different sectors of society and spanning generations.Peacemaking thus requires a marathon mentality.Success is rare and, to the perceptive, seldom permanent,since advances on one front often bring about a new setof challenges or change-generated conflicts. This volumeshares the experiences and lessons learned bypractitioners reflecting on their work of many years. Theystress the primacy of local peoples and their indigenouscapacities and acknowledge the need to complementthe work engaged in by both governments and inter-governmental institutions – indispensable ingredients inbuilding peace that is both viable and durable.

The cases in this publication constitute ground-breakingwork. Confronted by enormous obstacles, church peopleand business leaders linked up with politicians toadvance a difficult process that led to South Africa’snegotiated transition and the end of the apartheidsystem. A diverse array of organizations and institutionsin Guatemala – representing indigenous peoples,churches, unions, women’s groups and others –collaborated to advance citizens’ assemblies thatarticulated an agenda for peace and forged viablethough imperfect agreements in negotiations betweengovernment and guerrillas.

In Northern Ireland, women from different communitiesorganized to have a voice in the framing of an accord andits painstaking enforcement. In Colombia and thePhilippines, people continue their efforts to buildterritories where non-combatant citizens’ rights arerespected in regions where the military and armedopposition are locked in combat. These experiences arebut a few examples. While they do not provideblueprints for guaranteed success, they neverthelessreveal alternative paths or ways of taking further steps insituations that at times seem utterly withoutways forward.

Even the brave efforts of governments or inter-governmental organizations have at times floundered onthe hard realities of protracted conflicts. In Israel andPalestine, the Oslo Accords – though initially celebrated asa breakthrough – have failed to halt the escalation ofviolence that is deepening the divide, the bitterness andthe mounting loss of lives. The Northern Ireland BelfastAgreement, forged with the support of the governmentsof the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, findsitself continually challenged as inter-community andinter-party relations break down, demonstrating thateven the best efforts of government leaders constantly

face constraints and limitations. It may be that if peopleown the process, they will work hard to ensure viableoutcomes and overcome the inevitable obstacles thatarise once the agreement is in place. The earlier weengage in the task of building the social infrastructure ofpeace, the sooner societies will come closer to anotherreality where the dignity of difference is celebrated,political tolerance observed and a just peace becomes possible.

Moreover, waging peace in the current climatecharacterized by the global ‘war on terrorism’ presents adaunting challenge. In past decades we have witnessedhumanitarian disasters, monstrous massacres andseemingly unending wars in many regions of the world.However, in the aftermath of the tragic events of 11September 2001, the work of citizens on many fronts tobring about a just peace has become more difficult andthe field for their participation greatly reduced; yetincreased involvement is more imperative than ever. Asgovernments form alliances to act against a perceivedcommon scourge of ‘terrorism’, pre-eminence is given tomilitary means of resolving disputes. Such approacheshave tended to undermine efforts to address the specificgrievances at the heart of intractable conflicts in diversecontexts. They have taken actions that can erode respectfor the rule of law and advances in the fields of humanrights, while making negotiating efforts evenmore difficult.

In working for peace, process and outcome walk hand inhand. Unless people own the process and help shapesustainable outcomes, it will indeed be difficult toprovide human security or a meaningful future.Unleashing more violence or launching full-scale wardoes not guarantee a comprehensive security wheremen and women feel safe or communities secure.Security that is people-centred responds to the deepestyearnings of the young and the old alike and is sharedeven by those across political divides. It may be onlywhere people and their communities put their hands tothe task of building a more inclusive peace that thepossibility of a human security addressing commonconcerns becomes less distant.

In the end, the experiences of people who have tried tobuild peace and remain undaunted are a source of hope.This publication may seem a modest step, a smallcontribution from people whose thoughts are capturedwithin two covers. However, for those who have lived orstill live amidst violent conflict, hope perhaps is the hour’sneed in the marathon journey called peacemaking.

Building on his own experience in the 1986 ‘people’s revolution’

in the Philippines, Professor Ed Garcia has spent years promoting

and supporting popular participation in peace processes in

Africa, Asia and Latin America. He is a Senior Conflict Advisor at

International Alert in London.

6 Accord 13

In countries torn by war, peace processes are more thana means to end armed hostilities. They offeropportunities for developing the road map towards a

peaceful future by addressing the underlying issuesgenerating conflict and developing new ‘rules of thegame’. As such, peacemaking can be a political processfor social change. The character of this process, includingwho participates – to what degree, at what stage, and inwhat capacity – the agreements reached and how theyare implemented can all create opportunities forstructural changes in governance, human rights, securityand development policies, as well as shape the relationsbetween those engaged in conflict.

The prevalent strategy for negotiations to end internalwars is to bring together the representatives of thecombatant groups (governments and armedinsurgencies) – typically with the assistance of aninternational mediator and often behind closed doors ina foreign location – to reach an agreement that satisfies atleast the minimum demands of the negotiators. Manywars have been ended through this approach and it hasresulted in some sustainable agreements. Yet it rarelyprovides opportunities for those who did not take uparms – including other political groupings, organized civilsociety or the wider public – to have a voice in shapingthe agreements or endorsing them. Although the end ofhostilities is likely to be met with widespread feelings ofrelief, some may feel alienated from an agreement that isnot ‘theirs’. This may be the case if ‘enlightened leaders’reach a deal that goes beyond the realm of what isacceptable to more conservative public opinion.Alienation may also be intensified if the agreement isseen as more about ‘dividing the spoils’ between thosewilling to use violence to access power than aboutpromoting social inclusion and equitable development.Nor has the process itself helped to strengthendemocratic forms of decision-making or provided spacefor different social and political groupings to jointly makeagreements to address the issues that divide them. This isa particular concern in situations where the governmentand the armed groups lack a strong social support baseand thus neither are seen as legitimate representatives ofpublic interests. All too often, the implicit message is thatviolence pays.

Demonstration for civil society participation in the peace process, Guatemala City.

Source: Paul Smith/Panos Pictures

Democratizingpeacemakingprocesses: strategies and dilemmas for public participation

Catherine Barnes

Catherine Barnes is an independent

consultant on conflict and human

rights issues, specializing in peace

processes. She holds a doctoral degree from

the Centre for Conflict Analysis and

Resolution and is a Conciliation

Resources Programme Associate.

Democratizing peacem aking processes

This publication explores alternatives to the ‘elite pact-making’ approach to peace negotiations. It documentsand analyzes a range of experiences where non-combatant activists asserted the right of the wider publicto participate in the negotiated processes to shape theircountry’s future. In so doing, to varying degrees theywere able to influence the shape of the process, theagenda of issues addressed, the substantive agreementsreached and their implementation. In most cases theybrought the talks process further into the public sphere,enabling a wider range of people to contributesuggestions and follow the negotiations. With greatertransparency, the public was better able to understand –and potentially accept – the reasons for the compromisesreached. Furthermore, the processes marked a historicmoment of change in each country and helped toestablish the value of public debate and democraticprocesses as the legitimate response to conflict.

This is the first edition of Accord to document a number ofexperiences in different countries in order to betterunderstand a specific cross-cutting theme inpeacemaking. In doing so, the coverage of the overallcontext of each peace process is necessarily limited. Yetby focussing on mechanisms that enable publicparticipation, the variety of cases offer importantcomparative insights into a little documented approachto peacemaking practice.

In this context, ‘mechanisms’ are a definable and typicallytime-bound procedure or process to engagerepresentatives of a range of sectors and identity-groupsto deliberate the substantive and procedural issuesaddressed in the negotiations. The mandate of themechanism is likely to vary. At the ‘maximalist’ end of thecontinuum, it may be a deliberative body whoseagreements have legal force; at the minimalist end, themechanisms are primarily consultative with outcomestreated as recommendations. Each of the mechanismsdocumented existed in the ‘public sphere’: wideraudiences were aware of them and had opportunities tocontribute. As such, they may be widely reported in themedia, issues could be meaningfully debated in publicand representatives have opportunities to consult withconstituencies. Thus they are characterized by featuresthat increase the transparency and accountability of theprocess. These mechanisms are different than, thoughpotentially complementary to, the types of civil societypeacemaking roles fulfilled by non-partisan individualsand agencies acting as quiet intermediaries, processfacilitators, and trainers to support constructive dialogueamongst the main protagonists or to create a socialenvironment conducive to peacemaking.

For a volume of a hundred pages, we have had to selectcases from a much wider pool of experiences worldwide.In reviewing the diversity of experiences documented

7

8 Accord 13

here, it becomes clear that there are no uniform formulasthat can be transplanted elsewhere because the impetusfor activating genuine participation is deeply rooted inthe fabric of each society. But it is hoped that the readerwill find numerous stimulating ideas as well as cautionarytales to inspire efforts in other contexts and to informpeacemaking policy and practice more generally.

Representative, consultative and direct participationA central question guiding this project has been toexamine how the interests, aspirations and values ofdifferent constituent elements of a society can inform thepolitical negotiations. The cases reveal several basicmodes: representative participation through politicalparties; consultative mechanisms where civil society hasan opportunity to voice views and formulaterecommendations; and direct participation, where allinterested individuals engage in a process of developingand implementing agreements to address the conflict.

In South Africa and Northern Ireland, the politicalnegotiations engaged all the political groupings with arequisite degree of public support that were willing toparticipate in the talks. In both cases, key actors realizedthat an agreement was not likely to be sustainablewithout the involvement and consent of all the otherparties. Therefore there was no serious attempt to limitthe negotiations by engaging exclusively with only themain armed opposition groupings. This was partiallybecause political parties represented constituencies thatwould be likely to work against an agreement if they werecompletely excluded from the process. Furthermore,each society had a political tradition that helped to shapethe more democratic structure of the peace process. Ineach place, there was a well-developed system of multi-party politics rooted in the vibrant political cultures of thedifferent communities and many parties had processesfor consulting members and affiliate bodies. These factorsincreased the potential for parties to serve as a channel ofconstituency interests and values; they could bothrepresent prevalent opinions and help to ‘bring along’their supporters in the process.

Nevertheless, there are likely to be limits to the degreethat political parties reflect public interests and aconsequent need to ensure that the negotiations are notcommandeered by political elites to make deals thatpromote their own vested interests without regard tobroader public concerns. In both processes, there weredebates over the relative degree of influence each partyshould have in relation to the size of its support base. InNorthern Ireland, this was addressed by holding electionsfor parties to the negotiations; furthermore, theagreement had to be endorsed through a publicreferendum. While perhaps not designed to do so, thissystem also provided opportunities for those outside the

political mainstream to participate. As Kate Fearondescribes, a cross-community group of women civilsociety activists formed the Northern Ireland Women’sCoalition to contest elections, mobilizing a sufficientconstituency to win a seat at the negotiating table andconsequently helping to ensure that the talks engagedwith a wider range of views. As Eldred De Klerkdocuments, South Africans developed a two-stageprocess whereby all parties, regardless of the size of theirsupport base, could participate in negotiations todetermine the rules guiding the transition and the coreconstitutional principles. This was followed by publicelections for delegates to a Constitutional Assemblywhich was in turn influenced by a public participationprogramme eliciting almost two million submissions.Negotiations in both places resulted in substantial andwidely supported political and constitutional reforms.Furthermore, politicians who were forced to work acrossthe conflict divides were better prepared for futurecooperation in a more inclusive political system.

The Guatemalan peace process and the PhilippinesNational Unification Commission (NUC) demonstrate adifferent mode of civil society participation throughconsultation processes. Enrique Alvarez and TaniaPalencia Prado analyze Guatemalan efforts to enddecades of war through negotiations that were spurred,in part, by church leaders on the government-appointedCommission for National Reconciliation that sponsoredthe Grand National Dialogue. It created anunprecedented space for non-combatants to discuss thestructural causes of conflict. The participants identifiedkey issues that were later incorporated into the officialnegotiating agenda. In response to the demands of civicactivists, the UN-mediated bilateral negotiations betweenthe government and the guerrillas were accompanied bya Civil Society Assembly. It included representatives fromthe diverse – and sometimes antagonistic – organizedsectors of society to discuss the substantive issues andreach consensus on recommendations to thenegotiators. The final accords, which addressed anambitious range of issues, reflected most of theirproposals. Yet the power of the pro-peace accordgroupings was weak relative to those in support of thestatus quo. Implementation of some of the mostsignificant provisions was impeded by a ‘no’ vote on areferendum for constitutional amendments. Afterdecades of repressive authoritarian rule that inculcatedfear and constricted the development of organized civilsociety, including representative political parties, the linksbetween civic leaders and the wider public wererelatively weak. Furthermore, the Assembly’s tighttimetable meant that, with notable exceptions,participants were unable to promote an informedunderstanding amongst the public of what the accordsmeant and generate sufficient support for the long-termreform they implied.

Democratizing peacem aking processes

President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines appointed theNUC in 1992 to help revive peace talks with a number ofarmed opposition groups and to producerecommendations for a process towards a ‘just,comprehensive and lasting peace’. Miriam Coronel Ferrerdescribes how, together with civil society organizations,the NUC hosted a country-wide consultation processinvolving both sectoral representatives and, in somecases, interested members of the public. It helped torevive interest in and support for a peaceful resolution ofseveral violent conflicts, whose specific concerns wouldbe addressed in bilateral negotiations between thegovernment and the armed groups. The process resultedin a set of principles guiding the peace programmes ofsuccessive governments. Yet, as most of the conflictscontinue and key recommendations were notimplemented, some are sceptical about the commitmentof those who control the state to substantial reforms.

One conclusion from the Guatemalan and Philippinesexperiences is that consultation processes – whileproviding a valuable opportunity to identify issues andbuild consensus – may be weaker forms of participationthan the ‘representative’ model. At worst, they can be asuperficial public relations exercise; at best, they can bean opportunity to contribute ideas to the political debatewhile strengthening the legitimacy of different elementsof civil society to have a voice in policy-making.

The Malian inter-community meetings, the MogotesMunicipal Constituent Assembly in Colombia and SouthAfrica’s local and regional peace committees all revealanother mode of participation based on the directinvolvement of members of the public in localizedpeacemaking. In each of these cases, local civic leadersinstigated and managed processes engaging allinterested community members in developing andimplementing agreements to address the aspects of aconflict within their control. In Mali, a number of attemptsby the government to negotiate a political settlementwith the armed movements leading a separatistinsurgency in the north resulted in agreements that failedto stop the fighting. Instead previously inter-dependentcommunities began to fracture along new lines ofconflict. Kåre Lode describes how a group of non-governmental facilitators, drawing on traditions ofcommunity decision-making, stimulated acomprehensive series of locally-led inter-communitymeetings throughout the north that resulted in localizedceasefire agreements and strategies for addressing themain sources of conflict. The cumulative effect of thisprocess was consensus on development priorities, an endto the war and the space for national reconciliation.

As Monseñor Gomez Serna describes, the citizens ofMogotes, Colombia were vulnerable to various armedgroups and subject to corrupt authorities that promotedthe interests of local elites. Inspired by the idea of popular

sovereignty and triggered by the kidnapping of the localmayor by an armed group, citizens mobilized in protest toreclaim the local government. They created a MunicipalConstituent Assembly based on principles of directdemocracy, formulated an integral development plan,and created a community independent of all non-statearmed groups. Mogotes thus became one of the first ofColombia’s numerous ‘zones of peace’. Although unableto address the conflict at the national level, they havecreated spaces of relative peace and begun to model anew kind of politics and governance.

In South Africa’s deeply divided and segregated society,escalating political violence threatened the process ofnegotiations and devastated many communities. Toaddress this problem, the political parties – in a processdistinct from and prior to the constitutional talks –negotiated the National Peace Accord. As Chris Spiesdocuments, it mandated a system of national, regionaland local violence monitoring and mitigation structures,including regional and local peace committees thatinvolved local people from differing backgrounds inproactively mediating disputes and facilitating localizedagreements on the conduct of political events. By de-escalating conflicts at the local level, they made animportant contribution to stabilizing the country so thatthe national negotiations to decide the political futurecould progress.

In each of these three cases, local people engaged inprocesses to create a ‘pragmatic peace’ with others intheir community so as to enable co-existence and workproactively towards mutually beneficial peacefuldevelopment. A significant factor was the scale on whichthey operated: by working at a community level, localleaders could facilitate processes that engaged hundredsand even thousands of people in face-to-face, directpolitical dialogue. Those who participated in theseprocesses tended to feel ownership of the agreementsreached and a degree of responsibility for theirimplementation. While the disputes might continue, newmechanisms were created for managing them peacefully.Although the agreements were not legally-bindingcontracts, the process created a general atmosphere ofsocial pressure on those involved to cooperate in abidingby these agreements.

Creating a forum for participationOne of the interesting questions explored throughout ishow the spaces for public participation were created andwhether the origins of a mechanism shape the quality ofparticipation that occurs through it. None of themechanisms were inevitable or automatic; the space forpublic participation in official peacemaking is rarelyoffered and reluctantly given. As Quintin Oliver explores,each grew out of an activation of existing social forcesand was situated within the overall context of a political

9

General Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 25 (Adopted 1996)

10 Accord 13

transition process. They emerged through the particularconstellation of actors and circumstances leading topeace negotiations; the expectations and resourcesimplicit in the country’s cultural and political traditions;the vision and operating style of the leaders; and – mostimportantly – the capacity of those outside thecombatant parties to demand a role.

In most cases the peace process was entwined withmoves toward democratization. Leaders seemed to viewparticipatory processes as a way to strengthen theirdemocratic credentials. Once the space for involvementwas opened, well-organized civil society activists couldshape the nature and scope of their involvement and, inmany cases, assume increasingly influential roles. In eachof the cases, organizers used existing social structures orcultural traditions as the source of inspiration andlegitimacy. Where there was a tradition of communitydecision-making, notably Mali, this was activated tocreate a space for peacemaking. In places where therewas a tradition of mass movement politics, notably SouthAfrica, this became the channel for participation. In manyplaces, church leaders were prominent and able to drawon their legitimacy as ‘moral authorities’ to initiateprocesses leading towards peaceful social change. Butother organized sectors of society were equally crucial.

Although the most important ingredient in each processwas the activation of those involved, each mechanismneeded a variety of financial, technical, and practicalresources to implement it. In most cases, the financingcame principally from domestic sources with additionalsupport from foreign donors (especially from ‘friends ofthe peace process’ countries). Strategic andadministrative support came from a variety of sources,often from civil society. The Consultative Business

Movement seconded staff to facilitate and administernegotiations in South Africa; the facilitation group for theMalian inter-community meetings was convened by atrusted person from Norwegian Church Aid; Catholicbishops played crucial leadership roles in both Guatemalaand Mogotes, Colombia.

The cases reveal the valuable role that can be played byinternational actors, whether governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental. They can help tocreate the space for the mechanisms, both literally (bysponsoring or hosting meetings) and politically (byencouraging governments and armed groups to openout the process to other groups). The Guatemalanexperience also highlights the importance of helping toguarantee the personal safety of participants. This is atask that state security forces may be unable to perform– especially if they have been complicit in violations – and international monitors or even peacekeepers may be necessary to create an environment secure for participation.

The right to participatePublic participation in peace processes should also beunderstood within the wider context of the right toeffective participation in governance. To the extent thatnegotiations go beyond agreements on the specificmeans for ending the hostilities to address questionsinvolving the state structure, political systems or theallocation of resources, they become a form of politicaldecision-making. International human rights standardsguarantee everyone the right to participate in theconduct of public affairs and specifically promote therights of women, indigenous peoples and members ofminority groups to participate effectively in political

The right to participate: some UN instruments

Women Security Council Resolution 1325. (S/RES/1325) On Women, Peace and Security

UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Article 7)

UN Declaration on the Participation of Women in Promoting International Peace and Cooperation

Beijing Platform for Action (A/52/231)

Group Instrument

Minorities and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Article 5.c)

UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious,and Linguistic Minorities (Articles 2.2 and 2.3)

International Labour Organisation’s 1989 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, No. 169 (Articles 4,6,7,14,17)

indigenous people

decision-making. As such, these international standardscan be understood as putting an obligation ongovernments and inter-governmental organizations topromote opportunities for effective participation inpeace processes.

This raises questions about the responsibility ofinternational mediators – particularly those representingthe UN or other international organizations. MarrackGoulding explores some of these issues and commentsthat most governments have traditionally viewedpeacemaking as a quintessentially governmental activity,an assumption that has carried over to inter-governmental organizations. International mediatorshave tended to see their role as that of directing thenegotiation process. Most require a high degree ofconfidentiality to be effective in their role, which tends tofocus on brokering deals between the combatant parties.Some would view the idea of opening the process to awider array of parties to be a risky and unnecessarycomplication to their central task of ending the war. Aseach of the processes documented here reveals, there is atime and a place where private dialogue is necessary tomove the process forward and external intermediariescan play an invaluable role in assisting it. Yet thechallenge nevertheless remains: if the leaders of thecombatant parties do not promote inclusion (possiblybecause of their interest in consolidating their ownposition), do the international sponsors of a process havean obligation to create opportunities for broaderparticipation, at least on decisions that could restructurethe state and governance systems and the policypriorities? Furthermore, are there opportunity costsinherent in deferring participation until after anagreement has been reached? These are issues in need offurther debate in international peacemaking circles. Suchdebate should be tempered by awareness that it is thepeople of conflict-affected societies that mustthemselves ultimately own the process of politicalchange if it is to be responsive to their needs.

Representation, accountabilityand inclusionThe problem of scale means that it would be difficult forevery member of a society to meaningfully participatedirectly in negotiations at the national level, althoughthere may be more scope at the community level. Thusthere are a number of potential dilemmas concerning theaccountability and representativeness of the participants,particularly in the political representation andconsultation type processes where leaders may not havebeen able to engage or communicate effectively withtheir members and the wider public. Several methodswere used to help address this in the politicalrepresentative model: delegates were chosen throughpublic elections and referenda were organized on the

agreement to ensure both a constituency mandate andconsent to the agreements reached. The consultationmechanisms did not include such formal measures; yetalthough influential, the participants were not chargedwith the responsibility of making legally bindingagreements about their country’s future. More salientcriteria might be whether they truly represented thediversity of public interest and opinion and whether theywere able to generate a broad social consensus insupport of the process and the agreements reached.

It seems that peace processes can create opportunitiesfor enabling an array of previously subordinated groupsto have a voice in shaping arrangements that will allowthem to participate effectively in the future. Thisopportunity may be lost, however, if they aremarginalized and excluded because they have notentered into armed struggle. Because each of theprocesses documented here enabled wider participation,they afforded greater opportunities for those traditionallyat the social and political margins to have a voice. Yettheir inclusion was not guaranteed; in most cases, theyhad to claim their right to a role in the process. Forexample, an early intervention by a female delegate inSouth Africa’s CODESA negotiations shamed the mostlymale party representatives into introducing systemspromoting gender representivity. Mayan communities inGuatemala organized to have a major role in the CivilSociety Assembly and promoted a landmark agreementrecognizing their identity and rights. Yet there may beother obstacles to effective participation. Attention isneeded to ensure that the format does not disadvantagecertain participants, particularly those who have beenexcluded previously from political processes. Training andstrategic advice can help; as can ensuring that the designand format of the process do not mirror exclusionarysocial structures.

Legitimate process: legitimate outcomes?In many of the experiences, there were tensions aroundthe mandate of the mechanisms and how it connected topublic expectations on one hand and to broader politicaldecision-making on the other. Some of the processes thatattempted to engage large numbers of the publicthroughout the country – such as the Philippines NUC,South Africa’s public consultations on the constitution orMali’s regional ‘concertations’ – were interpreted by someanalysts as a kind of ‘window dressing’ to give anacceptable public face to deals that would otherwise bemade in private between elites. Nevertheless, eachprocess elicited a range of views that may haveinfluenced decision-makers and also took the politicaldebate out of the capital and into spaces accessible toordinary people. In addition to the instrumentaldimension of influencing decisions, they also had animportant symbolic value: people felt that they were

11Democratizing peacem aking processes

12 Accord 13

being included in politics, often for the first time, andwere able to take part in shaping their country’s future.Opening the process also provided opportunities toshape the negotiating agenda so as to prevent those wholed the armed conflict from imposing the terms of peaceon the population as a whole. All the case studies indicatethat the participatory mechanisms succeeded inwidening the range of issues addressed to reflect thescope of public concerns and generally contributed agreater depth to the debate.

These processes did not take place outside of real politikconsiderations but rather resulted from an awareness thatreaching consensual solutions offered the best hope for adurable peace because no party could dominateunilaterally. In most cases, primacy was given to makingdecisions consensually, avoiding vote-based decision-making as unnecessarily divisive. Smaller politicalgroupings were able to make a significant difference tothe outcomes when they organized effectively andarticulated coherent and persuasive analysis andproposals. Thus by including them at the table, thesemore participatory processes became a de facto forum forsome degree of power-sharing. Nevertheless there werein-built constraints on the issues that the processes couldmeaningfully address – especially in places where thepower of those who controlled the state had not beenaltered fundamentally during the course of the conflict orthe negotiated transition. In most cases, for example, theprocess did not result in redistribution of wealth, despitethe fact that addressing this inequality was often cited byboth the armed movements and civil society as acentral goal.

Several authors indicate that a peace agreement marksthe beginning of a process, not its end. The challenges ofimplementation are frequently under-rated; too oftenimplementation mechanisms are resourced inadequatelyand the momentum generated by the negotiationprocess can be easily lost. Although participation can leadto a greater stake in the agreement and a commitment toimplement it, this should not be taken for granted. Insome cases acquiescence to an agreement by certaingroups may have been a tactical manoeuvre that did notentail a willingness to defend it – or at least abide by it –when the time came to implement the more difficultprovisions. Furthermore, a number of attempts toinstitutionalize participatory mechanisms inimplementation phases floundered, squandering thepotential to generate increased political accountability.But even in places where there have beenimplementation difficulties, it has been impossible toignore the agreement altogether – in part because theprocess for reaching it was accorded broad publiclegitimacy. Agreements have remained alive in publicpolitical discourse at least as aspirational guidelines andpro-agreement activists continue to use them as a ‘base-line’ for their political agendas.

People-centred peacemakingWar-torn societies are typically fragmented, with deepdivisions that become the fault lines along which conflictis organized. In these circumstances, any politicalparticipation may be risky and public debate highlypolarized by anger and fear. Yet the experiencesdocumented here reveal that peace processes canprovide opportunities for a degree of social and politicalreconciliation through the act of making and keepingagreements. There are two facets of this potential: thesubstantive content of the agreements reached and themethods of the process itself. Effective participationmechanisms made a difference both in the quality ofagreements reached – characterized by a range ofprovisions to address the underlying causes of conflict –and, in most cases, the legitimacy with which theseagreements were viewed by the public. Furthermore, theprocesses helped to promote transformation ofrelationships impaired by conflict; through discussionsaimed at developing greater understanding and strivingtowards a consensus on how contested issues should beaddressed, enemies were slowly transformed intocollaborators in peacemaking.

It seems that where a peace process enables broad-basedparticipation and public debate, intensely conflictualissues can be reclaimed as the normal subjects of politicaldialogue, problem-solving and constructive action. Ittherefore becomes a defining moment in the transitionfrom one political order to the next and can potentiallygenerate moves toward a more participatory anddemocratic political system and society.

Members of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition during the ‘YES’ campaign.

Source: Lesley Doyle

14 Accord 13

"We, the people of South Africa, recognise the injustices of our past... [and]

believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity. We

therefore... adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to

heal the divisions of the past... [and] to improve the quality of life of all citizens

and free the potential of each person."

– Pre a m ble, South Africa n Constitution

From the mid-1980s until 1996, South Africans at alllevels of society engaged in an extraordinaryprocess of negotiating a transition from a repressive

and discredited apartheid state based on racialsegregation to a constitutional state with a justiciable billof rights and a legitimate democratic government. Yetdespite profound political changes, South Africa is still adivided country; over 340 years of colonialism andapartheid has not been undone in eight years. Issues ofethnicity, identity and racism are part of the nation’spsyche. Although the government has made significantprogress in addressing some basic human needs bybuilding houses and health clinics and supplying cleanwater, the gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ is stillincreasing. Up to 22% of the population is infected withHIV/AIDS. Frustration of fundamental needs – asmanifested in poverty, unemployment, crime and socio-economic woes – are the underlying causes of ongoingdeep-rooted conflict. Despite these difficulties, politicalviolence is largely absent. It is safe to say that the dialogueprocesses at the heart of the transition helped toestablish a culture of peaceful negotiations, entrenchingand affirming a habit of constructive cooperation andcoexistence, politically as well as economically. Yetdetermined action to fulfil the promise of theConstitution’s preamble remains necessary; otherwisethe dream could explode.

European colonization and the apartheid stateNumerous peoples have long inhabited the territory thatcomprises contemporary South Africa: indigenousKhoisan groups, Bantu-speaking groups, and morerecently those with European origins, Indian and Malaybackgrounds, Jews and those of mixed ancestry classified

South Africa’snegotiatedtransition:context, analysis andevaluation

Eldred De Klerk

A rally in Cape Town in the late 1980s.Source: David Turnley/CORBIS

Formerly an anti-apartheid activist and

member of the Mass Democratic Movement

working to promote peaceful structural

change in South Africa, Eldred De Klerk is

Programme Manager of the Policing

Programme at the Graduate School of Public

and Development Management at the

University of Witwatersrand in South Africa.

15South Africa’s negotiated transition

by the South African state as ‘coloured’. The process ofnegotiating South Africa’s democratic transition in the1990s was challenged with transforming a state structurefounded on principles of segregation and inequality thatgave members of these groupings differential status.

The apartheid system had its roots in 350 years ofreligious, land and labour conflicts. In 1652, a group ofDutch settlers landed in the Cape of Good Hope andgradually established a rigidly stratified colony based onslave labour from Africa and Asia to farm the productivelands. The British gained control in 1795, with manyDutch-speaking Afrikaners fleeing further into the interiorwhere they established new colonies. Over the nextcentury, the British conquered the remaining Africankingdoms and expanded their control to subsume thenew Afrikaner ‘republics’. They also controlled many ofthe lucrative gold and diamond mines, worked mostlywith indentured Indian labourers. The British suppressedthe Afrikaner Boers rebellion from 1899-1902, deploying ascorched-earth policy and interning Afrikaner and Africancivilian communities in camps where thousands died ofhunger and disease.

With the inauguration of the new Union of South Africa in1910 – comprising the former British and Afrikanercontrolled territories under the British monarch – theAfrikaners gained predominance and were decisive inshaping a constitution based on white supremacy.

Successive legislation was passed introducing racialsegregation, reserving almost all land for whiteownership and progressively excluding the African, Asianand ‘coloured’ populations from political participation.The South African Native National Congress, which in1923 became the African National Congress (ANC), wasformed shortly after the Union of South Africa to opposeracial discrimination, extend the franchise and gainequality. Their demands were rejected by successive governments.

After the Afrikaner extremist Nationalist Party assumedpower in 1948, they began to systematically extend thepolicy of apartheid to promote the economic andpolitical power of Afrikaners, resulting in one of theworld’s least equitable distributions of wealth. Peoplewere segregated into racially defined group areas andwhole communities were displaced from areasdesignated as white only, with ‘pass laws’ used to controlthe movement of non-whites. The majority demand inSouth Africa came to be for a political system based onthe principle of ‘one person, one vote’. Slogans such as‘power to the people’ and ‘the people shall govern’ calledfor the creation of a system of governance where allcitizens could vote. This was not a challenge to theprominence of the South African state but rather thespecific uses to which state power were deployed.

16 Accord 13

Congress of the People and the Freedom CharterDrawing on Mohandas Gandhi’s earlier campaigns topromote the rights of South Africa’s Indian labourers, in1952 the ANC and the South African Indian Congressorganized a mass civil disobedience campaign thatbroadened the base of organized resistance. In 1955, fiveyears before it was banned, the ANC convened aCongress of the People to develop a Freedom Charter forall South Africans. The charter articulated not just whatthey opposed but also what they stood for. It shaped thedevelopment of political thinking, formed thefoundations for a pro-democracy movement andinfluenced the negotiations in the 1990s. It was a uniqueexperience of mass participation in a political visioningprocess amidst hostile political circumstances andshaped the implicit expectation for public participation increating a new South Africa.

Preparations began in 1953 as hundreds of activistsorganized meetings and house-to-house canvasses toalert South Africans to the project. Ordinary citizens wereasked the open-ended question: “what needs to changein South Africa for you to enjoy full and abundant lives interms of country, community and individual?” Theorganizers learned that if they wanted people toparticipate, they needed to meet them where they lived,worked and played. This lesson became a powerfuloperating principle for the democracy movement thatemerged in the 1980s. The organizers were instructed notto write demands on behalf of the people but rather tocollect and collate the perspectives they heard; to enableprocesses that allowed the dispossessed anddisempowered to find their own voice rather than seethemselves as representatives who could ‘speak for’ thepeople. Communities also nominated delegates torepresent their group at a mass gathering and collectedmoney for their travel.

The government tried to impede the Congress as itbecame obvious that the process was gatheringmomentum: meetings were banned, gatheringsdisrupted by the police, and materials confiscated ordestroyed. Despite a police cordon on 26 June 1955 inKliptown, Johannesburg, the Freedom Charter waswritten, based on the deliberations of the 2,800 delegateswho had gathered on a dusty patch of ground to debatethe results of the consultations. Its central principle wasthat: “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black andwhite, and no government can justly claim authorityunless it is based on the will of the people.”

Anti-apartheid strugglePopular resistance increased in the 1950s and in 1960 thegovernment outlawed the ANC and its rival, theexclusively African Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). In the

Acronyms

ANC African National Congress

AWB Afrikaner Resistance Movement

AZAPO Azanian People’s Organization

CBM Consultative Business Movement

CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa

COSAG Concerned South African Group

COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions

CP Conservative Party

IFP Inkatha Freedom Party

LPC Local Peace Committee

MPNP Multi-Party Negotiating Process

NP National Party

NPA National Peace Accord

NPC National Peace Committee

NPS National Peace Secretariat

PAC Pan-Africanist Congress

RPC Regional Peace Committee

SACC South African Council of Churches

SERD Socio-Economic Reconstruction andDevelopment

SWAPO South West African People’s Organization

UDF United Democratic Front

ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union

South Africa

South Africa’s negotiated transition 17

face of massive repression, the ANC decided that solelypeaceful protest was ineffective and in 1961 formed anarmed wing, Umkonto we Sizwe (known as MK).Opposition leaders, including Nelson Mandela, wereimprisoned for life in 1964 and others fled into exile.

In June 1976, police responded to a student protest inSoweto by shooting at and killing children. It sparked arevolt that rapidly spread throughout urban blacktownships. Government forces killed hundreds ofprotesters that year and the growing Black Consciousnessmovement revitalized activism. In 1982, attempting tocurtail the continued uprising, Prime Minister P.W. Bothaimplemented constitutional reforms that split the NP,leading to the formation of the Conservative Party (CP).Botha’s reforms continued the logic of divide-and-rule tomaintain control and the 1983 Constitution created aTricameral Parliament with separate chambers for white,coloured and Indian representatives. The latter wereoffered a degree of authority over the affairs of theircommunity, while the white chamber retained power todecide national issues and could veto decisions by theother chambers. Africans were granted township councilsand nominally independent ‘homeland’ governments.

The reforms made the reality of political exclusion all themore stark. They spurred the development of a cross-community popular opposition movement to resist co-option by the tricameral system. The new UnitedDemocratic Front (UDF) was an ANC-affiliated umbrellaorganization that drew members from across SouthAfrican civil society, including religious, community andprofessional organizations. It linked with the mostly blackand ANC-aligned Congress of South African Trade Unions(COSATU) to form the Mass Democratic Movement,which endorsed the Freedom Charter as its guidingdocument. Throughout the mid-1980s, a series of urbanuprisings, strikes and consumer boycotts combined withthe ANC’s strategy of economic warfare, industrialsabotage and attacks on government targets to bring thecountry to a standstill. The government responded byrepealing some apartheid laws while imposing a nationalstate of emergency. Most political activity was banned,over 30,000 were arrested, thousands killed, and keypolitical activists assassinated by the security forces. Yet asthe country became increasingly ungovernable, some NPleaders began to realize that incremental reform wouldbe unlikely to contain the conflict over the longer term.

Incentives for negotiationA combination of internal and external factors createdconditions that led both the ANC and the NP towards therealization that their aims might be best met throughpolitical negotiations. The apparent problems ofgoverning South Africa by apartheid were compoundedby inherent economic inefficiencies. Although the socialand political objectives of apartheid were to confine

Sequence of mechanisms

1955 Freedom CharterA statement of principles to guide the pro-democracy anti-apartheid movement is drafted, through an ANC convenedCongress of the People

19898 Dec

Conference for a Democratic Future A gathering of the Mass DemocraticMovement is held to develop a commonapproach based on the ANC’s HarareDeclaration for negotiations leading to anew constitution drafted by an electedconstituent assembly.

1991June - Sept

National Peace Accord negotiation Negotiations involving representativesfrom political parties, business and churchassociations lead to an agreement signedby 27 political, trade union andgovernment leaders that creates national,regional and local peace structures.

1991 - 1992Dec 91 - May 92

Convention for a Democratic South Africa(CODESA) Negotiations are held to decide the rulesguiding the transition and a newconstitution, involving 19 parties and morethan 400 negotiators organized in work inggroups. It starts with an opening plenary(CODESA I) and finishes with a final plenary(CODESA II) that marks the breakdown ofthe process.

199226 Sept

Record of Understanding The ANC and the NP sign an agreement on the process to negotiate an interimgovernment and interim constitution.

1992 -1993April 92 -Nov 93

Multi-party Negotiating Process Negotiations involving 26 parties to draft an interim constitution, with administration provided by theConsultative Business Movement.

199427 - 29 April

General elections The first non-racial, democratic electionsare held for parties to form the transitionalgovernment and choose delegates to newparliament and Constitutional Assembly.

1994 - 1996May 94 - Oct 96

Constitutional Assembly and public participation programme490 members from 7 parties draft a newConstitution with inputs from a massivepublic participation programme. The finaltext of the Constitution is adopted 8 May1996 and an amended text. is approved on 11 October 1996.

199610 Dec

Constitution signed into lawPresident Nelson Mandela signs theConstitution into law in Sharpeville. Itcomes into effect on 4 February 1997.

18 Accord 13

black South Africans in separate territories, theindustrializing economy needed their labour in the‘white’ urban areas. These contradictions werecompounded when Botha declared a state of emergencyin 1986 that prompted international banks to suspendloans to South Africa, precipitating an immediate 50 percent drop in the currency’s value and creating severecapital scarcity. This was exacerbated by the increasinglywidespread economic sanctions and embargoes onSouth African companies and goods – which also hadsignificant symbolic political impact. These factorsconvinced many in South Africa’s influential businesscommunity that it was necessary to seek a more dramaticsolution to the conflict.

External political developments also influenced thegovernment and the ANC. In the global context ofdecolonization and expanding civil rights, apartheidSouth Africa had been treated as an international pariahfor decades. Yet the Cold War confrontation hadcombined with South Africa’s profitable investmentenvironment to encourage many Western governmentsto support the National Party government as an ally. Asthe communist governments in Eastern Europecollapsed, this polarization eased and Western alliesbegan to pressure the government to reform. The peaceprocesses in neighbouring states and theirrapprochement with the South African governmentmeant the ANC was cut off from some of its previousbases. From the mid-1980s the Soviet Union and manyAfrican governments put increasing pressure on the ANCto negotiate a political resolution to the conflict.

Negotiating the transitionFrom the early 1980s, there were a number of quietinitiatives by civil society intermediaries to open lines ofcommunication between influential people in the ANCand NP. They facilitate the initial exploratory ‘talks abouttalks’ and, by encouraging the development of personalrelationships across the lines of conflict, helped to buildconfidence in the potential for a negotiated settlement.In the mid-1980s, Nelson Mandela began preparing forthe possibility of negotiations. Soon the ANC and NPbegan to explore options through a series of secretexchanges. Elections in 1988 brought F.W. De Klerk – apragmatic reformist – to the presidency. In December1989, the Mass Democratic Movement held a meetingwhere its 4,600 delegates passed a resolution in supportof the ANC’s Harare Declaration setting out thepreconditions for negotiations – thus providing consentfor the new strategy.

