oversight and accountability model · the laws passed since 1994. the oversight model has been...

OVERSIGHTANDOVERSIGHTANDOVERSIGHTANDACCOUNTABILITYMODELACCOUNTABILITYMODELACCOUNTABILITYMODEL

OVERSIGHTAND

ACCOUNTABILITYMODELASSERTINGPARLIAMENT’SOVERSIGHTROLEINENHANCINGDEMOCRACY

PreFaCe By the PresIdInG OFFICers 5

Foreword by Co-Chairpersons 6

Chapter 1: Introduction 9

1.1 ConstitutionalpreceptsguidingthevisionandmissionofParliament

1.2 Constitutionalrequirementformechanismsonoversight

1.3 CompositionandmandatesofParliament

1.4 Mandatesoffocusgroups

Chapter 2: the role of Parliament in relation to oversight and

accountability as mandated by the Constitution 15

2.1 Definingoversight

2.2 Definingaccountability

2.3 ConstitutionalprovisionsexpressingpowersandfunctionsofParliamenton

oversightandaccountability

Chapter 3: Institutional characteristics of oversight and

accountability and existing mechanisms utilised by Parliament 29

3.1 Currentmechanismsforoversightandaccountability

3.2 Toolsforoversightandaccountability

Chapter 4: new mechanisms for oversight and accountability 43

4.1 Newmechanisms

4.2 Maximisingcurrentmechanisms

4.3 Generalrecommendations

CONTENTS OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

Page 2

Chapter 5: Procedure for amending money bills 57

5.1 TermsofreferenceofBudgetFocusGroup

5.2 Recommendations

Chapter 6: Co-ordination amongst the spheres of government on oversight 59

6.1 Co-operativegovernment

6.2 Valuesandprinciplesguidinginstitutionaloversight

6.3 Introducingtheparliamentaryoversightcycleasaguideforoversightprocesses

Chapter 7: Increasing the capacity of committees and members 65

7.1 Training

7.2 Additionalsupport

Chapter 8: Best Practice Guide 69

8.1 BestPracticeGuide(BPG)

Chapter 9: Projects Focus Group [Constitutional Landscape Governing Oversight] 71

9.1 Introduction

9.2 Auditofbodiesperformingpublicfunctions

9.3 Constitutionallandscaping

9.4 Reviewoftherules

Chapter 10: Conclusion 75

References

Annexures

Acknowledgments

CONTENTSOVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

Page 3

MrMJMahlangu,MP MrMVSisulu,MP

PreFaCe By the PresIdInG OFFICers

ThedevelopmentoftheOversightandAccountabilityModelwasinformedbyParliament’sstrategic

visionofbuildinganeffectivepeople’sParliamentthatisresponsivetotheneedsofthepeopleandthat

isdrivenbyadesireforabetterqualityoflifeforallthepeopleofSouthAfrica.TheModelisoneofthe

toolsParliamentwillusetostrengthenitsoversightovertheexecutiveandorgansofstate.

DuringthefirstParliament(1994-1999)andthesecondParliament(1999-2004),ourfocuswason

repealingapartheid legislationandpassingnew laws in linewith the imperativesofademocratic

institution.Whilstundertakingthisprocess,Parliamentpassedcloseto1000piecesoflegislation.

Nowourfocushastochangefrompassinglegislationtooversight,includingassessingtheimpactof

thelawspassedsince1994.TheOversightModelhasbeendevelopedtoequipuswithanimproved

standardoperatingproceduretoenhancethecapacityofParliamenttodischargeitsduties.

ThisModelisaproductofrobustmulti-partydiscussions,andconsultations,aswellasintensiveresearch,

bothnationallyandinternationally.Ouraimwastobringtothetablebestpracticearoundissuesof

oversightandaccountabilityfromavarietyofsources.Parliament’scritical roleofensuringthatour

governmentremainsaccountabletothepeoplewillbeenhancedwhenallinthesecorridorsadoptthe

valuesandprinciplesoutlinedintheOversightModel.

M V sisulu, MP MJ Mahlangu, MP

SpeakeroftheNationalAssembly ChairpersonoftheNationalCouncilofProvinces

MrMJMahlangu,MP MrMVSisulu,MP

FOREwORD OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

Foreword by Co-Chairpersons

TheConstitutiongivesParliamentspecificresponsibilitiesinrespectofoversightovertheExecutive.In

termsofsections42(3)and55(2)oftheConstitution,thefunctionsoftheNationalAssemblyinclude

scrutinyandoversightofexecutiveactionprovidingformechanismstoensurethatexecutiveorgans

ofstateinthenationalsphereofgovernmentareaccountabletoitandtomaintainoversightofthe

exerciseofnationalexecutiveauthorityandanyorganofstate.TheconstitutionalmandateoftheNCOP

asenshrinedinsection42(4)providesthattheNationalCouncilofProvincesrepresentstheprovinces

toensurethatprovincialinterestsaretakenintoaccountinthenationalsphereofgovernment.Itdoes

thismainlybyparticipatinginthenationallegislativeprocessandbyprovidinganationalforumfor

publicconsiderationofissuesaffectingtheprovinces.Intermsofsection92(2)membersofthecabinet

areaccountablecollectivelyand individuallytoParliamentfortheexerciseoftheirpowersandthe

performanceoftheirfunctions.

AsParliamenthadnotyetput inplacesufficientmechanismsandprocedurestofulfil itsoversight

functionsandtoholdgovernmentdepartmentsandorgansofstateaccountable,itengagedtheservices

ofaconsultantatthebeginningof1999toresearchParliament’soversightfunctions,toidentifyareas

inwhichParliamentisrequiredtoexerciseoversight,toassessexistingparliamentarymechanismsand

procedurestoholdtheExecutiveaccountableandtomakerecommendationstoimprovetheefficiency

andeffectivenessofparliamentaryoversight.ThereportoftheconsultantwassubmittedtoParliament

inJuly1999.TheJointRulesCommitteeestablishedanadhocJointSubcommitteeonOversightand

AccountabilitytoconsiderthereportandmakerecommendationstotheJointRulesCommitteeonits

findings.

Thesubcommitteeheldanumberofmeetingsandinterviewedkeyparliamentaryrole-playersbefore

presentingtheJointRulesCommitteewithitsfinalreportin2002.TheJointRulesCommitteeapproved

therecommendationscontainedinthereportandrequestedthatanimplementationplanbeconsidered

inrespectoftherecommendations.In2003,itwasdecidedtosetupaTaskTeamonOversightand

AccountabilityconsistingofmembersofbothHousestoleadtheimplementationofthesubcommittee’s

proposals.TheHouseChairpersonintheNationalAssemblyandtheHouseChairpersonintheNational

CouncilofProvincesresponsibleforoversightweretaskedwithdrivingtheprocess.

Page 6

FOREwORDOVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

Thetaskteamestablishedthreefocusgroups,namelybudgetprocesses,projectsandcommittees.The

overarchingobjectivewastodevelopamodelforParliament’soversightfunctionthatwasbothinline

withthenewstrategicvisionandthatwouldproducetheresultantrealignmentofresourcestofulfil

Parliament’smandatewithgreaterefficiencyandeffectiveness.

Thereportofthetaskteam,whichsubsequentlybecameknownastheOversightandAccountability

Model,wasadoptedinprinciplebytheJointRulesCommitteeon19March2008.TheModelwas

adoptedon17February2009bytheNationalAssemblyandon19March2009bytheNationalCouncil

ofProvinces.

TheModelistheoutcomeofcontributionsbyformercolleagueswhowereinstrumentalinfacilitating

andgivingguidancetothetechnicalteamsovertheyears.TheprocessofdevelopingtheModelbegan

undertheguidanceofMrNNhleko,theHouseChairpersondealingwithoversightandaccountability

issuesintheNationalAssemblyandMrTSSetona,theHouseChairpersonintheNationalCouncilof

Provincesdealingwithoversightandaccountabilitymatters. Itwasthereaftertakenforwardbythe

NationalAssemblyHouseChairpersondealingwithInternationalRelationsandOversight,MrKOBapela,

whotogetherwithMrTSetonajointlyledtheTaskTeamuntiltheModelwasadoptedbytheJointRules

Committee.Whenthemodelwasreferredtocommittees,MrSetonacontinuedwithhisresponsibilities

ontheNCOPside,working jointlywiththeNAHouseChairpersonsforCommitteesandOversight,

MrGQMDoidgeandlaterwithMrACNel.WiththecomingintobeingofthefourthParliamentthe

responsibilityforthepublicationandimplementationoftheModelwastransferredintheNCOPtoMsN

MMagadlaandthereaftertoMrRJTau,HouseChairpersonforCommitteesandOversightintheNCOP

andonthesideoftheNationalAssembly,toMrBapela(NA),whenhebecametheHouseChairperson

forCommittees,Oversight&ICT.

C t Frolick, MP r J tau, MPHouseChairperson:Committees,OversightandICT HouseChairperson:CommitteesandOversight

NationalAssembly NationalCouncilofProvinces

Page 7

CHAPTER 1 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

Page 8

111IntroductionIntroductionIntroduction

CHAPTER 1OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

Page 9

CHAPTER 1: IntrOdUCtIOn

1.1 Constitutional precepts guiding the vision and mission of Parliament

Parliament’sstrategicvisionistobuildaneffectivepeople’sParliamentthatisresponsiveto

theneedsofthepeople,andthatisdrivenbytheidealofrealisingabetterqualityoflifefor

allthepeopleofSouthAfricaanditsmissionistorepresentandactasavoiceofthepeoplein

fulfillingParliament’sconstitutionalfunctionsofpassinglawsandoverseeingexecutiveaction.

BasedonthevisionandmissionofParliamentandtheconstitutionalrequirementsParliament

herebydevelopsmechanismstoguideitsworkonoversightintheformofanoversightmodel.

Historically,the1994electionsusheredinanewdemocraticorderinSouthAfrica.Theextraordinary

participationbySouthAfricansshowedthatwedesiredanendtothedivisionsofthepastanda

movetowardsestablishingasocietybasedondemocraticvalues,socialjusticeandfundamental

humanrights.Theprocessofnegotiations,whichprecededthe1994elections,resultedinthe

draftingofanewConstitution,asadoptedon8May1996bytheConstitutionalAssembly.

ThemandateofParliamentisachievedthroughpassinglegislation,overseeinggovernment

action,andfacilitatingpublicparticipationandinternationalparticipation.TheroleofParliament

includesthepromotionofthevaluesofhumandignity,equality,non-racialism,non-sexism,the

supremacyoftheConstitution,universaladultsuffrageandamulti-partysystemofdemocratic

government.Itupholdsourcitizens’politicalrights,thebasicvaluesandprinciplesgoverning

public administration, and oversees the implementation of constitutional imperatives.

Much of Parliament’s focus in the first decade of democracy was on ensuring the

transformation of South Africa’s legislative landscape, in line with the country’s first

democraticConstitution,Act108of1996. In thisprocess,Parliament’soversight function

received lessattention,andwascompoundedfurtherbytherealitythattheConstitution

dealswithParliament’slegislativeauthorityinmoredetailcomparedtoitsoversightrole.

Ingivingcredenceto its increasingly importantoversight role,Parliament’snewstrategic

vision,namelytobuildaneffectivepeople’sParliament“... that isdrivenbytheidealof


Page 10

realisingabetterqualityoflifeforallthepeopleofSouthAfrica”,underpinnedthemannerinwhich

theorganisationbeganengagingontheneedtoinstitutionalisepublicparticipationasanintegralpart

ofitsoversightfunction.Themotivationforpoliticaldelegationstoundertakethemanagementofthe

legislativeandoversightprogrammeofParliamentdemandscapacity,competenceandcollectiveaction.

1.2 Constitutional requirement for mechanisms on oversight

Againstthisbackdrop,andinthecontextofsections42(3)and55(2)oftheConstitution,aswellas

variousprovisionsthatimplyoversightfunctionsoftheNationalCouncilofProvinces,Parliamentthrough

theJointRulesCommitteeestablishedaTaskTeamonOversightandAccountabilitycomprisingmembers

ofbothHousesofParliament,whichstudiedthemandatesrelatingtooversightemanatingfromthe

Constitution.Thetaskteamestablishedthreefocusgroups,thatof,theProjectsFocusGroup,theBudget

andtheCommittees.TheobjectivewastodevelopanoversightmodelforParliamentinlinewiththe

ConstitutionandParliament’snewstrategicvision,togetherwiththerealignmentofresourcestofulfilits

mandatewithgreaterefficiency.

Themodel’sprimaryobjectiveistoprovidetheframeworkthatdescribeshowParliamentconducts

oversight.Itseekstoimproveexistingtoolsofparliamentaryoversight,streamlinecomponentsofthe

newoversightmodelwithexistingcomponents,andenhanceParliament’scapacitytofulfilitsoversight

functioninlinewithParliament’snewstrategicdirection.

Furthermore,therationalefortheOversightandAccountabilityModelwastoscrutiniseexistingpractices

and/ormechanismsusedasaprototype,somethingtobemeasuredorstandardised,andthereafter

interrogateandofferalternativesthatcouldbeutilisedinthefuture.Anoversightandaccountability

modelmustthereforecomprisethemostimportant,features,whichinclude-

• thevaluesandprinciplesbywhichParliamentconductsoversight;

• themechanismorframeworktoconductoversight;and

• theprocessesandresourcesrequiredforconductingoversight.

Themodelisnotdogmaticandwilladaptfromtimetotimedependingonthecontextandcircumstances.


Page 11

1.3 Composition and mandates of Parliament

ParliamentconsistsoftwoHouses,namelytheNationalAssembly(NA)andtheNationalCouncilof

Provinces(NCOP).Section42(3)oftheConstitutionprovidesthattheNationalAssemblyiselectedto

representthepeopleandtoensuregovernmentbythepeopleundertheConstitution.Itdoesthisby

choosingthepresident,byprovidinganationalforumforpublicconsiderationof issues,bypassing

legislation and by scrutinising and overseeing executive action. The Assembly is further required

in terms of section 55(2) to provide mechanisms to ensure that all executive organs of state in

thenationalsphereofgovernmentareaccountabletoit;andtomaintainoversightoftheexercise

ofnationalexecutiveauthority, includingtheimplementationof legislation,andanyorganofstate.

