Overcoming the Human Condition An Arendtian analysis of the antipolitical

tendencies in transhumanism

Master Thesis

Author: Alexander Hjelm

Supervisor: Henrik Enroth

Examiner: Mats Sjölin

Term: Spring 2020

Subject: Political Science

Level: Master Thesis, 30 hp

Course code: 5SK30E

Abstract

This article critically analyses transhumanism, an ideological movement that

advocates the radical biomodification of the human body in order to overcome our

deficiencies and progress towards our next phase in evolution. Following previous

criticism against the depoliticization within transhumanism, the article will aim to

highlight the difficulty within transhumanism to balance the respect for diversity

against the imperative for human enhancement. This paper then turns to the political

theory of Hannah Arendt as the theoretical lens to highlight the source of this tension

as the ideology’s reductive view of politics. The paper concludes on the difficulties

reconciling diversity with human enhancement, as well as raising awareness of the

possibility of conscious action in concert related to the use of biomodification

technologies advocated by transhumanists.

Key words

transhumanism, Arendt, depoliticization, action, diversity, political philosophy,

human enhancement

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my supervisor Henrik Enroth for his continued support and

guidance throughout the process of writing this thesis.

Table of contents

Abstract 2

Acknowledgments 3

1 Introduction 1

2 Transhumanism: enhancing the individual and remedying our deficiencies 3

3 Critics against transhumanism 7

3.1 The comparison with eugenics 8

3.2 Dévédec: The anthropology of deficiency 9

4 Beyond depoliticization 11

5 Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition 13

6 Fabricating human beings for the future 15

7 The freedom found in action 19

8 Conclusions 23

References 25

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1 Introduction

“[The] future man, [with altered size, shape, and function], whom the

scientists tell us they will produce in no more than a hundred years, seems to

be possessed by a rebellion against human existence... which he wishes to

exchange, as it were, for something he has made himself. There is no reason

to doubt our abilities to accomplish such an exchange… The question is only

whether we wish to use our new scientific and technical knowledge in this

direction, and this question cannot be decided by scientific means; it is a

political question of the first order” (Arendt in The Human Condition (1989),

p. 2-3).

This article addresses the ideological movement known as transhumanism, the

proponents of which seek to improve “the human condition... by developing and

making widely available technologies and to greatly enhance human intellectual,

physical, and psychological capacities” as well as “to overcome fundamental human

limitations” (Bostrom 2003, p. 4). It is a movement or “class of philosophies” that

sees the current state of the human condition as one in several steps in the evolutionary

trajectory, in which we would improve ourselves with technologies in order to no

longer “suffer from disease, aging, and inevitable death”. The transhumanist

movement does not entail or endorse particular technologies (More 2013, p. 3-4), but

rather any which may improve the human condition. Such technologies include but is

not limited to; biomodification of human beings to make them smaller to reduce their

carbon imprint (Liao et al 2012); modifying human psychology to remedy it of its

cognitive biases (Persson & Sandberg 2012); and uploading ourselves to digital

platforms in order to overcome the limits of our biological bodies (Kurzweil 2005).

Though the movement has generated a debate since its inception in the 80s and 90s,

reservations about transhumanism have primarily concerned implementation of the

technologies advocated by transhumanists, and what their implementation would

mean for our concept of humanity (See Fukyama 2001; Agar 2010) or how unjust

distribution of technologies would affect societies (See Brown 2001). More striking

criticism appears in Dévédec’s (2018) writings in which it is argued that the

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movement - in addressing the deficiencies of human beings - exchanges the goal

towards “social and political emancipation with the goal of technoscientific and

biomedical adaptation” of the human to demands of the status quo or an inevitable

future. In so doing, the movement constitutes a depoliticization of social issues and

hence “marks a major rupture with the modern democratic project of autonomy” (p.

488, 490, 501).

This paper will expand on Dévédec’s critique and make a two-fold contribution; First,

the article argues that the problem of depoliticization runs deeper than existing

critique has suggested. Transhumanism not only removes social issues from political

deliberation and decision-making; it rests on a reductive view of the political realm,

a view that fails - both analytically and normatively - to identify what it means to

speak and act politically. Second, to address these shortcomings, the article turns to

the political thought of Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), primarily outlined in The Human

Condition and Between Past and Future. Through the lens of Arendt’s political

theory, the paper will argue that the question of the “future man” is indeed a political

question, one that warrants questioning and debate as to its desirability. My ambition

is not only to shed light on some of the troubling aspects of transhumanism in terms

of its antipolitical tendencies, but also to raise consciousness in the choices we have

in these matters, and in so doing, restore agency.