A historic breakthrough came on 2 February 1990 whenDe Klerk opened parliament with a speech announcingthe unbanning of political organizations, the release ofimprisoned political leaders and conditions free forpolitical activity. This step laid the foundation for a returnof the exiled ANC leadership and talks between the

estranged political and social leadership on all sides ofthe conflict. The stage was set for formal negotiations.

Although the ANC was the largest of the oppositionpolitical groups, it was composed of sub-groupings.There was also a range of separate political formations –some of which opposed negotiations – that comprisedthe anti-apartheid movement together with the ANC.There were a number of political groupings within thewhite population, ranging from radicals opposed to anyform of negotiations to people who supported ademocratic transition to full equality. There were also anumber of parties that had formed around the differenthomeland governments or to represent specific ethnicgroup interests – such as the Transvaal Indian Congress.Of these, the largest was the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP),led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, which drew itssupport primarily from the Zulu community. As an ethnicand regionally-based party, it tended to be conservativeand realized that a state based on some form of ethnicfederation would favour its interests more than even aminimum degree of majority rule. As the processdeveloped, it partnered with Afrikaner conservativeparties in an effort to strengthen their positions. Althoughthe ANC and NP were the engines that drove thenegotiation process – and it was inconceivable thatagreement could be reached without the consent ofthese key parties – the proliferation of political groupingsthat together drew support from large numbers of SouthAfricans had to be represented in the talks if the processand its outcomes were to be seen as legitimate.

Owning the processThe ANC drew lessons from watching its counterparts inthe peace negotiations directed by internationalmediators in both Zimbabwe, where ZANU was forced todilute its major objectives, and in Namibia, where SWAPOwas shut-out of the negotiations. It was determined toseize the initiative while it had full support from allies andto avoid international mediation. The NP had found theexperience of US and British pressure in the Namibiannegotiations to be humiliating and it too was eager toavoid international mediation.

Thus South African leaders, with the assistance of civilsociety peacemakers and technical experts from homeand abroad, slowly constructed an inclusive andprincipled process for managing the multiple transitionsto a post-apartheid State, followed by a power-sharingtransitional government, and finally a newconstitutionally-mandated state structure and governingsystem. The process moved from the initial secret talksbetween NP and ANC representatives; to the post-February 1990 bilateral pre-negotiation talks betweenkey parties to determine the shape of the negotiationprocess; to the initial multilateral negotiations betweenpolitical parties to develop the 1991 National PeaceAccord (NPA) to address the political violence; to formally

Queueing to vote in northern Johannesburg, 28 April 1994.Source: AFP

South Africa’s negotiated transition 19

constituted multi-party negotiations to agree the rulesfor a transitional government and key constitutionalprinciples; and finally culminated in an electedConstitutional Assembly with an ambitious publicconsultation programme to draft the new Constitution.From its secretive origins, the process became slowlymore open to public scrutiny and, in some cases, direct participation.

There were two main facets of the multi-party process:constitutional negotiations to create a new set of rules togovern the state and the NPA structures to preventviolence (much of which appears to have been instigatedby some of the political parties). Although distinct, theyinteracted in important ways. Many of the partyrepresentatives involved in negotiating the NPA were alsoinvolved in the constitutional negotiations. The collegialrelations formed in the NPA helped with the laternegotiations, as did collaborative problem-solvingtechniques introduced by the business and churchfacilitators in the NPA process. The national, regional, andlocal structures set up by the NPA to address theproblems of political violence appear to have bothcontributed toward stabilizing the country during thetransition and to creating spaces where South Africanscould meet to address specific conflict issues in theircommunity. At times when the constitutionalnegotiations were suspended, the national NPAstructures remained active and continued to provide achannel of communication between the signatoryparties that retained oversight of the process. Thetransition would doubtless have been much moredifficult if either of these facets was missing.

The negotiated processes that guided the transition wererooted in the mass political organization that hademerged over almost a century of struggle, as well as in

the political organizations of South Africa’s whitepopulation. Both had evolved representative politicalparties with systems to hold leaders accountable to theirmembers and constituencies. During the negotiations,political leaders had to pay careful attention to bringingalong their supporters when making agreements. TheSouth African public had the opportunity to witness muchof the later negotiations through media broadcasts. Manyof the political parties consulted frequently with membersto gauge their reaction to proposals and to identify issuesof continued concern. There were opportunities tocontribute ideas and comment on the draft Constitutionand to participate in peacemaking through the local andregional peace committee structures of the NPA. It seemsthat these strategies greatly increased both the sense ofpublic ownership of the terms of the transition and gavelegitimacy to the new state structures that emerged fromthe process.

During the transition, South Africans started to debunkmisperceptions and myths about each other. As trustincreased, they began to make the political compromisesnecessary for a mutually acceptable future. They soonlearned that the benefit of engagement was in theprocess itself as well as in its outcomes. Those involvedgained a sense of the reasons why specific compromiseswere necessary and a commitment to ensuring thesuccess of agreements reached. And to this end allstakeholders – and as many people as possible – neededto be engaged and the process as transparent andaccessible as possible. The parties learned these lessonswell and over time the negotiating forums becameincreasingly open. In so doing, the process itself createdconditions for a radical change in South Africa’s formerlyexclusionary and secretive political culture and helped tocreate a more truly democratic state and society.

South Africa’sNational PeaceAccord: its structures and functions

Chris Spies

South Africa’s transition to democracy in the 1990swas not as peaceful as is often characterized by theoutside world. For much of the twentieth century,

the anti-apartheid movements relied on non-violentactivism to challenge the state based on whitesupremacy, institutionalized segregation anddiscrimination. This shifted in the 1960s, when someembarked on an armed struggle to force the governmentto abandon its policies, which was in turn met withviolence by the state security structures. In the absence ofresources and mechanisms to manage conflict at alllevels of society, competition and mistrust within andbetween communities often flared into violence. When the official negotiations began in 1990, battles forpower surfaced and political violence escalateddramatically – with a 307 percent rise in fatalities from1985 to 1991.

To respond to this crisis, South African political partiesnegotiated the 1991 National Peace Accord (NPA) aimed atpreventing violence. It created an unprecedentedcountry-wide network of structures to implement theagreement by addressing the behaviour of politicalparties and the security forces, issues related to justice,and conflict management through participatoryprocesses of localized mediation and monitoringcoordinated at the regional and national level. Althoughaimed at ending the violence, its principles andstructures provided an important safety net for nationalnegotiations. Later, politicians knew that even when theywalked out of the constitutional negotiations, theyretained their common commitment as signatories to theNPA, which provided a mechanism for channels ofcommunication to remain open.

Finding an acceptable convenorBy 1990, many South Africans were deeply concerned bythe violence and the risk it posed for derailing theprospect for constitutional negotiations. Despite theurgency, it was unclear who would be acceptable toinitiate a process to address it. Most South Africans hadno faith in President De Klerk’s National Party (NP)government and it was widely suspected that the statesecurity structures were complicit in the violence.

The churches made the first initiative. In November 1990,a national conference involving all but two Christianreligious groups marked a historic moment towardsreconciliation. The Dutch Reformed Church – seen bymany as the ‘National Party in prayer’ – confessed its guiltand acknowledged its role in apartheid. Moved by thisconfession, delegates formulated the RustenburgDeclaration denouncing apartheid, calling for ademocratic constitution and more equitable distributionof wealth. They urged the churches to condemn all formsof violence and decided to convene a peace

Chris Spies is the director of Dynamic

Stability CC, a conflict transformation and

development practice, and a senior

associate of the Centre for Conflict

Resolution. He was the Regional Organizer

of the Western Cape Regional Peace

Committee .

South Africa’s National Peace Accord 21

conference.But the March 1991 offer by the South AfricanCouncil of Churches (SACC) to convene a peaceconference met with a negative response from theInkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which perceived the SACC as supporting the ANC and therefore an unacceptable convenor.

Around the same time as the church initiative, a group ofprogressive business leaders from a number of largecorporations formed the Consultative BusinessMovement (CBM) to develop an informed response tothe deteriorating situation. After a series of discreetmeetings with key leaders, the CBM gained credibility as a potential facilitator in both the NPA andconstitutional negotiations.

Under increasing pressure to respond to the politicalviolence, in April 1991 President De Klerk announced apeace summit for late May involving political, church andcommunity leaders. Although welcomed by the IFP, theANC and others rejected it as a propaganda ploy. Theyargued that the government lacked credibility toconvene such a process unilaterally. Alarmed, CBM andsenior church leaders decided to use their combinedinfluence and credibility to move the process forward.They called an emergency meeting, inviting leaders ofother key business associations and the Congress ofSouth African Trade Unions (COSATU). Through back-channel talks, they developed a formula with the keypolitical leaders that allowed the government summit tobe seen as a component of an ongoing andindependently-convened peace conference involving allparties and organizations.

Designing a processAlthough the SACC, the ANC and a number of othersstayed away from the May summit, the delegates wereable to express their views on the causes of violence andintroduce proposals to end it. The conference appointedLouw Alberts, co-chair of the Rustenburg Conference, toact as facilitator of a second peace conference. He wasmandated to form a ‘facilitating committee’ capable ofconvening a more representative gathering. The ANCwelcomed the summit outcome and proclaimed thepeace process back on track.

Alberts consulted immediately with SACC GeneralSecretary Frank Chikane and others in the ad hocbusiness/church group on the principles and process forestablishing a representative facilitating committee.Chikane agreed to consult with the anti-apartheidmovements, while Alberts consulted the government,businesses and the IFP. Within the week, agreement wasreached on the membership of a 13-person committeedrawn from the church and business community under arotating chairperson.

The facilitation committee judged that the main politicalleaders should not conduct the negotiations directlybecause they would become mired in positionalbargaining and find it difficult to make concessionsneeded for an agreement to address the violence.Instead, Alberts decided to involve junior representativesin a quiet forum designed to encourage consensusbuilding. The facilitators would consult with the mainparties and shuttle between them to determineacceptable proposals that could be the basis for anegotiated solution.

The committee initiated the process with a low-keypreparatory meeting in late June. It attracted almost 120appointed representatives from all the political groupingsexcept three white right-wing parties. It was the first timethat the NP, ANC, and IFP met to discuss the violence andwas the first time that the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)agreed to participate in negotiations involving thegovernment. After a tone-setting speech by ArchbishopDesmond Tutu, the facilitators established ground rules.They then led the delegates through a non-evaluative‘brainstorming’ process on the causes of violence andpossible ways to address them. After grouping thesefactors into themes, the delegates decided to appoint apreparatory committee to consider the issues and toestablish working groups to draft proposals. It was agreedthat nine additional members, three each nominated byANC, IFP and NP, would join the existing members of thenon-partisan facilitating committee to form thepreparatory committee. They would then consult withthe other relevant parties and organizations, report onprogress in August and work toward convening aninclusive forum leading to a binding agreement.

Reaching agreementThe preparatory committee appointed five workinggroups mandated to develop consensus proposals onthe key themes. Every group comprised threerepresentatives each from the government, ANC and IFPgroupings, plus one religious and one businessrepresentative from the committee. The CBM providedadministrative support, with financing from thegovernment. The groups were formed to address fivetopics: (1) code of conduct for political parties; (2) code ofconduct for security forces; (3) socio-economicdevelopment; (4) implementation and monitoring; and(5) process, secretariat and media. After a series ofdeliberations, negotiations, reviewing draft agreementsand receiving feedback, the committee decided to hold ahigh profile National Peace Convention on 14 September 1991. Finally, under considerable pressureand only hours before the Convention, the final draftswere compiled into a single text that would become theNational Peace Accord.

22 Accord 13

The Convention was a tremendous occasion, bringingtogether the senior political leadership for the first timealong with representatives from other political parties,leaders of the ’independent homeland’ territories,traditional leaders, churches, trade unions, businessgroupings, the media and the diplomatic corps. TheAccord was signed by 27 political, trade union andgovernment leaders. It marked a breakthrough revealingthat deep-seated differences would not prevent thevarious parties from working with each other to addresscommon concerns.

Yet a number of significant stakeholders with moreradical views did not agree to sign the NPA. The PAC andthe Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) declined tosign because they were unwilling to be part of anystructure that included the government, yet theyindicated their support for the spirit and objectives of theAccord. On the right, the Conservative Party (CP), theright-wing Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) andHerstigte Nasionale Party did not attend or sign. Three ofthe homeland governments also refused to sign; Ciskeisigned but later withdrew from implementation. But themajority committed themselves – at least on paper – toimplementing the Accord.

NPA’s aims, principles and objectives The NPA created the first institutionalized peacekeepingand peacemaking instrument for South Africa. Mostbelieved that it was the political parties - some of themNPA signatories - that were the key instigators behindmuch of the political violence. The agreement mandatedthe signatories to monitor each other’s compliance withspecified codes of conduct. Political parties andorganizations had to condemn violence publicly, preventmembers from promoting or using any form of violence,cooperate with the authorities to prevent violence atpolitical events and assist the police in investigating andapprehending violators. There were also detailedstandards and operating procedures for the securityforces, particularly the police.

The agreement was rooted in a number of basic values. Itpromoted democratic principles of good governance,mutual responsibility and accountability. It explicitlyrecognized the fundamental rights and freedoms ofconscience and belief, speech and expression,association, movement, peaceful assembly and peacefulpolitical activity. These commitments were especiallysignificant given the history of authoritarianism andpolitical intolerance.

Recognizing poverty as an underlying condition thatcombined with intense political rivalry to be a drivingforce behind some of the most extreme violence, the NPAprovided for social and economic reconstruction anddevelopment intended particularly to benefit and

involve those communities affected by political violence.It also acknowledged the need for urgent rehabilitationand reconstruction in violence-affected areas andstressed the principle of involvement to defuse tensionswithin communities.

NPA implementation structuresThe agreement specified implementation mechanismscreating a structure based on national, regional and localcommittees to facilitate violence prevention andspecialized committees to address key themes. Thesestructures were financed mainly through the nationalbudget, with additional support provided by the privatesector and foreign aid agencies. By 1993, its annualbudget was over USD $12 million – a budget that did notreflect the significantly larger in-kind contributions madeby volunteers and organizations donating their staff andsupport services. The budget was initially administeredby the Department of Justice. In mid-1993, frustrationwith bureaucratic delays and a misperception thatfinancial management indicated government control ledto its transfer to the National Peace Secretariat.

National-level structuresSeveral structures were created at the national level. The60-person National Peace Committee (NPC) wascomposed of representatives from all the signatoryparties and members of the preparatory committee, co-chaired by business leader John Hall and Bishop StanleyMogoba. Its role was to oversee the implementation ofthe agreement as a whole and to resolve any politicalobstacles to its smooth functioning. It was also mandatedto monitor compliance with the codes of conduct forpolitical groups. The NPC was supported by anindependent National Peace Secretariat (NPS), chaired byAdvocate Anthonie Gildenhuys, which implemented itsorders and was responsible for establishing andcoordinating the regional committees. After considerablenegotiations, representatives of five political parties and arepresentative of the legal profession, as well as arepresentative from the Department of Justice wereselected to staff the seven-person NPS. Several positionswere left open in the hope that the non-signatory partieswould decide to join the agreement. The Department ofHome Affairs’ Directorate of Internal Peace Institutionsprovided the NPS’s infrastructural support. Both the NPCand NPS operated by consensus.

Also established at the national level was anindependent, five-person Commission of Inquiry(Goldstone Commission) to investigate the nature andcauses of political violence and intimidation, identifythose responsible and suggest remedies. It comprisedrespected senior members of the judiciary and legalprofession under the leadership of Justice RichardGoldstone. They investigated specific past events as well

South Africa’s National Peace Accord 23

National PeaceCommittee (NPC)Representatives of signatory parties.Oversawimplementation,monitoredcompliance withCode of Conduct forpolitical groups anddispute resolution.

National PeaceSecretariat (NPS)Representatives of4 major politicalparties. 1 person fromthe Peace Directorate& chaired byindependentadvocate. Chargedwith establishing andcoordinating RPCs.

Regional PeaceCommittees (RPCs)1 per province,11 nationally.Representatives ofpolitical and religiousgroups, business,unions, localauthorities, police anddefence forces, LPCsand otherstakeholders.

Local PeaceCommittees (LPCs)Approximately 260nationally.Membership reflectedcomposition ofcommunity.Accountable to RPC. Peace

MonitorsApprox.15,000

National structures Local and regional structures

Commission ofInquiry Regardingthe Prevention ofPublic Violence(GoldstoneCommission)

Police Board Socio-EconomicReconstruction &DevelopmentCommittees. 1 perregion to brokerdevelopmentprojects

Police ReportingOfficers. 1 per region

Special CriminalCourts (created in manylocalities)

as situations likely to trigger violence, such asdemonstrations or the upcoming elections. A PoliceBoard was established to make recommendations formore effective policing, improved police-communityrelations and policy changes.

Regional-level structuresEleven Regional Peace Committees (RPCs) wereestablished around the country, except in the fourindependent homeland territories that were not NPAsignatories. Each RPC comprised representatives ofpolitical and religious organizations, unions, business andindustry groups, local authorities, security forces andother relevant organizations. In some regions, the processof forming the RPC replicated the conflict dynamics of thecountry and called on all the NPS’s mediation skills beforethey could be constituted. They were charged withpreventing violence in their region by using a number ofapproaches, including mediation, monitoring, andfacilitating preventive action. They reported to thenational structures on the causes of violence, coordinatedactivities in the region and established networks of localcommittees. They made decisions by consensus. Inparticular, they established Socio-EconomicReconstruction and Development (SERD) committees tobroker development projects aimed at preventing orreducing violence. Also at the regional level were PoliceReporting Officers nominated by the Bar Association andappointed by the Minister of Law and Order. They wereresponsible for investigating allegations of policemisconduct and supervising the police department’sown Complaints Investigation Unit – which manysuspected was incapable of impartial investigations.

Local-level structuresIn each region, a number of Local Peace Committees(LPCs) were established, eventually totalling more than260 across the country. It was intended that membershipin each LPC would reflect the composition of thatcommunity and involve representatives of keystakeholder groups. Their function was to promote trustand reconciliation at the grassroots, mediate conflicts,facilitate agreements on the operation of local publicpolitical events,promote compliance with theagreements reached and liaise with the local police andjudiciary, and implement national and regional initiatives.They reported to their RPC. In many areas they becameinvolved in coordinating the 15,000 trained peacemonitors drawn from all sectors of society. The volunteerLPC members were trained in dispute resolution,meeting facilitation and negotiation skills and werecompensated for out-of-pocket expenses. In some areas,the LPCs worked closely with the SERD committees toaddress economic development in their community. In afew regions, special Justices of the Peace capable oflaunching their own inquiries into the violencecomplemented the LPCs’ work. Also at the local levelwere Special Criminal Courts established by theDepartment of Justice in cooperation with the local legalprofession. They were intended to process unrest-relatedcases more swiftly and effectively than the existing courtsand operated with special rules guiding evidence and procedures.

South Africa’s National Peace Accord structures

24 Accord 13

Responding to political violenceThe NPA agreement was a major breakthrough thathelped to create the space for parties to engage innegotiations to decide the political future of South Africa.Although the aims of the NPA were probably appropriateto address the violence and many of its goals wereachieved, resource limitations and political turmoil meantthat they were unable to end the violence or resolve thediverse conflicts. Yet the participants deserve credit forworking relentlessly for peace amidst growing cynicismover a continuing dirty war perpetuated by some of thesame parties who were signatories to the NPA. The peacecommittees helped to open channels of communication;legitimize the concept of negotiations; create a safespace to raise issues that could not be addressed in otherforums; strengthen accountability; equalise the powerbalance; and reduce the incidence of violence.1 It is, ofcourse, impossible to know what the consequencesmight have been in the absence of the NPA and itsstructures. Although statistics reflect an increase in thenumber of political fatalities for the period 1991-1993, it iswidely agreed that the levels of violence were reduced inmany areas from what they would have been withoutthese structures.

At national level, NPA structures contributed towardsencouraging and nurturing a culture of tolerance andnon-violence. It created an expectation that the signatorygroups would have to comply with the code of conduct.Although problematic in practice, it gave leverage to NPAstaff and volunteers to encourage political leaders andthe police to live up to their undertakings; manyresponded positively so as not to be seen in oppositionto the accord.

The NPA helped to shift the institutional cultures andbehaviour of both the South African Police (SAP) and theSouth African Defence Force (SADF), both of whomlacked public credibility. The SAP interacted with ordinary

citizens and international observers who cared deeplyabout human rights and the values underlying the NPAand were exposed to constructive problem solvingprocesses. Further, many NPA staff and volunteers usedthe Police Reporting Officers to consistently reportalleged offenders, holding the police accountable fortheir actions for the first time in decades. The processplayed an important role in stimulating the SAP to adopta community policing approach.

At the local and regional levels, the committeessuccessfully managed tensions between major politicalactors by facilitating forums for debate and decision-making. Tensions at the local level were addressed withinthe communities as far as possible. When local peacecommittees were unable to resolve conflicts, the RPCassisted them. They were often asked to help mediatespecific conflicts and helped to broker local peaceagreements on key issues of concern. They were alsoinstrumental in crisis management and violenceprevention. For example, after the revered militant leaderChris Hani was assassinated in April 1993 and massdemonstrations were planned throughout the country,the committees were instrumental in forming ‘jointoperations communications centres’ with the ANC andpolice so as to mitigate the potential for violence. On thisand other occasions, the deployment of peace monitorsto witness public events and position themselvesbetween the hostile forces was often effective inmoderating behaviour and increasing accountability.International observers complemented the efforts oflocal monitors. Although unable to prevent all fatalities, in retrospect it seems likely that they helped to stabilizethe situation at a very vulnerable moment in the peace process.

In addition to this direct work, the NPS sought tostimulate a pro-peace public constituency. They formed asubcommittee responsible for marketing and a media

25

department. They cooperated with South Africa’s topadvertising agencies in a peace promotion campaign,developing logos and peace messages and working withmusicians to develop a popular peace song. They helpedthe media to highlight positive stories instead of theusual sensationalist horror stories.

Assessing the shortcomingsDespite the many evident contributions made by theNPA, there were a number of shortcomings. Perhaps thecentral one was that the NPA structures dealt mostly withthe symptoms of violence rather than its underlyingcauses. Its limited capacity to promote socio-economicreconstruction and development was notable. It was alsounable to transform the violent conflict in the transportsector or to implement gun control measures and reducethe number of weapons, which may have enabled thepost-1994 crime wave. Yet the processes it fosteredopened space for South Africans to discuss these largerissues and to seek ways to address them.

The NPA was an agreement between the signatories butbecause it was not enforceable through the courts, theNPC could not use the legal system to sanction thosewho violated its code of conduct. Despite the need tomake amendments to update the NPA, the NationalPeace Convention was never reconvened after theoriginal event – in part because the political parties werebusy positioning themselves for elections. In retrospect,some consider that the NPA was a success despite thepolitical parties rather than because of them; yet withoutthe principled support of these parties, the regional andlocal peace committees could not have operated.

There were also shortcomings in the administration andimplementation of the NPA structures. One of the mostsignificant was the disparity between regions andlocalities, with some RPCs more effective than in others.Throughout the country, there were far more LPCs in ruralareas and an insufficient number in urban areas. Themarketing arm tended to overlook the importantmedium of radio, which has the widest reach in thecountry. Instead they concentrated on expensivetelevision campaigns and the print media, which reacheda disproportionately wealthier and more educatedaudience. Furthermore, although the NPA advocatedinclusiveness, it was clear that men dominated the peacestructures at the management level and only one womanserved on the NPS. When they were formed, almost allthe RPC chairs were white men – despite the transparentelection and appointment procedures. These tendencieswere largely reversed at the level of staff and volunteersand most of the RPCs and LPCs reflected thedemography of the communities they served.

From September 1994, soon after the elections, the newgovernment started closing down the peace structures

without stating its reasons. This decision was possiblytaken in the belief that the new Constitution provideddemocratic mechanisms at all levels that supplanted theneed for the NPA structures. Furthermore, the NPS alwayssaw its role as interim and short-term. Yet in many placesthe LPC's ‘peace office’ had become a valuable resourcefor local communities: they were places to discuss vitalissues and where telephones, a fax machine and a rapidresponse vehicle were available to people who neededthem most. After the closure of the NPA structures, theseresources were no longer available. The KwaZulu NatalProvincial Legislature was the only provincial governmentthat arranged for the continuation of a peace committee.Valuable data including the records of monitors, peacecommittee members, minutes and reports were lostbecause of a lack of coordination and a rigorous researchprogramme. The huge investment in human resourcesthrough training programmes and exposure to uniquepeacekeeping activities was dispersed as retrenched staffdashed to find employment, leaving the closure of NPAoperations in the hands of a few officials of theDepartment of Home Affairs’ Peace Directorate.

In addition to all its more formal achievements andshortcomings, there was also something less tangiblethat occurred through the joint efforts of those involvedin the NPA structures. The exposure of tens of thousandsof people to conflict resolution methodologies made adifference in the way many chose to respond to conflict.The experience of working in a diverse team withcompetent and committed people was a life-changingexperience for many and may have contributed to adeeper shift in South Africa’s divided society. As SusanCollin Marks, a key figure in the Western Cape RPC,observed in Watching the Wind:

“South Africans had never met one another before like this,face-to-face, and over time we learned to turn away fromour habit of fearing one another and instead begin to faceour common problems and jointly find solutions.… Asformer adversaries found one another’s humanitythroughout the country, so the foundation began to be builtfor a place where we could one day all be human beingstogether.” (2000, page 16)

It would be fair to attribute much of the success of SouthAfrica’s peaceful elections to the ordinary women andmen who came forward to make a difference.

1For further information, see . Ball, Nicole and Chris Spies. ManagingConflict: Lessons from the South African Peace Committees.(Washington, D.C.: US Agency for International Development, Centerfor Development and Evaluation: 1998)

F.W. De Klerk and Nelson Mandela at the National Peace Convention.Source: Rodger Bosch/iAfrica Photos

South Africa’s National Peace Accord

South Africa’smulti-partyconstitutionalnegotiationprocess Catherine Barnes and Eldred De Klerk

"…It is therefore important that as we put our vision to the country, we shoulddo so directly, knowing that people out there want to be part of the process andwill be responding, because in the end the drafting of the constitution must notbe the preserve of the 490 members of this Assembly. It must be a constitutionwhich they feel they own, a constitution that they know and feel belongs tothem. We must therefore draft a constitution that will be fully legitimate, aconstitution that will represent the aspirations of our people" .– Cyril Ramaphosa, Chairperson, Constitutional Assemb ly,

24 January 1995

South Africa’s diverse political parties – some ofwhich had a broad membership base andnumerous affiliated civil society organizations –

were at the centre of the negotiations to decide SouthAfrica’s political future culminating in a new Constitution.Although contested at times by the Inkatha FreedomParty (IFP), South Africa’s leaders chose to design andnegotiate the process by themselves without theguidance of an international mediator. The leadership ofthe two most powerful parties – the African NationalCongress (ANC) and the ruling National Party (NP) – werethe most influential in both instigating and shaping thenegotiation process and deciding its substantiveoutcomes. Throughout the long transitional process, they and the other parties engaged in a range of bilateral talks, seeking to resolve differences or makealliances to advance shared goals. Nevertheless, the main process was organized around formally constituted multi-party negotiating forums that allowedsmaller political groupings to voice their perspectives and help shape agreements. Over time, these forums became increasingly open to the media and thus underpublic scrutiny. Many of the political parties used theirmembership structures to consult with theirconstituencies on key issues in the negotiations and to ‘bring them along’ in the process, thus involving them indirectly in the negotiations and creating the foundations for a more inclusiverepresentative democracy.

Deciding the principles and structure of the negotiationprocess was as contentious as the substantive issues tobe addressed within it. The ANC wanted a unitary statethat would be a powerful instrument capable oftransforming the conditions wrought by apartheid, whileat the same time building in safeguards to protect rightsfrom illegitimate state intervention. From the outset, itdemanded an elected assembly to draft a newconstitution. It argued that a democratic state can only bebuilt on a firm democratic basis; the people, through theirelected representatives, must write their ownconstitution. The NP and other smaller partiesrepresenting minority constituencies feared that anelected assembly would negate the purpose ofnegotiations and result in majority rule withoutconstitutional safeguards to protect effective minority

South Africa

26 Accord 13

South Africa’s multi-party constitutional negotiation process 27

participation in political decision-making. They insteadproposed a multi-party forum where all political parties –without regard to their electoral support – would agreeby consensus to a new constitution subject to popularapproval through a referendum. This dispute waseventually addressed through the formula of first holdinga multi-party constitutional conference where all parties,irrespective of the size of their constituency couldparticipate as equals to decide core constitutionalprinciples and the structure of a transitional government.Then the public would elect the parties to form a power-sharing transitional government and the delegates to anassembly that would draft the final Constitution. Themulti-party conference was called the Convention for aDemocratic South Africa (CODESA) and, after that forumcollapsed, the Multi-party Negotiating Process (MPNP).These formally constituted mechanisms becameincreasingly open to public scrutiny, creating theprecedent for the transparent and consultativeconstitutional drafting process. This helped to providewidespread public legitimacy for the process to createwhat has become known as the ‘new South Africa’.

CODESA: first attempts to negotiatethe transitionAt the end of November 1991, after repeatedpostponements, an All-Party Preparatory Meetinginvolving most political parties and homelandgovernments was held to plan CODESA’s structure andworking methods. Importantly the delegates agreed tothe procedure of ‘sufficient consensus’: the conventionshould seek consensus but, if it proved impossible, thechair would decide whether there was sufficientagreement to allow negotiations to proceed. Since anelectorate did not mandate the parties and the processwas designed to be as inclusive of parties as possible – nomatter how small their support base – it was agreed thatno decision would be taken on any matter unless thegovernment and ANC, at the very least, were inagreement. Nonetheless, agreement between only theANC and government was considered insufficient for adecision to be taken. Although the IFP in particular feltaggrieved by this principle and others contested itsappropriate application at various points during thenegotiations, this method created an incentive for themoderate parties committed to reaching an agreementnot to be held hostage by the extremes.

On 20 December 1991, 238 delegates from the 19participating parties together with nearly 1,000international observers gathered for the first plenarysession, CODESA I. Although most political groupingsparticipated, the Conservative Party (CP) on the right andAZAPO and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) to the leftboycotted it. Women comprised only about 5 per cent ofthe delegates. Appalled, parliamentary veteran Helen

Suzman intervened to point out the imbalance,highlighting the parallels between gender discriminationand racism. Most of the parties thereafter made efforts toincrease gender representivity in the negotiations. Theplenary was mostly a ceremonial occasion to mark aformal commitment amongst the participating parties tonegotiate a settlement. The delegates agreed aDeclaration of Intent to guide the negotiators towardcreating a ‘united, non-racial and non-sexist state’protected by a Bill of Rights, with multi-party democracybased on universal adult franchise and a proportionalrepresentation electoral system. They also agreed toform CODESA as a standing institution to facilitate anegotiation process.

CODESA’s management structure and operationsThe first plenary established five working groups toaddress key issues and a Management Committee tooversee the process; it also decided that the secondplenary session would take place in March 1992. TheManagement Committee was responsible for the overallpolitical guidance of the process and consisted of onedelegate and one advisor from each party. To assist itswork, a secretariat and Daily Management Committeewere established, with administrative staff seconded bythe Department of Constitutional Development and theConsultative Business Movement The ManagementCommittee established several sub-committees toaddress important substantive issues. The first addressedthe representation of traditional leaders and otherswho applied to participate. Traditional leaders were

eventually accorded special, but not equal,representation in the negotiations channelled thoughfour provincial delegations.

Each party could nominate two delegates and twoadvisors to each working group. The five working groupswere created to address: (1) creation of a climate for freepolitical activity; (2) constitutional principles; (3) transitionalarrangements; (4) future of the ‘independent homeland’states; (5) timeframe and implementation. Working groupssat two days a week and Parliament sat the other threedays. Each group had a steering committee to manage theagenda and work programme. Groups prepared interimreports tabled to the Management Committee, whichwould eventually table agreed proposals at the CODESAplenary for approval and ratification. CODESA soonbecame the most important site of political activity and itsregularity helped to generate collegial working relationsbetween the negotiators.

Although the public was invited to make submissions onconstitutional principles to the working groups, CODESAmade little attempt to either educate the public about itswork or elicit the views of important groupings on the

28 Accord 13

substantive issues; delegates and their advisors were theprimary figures to develop options and negotiateagreements. Some CODESA members later criticized itslack of transparency and the South African CommunistParty’s Joe Slovo noted public perceptions of a“mysterious cabal”. Initial moves to open negotiations tothe press, however, were interrupted by a collapse of theprocess. It also became apparent in retrospect that thestructure of developing substantive proposals throughworking groups created impediments to developingintegrative ‘packages’ of agreements across issues. Itfurthermore meant that successes in one group but not in another placed strain on the entire process –particularly as no deadlock breaking mechanisms had been envisioned.

Breakdown of the CODESA processBy March 1992, the progress of the working groupshalted. Facing intense criticism from conservatives thatthe NP did not represent white voters, President De Klerkcalled a risky referendum to gauge the support of thewhite electorate. The NP won an overwhelming victory,confirming that the majority of whites supported anegotiated settlement. With its position greatlystrengthened, the NP returned to the processdetermined to hold its line against the ANC’s insistenceon installing an interim government in the near future. Topressure the parties to reach agreement in the workinggroups, the Management Committee set 15-16 May asthe date for the second plenary session in order to ratifyagreements to guide the next phase.

Yet by early April the process was beginning to flounder;parties were unable to reach a common formula oninterim governance and the principles for creating thenew state political structure. They agreed on the formula

of a transitional government and assembly to draft aninterim constitution but disagreed over the percentage ofvotes needed to adopt the constitution and contestedthe role of a potential second parliamentary chamber.The NP wanted a system that would give it an effectiveveto and maintain its relevance as a political force,whereas the ANC feared it would be forced to liveindefinitely with an interim constitution. The day beforethe plenary, Working Groups 1, 3 and 5 had reachedagreement but Working Group 2 on constitutionalprinciples remained deadlocked. The NP tabled a newproposal and the ANC called a consultation meeting forthe 85 unions and political, religious, and studentorganisations in the Mass Democratic Movement tofinalise its position. Yet at the two-day ‘CODESA II’ plenary,tensions between negotiators escalated under the glareof television cameras and journalist interviews. Repeatedadjournments were called in the hopes that WorkingGroup 2 could devise a breakthrough. But it neveremerged and the parties agreed to convene anotherplenary at a later point.

Many observers thought the NP’s refusal to compromisewas due to its over-estimation of its power following theMarch referendum. After the failure of CODESA II, the ANCdecided to demonstrate its power through the use of a‘rolling mass action’ of coordinated strikes and streetdemonstrations with the aim of forcing the governmentto agree to an interim government, despite fears offuelling the political violence. In mid-June 49 people werekilled in the ANC stronghold of Boipatong. This timeMandela held De Klerk personally culpable andsuspended all talks – both bilaterally with thegovernment and multilaterally through CODESA.

South Africa’s multi-party constitutional negotiation process 29

The business and international communities immediatelyvoiced their concern. Over the following weeks therewere a number of initiatives to bring in an internationalmediator. In mid-July, the UN Security Council held anunprecedented two-day debate on South Africa thatresulted in the appointment of a Special-Representativeof the Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance, to investigate theviolence and make recommendations on restarting talks.This soon led to the creation of a 50-member UNobserver mission and support for the National PeaceAccord (NPA) structures. The NPA was the only multi-party forum to remain operational throughout this periodand provided continuity and a space for partyrepresentatives to meet when other avenues forcommunication were blocked, helping to stabilize thepolitical conflict.

Multi-party Negotiating ProcessAfter CODESA’s collapse, De Klerk and Mandelaexchanged memoranda and the NP considerablysoftened its demands. By August 1992, the ANC hadagreed to establish a ‘channel bilateral’ for maintainingquiet dialogue, nominating Cyril Ramaphosa to hold talkswith the NP’s Roelf Meyer. They made considerableprogress and on 26 September Mandela and De Klerkheld a summit to sign the Record of Understanding. Theyagreed on the principles of an interim government at thenational and regional levels empowered by an interimconstitution. They also agreed on a formula for an electedassembly that would serve as an interim parliament anddraft a constitution based on principles agreed in priormulti-party negotiations. They agreed that to improveefficacy, in future negotiations, the ANC and NP wouldfirst reach agreement on a bilateral basis before going toother parties for multilateral negotiation: in sum, otherscould either agree to be a part of the process or be left behind.

The agreement appalled most right-wing parties –sparking the IFP and CP to join with a number ofhomeland governments and Afrikaner parties to form theConcerned South Africans Group (COSAG). They rejectedthe principles outlined in the agreement and demandedit be scrapped. In the following months, Buthelezithreatened secession but the move was met with intensediplomatic pressure that revealed his isolation. Theagreement also surfaced fault lines within the NP and theANC over both tactical and substantive principles. Thepro-negotiation faction within the NP leadership waseventually able to predominate. The ANC engaged inconsultations with constituents and eventuallycommitted itself to a positive-sum negotiating positionbased on a transitional period of power-sharing, thusdecisively moving away from a maximalist, zero-sumstrategy aiming at the immediate elimination of the NP as a political force.

Towards the end of the year, ANC and NP teams met forseveral days in a secluded game lodge – an atmospherethat proved conducive both to developing politicalformulas and humanizing the working relationships. At asimilarly structured meeting in January and successivebilaterals thereafter, they formulated a joint negotiatingposition to guide their participation as a bloc in a futuremultilateral forum. The COSAG members becameincreasingly aware that if they did not participate in sucha forum, they would have little influence on theoutcomes. By January 1993 they agreed to resume multi-party talks but wanted to have a voice in the creation ofthe new negotiating forum – even if many of its termshad been predetermined by the ANC and NP. ANegotiation Planning Conference was held in earlyMarch, where the political parties were able to restructurethe process and address some of the previous objectionsto CODESA. Agreements reached in principle in theearlier forum would be a guide but were non-binding.Reluctant to use the name CODESA and unable to agreeto a new one, on 1 April 1993 what became known as theMulti-party Negotiating Process (MPNP) opened at theWorld Trade Centre. It convened 26 participating partiescomprising political groupings, national and homelandgovernment representatives and traditional leaders. Forthe first time the PAC, CP and Volksunie participated; onlythe far-left AZAPO and several extreme Afrikaner partiesrefused to join.

MPNP structures and working methodsThere were a number of innovations in the MPNPstructure. The highest decision-making body was the208-member, 26-party, parliamentary-style plenary. Butthe process was focused around a Negotiating Councilthat met three to four days a week to developagreements that would be ratified by the plenary, whichmet whenever necessary. The Council was composed oftwo delegates per party – at least one of whom had to bea woman – and two advisers. The original idea for aNegotiating Forum situated between the Plenary andCouncil was deemed unnecessary and its responsibilitiesinstead devolved to the Council.

Instead of presenting their views orally in the Council,parties prepared written submissions that were firstconsidered by a series of issue-specific TechnicalCommittees consisting of non-party political expertsappointed by the Council. They drafted reports thatsought to take everyone’s views into account, seekingcompromise formulas and methods for breakingdeadlocks. Their reports were considered by the PlanningCommittee, which drafted resolutions for considerationby the Council. The Planning Committee assumed mostof the same roles as CODESA’s Management Committee.It consisted of 10 Council members, appointed in theirpersonal capacities rather than as party representatives,

Sitting of the CODESA at the World Trade Center,Kempton Park, November 1993.Source: Henner Frankenfeld/PictureNET

and was chaired on a rotating basis. It tended to set theoverall negotiating agenda and oversaw the work of twonon-partisan commissions on the demarcation of regionsand on national symbols. The process was administeredby the Consultative Business Movement, which providedan independent secretariat and administrative support.