TheNationalCouncilofProvincesrepresentstheprovincestoensurethattheprovincialinterestsare

takenintoaccountinthenationalsphereofgovernmentasstatedinsection42(4)oftheConstitution.

TheCouncildoesthismainlybyparticipatinginthenationallegislativeprocessandbyprovidinganational

forumforpublicconsiderationofissuesaffectingtheprovinces.TheCouncil’sroleistoexerciseoversight

overthenationalaspectsofprovincialandlocalgovernment.Itcontributestoeffectivegovernmentby

ensuringthatprovincialandlocalconcernsarerecognisedinnationalpolicymakingandthatprovincial,

localandnationalgovernmentsworktogethereffectively.

Inaddition,Parliament-

• facilitatespublicparticipation,involvementandtransparency;

• facilitatesco-operativegovernment;

• facilitatesinternationalparticipation;and

• representstheinterestsofthepeople.

Basedonthesemandates, theConstitutionfurther requiresParliament todevelopmechanismsfor

oversight.

1.4 Mandates of focus groups

1.4.1 Projects Focus Group [Constitutional Landscape Governing Oversight]

Thetermsofreferenceofthisgroupwereto-

• conductconstitutionallandscaping;


Page 12

• conductanauditofbodiesperformingpublicfunctions;

• analysetheoversightroleofinstitutionssupportingdemocracy;and

• reviewrulesonoversight.

1.4.2 Committees Focus Group


• draftthebestpracticeguideinrespectofoversightpracticesofcommittees;

• draftguidelinesforportfolioandselectcommitteestoallowforjointplanningandoversight

work;

• draftguidelinesonjointplanningonprotocolsforstructuredcommunicationbetweenthetwo

HousesofParliament;

• draftrecommendationsforcapacitydevelopmentofcommittees;and

• draftrecommendationsonappropriaterecord-keepingsystemsandmonitoringmechanisms

intheCommitteeSection.

1.4.3 Budget Focus Group


• developprocedurefortheamendmentofmoneybills;and

• draftlegislationontheamendmentofmoneybills.


Page 13


Page 00

222

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO OVERSIGHT THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO OVERSIGHT THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAND ACCOUNTABILITY AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAND ACCOUNTABILITY AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION


CHAPTER 2: the rOLe OF ParLIaMent In reLatIOn tO OVersIGht and aCCOUntaBILIty as Mandated By the COnstItUtIOn

2.1 defining oversight

TheconventionalWestminsterviewonoversight,asinheritedbymanyformerBritishcolonies,

isoftenratheradversarialandinsomeinstancesoversightisprofessedtobethepurviewof

oppositionpoliticiansandnotthelegislatureasaninstitution.Theemphasisisplacedonthe

oversightroleoflegislatures,especiallyasitrelatestoensuringgovernmentcompliancewith

approvedpublicspending.Thetaskteamadoptedthefollowingdefinitionofoversight:

IntheSouthAfricancontext,oversightisaconstitutionallymandatedfunctionoflegislative

organsofstatetoscrutiniseandoverseeexecutiveactionandanyorganofstate.

Itfollowsthatoversightentailstheinformalandformal,watchful,strategicandstructured

scrutinyexercisedbylegislaturesinrespectoftheimplementationoflaws,theapplicationof

thebudget,andthestrictobservanceofstatutesandtheConstitution.Inaddition,andmost

importantly,itentailsoverseeingtheeffectivemanagementofgovernmentdepartmentsby

individualmembersofCabinetinpursuitofimprovedservicedeliveryfortheachievementof

abetterqualityoflifeforallcitizens.

IntermsoftheprovisionsoftheConstitutionandtheJointRules,Parliamenthaspowerto

conductoversightofallorgansofstate,includingthoseatprovincialandlocalgovernmentlevel.

TheappropriatemechanismforParliamenttoconductoversightoftheseorgansofstate

wouldbethroughparliamentarycommittees.Inconductingoversight,thecommitteewould

eitherrequestabriefingfromtheorganofstateorvisittheorganofstateforfact-finding,

dependingonthepurposeoftheoversight.Thecommitteeswouldhavetoconsiderthe

appropriatemeansforconductingoversighttocoverallorgansofstate.

Oneofthemostimportantaspectsoftheoversightfunctionistheconsiderationbycommittees

ofannualreportsoforgansofstateandtheAuditor-General’sreports.


2.1.1 Functions of oversight

Theconceptofoversightcontainsmanyaspectswhichincludepolitical,administrative,financial,ethical,

legalandstrategicelements.Thefunctionsofoversightare:

• Todetectandpreventabuse,arbitrarybehaviourorillegalandunconstitutionalconductonthe

partofthegovernmentandpublicagencies.Atthecoreofthisfunctionistheprotectionofthe

rightsandlibertiesofcitizens.

• Toholdthegovernmenttoaccountinrespectofhowthetaxpayers’moneyisused.It

detectswastewithinthemachineryofgovernmentandpublicagencies.Thusitcan

improvetheefficiency,economyandeffectivenessofgovernmentoperations.

• ToensurethatpoliciesannouncedbygovernmentandauthorisedbyParliamentare

actuallydelivered.Thisfunctionincludesmonitoringtheachievementofgoalssetby

legislationandthegovernment’sownprogrammes.

• Toimprovethetransparencyofgovernmentoperationsandenhancepublictrustin

thegovernment,whichisitselfaconditionofeffectivepolicydelivery.

2.2 defining accountability

Accountabilitycanbebroadlydefinedas-

asocialrelationshipwhereanactor(anindividualoranagency)feelsanobligationtoexplainandjustify

hisorherconducttosomesignificantother(theaccountabilityforum,accountee,specificpersonor

agency).

Ghutto.S

Accountabilityisthehallmarkofmoderndemocraticgovernance.Democracyremainsclichédifthose

inpowercannotbeheldaccountable inpublic for theiractsoromissions, for theirdecisions, their

expenditureorpolicies.Historically,theconceptofaccountabilitywascloselylinkedtoaccountingin

thefinancialsense.Ithashowevermovedfarbeyonditsoriginsandhasbecomeasymbolofgood

governancebothinthepublicandprivatesectors.Accountabilityreferstoinstitutionalisedpracticesof

givingaccountofhowassignedresponsibilitiesarecarriedout.


2.2.1 Functions of accountability

Thefunctionsofaccountabilityincludethefollowing:

• Toenhancetheintegrityofpublicgovernanceinordertosafeguardgovernmentagainst

corruption,nepotism,abuseofpowerandotherformsofinappropriatebehaviour.

• Asaninstitutionalarrangement,toeffectdemocraticcontrol.

• Toimproveperformance,whichwillfosterinstitutionallearningandservicedelivery.

• Inregardtotransparency,responsivenessandanswerability,toassurepublicconfidence

ingovernmentandbridgethegapbetweenthegovernedandthegovernmentandensure

publicconfidenceingovernment.

• Toenablethepublictojudgetheperformanceofthegovernmentbythegovernmentgiving

accountinpublic.

Notwithstandingthefactthatsection55oftheConstitutionenablestheNationalAssemblytomaintain

oversight over all organs of state and section 92 which enables Parliament to hold the Cabinet

accountableoperationally,organsofstateatnationallevelandMinistersandtheirdepartmentsare

generallyheldtoaccountbyParliament.Atnationallevel,thereisdirectaccountabilitytoParliamentby

nationaldepartments,nationalpublicentitiesandnationalbodiessuchascommissions.

TheNationalAssemblydoeshoweverhavetherighttocallorgansofstateatprovincialandlocallevelto

account,butdoesnotdosooperationallyunlessthereareissuesofpublicimportance,nationalinterest

andsharedcompetencies.AccountabilitytoParliamentbyorgansofstateatprovincialandlocallevel

mustbeconductedthroughobservanceoftheIntergovernmentalFrameworkRelationsActandthe

principlesofco-operativegovernment.

WhennationaldepartmentsaccounttoParliamentbymeanswhichincludethesubmissionofreports,for

exampleannualreportsetc,Parliamentneedstobeinformedofthecompletepictureoftheperformance

ofthefunctionsreportedon.Theconsiderationoftheannualreportofthedepartmentalonemaynot

givethecompletepictureoftheperformanceofthefunctions.Thisissobecausenationaldepartments

havepublicentitiesthatareagenciesofimplementationoftheirfunctions,andtheiractivitiesmaynot

bereportedintheannualreportofthenationaldepartment.


Inconductingoversightandaccountability,theprinciplesofco-operativegovernmentandintergovernmental

relationsmustbetakenintoconsideration,includingtheseparationofpowersandtheneedforallspheres

ofgovernmentandallorgansofstatetoexercisetheirpowersandperformtheirfunctionsinamannerthat

doesnotencroachonthegeographical,functionalorinstitutionalintegrityofgovernmentinanothersphere.

Theillustration(Figure1)belowdepictsthelinkagesincreatingefficiencyandensuringco-ordination

onco-operativegovernmentwhichultimatelyleadtooversightandaccountabilityatnational,provincial

andlocallevelsofgovernment.

Figure 1


2.3 Constitutional provisions expressing powers and functions of Parliament on

oversight and accountability

Therelevantconstitutionalprovisionsthatreferdirectlyandindirectlytooversightand

accountabilityarethefollowing:

Section41(2)

AnActofParliamentmustestablishorprovideforstructuresand

institutionstopromoteandfacilitateintergovernmentalrelations

andmustprovideforappropriatemechanismsandproceduresto

facilitatesettlementofintergovernmentaldisputes.

Section42(3)&(4)

(3)TheNationalAssemblyiselectedtorepresentthepeopleand

toensuregovernmentbythepeopleundertheConstitution.It

doesthisbychoosingthePresident,byprovidinganationalforum

forpublicconsiderationofissues,bypassinglegislationandby

scrutinisingandoverseeingexecutiveaction.

(4)TheNationalCouncilofProvincesrepresentstheprovinces

toensurethatprovincialinterestsaretakenintoaccountinthe

nationalsphereofgovernment.Itdoesthismainlybyparticipating

inthenationallegislativeprocessandbyprovidinganationalforum

forpublicconsiderationofissuesaffectingprovinces.

Section55(2)

TheNationalAssemblymustprovideformechanisms–

(a)toensurethatallexecutiveorgansofstateinthenational

sphereofgovernmentareaccountabletoit;and

(b)tomaintainoversightof-

(i)theexerciseofnationalexecutiveauthority,includingthe

implementationoflegislation;and

(ii)anyorganofstate.


Section56

TheNationalAssemblyoranyofitscommitteesmay-

(a)summonanypersontoappearbeforeittogiveevidenceon

oathoraffirmation,ortoproducedocuments;

(b)requireanypersonorinstitutiontoreporttoit;

(c)compel,intermsofnationallegislationortherulesandorders,

anypersonorinstitutiontocomplywithasummonsorrequirement

intermsofparagraph(a)or(b);and

(d)receivepetitions,representationsorsubmissionsfromany

interestedpersonsorinstitutions.

Section66(2)

TheNationalCouncilofProvincesmayrequireaCabinet

member,aDeputyMinisteroranofficialinthenational

executiveoraprovincialexecutivetoattendameetingofthe

CounciloracommitteeoftheCouncil.

Section67

Notmorethan10part-timerepresentativesdesignatedby

organisedlocalgovernmentrepresentingthedifferentcategories

ofmunicipalitiesmayparticipateintheproceedingsoftheNational

CouncilofProvinceswhennecessary,butmaynotvote.

Section69

TheNationalCouncilofProvincesoranyofitscommitteesmay–

(a)summonanypersontoappearbeforeittogiveevidenceon

oathoraffirmation,ortoproducedocuments;

(b)requireanypersonorinstitutiontoreporttoit;

(c)compel,intermsofnationallegislationortherulesandorders,

anypersonorinstitutiontocomplywithasummonsorrequirement

intermsofparagraph(a)or(b);and

(d)receivepetitions,representationsorsubmissionsfromany

interestedpersonsorinstitutions.


Section70(1)

TheNationalCouncilofProvincesmay–

(a) determineandcontrolitsinternalarrangements,proceedings

andprocedures;and

(b) makerulesandordersconcerningitsbusiness,withdueregard

torepresentativeandparticipatorydemocracy,accountability,

transparencyandpublicinvolvement.

Section89

(1)TheNationalAssembly,byaresolutionadoptedwitha

supportingvoteofatleasttwothirdsofitsmembers,mayremove

thePresidentfromofficeonlyonthegroundsof–

(a)aseriousviolationoftheConstitutionorthelaw;

(b)seriousmisconduct;or

(c)inabilitytoperformthefunctionsofoffice.

(2)AnyonewhohasbeenremovedfromtheofficeofPresidentin

termsofsubsection(1)(a)or(b)maynotreceiveanybenefitsof

thatoffice,andmaynotserveinanypublicoffice.

Section92

(2)MembersoftheCabinetareaccountablecollectivelyand

individuallytoParliamentfortheexerciseoftheirpowersandthe

performanceoftheirfunctions.

(3)MembersoftheCabinetmust…provideParliamentwithfull

andregularreportsconcerningmattersundertheircontrol.

Section93(2)

DeputyMinisters…areaccountabletoParliamentfortheexercise

oftheirpowersandtheperformanceoftheirfunctions.


Section100(2)

Ifthenationalexecutiveintervenesinaprovincebyassuming

responsibilityfortherelevantobligationwhichthatprovincecannot

ordoesnotfulfil,thenationalexecutivemustsubmitawritten

noticeoftheinterventiontotheNationalCouncilofProvinceswithin

14daysaftertheinterventionbegan.Theinterventionmustendif

theCouncildisapprovestheinterventionwithin180daysafterthe

interventionbeganorbytheendofthatperiodhasnotapproved

theintervention.TheCouncilmust,whiletheinterventioncontinues,

reviewtheinterventionregularlyandmaymakeanyappropriate

recommendationstothenationalexecutive.