The paper is structured as follows: First, it will map out several strands of the

transhumanist movement in order to bring to light the commonalities between them

for critical analysis. After a brief review of previous criticisms against the movement,

the paper will then focus on Dévédec’s critique of the movement as depoliticizing. It

will then look to Arendt’s political theory for a concept of politics to highlight the

reductive view of politics in transhumanism as well as to resolve an internal tension

within the movement between human enhancement and diversity.

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2 Transhumanism: enhancing the individual and remedying our deficiencies

There are many strands within transhumanism (Hughes 2012), and it is beyond this

paper to map out all the nuances that differentiate them. Here, transhumanism will be

referred to as a movement that endorses the use of human engineering or

biomodification as a means of achieving a political goal. This goal is either 1) taking

charge of our evolution towards the next stage of evolution, either as an improved

version of the homo sapiens or a post-human existence that bears little resemblance

to homo sapiens as we know it in the name of progress or improving the human

condition; or 2) taking charge of our evolution to avoid disaster by correcting our

deficient biology, which causes the human species to be prone towards self-

destruction. According to transhumanists, the human species has yet to attain its true

potential which remains to be unlocked through “technological advancements and

scientific understanding”. The prospects of such enhancement technology include:

[Giving] us control over the biochemical processes in our bodies, enabling us

to eliminate disease and unwanted aging. Technologies such as brain-

computer interfaces and neuropharmacology could amplify human

intelligence, increase emotional well-being, improve our capacity for steady

commitment to life projects or a loved one, and even multiply the range and

richness of possible emotions.

In other words, the transhumanist movement concerns the use of enhancement

technologies in order to further the capacities of the human being. Such technologies

include but is not restricted to; germline manipulation, which would allow us to alter

the genetic composition of an individual while also making such changes hereditary

(See Stock 2013); “uploading” the consciousness and personality of a person to a new

digital platform following the Singularity1 (Kurzweil 2005); and achieving a

substrate-independent mind (a mind that is no longer reliant on a brain to perform its

thinking process) (See Merle 2013; Koene 2013). As such, it includes a broad range

1 The hypothesis predicting a point in time when there will be an intelligence explosion as a

result of exponential technological growth (Kurzweil 2005).

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of authors and thinkers that endorse this movement towards the next step in evolution.

However, this evolution would not be left to chance, but rather controlled and

deliberate (See Harris 2007; Bostrom & Sandberg 2009) through a market structure

in the form of an “enhancement market”. This has been envisioned by Miah (2013),

who see these enhancements are merely an extension of cultural capital products that

consumers may pick and choose between. “As such, it is sensible to presume that a

transhuman future will be brought about within a commercial structure” (p. 300).

Within this commercial structure, individuals would be free to exercise their

“morphological freedom”, which Sandberg (2013) defines as “the right to modify

oneself according to one’s desires.” (p. 56)

While some transhumanists emphasize the potential for self-expression with human

enhancement technologies, others highlight their potential in overcoming the

limitations of human biology. Persson and Savulescu (2012) argue that due to the

tangible risk that humans pose to future life on Earth, we are ill-equipped biologically

to consider the moral repercussions of our actions. For as long as the human species

have existed, “human beings have lived in comparatively small and close-knit

communities... So their psychology and morality are likely to be better fit for these

conditions” (p. 1). Our “psychological dispositions” - such as our bias towards the

near future, our conception of responsibility as causally based, and egocentrically

biased morality – are inappropriate for the scale of the complex, modern world in

which we live today. Our potential to cause “ultimate harm” through our potential

misuse of existing and future science, as well as cause irreversible damage to the

environment, necessitate an intervention into our biology. As such, there is a need to

adjust the “myopic” psychology of the human being to address our ineptitude when

it comes to considering the repercussions of our actions (Persson & Savulescu 2012,

p. 1-4, 12-30, 46-48). Moral bioenhancements, the authors argue, would prove an

effective way to remedy this hazard (Ibid, p. 2):

“[O]ur knowledge of human biology, in particular of genetics and

neurobiology, is now beginning to supply us with means of directly affecting

the biological and physiological bases of human motivation, e.g.by the use of

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pharmacological and genetic methods, like genetic selection and

engineering.”

Zoltan Istvan, a transhumanist candidate for the presidential election in the United

States in 2016, raised similar concerns with our biology: “Humans are handicapped

by our biology. We operate tens of thousands of years behind evolution with our

inherited instincts, which means our behaviour is not suited to its current

environment” (Istvan 2016).