Although the Plenary continued to make decisions by‘sufficient consensus’, strategies to address thesubstantive details of the negotiations were developed inthe Technical Committees and the tough politicaldecisions were worked out in the Negotiating Council.Bilateral bargaining behind-the-scenes complementedthese formal processes.

Violent attempts to derail the negotiationsShortly after the MPNP began, an extremist groupassassinated the popular militant leader Chris Hani.Amidst the outpourings of grief, anger and frustrationthat threatened to engulf the country in protest andviolence, Mandela appealed for calm; the leadershiprecognized the killing as an attempt to derail thenegotiations. The ANC, NP and other moderate partiesrealized that they needed to move quickly to reachagreements that could begin to bring home the fruits ofthe transition, most visible of which would be thecountry’s first non-racial democratic elections. Toexpedite the process, the Negotiating Council agreed a

new Declaration of Intent, noting the urgent need toreduce violence and inspire broad public confidence inthe process and a clear vision of the milestones markingthe transition process. Senior leaders in the CBM, alarmedat the uncertainty inherent in protracted negotiationsand the escalating instability, met with key politicalleaders to demand swift settlement; a demandunderscored shortly afterwards by a similar initiative fromthe COSATU labour movement.

At the beginning of June 1993, the Negotiating Councilagreed to set the election date for 27 April 1994. Theplenary had to ratify the date, which generatedtremendous pressure to bargain over the principlesguiding the constitution-making process. To keep theCOSAG alliance in the process, the ANC made thesignificant concession to structure the state on thenational, regional and local levels, which would each havedemocratically elected governing bodies. Yet when theANC and NP blocked the IFP’s demand for a debate on afederal constitution, the COSAG group staged a walkout.Although most parties eventually returned, the IFP andCP remained largely outside the process. Following anMPNP decision to reject an Afrikaner homeland, severalhundred white paramilitaries stormed the negotiatingchambers at the World Trade Centre in late June,roughing up the delegates. Though shocking, it mostlyserved to undermine the image of the perpetrators.When the Plenary – minus most of the COSAG group –finally ratified the election date, it sparked a wave of

PlanningCommittee(10 membersappointed in personal capacity)

NegotiatingCouncil(4 delegates + 2advisors per party)

Negotiating Forum(did not becomeactive)

Plenary(10 delegates perparty for 208 members)

Administration(Consultative BusinessMovement)

Commission onNationalSymbols(non-partisan)

Commission forthe Demarcationof Provinces(non-partisan)

CODESA II(plenary)

DailyManagementCommittee(7 members)

SecretariatAdministration(Secretarial services,travel, conventionmanagement, finance)

Sub-committees

Creation of climate for free political activity

Constitutional principles

Transitional arrangements

Future of TBVC states

Timeframe and implementation

Declaration of Intent

Work ing groups

Participation ofTraditional Leaders

Gender AdvisoryCommittee

Management Committee(38 members - 2 from each party)

CODESA’s structures

Multi-party negotiating process structures

Violence

Fundamental Human Rights

Constitutional Issues

Discriminatory Legislation

Transitional Executive Council

Technical Committees(5-6 non-partisan experts)

Independent Media Commission

30 Accord 13

South Africa’s multi-party constitutional negotiation process 31

violence throughout the country. Yet throughout thisperiod, the ongoing violence appeared to deepen themoderate parties’ commitment and bound them furtherto the negotiation process.

From July to August, the MPNP engaged in intensenegotiations over various draft interim constitutions andthe structure of the Transitional Executive Council thatwould be the central governing authority. The IFP, theAfrikaner AWB and their allies – now regrouped as the‘Freedom Alliance’ – continued to reject the process. Theydemanded a summit of select leaders to negotiate thefinal constitution prior to elections. Violence escalatedamidst ‘war talk’ by both the far left and especially the farright. Nevertheless, in the early hours of 18 November1993, the Negotiating Council adopted a comprehensivepackage agreement – including an electoral act and theinterim constitution giving legal basis for the transitionalinstitutions and specifying non-negotiable constitutionalprinciples – that became the basis for South Africa’sdemocratization pact.

The leaders were careful to leave the door open to thePAC, AZAPO and the Freedom Alliance to join theagreement and in the following months sought to bringthem on board. Nevertheless there were real fears thatthe right-wing forces would organize armed resistanceleading to civil war. Furthermore, there were fears thatSouth Africa’s future would be deeply compromised ifmajor constituencies were not represented in theelections which would choose parties for the transitionalgovernment of national unity and delegates to theassembly that would write the final constitution. If theywere not involved in the process, they might then work to undermine it.

In the first months of 1994, there were numerous bilateralmeetings with the IFP and AWB to prevent a boycott ofthe elections and to bring them back into theconstitution-making process. In March, the ANC and IFPagreed to international mediation led by former USSecretary of State Henry Kissinger. Althoughdisagreement over the terms of reference meant theinitiative never got off the ground, it effectivelyfragmented the Freedom Alliance bloc. In March, the ANCreached agreement with the newly formed Afrikaner-based Freedom Front on how they could pursue anAfrikaner ‘volkstaat’ (a self-governing entity) through theconstitutional process. Civil unrest in theBophuthatswana and Ciskei homelands led thegovernment to reincorporate them into South Africa.With the conservative bloc in disarray, the ANC, NP andIFP concluded an agreement several days before theelections, whereupon the IFP agreed to participate. Thenthe Freedom Front also agreed to take part. In the end, allthe main political parties participated in the electionsheld 27-29 April 1994. Despite some minor squabbles,logistical and registration problems, and queries over the

absolute accuracy of the results, the elections wereremarkably peaceful and brought out the overwhelmingmajority of the eligible public to cast their vote.

Constitutional Assembly structures andworking methodsThe Constitutional Assembly consisted of both houses ofthe newly elected Parliament: the National Assembly andthe Senate. Its 490 members were drawn from sevenpolitical parties, represented proportionally inaccordance with their share of the vote. To preventindefinite delays, there were numerous deadlockbreaking measures and delegates had to finalize a draftwithin two years. The new constitution had to complywith the 34 principles agreed in the MPNP and pass by atwo-thirds majority vote; failing this, it would have to passthe assembly by a simple majority and then be put to anational referendum to pass by a 60 per cent majority.The Constitutional Court would test the text approved bythe Constitutional Assembly and thus serve as the onlyand final arbiter on whether it complied with the agreed principles.

One of the remarkable features of the process was thelevel of consensus achieved, despite the disparity in theproportion of seats held by the parties – with the ANC atalmost 64 per cent, the NP a little over 20 per cent, the IFPalmost 10 per cent and the remaining four partiescomprising the remaining 6 percent of the seats. Afteryears of multi-party negotiations, in which the parties hadexperienced a steep learning curve, the ConstitutionalAssembly was able to crystallize a consensual approach. Itwas based on both the flexibility of the major players whowere committed to seeking ‘win-win’ agreements andthe design of the negotiating structures that generatedworkable proposals. The level of camaraderie amongstthe negotiators and skillful administrative supportenhanced these attributes to create a conduciveenvironment. Although the IFP ultimately withdrew fromthe process, the Constitutional Assembly votedoverwhelmingly in favour of the final amended text on 11October 1996.

The Constitutional Assembly was guided by a set ofvalues that were manifest in mechanisms for publicparticipation built into the process. The Assembly’s workwas organized to satisfy three fundamental principles:inclusivity, accessibility, and transparency.1 To ensureinclusivity, it was agreed that the constitution had to bethe product of the ideas of all the major elements ofsociety, grouped as three categories of role players: therepresented political parties; parties outside theConstitutional Assembly together with organised civilsociety; and individual citizens. To encourageaccessibility, the parties agreed that it was not enough tomerely invite submissions; it was necessary to solicitviews proactively. Transparency was promoted by

32 Accord 13

allowing all meetings of the Constitutional Assembly andits structures to be open to the public and all materials –including minutes, reports and submissions – madeaccessible through the internet. Furthermore, the newconstitution would be drafted in plain speech so thatordinary people could understand it, translated into theeleven main languages and disseminated through amassive public education programme.

The structuresSix theme committees of 30 appointed members eachwere formed to address subsets of the 34 constitutionalprinciples. The committees respectively covered: (1) thecharacter of the democratic state; (2) the structure ofgovernment; (3) the relationship between levels ofgovernment; (4) fundamental rights; (5) the judiciary andlegal systems; and (6) government institutions. The mainfunction of the theme committees was to ensure theinclusiveness of the process by receiving the views andsubmissions of all the role players. The committees weretherefore the initial interface between the ConstitutionalAssembly and the public. A technical committeeconsisting of three to four experts supported each themecommittee and various ad hoc expert committees wereappointed to address specific subjects.

The Assembly created a Constitutional Committee as themain negotiating and coordinating structure, comprising44 members appointed by parties in proportion to theirrepresentation and including their chief negotiator. Thishelped to ensure that the smaller parties, who did nothave enough representatives to always field members inthe theme committees, were not disadvantaged. TheConstitutional Committee’s smaller size and ability tomeet frequently made it the most important element ofthe decision-making structure. It formed a ManagementCommittee charged with managing the day-to-dayprocess of the negotiations – including the importanttask of ensuring the structures worked according to planin order to meet the timetable deadline. When it becameclear that certain issues were the subject of seriousdisagreement in both the large theme committee andConstitutional Committee forums, a ten-member sub-committee was established to address these topics – witha membership that varied according to the issues underdiscussion. The Assembly also established theCommission on Provincial Government to oversee thecreation of this new governing system and the VolkstaatCouncil to enable proponents of this idea to developproposals for establishing a Afrikaner self-determiningentity constitutionally. An independent panel ofconstitutional experts was established with the primaryaim of helping to resolve conflicts, avoiding deadlocksbetween parties and providing advice on technical issues.

Public participation programmeTo enable public participation, the parties swiftly agreed athree-phase work programme that included a first phaseof activities to elicit issues to be considered in preparing adraft, followed by a second phase where the publicwould be invited to comment on the draft text, and athird phase when the Constitutional Assembly wouldfinalize and adopt the new Constitution.

The first phase started in December 1994. A MediaDepartment was immediately established to initiate print,radio and television programmes about the work of theAssembly, as well as a national advertising campaign.Much of the messaging was based on the slogan ‘You’vemade your mark, now have your say’. Agencies werecommissioned to conduct a survey to assess thepenetration of the campaign after three months, whichrevealed areas in need of further attention and resulted ina Constitutional Education Programme.

Once the negotiators in the theme committees reachedagreement on the areas to be covered, they placedadvertisements in major newspapers invitingsubmissions and organised workshops and consultationswith affected sectors to elicit views. Every South Africanwas invited to share their thoughts by sending writtensubmissions, making oral statements at a public meeting,phoning the Constitutional Assembly talk line, or usingthe internet. Through a face-to-face outreachprogramme, the Assembly, assisted by local civil societyorganizations, targeted communities that would find itdifficult to access information through print or electronicmedia – particularly in remote areas or communities withlow literacy rates. For many of these, it was the first timethey were able to interact directly with their electedrepresentatives. It elicited nearly 1.7 million submissions –most of which were in the form of signatures on petitions– and more than a thousand workshops, briefings andmeetings reaching approximately 95,000 people.

The submissions were collated into reports, noting theconvergence of ideas and agreements as well ascontentious issues and ideas for addressing them. Thesubmissions soon generated a long list of new issues,sparking an important debate over which issues shouldbe addressed in the constitution and which should beaddressed through ordinary legislation. This dilemmawas partially addressed by the panel of constitutionalexperts, which drafted criteria for considering the issuesfor inclusion. Of the 13,443 written submissions – rangingin size from a few handwritten lines to printed reportsover a 100 pages long – about 10 per cent were fromorganizations, about 0.6 per cent from political parties,and the vast majority from individuals. Yet adisproportionate share of the submissions were from thewell-educated, the middle class, and professionals,

33South Africa’s multi-party constitutional negotiating process

academics and political activists. This posed dilemmasabout whether the submissions should be regarded asrepresentative and the weight they should be given inthe context of negotiations between democraticallyelected parties. In a country with such enormousdisparities in education and access to information andother resources, issues of representativity were at theforefront of concern.2

In the first phase, responses were copied and sorted bythe secretariat and then forwarded to the experts in therelevant technical committees. They collated the subjectsand prepared summary reports for consideration by theirtheme committees. Yet the vast quantity of input createda major challenge in information management –particularly for Theme Committee 4, charged withaddressing the rights issues that were the main subject ofthe submissions. It seems that the submissions fromorganizations with links to parties or with specializedknowledge of the issues were given seriousconsideration. Submissions from individual citizens werenot utilized systematically by the drafters in the firstphase, in part because of the sheer volume of materialand in part because some issues were seeminglyunrelated to the negotiating agenda.

In the second phase of consultation, during December1995 and January 1996, over four million copies of theworking draft constitution were distributed in the secondphase of consultation, along with explanatory articlesand graphics. The draft attracted about 250,000submissions that were more focused and betterprocessed. They were summarized and linked to specificarticles in the constitution, making them more accessibleto representatives negotiating a revised draft, thusincreasing the probability they would be considered.

The Constitutional Assembly deliberations were open tothe public and well covered by journalists. But in the latestages of negotiations, when time was running out andagreement still elusive, the parties held frequent bilateraland multilateral meetings in private. This move wascriticized by some civic organizations and the mediaparticularly objected to the closure of multilateralmeetings. Yet privacy enabled the negotiators to makeconcessions without being revealed in the media asbetrayed their constituencies; privacy also reduced thetemptation to publicly score points in the ongoingdebate – an experience that revealed some of thetensions between the needs of principled negotiationsversus those of constituency politicking.

The Assembly was concerned to create an awareness thatwould help make the new Constitution a reference pointfor all South Africans on the foundation of theirdemocracy. It disseminated 7 million copies of the finaldocument in all 11 official languages, accompanied by an

illustrated popular version. There were few opportunitiesfor formal debate between the Assembly and the public,yet there was significant informal discussion amongSouth Africans, both in public and in private. Surveysindicated that a quarter of all adults had discussed theConstitutional Assembly and related issues with friends orfamily. The constitutional debate and the previousnegotiations helped to legitimize and underscore theimportance of democratic processes as the way toaddress political conflict. CASE’s survey also indicated thatthe public participation initiatives helped to create astrong sense of ownership of the Constitution among thepublic, the majority of whom felt they had an opportunityto contribute its creation – despite some lingeringscepticism amongst those who perceived they had themost to lose in the new system.

ConclusionThe promise of CODESA and the MPNP was for politicalaccess and power to all South Africans and for a politicalmachinery to achieve this promise. The mechanismsemployed relied on the broad membership base of thepolitical parties and their reach into the grassroots ofSouth Africa’s diverse communities as the principalmeans of opening up the transition process to publicinvolvement. The caution is that this mode ofchannelling and enabling popular participation hashistorically been viewed by the ANC as a means to bolsterthe role of the state under its leadership, rather than as anindependent force, potentially contradicting, challenging,or forcing it to rethink its policies. The post-1994 politicalscenario has seen government and civil society start aproductive and co-operative relationship in the fields ofservice delivery and, to a lesser extent, in policy-making.Yet today, many in government see civil society’s‘watchdog’ role as a thorn in its side. Nonetheless, SouthAfrica is among the few countries in the world where theruling party openly expresses a commitment to civilsociety participation – a factor that can be used by civilsociety to strengthen its role. As in the turbulent times ofapartheid, civil society in post-1994 can continue to be aforce for making the government of the day accountableto its constituencies. Now that South Africa has created asystem of government enabling all citizens to vote andgain access to power, the challenge is to organizepeople to influence the way power is conceptualizedand exercised. This is the challenge for public

participation today.

1For further information, see Hassen Ebrahim. The Soul of a Nation:Constitution-Making in South Africa. (Cape Town: Oxford UniversityPress, 1998)

2For further analysis, see as Siri Gloppen South Africa: the Battle overthe Constitution (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Company, Ltd. 1997)

34 Accord 13

SouthAfricaKey texts National Peace Accord

[Opening preamble, contents,chapter 7 and 8 andsignatories]

To signify our common purpose tobring an end to political violence inour country and to set out the codesof conduct, procedures andmechanisms to achieve this goal.

We, participants in the political processin South Africa, representing thepolitical parties and organisations andgovernments indicated beneath oursignatures, condemn the scourge ofpolitical violence which has afflictedour country and all such practices ashave contributed to such violence inthe past, and commit ourselves and theparties, organisations and governmentswe represent to this National PeaceAccord.

The current prevalence of politicalviolence in the country has alreadycaused untold hardship, disruption andloss of life and property in our country.It now jeopardises the very process ofpeaceful political transformation andthreatens to leave a legacy ofinsurmountable division and deepbitterness in our country. Many,probably millions, of citizens live incontinuous fear as a result of theclimate of violence. This dehumanising factor must be eliminated from our society.

In order to achieve some measure ofstability and to consolidate the peaceprocess, a priority shall be theintroduction of reconstruction actionsaimed at addressing the worst effects ofpolitical violence at a local level. Thiswould achieve a measure of stabilitybased on common effort therebyfacilitating a base for broader socio-economic development.

Reconstruction and developmentalactions of the communities as referredto above, shall be conducted within thewider context of socio-economicdevelopment.

In order to effectively eradicateintimidation and violence, mechanismsneed to be created which shall on theone hand deal with the investigation ofincidents and the causes of violenceand intimidation and on the otherhand actively combat the occurrence ofviolence and intimidation.

The police force, which by definitionshall include the police forces of allself-governing territories, has a centralrole to play in terminating the violenceand in preventing the futureperpetration of such violence.However, the perception of the pastrole of the police has engenderedsuspicion and distrust between thepolice and many of the affectedcommunities. In recognition of theneed to promote more effectivepolicing, a commitment to soundpolicing practices and a co-operativerelationship between the police and thecommunities are necessary.

This Accord is intended to promotepeace and prosperity in violence-stricken communities. The right of allpeople to live in peace and harmonywill be promoted by theimplementation of this Accord.

The Accord is of such a nature thatevery peace-loving person can supportit. The Accord reflects the values of allkey players in the arena of negotiationand reconciliation.

The implementation and monitoring ofthe Peace Accord represents a crucialphase in the process to restore peaceand prosperity to all the people ofSouth Africa.

Noting that the majority of SouthAfricans are God-fearing citizens, weask for His blessing, care andprotection upon our Nation to fulfil thetrust placed upon us to ensure freedomand security for all.

Bearing in mind the values which wehold, be these religious orhumanitarian, we pledge ourselveswith integrity of purpose to make thisland a prosperous one where we can alllive, work and play together in peaceand harmony.

The signatories have agreed upon;

a Code of Conduct for political partiesand organisations to be followed by allthe political parties and organisationsthat are signatories to this Accord;

a Code of Conduct to be adhered to byevery police official: to the best of hisor her ability, as well as a detailedagreement on the security forces;

the guidelines for the reconstructionand development of the communities;

the establishment of mechanisms toimplement the provisions of thisAccord.

The signatories acknowledge that theprovisions of this Peace Accord aresubject to existing laws, rules andprocedures and budgetary constraints.New structures should not be createdwhere appropriate existing structurescan be used.

This Accord will not be construed so asto detract from the validity of bilateralagreements between any of thesignatories.

We, the signatories, accordinglysolemnly bind ourselves to this Accordand shall ensure as far as humanlypossible that all our members andsupporters will comply with theprovisions of this accord and willrespects its underlying rights andvalues and we, the governmentsignatories, undertake to pursue theobjectives of this accord and seek togive effect to its provisions by way of the legislative, executive andbudgeting procedures to which we have access.

Chapter 1. Principles

Chapter 2. Code of Conduct forpolitical parties andorganisations

Chapter 3. Security Forces: Generalprovisions

Chapter 4. Security Forces: Policecode of conduct

Chapter 5. Measures to facilitatesocio-economicreconstruction anddevelopment

Chapter 6. Commission of Inquiryregarding the preventionof public violence andintimidation

Chapter 7. National Peace Secretariat,Regional And LocalDispute Resolution

35South Africa Key texts

Committees

Chapter 8. National Peace Committee

Chapter 9. Enforcing the peaceagreement between theparties

Chapter 10. Special Criminal Courts

CHAPTER 7

National Peace Secretariat, RegionalAnd Local Dispute ResolutionCommittees

7.1. It is clear from the aforegoing thatsufficient instruments exist toinvestigate violence and intimidationand to bring the perpetrators thereof tobook. Insufficient instruments existhowever to actively combat violenceand intimidation at grassroots level. Itis therefore proposed that committeesbe appointed at regional and locallevels to assist in this regard. These committees will require national co-ordination.

7.2 In order to provide managementskills, budgetary commitment andstatutory empowerment and sanction,State involvement is essential.

7.3 A National Peace Secretariat

7.3.1 A National Peace Secretariat shallbe established, comprising at least fourpersons nominated by the NationalPeace Committee and onerepresentative of the Department of Justice. Further members, up to a maximum of four, may also be appointed.

7.3.2 The function of the NationalPeace Secretariat will be to establishand co-ordinate the Regional DisputeResolution Committees and the LocalDispute Resolution Committees.

7.3.3 The National Peace Secretariatwill take decisions on a consensus basis.

7.3.4 The required financial andadministrative resources of theNational Peace Secretariat, and theother bodies established by it, will beprovided by the Department of Justice.

7.4 Regional and Local DisputeCommittees

7.4.1 Peace bodies are to be establishedat both regional and local level, to bestyled "Regional Dispute ResolutionCommittees" (RDRC) and "LocalDispute Resolution Committees"(LDRC) respectively.

7.4.2 Just as the Commission will gainits legitimacy from its composition,reflecting the interested and relevantorganisations, the RDRCs and LDRCswill gain their legitimacy byrepresenting the people andcommunities they are designed to serve.

7.4.3 The areas of jurisdiction of theRDRCs shall be decided by the NationalPeace Secretariat until such time asstatutory provision is made.

7.4.4 RDRCs will be constituted asfollows:

7.4.4.1 representatives from relevantpolitical organisations;

7.4.4.2 representatives from relevantchurches;

7.4.4.3 representatives of relevant tradeunions, industry and business in theregion;

7.4.4.4 representatives of relevant localand tribal authorities; and

7.4.4.5 representatives from the policeand the defence force.

7.4.5 Duties of RDRCs shall include the following:

7.4.5.1 attending to any matter referredto it by the LDRC, the National PeaceSecretariat or the Commission;

7.4.5.2 advising the Commission onmatters causing violence andintimidation in the region;

7.4.5.3 settling disputes causing publicviolence or intimidation by negotiatingwith the parties concerned andrecording the terms of such settlements;

7.4.5.4 guiding LDRCs in their duties;

7.4.5.5 monitoring current applicablepeace accords and future peaceagreements entered into in the relevantregion and settling disputes arisingfrom them;

7.4.5.6 informing the National PeaceSecretariat of steps taken to preventviolence and intimidation in its regionincluding breaches of PeaceAgreements; and

7.4.5.7 consulting with the relevantauthorities in its region to combat orprevent violence and intimidation.

7.4.6 The communities within whichLDRCs are to be established should beidentified by the RDRCs.

7.4.7 LDRCs will be constituted bydrawing representatives reflecting theneeds of the relevant community.

7.4.8 Duties of the LDRCs shall includethe following:

7.4.8.1 attending to any matter referredto it by either the Commission or the RDRCs;

7.4.8.2 creating trust and reconciliationbetween grassroots communityleadership of relevant organisations,including the police and the defenceforce;

7.4.8.3 co-operating with the localJustice of the Peace in combating andpreventing violence and intimidation;

7.4.8.4 settling disputes causing publicviolence or intimidation by negotiatingwith the parties concerned andrecording the terms of such settlements;

7.4.8.5 eliminating conditions whichmay harm peace accords or peaceful relations;

7.4.8.6 reporting and makingrecommendations to the relevant RDRCs;

7.4.8.7 to promote compliance withcurrently valid and future peaceaccords and agreements entered into in the relevant area;

7.4.8.8 to agree upon rules andconditions relating to marches, rallies and gatherings; and

7.4.8.9 liaise with local police and localmagistrates on matters concerning theprevention of violence, the holding ofrallies, marches and gatherings.

7.5 Justices of the Peace

7.5.1 It is proposed that additionalJustices of the Peace be appointed afterconsultation with the relevant partiesand the LDRCs. The purpose of theJustices of the Peace will essentially beto promote the peace process atgrassroots level and to assist the LDRCsin their activities.

7.5.2 Duties of Justices of the Peaceshall include the following:

7.5.2.1 investigating any complaintreceived from anyone pertaining topublic violence and intimidation,except where legal processes ofinvestigations instituted by the SouthAfrican Police, other police forces, the

Commission, the RDRCs, the PoliceReporting Officer or a commission ofinquiry are dealing with the relevant matter;

7.5.2.2 mediating between relevantparties to a dispute by negotiation;

7.5.2.3 applying rules of natural justicewhen issuing an order which will befair and just in the particularcircumstances in order to restorepeaceful relations;

7.5.2.4 referring facts constituting an offence to the relevant Attorney-General;

7.5.2.5 in co-operation with parties andin consultation with the LDRCs actingas the ears and eyes of LDRCs andreacting in urgent cases;

7.5.2.6 in all matters relating to publicviolence reporting to the LDRCs; and

7.5.2.7 to pronounce as a judgementthe terms of a settlement reached atLDRCs or RDRCs, provided that the terms of such settlement are executable.

7.6 RDRCs, LDRCs and Justices of thePeace shall be empowered to:

7.6.1 request the presence of anyperson with knowledge of any acts of violence or intimidation to give evidence;

7.6.2 request that any person inpossession of any relevant documentor other evidentiary material put thesame at their disposal; and

7.6.3 protect the identity and safety ofanyone assisting the relevant body ascontemplated in 7.6.1 and 7.6.2 byexcluding the public and/or mediafrom its proceedings or by limitingaccess to its documents or reports or by prohibiting the publication of thecontents of any of its documents or reports.

7.7 The National Peace Secretariat shall assist RDRCs in the exercise of their duties.

7.8 RDRCs may limit the number ofmembers of a LDRC taking intoaccount the prevailing circumstancesin the community.

7.9 RDRCs shall determine theboundaries of the area constituting thejurisdiction of LDRCs within their ownareas of jurisdiction.

7.10 The National Peace Secretariat andthe Commission will advise on thepolicy to be applied to and by theRDRCs and the LDRCs and themanagement of the said bodies.

7.11 Members of the RDRCs, LDRCsand Justices of the Peace not in thefull-time employment of the State shallbe entitled to remuneration andallowances to be paid by the State.

7.12 RDRCs and LDRCs shall appointchairmen and vice-chairmen torepresent the RDRC or LDRC concernedfor a period of one year.

7.13 RDRCs and LDRCs shall furnishthe National Peace Secretariat, theCommission or the relevant RDRC, asthe case may be, with any informationrequired by such bodies.

7.14 In view of the lack of effectivepeace promoting mechanisms atgrassroots level it is urgent that theseproposals be implemented as soon aspossible. Because of the said urgency, itis agreed that the proposals beimplemented on a voluntary basis atthe outset. In order to give permanencyand effectivity to the proposedstructures it will have to be givenstatutory recognition as soon aspossible. This should also ensure thatthe structures be funded by the State.In drafting the required legislationthere should be wide consultationincluding with the National PeaceCommittee. The proposed legislationwill also be published for generalinformation and comment.

7.15 In order to ensure the properfunctioning of the LDRCs, it isnecessary to:

7.15.1 give them high status in theircommunities for their role in the peace process;

7.15.2 compensate the members ofLDRCs for out-of-pocket expenses forattending meetings; and

7.15.3 train the members of the LDRCsin conciliating disputes, runningmeetings, negotiating skills, etc.

Chapter 8

National Peace Committee

8.1 Composition

8.1.1 Those political parties andorganisations currently represented onthe Preparatory Committee shallconstitute the National PeaceCommittee together withrepresentatives drawn from othersignatory parties where the NationalPeace Committee believes suchinclusion will give effect to theNational Peace Accord.

8.1.2 The National Peace Committeeshall appoint a chairperson and vice-chairperson, who shall be drawn fromthe religious and businesscommunities.

8.2 Objective

The objective of the National PeaceCommittee is to monitor and to makerecommendation on theimplementation of the National PeaceAccord as a whole and to ensurecompliance with the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Organisations.

8.3 Functions

8.3.1 The functions of the NationalPeace Committee shall be, inter alia, to:

8.3.1.1 perform those functionsimposed upon it by the National PeaceAccord;

8.3.1.2 receive and consider reports bythe National Peace Secretariat and theCommission;

8.3.1.3 decide disputes concerning the interpretation of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Organisations;

8.3.1.4 resolve disputes concerningalleged transgression of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Organisations;

8.3.1.5 convene a meeting of thesignatories in the event of anunresolved breach of the NationalPeace Accord; and

8.3.1.6 recommend legislation to giveeffect to the National Peace Accord.

36 Accord 13

8.4 Powers

8.4.1 The National Peace Committeeshall have the following powers:

8.4.1.1 promote the aims and spirit ofthe National Peace Accord;

8.4.1.2 convene a meeting of thesignatories where necessary;

8.4.1.3 amend the constitution of theNational Peace Committee;

8.4.1.4 negotiate and conclude furtheragreements to achieve the objects ofthe National Peace Accord.

8.5 Meetings

8.5.1 The National Peace Committeeshall elect a chairperson who shall notbe a representative of any of thesignatory parties.

8.5.2 Meetings shall take place on aregular basis at a date and time agreedto in advance.

8.5.3 Urgent meetings shall beconvened by the chairperson on notless than 48 hours' notice in writing tothe authorised representatives;

8.5.4 The service of written notice of ameeting at the specified address of theauthorised person shall constitute due notice.

8.5.5 An urgent meeting shall be calledby the chairperson on a written requestof one of the signatory parties to theNational Peace Accord.

8.6 Voting

8.6.1 All decisions shall be by consensus.

8.6.2 In the event of a dispute over theinterpretation of the National PeaceAccord, the failure of the NationalPeace Committee to achieve consensusat the meeting at which the dispute israised or at such further meetings asagreed, the dispute shall be referred toexpedited arbitration in the manner setout in paragraph 9.4.

8.6.3 In the event of a breach of theNational Peace Accord not beingresolved by consensus at a meeting of the National Peace Committee, thechairperson of the National PeaceCommittee shall convene a meeting ofnational leadership of the signatorieswithin 30 days of the meeting.

Signatories

African National CongressAmalgamated Union of Building TradeWorkers of South Africa

Confederation of Metal and Building Unions

Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa

Congress of South African TradeUnions

Democratic PartyDikwankwetla Party / QwaQwagovernment

Federation of Independent Trade Unions

Ximoko Progressive Party / Gazankulugovernment

Inkatha Freedom Party

Intando ye Sizwe Party

Inyandza National Movement /KaNgwane government

KwaNdebele government

KwaZulu government

Labour Party of South Africa

Lebowa government

United People's Front

Merit Peoples' Party

National Forum

National Party / Government of South Africa

National Peoples' Party of South Africa

Solidarity Party

South African Communist Party

United Workers' Union of South Africa

37South Africa Key texts

38 Accord 13

Guatemala’speace process:context, analysis andevaluation

Enrique Alvarez with

Tania Palencia Prado

T he peace accords finalized in December 1996brought a formal end to a war that had lastedintermittently for 36 years. They included almost

200 substantive commitments that, if fulfilled, wouldbring significant changes to the structure of theGuatemalan state and society and go some way towardsaddressing issues that many believe are the underlyingsource of protracted conflict. The scope of the accordswas due partially to several mechanisms that enabledrepresentatives of organized sectors of civil society todiscuss problems largely untouched in public discoursefor decades. Through these discussions and subsequentlobbying efforts, civil society representatives helped toshape a negotiating agenda and then contributedproposals on how to address substantive issues. Thepeace process was entwined with moves towarddemocratization beginning in the mid-1980s; it helped tocreate the space for peacemaking and was, in turn,strengthened by social mobilization around the peaceprocess. These domestic trends were supported byinternational pressure and involvement. Yet despite thepotential in the accords, it has proven exceedinglydifficult to consolidate the process. Implementation hasbeen either slow or blocked and the necessaryconstitutional reforms were defeated in a nationalreferendum. Nevertheless the experience laid thegroundwork for potential change to a more inclusivesociety, both by providing an opportunity for thoseoutside the established elite to voice their opinion in thepolicy arena for the first time and by raising expectationsfor a more participatory democratic state and society.

Conflict and warGuatemala is composed of four main peoples speaking atleast 23 languages. Approximately 60 per cent of thepopulation are part of the 22 ethnic groups comprisingthe Mayan people who, along with the Garifuna andXinca peoples, have experienced systematic oppressionfor the past five centuries, including forced labour untilthe mid-twentieth century. Yet a Ladino (mestizo peopleidentifying with Spanish cultural heritage) elite hasdominated a state that denied this diversity andmonopolized political, economic, and ideological power.Social exclusion has been compounded by the socio-economic structure. In this predominantly agrariansociety, 65 per cent of the fertile land is owned by 2.1per

President Alvaro Arzú lights a peace flame, December 26 1996. Besidehim is Commander Rolando Moran of the URNG.

Source: Rene P

Enrique Alvarez was a founder member of

the Civil Society Assembly, representing the

investigative research sector. He was a

member of the Accompanying Commission

from October 1997 until January 2001. He

currently works as director of Incidencia

Democrática, a research institute.

Tania Palencia Prado is a Guatemalan

researcher who has written extensively on

the war and civil society participation in the

peace process. She has served as a

consultant to numerous international

organizations, including the

Lutheran World Federation.

Guatemala’s peace process

cent of the population, creating the basis for profoundinequality. Furthermore, with the lowest tax rates in LatinAmerica, the state has had few resources to provide evenbasic services or to support development. The old landedfamilies have exerted disproportionate influence ongovernance and the military has considered itself as theguarantor of the state and defender of the existing socialorder and intermittently installed military rulers. With theexception of a brief democratic opening from 1944-1954that was crushed by a US-sponsored invasion, citizenswere largely excluded from political participation untilthe mid-1980s. These factors led to a weak state,incapable of responding to the needs of most of its population.

The armed insurgency originated initially in the ranks ofthe military in reaction to the 1954 counter-revolutionand subsequent repression. In 1960 a group of officersinstigated an unsuccessful uprising and fled into exile.They later joined with other groups, including the smallcommunist party, to develop a leftist guerrilla movement.In the 1970s, large numbers of Mayan activists joined andtheir communities subsequently became vulnerable tothe military’s counter-insurgency campaigns. In early1982, the various insurgency groups united in the UnidadRevolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).

In response to the URNG’s effectiveness, Gen. Efrain RíosMontt presided over a ‘scorched earth’ campaign in thehighlands. According to the report of the officialCommission for Historical Clarification, this campaignresulted in the genocidal massacres of some Mayancommunities, with the annihilation of more than 440villages, the death of up to 150,000 civilians from mid-1981 to 1983, and the displacement of over a millionpeople. Unions, popular organizations and politicalopposition groups were eradicated and many activistsassassinated, ‘disappeared’ or exiled, leading to thedecimation of their organizational structures.

The army’s counter-insurgency campaign greatlyweakened the URNG. Sensing its tactical advantage andfacing international isolation in the midst of an economicdownturn, the military took steps to return the country tocivilian rule. In 1984, the military called a NationalAssembly to promulgate a new constitution. In the 1984-85 general and presidential elections, the mostprogressive contestant – the centre-right ChristianDemocratic party led by Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo – wonamidst a relatively high voter turnout. Many interpretedthe result as a rejection of authoritarianism andmilitarism. Although the military retained the balance ofpower, civilian authorities governed the countrythereafter. Some Guatemalans see this period as thebeginning of the democratic transition, whereas othersidentify the signing of the accords almost ten years lateras the real turning point. Yet the greater politicalopenness from the mid-1980s led to important changesand, eventually, movement towards promoting apeaceful settlement to the armed conflict as the armygradually lost much of its control over the process.

Moving toward peaceThese domestic events were highly influenced by globaland regional developments. The 1979 victory of theSandinista revolution in Nicaragua meant that muchgreater attention was given to the revolutionarymovements in El Salvador and Guatemala, thrusting theregion into the centre of the polarized dynamics of theCold War with high levels of US intervention. Several LatinAmerican countries realized that they should support aresolution of the Central American conflicts independentof US involvement. In 1983, Colombia, Mexico, Panamaand Venezuela formed the ‘Contadora Group’ that, for thefirst time, recognized the political origins of the wars. Thenew civilian government of President Cerezo soonadopted a policy of ‘active neutrality’ identifying theunderlying causes of the regional conflicts as distinctfrom the East-West confrontation.

39

40 Accord 13

Acronyms

ASC Civil Society Assembly

CACIF Coordinating Committee on Farming,Commercial, Industrial and FinancialAssociations

CNR Commission for National Reconciliation

COCIPAZ Civil Coordinator for Peace

COPMAGUA Coordination of Organizations of theMayan People of Guatemala

CSC Civil Coordinating Sector

FRG Guatemalan Republican Front

GND Grand National Dialogue

INC National Consensus Forum

MINUGUA United Nations Mission for the Verificationof Human Rights

SEPAZ Secretary of Peace

UNAGRO National Farming and Ranching Union

URNG Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity

Guatemala Within this context, Central American presidentsgathered in Esquipulas, Guatemala in 1986 to discussregional peace issues. They agreed to increase economiccooperation, to oppose the US-supported ‘contras’fighting the Sandinista government and to promote thedemocratic reconstruction of the region. In August 1987,the presidents met again at Esquipulas II. Adopting amodified version of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias’regional peace plan, they signed an agreementarticulating the principle of democracy as theprerequisite for conflict resolution and detailingstandards that each government was expected to fulfil topromote peace.

It was initially difficult to implement the Esquipulas IIagreement in Guatemala, where both the URNG and thearmy demanded that the other fulfil certain pre-conditions before negotiations could begin. The URNGmaintained an ambiguous position: it supported theprovision for a national dialogue but simultaneouslydemanded the removal of counter-insurgency measures.The army’s position was more radical: the guerrillas wouldhave to disarm before engaging in dialogue. Neitherenvisioned initiatives to involve civil society in the debate.Yet in de-emphasizing military strategies, the Esquipulas IImeeting helped to stimulate the development of newsocial groups in favour of peace, largely spearheaded byreligious organizations, who slowly generated publicpressure for dialogue.

Yet Guatemalan society lacked a unified voice on how toachieve peace; nor did it have a civil, economic or politicalleadership that could envision peacemaking as a roadtoward national cohesion in the future. The principaldividing lines were between the powerful establishmentgroupings – the chamber of commerce, the agrarian-export oligarchy and the military – versus the popularmovements including peasant associations, trade unions,indigenous people, and cooperatives. The latter tendedto ally with other, mostly urban, social groupings – suchas the opposition political parties, most church groups,universities and research centres, and small industries – todiscuss and promote the social changes they believednecessary to end the war and build peace. Most of thepopular groupings were, however, relatively new and hadweak links with broad social constituencies and the widerpublic. Nevertheless, these more progressive groupingsbecame the national engine enabling peace talks.

The Catholic Church played an important leadership rolein stimulating public opinion in favour of both a nationaldialogue and ‘humanization of the war’ through trying tofind solutions for structural problems. Partially at theinstigation of church officials, the government-formedNational Reconciliation Commission (CNR) convened aGrand National Dialogue in 1989. It provided the firstformal opportunity for civil society to articulate theirdiverse perspectives about the war and identify the

41Guatemala’s peace process

substantive issues later incorporated into the negotiatingagenda. A significant outcome was the increasedexpectation that wider society should be involved in thenegotiations. It helped put the conflict into the sphere ofpolitics and to de-emphasize military ‘solutions’. Thefollowing year, the CNR held talks with the URNG inNorway, under the auspices of the Lutheran WorldFederation. The negotiations resulted in the signing ofthe Oslo Accord in March 1990, committing the parties toa political solution to the conflict. The next significantcontribution of civil society was to recognize the URNG asa legitimate party to the negotiations. This came out ofthe series of five meetings (the ‘Oslo consultations’) heldbetween the URNG with each of the five sectoralgroupings following on from the Oslo Accord. Theseconsultations in turn paved the way for officialnegotiations between the government and the URNG,initially mediated by a Guatemalan Catholic bishop and –after those talks broke down – subsequently by theUnited Nations.