Section102

(1)IftheNationalAssembly,byavotesupportedbyamajority

ofitsmembers,passesamotionofnoconfidenceintheCabinet

excludingthePresident,thePresidentmustreconstitutethe

Cabinet.

(2)IftheNationalAssembly,byavotesupportedbyamajorityof

itsmembers,passesamotionofnoconfidenceinthePresident,the

PresidentandtheothermembersoftheCabinetandanyDeputy

Ministersmustresign.

Section114(2)

Aprovinciallegislaturemustprovideformechanisms–

(a)toensurethatallprovincialexecutiveorgansofstateinthe

provinceareaccountabletoit;and

(b)tomaintainoversightof-

(i)theexerciseofprovincialexecutiveauthorityintheprovince,

includingtheimplementationoflegislation;and

(ii)anyprovincialorganofstate.

Section125(4)

Anydisputeconcerningtheadministrativecapacityofaprovincein

regardtoanyfunctionmustbereferredtotheNationalCouncilof

Provincesforresolutionwithin30daysofthedateofthereferralto

theCouncil.


Section133(2)&(3)

(2)MembersoftheExecutiveCouncilofaprovinceareaccountable

collectivelyandindividuallytotheprovinciallegislatureforthe

exerciseoftheirpowersandtheperformanceoftheirfunctions.

(3)MembersoftheExecutiveCouncilofaprovincemust

providetheprovinciallegislaturewithfullandregularreports

concerningmattersundertheircontrol.

Section139(2)

Ifaprovincialexecutiveintervenesinamunicipalitywhichcannotor

doesnotfulfilanexecutiveobligationbyassumingresponsibilityfor

therelevantobligationinthatmunicipality,theprovincialexecutive

mustsubmitawrittennoticeoftheinterventiontotheCabinet

memberresponsibleforlocalgovernmentaffairsandtherelevant

provinciallegislatureandtheNationalCouncilofProvinceswithin14

daysaftertheinterventionbegan.

TheinterventionmustendiftheCabinetmemberresponsiblefor

localgovernmentaffairsdisapprovestheinterventionwithin28

daysaftertheinterventionbeganorbytheendofthatperiodhas

notapprovedtheintervention,oriftheCouncildisapprovesthe

interventionwithin180daysaftertheinterventionbeganorbythe

endofthatperiodhasnotapprovedtheintervention.TheCouncil

must,whiletheinterventioncontinues,reviewtheintervention

regularlyandmaymakeanyappropriaterecommendationstothe

provincialexecutive.


Section139(3)

Whentherelevantprovincialexecutiveintervenesinamunicipality

whichcannotordoesnotfulfilanexecutiveobligationby

dissolvingtheMunicipalCouncil,theprovincialexecutivemust

immediatelysubmitawrittennoticeofthedissolutiontothe

Cabinetmemberresponsibleforlocalgovernmentaffairsandthe

relevantprovinciallegislatureandtheNationalCouncilofProvinces.

Thedissolutiontakeseffect14daysfromthedateofreceiptofthe

noticebytheCouncilunlesssetasidebythatCabinetmemberor

theCouncilbeforetheexpiryofthose14days.

Section139(6)

Ifaprovincialexecutiveintervenesinamunicipalityinterms

ofsubsection(4)or(5),itmustsubmitawrittennoticeofthe

interventionto–

(a) theCabinetmemberresponsibleforlocalgovernmentaffairs;

and

(b) therelevantprovinciallegislatureandtheNationalCouncilof

Provinceswithinsevendaysaftertheinterventionbegan.

Section146(6)

AlawmadeintermsofanActofParliamentoraprovincialActcan

prevailonlyifthatlawhasbeenapprovedbytheNationalCouncilof

Provinces.

Section154(1)

Thenationalgovernmentandprovincialgovernments,bylegislative

andothermeasures,mustsupportandstrengthenthecapacityof

municipalitiestomanagetheirownaffairs,toexercisetheirpowers

andtoperformtheirfunctions.


Section155(6)

Eachprovincialgovernmentmustestablishmunicipalitiesinits

provinceinamannerconsistentwiththeapplicablenational

legislationand,bylegislativeorothermeasures,must-

(a)provideforthemonitoringandsupportoflocalgovernmentin

theprovince;and

(b)promotethedevelopmentoflocalgovernmentcapacityto

enablemunicipalitiestoperformtheirfunctionsandmanagetheir

ownaffairs.

Section155(7)

Thenationalgovernment,subjecttosection44,andthe

provincialgovernmentshavethelegislativeandexecutive

authoritytoseetotheeffectiveperformancebymunicipalities

oftheirfunctionsinrespectofmatterslistedinSchedules4and

5,byregulatingtheexercisebymunicipalitiesoftheirexecutive

authority.

Section194(1)

ThePublicProtector,theAuditor-Generaloramemberofa

CommissionestablishedbythisChaptermayberemovedfrom

officeonlyon–

(a) thegroundofmisconduct,incapacityorincompetence;

(b) afindingtothateffectbyacommitteeoftheNational

Assembly;and

(c) theadoptionbytheAssemblyofaresolutioncallingforthat

person’sremovalfromoffice.

Section199(8)

Togiveeffecttotheprinciplesoftransparencyandaccountability,

multi-partyparliamentarycommitteesmusthaveoversightofall

securityservicesinamannerdeterminedbynationallegislationor

therulesandordersofParliament.


Section201(3)&(4)

(3)Whenthedefenceforceisemployedinco-operationwith

thepoliceservice;indefenceoftheRepublicorinfulfilmentof

aninternationalobligation,thePresidentmustinformParliament

promptlyandinappropriatedetail.

(4)IfParliamentdoesnotsitduringthefirstsevendaysafter

thedefenceforceisemployedasenvisagedinsubsection(2),

thePresidentmustprovidetherequiredinformationtothe

appropriateoversightcommittee.

Section203

(1)ThePresidentasheadofthenationalexecutivemaydeclarea

stateofnationaldefence,andmustinformParliamentpromptlyand

inappropriatedetailof-

(a)thereasonsforthedeclaration;

(b)anyplacewherethedefenceforceisbeingemployed;and

(c)thenumberofpeopleinvolved.

(2)IfParliamentisnotsittingwhenastateofnationaldefence

isdeclared,thePresidentmustsummonParliamenttoan

extraordinarysittingwithinsevendaysofthedeclaration.

(3)Adeclarationofastateofnationaldefencelapsesunlessitis

approvedbyParliamentwithinsevendaysofthedeclaration.

Section206(9)

Aprovinciallegislaturemayrequiretheprovincialcommissionerof

theprovincetoappearbeforeitoranyofitscommitteestoanswer

questions.

Section210

Nationallegislationmustregulatetheobjects,powersandfunctions

oftheintelligenceservices,includinganyintelligencedivisionofthe

defenceforceorpoliceservice,andmustprovidefor-

(a)theco-ordinationofallintelligenceservices;and

(b)civilianmonitoringoftheactivitiesofthoseservicesbyan

inspectorappointedbythePresident,asheadofthenational

executive,andapprovedbyaresolutionadoptedbytheNational

Assemblywithasupportingvoteofatleasttwothirdsofits

members.


Section216(3)&(4)

(3)Adecisiontostopthetransferoffundsduetoaprovince….

maybeenforcedimmediately,butwilllapseretrospectivelyunless

Parliamentapprovesit.

(4)Parliamentmayrenewadecisiontostopthetransferoffunds

fornomorethan120daysatatime.

Section231(2),(3)&(4)

(2)AninternationalagreementbindstheRepubliconlyafterithas

beenapprovedbyresolutioninboththeNationalAssemblyandthe

NationalCouncilofProvinces,unlessitisanagreementreferredto

insubsection(3).

(3)Aninternationalagreementofatechnical,administrativeor

executivenature,oranagreementwhichdoesnotrequireeither

ratificationoraccession,enteredintobythenationalexecutive,

bindstheRepublicwithoutapprovalbytheNationalAssembly

andtheNationalCouncilofProvinces,butmustbetabledinthe

AssemblyandtheCouncilwithinareasonabletime.

(4)AnyinternationalagreementbecomeslawintheRepublicwhen

itisenactedintolawbynationallegislation;butaself-executing

provisionofanagreementthathasbeenapprovedbyParliamentis

lawintheRepublicunlessitisinconsistentwiththeConstitutionor

anActofParliament.

Inthecontextoftheconstitutionallymandatedprovisionsofaccountabilityandoversightaslistedabove,

thechaptersbelowdetailtheexistingprocessesundertakenbytheSouthAfricanParliamenttofulfilits

constitutionaloversightandaccountabilityobligations.Thefocusisalsoplacedonthegapsincurrent

rulespertainingtooversight,andsomemechanismsarerecommendedtoaddressthesechallenges.


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INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OVERSIGHT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OVERSIGHT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY AND EXISTING MECHANISMS UTILISED BY ACCOUNTABILITY AND EXISTING MECHANISMS UTILISED BY ACCOUNTABILITY AND EXISTING MECHANISMS UTILISED BY PARLIAMENTPARLIAMENTPARLIAMENT


CHAPTER 3: InstItUtIOnaL CharaCterIstICs OF OVersIGht and aCCOUntaBILIty and eXIstInG MeChanIsMs UtILIsed By ParLIaMent

3.1 Current mechanisms for oversight and accountability

Parliamenthasestablishedmechanismstofulfilitsoversightandaccountabilitymandates

intermsoftheConstitutionandundertherulesestablishedbythetwoHouses,individually

and jointly. Committees can interact with civil society organisations, organised business,

expertsandprofessionalbodiesasawayofenhancingaccountabilityandcancallMinisters

anddepartmentalheadstoaccountonanyissuerelatingtoanymatteroverwhichthey

areeffectingaccountabilitywithin theambit of theprovisionsof sections56and69of

the Constitution and legislation. Current practices andoversightmechanisms include the

committeesofParliament(withtheirassociatedpractices)andplenaryprocessesaslisted

below.

3.1.1 Practices of committees to effect oversight and accountability

ThemandatesofthecommitteesareprovidedforintherulesofeachHouseandtheJoint

Rules.Committeesofferasettingwhichfacilitatesdetailedscrutinyoflegislation,oversight

ofgovernmentactivitiesandinteractionwiththepublicandexternalfactors.Consideration

of committee reports is necessary because committees work as intermediary bodies

betweeninterestgroupsandgovernmentandareanentrypointforcitizenstothework

ofParliament.Inaddition,theworkofcommitteesincludestudyvisitsthatentailphysical

inspections,conversingwithpeople,assessingtheimpactofdeliveryanddevelopingreports

foradoptionbycommitteeswhichcontainrecommendationsfortheHousestoconsider.In

exercisingoversight,committeesoftenobtainfirst-handknowledgefrompeopleengagedin

thedirectimplementationofspecificprogrammesand/orwhoaredirectlyresponsiblefor

servicedelivery.Inordertoevaluatetheworkofgovernmentfromabroaderperspective,

committeesmayinviteexpertsfromoutsidegovernmenttoprovidebackgroundknowledge

andanalysisonrelevantissues.


reports and mandates of committees

ParliamentarycommitteesareestablishedasinstrumentsoftheHousesintermsoftheConstitution,

legislation,theJointRules,RulesoftheNCOP,RulesoftheNA,andresolutionsoftheHousestofacilitate

oversightandthemonitoringoftheExecutive,andforthispurposetheyareprovidedwithprocedural,

administrativeandlogisticalsupport-theyareregardedastheengineroomsofParliament.

Parliamentary committees have various tools of oversight as listed above, including departmental

briefingsessions,annualanddepartmentalbudgetanalyses,callsforsubmissionsandpetitionsfrom

thepublic,theconsiderationofstrategicplansandannualreports,andpublichearings.

Whilstcommitteeshaveestablishedwaysofconductingtheiroversightfunctions,theirbusinessgenerally

runsparalleltogovernment’spoliticalcycle,unlesstherearespecific“adhoc”oversightfunctionsthatare

required.Inprogrammingtheiroversightactivities,theywouldthusactinaresponsive/reactivemanner.

AcommitteeconductsitsbusinessonbehalfoftheHouseandmustthereforereportbacktotheHouseon

mattersreferredtoitforconsiderationandreport.Acommitteemayalsoreportonanyothermatterwithin

thescopeofitsmandatethatitconsidersnecessaryintermsofNARule137(2)andNCOPRule102(2).

WhenacommitteereportsitsrecommendationstotheHouseforformalconsiderationandtheHouse

adoptstheCommitteereport,itgivestherecommendationstheforceofaformalHouseresolution

pursuanttoitsconstitutionalfunctionofconductingoversight.TheHousethenalsomonitorsexecutive

compliancewiththeserecommendations.

the following types of committee reports are presented to the house:

1. Legislation(intermsofsections74,75,76or77oftheConstitution);

2. Studytours;

3. Oversightactivitiesofcommittees,includingresponsestoannualreportsandfinancial

statementsofdepartments;

4. Internationalagreements;

5. Privatemembers’legislativeproposals;

6. Budgetvotes;

7. Petitions;

8. Statutoryprovisions(forexamplethefillingofvacanciesinastatutorybody);


9. Annualreportsofcommitteeactivitiesandperformanceagainsttheirstrategicplans;

10. AnymatterreferredtocommitteesforconsiderationandreportintermsofNARule137and

NCOPRule102.

OnceareporthasbeenadoptedbytheHouse,theSpeakercommunicatestherecommendationsof

theHousetotherelevantMinisterandcopiestherelevantHouseChairperson,portfoliocommittee

ChairpersonandDirector-General.TheSpeakeralsorequeststheMinistertodirecthisorherresponses

totheSpeakerforformaltabling.

TheSecretarytoParliamentcommunicateswiththeDirector-GeneralinthePresidencyonallresolutions.