In similar spirit, Liao et al (2012) raise that human engineering bears potential as a

solution to the issue of climate change. They argue that while other avenues to address

the problem such as geoengineering are too risky and the technology needed is too

distant, human engineering - “the biomedical modification of human to make them

better at mitigating climate change” (p. 207) - represents an avenue that can remedy

the issues with much less risk. The authors explore different biomedical modifications

such as creating “pharmacological meat intolerance”, making “human beings

smaller” to reduce their ecological footprint, or “cognitive enhancement” in order to

lower birth rates. Given the insufficient means that we possess today to tackle climate

change, the authors argue, “we believe that human engineering deserves to be

considered and explored further in this debate” (Ibid, p. 207-2010, 218).

Ultimately, transhumanists that highlight the societal benefit of human enhancement

technologies trace all social issues to our deficient biology. Hughes (2004) argues that

the pursuit of social equality is a pointless endeavour so long as there are biological

differences between individuals. “Patriarchy,” he writes, “the most fundamental form

of human domination, begins with the fact that men can beat women up, and that

women are doubly vulnerable when pregnant”. Social inequality is a result of our

biological differences, both between the sexes and between individuals, and will

persist so long as these differences exist. Only technologies that can remedy the

differences will provide everyone with “more real equal opportunities.” (p.195-197;

my emphasis) In agreement, Persson and Savulescu claims the egalitarian doctrines

promoted by the UN and liberal democracies merely act as a “facade” for the “deep-

seated xenophobia of our nature”, which took their violent expressions in Rwanda

and former Yugoslavia in the 90s (Persson & Savulescu 2012, p. 52, 97, 104-105).

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The genocides had their cause in our psychological dispositions, and hence ought to

be remedied by biomedical means. Therefore, anyone true to their pursuit of political

ideals ought to embrace these technologies, which the authors argue when discussing

income disparities: “[W]elfare egalitarians have moral reason to wish it were possible

to enhance – e.g. by means of genetic engineering – the abilities of individuals who

are disadvantaged by nature... they have a reason to correct the effects of the natural

lottery” (p. 45). Until this happens, political ideals will merely be empty platitudes

that hide the true sources of human disparity, that is, the biological differences that

separate individuals and genders alike.

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3 Critics against transhumanism

The transhumanist thoughts such as those outlined above have generated criticism,

most of which are derived from a discussion to what extent the transhumanist vision

is likely to come to pass or how these technologies might affect our notion of what

constitutes “humanity”. Hauskell (2016) has criticized the ambitions of

transhumanism by framing them as myths, and that “the persuasiveness of

transhumanist arguments for radical human enhancement crucially depends on their

utopian content” (p. 9). Agar (2010) has similarly argued that the potential benefits

outlined by transhumanists are too optimistic, and that we ought to instead take a

cautionary approach to enhancements technologies to ensure that potential dystopian

realities enabled by such technologies are not realized.

Furthermore, Agar argues that in the transition from human to posthuman, we may

lose valuable emotional experiences in which our humanity is rooted (2010, p. 15).

Likewise, Sandel (2007) cautions the use of biomedical science such as genetic

engineering, as it may lead to an “excess of mastery and domination that misses the

sense of life as a gift” (p. 62). Meanwhile, Fukuyama (2001) raised the posthuman

condition as problematic for human dignity, as this concept is dependent on what we

consider to be human nature. Ultimately, there is some commonality between human

beings that allows us to enshrine people deviating from social norms with as much

rights as any other person, even if we will struggle to define what such a commonality

would be in terms of a palpable essence (p. 107-174).

Concerns with basis in notions such as human dignity has been dismissed by

bioethicists and transhumanists as something irrational. Yuval Levin (2003) coined

this as the “paradox of conservative bioethics”, in which private taboos in the form of

“powerful moral intuitions” are brought into the public as arguments to regulate

bioethical questions. Yet in so doing, these moral intuitions are unravelled and laid

bare for public scrutiny, and hence become unsustainable (p. 55). Concurring with

Levin, Hughes states “the bioconservatives cannot validate their taboos and ethical a

prioris in the public square” (2010, p. 625). Hence, there is a scepticism among

transhumanists towards moral intuitions that would inhibit progress attained through

enhancement technologies, as seen in Pinker’s scepticism towards policies “based on

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nebulous but sweeping principles such as ‘dignity,’ ‘sacredness,’ or ‘social justice’.”