During the early years of peace talks, particularly between1991-93, the establishment groupings were gripped byinternal struggles over the issues of reform that wereincreasingly integral to the peace process. Within themilitary, there were divisions between the ‘hard-line’members and the ‘constitutionalists’, with the formerdeeply opposed to talking with the URNG and the lattermore open to the negotiation process. While most withinthe business and agro-export elite demanded a militaryresponse to the URNG, some recognized the need tomodernize and improve Guatemala’s international image.Yet virtually all were reluctant to discuss, much lessaddress, the social problems that were included on thenegotiating agenda. When President Serrano attemptedto suspend the Constitution in May 1993, however, thebusiness sector joined with the other social groupingsand with the military’s constitutionalists in an impromptuNational Consensus Forum to successfully prevent thecoup and demand democracy. For the first time, therewas visible national consensus on the fundamental valueof a democratic system of government.

This experience led to conditions that re-invigorated thepeace process, with the military generally favouringnegotiations. In 1994, bilateral talks between thegovernment and the URNG – mediated by the UN andsupported by key countries in the ‘Group of Friends’ –resumed again in earnest. They agreed to create a CivilSociety Assembly (ASC) involving the diverse sectors oforganized society to discuss the substantive issues on thenegotiation agenda and provide recommendations tothe negotiators. Most of the ASC’s recommendationswere incorporated into the final accords – thus makingcivil society a vital, if non-decision making, presence inthe negotiations.

Sequence of mechanisms

1987Aug

Esquipulas IICentral American governments agree aframework to promote peace in the region.

1997Oct

Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR)Body appointed by the government to overseeimplementation of Esquipulas agreement.

1989Feb - Oct

Grand National DialogueTalks sponsored by CNR with participation of 47 civil organizations with 84 delegates;excluded the URNG and boycotted by army,government and business elites. The GNDcomprised 15 work ing commissions to discusssubstantive issues related to the conflict.

1990March

Oslo AccordCNR and URNG agree to consultations betweenURNG and Guatemalan society.

1990

El Escorial, Spain: Delegation of 10 politicalparties – URNG promises not to interfere withelections and parties commit to holding aNational Constituent Assembly and need forconstitutional modifications.

‘Oslo consultations’ : URNG meetings withvarious sectors are facilitated by the CNR andobserved by a UN representative

O ttawa, Canada: Business sector (CACIF) –Separate communiqués are signed expressingcommitment to negotiations.

Quito, Ecuador: Religious groups – emphasis on need for national consensus andrespect for human rights.

1991April

Mexico AccordGovernment and URNG agree a negotiatingagenda & process; no formal role for civilsociety in the peace negotiation process.

1993May - June

Instancia Naciona l de Consenso(National Consensus Forum)A broad coalition of civic and establishmentgroupings is formed to resist President Serrano’sattempted ‘self-coup’ and restore democracy.

1994Jan

Acuerdo Marco (Framework Accord) Establishes UN-mediated bilateral peacenegotiation.

27 May - 1 June

31 Aug - 1 Sept

24 - 26 Sept

1994May

Civil Society Assembly (ASC) The ASC is formed, comprising 11 sectoralgroupings. They are convened in an assemblychaired by Bishop Quezada to prepareconsensus documents to feed into the bilateral negotiations.

199629 Dec

Agreement on a Firm and Lasting PeaceFinal agreement signed by the Government and URNG that brings the 10 previous accords into effect.

199916 May

National Referendum Electorate votes on constitutional amendmentsto incorporate the peace accords; but with only17% turnout, the amendments are rejected.

Metepec, Mexico: Unions & popularorganizations – joint declaration that peacemust be based on transformation of structuralproblems generating conflict.

23 - 25 Oct

Atlixco, Mexico: Academics, Cooperatives,Small Businesses – joint declaration asks CNRto organize a similar process between sectorsand government.

27 - 28 Oct

42 Accord 13

Yet after fulfilling its original mandate, the ASC began tofragment. Amidst accusations about the progressivesectors’ dominance, representatives disagreed overwhether the ASC should define a new role to maintain itsvoice in the peace process. Ultimately, the debates withinthe ASC did not carry over into significant influence onimplementing the accords – although some sectorscontinued to exert influence in both society and politics.

Furthermore, the ASC was not the only civil societychannel for influencing the talks. The main businessassociation, the Coordinating Committee on Farming,Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF)had refused to join either the ASC or the earlier GrandNational Dialogue, though it did hold talks with theURNG in the Oslo consultations. When the negotiatorsdiscussed the agenda on socio-economic and agrarianissues, the CACIF successfully lobbied against key ASCrecommendations. They were able to substitute many oftheir own recommendations for inclusion in the finalagreement – a source of great disappointment for manyof the ASC members, who eventually endorsed itnonetheless. Many believed that this compromisemarked a national consensus for reform.

Challenges of implementationBy the end of 1996, the negotiators had concluded sixsubstantive and five operative accords. Theseagreements mapped steps for ending the militaryconfrontation and set forth guarantees of reforms toaddress some of the underlying social and structuralissues, grouped into accords on: human rights; a truthcommission; the resettlement of refugees and displacedpeople; the identity and rights of indigenous peoples; the socio-economic and the agrarian situation;strengthening civilian power and the role of the armed forces; and reform of the Constitution andelectoral system.

A variety of mechanisms were created to supportimplementation of the accords, with the UN given anoverall monitoring role. An Accompanying Commission(Comisión de Acompañamiento) was created as thehighest body for interpreting the content and spirit of theaccords and facilitating their implementation inaccordance with the agreed schedule – which only itcould change through the unanimous decision of allmembers. The Commission comprised tworepresentatives each from the government and theURNG, one from the Congress, and four ‘notable’ citizens,with the UN Mission head as an observer. It had noenforcement powers but operated instead by workingwith the other bodies. These included ‘paritarian (equallyrepresentative) commissions’ of government andsectoral representatives to discuss issues related to theimplementation of specific provisions in the accords.There were also ‘non-paritarian commissions’ with onlycivil society representation. However none of these

commissions were given any decision-making authorityand there were no defined channels to translate theiradvice into public policies. Furthermore, theadministrative body charged with overseeing theprocess, the Secretary of Peace (SEPAZ), was not givendecision-making power over the national budget or thepolicies and programmes of government ministries. Ittherefore had few instruments to make changes to fulfilthe provisions. Implementation relied instead on thegovernment to initiate programmes and Congress topass legislation.

Although many of the provisions were implementedmore or less according to the agreed timetable, the mostfar-reaching provisions have yet to be fulfilled. There havebeen a number of particularly problematic areas. Thebiggest setback was the failure of the referendum toamend the Constitution. Constitutional amendmentswere needed to establish the agreements as ‘accords ofstate’ rather than reversible political agreements; withoutthem, the government lacked the legal basis forreforming the army or the judiciary and for implementingmany of the provisions of the indigenous rights accord.After two and a half years, the struggle to make thosechanges was lost.

It was initially anticipated that thirteen key provisionswould be incorporated into the Constitution. To do this,they would need to be approved by a two-thirds majorityvote in the Congress and then by the electorate in anational referendum. The process first stalled in a lengthycongressional drafting process, where parties used theopportunity to add 37 other items – many on issuesdesigned to give them partisan advantage. The eventualreferendum required voters to respond with a simple yesor no vote to four sets of questions that incorporated 50different reforms. Many analysts believe that this designwas inherently confusing and therefore conducive to a‘no’ outcome. The government did not undertake apublic education campaign to inform the electorateabout the proposed changes, although the UN mountedan extensive dissemination effort. Initial opinion pollssuggested most of the electorate did not know about thereforms or were undecided – but an overwhelmingnumber of those who did know about it claimed theywould vote in favour. Then a highly effective ‘no’campaign was mounted by conservative sectors and theprivate media. The pro-reform forces conducted agenerally lacklustre campaign only shortly before thevote – although the indigenous sector was moreeffective in reaching their constituency. In the end, with aturnout of only 17 per cent of the voting age population,the ‘no’ vote prevailed. With significant variationsbetween rural and urban areas, the outcome was largelydecided by voters in the capital; the greatest variationwas between Mayan-majority regions returning a ‘yes’ vote and Ladino-majority areas – where the war was notexperienced directly – voting against the changes.

This defeat was compounded by the failure to implementtax reforms needed to provide domestic financing toimplement many of the accords – particularly the socio-economic provisions. The Accords specified thatGuatemala’s tax base would be raised to twelve per centof GNP by 2000. Despite early optimism that many in theindustrial and agro-export sector recognized the need forreform, they effectively blocked it. The governmentseemed reluctant to alienate its conservative supportbase by pushing through reforms, nor did it mobilizesupport from sectors that would benefit most. Thegovernment of President Arzú, who won power in 1996,introduced a package of property tax reforms in 1998 butdropped them after public protest and asked to re-schedule implementation of this part of the Accords. Inresponse, from 1999-2000, the AccompanyingCommission, with the participation of all the socialsectors, convened negotiations of a ‘Fiscal Pact’ to createa new tax structure, as well as the political andinstitutional reforms needed to implement the accords.The pact was signed in May 2000 and approved by theheads of the executive, legislative and judicial branchesof government. The necessary legislation was, however,diluted in the congress, which only approved a partial taxreform, leaving this important aspect of the peaceagreement unfulfilled.

Despite these setbacks, the Accompanying Commissiontried to keep the process moving. In addition toconvening the Fiscal Pact process, in August 2000 itinitiated a process to agree a new timetable forimplementing the unfulfilled provisions – culminating ina Presidential Act signed that December in a ceremonywitnessed by 12,000 people. When this also failed toachieve tangible results, a number of members resigned. Although the Commission continues to exist in form, it has almost no influence. Today the accordshave no status as legal obligations of the state; thelegislative agenda necessary to make them such hasnot been supported by the majority of

Congressional representatives.

The November 1999 elections were dominated by thefar- right Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) partyfounded by Gen. Ríos Montt, thus putting those stronglyopposed to reform in power. A new, leftist party partiallycomprising former URNG members also gained seats.Although it may become an important political force,thus far leftist groups have not been effective thus far inpromoting and enacting the accords – in part becausethey were unable to lead a political or social movementto support implementation.

Prior to and during the peace talks, Guatemalan civilsociety leaders developed the capacity to influence thenegotiations. But after the accords were signed, thisexperience and capability was not channelled effectively– partly because there was no institutional mechanism toenable it formally. Instead, each sector tended toconcentrate on its own interests, creating a socialvacuum incapable of formulating or promoting an overallpeace agenda. Paradoxically, with internal social sectorsweakened, the international community has become theonly actor with sufficient leverage to keep the peaceagreement on the national agenda.

ConclusionsIn the early years of the new century, Guatemala isexperiencing a critical transition. The new dispensationhas not been consolidated in part because the oldmilitary and economic structures that generated conflictare largely untouched. The rejection of the constitutionalreform package revealed the weakness of the pro-peacesocial movements and their ability to mobilize broadpublic constituencies to take a stand. It demonstrates theprofound challenge of supporting a negotiated transitionto a democratic and egalitarian society in a countrytraumatized by decades of war and centuries ofinstitutionalized racism. Yet against the long history ofauthoritarianism and systematic exclusion, theinvolvement of representatives of diverse sectors of theGuatemalan public in defining the substantive agenda ofthe peace talks and in shaping the accords that emergedfrom them was ground-breaking. Especially significantwas the crucial role played by Mayan organizations, whomade progress in legitimizing their voice and issues inthe mainstream of Guatemalan politics and socialdiscourse. With sufficient continued pressure for change,it is likely that the process and events that led to thesigning of the Accords will, despite all the difficultiesalong the way, come to be seen as a turning point inGuatemalan history.

Guatemala’s peace process 43

Election workers prepare ballots for the national referendumon constitutional reforms, 13 May 1999, Guatemala City.Source: Jorge Uzon/AFP

The GrandNationalDialogue andthe Osloconsultations: creating a peace agenda

Enrique Alvarez

During the late 1980s, Guatemalans representing adiverse range of interests and perspectives wereconvened in several processes to discuss the

causes of the war and identify strategies for transformingit. Although these processes did not lead to a definitivesettlement, they mobilized public involvement inpeacemaking, set out a range of complex issues to beaddressed in bringing a negotiated end to the war andhelped to create public support for negotiationsbetween the government and the Unidad RevolucionariaNacional Guatemalteca (URNG). The Grand NationalDialogue and the series of meetings known as the ‘Osloconsultations’ between representatives of specific socialsectors with the URNG together played a vital role inshaping the pre-negotiation phase of the Guatemalanpeace process and set a benchmark for later participationin drafting the peace accords.

Commission for National ReconciliationIn August 1987, Central American presidents at theEsquipulas II meeting agreed to the ‘Procedure for theEstablishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in CentralAmerica’ that included provisions to end support forirregular military forces; a ceasefire and amnesty forinsurgent groups; national dialogue to promote peaceand democratization; and a National ReconciliationCommission (CNR) to verify implementation of theaccords. In September and October, the newly-electedgovernment of President Cerezo moved to implementthe agreement. For the first time, the governmentengaged in direct talks with the URNG in Madrid but themeeting was inconclusive. The government and militarymaintained that the agreement specified dialogue onlyafter armed groups laid down their arms, which theURNG refused to do. It instead demanded a purge of thearmy and the creation of demilitarized zones as itscondition for negotiations.

Cerezo also convened the Guatemalan CNR. It comprisedtwo government delegates, including the Vice-President;two representatives of the eleven legal political parties,including future president Jorge Serrano; two prominentcitizens; and Bishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruño from theGuatemalan Bishop’s Conference. Bishop Quezadabecame the President of the CNR.

The Esquipulas process had the effect of catalysing theCatholic Church to take a proactive role in promotingpeace and addressing underlying structural problems. Itcalled for a national dialogue on the war, which BishopQuezada took up by persuading the CNR to develop amechanism to enable it. His efforts were complementedby diplomatic pressure from neighbouring governments,who urged Guatemala to comply with the commitmentsto national dialogue made at the summit. AlthoughQuezada initially advocated greater governmentparticipation, in Guatemala’s deeply polarized society the

44 Accord 13

The Grand National Dialogue and the Oslo consultations 45

diversity of representatives provided a degree ofindependence that helped increase the effectiveness ofthe CNR. Nevertheless, the CNR worked closely with thegovernment to design and implement the GrandNational Dialogue (GND), which became a reality within the year.

The Grand National DialogueOn 1 March 1989, the CNR inaugurated the GND withrepresentatives from various political, social andeconomic sectors in Guatemalan society. The aim was toidentify and promote consensus on the major topics ofconcern to peacemaking. In contrast to latermechanisms, the GND was not structured as sectoraldialogue because the sectors as such were not yetorganized. Yet the process involved a diverse social mix ,with 84 delegates representing 47 organizations asparticipants. There were full delegations from: thegovernment; political parties; media organizations;churches; refugee groups; cooperatives; the Unity ofPopular and Labour Action; the Council of Labour Unity;the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission; theUniversity Student Association; the Worker/OwnerSolidarity Movement; the Federation of SmallBusinessmen and Producers; the Education Federations;and the National University of San Carlos.

Several key sectors were absent. The government refusedto allow URNG participation until it decommissioned,although Bishop Quezada agreed to read URNGdocuments into the official record. The formerly exiledpolitical opposition associated with the URNG was onlyallowed limited involvement based on a ‘voice but novote’. At the other end of the political spectrum, the GNDwas boycotted by the military and several right-wingpolitical parties as well as the Coordinating Committee ofFarming, Commercial and Financial Associations (CACIF)and the National Farming and Ranching Union(UNAGRO), who together represented the interests oflarge businesses and landowners. They claimed that theGND was unrepresentative and would be susceptible tomanipulation. Others were concerned that the exclusionof the URNG and its political allies indicated that thegovernment wanted the GND to be only a ‘cosmeticdialogue’ with strict limits on the issues addressed andthe breadth of participation. They saw it as a forum tohelp legitimize the Christian Democratic government ofPresident Cerezo and his policy of active neutrality inorder to end Guatemala’s international isolation.Furthermore, it is notable that neither women’s norMayan organizations were represented, in part because ahistory of discrimination and exclusion meant their voicesand organizations were not widely acknowledged bythose with established authority.

The participating organizations identified the issues theywanted discussed. Out of a large initial list, fifteen topics

were accepted and classified into four main areas: (1)support and reinforcement of the democratic system; (2)organization and participation of citizens; (3) quality oflife; and (4) economic policies. Representatives of theparticipating organizations made proposals on the topicsthey considered a priority, which were then discussed inplenary session by delegates from all the participatinggroups. Bishop Quezada led this process on behalf of theCNR, which supported him throughout.

It was anticipated that the process would be structuredwith an opening and a closing plenary session – at anundetermined future date – but most of the actualdialogue would take place in fifteen workingcommissions, each of which was mandated to address aspecific agenda issue and to prepare written proposals.After the opening plenary, progress was slow. By lateApril, none of the working commissions were functioningand several of the participating groups had notappointed their representatives. Gradually, however, theyformed and began to present their papers to be debated.

The diversity of themes addressed in the GND reflectedthe different interests of those represented and theirexpectations regarding strategies to end the war. Acommon thread that emerged from the discussions wasshared concern about the continued militarization of thecountry, despite the civilian government. It was the firsttime in decades that Guatemala’s underlying structuralproblems were discussed in public and therefore posedconsiderable safety risks. Without basic personal securityguarantees, there were constraints on the openness ofthe dialogue. Bishop Quezada tried to offset this threatthrough private meetings with influential figures. Yetneither the government nor even the military hadcomplete control over the forces opposing change in thecountry, who had their own operating dynamics anddetermination to pursue their own agendas.

The working commission on human rights presented aset of proposals that included the abolition of theparamilitary Civil Defence Patrols and the resolution ofland problems of Guatemalan refugees. The proposalsattracted considerable opposition. Soon after, numerousparticipants from popular sectors and opposition groupsbegan to receive death threats. The reluctance within theGND to discuss continuing human rights violationsagainst its delegations began to undermine theeffectiveness and legitimacy of the process. In June 1989,nine of the university student leaders were detained bythe security forces, one of whom – Ivan Gonzalez – neverappeared again. Thereafter a number of other GNDmembers were kidnapped and tortured. With securitydeteriorating rapidly, in October the CNR decided todisband the GND, leaving the process unfinished.

The GND nevertheless had a number of importantoutcomes. It was the first time that the problems

46 Accord 13

generating armed conflict were discussed openly in thepublic arena. Although it did not result in conclusiveoutcomes, the analysis was vitally important several yearslater when it helped to define the official negotiatingagenda between the URNG and the government.Furthermore, it set the stage for the involvement of thepublic and transformed the closed characteristics of thenegotiations. The demands for political negotiationstopped being the exclusive concern of the partiesdirectly involved in the conflict, who started to realize thata solution to the armed confrontation had to involve civilsociety. The social participation that the GND enableddecreased the perception of the conflict as a purelymilitary issue and gave it a political nature. It was apowerful impetus for the URNG and the army to end theirmanipulation of the peace process as part of their warstrategies. Furthermore, the dynamic of discussing andnegotiating proposals was highly significant givenGuatemala’s authoritarian political traditions. It helped tostimulate the beginnings of democratic culture. Thesafety issues that constrained the GND – and ultimatelyled to its closure – were eventually addressed in the 1994human rights accord that mandated a UN human rightsmission. This became a key factor in helping to decreasethe levels of repressive violence to enable a climate forcivil society involvement in peacemaking.

The GND was also a turning point for Guatemala’sreligious organizations in the peace process. With theexception of some of the new fundamentalist evangelicalgroups, they found a common voice and became anintegrated sector so that their perspectives would havegreater recognition and authority. The GND alsosupported the re-emergence of the popular movementthat had been severely weakened by the murder,disappearance and exile of its leaders during the war. Ingeneral, throughout the GND, representatives of politicalparties displayed a greater capacity to participate indiscussions and to elaborate proposals. However theGND provided important skills-building experience forparticipants from diverse social organizations who werebetter prepared to participate effectively when the CivilSociety Assembly was later formed. As a consequence,organized Guatemalan society changed from being aspectator to being an active force in the peace process.

The Oslo AccordDespite these developments in the role of civil society inpeacemaking, the late 1980s witnessed a virtualstalemate in the talks between the government and theURNG – each of whom continued to insist that theirpreconditions be met before engaging in negotiations.Yet the failure to make significant progress continued to hurt Guatemala’s international image. At the beginningof 1990, conscious of the elections later that year,President Cerezo indicated a willingness to engage in

exploratory talks without preconditions. In February heappointed Bishop Quezada to the newly created post of conciliator.

The first major breakthrough came during a secretmeeting in Oslo, Norway in March 1990, facilitated byPaul Wee, the Assistant General Secretary of the LutheranWorld Federation. For years Wee had sought outGuatemalan military and URNG leaders in the hope ofgetting them to talk to each other. This helped to developa high level of rapprochement between the groups. Aftermonths of shuttle diplomacy, a URNG delegation metwith a CNR delegation led by Jorge Serrano in agovernment-owned chalet outside Oslo, with theirexpenses paid by the Norwegian government. After anumber of days, they signed the Oslo Accord – thatcreated a framework for negotiations that would last,despite stops-and-starts, for the next six years.

Sectoral consultations with the URNGThe Oslo Accord was based on the premise that peacewould result from a participatory and stable democracy.A main provision was to call for dialogue between theURNG and different sectors of society. From late May tolate October 1990, a series of five meetings – each lastingseveral days – that became known as the ‘Osloconsultations’ were convened by the CNR outsideGuatemala to fulfil this agreement.

The consultation process was designed as a series ofsectoral meetings for both practical and political reasons.The CNR recognized that it was not feasible to have all thesectors involved in the same meeting. For example, boththe military and the URNG – though for different reasons– wanted the business sector to participate in theconsultations; yet the social groups did not have muchtrust in this sector. They believed that meetings wouldneed to be relatively small if they were to address theunderlying challenges Guatemala faced. The CNR alsowanted to take advantage of the sectoral work initiatedduring the GND. Bishop Quezada chaired eachconsultation meeting and helped to ensure that theywere conducted in an open and respectful manner. TheUN Secretary-General also sent his personalrepresentative to observe the meetings. The agendaswere left open so that the representatives of each sectorcould use it as an opportunity to present their views andto recommend strategies to end the armed conflict.

The meetings were held outside Guatemala in partbecause the URNG remained banned but also becausethe CNR realized that in-country meetings would beunder military intelligence surveillance that could inhibitopen dialogue. The host governments covered most ofthe costs and made the logistical arrangements. Initialplans to hold a meeting in the US were abandoned when

The Grand National Dialogue and the Oslo consultations 47

visas for some of the URNG commanders were denied; itwas subsequently moved to Canada.

The first meeting was held in El Escorial, Spain with adelegation from ten political parties. In their jointdeclaration, the URNG promised to not interfere withelections and the political parties agreed to support aNational Constituent Assembly. It seemed to indicate thatthe URNG was preparing itself for the transition toconstitutional politics. The second meeting was held inOttawa, Canada with the business sector represented inthe CACIF – a dialogue that would have seemedunthinkable previously. Although they did not agree ajoint statement, the URNG and the CACIF later issuedseparate communiqués expressing their commitment tofurther negotiations and recognizing the goodwill of theother in the search for peace. The third meeting was heldin Quito, Ecuador with religious groups. Their jointdeclaration emphasized the need for national consensusand respect for human rights. The fourth meeting washeld in Metepec, Mexico involving representatives ofunions and popular organizations. Their joint declarationemphasized that peace must be based on the resolutionof underlying structural inequalities. The final meetingwas held in Atlixco, Mexico and involved representativesof academic organizations, small businesses andcooperatives, and professional bodies. Their declarationreaffirmed the Oslo Accord and its consultation processand asked the CNR to convoke a similar dialogue processbetween the participating sectors and the government.The social groups also asked the government and theURNG to initiate a dialogue to end the war and addressthe country’s underlying problems; their involvement inpeacemaking was in turn recognized by the URNG, whoasked them to keep participating.

With the exception of the Ottawa meeting with theCACIF, the resulting declarations called on the parties tohold direct negotiations urgently. They emphasized thatall social sectors should participate in defining theinstitutional and constitutional reforms and recognizedthat human rights, social injustice and developmentissues must be addressed. The Oslo consultationsreinforced a tendency that had emerged in the GND. Itcreated a political space where ideas about importantsocial issues could be expressed; it crystallized thedemand that these themes be included in negotiations ina way that did not necessarily correspond with the viewsof the main protagonists. As one direct outcome, theURNG demanded that the negotiations distinguishbetween substantive themes (such as state reforms andchanges in the socio-economic structure) and operativethemes (such as a ceasefire or demobilization).

The Oslo consultations resulted in significant changes tothe political dynamics of peacemaking. Both the armyand the URNG wanted to use the consultations to

promote their interests. The army – which perceived theURNG as a defeated force – assumed initially that theURNG sought an honourable face-saving way out of theconflict. It also assumed the URNG would be subjected tointense scrutiny by the various sectors. For its part, theURNG leaders did not see themselves as concedinganything through the process. Instead they saw it as anopportunity to openly express their voice and theirproposals for resolving the conflict, while at the sametime isolating war proposals of the army commanders. Inretrospect, it appears that the URNG calculated correctly.Almost immediately, the army was marginalizedpolitically. It responded by trying to stop the process afterthe first meeting with the political parties and the nextmeeting, which was with the business sector, was almostcancelled because of the army’s pressure. Yet themomentum for the process had become unstoppable.

An indirect outcome of the process was that severalsectors enhanced their internal organization after theOslo consultations. During 1991, the organizations thatmet in Metepec formed what would later become theCivil Sector Coordination (CSC). The groups that met inAtlixco formed the Civil Coordination for Peace(COCIPAZ). The former tended to share positions with theURNG, whereas the latter tended to be moreindependent. These bodies were to play an importantrole in lobbying for greater civil society participation inthe formal peace negotiations in the years to come. Yetseveral sectors were still divided by serious politicaldisputes. Civil society reflected these polarizations, withthe labour and popular organizations appearing closestto the URNG and the private sector closer to thegovernmental forces. There were no direct efforts todiscuss these differences and these sectors operated inisolation from each other, with few efforts to evenestablish communication channels between them.Paradoxically, both the military and the URNG becameinvolved in the activation of these civil society sectors aseach sought to create alliances and win their support. TheOslo consultations also effectively laid the thegroundwork for the participation of the sectors in theCivil Society Assembly.

The Oslo consultations and the GND helped to bringabout a transformation in public opinion in favour of anegotiated process to end the armed confrontation –even amongst those who had been most staunchlyopposed to recognizing the URNG. Furthermore, manybegan to perceive the war as resulting from deeperunderlying structural problems and the URNG as amanifestation of these problems rather than as theprimary cause of the conflict. The issues identified anddiscussed through these processes were laterincorporated into the official negotiating agenda andeventually helped to shape the agreements reached.

The CivilSocietyAssembly: shaping agreement

Enrique Alvarez

T he Oslo consultations in 1990 created momentumfor direct peace negotiations between thegovernment and Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional

Guatemalteca (URNG). The process was put on hold,however, during the run-up to the presidential electionsat the end of the year. Jorge Serrano – a centre-right, pro-negotiation candidate and a member of the Commissionof National Reconciliation (CNR) – won the elections. Heremoved key hard-line figures in the military highcommand and soon organized direct negotiations.Bishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruño continued as mediator,accompanied by a UN observer.

In April 1991, President Serrano issued his ‘Initiative forTotal Peace’ in advance of the first new round of talks inMexico, which gained the support of the conservativesectors of civil society. After three days of talks, the URNGand government agreed to the Mexico Accord thatspecified an 11-point negotiating agenda incorporatingmany of the recommendations of the Oslo consultations,including the idea of addressing both substantive andoperative themes. Although influenced by these earliercivil society inputs, these negotiations did not involve civilsociety representatives – a pattern that continuedthroughout the Serrano period. In July, a second round oftalks was held in Queretaro, Mexico where they agreedon the principle of democratization as the means to reachpeace through political means. Later that year, however,negotiations on human rights stalled as the governmentand URNG hardened their positions and no agreementwas reached during the next three rounds of talks. By late1991, popular organizations were protesting theirexclusion from the talks but their demands were largelyignored. Human rights violations increased and protestsmet with an increasingly authoritarian response.Nevertheless, new organized sectors – includingwomen’s, indigenous and community based groups –began to articulate perspectives that were oftenideologically independent of the left.

In mid-1992, the URNG issued a new peace programmemodifying its positions but the government mostlyrejected it. By the end of the year, however, someprogress has been made on freezing the development ofCivilian Defence Patrols and on the terms of return forrefugees from Mexico. In early 1993, both the URNG andPresident Serrano announced new peace plans that weremutually rejected and Bishop Quezada declared thenegotiations at an impasse.

‘Serranazo’: civil society takes a standIn early May 1993, the leader of the governmentnegotiating team broke off peace talks. Several weekslater Serrano suspended the constitution and attemptedto dismiss the legislature and judiciary – an attemptedcoup known as the Serranazo. Although supported bythe military high command, his moves met with stiff

48 Accord 13

The Civil Society Assembly 49

opposition in Guatemala and internationally. Congressand the Constitutional Court declared his moves illegal;international donors suspended aid and applieddiplomatic pressure. Civil society organizations fromacross the political spectrum quickly mobilized a broadmulti-sectoral forum, the Instancia Nacional de Consenso(INC) – or National Consensus Forum – to oppose thecoup. In early June, the popular organizations called ageneral strike and the INC presented a list of prospectivepresidential candidates. Serrano fled after senior militarycommanders withdrew their support. In June, theCongress elected the popular organizations’ nominee,Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de León Carpio, asinterim president.

Over the next six months, President de León initiated aprocess of constitutional reform. Yet when pressured bypolitical and private sector elites and the military, hegradually excluded popular organizations from talks onconstitutional issues and toned down his initially radicalproposals. He made few efforts to renew peacenegotiations – claiming that they were not a priority forhis government, despite his previous involvement. In July,he issued a new peace programme that dismantled theCNR, suspended Bishop Quezada as conciliator (who hadlong been seen by the military as too ‘pro-URNG’), andinstalled a new governmental peace commission(COPAZ). He planned to separate the substantive from theoperative themes in the negotiations. Civil society wouldbe responsible for addressing the substantive issues in anew Permanent Peace Forum, whereas the URNG and thegovernment would negotiate a settlement on theoperative issues related to the conduct of the war. Thiswould mean that the URNG would effectively becomeone amongst multiple political forces and would notnegotiate issues related to social or state reform with thegovernment. These proposals were rejected by the URNGand the impasse continued.

Throughout this period, popular organizations becameincreasingly vocal in demanding participation in thepeace process. Grassroots popular and indigenousorganizations viewed the peace process as an arena fordiscussing issues unaddressed in the formal politicalarena. During the Serranazo, these popular forcesmobilized to play a role in mainstream national politics forthe first time in decades. Through the INC, they hadparticipated alongside established groupings such as theCACIF in demanding democracy and they were nowunwilling to be sidelined in future peace talks.

Framework AccordBy late 1993, with considerable pressure from theinternational community and UN involvement, thegovernment and URNG were preparing to resume formalnegotiations. Communication had been eased throughseveral unofficial ‘ecumenical encounters’ sponsored by

an alliance of international church bodies including theLutheran World Federation. They convened civil societyrepresentatives, the government and the military inforeign cities to engage in informal dialogue and help tore-establish communication.

In early January 1994, the government and URNG met inMexico City for UN-moderated talks and concluded theFramework Accord for the Resumption of Negotiations. Theyreaffirmed the 11-point negotiating agenda in the 1991Mexico Accord and agreed to a structure and procedurefor UN-mediated negotiations. It established a formal rolefor the ‘Group of Friends’ – comprising the governmentsof Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United States,and Venezuela – to assist the UN and witness theagreements. They agreed the talks would be private andonly the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (in the person of Jean Arnault), who would issuepublic information. They envisioned a process lasting ayear, marking the expectation of an acceleratednegotiating process.

The Accord noted the specific contribution of the sectorsparticipating in the Oslo consultations and the generalrole of society in achieving peace and reconciliation. Itcalled for an assembly “open to the participation of non-governmental sectors of Guatemala society, providedthat their legitimacy, representative character andlawfulness have been recognised.” This Civil SocietyAssembly (ASC) was mandated to discuss the substantiveissues addressed in the bilateral negotiations and toformulate consensus positions on the six of the sevenmain topics from the Mexico Accord: (1) strengtheningcivil society and the function of the army in a democraticsociety; (2) the identity and rights of indigenous people;(3) constitutional reform and the electoral regime; (4) theresettlement of those displaced by the conflict; (5) socio-economic conditions; and (6) the agrarian situation. Thelast two topics were eventually merged into one. Theagreement specified that any ASC recommendations orguidelines on these issues would be considered by thenegotiators but were non-binding on them. The ASCwould, in turn, review the final agreements signed by theparties on substantive issues and could endorse them “soas to give them the force of national commitments,thereby facilitating their implementation”, but the ASCdid not have the power to veto those it did not endorse.

The Framework Accord proposed Bishop Quezada as theASC president, who would be assisted by an ‘OrganizingCommittee’ consisting of representatives of each of thesectors that participated in the Oslo consultations and“representatives of the Maya people.” The ASC’s workwould be synchronized to discuss the substantive issueswith the timetable for the bilateral negotiations so that itwould not delay the negotiating process. Although theofficial negotiations were to be held in secret, it wasunderstood that Jean Arnault would work with Bishop

50 Accord 13

Quezada to exchange information necessary tocoordinate the work of the ASC with the negotiations.

The ASC’s mandate seemed to indicate that the CSC andCOCIPAZ – the coordinating councils that had beenformed by the sectors in the Oslo consultations inMetepec and Atlixco respectively – had been successfulin convincing the government to create a mechanism forcivil society involvement in the process. The governmenthad been reluctant previously to formalize any role forthe public in negotiations, presumably perceiving it as aURNG manoeuvre to strengthen its position by includingsectors with similar points of view. There is little reason tobelieve that the UN or any other external actor advocateda formal role for civil society. Many ASC participantsbelieved that the government accepted the ASC becauseit assumed that the diverse sectors would not be able toreach agreement on common positions and thus wouldbe ineffective. Furthermore, if it ignored theseorganizations altogether, the legitimacy of thenegotiations might have been weakened. However theASC’s mandate meant that civil society would not have aformal place at the negotiating table; they would have avoice, but not a decision-making vote. As Quezada laterobserved, the ASC could have been seen as a ‘consolationprize’ for being excluded from direct participation in thenegotiations. The challenge was therefore to make itsinfluence as effective as possible.

The Civil Society Assembly (ASC) in actionThe ASC’s minimal budget was funded primarily bymembers of the Group of Friends, particularly Norway.Earlier, they funded the newly created ‘Fundación CasaReconciliación’, which financed the CNR and built ameeting house. The ASC used this infrastructure and hada budget for a small administrative staff, for refreshments,and for publishing ASC proposals. Each of theparticipating sectors sought their own funding toparticipate, some of them receiving both financial andtechnical support from international donors and partners.

The Framework Accord provided only vague outlines forthe structure of the ASC. In the following months,Quezada and the Organizing Committee began to shapeit and devise a methodology to involve the large numberof organizations wishing to participate. They decided tostructure the ASC through sectoral groupings. TheAccord specified the inclusion of at least six sectors: thefive from the Oslo consultations (political parties, religiousgroups, trade unions and popular organizations, theCACIF and the Atlixco grouping) as well as Mayanorganizations. After some debate, however, they alsodecided to invite five more sectors: women’sorganizations, other non-governmental developmentorganizations, research centres, human rights groups,and media organizations.

At this point, the economically and politically powerfulbusiness elite’s CACIF withdrew from the ASC, claimingthat it comprised illegal and unrepresentative façadeorganizations. CACIF later sought to influence thegovernment team directly and may have weakened theeffectiveness of the ASC on socio-economic and agrarianreform issues. Nevertheless the ASC also includedparticipants from far-right political groupings – includingthe Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), the politicalparty led by former president General Ríos Montt. Yet itwas the involvement of indigenous’ and women’s sectorsthat was particularly monumental in the dynamics ofGuatemalan society and politics.

Each sector had its own organizational structure forinternal discussion to define priorities and formulateproposals, as well as enable members to discuss andapprove the outcomes of ASC plenary sessions. Eachsector chose ten delegates to represent them in the ASC.Each sector elected their delegates according to thesector’s own statutes and financial resources. Mostworked behind closed doors, with the exception of theindigenous organizations that convoked ‘GreatAssemblies’ convening representatives from throughoutthe country. The popular and trade union sector hadprobably the greatest challenge in reaching internalconsensus – with the URNG’s political influence on somemember organizations affecting the internal dynamic.

Mayan leaders initially demanded direct representation atthe negotiation table on the topic of indigenous rights.They objected to a process whereby approximately 60per cent of the population would be characterized as a‘sector’ of civil society. The indigenous sector formed theCoordination of Organizations of Mayan People ofGuatemala (COPMAGUA) comprising over 200 differentgroups, including the four most representativecoordinating groups – although there were no delegatesfrom the Garífuna or Xinca peoples. It created a spacewhere they could develop a common platform, despitetheir political and ideological differences and thevariations in the ways they had suffered during theconflict. Throughout the process, COPMAGUAmaintained a unified voice in the debates, despite anylingering internal disputes. They encountered difficultiesdue to the historical prejudices of a deeply racist societyimplicit in the ASC debates. Differences in underlyingcultural assumptions – particularly regarding values andperceptions of time – challenged discussions intended todevelop solutions to problems. A significant politicalprejudice stemmed from the belief that the indigenouspeople would take ‘revenge’ once they gained power andspace. Yet it was the first time in the country’s history thatracism, marginality and exclusion were discussed in sucha heterogeneous forum. As a consequence, drafting thedocument on ‘Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples’was the most complex topic on the ASC’s agenda.

The Civil Society Assembly 51

Women had played important roles in the re -development of civic movements in previous years buttheir participation was concentrated in human rightsorganizations. The invitation to the women’s sectormeant that women’s organizations with different politicaland ideological views were able to explicitly discussgender issues for the first time in Guatemala’s socio-political history. The sector was initially isolated within theASC, with many of the largely male-dominatedorganizations from other sectors treating them withdisdain. Yet within the year their policy documentsbecame key discussion points and they were seen as aforce for tolerance. The priority of the women’s sector waspromoting equality and improving the status of womenin the framework of political solutions to the conflict.Although gender issues were not on the negotiatingagenda as such, they were able to introduce provisions inthe accords that addressed or were sensitive to genderissues. In addition, women participated as delegates inmost of the other sectors. Although most had noexperience in formal activism on gender issues, theirinvolvement generated spaces for discussion and helpedto ensure that proposals articulated by the women’ssector were given serious consideration.

Another factor that contributed to the work of the ASCwas that the security situation had improved after theComprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in March1994 created the United Nations Mission for theVerification of Human Rights (MINUGUA). Their presencegave important support to social organizations, whosemembers felt less vulnerable than they did during theGrand National Dialogue. It also enabled a leftist partyclearly related to insurgent groups to contest theNovember 1995 general elections.

Reaching agreementsThe ASC was formed in April 1994 and formallyinaugurated the next month. Throughout April thesectors prepared themselves and the operatingprocedures were finalized. In addition to the challenge offorming a cohesive structure and securing participation,the ASC had to develop working methods to reachconsensus documents on some of the most challengingissues in Guatemala’s history under pressure from a tightdeadline of December 1994. This timetable involvedpreparing an average of one document every month. Toachieve these ambitious targets, every sector developedits own proposals for each of the five substantive topics.

Sectoral Groupings: eachsector develops positionpapers and chooses tendelegates for the ASC

Political Parties

Religious groups

Metepec (TUs and popular organisations)

Atlixco (academic, smallbusinesses, cooperatives)

COPMAGUA: Mayanorganisations

Women's organisations

Development NGOs

Research Centres

Human Rights groups

Media organisations

CACIF drops out of process

ASC Commissions: two delegatesfrom each sector are assigned totopical Commissions; eachCommission produces a preliminarysynthesis paper on the topic.