Portfolio committees of the na and select committees of the nCOP

ThemandateofoversightresideswiththeNAandtheNCOPandthroughtheirrespectiverules,the

NAestablishesportfoliocommitteesandtheNCOPestablishesselectcommittees.Portfoliocommittees

mirrorportfoliosingovernmentwhilstselectcommitteesmirrortheclustersingovernment.Dueto

thefactthatcommitteesconducttheirbusinessonbehalfoftheirrespectiveHouses,theyreporttothe

relevantHouseindividuallyandseparatelyonmattersreferredtothemtoensurethateachHousemay

makeanydecisionsitdeemsnecessary.

Joint committees

JointcommitteesarecommitteesthatareestablishedintermsoftheJointRulesandhavesimilarpowers

toportfoliocommitteesandselectcommittees,exceptthattheyhavespecificmandatesrelatingto

transversalissues,suchaswomen,children,youthanddisability.

ad hoc committees

Whennecessary,Parliamentestablishesadhoccommitteestoassistinitsinvestigationoftransversal

issues.

Joint standing committees

Parliament, in accordance with the Constitution, legislation and the rules, can establish standing

committees.TwojointstandingcommitteescurrentlyexistinParliamentthroughlegislation,namelythe

JointStandingCommitteeonIntelligenceandtheJointStandingCommitteeonDefence.


specialised committees

TheNARulesandthePublicAuditAct(No25of2004)establishtheCommitteeontheAuditor-General

withamandatetomaintainoversightovertheAuditor-Generalandperformfunctionsintermsofthe

PublicAuditAct.TheJointCommitteeonEthicsandMembers’InterestsisestablishedbytheJointRules

(Rule121)toimplementtheCodeofConductforAssemblyandpermanentCouncilmembersand

developstandardsofethicalconductforAssemblyandCouncilmembers.TheCommitteeonPublic

AccountsisestablishedbytheNARules(Rule204)andistaskedwithconsideringfinancialstatementsof

allexecutiveorgansofstateandconstitutionalinstitutions,anyauditreportsissuedonthosestatements

aswellasanyreportsissuedbytheAuditor-Generalontheaffairsofanyexecutiveorganofstateor

otherpublicbodiesoranyotherfinancialstatementsorreportsreferredtothecommitteeintermsof

therules.

3.1.2 Plenary processes for effecting oversight and accountability

Budget Votes

Budget votes occur when the Minister of Finance announces the budget projections for the next

financialyear,aswellasthebudgetvotesofeachMinister(department).IntheBudgettheMinisterof

Financesetsouthowmuchmoneythegovernmentwillspendinthefollowingyear.Parliamentmust

approvetheBudget.SubsequenttothepresentationoftheBudgetbytheMinisterofFinance,each

parliamentarycommitteehashearingswiththegovernmentdepartmentoverwhichthatcommittee

exercisesoversightandcanalsocheckwhetherthedepartmentkeptthepromisesofthepreviousyear

andspenttaxpayers’moneyproperly.ThebudgetvotesaredebatedintheNationalAssemblyandthe

NationalCouncilofProvincesoncecommitteeshavefinisheddiscussingthedifferentbudgetvotes.

Questions

Section92of the Constitution stipulates thatmembers of the Cabinet are accountable collectively

andindividuallytoParliamentfortheexerciseoftheirpowersandtheperformanceoftheirfunctions.

Theprocedureofputtingquestionsto theExecutive isoneof theways inwhichParliamentholds

theExecutivetoaccount.QuestionscanbeputfororalorwrittenreplytothePresident,theDeputy

PresidentandtheCabinetMinistersonmattersforwhichtheyareresponsible.Questiontimeaffords

membersofParliamenttheopportunitytoquestionmembersoftheExecutiveonservicedelivery,policy

andotherexecutiveactiononbehalfofboththeirpoliticalpartiesandtheelectorate.


Members’ statementsThisistheprocesswherebymembersofParliamentareaffordedtheopportunitytomakestatementsonanymatterintheHouse.

statements by Cabinet membersMinistersmaymakefactualorpolicystatementsinrelationtogovernmentpolicy,executiveactionandothersimilarmattersofwhichtheAssemblyshouldbeinformed.TheMinisteraskstheSpeakerfortheopportunitytomakesuchastatement,whichshouldnotbelongerthan20minutes. notices of motionMotionsareoneofthemechanismsavailabletomembersofallpoliticalpartieswhichcanbeusedtohelpfulfiltheiroversightresponsibilitiesinParliamentbybringingissuestoParliamentfordebate.Noticemustbegivenofamotionunlessitisbywayofanamendmenttoadraftresolution,raisingapointoforderoraquestionofprivilege,thepostponementordischargeoforgivingprecedencetoanorderfortheday,referringabilltoacommittee,theproposalofadraftresolutiononthereportofacommitteeimmediatelyafteradebateonthereporthasbeenconcluded,orinregardtowhichnoticeisdispensedwithbytheunanimousconcurrenceofallthememberspresent.NoticemustbegivenofeverymotionsinceinprincipletheHousemustbeinformedinadvanceofanysubstantivemotionsothatmembersandpartieshavetimetopreparetodebateit.NoticesofmotionarethereforeavitaltoolwhichcanbeusedbymemberstobringmattersofpoliticalimportancebeforeParliamentfordebateoradecision. Motions without noticeMotionswhichrequirenoticemaybemovedwithoutnoticeprovidednosinglememberpresentobjects.ItisthereforecommonpracticeforpartiestobeconsultedbeforetheHousemeetswhenseekingtomoveamotionwithoutnotice,andtoinformthepresidingofficeroftheintentiontodoso.Motionswithoutnoticearemovedwhenthepresidingofficercallsforanyformalmotions,usuallynearthebeginningoftheday’ssitting.ThismediumallowsforconsultationbetweenpartiestoobtainconsensusonissuesthatmustbebroughttotheattentionoftheHouse. Plenary debatesPlenarydebatesareafurthermeanstobringimportantinformationtotheattentionoftheExecutiveregardingspecificgovernmentprogrammesand legislation required to improveservicedelivery. In

plenarydebates,certainmechanismsforconductingoversightareused.Theseincludequestiontime,theconsiderationofcommitteereports,showcasing,scrutinisinganddebatingtheimplementationofpolicyandbudgetvotes,members’statementsandquestionsbymembersofParliament,whichdraw


theattentionoftheExecutivetotheconcernsofmembers’constituents.

3.1.3 Use of activities and reports from state institutions supporting constitutional democracy to enhance Parliament’s oversight functions

TheseinstitutionshaveparticularmandatesasprovidedforintheConstitutionandbywayofadditionalActsofParliamentthatprescribetheirfunctionsandpowers.TheinstitutionsareindependentandsubjectonlytotheConstitutionandthelaw,andtheymustbeimpartialandmustexercisetheirpowersandperformtheirfunctionswithoutfear,favourorprejudice.Intermsofsection181(3)oftheConstitutionotherorgansofstate, through legislativemeasures,havetoassistandprotect theaforementionedinstitutionstoensuretheirindependence,impartiality,dignityandeffectiveness.

Intermsofsection181(5)theseinstitutionsareaccountabletotheNationalAssemblyandmustreportontheiractivitiesandtheperformanceoftheirfunctionstotheAssemblyatleastonceayear.Theinstitutionsare:• TheAuditor-General(AG);• TheCommissionforGenderEquality(CGE);• ThePublicProtector(PP);• TheElectoralCommission(EC);• TheSouthAfricanHumanRightsCommission(SAHRC);and• TheCommissionforthePromotionandProtectionoftheRightsofCultural,Religiousand LinguisticCommunities(CRLRightsCommission).Thetaskteamconsideredtheviewsandconcernsraisedbystateinstitutionssupportingconstitutionaldemocracyduringtheinterviewsandintheirsubmissions.Weaknesseswereidentifiedinthecurrentparliamentarymechanisms.However,concomitanttotheworkconductedbythetaskteam,Parliamentestablished the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions. Thecommittee’smandatewasbroaderthanthatofthetaskteamandasaresultitwasagreedthatdirectionwouldbeobtainedfromtheoutcomesofthatprocess.It is recommended that Parliament develop clear mechanisms to enable the reporting by stateinstitutionssupportingconstitutionaldemocracyontheiractivitiesandtheperformanceoftheirfunctions

asprescribedintheConstitutionandrelatedActsofParliament.


ThesecondrecommendationisforParliamenttoputinplaceprocessesinordertoallowthereportsto

bereferredtocommitteesforconsideration,oversight,andreportingbackonissuestoplenarysessions.

3.1.4 Other statutory institutions supporting democracy

Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC)

TheFFCisanadvisorybodyandhasamandatetomakerecommendationsonfinancialandfiscalmatters

toParliament,theprovinciallegislatures,andanyotherinstitutionsofgovernmentwhennecessary.

TheFFCisseparatefromgovernmentandisthereforeabletoperformimpartialchecksandbalances

betweenthethreelevelsofgovernment.Itfacilitatesco-operativegovernmentonintergovernmental

fiscalmatters.Atleast10monthsbeforethestartofeachfinancialyear,theCommissionmustsubmit

recommendationsforthatfinancialyeartobothHousesofParliamentandtheprovinciallegislatures,

withparticularregardto:

• Anequitabledivisionofrevenueraisednationally,amongstthenational,provincialandlocal

spheresofgovernment;

• Thedeterminationoftheequitableshareofeachprovincewhenrevenueisdividedbetween

thenineprovinces;and

• Anyotherallocationstoprovinces,localgovernmentormunicipalitiesfromthenational

government’sshareofthatrevenue,andanyconditionsonwhichthoseallocationsshouldbe

made.

national youth Commission (nyC)

TheNationalYouthCommissionisastatutorybodyofgovernmentestablishedthroughtheNational

YouthCommissionAct,No19of1996.TheCommissionconsistsoffivefull-timemembers,fivepart-

timemembersandninecommissioners,nominatedbyPremiersofeachprovinceandappointedat

nationallevel.TheNationalYouthPolicyhasbeendesignedtoaddressthemajorneeds,challengesand

opportunitiesofyoungmenandwomen.

Pan south african Language Board (Pansalb)

ThepurposeofthePanSouthAfricanLanguageBoardistopromotemultilingualisminSouthAfricaby:

• creatingtheconditionsforthedevelopmentandequaluseofallofficiallanguages;

• fosteringrespectforandencouragingtheuseofotherlanguagesinthecountry;and


• encouragingthebestuseofthecountry’slinguisticresourcestoenableSouthAfricanstofree themselves from all forms of linguistic discrimination, domination and division, and to enablethemtoexerciseappropriatelinguisticchoicesfortheirownwell–being,aswellasfor

nationaldevelopment.

Public service Commission (PsC)

ThePSCderivesitsmandatefromsections195and196oftheConstitution.ThePSCistaskedand

empowered,amongstothers,toinvestigate,monitorandevaluatetheorganisationandadministration

of thepublicservice.Thismandatealsoentails theevaluationofachievements,or lack thereof,of

governmentprogrammes.ThePSCalsohasanobligationtopromotemeasuresthatwillensureeffective

andefficientperformancewithinthepublicserviceandtopromotebasicvaluesandprinciplesofpublic

administration,assetoutintheConstitution,throughoutthepublicservice.

Independent Communications authority of south africa (Icasa)

TheIndependentCommunicationsAuthorityofSouthAfricaderivesitsmandatefromseveralstatutes:

TheIndependentCommunicationsAuthorityofSouthAfricaActof2005,theIndependentBroadcasting

AuthorityAct,theBroadcastingActandtheSouthAfricanTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority

ActandtheIcasaAmendmentAct.TheElectronicCommunicationsActsubstantiallyamendedtheIBA

Actof1993andtheBroadcastingActof1999.TheAuthorityregulatesthetelecommunicationsand

broadcastingindustriesinthepublicinterest.Itskeyfunctionsareto:

• makeregulationsandpoliciesthatgovernbroadcastingandtelecommunications;• issuelicencestoprovidersoftelecommunicationsservicesandbroadcasters;• monitortheenvironmentandenforcecompliancewithrules,regulationsandpolicies;• hearanddecideondisputesandcomplaintsbroughtbyindustryormembersofthepublic againstlicensees• plan,controlandmanagethefrequencyspectrum;and• protectconsumersfromunfairbusinesspractices,poorqualityservicesandharmfulorinferior products.

Organs of stateAn“organofstate”isdefinedinsection239oftheConstitutionas–(a) anydepartmentofstateoradministrationinthenational,provincialorlocalsphereof

government;or


(b) anyotherfunctionaryorinstitution–

(i) exercisingapowerorperformingafunctionintermsoftheConstitutionoraprovincial

constitution;or

(ii) exercisingapublicpowerorperformingapublicfunctionintermsofanylegislation,butdoes

notincludeacourtorajudicialofficer….

Section239dividesorgansofstateessentiallyintotwocategories.Thefirstcategoryisdescriptivein

termsofwhichorgansofstatearedefinedasanydepartmentofstateoradministrationinthenational,

provincialorlocalsphereofgovernment.Thiscategoryis,webelieve,selfdefining.Forexample,in

its interpretationof thisfirstcategory, theCorderReport(1999:13) includedbodiesrepresented in

Cabinetascomprising“nationalexecutiveauthority”,whereaccountabilityisvestedatthepoliticallevel

viathedoctrineofministerialresponsibility(section92(2)).Theterms“anydepartmentofstateor

administration”canfurtherbetracedtothePublicServiceAct(No103of1994),whichrefersspecifically

tonationalandprovincial“departments”,andotherdepartments.Finally, the inclusionof theterm

“local” inthiscategory insection239mustalso logically includemunicipalities,astheseconstitute

administrativebodiesoperatinginthelocalsphereofgovernment.

Thesecondcategoryinsection239issubdivided,andfocusesontheconductoractivityoftheorganof

stateandontheempoweringprovisions.Thesetwosubcategoriesare:

• section239(b)(i):anyotherfunctionaryorinstitutionexercisingapowerorperforminga

functionintermsoftheConstitutionoranyprovincialconstitution;and

• section239(b)(ii):anyotherfunctionaryorinstitutionexercisingapublicpowerorperforming

apublicfunctionintermsofanylegislation,butdoesnotincludeacourtorajudicialofficer.