(Pinker 2015)

3.1 The comparison with eugenics

While some may advocate caution towards the application of enhancement

technologies based on such “sweeping principles”, other critics have made

comparisons to transhumanism with the controversial eugenics movement (Koch

2010; Newman 2010). The eugenics movement, originating in the United States in

the late 1800s, advocated the cultivation of good genetic characteristics while

discarding the inferior genetic characteristics. Like transhumanism, the eugenics

movement sought to take conscious control of evolution for the purpose of the “self-

direction of human evolution” (Koch 2010, p. 689-694).

The eugenics movement influenced policies in Nazi Germany and the sterilization

programmes in Scandinavia (Carlson 2001; Broberg & Roll-Hansen 2005), which has

led some transhumanists to reject the comparison, saying that transhumanism does

not share the “racist and classist assumptions on which [eugenics was] based”.

However, other transhumanists tenuously accept the comparison (Hughes 2004, p.

131-133), with some fully embracing it, such as Fuller & Lipinska: “[M]uch of what

is nowadays proposed under the name of ‛transhumanism’ is simply ‛Eugenics 2.0’.”

They claim that what was the error of previous policies employing eugenic thoughts

was not the faulty science, but “the gradual loss of proportion in a policy that might

have worked in a more circumscribed application” (2014, p. 92).

Hence what differentiates transhumanism from the eugenics of the past concerns

implementation; instead of state coercion, the “liberal eugenics” (See Agar 1998) of

transhumanism relies on “self-applied” methods (Fuller & Lipinska 2014, p. 131).

Additionally, transhumanism - because of its leanings towards the individualistic

market driven human evolution, and the necessity of voluntary participation in that

process - argues for a positive eugenics, the engendering of “good characteristics, as

opposed to the negative eugenics, the neglect of “bad characteristics”, (Newton 2010,

p. 31 for the distinction) that they argue define the “old eugenics”. Finally, the

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intended enhancements of the individual are not based in racial ideologies but instead

for the betterment of the human species in general (See Bostrom 2003; Hughes 2004).

Because the evolutionary enhancement will occur within a market-structure, it has

been argued that the transhumanist vision of widespread usage of enhancement

technologies is inevitable. Bailey (2014) compares bioconservatives and

policymakers who wish to prohibit or restrict the usage of biomodification

technologies (in his example, germline technologies) to those who tried to impede the

industrial revolution. They write: “Policymakers sometimes mistakenly think they

have a choice whether germline technologies will come into being. They do not.” (p.

313). In a similar vein, Hughes (2004) calls the opponents of biomodification

technologies “BioLuddites”, their namesake drawn from the anti-industrialization

movement that sought to protect worker rights against the increasing automation of

the industrial revolution. Either way, transhumanists argue, history has doomed the

opposition to defeat, and should therefore consider Pinker’s (2015) imperative to

simply “get out of the way”.

3.2 Dévédec: The anthropology of deficiency

While there are numerous critics of transhumanism in the form of dignity-advocates

and authors concerned with the blurring lines between eugenics and transhumanism

are plentiful, a more novel line of critique is raised by Dévédec (2018), who questions

the movement’s self-proclaimed basis in the Enlightenment humanism and the notion

of human perfectibility. He argues that the movement towards transforming human

beings to better suit their environment and the demands of a fixed future is

“fundamentally [a] political issue... that questions the values orienting collective

action and establishing shared life.” Dévédec posits that rather than advocating human

perfectibility in the sense of rejecting the status quo and using collective action for

change, the transhumanist project results in a “depoliticization of social issues” by

tracing social issues to a faulty human biology ill-equipped. Thus, instead of

questioning whether these issues have a social, environmental, or political origin, the

result is a “‘naturalization’ of social problems”, to which humans must be adapted (p.

489, 497). Dévédec refers to this as the “anthropology of deficiency”, a “depreciative

view of humans and the human body” which underpin the transhumanist movement.

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As a result of this view, there is a widespread scepticism about the desirability and

need of political deliberation and decision-making not just among transhumanists of

a libertarian leaning - and the associated centricity on individualism - but the

transhumanist movement as a whole (Dévédec 2018, p. 496-497). Hence, while many

transhumanist authors highlight the potential of the technologies as a means to

enhance the individual for self-fulfilment (see Bostrom 2003), others explicitly

emphasize the current existing deficiencies that mar the biology of the human being

and the species as a whole.