Role of civil societyand the army in ademocratic society

Resettling refugeesand IDPs

Constitutionalreform and electoral system

Identity and therights of indigenous people

Socio-economic andagrarian reform

ASC Plenary Session.All delegates debate the synthesis papers until members agree a finalConsensus Document for eachof five agenda items

Bilateral Negotiationsand the Official Accords

ASC ConsensusDocuments aretransmitted to theGovernment-URNG Bilateral Negotiations for consideration.

The Negotiators, with assistance from the UNmediator and the Group of Friends countries, draft Accords on each ofthe substantive andoperative negotiationagenda items.

The five substantive Accordsare transmitted back to theASC for deliberation andpossible endorsement.

Guatemala’s Civil Society Assembly

52 Accord 13

They could work on several topics simultaneouslybecause each had twenty members and could organizeseparate working groups for the different topics.

Separate topical commissions, with two delegates persector, were formed to work on each of the fivesubstantive topics. They were charged with compiling adraft document incorporating the various positionsarticulated by every sector. Each commission had toreach consensus on the positions while preparing thedraft or note any continued disagreements. These draftswere then debated in ASC plenary sessions until finalconsensus was reached. In practice, during plenarysessions new areas of disagreement often emerged andwere further debated. Sometimes internal disagreementsbetween members of the same sector surfaced andinformal alliances formed across sectors betweendelegates with similar perspectives. These disputes wereunderstandable given the magnitude of the issuesdiscussed and the deep divisions within Guatemalansociety reflected in the ASC. Nevertheless, the ASC wasable to formulate a consensus position on each of the fivetopics of their mandate before their deadline. In practice,the need for consensus tended to result in the ASCadopting a ‘lowest common denominator’ proposal, thuspossibly encouraging weak positions on the issues.

In general, the ASC process forced Guatemalan socialorganizations to cooperate with each other, reducing theintense fragmentation and mistrust that had oftencharacterized relations in the past. It providedopportunities to strengthen integration within sectorsand communication between sectors. Bishop Quezada’sleadership transmitted confidence, respect and credibilityand was a key element enabling the ASC to operateeffectively. Although Quezada had more authority thanordinary members, it resulted more from his naturalinfluence than a formal rule. He was able to mediate the

ideological differences that later proved disruptive to theASC’s work after his resignation in late 1994. TheOrganizing Committee members were elected by eachsector and their diverse and representative characteristicswere another factor that generated confidence in theprocess. The Committee also made decisions byconsensus, with all very important matters passed to theASC plenary.

Delegates worked very long hours and devotedthemselves to making the process work and to ensuringtheir sector’s effectiveness in promoting its aspirations.There were no arrangements to train ASC delegates innegotiation or consensus-building as a part ofpreparation for the process – although some individualshad experience from their previous work. Some of theless experienced sectors, such as the popularorganizations, had advisors who had worked with themfor years. Many had gained experience in formulatingproposals and negotiating through their earlierparticipation in the Grand National Dialogue and the Osloconsultations. They were subsequently more effective inthe ASC process. Nevertheless, political inexperienceinitially led the ASC to present unrealistic demands. Yetthey soon began to produce more credible proposals.The ASC also organized meetings with the URNG andgovernment negotiators to lobby for its positions andinitiated regular information meetings with the UN teamand representatives of the Group of Friends countries.

Perhaps one of the clearest indicators of the success ofthe ASC was the inclusion of many of its proposals in theofficial peace accords – in fact most were adopteddirectly by the negotiators. Some of the most significantareas where the ASC’s positions were ignored had to dowith socio-economic and agrarian reform and particularlythe issue of land redistribution. This was partially becauseof the influence of the CACIF in directly lobbying the

The Civil Society Assembly 53

government and refusing to accept the ASC’srecommendations. This failure left a lasting sense ofdisappointment amongst many, particularly as mostviewed these as the most important structural problemsthat needed to be addressed to transform the underlyingconflict and promote justice. Nevertheless, amidst someinternal controversy, the ASC eventually endorsed it andthe other accords from the bilateral negotiations.

One of the major weaknesses of the process, however,was ensuring that the wider public were aware ofdevelopments in the ASC and in the official negotiations.It was difficult for those not linked to organized socialsectors to have any interface with the process. Although amedia sector was included in the ASC, they were not veryactive or influential and it was difficult to disseminateaccurate information through the media – a factorperhaps compounded by the tendency of the army andthe conservative owners of media organizations toportrayal of the ASC as a mouthpiece of the URNG.

Re-defining the mandateThe Framework Accord did not envision an ongoing rolefor the ASC. After their proposals were delivered in late1994 and the negotiations stalled, some memberssuggested new roles. Some sectors, particularly membersof the Atlixco grouping, believed that the ASC shouldremain strictly within the bounds of the FrameworkAccord; others felt that the ASC could play an importantrole in consolidating the peace process. This debatecoincided with the resignation of Bishop Quezada in late1994 – due principally to internal political divisions withinthe Guatemalan Episcopal Conference over their role inthe peace process.

The ASC was strongly affected by these developments.There were tensions over the revised mandate andfunctions of the mechanism. A majority decided toinfluence the Guatemalan transition by situating the ASCas ‘a political reference point of consensus in civil society’by taking positions on national issues based either on theASC’s existing documents or through a new consensus-building process. With these decisions, however, mostmembers of the Atlixco sector withdrew from the ASC,arguing that it was dominated by leftist groups and wasinsufficiently representative of the public. Furthermore,although the sector representing political parties was notespecially influential in the ASC, after Bishop Quezadaresigned, only the small political parties remained.

Although there was a general effort to maintain the ASCas a mechanism of permanent discussion, two furtherfactors contributed to its decline. Firstly, some membersfrom the trade unions and popular organization sectorsdecided to create the New Guatemalan Democratic Frontas a political party to contest the November 1995 generalelections. The identification of key ASC figures with this

leftist party meant that the ASC lost some of its perceivedpolitical autonomy. Furthermore, when several becamecongressional candidates, they resigned from the ASCand their organizations failed to propose substitutedelegates – thus depriving the ASC of importantdelegates. Second, many members felt deeply dissatisfiedwith the process when the ASC endorsed the Socio-Economic Accord.

Throughout 1995 and 1996, one of the most hotlydebated issues was whether the ASC should be involvedin the verification and implementation of the peaceaccords. Yet from mid-1996, it was clear that neither thegovernment nor the URNG wanted to give the ASC aformal role in implementation. The issue eventuallybecame irrelevant, as the ASC lost its influence to thepoint where it was so marginalized that it dissolved.Therefore the ASC as an institution had no role inimplementing the accords – although some of the formerdelegates participated in commissions as representativesof their own groupings. Thus the experience of inter-sectoral discussion and negotiation was not deployed inthe implementation phase of the process.

ConclusionIn general, the Grand National Dialogue, the Osloconsultations and the subsequent Civil Society Assemblywere significant in defining the official negotiationprocess. They were crucial in identifying the underlyingcauses of the armed conflict, as well as the substantiveissues that would need to be addressed to end it andbuild peace. The armed forces tolerated these threeprocesses in order to change their negative image andend the isolation that resulted from it – a calculation thatpartially backfired on them. Nevertheless, each of theseprocesses both relied on and expanded the limited butimportant political openness begun by the military in1985 with the National Constituent Assembly.

Despite the fragmentation, atomization andconfrontation inherent in Guatemalan society, the ASCbecame a historical milestone because of the capacity fordialogue, negotiation and agreement between thedifferent sectors that participated in it. Unfortunately, inthe process of implementing the agreements, thesignatory parties to the peace accords did not define orassign any role to the ASC. This contributed to a processof decline that had started with the slow pace at thenegotiation table, the participation in politics of some ofits members, the withdrawal of the president of the ASCby the Episcopal Conference, and lasting disappointmentabout the Accord on Socio-economic Aspects and theAgrarian Situation. These developments contributed to amixed legacy for these innovative experiences in civilsociety involvement yet it is likely that the peace processwould have been very different – and probably much lesscomprehensive – without them.

Jean Arnault (second from left), representative of the UN Secretary-General, with the CNR. Bishop Quezada sits on his left.Source: Rene P

54 Accord 13

GuatemalaKey textsBasic Agreement forthe Search for Peace byPolitical Means (OsloAgreement)

In the city of Oslo, Norway, thedelegation of the NationalReconciliation Commission (CNR) ofGuatemala, acting with the full supportof the Government of the Republic ofGuatemala and in the conciliatory roleattributed to it under the Esquipulas IIAgreement, and the delegation of theUnidad Revolucionaria NacionalGuatemalteca (URNG), with the fullsupport of its General Command,having met from 26 to 30 March 1990expressly for the purpose of findingways to bring about a peaceful solutionof the nation’s problems by politicalmeans, and recognizing that thisobjective is fundamental to theachievement of reconciliation betweenGuatemalans and to the solution of thenation’s problems, do agree to initiatea serious process which will culminatein the attainment of peace and theenhancement of functional andparticipatory democracy in Guatemala.

The two delegations shall, by mutualagreement, proceed to exercise theirgood offices.

Good Offices

In accordance with the spirit of theEsquipulas II Agreement, the NationalReconciliation Commission shall takesteps to facilitate and sustain thepeace-seeking activities to which thisAgreement refers, through its goodoffices and the appointment asConciliator, by agreement with URNG,of Monsignor Rodolfo Quezada Toruñoin his capacity as Chairman of theNational Reconciliation Commission.

It shall be the function of theConciliator to propose initiatives to allthe parties, to facilitate and sustaindialogue and negotiation and to impart

momentum to that process, and toanalyze whatever similarities ordifferences there may be between thepositions of the parties. He shall beentitled to propose initiatives andsolutions for discussion and agreementand shall perform all other functionsrequired for the proper fulfilment of his commitment.

The National ReconciliationCommission and the UnidadRevolucionaria Nacional Guatemaltecaagree to request the Secretary Generalof the United Nations, Dr. Javier Pérezde Cuéllar, to observe the activities tobe carried out and to act as guarantorof compliance with the agreements andcommitments entered into uponsignature of this document.

Activities to be carried out:

The two delegations agree to launchactivities which will generateconditions permitting the definitiveattainment of peace and theenhancement of democracy.

(a) A meeting shall be held betweenrepresentatives of the political partiesof the Republic of Guatemala andrepresentatives of the UnidadRevolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca.The National ReconciliationCommission and the UnidadRevolucionaria Nacional Guatemaltecashall, by mutual agreement, decide theconditions under which this meetingwill take place. The parties shall makethe efforts required for the meeting tobe held in the second fortnight ofMay 1990.

(b) The National ReconciliationCommission shall, by mutualagreement with URNG, create themechanisms required for theconvening, preferably in June 1990, ofthe necessary meetings between theUnidad Revolucionaria NacionalGuatemalteca and representatives ofthe country’s popular, religious andbusiness sectors, as well as otherpolitically representative entities, witha view to finding ways of solving thenation’s problems.

(c) Talks with a view to achieving apolitical solution of the internal armedconfrontation shall be held, on a dateto be established by mutual agreementbetween the Government of Guatemalaand the Unidad RevolucionariaNacional Guatemalteca, between

representatives – with decision-makingpowers – of the Government of theRepublic, the Guatemalan Army andthe General Command of the UnidadRevolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca.The National ReconciliationCommission shall take part in thesemeetings for purposes of confirmationand verification, in accordance withthe functions attributed to it under theEsquipulas II Agreement.

Signed in the city of Oslo this 30th dayof March 1990.

Framework AccordFor the Resumption of theNegotiating Process betweenthe Government ofGuatemala and the UnidadRevolucionaria NacionalGuatemalteca (URNG)

The delegations of the Government ofGuatemala and the UnidadRevolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca,having met at Mexico City from 6 to 9January 1994 under the auspices of theSecretary-General of the UnitedNations and as guests of theGovernment of Mexico, have reachedthe following agreement on theframework for the resumption of thenegotiating process aimed at achievinga firm and lasting peace:

I. Agenda for the negotiations

The parties shall negotiate on all theitems included in the general agendaset forth in the Mexico Agreement. Theparties shall together decide on thescope of their undertakings, all ofwhich shall be subject to verification.

The Government and URNG undertaketo be appropriately represented in thenegotiations by high-ranking delegatesso that political agreements consistentwith the constitutional order can beentered into, without restricting theirpower to conclude agreements oninstitutional and constitutionalreforms.

II. Moderation of the bilateralnegotiations

The parties have agreed to request theSecretary-General of the UnitedNations to appoint a representative to

serve as moderator of the bilateralnegotiations between the Governmentand URNG. The parties agree that themoderator may make proposals tofacilitate the signing of a firm andlasting peace agreement.

III. Society at large

The two parties recognize thecontribution of the sectors which,pursuant to the Oslo Agreement, haveparticipated in the meetings withURNG held at El Escorial, Ottawa,Quito, Metepec and Atlixco. Thesemeetings have given an impetus to thenegotiating process in Guatemala. Theparticipation and contributions ofthese sectors have helped to makepossible the start of direct negotiationsbetween the Government and thecommand of URNG.

The parties agree that Guatemalansociety continues to have anessential role to play in theachievement of peace and in theprocess of reconciliation.

Without prejudice to other machineryand forums, whether temporary orpermanent, for promoting nationalreconciliation, the parties agree topromote the establishment of anAssembly open to the participation ofnon-governmental sectors ofGuatemalan society, provided that theirlegitimacy, representative characterand lawfulness have been recognized.The Assembly shall meet during thenegotiating period and shall have thefollowing functions:

(i) To discuss the substantive issues forthe bilateral negotiations, i.e. items (ii)to (vii) of the general agenda containedin the Mexico Agreement, with a viewto formulating positions on whichthere is consensus;

(ii) To transmit to the United Nationsmoderator, the Government ofGuatemala and URNG therecommendations or guidelinesresulting from its deliberations. Theserecommendations and guidelines shallnot be binding and shall be aimed atfostering understanding between theparties. The Assembly shall discuss thesubstantive issues on the basis of atimetable that is synchronized with thedates set for the bilateral negotiationsand shall not delay the conduct of thebilateral negotiating process;

(iii) To consider bilateral agreementsconcluded by the parties on thesubstantive issues and endorse suchagreements so as to give them the forceof national commitments, therebyfacilitating their implementation.However, if for any reason a bilateralagreement is not endorsed, theagreement shall continue to be valid.

The parties agree to request theEpiscopal Conference of Guatemala toappoint the President of the Assembly,considering for this office theconciliator, Monsignor QuezadaToruño. The President of the Assemblyshall be assisted by an organizingcommittee. The Committee shall becomposed of representatives of each ofthe sectors which participated in theOslo process, together withrepresentatives of the Maya people.

The President of the Assembly shallhave the following functions:

(i) To convene the Assembly;

(ii) To organize its deliberationswith the assistance of the Organizing Committee;

(iii) To promote the formulation ofconsensus recommendations regardingthe substantive issues;

(iv) To transmit to the United Nationsmoderator and to the parties therecommendations and guidelines thatresult from the Assembly'sdeliberations and to participate inspecial meetings of the bilateral bureauconvened to this end by mutualagreement between the parties;

(v) To receive from the United Nationsmoderator the bilateral agreements onsubstantive issues signed by theparties, put them before the Assemblyand promote their endorsement by it.

IV. Role of the countries constitutingthe group of friends

The parties request the Governments ofColombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, theUnited States of America andVenezuela to form a group of friends ofthe Guatemalan peace process. Thefriends will be kept duly informed ofthe progress and content of thenegotiations between the parties, andwill have the following functions:

(i) To support, through their actions,the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in orderto facilitate the negotiating process;

(ii) To give greater certainty andfirmness to the commitments enteredinto by the parties in their capacity assolemn witnesses to the agreementsarrived at in the course of thenegotiating process, when the partiesso request.

V. Procedures

(i) Disclosure: the parties agree that thebilateral negotiations will be conductedin the strictest secrecy in order toensure that they are carried on in anatmosphere of trust and seriousness.They agree that the only publicinformation on their conduct will bethat made available by therepresentative of the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations. For purposes ofcoordination with the work of theAssembly, the moderator and thePresident of the Assembly will draw upappropriate rules to permit exchangesof information that do not impair thesecrecy necessary for the work of thebilateral bureau.

(ii) Time-frame: the parties expresstheir commitment to arrive at a firmand lasting peace agreement within theshortest possible time during 1994. Inthis context, they undertake todemonstrate the necessary flexibilityfor successful negotiation of thegeneral agenda.

(iii) In the context of their efforts tofacilitate the negotiating process, theparties have recognized the desirabilityof resorting to all measures that will beconducive to rapprochements andagreements between them, and declarethemselves ready to respond to therequests made by the moderator in thisrespect.

VI. Verification mechanisms

Verification is a vital element inensuring compliance with and respectfor the agreements. Consequently, theparties reiterate that all the agreementsmust be accompanied by appropriatenational and international verificationmechanisms. The experience andauthority of the United Nations confera high degree of reliability oninternational verification by theOrganization. The two parties agree torequest the United Nations to verify allthe agreements, in both theirsubstantive and their operationalaspects.

Mexico, D.F., 10 January 1994.

55Guatem a la: Key texts 55

56 Accord 13

Mali’s peaceprocess: context, analysis & evaluation

Kåre Lode

Between June 1990 and March 1996, Maliexperienced a separatist war in the north. Initiallymobilised through regional solidarity, the conflict

slowly fragmented along inter-ethnic lines and violencetore apart inter-dependent communities. Attempts toaddress the conflict began in 1991, with government-sponsored initiatives to reach an acceptable negotiatedsolution with the armed groups. Yet one of the strikingfeatures of the Malian experience of peacemaking is thatthe negotiated agreements between governmentrepresentatives and the armed factions were unable tobring the conflict to a conclusion. Instead, the initialnegotiations actually exacerbated the conflict dynamics.Although later talks created the political terms for peace,without the involvement of local guarantors of thesettlement at the community level, implementationfloundered and peace remained elusive on the ground. Itwas only when thousands of people throughout thenorth engaged directly in inter-community peacemakingthat the path to national reconciliation opened. Theinvolvement of all those most affected by the conflict inopen and inclusive decision-making meetings was ableto achieve what official political negotiations could not: atransformation of the conflict and consolidation of peace.

Approximately 65 per cent of Mali's land area is desert orsemi-desert, except the fertile Niger River basin in thesouth and east. Despite being rich in human creativity, itis economically one of the poorest countries in the world.The northern part of the country is deep in the Saharadesert and is inhabited principally by Tuareg nomads,Arab nomads and merchants and the Songhoysedentarists of the Niger River basin. These communitiestogether comprise approximately ten per cent of Mali’soverall population of more than eleven million. Althougha modern professional elite exists in the capital andprovincial towns, the majority in the north are groundedin traditional society. However, there are importantdivides in the north, where the variations in ethic, socialand occupational roles between the nomads andsedentarists inevitably reflect in the characteristics of civilsociety. Despite some tensions between thesecommunities, their complementary economic activitieshave traditionally provided incentives for conflictresolution. Throughout the north there is a strong senseof inter-dependence based on mutual belonging to each

Kåre Lode worked for Norwegian Church Aid

in Mali between 1987-88 and was their

consultant for reconciliation in Gourma in

1995-96. He currently works as a Researcher

at the Centre for Inter-Cultural

Communication in Norway.

President Alpha Oumar Konaré among thedignitaries at the Flame of Peace.

Source: Malian Press Agency

Mali’s peace process 57

other and the land that underpins relations acrossethnicity and other social divides. Awareness of this inter-dependence underpins the community approach toadopting collective decisions – a quality mobilizedeffectively for peacemaking.

Social exclusion and sources of conflictArmed conflict in the north can trace its lineage to severalearlier rebellions. Hard-hit by French colonial rule, Tuaregsrevolted unsuccessfully in 1916. Mali gained itsindependence in September 1960 after a short period ofunion with Senegal. Prior to independence, many in thenorth advocated the creation of a trans-Saharan state andmost felt marginal to the political processes leading toMalian independence. In 1963, a Tuareg uprising in thenortheast was decisively repressed by the army, whichpoisoned wells and used aerial bombardment amongother tactics. Many fled northwards to Algeria but aresidual bitterness remained amongst Tuaregs that wasreciprocated by the army’s distrust of the community.

In 1968, Col. Moussa Traoré overthrew the post-independence government of Modibo Keita and installeda highly centralized and repressive military regime thatappeared more interested in maintaining its control thanpromoting development. The north was extremelymarginalized, with the nomads especially excluded.Communities in the north could not manage local affairsaccording to their traditions and needs. Northerners –especially nomads – held virtually no positions at anylevel in the government, administration and army and

southern officials rarely understood or appreciatednorthern cultures. There were few developmentprogrammes that targeted the north and hardly anyinfrastructure for education, health and communication.The government did not address basic issues facingnortherners, such as frustration over traditional land andwater use rights.

The north was particularly hard hit by the droughts of1972-73 and 1983-85. Insufficient relief efforts, oftenperceived as deliberate neglect, led many to flee toneighbouring countries. Many northern migrant menbecame soldiers in Libya’s ‘Islamic Legion’ and receivedsophisticated military training and experience fighting inChad and in Lebanon. A few joined POLISARIO andfought in the Western Sahara. These experiencesstimulated the belief that it was acceptable and possibleto solve important problems through the use of force.Some aspired to use this experience to address theproblems of marginalization of northern Mali. Thisaspiration was compounded by the widespread feelingof hopelessness for their future among the north'syounger generations. These perceptions were translatedinto action when most Malian Tuaregs were expelledfrom Algeria and Libya in the late 1980s due todeteriorating economic conditions in the host countries.The new confidence in their military capabilitiescombined with protracted grievance and a lack ofperceived alternatives to be the crucial ingredients insparking a well-organized armed revolt.

57

58 Accord 13

In June 1990, a small group of Tuaregs attacked a militarypost, effectively announcing the start of the rebellion.They then hit hard at government and military targets.The army responded with brutal violence against bothTuareg and Arab civilians. The number of casualties isunknown but it is clear that the brutality of the army’sretaliation resulted in popular support for the insurgency.Soon thousands of young men had joined the rebels.Despite their hopes of support from Libya, the armedmovements were mainly financed with local resourcesand with money sent from individuals living abroad.

Tuaregs in the People’s Movement of Azaouad (MPA)initiated the revolt. Azaouad is a name that traditionallydesignates a huge zone north of Timbuktu. Theinsurgency movements used it to designate the threenorthern regions, Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, which coversome two-thirds of the national territory of Mali – thoughthe region is called simply ‘the North of Mali’ in laterpeace agreements. After the army’s reprisal attacks, theywere soon joined by Arabs who organised their ownArabic Islamic Front of Azaouad (FIAA). The rebels had thesupport of all ethnic groups in the north for at least thefirst year. In this period, the main divide was between thenorth and the central government. Northern solidaritytranscended any local inter-ethnic tensions overresources or social differences.

Early negotiation effortsThe Traoré regime was under mounting international anddomestic pressure for democratization when theinsurgency emerged. President Traoré realised that a swiftmilitary victory was impossible, making the possibility ofa negotiated settlement more attractive. The Algeriangovernment was concerned with internal security andfeared an uncontrollable situation on its southern borderthat might draw in the disaffected Tuareg population inAlgeria. It became very active in supporting peaceinitiatives to address the conflict in Mali. Within Mali,President Traoré began to pursue strategies to influencethe northerners. First he turned to a traditional chief whowas comparatively close to his government, Intallah AgAttaher, for mediation. However, the northern ‘youth’viewed the traditional leadership as part of the repressiveregime and ignored Attaher. In 1994, they kidnapped himand it became evident that the revolt was not onlyagainst the military regime but also against thetraditional domination of the Tuareg aristocracy.

The army continued to suffer a series of humiliatingdefeats and the insurgents recognised that they couldnegotiate from a position of military advantage. Traorédevoted more time in late 1990 to the Tuareg insurgencythan to containing the pro-democracy movement thatwas gathering momentum in the south. Aware that heneeded to stabilize the situation quickly and returntroops to the capital, he entered into direct negotiations

Acronyms

ARLA Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Azaouad

FIAA Islamic Front of Azaouad

FPLA Popular Front for the Liberation of Azaouad

POLISARIO Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El-Hamra y Rio de Oro

MPA People’s Movement of Azaouad

MFUA United Movements and Fronts of Azaouad

NCA Norwegian Church Aid

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

Mali

59Ma li’s peace process

with the MPA (and later the FIAA) with Algeria’s assistance.On 6 January 1991, they signed a peace agreement inTamanrasset, Algeria. The agreement satisfied the coredemands of the movements, including a very highpercentage of development funds allocated to the north;integration of nomads into the army, other ‘uniformedservices’ and in all levels of the administration; andgreater regional autonomy for managing local affairsaccording to cultural customs.

But Moussa Traoré had gone too far and did not dare topublish the exact terms of the Tamanrasset Agreement.The opposition was furious at the perceived capitulationof the army and the rumour that the concept of‘autonomy’ had been agreed. Although many of the newpolitical parties, students, trade unions and other civilsociety groups had supported the northern rebellioninitially because it threatened the authoritarian regime,many thought Traoré had jeopardised the country’sintegrity with the agreement. Furthermore, Songhoycommunities had not been represented at theTamanrasset negotiations and many worried that theagreement would install Tuareg dominance in the north,thus fuelling suspicion and tensions within the region.

In March 1991, amidst frequent demonstrations that wereviolently suppressed, Gen. Adamou Toumani Touréoverthrew the regime in a military coup d’etat. He formeda transitional government to guide the country on its wayto democracy. Yet the new regime did not considerTamanrasset Agreement legitimate and made few movestowards implementing it. Under pressure from civilsociety, in August 1991, the new government hosted aNational Conference in Bamako to discuss the future anddraft a new constitution.

Although northerners participated in the NationalConference, it was not intended as a forum to address theconflict and the insurgency was not on the agenda. Yeton the second day, the 192 northern delegates – menand a few women with positions of status in theircommunities – met to discuss the situation. They decidedto form a commission to follow up on the issuesaddressed in the Tamanrasset Agreement, where thegrassroots had not been represented. The generalcomplaint was of insufficient information and aperception that neither the government nor themovements encouraged popular involvement. ManySonghoy were also negative, believing that theTamanrasset Agreement failed to pay serious attention totheir particular needs. At this stage, however, it wasdifficult for local civil society to act. Continued violencewas exacerbated by the transitional government’sinability to control army troops stationed in the north,who wanted to show that they could command thesituation. As the army’s atrocities against civiliansmounted, two new and more aggressive movements

Sequence of mechanisms

1990June

Rebellion beginsPeople’s Movement of Azaouad (MPA) andIslamic Arabic Front of Azaouad (FIAA) attackmilitary targets in north.

1991Jan

Tamanrasset AgreementThe widely condemned agreement betweenTraoré and the MPA and FIAA is signed; thePeople’s Liberation Front of Azaouad (FPLA) andthe Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azaouad(ARLA) are formed shortly after.

1991March

Transitional GovernmentTraoré overthrown by military coup; a new pro-democracy transitional government thatrejects Tamanrasset Agreement is installed.

199129 July - 12 Aug

National ConferenceThe transitional government hosts a gatheringof delegates from all over Mali to develop a newconstitution, providing an opportunity fornorthern participants to discuss peacemak ing.

1991

Segou: government officials, leaders from thearmed movements and civil society meet todraft the basic document to guide negotiations.

Preparatory meetings for Nationa l Pact

El Golea, Algeria representatives of the armedmovements meet to develop a commonplatform United Movements and Fronts ofAzaouad (MFUA). Mopti: civil society participants are involved inMFUA - government negotiations; the partiesagree on the principle that the solution should be sought within the framework of a single state.

1991 - 1992Dec - March

Nationa l PactA series of meetings in Algiers concludes in theNational Pact but key stakeholders are left outand implementation proves difficult.

1994Aug

Regional concertationsGovernment-sponsored meetings are heldthroughout the country to engage the widerpublic in discussion of political priorities; theyhelp to consolidate democracy and consensuson need for a peaceful resolution to conflict inthe north.

1994Nov

Inter-community meetings37 meetings are self-organized throughout theNorth with support from Norwegian Church Aid, resulting in localized ceasefire and peace agreements.

25-27 Nov

10-13 Dec

15-17 Dec

199622 March

Consolidation meetingUnsuccessful attempt to follow up on thecommunity meetings.

199627 March

‘Flame of Peace’ A national reconciliation ceremony is held,mark ing a final conclusion to the war withdecommissioned weapons destroyedsymbolically in a giant fire.

1997Oct

Follow-up meetings A series of inter-community meetings is held tofollow up on earlier developments, resolveoutstanding disputes and address ongoingdecommissioning issues. They feed into thenational process of decentralizing government.

60 Accord 13

emerged: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Azaouad(FPLA) and the Revolutionary Army for the Liberation ofAzaouad (ARLA).

Negotiating the National PactIn late-1991, President Touré's transitional governmentopted for a new negotiating strategy with the northerninsurgency movements. Algeria was asked to play anactive role in the peace process and Edgar Pisani ofFrance and Ahmed Baba Miské of Mauritania, known fortheir personal skills and impartiality, were invited to assistin bringing the movements into negotiations. Previousgovernment-led peace initiatives had provided fewopportunities for significant civil society participation. Inadvance of entering into negotiations in late 1991, therewere a series of preparatory meetings to formulatepositions, consolidate the northern forces and develop anegotiating framework.

In November 1991, an initial meeting was held in Segouinvolving representatives from the government, thearmed movements and a few civil society leadersselected by the government, who jointly agreed the basicnegotiation process and agenda. This was followed by ameeting of representatives of all the armed movementsin El Golea, Algeria in December where they created acommon platform and formed the United Movementsand Fronts of Azaouad (MFUA). The government and theMFUA met in Mopti a few days later and they soon agreedto a ceasefire. The talks involved representatives ofneighbouring governments as well as prominent civilsociety figures, who were influential both with thegovernment and the MFUA negotiators – although it wasnot an event where civil society participated in its ownright and on its own initiative. A significant substantiveoutcome was the MFUA’s agreement that a solutionshould be sought within the framework of the existingMalian state. Independence for the north was no longerseen as a viable option.

This series of preparatory meetings was followed by aseries of four negotiation meetings in Algiers from lateDecember 1991 until March 1992. The Algeriangovernment, accompanied by Pisani and Miskié, played akey role in facilitating the talks and mediatingagreements. The delegates at each meeting agreed newelements that culminated in the preparation of whatbecame known as the National Pact, which was signed inBamako between the MFUA and the transitionalgovernment in April 1992. The agreement was based onfour key points: peace and security in the north; nationalreconciliation; special initiatives to promote socio-economic development in the north; and according thenorth a special status within the framework of the unitarystate of Mali. It also envisioned a new ‘Commissioner for

the North’ to oversee implementation, who would beappointed for a five-year renewable term and operatedirectly under the president’s authority.

After the signing, interim President Touré admitted thesystematic neglect of the development of the north asthe primary source of the conflict, thus taking acourageous step towards peace. Many thought thiswould bring the conflict in the north to a decisiveconclusion in advance of the elections for choosing anew democratic government. But it soon became clearthat – like the Tamanrasset Agreement before it, althoughfor different reasons – the National Pact would be difficultto implement.

Implementation problemsTwo months after the signing of the National Pact, AlphaOumar Konaré was elected as President. Until late-1994,the threat of a military coup remained an activepossibility, making it a priority for the new democraticgovernment to gain control over the army. There were anumber of problems. Discipline and leadership within thenational army and its relations with the government wereproblematic. Although some soldiers and officerssupported democracy, most soldiers had no experienceof civilian rule. Many in the army believed that thegovernment had capitulated to the demands of thenorthern insurgency – forced in part because the armyhad been denied the necessary weapons to defeat themovements on the battlefield. These issues of legitimacywere compounded by internal discipline problems.Soldiers stationed in the north had organized a type ofunion; they rejected the army’s command structure andrefused to take orders from senior officers. Local unitscontinued to fight their own war, effectively blocking theimplementation of the demilitarization and integrationprovisions of the National Pact. The weak governmentfound it difficult to address this serious problem withinthe army.

The northern armed movements were also affected byindiscipline and fragmentation. Although they had acommon federative structure in the MUFA, theycontinued to be composed of four groupings, each loyalto their own leaders and drawing on their own socialsupport base. The combatants were largely self-reliant;their movement provided neither their weapons nor asalary. In the beginning, most were idealistic. But as theyears passed, they became increasingly autonomous andunconstrained by orders, including those concerningtheir commitments in the National Pact. In addition to thefour main groupings, there were a number of smallerarmed groups that never had substantial influence in thepeace talks. Some of these were essentially armedbandits acting independently and uninterested in peace.

Mali’s peace process 61

Furthermore, many sedentarist communities felt uneasyabout the National Pact. They were not represented at thevarious negotiating tables and suffered increasingly atthe hands of the insurgency movements.

In addition to these obstacles, there were few resourcesto implement the substantive provisions in theagreement regarding socio-economic development.International donors showed little interest in Mali and thepeace settlement. Of those that did make pledges tosupport the National Pact with investments, few fulfilledtheir commitments. Local communities needed to adaptthe agreement to their situation but insecurity made itdifficult for local civil society to act. Thus there was little inthe way of a ‘peace dividend’ and it was difficult to makeany substantial changes in living conditions.

The National Pact process in 1991 and 1992 did, however,succeed in reaching important political agreements oflasting importance. Yet they were ultimately insufficientto transform the dynamics of the conflict and generatepeace. First, it became clear that the neighbouringcountries wanted stability in Mali and were willing toprovide support for initiatives towards peace. This helpedto de-escalate mistrust and diminish the idea that the

conflict could be sustained with external support.Second, all actors realised that their enemies wanted apeaceful settlement of the rebellion, provided that theirmain objectives were met. Third, through the variousnegotiations, the actors agreed on the basic parametersand conditions to build a political settlement that couldfoster durable peace, as expressed in the National Pact.Fourth, although the government expected to be incharge of the process, top-level civil society actors usedtheir strength and creativity to become involved. Fromthis time, the pattern began to shift so that civil societyassumed an instigating role that was increasingly ownedby local-level actors and eventually government officialsand top civil society leaders became observers of aprocess led by others. These were all extremely importantsteps towards peace. The National Pact was not the endof the conflict, nor even the beginning of the end; butperhaps it was the end of the beginning.

Civil society takes the leadAlthough 1993 was a relatively quiet year, the intra-northern conflict dynamics had been changing and by1994 there was considerable inter-factional fightingbetween the movements that in turn fuelled inter-ethnic

Map designating inter-community meetings that took place in northern Mali, October 1995 - March 1996 Source: Sigrid Lode

62 Accord 13

tension. It seemed clear that the government could notbring the violence to an end unilaterally. In June 1994,under severe domestic pressure and facing a potentialcoup d’état, President Konaré announced a series ofregional ‘concertations’ (consultations) to engage thepublic in debate on the country’s future. Although theconcertations were not peace initiatives, they engagedthe public and helped to consolidate democratic rule bybreaking the control of well-organized political voices inthe capital and generated a broader public consensus onthe need to bring a peaceful conclusion to the conflict inthe north.

By October 1994, the government was on an informationoffensive with unprecedented levels of openness aboutevents in the north. Furthermore, the army was undercivilian control – in part because its influence haddiminished when it proved unable to defeat the northernmovements militarily. Although the movements werealso growing weaker and appeared to want peace, theydid not know how to achieve it. They understood thatthere was no military solution and they were under heavypressure from local civilians who wanted peace.

The foundations were eventually laid by Konaré'sencouragement of civil society peacemaking initiatives.In November 1994, the first inter-community meetingsbegan in the north, involving traditional and movementleaders in the negotiation of local ceasefires. At the time,there was no functioning government administrationand the army did not control the area. The President

wisely realized that the grassroots had taken the lead inseeking to end the fighting and decided to support them.On 2 November, the President visited the northerndistricts of Gao and Kidal, where he insisted that attacksby insurgents could not be used by the army to justifyreprisals against civilians.

In late 1994, Konaré announced that there would be nonew government initiatives “until we have given time forcivil society to work out a solution.” To this end, heorganized the withdrawal from the north of the militaryunits who had committed atrocities and confined manyother units to barracks. He insisted that regionalauthorities should support – but not interfere with – thework of civil society. These were very clear signals tonortherners to assume their responsibility and lay thefoundations for their own future by taking the initiative.Civil society did not let the opportunity pass. Whatfollowed was a series of self-managed inter-communitymeetings throughout the north creating localized peaceagreements among inter-dependent communities,leading to the voluntary disbanding of the movements,the resolution of local disputes, and social reconciliation.

Reintegration and national reconciliationWhile the inter-community meetings were bringing adecisive end to the armed confrontation, thegovernment was working on a programme fordecommissioning weapons and demobilizing andreintegrating the combatants from the movements. The

63Mali’s peace process

government assumed the primary political,organizational and financial responsibility for theinitiative and was assisted by the leadership of themovements and the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP).

Throughout the conflict, inter-governmentalorganisations and NGOs had played a number of roles,though to a lesser degree than in many othercontemporary wars. The UNDP, in particular, played animportant enabling role. In 1994, Tore Rose became theUNDP’s Resident Representative and developed strongrelations with the new Commissioner for the North,Mohamadou Diagouraga. Both were open-minded,creative and cooperative – and were extremely positivetowards civil society initiatives. Their close workingrelations enabled them to coordinate the internationalcommunity’s efforts to support the peace process, lay thefoundations for comprehensive development in thenorth and support post-conflict peacebuilding throughongoing inter-community meetings. They were alsocentral actors in two international conferences wheredonors discussed conditions for their contributions todemilitarization programmes and heavy investmentschemes for the north. These conferences were viewedby the movement leaders as a kind of guarantee of theprocess, encouraging them to dissolve their movements.

The president was alert to the need to consolidate thetransition politically through a powerful symbolic eventto mark national reconciliation. The UN-superviseddisarmament programme had collected close to 3,000arms from demobilized combatants. It was decided tohold a ceremony on 27 March 1996 in Timbuktu,organised jointly by the Commissariat of the North andthe UNDP. Close to 10,000 spectators gathered to watchthese weapons burn in a giant ‘Flame of Peace’ bonfire,where the president received the announcement of thedissolution of the five movements in a statement read byZeïdan Ag Sidalamine, leader of the Popular Front ofLiberation of Azaouad. This event marked the decisiveend to the war. Although the challenges of building a justand lasting peace continued, it was a powerful momentin shaping the historic memory of modern Mali.

ConclusionsAfter the secretive January 1991 Tamanrasset Agreement,the public felt excluded and suspicious. After the 1992National Pact, certain sections of the population – notablythe Songhoy sedentarists – continued to feel excluded.Many were uncertain whether the movements weresincere and unconvinced that the government wasstrong enough to provide security and ensure a peacefultransition. Community leaders – particularly at thegrassroots level – felt they had no role in creating thepeace agreement and were unprepared to take action insupport of it. This only began to change in 1994. Theregional concertations helped to consolidate thedemocratic transition and to build public support forpeace in the north. But it was not until local northern civilsociety leaders, with the government’s encouragementand support from a group of facilitators, took a primaryrole in peacemaking at the community level that thepeace process began to consolidate. The inter-community meetings involved all concerned indeveloping shared strategies to address conflict-generating problems and in creating a united frontagainst those who used violence. They reached localizedagreements that finally enabled implementation of theofficial demobilization programmes and the politicalagreements in the National Pact. The experience pavedthe way for post-conflict peacebuilding and laid thefoundations for self-managed development programmesand local self-governance that have begun to address theproblems that were initially at the root of the conflict.

The signing of the National Pact.Source:Malian Press Agency

64 Accord 13

The regionalconcertationsprocess: engaging the public

Kåre Lode

C onflict continued after the signing of the NationalPact in 1992. But after the relative calm of 1993,crisis escalated in 1994. Devaluation of the sub-

regional currency by 50 per cent that January led toeconomic crisis with high inflation and increasedunemployment. Student strikes, demonstrations andriots threatened the government. Violence escalated inthe north to the degree that the government and thearmed movements appeared to lose control. In May, theSonghoy sedentarists launched the Ganda Koy Self-Defence Movement that was supported by elements inthe army aspiring for a northern ally. Many feared thatMali was on the brink of a full-scale civil war and the risk ofa military coup was great.