Iftheinstitutionorfunctionaryisexercisingapowerorperformingafunctionintermsofthe

Constitutionoraprovincialconstitution,thenitisanorganofstate.Thenatureofthepower

exercisedorthefunctionperformedisirrelevant.Inthiscategory,thesourceofthepoweris

thedeterminingcriterion.

AllorgansofstateinthenationalsphereofgovernmentmustaccounttotheNationalAssemblyand

theydothismainlybywayofthesubmissionofannualreports.Aspersection55(2)(b)(ii),theAssembly

haspowertoconductoversightoverallorgansofstate.


There is an increasing number of listed organs of state, of which only national organs

of state are required to submit their annual reports to Parliament as part of their

accountability to Parliament, based on sections 55(2)(a) and 69(b) of the Constitution in

thattheexecutiveorgansofstateinthenationalsphereofgovernmentaccounttoParliament.

Otherpublicbodiesandinstitutionslistedasnationalorgansofstateincludeinstitutionssuchasuniversities

andbusinessunitsorsubsidiariesofothernationalorgansofstate.Theseinstitutionsdonothavetotable

theirannualreportsinParliamentbecausetheiractivitiesarereportedonintheannualreportsofthe

mainpublicentitiestheybelongto.Forexample,IntersitePropertyManagementServices(Pty)Ltdisa

subsidiaryoftheSARailCommuterCorporationLtdandshouldbereportedonintheannualreportof

theSARailCommuterCorporationLtd.

InformationinrelationtopublicbodiesascommissionedfromtheHumanSciencesResearchCouncil

(HSRC)Reportwillbeusedasthemainsourcetoestablishwhichinstitutionsarerequiredtoreportto

Parliament.Inthisregard,Parliamentwillknowwhichinstitutionsaresupposedtotableannualreports

asrequiredbythePublicFinanceManagementActandrelatedlegislation.

ItisimportantwhendepartmentsorpublicentitiesatnationallevelaccounttoParliamentthroughthe

NationalAssemblyandwhenprovincesreporttotheNationalCouncilofProvincesthatbothHouses

areinformedofthecompletescopeofthefunctionthatthedepartmentorpublicentityisreportingon.

It isthereforerecommendedthattheperformanceoftheseotherpublicbodiesandinstitutionsbe

includedinthereportstoParliament.Ifnot,Parliamentcan,intermsofsections56(b)and69(b)ofthe

Constitution,requireoftheentitytoreporttoitinorderthatParliamenthasthecompletepictureofthe

functionreportedon.Inthisregard,themandateoftheNationalAssemblybyvirtueofsection55(2)

(b)(ii)entitlesittoexerciseoversightoverallorgansofstate.Alistofallorgansofstate,publicbodies

andinstitutionsareattachedheretoforreferencepurposestoassistportfolioandselectcommitteesto

identifywhichinstitutionsarerequiredtoreportandbeaccountabletothem.

3.2 tools for oversight and accountability

CurrentlySouthAfricahasdesignedthefollowingtoolsinrelationtooversightandaccountability.For

easeofreference,thesetoolshavebeensplitintofourcategories:Category1liststoolsofestablished


legislationand long-termplans; Category2 contains tools relating toannual,monthlyandweekly

activities;Category3listsfinancialinstruments;andCategory4relatestoissuesarisingfrominstitutions

supportingconstitutionaldemocracy.

Category 1:

• ConstitutionoftheRepublic

• Legislation

• GovernmentProgrammeofAction[5-yearplan].

Category 2:

• State-of-the-NationAddress

• Questions(writtenandoral)

• President

• DeputyPresident

• Ministers

• Members’statements

• Ministerialstatements

• DebatesintheHouse

• Mattersfromconstituencywork

• Privatemember’sbills

• Individualmember’soversight

• Committeereportsonlegislationandoversightactivities

• Committeereportsoninternationalagreements

• Departmentalstrategicplans

• Departmentalcurrentandpastannualperformanceplans

• Annualreports(includingannualfinancialstatements,statementsonprogramme

performanceandhumanresourceinformation)

• Performancecontracts

• Departmentalcompliancewithparliamentarycommitteerecommendations.

Category 3:

• BudgetSpeech

• EstimatesofNationalExpenditure(ENE)

• DivisionofRevenueBill


• EstimatesofNationalRevenue

• BudgetReview

• Ministers’budgetvotespeeches

• Departmentalbudgetvotes

• TreasuryRegulationsrelatingtostrategicplanning

• ReportsoftheAuditor-General(includingperformancereports)

• Treasuryreports(monthlyandquarterlyreports)

• AuditReports(Scopa)

• Medium-TermBudgetPolicyStatement(MTBPS)

• AdjustedEstimatesofNationalExpenditure

• IntergovernmentalFiscalRelationsreport

• PublicFinanceManagementAct(PFMA)

• Financialstatements(monthlyfinancialreportsandquarterlyperformancereports)

• StatisticsSouthAfricareports.

Category 4:

• Reportsoninvestigatedmattersofrelevancebyinstitutionssupportingconstitutionaldemocracy

(ISDs)andotherstatutoryinstitutionssupportingdemocracyforconsiderationby

Parliament.


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NEW MECHANISMS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY NEW MECHANISMS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY NEW MECHANISMS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHTAND OVERSIGHTAND OVERSIGHT


CHAPTER 4: neW MeChanIsMs FOr OVersIGht and aCCOUntaBILIty

4.1 new mechanisms

The previous sections outlined the current parliamentary oversight and accountability

mechanismsandpractices.Thesectionsbelowhighlightpotentialmechanismstofurther

strengthenoversightandaccountability:

4.1.1 Institutional mechanisms

Notwithstandingtheexistingrulesonconferral,itisproposedthatwherecommitteesare

clusteredforoversightandotherlegislativework,theyshouldbeabletoreportjointlyon

mattersthataretransversalandfortheHousetoadoptsuchaclusterreport.

Reports and matters arising from the same delegations representing Parliament at

organisations, such as the Commonwealth ParliamentaryAssociation, Inter-Parliamentary

Union, Pan African Parliament, SADC Parliamentary Forum, Africa Caribbean and Pacific-

EuropeanUnion JointParliamentaryAssemblyandothers, shouldalsobe tabledandbe

programmedforconsiderationbytherelevantcommitteesand,wherenecessary,shouldbe

debatedintherelevantHouses.

Itisrecommendedthattherulesbeamendedtofacilitatethereferralofmattersarisingfrom

reportsofinternationalbodiestowhichParliamentisaffiliatedtocommitteesforconsideration,

wherenecessary,andfordebateintherelevantHouses.

It is recommended that sectoral parliaments such as the Women’s Parliament, Youth

Parliament,People’sAssemblyandothersuchassembliesshouldbeformallyrecognised

intherulesandthatprovisionbemadefortheirprocedures,powersandfunctionsandfor

theformalisationofrecommendationstobesubmittedtotherelevantcommittees,where

necessary,andtotherelevantHousesforconsideration.

ParliamentcurrentlyattendstospecialpetitionsthroughtheCommitteeonPrivateMembers’

LegislataiveProposalsandSpecialPetitions.Howevergeneralpetitions,representationsand


submissionsasspecifiedinsections56and69oftheConstitutionarenotadequatelyaddressedthrough

institutionalisedmechanisms.

Sections 56 and 69 require Parliament or its committees to accept petitions, representations or

submissionsfromanyinterestedpersonsorinstitutions.Itisthereforerecommendedthatmechanisms

beputinplacetofacilitatetheprocessing,referralandguidanceonattendingtopetitions,representations

and submissions. Best practices have already been established in various provinces, including the

establishmentofpetitionsofficesandinsomeinstancesbudgetcommitteestoassistthoseoffices.

Theeffectivenessof theseoffices canbe investigatedbyParliament in theprocessof developing

mechanisms.

It isproposedthatrulesbeamendedanddevelopedtoaccommodateSub-PlenarySessionsofthe

NationalAssemblywhichwillpurporttoprovideanextendedavenueforthedebateandconsideration

ofissuesreferredtoitbytheHousewhichareofnationalconcern.Itisfurtherproposedthatresolutions

reachedand issuesarising fromthesesessionsbe tabled in theHouse forfinalconsideration. It is

recommended that consideration be afforded to the development of mediums for deliberation,

engagementanddebatesonbroaderandcomplexissuesintraditionalSouthAfricanchannelswhich

includeLekgotleng,InkundleniandBosberaad.ThiswillleadtoamoveawayfromtheWestminster

systemandplacegreaterimpetusonthetransformationofParliamentintheSouthAfricancontext.

4.1.2 Joint Parliamentary Oversight and Government assurance Committee

In identifying mechanisms for Parliament to effect its oversight role, a gap was identified which

necessitatedthatconsiderationbegiventotheestablishmentofaJointParliamentaryOversightand

GovernmentAssuranceCommittee.Thecommitteeshouldhavesomepowersgoverningtheworkand

functionofcommitteesofParliament.

Itsmainpurposeandmandatewillbetoconsideranddealwithbroader,transversalandcross-cutting

issues.Itwillfurthermorepursueallassurances,undertakingsandcommitmentsgivenbyMinisters

on the floor of the House(s) and the extent to which these assurances etc have been fulfilled.

TheInter-ParliamentaryUnionpresentedastudywhichwasacompendiumofparliamentarypractice

asitappliestooversight.ltelaboratedonabroadrangeoftoolsthatparliamentshaveattheirdisposal


ormaywanttodevelop.Itacknowledgedthatparliamentscanestablishageneraloversightcommittee

whichco-ordinatestheoversightworkofotherpermanentcommittees.Anoversightcommitteecan

recommendthatotherpermanentcommitteesinvestigatespecificproblemsthatithasidentified.Other

permanentcommitteescanalsobringmattersbeforethegeneraloversightcommittee.

Itisrecommendedthattherulesbedevelopedtoaccommodateandfurthermoreexpressthefunctions,

powersandobjectivesoftheproposedcommittee.Therecommendedcommitteewillbeoneofthe

subcommitteesoftheJointRulesCommitteechairedjointlybydesignatedHouseChairpersonsandits

membershipwillbebasedontheissuesbeforeitwithintheclusterormulti-clustergroupofportfolio

andselectcommittees,andthereforeitwillhavearotationalmembership.Secretarialsupportwillbe

providedbytheOversightAdvisorySectionandtheTablestaffofbothHouses.

4.1.3 treaties, Conventions and Protocols - Compliance including oversight on

development aid

An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by

resolution in both Houses, unless it is an agreement of a technical, administrative or

executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession,

in which case the agreement must be tabled in the Houses within a reasonable time.

The recommendation is thatParliamentought tobe robustandproactive in thenegotiations that

are conducted relating to international agreements prior to the signing of these agreements, as

well as in relation to oversight on allocations per programme and expenditure from overseas

development aid (ODA) extended to the Republic. A mechanism needs to be established

to ensure that Parliament engages with the stakeholders involved in the negotiation teams.

It is further recommended that there ought to be a mechanism to oversee compliance with

international agreements and that this matter should form part of the programme of Parliament

foreffectingoversightandaccountability.Rule306oftheNARulesstipulateswhentheAssembly’s

approval is sought for an international agreement in terms of section 231(2) of the Constitution,

theagreementmust be submitted to the Speakerwith anexplanatorymemorandum. TheNCOP

rules donot stipulate that the agreement should be submitted to theNCOPwith an explanatory

memorandumintheinstancewheremattersofprovincialinterestsareaddressedintheagreement.


Itisrecommendedthatwhenamatterofprovincialinterestisaddressedintheagreement,theNCOP

shouldbeprovidedwiththeagreementandanexplanatorymemorandumandfurtherthattherulesof

theNAandtheNCOPbedevelopedtoenablethepresentationofreportstoParliamentbytheExecutive

priortotheirpresentationtointernationalbodiestoenableParliamenttoassessthecomplianceaspects

inthereports.

4.1.4 Oversight advisory section

Indevelopingtheoversightmodel,theneedwasidentifiedforsupportservicesrelatingtothemonitoring

andtrackingofissuesbetweenParliamentandtheExecutive,andonallotherrelatedmatterswithin

Parliament’sbroadermandate.AnOversightandAdvisorySectionoughttobecreatedinresponseto

theneedidentified.Itsmainfunctionswillbetoprovideadvice,technicalsupport,co-ordination,and

trackingandmonitoringmechanismsonissuesarisingfromoversightandaccountabilityactivitiesof

membersofParliamentandthecommitteestowhichtheybelong.Theworkofthissectionshouldalso

includethearchivingofrelevantinformationtofacilitatetheretentionofinstitutionalmemory.

TheforeseenobjectivesoftheOversightAdvisorySectionencompassthefollowing:

• Providinginformationandadvisorysupporttoparliamentaryoversightactivitiesasan

informationmanagementsection;

• TrackingandmonitoringExecutivecomplianceinrespectofissues,thatindividualMPsraised

flowingfromconstituencywork;

• Assistingwithtracking,monitoringandfollowingupissuesraisedthroughtheParliamentary

DemocracyOffices;

• Ensuringamoreco-ordinated,integratedandholisticapproachtoparliamentaryoversight;

• Assistingwithco-ordinatingalloversight-relatedinformationgatheredthroughParliament’s

publicparticipationactivities;

• Analysingsubstantivereportsbyinstitutionssupportingconstitutionaldemocracytoadvisethe

Housesonissuesforreferraltocommitteesforconsiderationandreport;

• AssistingwithmonitoringandtrackingExecutivecompliancewithHouseresolutions;

• Assistingwithmonitoring and tracking of government assurances and commitments that

emanatefromtheflooroftheHouses;and


• Monitoring and analysing debates, discussions and comments made by the public and

participants in thesectoralparliamentswithaviewtoadvising theHouseson issues for

consideration.

IntheestablishmentoftheOversightandAdvisorySection,thefollowingsubdivisionscanbecreated:

• FinancialScrutinyUnit,whichwilldevelopsystemsforthescrutinyoffinances,forinstance:

theplanningcyclewhichwillincludeaspectsonperformanceandexpendituretargets

fordepartmentsandspendingreviews;

• thebudgetcyclewhichwillincludeaspectsofhowgovernmentmakesitsassessmentonthe

stateoftheeconomyandhowitplanstoraiserevenuethefollowingyear;

• theestimatescyclewhichistheprocessbywhichdepartments’resourcesandcashfortheyear

isapproved;and

• thereportingcyclewhichinvolvesthereportingbydepartmentsthroughreports.