In these conditions, it was difficult for the recently-electedcivilian President Alpha Oumar Konaré to choose a courseof action. He could not afford to provoke the army, thestudents, the trade unions or the northern movements. Ina speech on 28 May 1994, he resisted pressure to arm self-defence groups but recognized that the situation hadbecome intolerable and that the national army should bemobilized to put an end to the insurgency. He alsoreiterated that he would not accept an ethnically-basedsolution and that Mali’s national unity would bepreserved. But the political pressure in the capital fromgroups with close relations to Ganda Koy continued andcreated an extremely difficult situation for the government.

Facing an escalating political crisis, the president turnedto the Malian public to find a path out of the crisis. In aspeech on 8 June 1994, he said:

“…Faced with the numerous disturbances and the violence,both physical and verbal, which have characterised the pasttwo years, I could have chosen alternative policies to those ofdialogue and consensus. … As a modern State, Mali needs toadd to its ancestral heritage of dialogue a moderninstitutional infrastructure which demonstrates that there isa real democratic process taking place… With this in mind, Ishall ask my government to organise a series of regional‘concertations’ in which every current of opinion will be ableto express its views. Each participant will be invited tocontribute to the debate, seeking to define solutions fortomorrow’s problems. Our purpose will exclude systematicopposition to the ideas of others; nor will there be room fornarrow sectoral demands. The government will bring to thediscussion both its point of view, and its proposals forchange: and together we shall seek the necessary consensusto achieve the transformations which we have started.” 1

To implement this plan, the government organized aseries of public meetings that were held throughout thecountry during the last two weeks of August 1994.Seventeen meetings were held in all, with some regionshosting two or three meetings to accommodate larger

The regional concertations process 65

populations or because of greater geographicaldistances. The objective was to listen to the people inorder to understand their frustrations and hopes and tobring the political dialogue out to the provinces, thusgenerating inputs from new social and political forces as acounter-balance to the political elite. The focus was togenerate alternative issues for the political agenda, ratherthan to discuss the situation in the north – although thissituation was also discussed.

Participation in the concertation process was open towhoever wanted to come and everyone could speak. Alllevels of the society were involved: traditional leaders,students, women, youth, the unemployed andprofessionals met with government ministers, localparliamentarians and leaders of the administration. Itappears that women and the youth were very active inthe meetings in most areas of the country. In the north,however, the sedentarists ruled the villages and cities.Due to increasing inter-ethnic tension caused byinsecurity, very few nomads participated.

When creating the concertations the government did notset out any expectations about how it would use theideas generated through the process. It was an opendiscussion and there was no agenda for any of themeetings; rather the format was adapted to local needsand customs. The concertations were not decision-making bodies but created the opportunity for a form ofnational ‘brainstorming’. The participants formulatedmany recommendations that were given to thegovernment to consider. The meetings lasted from twodays to a week, depending on the length of time neededfor all participants to speak but most occurred over threedays. Each concertation was guided by a facilitator andthe participants sought to reach consensus on therecommendations. The regional meetings were summedup in a national concertation in Bamako, where the doorswere open for whoever wanted to come. All those able toattend from the regional meetings participated and theywere joined by representatives of the government, theParliament and civil society.

By bringing the political discussions out to the provinces,the government effectively ended a situation where well-organized northern sedentarists monopolized thepolitical discussion. The regional concertations took placein the short period in 1994 when the ethnic conflictbetween Ganda Koy and the other armed movementswas at its most violent. The National Pact was heavilycriticized throughout the process. The peace agreementwas seen by many Songhoy as giving undue advantagesto the nomads. Given the context of limited resources,they feared they would lose out if it were implemented.Yet the government continued to insist that theagreement remained the basis for lasting peace.

Although many issues concerning the country as a wholeand other more specialized concerns were discussed, animportant outcome for the north was a general nationalconsensus about the need for fair treatment of all thegroups in the north. It opened the way for northernpeacemakers to begin the process of consulting and thenmobilizing civil society. It also strengthened PresidentKonaré’s position and added legitimacy to hisgovernment, which enabled it to act more decisively. Thesupport that the government obtained for a peacefulsolution probably strengthened its position vis-à-vis thearmy in a situation where a military coup d’état was adistinct possibility.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess the importance of thisexperience. Many in the north do not consider theregional concertations to have made a significantcontribution to bringing peace to the region. Perhaps thebroader significance was that the government builtsupport throughout the country for resolving thenorthern conflict through a consensual process. It helpedto strengthen the civilian government’s position inrelation to the army, which tended to favour a military‘solution’ to the conflict. It was also significant that theprocess was based on mechanisms deeply rooted inMalian cultures, where serious problems are discussed inpublic by all who think that they are concerned or whothink that they can make a contribution towards aconsensual solution. It was innovative for thegovernment to draw on this tradition at a time when itwas in the midst of political crisis. It may have helped toshore up the democratic transition, in which publiclegitimacy and involvement can be an important force for sustaining a vulnerable system. It may also havehelped to open the political space for public involvement in peacemaking that was soon mobilized in the inter-community meetings throughout the north.

1Quoted in Poulton and Ibrahim (1998: 106)

66 Accord 13

Inter-communitymeetings andnationalreconciliation: forging a pragmatic peace

Kåre Lode

By late 1994, local civil society leaders in northernMali had reached a common understanding that ifthey did not take responsibility for their own affairs,

they would continue to be exploited by politicians,administrators and the armed movements. Faced withthese dilemmas, traditional leaders began to initiatepeace talks in their communities. The process began witha few meetings that convened influential figures from thecommunity and the movements. The success of thesemeetings led to a gradual systemization and expansion ofthe peacemaking process. It grew organically becausethose who had been living with the violence tookownership and were aided with some of the strategic andfinancial resources needed to do so effectively. Thecumulative outcome of dozens of meetings involvingthousands of people throughout the north was stability,the foundations for national reconciliation and a greatersense of empowerment for local self-governance.

Meetings to end the violenceThe village chief of Bourem initiated the first inter-community meeting in November 1994. Nomad chiefsfrom across the area gathered and agreed to contributeto peace by motivating the people under their influence.These traditional leaders succeeded in bringing theirconstituencies along with them. This initiative sparked anumber of similar meetings based on activatingtraditional conflict resolution methods. A second Bouremmeeting was held on 11 January 1995 and resulted in alocal truce to end the fighting. Other meetings were heldin January in Gao, in March in Menaka and in April inAnsongo. These meetings involved representatives of theGanda Koy and the Popular Front for the Liberation ofAzaouad, headed by Zeïdan Ag Sidalamine. The Ansongomeeting also included the Revolutionary Army for theLiberation of Azaouad. A final meeting in this series tookplace in Aglal, just across the river from Timbuktu, whichended fighting in Timbuktu Province.

The main result of these initial meetings was to createlocalized ceasefires between the movements, ending theorganized violence by late April 1995. Civil society hadmanaged to put an end to the insurgency and succeededwhere the army, the movement leaders and thegovernment had all failed. Yet combatants and civiliansremained heavily armed – with some turning to banditryas their livelihood – and social and economic life wasdysfunctional. Fear was widespread and approximately150,000 refugees remained abroad. Clearly many issueshad to be addressed to develop a lasting peace.

The government was, however, pleased with the processand attempted to maintain the momentum. From 13-25May 1995, several governmental commissions, eachheaded by a minister, travelled through northern Mali.Their objective was to listen to the people and appraise

Inter-community meetings and national reconciliation

remaining tensions. The commissioners were impressedthat local communities seemed ready to take theinitiative. They encouraged civil society to continueefforts by organizing a reconciliation process to helpeconomic and social life to resume and thus createconditions that would facilitate the demobilization anddisarmament of the combatants. Although well-intentioned, the members of the governmentalcommissions did not understand the difficulties ininitiating local action after a century of authoritariangovernment that had severely repressed all initiatives ofthis kind. Local communities needed guidance frompeople they trusted and a strategy they could adapt todirect their action. Consequently the governmentalcommissions achieved no immediate results.

Nevertheless, efforts continued. In early September 1995,a meeting was held in Mbouna – a historically significantlocation for peacemaking – involving communities westof the Niger River. There were more than 2,500participants, including 85 who represented Malianrefugees in Mauritania. It was the first meeting wherereconciliation between the communities was the maintopic. It was organized with German support by a groupof key persons in civil society in the north and arepresentative of the Commissariat for the North. Themeeting marked a turning point in relations across thenorth and deepened the consensus on ending the war.Yet it was not an ideal setting for a generalized process ofreconciliation: it was too expensive, too big, and toodifficult to chair and some felt it did not have the rightleadership. The lesson many drew was that a generalizedprocess needed to rely on a local leadership.

Facilitation groupDespite bringing violence to a halt, local communitieswere unable to proceed to the next phase. Up until thispoint the meetings had been self-initiated – though theyhad received some financing from the government andNGOs – and community leaders had not felt the need fora more systematic strategy. But the time was ripe forexternal guidance in order to proceed from an objectiveof stopping the violence to a more creative goal. A smallgroup of experienced civil society leaders formed afacilitation group to provide guidance for locally-ledinitiatives. They elaborated a strategy for managing thecurrent situation based an analysis of the recentexperiences of adapting traditional skills forpeacemaking. The facilitation group emerged out of apartnership between local actors and Norwegian ChurchAid (NCA).

The NCA had been involved in northern Mali since 1984,when it started a relief project in Gourma as a result of acall for help from the Malian government. They soonbecame the biggest external agency in the north. In

1987-88, the operation became an integrated ruraldevelopment project and over time NCA developedstrong relations with people who were to take toppositions on all sides of the conflict. Two senior staffmembers, Zahabi Ould Sidi Mohamed (FIAA) and ZeïdanAg Sidalamine (FPLA) became general secretaries of theirmovements. Another senior staff member, Mohamed AgErlaf (a member of the MPA), became minister in thetransitional government 1991 and remained in variousministries until 1999. Whereas all other internationalNGOs discontinued their activities for long periods oftime during the war, the NCA remained and carried outactivities based on the policy “as much as possible, whereit is possible, whenever it is possible.” This policy had aheavy cost and seven Malian staff members were killed.Yet NCA’s operations were highly valued and it wasgenerally trusted by all parties.

In April 1994, Zeïdan Ag Sidalamine called his former NCAcolleague, Kåre Lode, to ask for assistance: “We are in apromising process towards peace, of which we shouldnot lose control. I want you to be ‘the oil in the works’.”They needed a respected outsider to add credibility andmoney from a reliable NGO to support the process andturned to Lode because of their own history of personalrelations and trust. When approached by Zeïdan, Lodecould immediately give a positive answer knowing thatNCA would take care of the budget and his currentemployers in the Norwegian Missionary Society wouldaccept any involvement in the peace process.

The first step was to form a facilitation group consisting ofLode, Zeïdan, UNDP Consultant Ibrahim Ag Youssouf, andtwo people who had served in the Commissariat of theNorth, Abacar Sidibe and Aghatam Ag Alhassane. Thefour Malians in the group were men who were respectedfor their integrity. Each had practical experience with theearlier inter-community meetings and these experiencesbecame the basis of the facilitation group’s peace processstrategy, with Ibrahim and Zeïdan as the maincontributors. Kåre Lode met with the newly appointedCommissioner for the North, Mohamadou Diagouraga,who was both open to innovation and supportive of civilsociety initiatives. After discussing the plan with him forapproximately half an hour, Diagouraga gave Lode a freehand to proceed with the programme, on the solecondition that he was kept informed of the progress. Hissupport was invaluable and on several occasions heprotected the process against officials andparliamentarians who sought to control it.

The process began with an inter-community meeting inGourma, which used the facilitation group’s basic design.Its immediate success created a widespread demand formeetings elsewhere as the strategy responded to adeeply felt need. The process seemed to releaseunstoppable social forces for change. Yet the NCA had

67676767

68 Accord 13

insufficient funds to support additional meetings and itseemed politically risky for it to be responsible for theentire process throughout the north. Instead, by joiningwith other donors, including the Canadian, German, andSwiss development agencies and by obtaining fundsfrom the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, theycreated a ‘Fund for Reconciliation and PeaceConsolidation in Northern Mali’ (FAR-Nord). Lode becamecoordinator with the other facilitators' continuedinvolvement, joined by representatives of the consortiumpartners. In response to demand, a total of 37 communitymeetings were organized across the north with thesupport of the fund.

Inter-community meeting strategy The meetings were designed for communities whoshared the same territory, were dependent on the sameresources and shared the same market place, so that theycould discuss the problems caused or aggravated by thewar. This organizing principle ignored the officialadministrative subdivisions created in the colonial erathat were designed to divide and control previouslystrong and inter-dependent communities. As there wasno official or other obvious leadership structure on thislevel, the facilitation group selected organizers for eachinter-community meeting based on an assessment of theindividual’s integrity, position in the area and capacity toconvene such a meeting. This was important because inMali the glue that binds society together is personalrelations and trust; people do not deal with a‘representative of something’ but rather with a person.

The facilitation group developed a list of problemsstemming from the war and asked the communities todevelop generally accepted solutions so that theireconomic and social life could function again. Theseincluded: how to verify information before taking action;a common approach towards armed bandits; strategiesfor reintegrating demobilized fighters and refugees;processes for collecting and controlling firearms; andsolutions to conflicts over land and water use rights. Thefacilitation group cautioned the communities to avoiddiscussing issues where the solution was not within theircontrol, as it would divert the discussion from the mainissues and led to disempowered frustration.

The facilitation group also formulated the categories ofpeople who should be involved in decision-making roles.These included: all traditional leaders, all religious leadersand all leaders in the emerging modern civil societyincluding women’s and youth groups. Local politicians,representatives of the government administration, thearmed forces and development organizations could onlyattend as observers. These guidelines made it possible forthe communities to renew their traditional dialogue so asto repair relations, without the ‘assistance’ ofintermediaries who might usurp the process.

Some funds were received from NCA but they wereinsufficient to cover all the costs. This meant that theorganizer had to find financing elsewhere, typically fromwithin the community. NCA decided not to requireaccounts of expenditures, instead insisting that themoney should be controlled according to local customsfor the use of common resources. This involved asignificant level of trust but also underscored the centralresponsibility of the organizers, who would have to livewith the consequences of the meeting’s success or failure.The organizer was asked to ensure that decisions wererecorded in official minutes, with the signatures of theofficial representatives to prove all the communities hadattended it. This document served as the de facto ‘receipt’for the NCA funds. The facilitation group’s conditionswere listed in a contract between the main organizer andLode that formed the legal basis for the meeting. It wasco-signed by two witnesses, with God invoked as awitness with this sentence at the end of each contract:“May the almighty and the all merciful God bless theefforts of his humble servants – Amen.” Because religionhad not been misused in the rebellion, it was an obviousconnector in the reconciliation process.

The organizers did not accept all details of the facilitationgroup’s strategy. Most added two elements. First, theydiscussed development issues – usually by making longlists of aspirations without any indication of priorities orroles for local participation. The local communities didnot yet have the capacity to formulate strategies for localeconomic development, yet in many places it marked thebeginning of a more responsible attitude towardsdevelopment issues. It was also significant because thelists indicated a growing interest in education on all levelsand on promoting the status of women. Second, theytended to issue open invitations to participate in themeeting. This had the positive consequence of increasingthe representativeness and legitimacy of the meeting. Italso indicated the strength of the organizers’commitment because they had to fund the additionalcosts of accommodating more people. Despite thefacilitation group’s encouragement, participantsrepresenting groups such as women and youth played amore marginal role than traditional leaders at this stage inthe process. But marginalized occupational groups –such as blacksmiths – and individuals with a strongpersonality, including women and young people, hadimportant positions in some localities.

Inter-community meetings in practiceThere was considerable preparation in advance of eachmeeting. For each meeting, the main organizer travelledfor several weeks around their region to discuss theprocess with key people, trying to convince them toparticipate with a positive attitude and to address anyobstacles to their involvement. This sometimes includedsettling long-standing disputes. They generally discussed

An inter-community meeting in progress.Source: Malian Press Agency

Inter-community meetings and national reconciliation

the issues and identified the positions likely to be takenso that the organizer could begin to understand the mainsubstantive issues that needed to be addressed.

Each meeting was attended by between 300 and 1,800people. As there were too many people to have longmeetings, they generally took place over one or two days.The meetings were typically opened by a plenary sessionwith formal speeches, a presentation of the outline of theprocedures, and selection of members for the topicalcommissions. Each commission consisted of ten to thirtymembers who were assigned to formulate proposals onthe main topic areas. Most often, there were commissionson development and on security, and sometimes a thirdcommission on another topic. A proposal on the topicwas usually put forward by the main organizer, who in thecourse of the preparatory consultations had carefullytaken into account a balance between the positions of alltypes of groups and professions in the area. Theproposals were then deliberated in the commission whilemost of the participants gathered in small groups, settledprivate problems and found partners for plannedprojects. Periodically, commission members consultedrelevant others as required. The general approach was toseek solutions to problems on all levels. The meeting wasconcluded with a final plenary meeting to approve ormodify each commission’s proposals.

The meetings were never chaired by outsiders. The mainorganizer generally formed a group of ‘wise men’ to chairthe meetings and who shared the responsibility betweenthemselves. Members of the facilitation group wereoccasionally present at the meetings but refrained fromtrying to use too much influence. The inter-community

meetings also provided an opportunity for people toaddress outstanding conflicts and feelings of enmity,where they found persons who could mediate. Oftenthey used readings from the Koran that exhortedbelievers to reconcile and forgive.

All decisions were made by consensus. If somebodyunderstood that there was no hope for consensus behindtheir position - but was not willing to accept a publicdefeat – they would ‘happen’ to be absent at theconclusion. It would be considered inappropriate forthem to raise the issue again after this stage. Yet theorganizers felt that there were no constraints to peoplemaking last comments or objections in the final plenary.Usually, however, this session did not last long becausecommission members had already looked forcompromises between the known positions of theinfluential figures. There were some occasions when theplenary rejected the commission's proposals. Then theyneeded the time to develop an acceptable agreement.

Outcomes of the meetingsThe participants in each meeting chose members for afollow-up commission to carry out the decisions. In somerespects, these commissions could be seen as the firstrelatively democratically elected bodies in rural northernMali. Yet they did not have much money for follow-upactivities and were hampered by the need to rentvehicles to travel long distances to meet with importantfigures. Yet they did their best and approached localauthorities, when such authorities were available in thearea, to settle specific problems. They sought toimplement strategies to resolve local disputes over land

69

70 Accord 13

and water resources and in some cases they negotiatedwith bandits and combatants from the movements. Inmost cases they found a solution.

Although there were variations in the conclusions of thedifferent inter-community meetings, the overall patternwas surprisingly similar. There was overwhelmingagreement that the authority of the state should berestored based on the principles of equality and justice.The process of talking together and developing sharedproposals helped to break down the wall of distrustbetween groups and individuals. In most places, therewere also significant practical outcomes. Market placesreopened immediately; armed robbery was dramaticallyreduced; and numerous combatants were convinced thatthe peace was real and consequently joined thedemobilization camps and turned in their weapons. Inmany areas, inhabitants began to implement the newstrategies for resolving long-standing communitydisputes, thus significantly reducing tensions.

Yet the process met with some resistance from those withan interest in maintaining the status quo. For example,leaders of the refugees in Burkina Faso tried to stop theprocess because they made considerable amounts ofmoney by inflating the number of refugees andembezzling the surplus funds. Because the inter-community meetings were not organized around theelectoral districts, parliamentarians were not formally partof the process. Some feared a loss of influence becauseuntil that time they could claim to be the exclusiverepresentatives of the people, whereas the inter-community meetings had empowered another group.

Consolidation and follow-up meetingsAfter the success of the inter-community meetings, somethought it would be useful to consolidate the processand assist it into the next phase. The aim was to develop astrategy for immediate follow-up to the six inter-community meetings that had been organized in theGourma area. Yet these ‘consolidation meetings’ were afailure and only one took place. The principal problemwas that the initiative did not emerge out of the felt needof the communities but was promoted by the facilitationgroup. This lack of community ownership wascompounded by an inadequate strategy. This wasevident when the participants focussed on discussing perdiems and travel costs, mostly because they did not viewit as their own meeting. This contrasted sharply with theinter-community meetings when money was nevercontested, despite the need for organizers to gatherconsiderable local resources. The facilitation group had torecognize that it was not the right moment and not theright approach. It was a powerful lesson that remindedthe group of their role as facilitators rather than as leaders.

Local communities had taken the lead; they woulddecide when and how the next steps would take place.

It seemed that most communities needed time to absorbtheir experiences. Their first goal was to participate in thenational Flame of Peace reconciliation ceremony. Theythen needed time to implement the decisions made atthe first round of meetings, to reflect on recent eventsand to identify issues to address in the next phase. It tookapproximately a year and a half of analysis andpreparation before the time was ripe for a follow-upprocess. But the cooperation between the facilitators andthe communities had created a mutual trust and respectthat lasted during this time.

After a period of reflection, in 1997 local leadersapproached the Commissariat of the North to ask forpermission and financial support for a process to addresstheir basic problems in post-conflict peacebuilding. Theirplans revealed the need for a new round of consultationsand a new determination to participate in the decision-making process. Virtually all wanted to understand andinfluence the national process of politicaldecentralization. Most also sought solutions to resolvelocal conflicts that might lead to serious violence andmany wanted to address the increase in armed banditryaffecting their communities.

The Commissariat wanted to encourage these efforts andasked the UNDP for support in the context of its ‘GoodGovernance’ programme. The Commissioner called uponthe facilitation group to become involved, along with afew new facilitators and joined occasionally by arepresentative of the Ministry of the Interior. Their rolewas to elaborate a strategy and decide on theappropriate amount of economic support for eachmeeting. The new programme began in October 1997and was based on a similar approach to the initial roundof inter-community meetings. They aimed to: reinforceinter-community ties and dialogue in order to continueto repair the social ties that had been torn away by therebellion; improve the local security situation through avoluntary disarmament of the civilian population;promote consensual solutions to local conflicts over landand water resources; and reinforce the process ofdemocratization and decentralization. The programmestructure was highly diverse. It included four massivemeetings in the border areas with Mauritania, Algeria andNiger involving participants from communities on bothsides of the border in order to reinforce security in theborder areas. It also involved 95 local communitymeetings and 11 reconciliation missions – consisting ofsmall groups of influential persons who worked with theprotagonists to develop workable solutions to problems,mostly regarding resource disputes.

Inter-community meetings and national reconciliation

Outcomes of the follow-up meetingsThe meetings proved highly effective for resolvingresource disputes. The lesson drawn by the facilitatorswas that only those whose lives depended on theseresources should participate in the decision-making;others should only be present as observers. The meetingsalso served as a training ground for participatorydemocracy. Every time local communities organized asuccessful meeting, their self confidence grew and theybecame increasingly aware that the decisions belongedto them. The national leadership was also shown thatlocal democracy was viable.

The meetings were also valuable as processes forpromoting reconciliation. The inter-community meetingsserved as unofficial local ‘truth commissions’. Participantshad a forum for stating their concerns in public beforedeciding whether to forgive each other. For example, atone meeting a participant raised an issue that impliedstrong criticism of someone who worked for UnitedNations High Commission for Refugees. The latter tried tostop the intervention by requesting: “Let us turn thatpage once and for all” to which the answer was: “yes weshall turn it but first we need to identify exactly thecontent of the page to make sure that both of us shallturn the same page.”

These follow-up meetings also addressed the ongoingchallenge of disarmament and in two places theycollected weapons on a large scale. Many northernersinsisted that they had bought the weapons during a timewhen the state could not guarantee security and theywanted to be refunded for their purchases. Yet throughthese meetings, they agreed that payment for weaponsexchange would be directed instead to their communitythrough the financing of development activities, insteadof personal payments. Although the Belgian governmentsponsored a programme to do this, some remainedreluctant to hand over weapons because of ongoingsecurity problems. Nevertheless, there was significantprogress toward voluntary disarmament.

Institutionalizing the outcomesOne of the most significant underlying causes of the war

was the under-development of the north. Based on theexperiences of the inter-community meeting process,since 1997 a number of development programmes thatcover large parts of the north have been based on theprinciple of local responsibility. Some internationaldonors have relinquished control over rural developmentproject financing, although they retain some input intothe way the money is used. The approach goes wellbeyond an advanced participatory method to the actualtransfer of responsibility for all aspects of management tolocal communities and their newly-elected municipalcouncils. Members of the facilitation group played key

roles in helping to design and manage it. NCA was one ofthe first donors to develop this approach – resulting in a90.5 per cent increase in funds available for direct projectfinancing after they ceased their own operationalactivities. (It is worth noting NCA is considered to run itsproject very well.) The French government, followed bysome UN agencies and the European Union also usedthese principles to guide their financing of largedevelopment programmes in Gao and the Timbuktuprovince. In each of these projects, formal responsibilityfor managing the budget is shared betweencommunities, associations or individuals, and the council.In a context of limited material resources, it can be moreefficient – as well as empowering – for those most directlyaffected by projects to have responsibility for them.

Between 2000 and 2002, there has been a new round oforganized inter-community meetings, with more than ahundred conducted or planned. The initiative was acontinuation of the former follow-up programme, withthe same group of facilitators who saw that support ofthis kind would still be necessary for a year or two. Thefinancing came from Norway (75%) and the Maliangovernment (25%). In many respects the meetings havesimilar objectives to the other follow-up meetings butthere are some new elements. Of the fifty meetingsorganised in 2001, ten were organized by youth for youthand fifteen were organized by women for women. Thesesector-specific meetings have resulted in new issues forthe public agenda, with potentially lasting significancefor shaping inter-community relations.

Delicate social processes such as peacebuilding typicallyneed continual nurturing. Yet the previously flexibleCommissariat of the North has been replaced by a newhighly bureaucratic structure. An informal and creativeapproach towards dialogue with local communities is nolonger possible and community generatedrecommendations are less influential in policy-making.The new municipal councils are well informed, however,and it would be difficult for them to disregard therecommendations from the meetings. Inter-communitymeetings have become part of the local strategy formanaging local affairs and most communities now havesufficient experience to conduct meetings without acentral group of facilitators.

The success of the Malian experience of peacebuildingrelied on equality of respect for modern analyticalapproaches and traditional knowledge based on theexperiences of several generations. It emerged out of adialogue between tradition and modernity on one handand between north and south on the other. If one partnertried to dominate the process, it did not work. Allparticipants learned to have a personal interest in thesuccess of others, which became the heart of the processof conflict transformation.

71

72 Accord 13

Mali Key textsThe National Pact: a summary

[An English translation of thesummary published in: Ag Mohamed,Coulibaly & Drabo: Nord du Mali – dela Tragedie à l’Espoir, Bamako 1995,pp. 13–14]

Chapter 1. Guiding Principles

The Pact is ‘the framework in which ajust and ultimate peace in the North ofMali will be restored and a nationalreconciliation between all Malians willbe achieved’. Furthermore, the Pact is a‘solemn commitment’ and the clausesof the agreement between the twoparties are irreversible.

However, it is also stated that there is adisagreement between the two partiesas to the appellation of the Northernpart of Mali. The Government wantedto use the administrativeexpression‘6th, 7th and 8th regions’whereas MFUA insisted on the term‘Azawad’ (French: ‘Azaouad’).

Waiting for the population to decidethrough the decentralized structures,the parties agreed to use the expression‘North of Mali’ in the document.

Chapter 2. On Ultimate Cessation ofHostilities and the Settlement ofProblems Caused by the Situation ofArmed Conflict

A final ceasefire is to take place at00.00 hours on the day following thesignature of the Pact. In addition thefollowing proceedings are to take placewithin a period of 60 days after thesignature of the document:

(i) total integration, based onindividual and voluntary acceptanceand on the competence of thecombatants of the MFUA, into thevarious uniformed bodies of theGovernment, the establishment, for aperiod of one year, of special units ofthe armed forces, made up of a

majority of integrated combatants ofthe MFUA,

(ii) the establishment of a local securitycorps (police, gendarmerie, localguards), made up of all sectors of thelocal population,

(iii) the establishment of special unitsof the army, composed mainly ofmembers of all sectors of the localpopulation,

(iv) a considerable, gradual andappropriate reduction of the armedforces in order to obtain withdrawal ofthe majority of troops,

(v) the establishment of a commissionfor the cease-fire,

(vi) the starting of a programme ofrepatriation of displaced persons,

(vii) the establishment of adevelopment- and reinsertion fundwell as an indemnisation- andcompensation fund for military andcivil victims from the two partiessignatories to the document,

(viii) the establishment of anindependent commission ofinvestigation.

Chapter 3. Particular Status for the North

On the basis of a new system ofadministrative subdivisions, thepopulations will organize local andinterregional assemblies. Theseassemblies will in particular beresponsible for the organization ofaffairs in the rural and urbancommunities. They are to define andpromote a programme for economic,social and cultural development, to beresponsible, through people selectedfor this purpose, for the control offorces and of activities connected withmaintaining order on the local andregional levels.

A Commissioner for the North of Mali,reporting directly to the Head of State,is to be appointed for a period of fiveyears. The appointment may berenewed. This person will beresponsible for the implementation ofthe National Pact.

Chapter 4. Public Acknowledgment ofSolidarity and National Unity in theNorth of Mali

The following steps have been decided:

(i) to launch a special programme ofdevelopment in the North of Mali; this

programme is to last for 10 years,organized in two consecutiveprogrammes of five years each;

(ii) a particular and exceptional effortfrom the Government in order tointegrate senior members of the MFUAand other persons from the North ofMali into the central high command ofthe national defence and of othersecurity structures as well as in thepublic and semi-public administration;

(iii) to set aside four seats in theNational Assembly for displacedpersons from the North of Mali, inaddition to one or two seats forrepresentatives of the Malianpopulation from the North, ‘residingabroad’.

Chapter 5. Sub regional Cooperationfor Peace and Development

Mention is made of the efforts to beundertaken by the Malian Governmenttowards the sub regional organizations(including the organization of SaharianStates), international institutions andfriendly countries, in order to obtain the support needed for consolidation of the peace process and for socio-economic progress.

Chapter 6. Schedule ofImplementation of Resolutions of thePact and of National Reconciliation

The schedules decided upon in theproceeding chapters are here summedup in detail – from the 24 hours givenfor the implementation of the ceasefire,to eight months for implementation ofthe new administrative and municipalsubdivision.

Chapter 7.Guarantee forImplementation of the Pact

A commission for follow up andimplementation of the Pact is to be setup within 15 days of the signature ofthe document. The Government andthe Coordination of the MFUA willeach appoint four members, and theperiod of function for the commissionis to be one year.

Signed in Bamako, April 11, 1992For the Government of the Republicof MaliThe Minister of the Administration ofthe Territory in charge of relations withthe CTSP and the Associations COLONEL BREHIMA SIRE TRAORE

For the Coordination of the UnitedMovements and Fronts of AzawadZAHABY OULD SIDI MOHAMEDThe President of the TransitionalCommittee for the Welfare of the PeopleLT-COLONEL AMADOU TOUMANITOURE

Contract

Concerning the organisation of aninter community meeting onreconciliation and consolidation ofpeace between Kåre LODE, theNorwegian Church Aid’s consultant forreconciliation in the Gourma and Mr.Nokh ag Attia, nomad chief and Tuaregnotable of the Province of Timbuktu

Article 1. Preliminary conditions1.1 The two parties have realised that,in the frame of reconciliation, and inorder to create a steady climateindispensable for lasting peace in thearea indicated below, such a meeting iswanted and decided upon by the civilpopulation involved,

1.2 The two parties have realised thatowing to the losses during the longperiod of insecurity, the populationneeds financial support to facilitate thephysical organisation of the meeting,

1.3 After long discussions and afterhaving listened to advice from severalresource persons, the two parties agreeon the following principles:

- the meeting should not discuss anysubject or problem that is beyond its competence,

- the meeting should discuss relevantsubject that are results of the period ofinsecurity, to which immediate andconsensual solutions have to be found,in order to permit the communitiesconcerned to start a normal way of lifeagain, a life that is favourable to socialand economic development and alasting civil peace, in particular:

- a common attitude towards reliable information;

- a common attitude against theft andother sorts of banditry;

- the socio-economic reintegration ofdemobilised combatants in the everyday life of their communities;

- the reintegration of returnedrefugees;

- the disarmament of the civilpopulation;

- a consensual management ofeconomic space and the areas ofattach;

- the role of various social groups inthe process of restoring andconsolidation of peace in the area;

- any other subject of the same naturedecided by the participants of themeeting.

1.4 The communities of Binga andGourma, zone 1, should be representedat the meeting by:

- the notables and traditional chiefs,

- religious authorities

- women

- youth

- old people

1.5 The following groups will beinvited as observers:

- the political parties that arerepresented at Bambara-Maoundé,the place of the meeting;

- the local administration;

- the partners in development (NGOs).

1.6 In order to facilitate theorganisation of the meeting and tomake it possible to make valuabledecisions, the number of officialparticipants should not exceed 100persons.

1.7 The meeting, that should lastmaximum two days, will take place atBambara

Maoundé between the 8th and the 15thof October, 1995, both dates included.

1.8 The committee of organisation andthe presidium should consist of peopleof good reputation representing all the communities concerned.

1.9 The minutes, signed by themembers of the presidium, will bemade by the end of the meeting. Theseminutes should contain the followingitems:

- the names of the participants and thenames of the communities theyrepresent;

- the decisions;

- the people responsible for carryingout the decisions of the meeting.

Article 2. The obligations of the parties

2.1 The NCA’s consultant commitshimself to pay to Mr. Nokh ag Attia, anamount of FCFA 2.500.000 (3.350dollars) to be used as follows:

- lodging of participants 1.500.000

- transport and miscellaneous 500.000

- information and motivation 500.000

This amount is the total support fromNCA for the inviting, organising, andcarrying through a successful meeting.

2.2 Mr. Nokh ag Attia commits himselfto:

- be responsible for the organisationand do whatever is possible in order tomake sure that the meeting will takeplace with the:

- dates;

- place;

- representation;

- organisation;

- agenda as stated above

- give to the NCA, not later than 10days after the meeting, the formalrequired proofs of the expenditures,and in particular:

- the minutes of the meeting;

- indications of the origin of theparticipants if not stated in theminutes.

2.3 The two parties commit themselvesin all their proceedings to worktowards a

consolidation of the peace and a socialsolidarity in order to reach asustainable development.

2.4 Any disagreement over thiscontract will be settled between theparties concerned.

Signed in Bamako, September 22,1995MR. NOKH AG ATTIAMR. KÅRE LODEWitnessesIBRAHIM AG YOUSSOUFZEIDAN AG SIDALAMINEMAY GOD THE ALL MIGHTY ANDALL MERCIFUL BLESS THE EFFORTSOF HIS HUMBLE SERVANTS. AMEN.

73Ma li Key texts 73

MogotesMunicipalConstituentAssembly: activating ‘popularsovereignty’ at a local level

Monseñor Leonardo Gomez Serna

C olombia has experienced protracted violentconflict for much of its history and there have beenefforts to address it for almost as long. The recent

period of the conflict dates from the emergence in theearly 1960s of a number of leftist guerrilla movementswaging a ’popular struggle‘ against the state. Despite theattempts of successive administrations to bring thesituation under control, the last few years have beenmarked by an upsurge in violence. The two main leftistguerrilla groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios deColombia (FARC) and the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional(ELN), as well as a growing number of right-wingparamilitary formations have attempted to consolidatetheir power throughout the country. Violence isparticularly widespread in rural areas, where armedgroups routinely intimidate and target local communitiesas they seek to expand their control. To date, over 35,000people have died in a conflict that has displaced morethan two million people inside the country.

Leftist armed groups frequently claim that they arefighting to secure major social, political and economicreforms that will wrest power away from corrupt politicalelites and benefit the majority of the population. As such,they have historically targeted and attempted to gaincontrol of local authorities. The state tried to address thisthrough efforts in the 1980s that were subsequentlyconsolidated through the promulgation of the newnational Constitution in 1991. The new Constitutionrequires the direct election of departmental governorsand mayors as well as municipal council officials, with theaim of increasing their legitimacy at a local level.However, constitutional reforms have ultimately donelittle to affect the culture of patronage and corruptionthat runs through Colombian politics and the violenttactics of the armed groups have continued.

In a context where national level efforts to address theconflict have failed to halt violence, citizens of thenortheastern town of Mogotes sought to address thesechallenges by developing local-level strategies for publicparticipation in ending violence and creating a newpolitical culture in their town. Their efforts had impact farbeyond their own immediate surroundings. Amongst thefirst of the ‘zones of peace’ to be established in Colombia,the experience of creating new structures of localgovernment in Mogotes has been a source of inspirationto communities who have replicated similar processes intheir own municipalities.

The occupation of MogotesDuring the run-up to local elections in October 1997,intimidation, kidnapping and sometimes assassination ofgovernment officials were common guerrilla strategies.As with other small towns in rural Colombia, thepopulation of Mogotes, a municipality of 13,000

Monseñor Leonardo Gomez Serna was the

Bishop of the Diocese of Socorro and San Gil

from 1996 until 2001. Currently the Bishop

of Magangue, he is involved in various

national peace initiatives and is a founding

member of REDEPAZ

74 Accord 13

Mogotes Municipal Constituent Assembly 75

inhabitants in the department of Santander, has longbeen vulnerable to the actions of both leftist and right-wing armed groups. Strategically located in the easternAndes, the outlying areas of the municipality are used as acorridor by these groups as they travel between theirmountain bases. Within the town itself, the majority ofthe population suffered the consequences of politicalexclusion, with local government controlled by a smallcircle of powerful individuals who looked after their owneconomic interests at the expense of public services anddevelopment. On 11 December 1997, shortly after theelections, political violence took a new turn. The ELNentered the town of Mogotes and kidnapped the newly-elected mayor, denouncing his administration ascorrupt. Three policemen and two civilians died in the one-day siege.

Despite the climate of fear generated by the heavy ELNpresence around the town, the citizens of Mogotesmobilized in protest. With the support of the leadershipof the local Catholic Church, they began a series of publicdemonstrations and prayer vigils, demanding the releaseof the mayor and an end to armed violence. After severaldays of campaigning, they were joined on 20 Decemberby a diocesan solidarity pilgrimage of priests, nuns andlay people, led by the Bishop of the Diocese of Socorroand San Gil. They arrived in Mogotes and congregated inthe centre of the town, issuing a public statement inwhich they rejected the ELN siege, the kidnapping of themayor and the political corruption at the root of theviolence. They encouraged the local population todefend the real interests of democracy.

Developing the MunicipalConstituent AssemblyIn addition to public protests, the citizens began toorganize themselves to reflect on the new situation.Earlier in 1997, as a result of a ‘pastoral plan’ developed bythe diocese, new ecclesiastical groups had been created.Each comprised between eight and ten families, who metweekly to pray and to reflect on the problems facing thecommunity. Following the siege, each group met todiscuss the crisis. The analysis of all the groups waspooled and led to the identification of three overallproblems that had culminated in the occupation:poverty, violence and administrative corruption.

With the support of the Church, the communitydeveloped proposals for a ‘project of liberation’ inresponse to the problems. This project, still ongoingsome five years later, has three components: a plan forintegral and sustainable human development to combatpoverty; a strategy to build a ‘community of peace’ andreduce violence; and a commitment to the recovery andexpression of the sovereign power of the people in orderto root out corruption. These responses were inspired by

their understanding of the liberating words of the Gospelstudied by the ecclesiastical groups during bible sessions,as well as by a strong local tradition of resistance andpopular mobilization that had its roots in the colonialperiod. They were also encouraged by the notion of‘popular sovereignty’ as a basis for the exercise of poweras enshrined in Article 3 of the Colombian Constitution,which states: “Sovereignty rests exclusively in the people,who are the source of public power.”