ThiswillassistthecommitteesresponsibleforFinanceandtheportfoliocommitteestoenhancetheir

oversightactivitiesandtrackingofissuesthatareaddressedinmonthlyreportstoParliamentandthose

thatwouldhavebeenraisedbytheCommitteeonPublicAccounts.

• TrackingandMonitoringUnit,whichwilladdressdecisionsintheHouse(s)andatcommittee

level, as well as issues emanating from the floor of the House(s) and from committee

reportsthatgettabledintheHouse(s).

• AdvisoryUnit,whichwillidentifyissuesfromsectoralparliaments,otherassemblies,international

bodiesandcompliancewithinternationalprotocols,treatiesandconventionsaswellas

petitions.

ItisthereforerecommendedthatParliamentmustspeedilyestablishthissectionwithfullresources,

capacityandpersonnelfortheefficientfulfilmentoftheobjectivesofoversightandaccountability.

4.1.5 reserve Bank

TheSouthAfricanReserveBankAct(No90of1989)regulatestheSouthAfricanReserveBank.Section

37oftheActrequirestheMinisterofFinanceinthecaseofnon-compliancebytheBankwiththeAct


oranyregulationundertheActtogivenoticetotheboardofdirectorsoftheBankofnon-compliance

andtherequirementofcompliancewithinaspecifiedtime.Intheeventthatthenon-complianceis

sustained,theMinistercanapplytoadivisionoftheHighCourttocompelcompliance.Whilstsection

224(2)oftheConstitutionstipulatesthattheReserveBankisindependent,asanorganofstate,itis

accountabletoParliamentintermsofsections55and69.Theexerciseofitspowersandfunctionsand

conditionsattachedtoitmustbedeterminedbyanActofParliamentinaccordancewithsection225.In

thisregard,itisrecommendedthattheReserveBankActof1989shouldbereviewedandrevisedfor

purposesofaligningtheactwiththeConstitutioninorderthatParliamentmayexerciseoversightoverit.

4.1.6 Issues from constituency work

Inthecourseoftheirconstituencydebates,issuesofconcerntothepublicarebroughttotheattention

ofmembersofParliament.Theseissues,onceintroducedinParliament,canbeformallychannelled

throughtheparliamentaryprocessesforexecutiveresponses.

4.1.7 appointments to institutions supporting constitutional democracy and other

specialised institutions which fall under the mandate of Parliament

TheproceduralaspectsofappointmentstoChapter9institutionsandspecialisedinstitutionsareassigned

tocommittees.Afterconsideringthematter,thecommitteesreporttheirrecommendationstoParliament

foradecision.Theweaknessisthelackofco-ordinationinhandlingtheseveryimportantappointments,

andthereforemechanismsintherulesareneededtoassistParliamenttogiveeffecttothisimportant

mandate.

Itisrecommendedthatanadhoccommitteebesetuptoreceiveandhearthepresentationonthe

AuditofStatutesandmakerecommendationsthat itdeemsnecessarytothepresidingofficersfor

consideration.

4.1.8 Public participation

Theneedtohavepublicparticipationisrequiredinsection42oftheConstitution.Thetaskteamconsidered

thematterofhow thepublic canengage through involvementandparticipation inparliamentary

processes.AmidsttheresearchconductedbythetaskteamandtherecentConstitutionalCourtcaseson


publicparticipation,thetaskteamidentifiedthattheneedforpublicparticipationandinvolvementcannot

merelybeaddressedinachapterofthemodelbutoughttobeincludedinaseparatemodelonpublic

participation,whichwillbeinterlinkedwiththeOversightandAccountabilityModel.Research,ideasand

bestpracticewillbeprovidedtothenecessaryprocessthatwillbeestablishedforthedevelopmentof

themodel.

4.1.9 sanctioning non-compliance by the executive

ItisrecommendedthatParliamentdeveloprulestoassistitfurtherinsanctioningCabinetmembersfor

non-complianceafterallestablishedexistingavenuesandprotocolshavebeenexhausted,forexample

namingtheCabinetmemberbytheSpeakeroftheNationalAssemblyortheChairpersonoftheCouncil

basedonafullexplanation.

4.2 Maximising current mechanisms

4.2.1 reporting by committees to the houses

Amechanismforevaluatingannualreportsfromgovernmentdepartmentsdoesexist.Thisisoneofthe

proceduresthroughwhichMinistersareheldtoaccount.Ministers,astheexecutiveauthorityintermsof

section65ofthePublicFinanceManagementAct(PFMA)havetotableannualreportsofdepartments

andpublicentitiesforwhichtheyareresponsiblewithinsixmonthsaftertheendofthefinancialyear

(30September).TheSpeakerimmediatelyrefersallannualreportstotherelevantportfoliocommittee

andtheCommitteeonPublicAccountsforconsiderationandreport.Latesubmissionsrequireawritten

explanationbytheMinisterprovidingreasonsforthedelay.TheCommitteeonPublicAccountsreviews

theauditedfinancial statementsand theaudit reportsof theAuditor-Generaland indicates to the

relevantportfoliocommitteewhichspecificissuestheyshouldbeawareofwithregardtooversight.The

committeehastoevaluatethoroughlythetechnicalqualityandtheperformanceinformationpresented

intheannualreport.

Membersshouldhaveaclearunderstandingoftheportfoliooverwhichtheyareconductingoversight

andwhatitistheywanttoachieve(improveservicedelivery).Therearedifferentphaseswhichleadup

tothefinalreporting,namely:


• Oversightpreparationphase:Thisstartssixtoeightweekspriorto30Septembereachyear.Membersneedtohaveaccesstoandinterrogatedocumentswhichincludecurrentandpreviousannualreportsforcomparisonpurposes,strategicplansandEstimatesofNationalExpenditureofrelatedyears,State-of-the-NationAddress,BudgetSpeech,budgetvotespeeches,divisionofrevenueinformationandrelatedpolicydocuments,quarterlyperformancereports,previousoversightreportsandHouseresolutions.

• Oversighthearingphase:IdeallyduringthelasttwoweeksofOctobereachyear,publichearingsareconductedtogainclarity/inputintotheareasthatshouldbeaddressedintheannualreport.

• Oversightreport-writingphase:AreportforeachoftheentitiesreviewedmustbetabledintheHouse(bythesecondweekinNovember).Thereportshouldcontaincommentswith regard tocompliance,spendingpatterns,ageneralinformationsectionintheannualreport,reportedperformance,keyissuesofthepreviousyearandrecommendations.

Itisrecommendedthatasystemfortrackingresolutionsuntilthematterhasbeendealtwithoranadequateresponsehasbeenreceivedmustbeinstituted.AneedtostrengthenParliament’smechanismsforevaluatingannualreportswasidentifiedasit isacriticalmechanismthroughwhichMinistersareheldtoaccountandisdealtwithin3.1.1above.HoweverthereisaneedtoimproveonmechanismsthatwouldensurethatthereisreportingonresponsesbytheExecutiveonresolutionsadoptedbyParliament.Itisrecommendedthatthecurrentsystembeimprovedinthefollowingmanner:

• Wherearesponseisrequired,theHouseresolutionwithitsdateofadoptionmustbeappended totheOrderPaperuntilsuchresponsehasbeenreceived.TheMinister’sformalresponsemust beaddressedtotheSpeakerorChairpersonoftheCouncil.• IfnoresponseisreceivedwithinareasonabletimeorwithintheperiodspecifiedbytheHouse resolution,theHouseChairpersonshouldnotifiytheSpeakerorChairperson,whoshould thenwritetotheMinisterrequestingcompliancewithin14daysorawrittenexplanationofthe delay.


• Intheeventofsustainednon-compliancebytheMinister,awrittencomplaintbytheSpeaker

or Chairperson may be sent to the Leader of Government Business, and in exceptional

circumstancestheMinistermaybecalledtoaccountintheHouse(e.g.duringquestiontime).

• Quarterly reports andanannual report on resolutions (by category) and compliancewith

outcomes shouldbemadeavailable to theHouses. These reports couldbeused to feed

informationintothetrackingandmonitoringmechanism.

Thisprocessdoesnotprecludethecommitteefrommonitoringexecutivecomplianceaspartof its

continuousoversightfunction.

4.2.2 debates initiated by Presiding Officers

NCOPRule84andNARule103respectivelyenablememberstorequesttheChairpersonoftheCouncil

andtheSpeakerinwritingtoallowamatterofpublicimportancetobediscussedintheindividual

Houses.ItisrecommendedthattherulesmustbeexpandedtoenabletheSpeakerandtheChairperson

oftheNCOPtoinitiatedebatesintheHouses.

4.2.3 developing specialisation for certain parliamentary committees

ThecommitteesysteminSouthAfricahasdrawnmuchguidancefromtheWestminstersystem,ashas

otherjurisdictions.However,manyjurisdictionshavetaperedtheWestminsterapproachtoaccommodate

variationsinthestructureofcommitteesbasedontheirspecificneedsandtheneedforspecialisation.

Theneedforfundamentalchangeinthecurrentmannerinwhichcommitteesexerciseoversightis

necessitatedbythefactthatSouthAfricahaspioneeredmandatoryoversightbyParliamentthroughthe

Constitution.

TheInter-ParliamentaryUnionisoftheviewthattheexistenceofspecialisedcommitteesaddsvalue

toparliamentaryworkbecausethesecommitteescanworksimultaneouslytoaddressproblemsfrom

differentangles.

Parliament should consider strongly resourcing, capacitating and developing the specialisation

of committees that are dealing with broad issues that cut across departments and ministries

inallspheresasthishasanimpactonsocietyandthenurturingofourdemocraticobjectives.This


consideration is motivated by the type, quantity and duration of work, complexity of issues and

the need for the development of specialisation as is the case in other parliaments in theworld.

TheprogrammingofParliamentshouldprioritisereportsfortablingwhicharisefromtheworkdoneandconductedbythesecommitteesonallareasoftheirfocusforconsiderationanddecision-makingwithintheambitofenhancingoversight.Thesecommitteesoughttobegiventherighttoconsiderandinitiatedebateonsomeoftheissuestheyfindtobeofnationalconsideration,asidentifiedintheprocessoftheiroversightwork.Furthermore,thesecommitteesmustprovideannualreportswhichmustbepublishedintheAnnouncements,TablingsandCommitteeReportsdocumentaswellastabledinParliamenttoallowothercommitteestoidentifyissuesthatwillhelptheminenhancingoversightandeffectingaccountability.

ItishighlyrecommendedthatParliamentprioritisethedevelopmentofcriteriatoidentifyonanongoingbasiswhichcommitteesqualifyforstrengthenedresourcing,capacityanddevelopmentbasedonthebroadnessoftheirmandates.

4.2.4 appointment of ad hoc committees

ThecurrentsysteminParliamentofappointingadhoccommitteestoinvestigateamatterofpublicinterestiseffective.However,weneedtoensurethatissuesofpublicinterest,astheyariseandaremadeknowntoParliament,areinvestigatedthroughtheappointmentofadhoccommittees.ThiswillenhanceParliament’sroleonoversightandensurecompliancewiththeConstitutionwherewearebecomingresponsivetotheneedsofthepeopleasoutlinedinthevisionandmissionstatementofParliament.Inaddition,Parliamentought,whenitdeemsitnecessary,tobeproactiveinappointingadhoccommitteestoaddressissuesofpublicinterest.4.2.5 accountability and oversight in relation to the executive

NARule117andNCOPRule249providefortheExecutivetoreplytoaquestionforwrittenreplywithin10workingdaysofthedayforwhichthequestionwassetdownforwrittenreply.ShouldtheExecutivefailtodoso,thequestionmay,uponrequestofthememberofParliamentinwhosenamethequestionstands,beputtotheCabinetmemberintheHousefororalreplyontherelevantquestionday.NARule115(3)providesthataquestionfororalreplymaynotstandovermorethanonce.Thisisgenerallyassumedtobeaperiodof14days.Itisstillamootpointastowhathappenstoaquestionstandingover

morethanonceastherearesuchinstances,andnosanctionsinthisregardexist.


ThereisaconstitutionalobligationontheExecutivetoaccounttoParliament(section92(2)and(3)of

theConstitution).InMarch2003,theNARulesCommitteedecidedthattheSpeakershouldwriteto

CabinetmembersandtheLeaderofGovernmentBusinesswithregardtomembersoftheCabinetnot

complyingwiththeirconstitutionalobligationsasthereisnocompulsiononamemberoftheCabinetto

respondtoaquestionotherthantheoptionofmembers’statements,motionsorarequestforadebate

onerrantmembersoftheCabinet.

ItisrecommendedthatNARule117andNCOPRule249,whichprovideatimeframefortheExecutive

torespondtoaquestionfororalreply,beamendedtoextendthetimeframeforaresponseto21days.

NotwithstandingtherightofParliamenttopassamotionofnoconfidenceinthePresidentorinthe

CabinetexcludingthePresident(Section102ofConstitution)andtheexistingmechanismsforholding

theExecutivetoaccount,itisrecommendedthatParliamentutilisetheJointParliamentaryOversight

andGovernmentAssuranceCommitteetoimplementeffectivemeasurestoensurecompliancebythe

ExecutiveintheeventthatallexistingavenuesofelicitingaresponsefromtheExecutivehavebeen

exhausted.

4.2.6 Individual member oversight

AmidstthemultifacetedandmultidimensionalworkofmembersofParliamentliestheroleofmembers

toeffectindividualoversight.Thisroleiscurrentlyperformedthroughquestions,members’statements,

motionswithoutnotice,noticesofmotion,motionsontheOrderPaper,debatesintheHouses,member-

initiateddebates,constituencywork,interventionsmadebymembers,privatemembers’legislative

proposalsandtheprocessingofbills.

PoliticalpartieshaveconstituencyofficesfromwhichthepubliccanobtaininformationonnewBillsor

discussissuesofconcernwithmembersofParliament.EachpartyrepresentedinParliamentisallocated

fundstodevelopitsownmethodofconstituentoutreach.EachmemberofParliamentisassignedby

theirpoliticalpartytoperformconstituencywork.Notwithstandingthis,membersarenotprecludedfrom

performingworkinotherconstituencies.Constituencyworkaffordsmembersthegreatestopportunity

toconductindividualoversight.Itconstitutestheclosestlevelofinteractionbetweenmembersand

thepublic,andprovidesthebestplatformfromwhichmemberscanfamiliarisethemselveswiththe

issuesconfrontingtheirconstituents.Throughthisinteraction,amembermayaddressmattersoflocal,


provincialandnationalconcern.However,itisimportantthat,inexercisingtheiroversightrole,members

takecarenottoencroachonthejurisdictionofprovincialandlocalpoliticalrepresentativesbutrather

adheretotheprinciplesofco-operativegovernment.

Interventionsmadebyindividualmembersisoneofthemoreeffectiveformsofindividualoversight

asitempowersmemberstointeractdirectlywithdepartmentsandotherorgansofstateatnational,

provincialandlocalgovernmentlevel.MembershaveadutytoalertParliamenttoanyissueofconcern

identifiedduringsuchoversightinterventions.

Inpractice,departmentsestablishstructurestoprocessconcernsraisedbymembersofParliament,such

asdepartmentalparliamentaryliaisonofficers.TheseliaisonofficersareaccountabletotheDirector:

MinisterialServiceswithineachdepartment.Theirkeyfunctionistofacilitatecommunicationbetween

theministry,thedepartmentandmembersofParliament.Concernsraisedbymembersarereferredto

seniorofficialswithindepartments,withtheveiledthreatthatshouldthedepartmentnotrespondina

satisfactorymanner,thematterwillbebroughttotheHouseformallyattheriskofgreatembarrassment

to the department, and ultimately the Minister. If the member’s informal communication with a

departmentdoesnotyieldsatisfactoryresults,heorshehasdiscretiontocommunicateformallywith

therelevantMinistertoprovidehimorherwiththeopportunitytorectifythematterbeforeplacingit

formallybeforetheHouse.Theobservanceofthisprotocolallowsfortheservicesnottobedisrupted.Itis

recommendedthatintheinterestsofensuringgreatercommunicationonissuesarisingfrommembers’

individualoversightworkministriesdevelopguidelinesformembers’interactionandengagementwith

Ministersonissuesofpublicconcern.

4.3 General recommendations

• Parliamentshouldstrengthenanddevelopitscurrentrulestoaccommodatenewandold

mechanismsasproposedinthismodelinordertoenhanceitsoversightrole.

• Intheeventthatthenewmechanismsaboveareagreedto,therulesneedtoberealignedto

accommodatethenewmechanisms.

• It isrecommendedthattheJointRulesbeamendedtoreferto“PersonswithDisabilities”

insteadof“DisabledPersons”.


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PROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT OF MONEY BILLSPROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT OF MONEY BILLSPROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT OF MONEY BILLS


CHAPTER 5: PrOCedUre FOr aMendInG MOney BILLs

5.1 terms of reference of Budget Focus Group

TheBudgetFocusGroupwasmandatedtodevelopprocedureforamendingmoneybillsand

todraftlegislationtoamendmoneybills.Thesemandateshavebeencompleted.

Theclassificationcriteriaguidingtheabovetermsfocusedonthefollowing:

• TheroleofParliamentinamendingmoneybills.Thisisagainstthebackdropin

whichtheintroductionofmoneybills isthesoleresponsibilityoftheMinisterof

Finance.TheExecutiveplaysamajorroleinthebudgetaryprocess,butthepointof

concernisthatintermsofsection77(3)oftheConstitution,anActofParliamentmust

provideforaproceduretoamendmoneybillsbeforeParliament.Themandatefrom

theJointRulesCommitteetotheBudgetProcessesFocusGroupwastodevelopa

draftbillprovidingforaproceduretoamendmoneybills.

Thefindingsofthefocusgrouptookcognisanceof-

• presentationsbyNationalTreasury;

• reportsofMsAFolscher;and

• ananalysisofthebudgetcycle.

5.2 recommendations

Thebill in draft format, as submitted,must be tabled in Parliament and referred to the

appropriatecommitteeandmustfollowthenormalparliamentaryprocess.


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CO-ORDINATION AMONGST THE SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT CO-ORDINATION AMONGST THE SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT CO-ORDINATION AMONGST THE SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT ON OVERSIGHTON OVERSIGHTON OVERSIGHTON OVERSIGHTON OVERSIGHTON OVERSIGHT


CHAPTER 6: CO-OrdInatIOn aMOnGst the sPheres OF GOVernMent On OVersIGht

6.1 Co-operative government

Thethreespheresofgovernmentmustconducttheiroversightandlegislativeworkwith

dueregardtoChapter3oftheConstitution,theIntergovernmentalRelationsFramework

(IGRF)andotherrelevantlegislationtoachievetheobjectivesofco-operativegovernment

andtheseparationofpowers.

TheNA,NCOP,provinciallegislaturesandmunicipalcouncilseachconducttheirfunctionswith

referencetoco-operativegovernmentasrequiredintheConstitutionandtheIntergovernmental

RelationsFrameworkAct(No13of2005).Therearehoweverfrequentmisunderstandingsin

relationtotheparametersofoversightconductedbytheNA,NCOP,provinciallegislaturesand

municipalcouncilsduetotheunco-ordinatedwayinwhichallthesebodiescarryouttheir

functions.Thischapterprovidesclarityontheroleofeachofthesefunctionalbodiesfound

intheConstitutionandlegislation.Muchdebateisstillrequiredonmechanisms/protocolsto

facilitategreaterco-operationandco-ordinationbetweenthethreespheresofgovernment.

The Constitution requires co-operative government between the three spheres of

government.Inthisregard,theparliamentaryoversightprocess,asitrelatestointeractions

withthepeopleandthegovernment,mustseektoadheretothevaluesofco-operative

government.National,provincialandlocalspheresofgovernmentmustseektopromote

theobjectivesoftheIntergovernmentalRelationsFrameworkAct,whichincludecoherent

government,theeffectiveprovisionofservices,monitoringtheimplementationofpolicyand

legislationandtherealisationofnationalpriorities.Theymustthereforetakeintoaccount

thecircumstances,materialinterestsandbudgetsofothergovernmentsandorgansofstate

inothergovernmentswhenexercisingtheirstatutorypowersorperformingtheirstatutory

functions.Inaddition,theremustbeconsultationswithotherorgansofstateinaccordance

withformalproceduresemanatingfromapplicablelegislationandacceptedconventionsas

agreedwithorgansofstateoralternativelyconsultinginthemostsuitablemanner.Actions

mustalsobeco-ordinatedwhenimplementingpolicyorlegislationaffectingthematerial

interestsofotherspheresofgovernment.


6.2 Values and principles guiding institutional oversight

Thismodel’s primaryobjective is toprovidea framework that describeshowParliament conducts

oversight.Itseekstoimproveexistingtoolsofparliamentaryoversight,streamlinecomponentsofthe

newoversightmodelwithexistingcomponentsandenhanceParliament’scapacitytofulfilitsoversight

functioninlinewithParliament’snewstrategicdirection.

AnoversightmodelmustthereforeconsistofthreeelementsasindicatedinFigure3below:

• ThevaluesandprinciplesbywhichParliamentconductsoversight;

• Themechanismorframeworktoconductoversight;and

• Theprocessesandresourcesrequiredforconductingoversight.

Constitutionally,theNAandtheNCOPhavetheprerogativetodesigntheirowninternalarrangements,

proceedings and procedures in terms of sections 57 and 70 of the Constitution. To this end, the

ConstitutionexplicitlystatesthatinmakingrulesandordersconcerningitsbusinessbothHousesare

compelledtotakeintoaccountrepresentativeandparticipatorydemocracy,accountability,transparency

andpublicinvolvement.Inadditiontothesevalues,section195(1)alsostipulatesbasicvaluesand

principlesgoverningpublicadministrationineverysphereofgovernment.Addedtotheabovementioned

valuesareahighstandardofprofessionalethics,theefficient,economicandeffectiveuseofresources,

development-orientatedness,impartiality,fairness,equity,andresponsiveness.Thesevaluesarecaptured

andsummarisedinParliament’sstrategythatwasadoptedbybothHousesinMarch2005,asfollows:

• Constitutionality:Democraticvalues(ofhumandignity,equality&freedom),socialjusticeand

fundamentalhumanrights;

• People-centredness:Respect,integrityandservicedelivery;

• Co-operativegovernment:Co-operatingwithotherspheresofgovernment;and

• Goodgovernance:Accountabilityandtransparency,valueformoney,customerfocusand

servicequality.

6.3 Introducing the parliamentary oversight cycle as a guide for oversight processes

Parliamentaryprocessestoensurethatinstitutionalmechanismsareeffectivelyundertakenareprescribed

within the parliamentary oversight cycle. The parliamentary oversight cycle takes into cognisance

Month Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec

Petitions

Constituency Work

Study Tours & Site Visits

ISD Submissions

Civil Society submissions

Strat Plans

Departmental Briefings

Pres Speech

Ministerial speeches

• media briefing

• budget speeches

Ministerial statements

Mtbps

Legislation /Policy

Assessment of Impact of

Legislation

Youth Parliament

Women’s Parliament

People’s Assembly

Annual Reports


theMedium-TermExpenditure Framework cycleof theExecutive, theMedium-TermBudgetPolicy

Statement,theDivisionofRevenueAct,theannualAppropriationBillandlegislationraisingrevenue.

Annual reports, reports fromtheAuditor-General, resolutionsof theCommitteeonPublicAccounts,

committeereports,quarterlyandmonthlyreportsofNationalTreasuryareconsideredamidstthecycle

andperformancebytheExecutiveismeasuredbyacomparisonbetweentheseandtheMedium-erm

BudgetPolicyStatement,theDivisionofRevenueAct,theAppropriationBill,andlegislationraising

revenue.Ministers are accountable for the policy that underlies their budgetswhereas accounting

officersaccountforexpendingthebudget.

Figure 2belowillustratestheoversightcycleonanannualbasis:

TheoversightcyclerequiresParliamenttotakealong-termviewofoversightinordertoensureeffective

oversightofsustainabledelivery.Theparliamentaryoversightcycleprovidesameansthroughwhich

Parliamentcanmonitorgovernmentdeliveryintermsoflong-termcommitments,ratherthanfocusing

exclusivelyonannualcommitments,annualplanningandperformanceassessments.Thecyclethus

providesforcontinuityinParliament’soversightactivitiesfromyeartoyear.


Page 62

Figure 3


Page 63


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INCREASING THE CAPACITY OF COMMITTEES AND MEMBERSINCREASING THE CAPACITY OF COMMITTEES AND MEMBERSINCREASING THE CAPACITY OF COMMITTEES AND MEMBERS


CHAPTER 7: InCreasInG the CaPaCIty OF COMMIttees and MeMBers

Thebestpracticesintheworldaresuchthatmembersofparliamentareadequatelysupported

byinstitutionstoenablethemtoperformtheirmandates.Insomeinstances,itincludesa

dedicatedsecretaryandresearcherinadditiontothatwhichisofferedtothecommitteesto

whichtheybelong.Committeesinsomeparliamentsalsohavededicatedroomsandthey

canmeetasoftenandaslongaspossible,whichtranslatesintobetterperformanceinthe

executionoftheirmandates.ThereforeitisbeingproposedthatParliamentshouldinitslifetime

progressivelyconsiderstronglyachievingonthisworldstandarddependingontheavailability

ofspaceandtheexpansionprogrammeofParliament’sinfrastructure.

7.1 training

TrainingshouldtakeplacebasedontheConstitution,rulesandrelevantpracticesinParliament

aswellasthepublicrepresentativeroleofmemberstoconductoversightandpasslegislation.

Trainingshouldbesplitintermsoftheoversightmandatesandmakinglaws.Thepersonal

developmentofmembersshouldbedealtwithinternallyinaccordancewiththeindividual

member’sinterests.

Otherareasoftrainingincludeformalacademicprogrammes,aswellas informaltraining

programmessuchasseminarsandconferences.Members’trainingshouldincorporatethe

followingcorecompetencies:

• AffirmingtheunderstandingoftheConstitution

• Affirmingtheunderstandingofallstatutesandlaws

• Proceduraltraining

• Speedreading

• Computerliteracy

• UseandapplicationoftheBestPracticeGuide

• UseandapplicationoftheOversightandAccountabilityModel

• Budgetanalysis

• Speechwriting


• Publicspeakinganddebatingskills

• Policyanalysisandengagement

• Generalknowledgeofcurrentnewsandhistoricalissues(domesticandglobal)

• Methodsofwork

• Standardoperatingprocedures

• Theseparationofpowersdoctrine

• Legislativeprocesses

• RulesofParliament

• Protocolskillsandethics

• Commitmenttoworkethicandobligations

• Skillsondevelopingpetitionstoassistthepublic

• Conformingtoethicalstandardsexpectedfromcitizens.

7.2. additional support

Membersoughttohaveadditionalsupportthattheycanaccessorutiliseinthecourseoftheirworkin

theformof:

• Content/subjectadvisersforeachcommittee;

• Dedicatedresearchersforeachcommittee;

• Apanelofexperts;

• Tertiaryinstitutions;

• Researchinstitutions;

• Civilsociety;

• Increasedcapacityforpublichearings;

• Increasedutilisationoffacilitiesandresources,forinstance,libraries,theinternetand

referencingfacilities.

Supportstafftocommitteesshouldbetrainedandcapacitatedonthefollowing:

• TheConstitutionandthelaw-makingprocess;

• Areasofspecialisation;

• Reportingandminute-takingskills;


• Generalproficiencyoflanguageuse;

• Communicationskills;

• Goodbehaviouralskills;

• Generaldiscipline;

• Parliamentaryprotocol,skillsandbasicethicalstandards.