Unwilling either to accept the remnants of the corruptlocal administration or the dictates of the ELN, the peopleof Mogotes developed a strategy to implement their‘project of liberation’ themselves. With the support ofexperienced teams of pastoral animators from theCatholic Church, the population was divided into 18 localassemblies based on the ecclesiastical groups in differentzones of the town and surrounding countryside thatformed the municipality. These local assemblies thenelected 180 delegates to form a Municipal ConstituentAssembly. The large number of delegates ensured theinclusion of a diverse array of political sympathies andinterest groups, including members of trade unions, non-governmental organizations, business leaders and localofficials. Approximately two-thirds of the delegates werewomen, with young people actively encouraged toparticipate in the politics of their town throughinvolvement in ‘young peacebuilder’ initiatives. The newMunicipal Constituent Assembly of Mogotes (AMC) wasinaugurated on 6 April 1998.

The AMC is mandated to monitor the implementation ofthe municipal development plan and to supervise thefunctions of municipal management. AMC plenarysessions take place on the first Monday of the month. Thesessions are chaired by the three-person Presidency thatperforms the functions of president, treasurer andsecretary. The meeting agendas are based on reports,analysis and reflection on everyday events, including themanagement of the town’s authorities and the mayor’soffice. All AMC delegates are required to consult withtheir local assemblies prior to the sessions. Decisions inthe AMC are made by consensus, although when this isnot possible a system of majority voting is used. The AMCis guided by an ‘operational committee’ comprising 13delegate representatives of different social groupingsincluding the Church, the business sector, teachers,health service personnel and representatives of the ruralareas. Its role is to oversee and evaluate the work of theAMC and to ensure the functioning of the localassemblies. It is also responsible for public informationabout the workings of all the structures.

76 Accord 13

Building support for the processDespite the clear popular momentum behind theprocess, the AMC has had many enemies. Families of theprevious administration issued violent threats and spreadnegative propaganda. The armed groups have also poseda continual danger to the ongoing development of theprocess by attempting to disrupt the proceedings fortheir own interests. So far, despite some isolatedincidents, an ongoing process of community dialoguewith representatives of the guerrillas and paramilitarieshas persuaded them to accept the process and not tobesiege the town.

The AMC leaders have also sought to strengthen theirposition by enlisting support at regional, national andinternational levels. They promoted their processextensively in the surrounding region, encouragingsupport and solidarity from provincial and departmentallevel ‘peace working groups’ in the area. National reactionto the process was at first mixed, with the government ofPresident Ernesto Samper unsure whether to recognizethe new organizational structures. However, followingassurances from the Catholic Church that they supportedthe new mechanisms and that they reflected the will ofthe people, the Santander Governor gave formalrecognition to the new Assembly and attended itsinauguration. The Bishop of Socorro and San Gill alsointervened personally and held meetings with thenational and departmental authorities and with theCommander of the Colombian army. He assured themthat the process was not a front for guerrilla activity – ashad been alleged – but a genuine movement of thepeople to recover their power. Finally, the new leadersinvited representatives of the international community tovisit the town and see the situation for themselves. Thusambassadors from eight countries visited Mogotes in1998 and subsequently offered financial support forsome small development projects that had beenidentified by the community.

Successes of the new administrationOne of the first successes of the new MunicipalConstituent Assembly was to secure the release of thekidnapped mayor from the ELN. However, in an effort tobreak with the corruption of the past, the Assemblyinformed him that they were not prepared to reinstatehim and asked him to resign. When he refused, thepopulation began silent marches and prayer vigils. Finally,the AMC organized a popular referendum throughoutthe municipality; when the results demonstrated that 95per cent of the town demanded his resignation, themayor conceded. The AMC then developed a newpolitical and ethical code of conduct for future mayorsand asked the national government to organize freshelections. They replaced the title of ‘mayor’ with

‘manager’ to indicate that the purpose of the role was toensure the implementation of the people’s wishes. Thesubsequent elections passed smoothly with Jose AngelGualdron emerging with a majority of votes. The resultwas recognized by the National Election Council andGualdron was inaugurated.

The Assembly has also begun to change the culture oflocal politics. The large number of delegates to the AMC –which now stands at 230 – has substantially broadenedpolitical participation in and responsibility for local affairs.Extensive consultations in the local assemblies formedthe basis for an integrated plan for development,peacebuilding and democratic governance that reflectsthe wishes of the population beyond the assembly. Whenthe first manager’s term expired in 2001, all candidateswishing to stand for election had to accept the plan forthe municipality as the basis for their work. During theelection campaign, assembly members accompanied allcandidates to the constituencies, encouraging them tolisten to the requests of the people rather than deliverlengthy speeches.

The AMC has strengthened accountability throughchanges to local electoral law and increased reportingrequirements. It introduced new regulations obliging themanager to present his work for evaluation by theAssembly every twelve months. Permission to continue inoffice for the full three-year term is granted subject to apositive evaluation of the work undertaken during eachyear. The manager is also required to report to the AMCevery three months, which then delivers a public reporton its activities.

The AMC has also made significant progress inimplementing the integral development plan at the heartof its project of liberation. The Assembly has builtconsensus on development and governance issues,begun to implement new agricultural projects andsucceeded in improving the distribution andmanagement of municipal resources.

The process of recovering popular sovereignty inMogotes has served as a catalyst for communityreconciliation in a previously polarized and violentsociety. As people have become accustomed todiscussing their problems openly, incidents of violencehave decreased considerably. Furthermore, theexperience has offered local people a chance toparticipate in a peaceful process of political change andsucceeded in involving young people, the future of thecommunity, in the peacebuilding project. Theseexperiences have underpinned the efforts to build acommunity of peace.

Mogotes.Source: Diocese of Socorro San Gil

Mogotes Municipal Constituent Assembly 77

Perhaps most significantly, the experience of Mogoteshas provided inspiration to other communities aroundthe country. Often called the ’laboratory of peace‘,Mogotes was awarded the first National Peace Prize inColombia in 1999. The municipality is now one ofhundreds of zones of peace throughout the country andthe inspiration behind the development of MunicipalConstituent Assemblies elsewhere in the departments ofAntioquia, Santander, Tolima and Huila. The Diocese ofSocorro and San Gil also stimulated the development of anational network, the Red Nacional de Iniciativas por la Pazy contra la Guerra (REDEPAZ), which serves as thetechnical secretary to the Coordinating Committee forthe Peace Territories and Communities. REDEPAZ runs anational ‘hundred towns of peace’ project to strengthenand support their activities throughout Colombia.

Challenges and problems ofpopular sovereigntyConsiderable challenges lie ahead for the town ofMogotes. Development potential is circumscribed by theinability of the state to invest sufficiently in the socialcapital of the community. In retrospect it is clear thatmore could have been done at an early stage toencourage external investment in economicdevelopment. The prevalence of violence, combined andentwined with recent escalations in the armed conflict,

has an impact on attitudes at the community level andrequires constant attention. Similarly, the traditionalpolitical culture of patronage and corruption is deep-rooted. All these challenges require the creation andimplementation of ongoing, long-term strategies forpeace, development and community reconciliation. Inaddition, there is the underlying need to ensure that themechanisms they have created are able to continuestimulating the active engagement of all sectors of localsociety, which is a necessary precondition to sustainingpopular sovereignty.

It has been five years since this experience started.Although it is not yet sufficiently consolidated, the peopleof Mogotes recognize that, despite the difficulties, it hasbeen a very positive step in advancing the integraldevelopment of the community and in enablingauthentic democratic participation in local politics. Whilemeaningful progress towards peace continues to eludeColombia at a national level, local populations in Mogotesand elsewhere are exercising their popular sovereigntyand building their own peace.

NorthernIrelandWomen’sCoalition: institutionalizing apolitical voice andensuring representation

Kate Fearon

C onflict has been a feature of life in Northern Irelandfor centuries. It has shaped a society that is deeplydivided socially and politically and where the

space for real cross-community engagement has beenconstricted. It dates back to the time when mostlyProtestant settlers from England and Scotland moved tothe area, partially displacing the mostly Catholicindigenous Irish inhabitants. In 1921, when part of Irelandwas granted limited independence, the six northerncounties remained under British jurisdiction. Theaspiration of some to a united Ireland (the ‘nationalists’and ‘republicans’) and the determination of others toremain joined with Britain (the ‘unionists’ and ‘loyalists’)has been at the heart of the conflict ever since. Later, theconflict manifested itself powerfully around the issue ofcivil and human rights. The modern ‘troubles’ started inthe late 1960s when demonstrations began for basicrights such as housing. After response and counter-response, the initially peaceful civil rights movementescalated into violent struggle, which lasted from 1970until the late 1990’s.

By the mid-1990s, it was increasingly recognized by boththe British government and republican paramilitaries thatthe conflict could not be won through military means.After decades of various peace initiatives and growingcooperation between the British and Irish governmentsto sponsor joint efforts, a process for all-party talks beganin June 1996 based, for the first time, on the assumptionthat: ‘if you are a part of the problem, then you need to bepart of the solution’. Representatives to the talks wouldbe chosen through public elections with the intent ofincluding the parties associated with paramilitary groupsin formal political negotiations for the first time. In anattempt to ensure that the elections would result indelegates from all the main communities, thegovernment developed an electoral system that offeredparticipation based on relatively few votes. The numberof seats would be assigned through a two-track system.The 18 territorial constituencies would each elect fiverepresentatives. Through a ‘top-up’ system, they wouldbe joined by two representatives from each of the tenmost successful parties across Northern Ireland as awhole. This enabled 110 delegates to participate in thepeace process. Although the format enabled delegatesoutside the mainstream parties to participate in talks,there were no specific arrangements for the participationof other organized sectors of society. What follows is thestory of a group of women rooted in civil society whoorganized to ensure their voice would be heard in thepolitical negotiations and who became a channel for bi-communal civil society involvement in the officialpeacemaking process.

Kate Fearon is a founder member of the

Northern Ireland Women's Coalition and

was an advisor to its delegation to the

Belfast talks. She currently directs the

National Democratic Institute's political

party programme in Sarajevo.

Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition 79

Forming the Northern IrelandWomen’s CoalitionThe Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) wasinitiated by women with long histories of engagement incivil, human and workers' rights. Many were leaders in thecommunity and voluntary sectors; others were teachers,university lecturers, professionals, and home workers.They included unionists and nationalists, as well as thosewho did not define themselves in either of thesecategories. They felt it necessary to take the gigantic stepfrom the non-governmental sector to the political arenabecause they believed that the incumbent politicalleaders either ignored or refused to take seriously theissue of women’s representation and participation in thepeace negotiations.

At first, under the aegis of the Northern Ireland Women’sEuropean Platform (a formally constituted organizationthat still exists), the NIWC leaders lobbied for the existingpolitical parties to include women in their candidate lists.When this action was effectively ignored and thegovernment published its ideas for the electoral system,they decided to form a political grouping to contest theelections. Not all women’s groups supported this idea.Some believed it would be difficult to sustain the bi-communal nature of the coalition over such contentiousissues as policing because cooperation would require toomany compromises. Despite these concerns, the NIWCattracted support from most groups.

Around 150 women attended the first meeting.Subsequent meetings regularly attracted up to 60people. Twice-weekly and then weekly meetings wereheld in Belfast to debate positions and were facilitated byrotating chairs. Equality, human rights and inclusion wereadopted as the coalition's three core principles and aprincipled approach became key to guiding andevaluating the development of positions. Another usefulpractice – and unusual in Northern Ireland – was thatparticipants were encouraged to take their ‘identitybaggage’ into the room with them. They were expectedto acknowledge differences up front, rather than to ‘bepolite’ and leave them outside the door.

The NIWC estimated that if they could win approximately10,000 votes across Northern Ireland, they would beeligible for the two seats offered by the top-up layer. Theirstrategy was to organize women through all their variousnetworks and contacts to gain the necessary threshold ofvotes. The NIWC initially had no money. A communitycollege provided rooms and several individuals madedonations. When it became clear they would not be ableto pay for a bulk order for printing campaign materials, ananonymous donation and the generosity of politically sympathetic printers resolved the problem.

Other parties and the media initially dismissed the NIWC.Yet it gained one per cent of the vote and finished as theninth most popular political party. It thus secured twoseats in the negotiations, where its delegates had thestatus of full participants. The Democratic Partnershipand the Labour Coalition were the other civil societygroupings to contest the elections – with the latterwinning sufficient votes to join the negotiations.

Participating in negotiationsDuring the talks, the larger parties were entitled to threeseats at the table, supported by three back-up members;whereas the smaller parties were allocated two seats withthree in back-up. For the purposes of voting, however, theparties were entitled to all the seats obtained through theconstituency elections in addition to their two automatic‘top up’ seats. While the other delegations at the tablewere overwhelmingly – and initially exclusively – male,the NIWC delegation was exclusively female. Thesedemographics meant that male voices were heard morefrequently during the negotiations. The NIWC delegateschallenged this dynamic by ensuring that theirperspectives were heard and by confronting delegateswho monopolized the debate.

The NIWC was careful to ensure that both nationalist andunionist women were at the table at all times. The team often women who supported them with political adviceand analysis was similarly balanced. Delegates wereselected at an open meeting of the NIWC, drawn fromthose who had been on the regional candidate list. Onehurdle the delegates encountered was the attitude of theother elected representatives. The NIWC delegates hadassumed initially that they would be treated with respectas equal negotiating partners. Although some grew torespect the NIWC’s contributions, others showed disdain.The delegates learned to develop a ‘thick skin’ and not totake rejection personally. Instead they tried to maintaintheir focus on the bigger picture and to make strategicallegiances when and where possible.

The NIWC concentrated initially on makingrecommendations for procedural issues, such asamendments to the Rules of Procedure that governedthe day-to-day operation of the talks and suggestions foragenda items and the order in which they should bediscussed. They were sensitive to how these matterslinked with process issues and were attentive to theunderlying relationships between participants. Theyworked to promote an inclusive process and to prevent asmall number of delegates getting drawn into adestructive spiral of blame that could harm the generalnegotiation ethos. They were later able to broaden thenegotiating agenda to include such issues as victims’rights and reconciliation. The NIWC produced high-quality position papers and tried to model a fresh

80 Accord 13

approach to politics based on cooperation, non-competitiveness and a willingness to share ideas. Whilemost parties did not regard the NIWC as a political threat,some of the nationalist mainstream politicians may haveperceived the NIWC policies as encroaching on theirterrain, which had traditionally been based on strongadvocacy for human rights and equality. Thus, eventhough the NIWC included many women from a unionistbackground, the agenda it agreed and articulated wasone that would be recognized as more traditionallynationalist – at least until the smaller loyalist parties alsobegan to adopt this political ground.

They remained true to their NGO roots and kept their feetfirmly in both the world of electoral politics and in theworld of public activism. This happened on two levels.First, there was a monthly meeting of the fullmembership of the Coalition. They discussed positionson forthcoming agenda items and provided informationto the membership about developments in the politicalprocess. The meetings provided opportunities for themembership to inform the representatives of theirperspectives on the process. Because the membershipwas bi-communal, they provided guidance onapproaches acceptable to either or both communities.Second, the NIWC maintained regular contact with arange of community and NGO leaders on specific issuesunder discussion. The NIWC was careful not to portrayitself as having all the answers and gave seriousconsideration to the views of those consulted. Theseinputs from both the membership and from thesenetworks meant that the NIWC was confident that itspositions could command cross-community support.

After a year, the NIWC decided to formalize some of itsdecision-making procedures and confirm its status as apolitical party. It developed a constitution that providedfor the annual election of a 12 -15 member executivecommittee to make policy decisions, which consisted oftwo representatives from each county plus the publiclyelected representatives as ex-officio members.Additionally, there was an option to co-opt additionalmembers if necessary to maintain the cross-communitybalance of members. Monthly meetings continued to beopen to the full membership, which supplemented thedecision-making process as necessary.

Promoting the Belfast AgreementAfter deliberating for 22 months, the negotiatorsconcluded the Belfast Agreement in April 1998. Before itcould take effect, however, it had to be endorsed througha public referendum. The NIWC played a key role inpromoting the Agreement. Few parties were asunequivocal in their support and no other political partyworked as closely with civil society leaders. The NIWC was

able to speak simultaneously to a number ofconstituencies: nationalist and unionist, organized civilsociety and individual members of the public. Membershelped prepare a ‘user friendly’ version of the Agreement,using plain speech to make it more comprehensible.NIWC representatives spoke at public debates andorganized debates amongst their own members. TheNIWC supported the civil society-led “Yes” Campaign. Asa political party, NIWC was entitled to free postage forsending a piece of literature to every voter. They put theirown message on one side and gave the “Yes” Campaignthe other side to print with its own message and logo.

The referendum on the Belfast Agreement was passed by72 per cent of the Northern Ireland electorate – an eventof massive historical and political significance. It createdthe new Northern Ireland Assembly, which would governthrough a power-sharing executive on issues ofeconomic and social concern. It established the North-South Ministerial Council to formalize links within theisland and a British/Irish Council to formalize relationshipsamongst all the representative bodies in the islands. Itproposed a range of measures that addressed thepolitical and constitutional dimensions of the NorthernIreland conflict – though not necessarily the moreinternalized social and socio-psychological dimensions.

Assessing the outcomesThe involvement of the NIWC in the political negotiationshad consequences for both the peace agreement andthe dynamics of politics in Northern Ireland. Some of theissues the NIWC put on the agenda – such as victims'rights and reconciliation – became touchstone issues inthe referendum campaign. It is arguable that if theagreement had not addressed these concerns, manypeople could have voted against it and thus jeopardizedthe greatest opportunity for peace in 30 years. The NIWCalso initiated the idea of a Civic Forum as part of theNorthern Ireland Assembly so as to institutionalizeopportunities for broader public participation in politics –a proposal eventually incorporated into the agreement.The NIWC worked hard to protect and nurture theagreement during the implementation period. At timesthey helped to mobilize civil society to protect theagreement and at other times collaborated with politicalparties in joint efforts to promote it.

One immediate impact of the NIWC was that the issue ofwomen’s political participation was placed firmly on themap of electoral politics. Women delegates from otherpolitical parties began to attain higher profiles withintheir parties. When the Northern Ireland Assembly finallyappointed ministers, two out of ten were women. TheNIWC also contributed to de-mystifying the politicalprocess, which was one of its original goals. The NIWC’s

The NIWC’s Bronagh Hinds with a poster that reads‘Wave Goodbye Dinosaurs’.

Source: Leslie Doyle

Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition 81

involvement in the negotiations not only facilitated andpromoted women’s participation, it also demonstratedthe possibility that civil society can participate in andinfluence formal political negotiations. It revealed thatpolitics is not necessarily the exclusive preserve ofcustomary politicians; groups other than thoseadvocating exclusively a nationalist or exclusively aunionist perspective also have a place at the decision-making table.

The founders of the NIWC never intended it to become apermanent political party; yet it is becoming one, in partbecause the public has endorsed its longevity throughelections. Elections to the new Northern IrelandAssembly in 1998 presented additional challenges.NIWC’s delegates had to be elected directly from multi-member constituencies, rather than winning seats due totheir overall proportional vote through the accumulatorsystem used to elect delegates to the negotiations. Yetafter an effective campaign, two candidates won seatsfrom their constituencies. These Assembly members havesince attempted to build cooperation with the smallerpro-Agreement parties.

The Belfast Agreement created a top-heavy executive. It islikely that the four largest parties, representing mirror

images of nationalism and unionism, will form apermanent governing coalition. A mature democracydemands a constructive opposition to critique thegovernment. The NIWC has now assumed this role.Elections scheduled for May 2003 will provide a key testof both the Belfast Agreement and the NIWC. If and whena political re-alignment comes to Northern Ireland in thefuture, the NIWC will play a vanguard role – in its currentform or in another.

The NIWC cannot claim the dominant role in negotiatingthe Belfast Agreement, which is a collective achievementof all the parties and governments involved. But it canclaim a key role in changing, at least temporarily, theculture of politics in Northern Ireland. It brought solutionsto the table that recognized and worked toaccommodate difference, instead of throwing upobstacles based on those differences.

PhilippinesNationalUnificationCommission: national consultation and the‘Six Paths to Peace’

Miriam Coronel Ferrer

T he Philippines has experienced decades of armedconflict involving a number of different movementswith distinct grievances and aspirations – including

self-determination struggles (notably Cordillera and MoroMuslim movements), a communist/leftist insurgency and,in the 1980s, a rebellion by a segment of the nationalmilitary. In July 1992, newly elected President Fidel V.Ramos announced new peace initiatives, starting with anexpanded amnesty program and the decriminalization ofcommunism as an ideology. The initiatives were rooted inRamos’ realization of the need to achieve political stabilityand national unity to advance his economicdevelopment agenda. Ramos had begun exploratorytalks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) whileon the campaign trail. After his presidency was secured,the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and theOrganization of the Islamic Conference initiatedconciliatory overtures at the same time as the moreradical Abu Sayyaf Group was emerging, thus indicatingthe need to urgently address the situation in Mindanao.

The more progressive sectors of society were highlycritical of Ramos’ focus on amnesty – with those closelyassociated with the national democratic left perceivingthe amnesty as an enticement to surrender. A number ofinfluential civil society peace advocates, including somebishops, quietly advised the President to situate amnestywithin a broader peace process. In September, Ramosappointed a National Unification Commission (NUC) tocreate a comprehensive and participatory consultationprocess and develop strategies for engaging inexploratory talks with all the armed groups.

The NUC’s mandate was to produce: “a viable generalamnesty program and process that will lead to a just,comprehensive and lasting peace” and it was given abudget of 12 million pesos (US $600,000). The NUC’s taskwas to hold consultations with all concerned sectors,including rebel groups – particularly the MNLF and theCommunist Party of the Philippines-National DemocraticFront-New People’s Army (CPP-NDF-NPA) – as well as thePhilippine military and police. It was initially asked toproduce recommendations in 90 days but ultimately tookten months to complete its work. In addition to itspolitical negotiation efforts, the NUC’s legacy was itsextensive programme of public consultations. Theresulting recommendations were integrated to producewhat many consider to be the classic framework guidingPhilippine peacemaking: the Six Paths to Peace.

NUC composition and frameworkThe NUC was composed of a chair and eight members.President Ramos appointed Haydee Yorac, the liberal andfeisty University of the Philippines law professor andformer elections commissioner, as NUC chair and thesecretaries of the justice and defence departments, a

Miriam Coronel Ferrer is director of the

Programme on Peace, Conflict Resolution and

Democratization at the University of

the Philippines and currently a member-

consultant of the Reciprocal Working Committee

for Political and Economic Reforms of the

Government Negotiating Panel for talks with the

National Democratic Front.

82 Accord 13

Philippines National Unification Commission 83

Catholic bishop, and the leader of the Protestant NationalCouncil of Churches of the Philippines (NCCP) ascommissioners. They were joined by four designatedmembers of congress, two of whom were known to havefriendly ties with the Left, while the other two wereretired military generals. Also created were a TechnicalCommittee to provide expert professional assistance, aSecretariat headed by a female executive director thatprovided administrative support to the NUC, and aneight-member Council of Advisers. This advisory bodyincluded an ex-president, an ex-senator, a retiredambassador, two former leaders of the old CommunistParty, and – at the prompting of MNLF chair Nur Misuari –two prominent Muslim leaders.

The Commissioners and Advisors covered a fairly widespectrum of ideological orientations and Haydee Yoracenjoyed the public’s respect. More than 90 per cent ofFilipinos are Christians and the churches have alwaysbeen a moral and political force in the country. Involvingthe churches’ leaders – and, in Muslim areas, Islamicreligious leaders – also meant being able to mobilizeresources nationwide and gain widespread acceptance.

The NUC apparently had the ear of the President. Becauseother public officials were also engaged in contacts withinsurgents, the NUC asked Ramos to make it clear thatonly the NUC had the authority to engage in exploratorytalks. The NUC issued policies and guidelines intended topromote coordination and limit the role of otherauthorities so that they could establish contact but notengage in actual negotiations.

Though the NUC met with key insurgency leaders, it wasan ad hoc advisory group rather than a negotiating panel.It reviewed initial agreements between insurgent groupsand government emissaries, pursued exploratory talks,issued safe conduct passes and recommended next stepsto the President. For example, when the MNLF refused tohold talks in the country, the NUC suggested acompromise strategy of ‘shifting venues’ wherebymeetings would be held in multiple countries includingthe Philippines. The NUC also improved and monitoredimplementation of the President’s confidence buildingmeasures, such as the amnesty programme. The NUCconducted its work discreetly but issued regular pressstatements and reports to inform the public ofdevelopments in the process.

The NUC developed an operational framework thatexceeded the expectations of the President’s critics. Itaimed to create a community-based vision that wouldguide the development of a programme to forge a newsocial contract for a just, equitable, humane andpluralistic society. It wanted to bring about: “principledand peaceful resolutions of the armed conflicts, withneither blame nor surrender, but with dignity for all

concerned”. Its most high-profile efforts were the publicconsultations it conducted intensively from November1992 to March 1993, which served as a mechanism tobroaden public participation in defining a national peace programme.

Mandate and participationThe NUC consultations were intended to discuss: (1)participants’ perceptions of the causes of the armedconflicts; (2) their proposals for how government andrebel forces should end them; (3) the issues they deemedrelevant to the peace process; (4) the specificprogrammes, reforms, and entities that could implementproposals and promote peace; and (5) what their owngroup could do to promote peace. The NUC identifiedtwelve key issues relevant to peacemaking: electoralreforms; human rights; political parties; dismantling ofprivate armies; administration of justice; protection of theenvironment; socio-economic reforms; autonomy andcultural integrity; provisions for victims of armed conflicts;economic components of national unification;disposition of forces and armaments; and amnesty. Theythen asked participants to identify additional topics thatshould be included in the peace programme. To ensure that it was a truly national process, theconsultations were structured through a series ofmeetings at three levels: provincial, regional, andnational. The NUC issued the ‘Manual of Operations forthe Conduct of NUC Public Consultations’ to guide theprocess and its Secretariat was given overall responsibilityfor organizing the national and regional consultations.The Secretariat was assisted by an Advisory Group withrepresentatives of the NCCP, Catholic Bishops’ Conferenceof the Philippines (CBCP), the department of localgovernments and the National Coordinating Council forLocal Governance. The NUC Secretariat and the AdvisoryGroup designed the consultations process, appointedtwo members nominated by the NCCP and the CBCP toeach Regional Convenors’ Group (RCG) and monitoredthe conduct of the provincial consultations. The RCGs inturn identified the three core convenors for each of theprovinces under their coverage. The Provincial ConvenorGroups were required to have a minimum of fourmembers, including the governor and representativesfrom an NGO and a people’s organization as well as areligious leader. Each province could expandmembership depending on the number of relevantsectors and different religious groups.

The NUC consulted with national formations, includinglarge multi-sectoral coalitions such as the National PeaceConference and the People’s Congress. These groupswere responsible for pre-consultation activities amongtheir networks and submitting proposals and documentsto the NUC Secretariat before the consultation. TheRegional and Provincial Convenors’ Groups organizedmeetings at their respective levels and received and

84 Accord 13

collated peace proposals. Considerable flexibility wasallowed at the provincial level because of the diversity inlocal conditions. Each PCG designed its own pre-consultation mechanisms, with some conductingmunicipal-level pre-consultations and others arrangingsectoral meetings. These events channelled into aprovincial consultation, where participants selected theirten representatives to the regional consultation.

The RCGs convened the regional consultations, which theNUC attended. Provincial representatives delivered theirrespective reports and an open forum followed eachpresentation. The body was then divided into workshopgroups to fill in a matrix that was later consolidated intothe regional report. In all, 71 provincial and 14 regionalconsultations were held and covered almost everyprovince, including Muslim Mindanao.

The NUC identified 24 sectors whose representativesshould be invited to participate, along withrepresentatives from local and central government, thejudiciary, police and armed forces. These included:women’s organizations, child advocates, civic groups,cooperatives, the differently-abled, teachers andresearchers, professional associations, farmers, fishermen,indigenous cultural communities, urban poor, media,labour, business, religious groups, social-developmentNGOs, cause-oriented and political organizations, issue-specific groups and groups of former rebels. In Mindanaocommunities with sizable Muslim populations, therepresentatives were also drawn from Muslim social,political and governing bodies. Furthermore, the RCGsjointly with the police and armed forces were authorizedto issue safe-conduct passes to combatants that wantedto attend the regional consultations.

Religious and other civil society personalities and groupshad leading roles in the consultative structures created.This meant that both practically and symbolically theseconsultations were led by civil society, rather than thegovernment, at the local and regional levels.

The ‘Six Paths to Peace’In July 1993, the NUC submitted its report. Itacknowledged that profound poverty and inequalitywere at the root of the country’s conflicts and concludedthat to achieve a just and lasting peace, at least six pathsmust be pursued simultaneously. The first was pursuit ofsocial, economic, and political reforms aimed ataddressing the root causes of armed struggle and socialunrest. The second path was consensus building andempowerment for peace through continuousconsultation at the national and local levels. The third waspeace negotiations with armed groups. The fourth pathwas implementing measures for reconciliation,reintegration of former combatants and rehabilitation ofthose affected by the conflict. The fifth was conflict

management and protection of civilians. The sixth pathaimed to build, nurture and enhance a positive climatefor peace. The NUC also made recommendations on a setof ‘do-ables’ as specific measures that the governmentcould immediately implement to partly address a rootcause of the conflict. The document, in effect, legitimizedand validated the long-existing demands of socialmovements and progressive sections of civil society: theneed for comprehensive reforms to address structuralinequalities and achieve lasting peace. President Ramosaccepted the NUC recommendations and adopted themas the basis for his declared peace strategy.

That September, the Office of the Presidential Adviser onthe Peace Process (OPAPP) was created to assume theadvisory and coordination functions of the NUC, whoseofficial term ended in June 1993. The OPAPP followed upon the set of do-ables with the relevant governmentagencies. In addition, Government Peace NegotiatingPanels were constituted for talks with the CPP-NDF-NPA,the Moro groups and the military rebels. The momentumand confidence gained between the parties through theNUC-led process combined with national andinternational interest to make a contribution to the peacetalks. The government signed comprehensive peaceagreements with the military rebels in 1995 and with theMNLF in 1996. A ceasefire agreement was also reachedwith the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 1997. Formaltalks with the National Democratic Front opened in 1995and in 1998, shortly before the end of President Ramos’term, an agreement was signed but remains inoperable.

Issues and controversiesThe NUC consultation process and outcomes had somedetractors. Some leftist groups chose not to participatefully in the process. In Negros Occidental, they held apicket outside the building where the consultations tookplace. Statements and articles written by groupsassociated with the National Democratic Front after theNUC’s work was concluded continued to reflect theirdistrust of the Ramos administration’s peace overtures –and even revealed an ideological resistance to amnestyand reintegration programmes because they mightundermine support for armed struggle. Pro-independence elements in the Muslim populationcontinued to hear an unbending stance on sovereigntyand territorial integrity in subsequent statements of thePresident. Some doubted that the process or outcomeswould be relevant to their priority needs. Furthermore,some local government officials were alienated by thecivil society-driven process. The NUC had to issue amemorandum in December 1992 requiring city mayors’inclusion in the PCGs. The NUC secretariat’s executivedirector later indicated her belief that because some localgovernments did not own the outcome, they did nothave much commitment to its implementation.

NUC Public Consultation on the Peace Process, (Lanao del sur) 11 May 1993.Source: OPAPP

Philippines National Unification Commission 85

From a procedural perspective, some found the multi-tiered structure of consultations repetitive and tedious ordismissed the exercise as a reiteration of grievances anddemands expressed in previous forums and earliernegotiations. Sometimes the discussions lost focus andparticipants raised seemingly unrelated concerns, such aspornography and family values. The NUC admitted that itdid not attempt to undertake a strict scientific samplingand there might have been some sectoral bias in theresults. One scholar queried whether it would have beenbetter to leave the question on the issues for inclusion inthe national peace programme open-ended. The NUCalso noted that the quality of the consultation resultsvaried considerably. They indicated time and logisticalconstraints, the degree of organization of the provinceand region and the level of awareness of the populationto be among the factors affecting the consultations.

AssessmentDespite the dissatisfaction of some, the NUC’s publicityand the nation-wide flurry of activities raised publicawareness of the issues and mobilized active support forthe peace process. Political negotiations were put backon track. The wide-scale consultative process alsostimulated the emergence of a national network of peaceconvenors, peace advocates and peace groups. Thisnetwork and the groups that emerged continue toparticipate in both government-led consultations andnon-governmental programmes and campaigns.

To date, the Six Paths to Peace remains the operationalframework for the Philippine peace processes. However,the subsequent administrations of Joseph ‘Erap’ Estradaand Gloria Macapagal Arroyo have revealed that thevoices of OPAPP and peace advocates are heard only ifthe President is willing to listen. Inside government, theOPAPP has to counter the influence of a militaryestablishment schooled in Cold War ideology andcorporate interests unreceptive to the structural reformsidentified through the NUC consultations as necessary forpeacebuilding. These are the recommendations thathave been the most difficult to implement.

The NUC exercise also helped institutionalize publicconsultations as a regular part of governance. Inspired bythe NUC’s success, government and civil society groupshave used subsequent consultations – or ‘summits’ – toaddress specific issues like economic development,poverty and crime. Consultations that enable directinterface with government have generated morepressure to deliver results. But consultations alone are notenough. If held repeatedly but without substantialoutcomes, participants become cynical about thepurpose and the sincerity of those engaged. This soonoverrides the usefulness of the process as a mechanismfor building consensus. Instead, consultations should becumulative and be seen as such – building from theoutcome of the previous ones – rather than merelyrepetitive. Government and society must consistentlyfollow through with the changes identified through theseprocesses if a just and sustainable peace is to emerge,even if only block by block.

86 Accord 13

Publicparticipationandinternationalpeacemaking

Marrack Goulding

In 1986, as the UN’s newly appointed Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, I gave a talk to an Americanreligious group visiting UN headquarters in New York.

At the end, someone asked whether I thought NGOs hada role to play in the UN’s efforts to maintain peace andsecurity. I answered with an unequivocal ‘no’. The UnitedNations was an association of governments; NGOs couldhelp to relieve hardship but had no role in thenegotiation and implementation of peace settlements.Thus was manifested the ignorance and arrogance of thenew appointee.

I would not give the same answer today. Since the end ofthe Cold War, non-state actors have played anincreasingly important role both in the conduct ofconflict and in its resolution. International NGOs haveproliferated and have become an accepted part of ‘theinternational community’ – although their quality variesand there are unanswered questions about theiraccountability. Within countries, the institutions of civilsociety have also acquired a recognized role, both in theresolution of internal conflicts and as a channel for publicparticipation in peacemaking.

Public participation: normative, efficientor a nuisance?Nevertheless, ambiguities remain about how far public

participation in peacemaking is viewed either asnormative, in the sense that the people have an inherentright to participate in efforts to maintain peace in theircountries; or as pragmatically desirable, because itcontributes to the efficiency of peacemaking; or as anuisance, which governmental peacemakers wouldprefer to avoid.

The preamble to the United Nations Charter beginsgrandiloquently “We the Peoples of the United Nationsdetermined to save succeeding generations from thescourge of war …” but it ends on a different note:‘Accordingly, our respective Governments …do herebyestablish an international organization to be known asthe United Nations’. The UN has always been anorganization of governments and will so remain. It is onlyslowly and reluctantly that governments have conceded

As a UN Under-Secretary-General from 1986

to 1997, Sir Marrack Goulding was involved

in the negotiation and implementation of

peace settlements in Africa, the Middle

East, Central America, Haiti, Cambodia,

the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

He is currently Warden of St. Antony's

College, Oxford.

Personal perspectives

Public participation and international peacemaking 87

to civil society a role in peacemaking, which almost all ofthem see as a quintessentially governmental activity. Veryfew have been persuaded to give civil society access topeacemaking, whether for normative or efficiencyreasons. Progress has been due to pressure from below,not wisdom from above; to accumulated precedents, notgeneric decisions.

With the variety of forms that both ‘internationalpeacemaking’ and ‘public participation’ can assume, it isimpossible to define general prescriptions for an idealrelationship between international peacemakers andpublic participants. Each conflict is unique. In each casethe peacemakers – be they international, national or amixture of the two – have to judge how they can besthelp the protagonists negotiate a peaceful settlement.The points at issue should (but do not always) include thepotential scope for public participation in that process.What seems to emerge from recent experiences ofpeacemaking is that there may be greater scope forpublic participation when the peacemaking is led bynational actors rather than international organizations.

Why have international peacemakers made rather limiteduse of public participation? It may be helpful if, as asuperannuated peacemaker, I offer not a politicalscientist’s treatise but a practitioner’s impressionistic

answer to this question. There are three possibleexplanations; they are not mutually exclusive. First, asalready mentioned, few governments are positive aboutgreater public involvement in peacemaking. Second,international actors may undertake, or be permitted, amediatory role only when national peacemaking effortshave failed. In these cases, the society may be sopolarized that public participation is difficult to managewithout enlarging existing divisions, thereby making thesearch for peace even more difficult. Third, internationalpeacemakers tend to be ill-informed, at least initially,about the country where they aspire to mediate peace.This may obscure their perception of the advantages that they and the process itself can gain from public participation.

Confidentiality versus public participationThe process of converting a situation of armed conflictinto one of stable peace is long and complicated. In mostcases where international peacemakers are in the lead,there are four phases. First, overture, when a third party orparties (‘the mediator’) persuades representatives of thearmed combatants (‘the parties’) to enter intonegotiations for a peaceful settlement of their conflict.Second, negotiation, when the mediator helps the partiesto work out an agreement (‘the settlement’) that is, for

Marrack Goulding (right) negotiating the demobilization of theContras with Comandante Franklyn, Nicaragua, June 1990.

Source: Marrack Goulding

88 Accord 13

each of them, a better option than continuing the war.Third, implementation, when the mediator (or anotherthird party) helps the parties to implement thesettlement (what the UN calls ‘multi-functionalpeacekeeping’). Fourth, peacebuilding, when variousactors (including the parties, the mediator, internationalinstitutions and/or national institutions) undertake long-term efforts to consolidate the peace and, especially, toaddress the root causes of the conflict – which may havebeen only superficially addressed in the settlement.

Overture is a phase when confidentiality is particularlyimportant, especially in internal conflicts. As withpreventive diplomacy, success is most likely if the mediaare not aware – or are only vaguely aware – that an effortis being made to persuade the parties to negotiate. Thebarriers to negotiation are usually immense. Thegovernment has been at war with what it typicallyperceives as a gang of armed criminals and is now beingurged to enter into a negotiation with those criminals.Even worse, it has to accept that for the purposes of thenegotiation, it and the ‘criminals’ will be treated aspolitical equals. It will not be granted preference orprivileges simply because it is internationally recognizedas the country’s government. If the mediator is sufficientlyskillful, the government will be persuaded to see that anegotiation on the basis of political equality is aninescapable pre-condition for peace. It is understandablethat its leaders will insist that they need private time toconvince core supporters that such negotiations are theright course. Premature revelation of the concessionsmade will not advance the cause of peace. While themediator recognizes that confidentiality is a politicalnecessity at this stage, he or she may nevertheless chafeat not being able to announce positive developmentsimpartially before the parties put out their inevitably one-sided views.

Confidentiality also impairs the mediator’s ability toengage with civil society as a source of information aboutthe nature of the conflict and its underlying causes. Inrecalling the UN peacemaking and peacekeepingenterprises in which I was involved, I am often shocked torealize how little we actually knew at the outset about theconflicts into which we were about to insert ourselves.But consultation with in-country experts is usuallyprecluded during overture. At that stage the overridingobjective is to convince the parties to accept mediationand that requires a high level of confidentiality.

Confidentiality remains an important factor in thenegotiation phase but is a less absolute one. Because the negotiations are known, both civil societyinstitutions and the general public want to be informed

and to contribute their ideas to the negotiators. This canbe of value to the mediator, especially if civil society iswell organized and there is strong public support forcompromise and reconciliation.

Constraints nevertheless remain. One is that theinternational mediators may not be interested incontributions from civil society. Another is that the partiesmay not want their negotiating positions revealed totheir own supporters or to the other side – let alone tothe public at large – until they are ready to disclose them.The mediator must therefore be very discreet. Anothercan be the need to protect what Alvaro de Soto, theformer Personal Representative of UN Secretary-Generalto the Central American Peace Process, calls ‘the integrityof the mediation’: there should be only one mediator; themediator must have overall control of the negotiation;the mediator can enlist others, whose help can be ofgreat value, but they must never take an initiative withoutthe knowledge and approval of the mediator. A free flowof information about the negotiation increases the risk ofunwanted initiatives and the confusion that they cancause. A desire to control the negotiation process canthus lead the mediator to insist on confidentiality.

There are, however, powerful factors that can incline themediator towards openness and public participation.One is the need for information. The mediator is astranger in a foreign land and may need to test ideas withlocal people in order to judge how they will be received.Another factor is that civil society institutions can helpcreate the climate for successful peacemaking. If they areto play this role, however, the mediator may have to takethem into her or his confidence about the kind ofagreement that seems likely to emerge. In so doing, themediator risks incurring the ire of the parties for violatingconfidentiality of the negotiation.

International mediators often find it necessary, however,to violate confidentiality on a lesser scale. They may, forinstance, find that their mediation is being damaged byexcessive secrecy. At one point in the El Salvadornegotiations, we learned that some Frente MartiLiberacion Nacional (FMLN) field commanders weresuspicious that their political demands were not beingpromoted with sufficient vigour by the FMLN negotiatorsin Mexico City. Because this occurred at a time when thenegotiators were making significant progress, both theFMLN leadership and the government saw the need toreassure these field commanders. The UN was allowed tobring several commanders from the field (where fightingcontinued) to Mexico City to witness the negotiations for themselves.

The mediator faces a similar dilemma when an importantsocial sector aligned with one of the parties is misled –often deliberately – about the likely contents of theemerging settlement. In Guatemala, when it becameclear that the business community was alarmed by animpending agreement, the mediator was able to assurethe employers’ organization that they had beenmisinformed. He thus opened himself to the charge ofbreaching confidentiality but judged it to be a necessary

Public participation and international peacemaking 89

risk. Such are the judgments that international mediatorsmust make. A similar risk is justified if a mediatorconcludes that an important sector of society has to bebrought into the process, either because its involvementwill help the mediator or because it is capable ofundermining an eventual settlement if it is excluded from the negotiation.

Whose peace process is it?Another important factor in favour of openness is theneed for citizens to feel a sense of ownership of thesettlement. Given sensitivities about sovereignty, theimpression must be avoided that it is being imposed onthem by foreigners. They should be encouraged to feelthat it contains elements that they have contributed. Civilsociety institutions can help the mediator meet this need.In Guatemala a procedural agreement between theparties established a Civil Society Assembly (ASC), whoseprimary functions were to put proposals to thenegotiators and to debate and endorse the successiveagreements that were negotiated between the parties.The ASC brought the negotiation much further into thepublic domain than had been the case in El Salvador. Thenegotiators were under a brighter spotlight. Thissometimes deterred the parties from conceding points,for fear of offending their supporters, and may have madethe process longer than it would otherwise have been.Yet there is power in the argument that this was a priceworth paying to enable Guatemalans to feel that theywere playing as large a role as the foreign mediator inmoulding the settlement. Public debate about itscontents also enhanced the transparency andaccountability of the process. In short, in eachnegotiation there is a trade-off between the tidiness ofcontrolled confidentiality and the political advantages ofgiving the public a role in the process and thereby asense that, at least to some extent, it belongs to them.

In internationally-led peace processes, civil society comesinto its own in the third phase, implementation, and evenmore so in the fourth phase, peacebuilding. Thesettlement has been negotiated and accepted by theparties; the international community has endorsed it; thefighting has ended; hope and optimism prevail; nationalreconciliation and reconstruction can begin. In reality, thepicture is rarely so rosy. Usually, significant elements insociety – and sometimes even one of the primary parties– are opposed to the settlement or doubt that it can bemade to work. Diehards are ready to use violence tointerrupt its implementation. Sometimes there areambiguities or unaddressed elements in the settlementthat generate tension between the parties andnecessitate re-negotiation.

By the time the implementation phase is reached, therehas usually been more foreign involvement than local

society wants; the time has come for it to assertownership of the peace process. One of the lessons theUN learned in the 1990s is that the shelf-life of its politicalpresence shortens with remarkable speed once asettlement has been signed. The UN mediator may be alocal hero on signature day but the message comes verysoon thereafter that it is time to go home. That messagewill almost always come from the government; it willprobably come too from the general public, which is tiredof the presence of well-paid and sometimes arrogantforeigners. It will not necessarily come, however, from allsegments of organized civil society. Some may recognizean ongoing need for an impartial mediator to helpresolve differences between the parties on how toimplement the settlement.

In these situations, public participation becomes criticallyimportant. Popular support is needed to ensure that theprocess can withstand post-settlement squabbling andthe assaults of its opponents. The questions then are how,and by whom, can the public be mobilized. The idealconveners are long-standing, non-aligned localinstitutions. Often, however, in war-torn countries theseinstitutions do not exist and have to be created. Thecreation can be done as part of the settlement. In ElSalvador the agreements included the establishment of a‘National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace’. Butit was a very official institution and did not have theadvantage of being perceived as an independent arbiterof peace – distant from the negotiation but supportive ofits outcome – in contrast to, for example, the churches inthe Namibian process.

In both the implementation and peacebuilding phases,therefore, external support may be necessary to developcivil society institutions to consolidate peace. But this isnot a function for foreign governments orintergovernmental organizations. Instead internationalNGOs can play an important role in helping local peopleto build and strengthen their own NGOs and other civilsociety institutions. Though they may be foreigners, theytoo are representatives of civil society. This may makethem less threatening and more acceptable as agents ofpeace in a country beginning to re-establish its ownnational identity and pride after years of civil war.

The conclusion to be drawn is perhaps that peacemakingis yet another field in today’s world where there is a needfor more positive exploration of the advantages to begained from partnership in the pursuit of commonobjectives shared by governments and their peoples. But,as in other such fields, the mechanisms of this partnershiphave to be very carefully designed. Whoever thepeacemakers may be, there will remain the need to strikethe right balance between confidentiality and theengagement of civil society in what will always be adelicate process.

90 Accord 13

Personal perspectives

Developingpublic capacitiesfor participationin peacemaking

Quintin Oliver

I n 1991, as the conflict in Northern Ireland raged, I waspart of a small group of what might be called‘intellectuals’ with various positions in civil society

(organized labour, NGO sector, academia, journalism)who met to agonize over the eternal question: “What is tobe done?” We hit upon the idea of inviting a commissionof outsiders to come and hear from ordinary peopleabout life in Northern Ireland and to makerecommendations on new ways of tackling what seemedto be an intractable problem. We had a strong economicand social agenda, not entirely divorced from theconstitutional question about our Irishness and/orBritishness. Initiative 92, as the project became known,gave birth to the first halting steps of a new form of civilsociety engagement with what became known as theNorthern Ireland peace process.

We approached Torkel Opsahl, a Norwegian humanrights lawyer, to chair the commission and invited othersto serve alongside him. The same group managed theorganizational framework, the fundraising and thepromotional aspects of the commission’s work. Thisinvolved taking the initiative into the lanes, streets andby-ways of Northern Ireland to hear what local people feltand to nudge hitherto recalcitrant political blocs toengage in some sort of process beyond violence. Theinitiative culminated in the compilation of a report thatwas published, launched and disseminated among thepolitical parties and the wider public.

We all agreed that we must not stop with the publicationof a book and therefore arranged for a one-year extensionto the project to disseminate and animate the resultsthrough an extensive follow-up programme. Of coursethe first IRA ceasefire of 31 August 1994 was not a directconsequence of the process we initiated. But with thebenefit of hindsight, many observers pinpointed ourcontribution to creating an atmosphere of greaterparticipation in debate, easing the situation andsoftening the edges of the conflict.

I remember feeling alienated as a civil society practitionerwhen the talks process chaired by Senator GeorgeMitchell began; the talks were taking place behind closeddoors (however understandably), but I wanted to help

Quintin Oliver has worked in the Northern

Ireland peace process as an NGO activist and

latterly a political lobbyist. He ran the

successful "YES" Campaign in the 1998

referendum on the Belfast Agreement. He

now runs the political consultancy

'Stratagem', and an international

referendum group 'Politicks'.

Developing public capacities for participation in peacemaking 91

the process along by assisting with explanation,communication and elaboration of the key principles ofany accommodation then being negotiated. Another rolesoon opened up. The UK government of John Major hadpromised a ‘triple lock’ before any negotiated agreementcould take effect: the parties to the negotiation mustagree, the two supervising governments (the UK andIreland) must agree and then the people must agreethrough a referendum held simultaneously on both sidesof the Irish border. The referendum created theopportunity for civil society players to organize a “YES”Campaign. So we did and thereby contributed to the 81per cent turnout – massive by UK and Irish standards –and the 71.2 per cent vote in favour of the agreement.

Yet the resoundingly endorsed Belfast Agreement, signedon Good Friday 1998, was not the end of the story. Againblessed by hindsight, we can see that it was only the endof the beginning. Its implementation was – and remains –critically contested, again requiring the engagement ofplayers other than elected political representatives tohelp ‘oil the wheels’ of the process. And so we are stillinvolved as observers, commentators, activists, tradeunionists, business people and NGOs.

This personal vignette shows three distinct phases in mymodest contribution to recent events in Northern Ireland:preparation for peace, the formal negotiations andimplementation/consolidation. In Northern Ireland, thedrive toward negotiations came principally from internalactors. Simultaneously, however, external pressures fromthe United States – sometimes stimulated by the

influential Irish diaspora – and the European Union addedurgency to the dynamic. The principal political parties, asselected by the electorate, were responsible fornegotiating an agreement. Civil society’s role was to helpprepare society for change.

This process reveals some elements in the developmentalsequencing of political participation by the public in awider peace process that I would like to explore in moredetail, drawing on experiences in Northern Ireland andelsewhere. Hindsight often makes it possible to chart alinear progression between these phases. At the time,however, it may often feel more like a zig-zag, asinitiatives break down, interested parties positionthemselves in a way that offends others, fears andapprehensions increase the contested territory – andoften spark violence – and a curious, if not confused,electorate express their apprehension or alienation from the process.

PreparationIf civil society organizations and a broader proportion ofthe overall public are sufficiently prepared to engage inpeacemaking, it can both create a climate conducive tonegotiations and help to ensure that the socialinfrastructure is developed for their voices to be heard atformal peace talks. As the Northern Ireland exampleshows, there are typically combinations of internal andexternal influences that encourage representatives ofarmed combatant groups to come to the negotiatingtable. These influences interact with civil society roles in

Quintin Oliver at the start of the ‘YES’ campaign for theBelfast Agreement referendum.

Source: Harrison Photography

92 Accord 13

complex ways. The role of external brokers and mediatorscan be helpful but only if the process is itself ‘owned’,sooner or later, within the conflict area. Here there is aneat balance between the role of catalyst and the role ofguest facilitator.

Often external forces have an overt role. Sometimes theycome from countries with considerable influence on theconflict. In Northern Ireland this was exemplified by USSenator George Mitchell, economic envoy and then chairof the formal talks process. There are also governmentswhose diplomatic corps are well known for their impartialobservers and mediators. For example, the ‘Oslo Process’is a term used both by Israelis and Palestinians and byGuatemalans. In both cases, the Norwegian governmentsupported civil society facilitated ‘talks-about-talks’between representatives of the combatant groupsleading to a substantive negotiation process. In Mali, theNorwegians provided support when Norwegian ChurchAid was asked to help with the inter-communitymeetings that eventually brought peace.

In other cases, internal actors are more important. InSouth Africa, the immense mobilizing capacity of theUnited Democratic Front allied to Nelson Mandela’s ANCwas a powerful force motivating the transition fromapartheid. A joint business and church led initiativeenabled the 1991 National Peace Accord process to befirmly rooted in civil society but connected at the sametime to the key power-brokers. In the Philippines, theagenda for peace talks emerged following a July 1992initiative by newly-elected President Fidel V. Ramos tocreate a National Unification Commission (NUC)mandated to hold consultations with all concernedsectors at the provincial, regional and national levels. TheNUC worked together with local actors so that theconsultations at the local and regional levels were led bycivil society, both practically and symbolically, rather thanthe government. Often called the ‘laboratory of peace’,the community of Mogotes, Colombia established aunique Municipal Constituent Assembly using classic‘bottom-up’ mobilization techniques. In the context ofongoing and widespread violence, community membersinitiated a peaceful process of political change at the locallevel. Mogotes is now a ‘zone of peace’ that has inspiredhundreds of others throughout the country.

These examples indicate that the mechanisms for publicparticipation in peace processes can be extremelyimportant. Yet they do not occur unless people makethem happen. This typically involves a substantial degreeof both advocacy, to ensure that their voices are heard,and mobilization to generate the capacity to createopportunities – whether proactively or reactively. Thepreparatory phase is thus a time for mobilizing voices,formulating substantive agendas, designing processesand developing a popular constituency of interest tosupport and engage in conflict resolution. Sequencing,

however, is critical. For example, consulting civil societyon the contents of the peace agreement after it has beennegotiated and signed can be difficult and sometimescounterproductive, especially if substantive input is nolonger sought or possible. Power-brokers may seek tomarginalize civil society voices after initial consultationsso as to dominate decision-making and reconsolidatetheir control in the post-agreement period; caution mustbe exercised to ensure they do not dictate the process.

In addition to preparing processes, it is important toemphasize the significance of preparing people so thatthey feel comfortable and are able to participate fully andmake effective contributions. Alienation and frustrationcan otherwise set in very quickly. Participation may beimpaired if the environment is exclusionary because ofover-reliance on unfamiliar procedural rules, forexample, or a formal style that intimidates those withless experience.

Participation in formal politicalnegotiationsThere are a number of dilemmas regarding who sits atthe negotiating table: representatives of the armedgroups? Political parties? Organized civil society? Thisquestion can become a knotty problem. Are politiciansnot representatives of the people? Are they not entitledto negotiate the best deal and then sell it to theirconstituencies of interest? How can civil society,essentially and inherently representative of particularinterests, play a helpful and supportive role?

In Northern Ireland the multi-party talks leading to theBelfast Agreement took place behind closed doors.Although the public was aware of the process, there werefew official channels to allow input into the content of theagreement being drafted. This created a degree ofconcern amongst organized civil society and also createda barrier to ‘bringing along’ the public in support of theAgreement. This was exacerbated by selective leaksamongst the actual participating parties to ‘spin’ theirside of any particular argument in order to gain politicaladvantage. This made the task of selling the agreementto the public in the subsequent referendum, scheduledfor only six weeks after the Agreement was signed,all the more difficult.

By contrast, the South African model took an alternativeroute to write a new constitution. The ConstitutionalAssembly deployed a multi-track approach. Thenegotiations deployed a representative decision-makingmodel with elected party representatives negotiating onbehalf of the members of political parties, which heldthem accountable. This was complemented by broadpublic consultation on the contents of the newconstitution so that everyone would feel that they had an

Developing public capacities for participation in peacemaking 93

opportunity to articulate their perspectives, interests andideals. There were high levels of awareness about theprocess and a broad feeling of ownership over theconstitution that finally emerged.

Sometimes the overlap between civil society and theformal political process can be seen as an opportunity.For example, to ensure that women would be present atthe negotiating table in Northern Ireland, a cross-community group of women from civil society formedthe Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition to contest theelections and won a place at the talks. Alternately,engagement in official politics can be a threat to civilsociety’s effectiveness, as was the case when Guatemala’sCivil Society Assembly (ASC) was weakened at a criticalmoment by the exodus of civil society leaders to assumenew political roles.

Here, the distinction between organized voices and widerpublic opinion may be helpful in differentiating the levelsand tiers of involvement. Even within organizations,some members or groupings may feel disenfranchised oroverlooked, stimulating them to work outside theirauthorised organizational structures. Many will also usethe press, such as the letters columns of newspapers, tocreate the mirage of participation.

Sometimes, public participation can be critical when aformal process falters or breaks down. Civil societyactivists can nudge key actors back into a peace process,as was seen in Guatemala, Mali and the Philippines. Theycan also help to create or maintain a climate conducive tonegotiations. In South Africa the local and regional peacecommittee structures underneath the National PeaceAccord were able to help stabilize the situation in April1993 after the assassination of the ANC activist Chris Hani.NPA structures also contributed to the creation ofconditions where a negotiated political transition couldtake place, by facilitating communication and modellingnon-violent approaches to the myriad manifestations ofthe political crisis.

Implementation and consolidationSenator George Mitchell, after signing off on the BelfastAgreement, is said to have observed: “poor souls – nowthe real trouble begins!” He was observing thatregardless of the difficulty of the negotiations, theimplementation often can be even more difficult. It isimportant to build a broad constituency of support for the process, not just for the piece of paper thatwas negotiated.

Those who want to derail the agreed package often cando so through selected acts of violence or politicalvandalism. Hard-line factions within armed groups mayfeel aggrieved that their principles were diluted toachieve the necessary accommodations and those left

outside the process can spot the moment to disrupt it yetfurther. The challenge can be to encourage them torealise that they are better off inside the process than inthe wilderness seeking to damage from outside – or toensure that they are so far outside that they can do it noserious harm.

Marrack Goulding observes the difficulties of an activecivil society role in the post-settlement phase if theinstitutional capacities are weak. A salutary lesson can bedrawn from Northern Ireland, where the agreementmandated that a civil society voice could beinstitutionalized in the new governing Assembly througha formally structured Civic Forum. Although agreed bythe participants at the talks, incorporated into theagreement and endorsed by the people in thereferendum of May 1998, the Civic Forum was stillborn. Itwas effectively starved of resources by the ‘real’politicians and hampered by a cumbersome electoralcollege mechanism of appointment. It has failed to exciteinterest or notice: organized civil society works around it,the politicians ignore it, and the press do not trouble with it.

At the time of writing in autumn 2002, the NorthernIreland process has run into further difficulties with abreach of trust between the four main political partiesoperating devolved governance under the 1998Agreement; a crisis that led to the suspension of theNorthern Ireland Assembly by the British Government. Asa fierce ‘blame game’ takes place, the public feel generallydisillusioned and alienated from the process. Perhapsthere should have been structural mechanisms to bindthe communities into the new governing system;perhaps the political parties succumbed to temptation inseizing the spoils of agreement for themselves, withoutreflecting on how its roots must extend into localcommunities in order to underpin the fragile settlement.

It seems that unless the people are closely involved,through their representative organizations and throughorganized public opinion, any agreement can merelybecome a dry letter. The power of the people isbeautifully exemplified by Mogotes, where thepopulation organized non-violent direct action to forcethe resignation of their corrupt mayor. In Mali, politicalnegotiations were not in themselves able to provide thefoundations for peace. It was only when communitiestook responsibility for resolving the conflicts affectingtheir regions that peace was achieved and the conflict transformed. The conclusion here is that ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ travel in different directions andcannot be neatly corralled together. The jigsaw ofrelationships requires sensitivity and flexibility in order togive appropriate place to each and dampen neither’sindependence or autonomy. To do so effectively is achallenge for all governments and civil societies.

94 Accord 13

Further reading

Political participation

• Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi. Women at the Peace Table:Making a Difference. United Nations Development Fundfor Women (UNIFEM) 2000.http://www.unifem.undp.org

• Baranyi, Stephen. The people's peace: civil societyorganisations and peace processes in the South. (London:Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1998).

• Cornwall, Andrea. 'Locating Citizen Participation', IDSBulletin, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2002.

• D’Entrèves, Maurizio Passerin, (ed.) Democracy as PublicDeliberation: New Perspectives. (Manchester and NewYork: Manchester University Press, 2002)

• Di Palma, Giuseppe. To Craft Democracies: An Essay onDemocratic Transitions. (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1990)

• Garcia, Ed, Julio P. Macuja II, and Benjamin T. Tolosa Jr.Participation in Governance: the People's Right.Proceedings from the International Conference on PeoplePower: the People's Right to Participate in Governance.(1993)

• Ghai, Yash. Public Participation and Minorities. (London:Minority Rights Group, Report 2001)

• Goulding, Marrack. Peacemonger.(London: John Murray, 2002)

• IIED . Deliberative Democracy and Citizen Empowerment.(International Institute for Environment andDevelopment, PLA Notes 40: 2001).

• O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe Schmitter. Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions aboutUncertain Democracies. (Baltimore and London: JohnHopkins University Press, 1986)

• Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

• Saunders, Harold. A Public Peace Process; sustaineddialogue to transform racial and ethnic conflicts. (PalgraveMacmillan, 2001).

• UNDP. Empowering People: A Guide to Participation.(United Nations Development Programme, 1998)http://www.undp.org/csopp/CSO/NewFiles/docemppeople.html

• Young, Iris Marion. Inclusion and Democracy. (Oxford andNew York: Oxford University Press, 2000)

Colombia

• Berqist, Charles, Peñaranda, Ricardo, Sanchez G.,Gonzalo. (eds.) Violence in Colombia 1990-2000. WagingWar and Negotiating Peace (Wilmington Delaware:Scholarly Resources, 2001)

• Chernick, Mark. 'Negotiating Peace amid Multiple Formsof Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement tothe Armed Conflicts in Colombia'. (In Cynthia Arnson(ed.) Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America.Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999)

• McDonald, Geraldine. Peacebuilding from Below:Alternative Perspectives on Colombia's Peace Process(London: Catholic Institute of International Relations,Comment Series, 1997)

• Romero, Mauricio. Civil Society, Cooperation and PeaceMobilization in Colombia. Civil Society and GovernanceProgramme, Institute of Development Studies,University of Sussex, 2001.

Guatemala

• Armon, Jeremy and R. Sieder and R. Wilson.( eds.)Negotiating Rights: The Guatemala Peace Process. Accord2, (London: Conciliation Resources, 1997) http://www.c-r.org/accord/

• Azpuru, Dinorah. 'Peace and Democratisation inGuatemala: Two Parallel Processes' (in Cynthia Arnson.(ed.) Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America.Washington D.C.:Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999)

• Jeffrey, Paul. Recovering Memory: Guatemalan Churchesand the Challenge of Peacemaking. (Uppsala, Sweden:Life & Peace Institute, 1998)

• Jonas, Susanne. Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala’sPeace Process. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000)

• Krznaric, Roman. ‘Civil and Uncivil Actors in theGuatemala Peace Process’, Bulletin of Latin AmericanResearch, Vol. 18, No 1, pp 1-16, 1999.

• Palencia Prado, Tania. Peace in the Making: Civil Groups inGuatemala. (London: Catholic Institute for InternationalRelations Briefing, 1996)

• Pearce, Jenny and Jude Howell, 'Civil Society Discoursesand the Guatemalan Peace Process', in Civil Society andDevelopment: a critical exploration. (Boulder, CO.:Lynne Rienner, 2001).

• Sieder, Rachel (ed.) Guatemala After the Peace Accords.(London: University of London, Institute of LatinAmerican Studies, 1998)

• Trudeau, Robert. Guatemalan Politics: the PopularStruggle for Democracy. (Boulder & London: LynneRienner Publishers, 1993)

• MINUGUA, the United Nations Mission for theVerification of Human Rights in Guatemalahttp://www.minugua.guate.net/

Further reading 95

Mali

• Adekanye, Bayo J with inputs from Gunnvor Berge,Lumsden Malvern and Inger Skjelsbæk. ‘NorwegianChurch Aid’s Humanitarian and Peacemaking Work inMali.’ International Peace Research Institute, Oslo PRIO.UD Evaluation Report 6.97; Oslo: Norwegian Ministry ofForeign Affairs

• Lode Kåre. ‘Civil Society Takes Responsibility - PopularInvolvement in the Peace Process in Mali’, PRIO Report5/97, Oslo International Peace Research Institutehttp://www.prio.no/publications/reports/lodemali/lode.html

• Pike, Claire. Facing Challenges of Microdisarmament : ACase Study Review of Practices in Post Conflict Countries.(Ottawa, Canada: Peacebuilding and Human SecurityDivision, Department of Foreign Affairs andInternational Trade, 1999)

• Poulton, Robin Edward and Ibrahim Ag Youssouf. APeace of Timbuktu – A Story of African Peacemaking.(Geneva: United Nations Institute for DisarmamentResearch (UNDIR), 1998)

Northern Ireland

• Fearon, Kate. Women's Work: The Story of the Women'sCoalition (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1999)

• Gidron, Benjamin, Stanley Katz and Yeheskel Hasenfeld(eds.) Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in NorthernIreland, Israel / Palestine and South Africa (London: OxfordUniversity Press, 2002)

• McCartney, Clem (ed.) Striking a Balance: the NorthernIreland Peace Process. Accord 8. (London: ConciliationResources, 1999) http://www.c-r.org/accord/

• Mitchell, George. Making Peace: the Inside Story of theMaking of the Good Friday Agreement. (London:Heinemann 1999)

• Oliver, Quintin. Working for "YES: the story of the May 1998referendum in Northern Ireland. (Referendum Company(Northern Ireland) Ltd.)

• Pollak, Andy (ed.) A Citizen's Inquiry: The Opsahl Report onNorthern Ireland. (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 1992)

• CAIN Web Service: Northern Ireland Conflict from 1968-present. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/

Philippines

• Coronel-Ferrer, Miriam Ed. Peace Matters: A PhilippinePeace Compendium (Quezon City: University of thePhilippines Center for Integrative and DevelopmentStudies, 1997)

• Garcia, Ed. A Distant Peace: Human Rights and People’sParticipation in Conflict Resolution (Manila: National BookStore, Inc. 1991)

• National Unification Commission, ‘The NUC Report tothe President on the Pursuit of a Comprehensive PeaceProcess’, submitted on 1 July 1993.

• Ramos, Fidel V. Break Not the Peace: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Negotiations 1992-1996. (Manila: Friends ofSteady Eddie, 1996)

• Stankovitch, Mara, (ed.) Compromising on Autonomy:Mindanao in Transition. Accord 6. (London: ConciliationResources, 1999) www.c-r.org/accord/

South Africa

• Ball, Nicole and Chris Spies. Managing Conflict: Lessonsfrom the South African Peace Committees. (Washington,D.C.: US Agency for International Development, Centerfor Development and Evaluation: 1998)

• Camay, Phiroshaw and Anne J. Gordon. ‘The NationalPeace Accord and its Structures.’ Institute ofDevelopment Studies, University of Sussex. South AfricaCivil Society and Governance Case Study No. 1.www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/final/southafrica/saf4.doc

• CASE (Community Agency for Social Inquiry). ‘Bringingthe Constitution and the People Together: Assessing theImpact of the Media Campaign of the ConstitutionalAssembly.’ Johannesburg 1995.

• Collin Marks, Susan. Watching the Wind: ConflictResolution During South Africa’s Transition to Democracy.(Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2000)

• Ebrahim, Hassen. The Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa. (Cape Town: Oxford UniversityPress, 1998)

• Gastrow, Peter. Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and theNational Peace Accord. (Washington: United StatesInstitute of Peace Press, 1995)

• Gloppen, Siri. South Africa: the Battle Over theConstitution. (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth PublishingCompany, Ltd. 1997)

• Haysom, Nicholas. ‘Negotiating the Political Settlementin South Africa: Are there lessons for other countries?’Track Two (University of Cape Town: Centre for ConflictResolution) Vol. 11, No. 3, May 2002.

• Meer, Fatima, (ed.) The CODESA File. Institute for BlackResearch, University of Natal. (Durban: MadibaPublishers, 1993)

• Ottaway, David. Chained Together: Mandela, De Klerk, andthe Struggle to Remake South Africa. (New York: RandomHouse, 1993)

• Sisk, Timothy. Democratization in South Africa: the ElusiveSocial Contract.(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995)

• Sparks, Allister. Tomorrow is Another Country: the InsideStory of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution. (London:Heinemann, 1995)

• University of Cape Town Constitutional AssemblyDatabase: http://www.constitution.org.za/

96 Accord 13

The Liberian Peace Process 1990–1996

Issue 1 | 1996

The first issue of the series documents thelengthy and fractious Liberian peace process andprovides insight into why thirteen individualpeace accords collapsed in half as many years.Articles analyse the impact of economic forcesand the erosion of civilian power on the conflict,as well as documenting and assessing thesuccesses and failures of local peace initiativesand international interventions.

Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process

Issue 2 | 1997

The signing of the peace agreement in 1996brought an end to 36 years of civil war inGuatemala. Historical circumstances and theprocess leading to this agreement enabledregional and civic actors to advance their concernson issues of social justice, political plurality and therule of law. The publication analyses the degree towhich these concerns became marginalized in thecourse of the process and the remainingchallenges in consolidating the peace agreement.

The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective

Issue 3 | 1998

The Mozambique issue of Accord documents thediverse initiatives which drove the parties to anegotiated settlement of the conflict as well asillustrating the impact of changing regional andinternational dynamics on Mozambique. Articlesanalyse the role and methods of the states in thepeace process; the impact of financial anddiplomatic ‘sticks and carrots’; the role of church-based mediation; and grassroots initiatives forjustice and reconciliation.

Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation inSri Lanka

Issue 4 | 1998

The Sri Lanka issue documents the cycles ofethnic/national conflict which have blighted thecountry since 1983. It analyses negotiations andother peace initiatives that have taken place since1993 and outlines fundamental issues that needto be confronted if a future peace settlement is tobe achieved. It features background articles andanalysis on government peace strategies;constitutional reform; popular Buddhism andTamil aspirations.

Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia’sConstitutional Challenge

Issue 5 | 1998

This publication documents issues around thesigning of the 1991 Paris Agreements whichofficially "brought to an end" Cambodia's longwar and the violent collapse of the country'sgoverning coalition in July 1997. The experiencessuggest the need for a rethinking of internationalresponses to Cambodia's problems, with agreater emphasis placed on monitoring andsupporting the functioning of its constitutionally-mandated political institutions. Includes pieceson elections and power sharing; Buddhistactivism; international disengagement andconstitutional safeguards.

Compromising on Autonomy: Mindanao inTransition

Issue 6 | 1999

The GRP-MNLF 1996 Peace Agreement was amilestone in many ways: all previous attempts tonegotiate an end to the 24 years of civil war hadfailed. Although implementation of thisAgreement has so far failed to bring an end theviolence, the efforts and innovations inpeacemaking in Mindanao are invaluableexamples to those engaged in comparableconflicts around the world. The publicationcontains analysis on Islamic diplomacy, civilsociety roles and development as peacekeeping.

The Accord seriesAccord: an international review of peace initiatives is published by Conciliation Resources (CR). It provides detailed narrativeand analysis on specific war and peace processes in an accessible format. The series is intended to provide a practical resourcefor reflection for all those engaged in peacemaking activities.

97Accord series

Future issues Conciliation Resources is currently developing publications on the Angolanpeace process and on the conflict and peace process in Colombia. Updates

of a number of previous issues are also being prepared.

A question of sovereignty: theGeorgia–Abkhazia peace process

Issue 7 | 1999

Following the outbreak of war in August 1992and the ensuing humanitarian crisis, Abkhaziaand Georgia have embarked upon a falteringpeace which is the focus of the issue. In exploringthe background and issues at the heart of theconflict - the Abkhaz demand for sovereignty andwhy Georgia refuses to grant it - Accord 7provides a unique insight into a politicalstalemate and points towards possible avenuesout of deadlock.

Russian language edition available from CR andpublished on www.c-r.org

Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland peaceprocess

Issue 8 | 1999

The signing of the Belfast Agreement in NorthernIreland in 1998 was the result of long andarduous negotiations to end thirty years ofsectarian violence and political stalemate. Accord8 explores the factors that led to the negotiationsand outlines the impact of history on currentaspirations. Describing the development of anenvironment for peace, it analyses the complexunderlying forces and those aspects of theAgreement that have facilitated the process orcaused problems with implementation.

Discussion pack, which accompanies the issue, andRussian language edition also available from CR

Paying the price: the Sierra Leonepeace process

Issue 9 | 2000

The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999 sought tobring an end to one of the most brutal civil warsof recent times. Sierra Leone, its regionalneighbours and the international community arecurrently faced with the daunting task of movingfrom a crisis of effectiveness and credibility to re-establishing an environment for sustainablepeace. Accord 9 explores earlier attempts tobring the conflict to an end and in doing so seeksto draw valuable lessons.

Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan peaceprocess

Issue 10 | 2001

With the break-up of the Soviet Union, conflictbegan to escalate in Tajikistan and by 1992, thisCentral Asian republic was engulfed in civil war.Accord 10 describes the aspirations of the partiesto the conflict and documents the negotiationprocess leading to the General Agreement of June 1997. It looks at the role of the internationalcommunity, led by the UN, as well as of local civil society, in reaching a negotiated peacesettlement.

Russian language edition available on www.c-r.org

Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives toend the violence in northern Uganda

Issue 11 | 2002

Since the mid-1980s, the internal conflictbetween the Ugandan government and theLord's Resistance Army has become linked tolarger geopolitical interests - in particular theconflict in southern Sudan. While a meaningfulpeace process remains elusive, this issuedocuments significant peacemaking initiativesundertaken by internal and external actors. Itanalyses the impact of civil society initiatives,traditional reconciliation processes and the childrights agenda on the dynamics of the conflictand attempts to find peace.

Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea - Bougainville peace process

Issue 12 | 2002

The Bougainville Peace Agreement of 2001brought an end to the most violent conflict in theSouth Pacific since the Second World War. Accord12 documents peacemaking efforts from thepreventative attempts at constitutionalaccommodation in the 1970s up to the finalnegotiations. It describes an indigenous processwhich drew on the strengths of Melanesiantraditions as well as innovative and enabling rolesplayed by international third-parties.

conciliation resourcesConciliation Resources (CR) wasestablished in 1994 to provide aninternational service and act as a resourcein the field of peacebuilding and conflicttransformation. CR’s principal objective isto support the activities of locally-basedgroups working at community or nationallevels in preventing violent conflict orseeking to transform armed conflict intoopportunities for social, political andeconomic development based on morejust relationships.

In striving to attain that objective, CR:

• assists organizations in developinginnovative and sustainable solutions toshort- and long-term problems relatedto armed conflict;

• involves previously marginalized groupsin community and national peacemakingand peacebuilding processes;

• helps strengthen civic capabilities fordialogue, problem-solving andconstructive action locally, nationallyand regionally;

• contributes to the local andinternational development anddissemination of conflict transformationpractice and theory.

In addition to the Accord programme, CRhas in 2001 and 2002 worked with:

• civic groups in Guinea, Liberia, SierraLeone and Nigeria;

• Kacoke Madit and its partners innorthern Uganda;

• journalists and media organizations inNigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda;

• the Angolan non-governmentalorganization ADRA and its local partners;

• the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum in Fiji;

• non-governmental organizations andofficials in Georgia and Abkhazia;

For more information or to make adonation contact:

Conciliation Resources173 Upper StreetLondon N1 1RGUnited Kingdom

Telephone +44 (0)20 7359 7728Fax +44 (0)20 7359 4081E-mail conres@c-r.orgWebsite http://www.c-r.org

Charity Registration No 1055436

CR programme staff andpartners in Sierra Leone.

Source: CR

98 Accord 13

99Accord order form

Accord: an international review of peace initiativesI would like to subscribe to AccordPlease tick against type of subscription requested 1 year (3 issues) £45.00 / $70.002 years (6 issues) £88.00 / $135.003 years (9 issues) £130.00 / $200.00 TOTAL £/$ ____________

I would like to request a complete set/single issuesPrice £200/$304 for a complete set of back issues (1 copy each of issues 1 to 13) or £17/$26 for a single issue – discounts available for bulk purchases

Issue 1 The Liberian peace process 1990–1996 !!Issue 2 Negotiating rights: the Guatemalan peace process !!Issue 3 The Mozambican peace process in perspective !!Issue 4 Demanding sacrifice: war & negotiation in Sri Lanka !!Issue 5 Safeguarding peace: Cambodia’s constitutional challenge !!Issue 6 Compromising on autonomy: Mindanao in transition !!Issue 7 A question of sovereignty: the Georgia–Abkhazia peace process !!Issue 8 Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland peace process !!Issue 9 Paying the price: the Sierra Leone peace process !!Issue 10 Politics of compromise: the Tajik istan peace process !!Issue 11 Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda !!Issue 12 Weaving consensus: the Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process !!Issue 13 Owning the process: public participation in peacemaking !!Please indicate number required against issues requested

Postage & packing Please add 10% for UK, 15% for Europe and 25% and 30% for the rest of the World TOTAL £/$ ____________

METHOD OF PAYMENTCheque made payable to ‘Conciliation Resources’ in pounds sterling or US dollars !!

Bank transfers (reference ‘Accord’) to account number 10022088, sort code 16-00-58 !!Royal Bank of Scotland, London Islington Branch, 40 Islington High Street, London N1 8XJ

Invoice please send me an invoice for TOTAL £/$ ____________

Credit card Mastercard !! Visa !!

Card number !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! Expiry date !! !! !! !!

Signature

Name

Organization

Address

Telephone Fax E-mail

To order, please photocopy this page and send to: Accord Marketing, Conciliation Resources, 173 Upper Street, London N1 1RG, UKFor further information contact AccordTelephone +44 (0)20 7359 7728 Fax +44 (0)20 7359 4081E-mail accord@c-r.org Website www.c-r.org

100 Accord 13

A poster goes up in Belfast’s Shankhill Road, 18 May 1998, four days before the referendum.

Source: AFP

a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v i e w o f p e a c e i n i t i a t i v e s

Issue Editor Catherine Barnes

Public participation in peacemakingOwning the process

Owning the process:public participation in peacemakingThe process for making a transition from war to peace providesthe opportunity to agree new political, constitutional andeconomic arrangements to address the causes of conflict. Oftenthese decisions are made exclusively by representatives ofgovernments and combatant groups – who do not necessarilyrepresent the interests of diverse constituencies in the widerpublic.This first thematic publication in the Accord seriesdocuments approaches developed by governments and civilsociety in order to open the process to a wider range ofparticipants. It reveals strategies for democratizing peacemakingthrough three basic modes of participation: representationthrough political parties, direct participation and publicconsultation.The opportunities for participation succeeded inwidening the range of issues addressed and resulted in broadlylegitimate agreements. Furthermore, the processesthemselves strengthened the capacity for inclusive political

participation in future governance and facilitated a degree ofpolitical reconciliation.

Three feature studies focus on mechanisms in South Africa,Guatemala and Mali, with additional examples from Colombia, thePhilippines and Northern Ireland.They highlight the possibleadvantages - and shortcomings - of public participation inpeacemaking and assess the influence of these processes on theagreements reached and their subsequent implementation.Thestudies are complemented by articles exploring the challenges ofdeveloping public participation and the interface withmainstream international peacemaking practice. The publication also includes relevant key texts and graphicillustrations of mechanisms.

Conciliation Resources and the Accord programmeConciliation Resources (CR) was established in 1994 to provide aninternational service in the field of peacebuilding and conflicttransformation. CR's Accord programme works collaboratively tosupport those engaged directly in reducing the number of livesaffected by armed conflict and transforming situations of violenceinto opportunities for sustainable human development.Theprogramme seeks to promote for learning from past andcomparable peace processes, by documenting specific conflictsand peace processes, as well as looking comparatively at cross-cutting issues in peacemaking experiences worldwide.

"I find the series useful as an analyst and practitioner, mainlybecause the issues are written by people with deep knowledgeof the topic under consideration."

Laurie Nathan, Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution,Cape Town

"The CR publications are of an extremely high quality, as well ascontinuing to breathe life into all our commitments to peaceprocesses and conflict resolution."

Vanessa Griffen, Asia and Pacific Development Centre,Kuala Lumpur

The full text of all issues in the Accord series can be found on theConciliation Resources website at http://www.c-r.org

Issue 13 2002

ISSN 1365-0742£17.00 or $26.00

Accord 13

Conciliation ResourcesPublic participation in peacem

aking

C o n c i l i a t i o n R e s o u r c e s

Featuring South Africa, Guatemala and Mali