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BEST PRACTICE GUIDEBEST PRACTICE GUIDEBEST PRACTICE GUIDE


CHAPTER 8: Best PraCtICe GUIde

8.1 Best Practice Guide (BPG)

The purpose of the BPG is to capture in a single document the best practices that

have emanated from the work conducted by committees since the advent of

democracy to allow for user-friendly access to and guidelines for committees.

The BPG will include aspects on scrutinising government’s financial management and

parliamentary scrutiny of the same in the planning cycle, budget cycle, estimates cycle,

reportingcycle,efficiencyprogramme, theprivatefinance initiativeand initiativeswithan

impactonfinancialmanagementandfinancialscrutiny,includingcapabilityreviews,financial

managementreviews,regulatoryimpactassessmentsandallgovernment’saccounts.

TheBPGisbeingreviewedandwillberenamedtheManualforParliamentaryCommittees.


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PROJECTS FOCUS GROUP PROJECTS FOCUS GROUP PROJECTS FOCUS GROUP [CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE GOVERNING OVERSIGHT][CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE GOVERNING OVERSIGHT][CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE GOVERNING OVERSIGHT]


CHAPTER 9: PrOJeCts FOCUs GrOUP [CONSTITUTIONALLANDSCAPEGOVERNINGOVERSIGHT]

9.1 Introduction

The Projects Focus Group had several mandates elaborated on in Chapter 1 above. The

mandatesandoutcomesofthespecificprojectsarediscussedbelow.

Thegroup,withoutexplicitlystatingitsclassificationcriteria,placeditsprimaryfocus,asnoted

aptlybyTiscornia,on:

• Theobjectandaimsofthesystem:Inlaw,modelsarebuiltaroundcomplexactivities

(precedents searching, contraposition of arguments, decision-making, legislative

planning,etc),ormodelsarebuiltaroundtheproductsoftheseactivities,suchas

legaldocuments(statutes,judicialdecisions,administrative,etc);and

• Themethod,thatistextualmodesbasedonlinguisticaspects,thedeductivemodels

oflegalknowledgeandreasoning.

Thesourcedocumentssupportinganunderstandingofaccountabilityandoversightutilisedby

thisgroupcomprisedthefollowing:

• ConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica;

• Primaryandsecondarydocumentationtodefineoversightandaccountability;and

• Rulesof(theSouthAfrican)Parliament.

9.2 audit of bodies performing public functions

Theobjectivesofthisauditwereto-

• determinethe“scope”oftheoversightandaccountabilityroleoftheNational

Assembly(inparticular),andtopresentParliamentwithanelectronicdatabasethat

capturesrelevantinformation;and


• capture information on relevant fields including full identification (i.e. contact details

of bodies), bodies exercising powers and performing functions in terms of section

239 of the Constitution, bodies receiving state funding, the legal relationship of

bodies to Parliament and the government, as well as line function departments

responsibleforbodies.

Thisprojecthasbeencompletedandthefinalreportisattachedhereto.

9.3 Constitutional landscaping

Parliament,throughtheJointRulesCommittee,wasrequiredtocompileadocumentlandscapingthe

constitutionalprovisionsdealingwiththeinterrelatedthemesofoversight,accountability,transparency

andresponsiveness,andoutlineinternationaltrends.

The Corder Report and the ad hoc Joint Subcommittee on Oversight and Accountability’s final

report map out and landscape, to a great extent, some of the constitutional provisions relating

to the interrelated themes of oversight, accountability, transparency and responsiveness. The NA

TablepublishedanAuditofStatutes,2004:GuidetoParliament’sobligationsundertheConstitution

and legislation, which maps out statutes mandating oversight. The landscaping document

thereforeprovidesaperspectiveontheseprovisions,without repeatingthemappingexercise.This

perspective can be discussed and refined for use pursuant to Parliament’s constitutional functions

relating to the interrelated themes of oversight, accountability, transparency and responsiveness.

Thisprojecthasbeencompletedandthefinalreportisattachedhereto.

9.4 review of the rules

Themodelisproposingdefiniteproposalsontherulesthatneedtobeestablishedandamendedtoeffect

changeinorderforthemodeltofinditsexpressionwithintherulesoftheNA,theNCOPandtheJointRules.

Itisrecommendedthatareviewofrulesbeconductedsubsequenttotheadoptionofthemodel.Itis

proposedthattheJointSubcommitteeonReviewoftheJointRulesmustattendtothereviewofthe

rulesoncethemodelisadopted.


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CONCLUSIONCONCLUSIONCONCLUSIONCONCLUSIONCONCLUSIONCONCLUSION


CHAPTER 10: COnCLUsIOn

The true test of democracy is considered the extent to which Parliament can ensure

that government remains accountable to the people by maintaining oversight of

government’s actions. Whether Parliament is indeed successful in effectively holding

the Executive accountable will ultimately depend on the extent to which committees

and individual members of Parliament actively exercise their oversight role.

Whilst anappropriate legal frameworkandadequate resources constitute criticalelements

foreffectiveparliamentaryoversightandaccountability,itisequallyimportantthatindividual

members,aswellasmembersof theExecutive,understand the rationale foraccountable

governmentandthepurposeitserves.Effectiveoversightrequiresthepoliticalwillonthepart

oftheindividualmembersofParliamenttoutilisetheoversightmechanismsandthearrayof

toolsattheirdisposaloptimally.

Conceptualmodelsarebydefinitionsimplified, ideal-type frameworks. Thisdocumentand

theaccompanyingproposedmodelstrivetopresentaframeworkwithinwhichParliament’s

oversightrolecanbestructured,soastoenhanceParliament’soversightcapacity,aswellas

bringcurrentpracticesinlinewithParliament’sstrategicpath.Thismodelwillbeaprocessthat

canenrichitselfbyadaptingtoasituationthatpermeatesfromoneparliamenttoanother.

Two critical factors for ensuring the success of thismodel is, firstly, the need to integrate

Parliament’spublicparticipationfunctionwithinitsoveralloversightmechanismand,secondly,

toprovidetheappropriatecapacity,especiallyhumanresources,tocommitteesandmembers

foritsexecution.Itisvitalthatallpublicparticipationprocessesbecomeinputstotheworkof

appropriatecommittees.

DetailedoversightpracticesalignedwiththisframeworkarecapturedintheBestPracticeGuide

onoversight currently being finalised.However, given the complex nature of Parliament’s

activitiesandthedynamicenvironmentinwhichitoperates,wewishtoechothesentiments

oftheadhocJointSubcommitteeonOversightandAccountabilitythatParliamentshouldadopt

apolicyrequiringeachnewparliamenttoassessandreviewitsoversightcapabilities,including

itsoversightmodel,atleastonceduringitsfive-yearlifespan.


Inordertoimplementtheproposedmodeldecisionsarerequiredonthefollowingaspects:

• Theimmediateneedtoincreasetheresearch(andcontentspecialist)capacityofcommittees,

whichiscurrentlyunderway.

• Theimplementationofsystemstocaptureandmanageinformationwithin

committees.

• Thedevelopmentofapublicparticipationmodeltoensurethatinputsreceivedthroughpublic

participationactivitiesarechannelledtoappropriatecommittees.

• Changesinparliamentarypolicy/rulestoaccommodatethecreationofanOversightAdvisory

Sectionwithrecommendedtermsofreference.

• ContinuouscapacitydevelopmentofmembersofParliamentandsupportstafftocommittees

intermsofinformationandcommunicationstechnology,budgetingpracticesandotherskills

requiredtoenhancetheiroversightcapacity.

• OfficesofmembersofParliamentshouldalsobeaffordedadditionalhumanresourcesand

upgradedintermsoftechnologycapacity.

• TrainingofstaffinlinewiththeBestPracticeGuide.

• Theadoptionofaprocedureforexecutivecompliance.

• DedicatedcommitteeroomsneedtobeconsideredwhenParliamentexpandsitsinfrastructure.

• Parliamentcanatalaterstageconsiderthedevelopmentoffurtherlegislationrelatingto

oversight,whichwillincludeothercommitteesthatarecurrentlyregulatedbytherulesin

relationtooversightasisthecasewiththeJointStandingCommitteeonIntelligenceandthe

JointStandingCommitteeonDefence.

REFERENCES OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

List of sources consulted

• NationalAssemblyTable.(2004)AuditofStatutes.

• NationalCouncilofProvinces.(2005)NCOPMembers’Handbook.

• ISDinterviewsreport.

• Jenkins,FS.(2005)Constitutionallandscapeoftheconstitutionalprovisionsdealingwiththe

interrelatedthemesofoversight,accountability,transparencyandresponsivenessin

respectofParliament’sfunctions(Draft1).

• Nhleko,N.(2005)OversightandAccountability:StatementofDefinition.

• Committeeworkstructureproposal.

• HSRC.(2005)Auditofpublicfundedbodies(Draft2).

• ConstitutionalExpertsInterviewReport.

• NationalTreasury.(2005)GuidelinesforLegislativeOversightthroughAnnualReports.

• DevelopmentBankofSouthernAfrica,www.dbsa.org

• GautengProvincialLegislature(GPL).(2002)ProgrammeEvaluationandBudget

Analysis:AnOversightParadigmfortheGautengLegislaturep77.

• ToolsforParliamentaryOversight.(2007)Acomparativestudyof88nationalparliaments.

• InformationServicesSection,ResearchUnit,ParliamentofSouthAfrica(2006).TheStrategic

ImperativesforSouthAfricaassetoutinthe2006StateoftheNationAddress:AnOversight

ToolforMembersandCommitteesofParliament,CapeTown,ParliamentofSouthAfrica.

• DuitlwilengB.(2005)TrendsandtendenciesintheSouthAfricanpublicmanagementand

administrationinthepost1994period,unpublishedpaper,UniversityoftheWesternCape.

• GuttoSetal.(2007)StudycommissionedbyParliament,Astudyonenhancingthestatus,role,

imageandpositioningoftheParliamentoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica.

• ConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica,Act108of1996.

• JointRulesofParliament.

• RulesoftheNationalAssembly.

• RulesoftheNationalCouncilofProvinces.

• http://www.parliament.gov.za

REFERENCESOVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

• Parliament’ssubmissiontotheIndependentCommissionfortheRemunerationofPublic

Office-Bearers.(2006),ProposalsonaComprehensiveStructurefortheRemunerationof

ParliamentaryPublicOffice-Bearers.

• TiscorniaD.(2000)TheMeaningofModelinHandlingLegalInformation.

AssistanceinthedraftingandinputwasobtainedfromtheHonMrKOBapela,MP;theHonMrGQM

Doidge,MP;theHonMrNMNene(MP),theHonMrTSSetona,MP;MrMBCoetzee(DeputySecretary

toParliament);MrMKMansura(SecretarytotheNationalAssembly);MrPLebeko(ClerkofthePapers);

taskteammembersandManagingforExcellence(Pty)Ltd.

anneXUres

1. Auditofbodiesperformingpublicfunctions(seewww.parliament.gov.za)

2. Constitutionallandscaping(seewww.parliament.gov.za)

tasK teaM MeMBers

• hon Mr O Bapela – Co-Chairperson;Convenor:ProjectsFocusGroup

• hon Mr G doidge – Co-Convenor:CommitteesFocusGroup

• hon Mr nM nene – Convenor:BudgetsFocusGroup

• hon Mr t setona – Co-Chairperson;Co-Convenor:CommitteesFocusGroup

• hon Ms s Botha – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr y Carrim – MemberofParliament

• hon Ms F Chohan – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr I davidson – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr r davies – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr M ellis – MemberofParliament

• hon Ms J Fubbs – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr d Gibson – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr Mt Goniwe – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr a harding – MemberofParliament

• hon Ms B hogan – MemberofParliament

• hon Ms s Kalyan – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr aC nel – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr n nhleko – MemberofParliament

OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODELACkNOwLEDGMENTS

• hon Ms LL Mabe – MemberofParliament

• hon adv ZL Madasa – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr G Madikiza – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr MJ Mahlangu – MemberofParliament

• hon adv tM Masutha – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr Ms Manie – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr Jh vd Merwe – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr BJ Mkhaliphi – MemberofParliament

• hon Kgoshi ML Mokoena – MemberofParliament

• hon dr CP Mulder – MemberofParliament

• hon Ms Mn Oliphant – MemberofParliament

• hon dr PJ rabie – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr t ralane – MemberofParliament

• hon Ms s seaton – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr Ka sinclair – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr a Watson – MemberofParliament

• hon Mr VV Windvoël – MemberofParliament

• hon dr GG Woods – MemberofParliament

ACkNOwLEDGMENTSOVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

PrOJeCt teaM

• Mr M Coetzee – ProjectSponsor,DeputySecretarytoParliament

• Mrs n Keswa – Coordinator:CommitteesFocusGroup

• Mr K Mansura – Coordinator:ProjectsFocusGroup

• adv L Matyolo-dube –Coordinator:BudgetFocusGroup

• Mr G Kunnath – Manager:ProjectManagementOffice

• Ms a dowling – ProjectManager

• Ms C Malan – ProjectCoordinator

• adv Z adhikarie – TeamMember

• Ms s ally – TeamMember

• Ms J Borien – TeamMember

• dr L Gabriel – TeamMember

• Mr K hahndiek – TeamMember

• adv F Jenkins – TeamMember

• Mr B Jephthah – TeamMember

• Mr PM Lebeko – TeamMember

• Managing for excellence – TeamMember

• Ms Z Mene – TeamMember

• Mr M Philander – TeamMember

• Mr M skolo – TeamMember

• Mr M tshaiviti – TeamMember

• Mr r yako – TeamMember

ACkNOwLEDGMENTS OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

OVersIGht

and

aCCOUntaBILIty MOdeL

ASSERTINGPARLIAMENT’SOVERSIGHTROLEINENHANCINGDEMOCRACY

PUBLISHED BY: PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICADESIGN & LAYOUT: LAZOLA ZANTSI

PUBLISHED BY: PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

oversight and accountability model · the laws passed since 1994. the oversight model has been...

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