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4 Beyond depoliticization

Dévédec’s critique is compelling, as it shows the degree to which the narrative of the

deficiency of human beings side-lines the possibility of political action. Nevertheless,

several objections will be raised here. First, while it may be true that the transhumanist

movement represents a “rupture” rather than a continuation of Enlightenment

thought, this may be explained because the Enlightenment tradition itself bore

“contradictions and tensions” (Hughes 2010, p. 622). As a result, it would not be

surprising that there are differing notions of human perfectibility which emphasize

different aspects of progress, from social reforms to technical mastery over nature.

Second, even if the transhumanist movement represents a reversal of the humanist

tradition, it is questionable to what extent it would represent a challenge for liberal

democracies today. While our understanding of democracy certainly owes itself to

Enlightenment thought, it has also progressed since then, to such where the reversal

is not enough to question the propositions of transhumanism.

This paper contends that the criticism is simply not extensive enough: If we consider

depoliticization as framing potential political issues as technical problems, “as

transcendent imperatives that demand responses, without any attached specification

as to who should respond to what and to whom” (Enroth 2014, p. 68), then the

transhumanist solutions to climate change or preventing human extinction through

biomodification certainly qualifies as such. Yet we will argue that what the

transhumanists propose constitutes a step beyond just a “normative void”; rather than

removing issues from the public realm, the imperative to address our deficient biology

would mean to adjust the very basis of the political itself, namely the human beings

themselves.

I argue that the adaptation of human beings to new naturalized social situations creates

a tension between safeguarding diversity and the drive towards enhancement. Some

authors explicitly acknowledge this tension: Hughes (2004), pointing out that “innate

biological traits... predict, even if they don’t determine... life success”, raises the

example that “short men earn less than tall men” to point out how human engineering

can be used to combat inequality. Nevertheless, he concludes that “[w]hen parents are

able to choose the height of their children, more children will be tall, but we should

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also work on being less heightist.” (p. 195-197) Simultaneously, he is aware that “the

ethical obligation... to enhance ourselves” should not be so “invasive that they inhibit

diversity”, and that the lines between protecting diversity and encouraging

enhancement “will be difficult to draw” (p. 256-257). Fuller & Lipinska recognize

this difficulty as well (p. 135-136):

“The burden on [transhumanists] will be to design welfare states that tolerate

such a diversity of human conditions, whereby what some judge to be an

enhancement to their capacities is taken by others to be a sign of disability.

Failure in this task might result in a formally recognized sub-speciation:

Apartheid 2.0.”

What will be argued here is that this tension bears its source in the reductive and

erroneous view of politics as just an instrument to deal with issues on a collective

scale and safeguard the interests of individuals. While it may be that the methods

advocated by transhumanist cannot be seen as problematic through the classic liberal

lens of “autonomy, fairness, and individual rights” (Sandel 2008, p. 9), it nevertheless

represents a misunderstanding of the full potential of politics in democratic societies,

namely to engender diversity of identities.

To resolve this tension and bring to light the normative dimension of the political

realm that is neglected in transhumanism, we turn to the political theory of Hannah

Arendt. Though political theories advocating democracy may argue its desirability

based on the equal representation of the interests of its subjects (See Dahl 1989),

Arendt takes care not to specify a purpose of/for politics in terms of substantive

content; her emphasis is instead on action in concert, through which we can become

individuals and experience autonomy. However, participation in the political realm

can only occur as a result of the pluralism among human beings, which is currently

in tension with the transhumanist imperatives of human evolution.

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5 Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition

Arendt sought to define the meaning of the political by drawing upon the ideas of

Ancient Greece as the normative basis of what constitutes a genuine political life.

This undertaking is what informs her political theory, which is primarily outlined in

The Human Condition (1989). In it, Arendt outlines three activities that define the

human condition (Arendt 1989, p. 7-9, 12-17, 48-49, 175-178):

1) The first, labour, is related to the biological conditions which human beings

(and animals alike) are subject to. It is defined by the repetitive actions that

sustain the needs of the human body and “the maintenance of life”. To labour

is to be “enslaved by necessity” and to respond to the human condition of

“life itself” (Ibid, p. 7, 83-84).

2) The second, work, is related to the fabrication and existence within an

artificial environment that is distinct from the natural environment, including

the “the [human] species’ ever recurring life cycle” (Ibid, p. 7). Unlike the

natural world, the artificial world is durable and possesses some degree of

permanence.

3) The third activity, action, becomes possible through the human condition of

plurality. Because we are distinct and unique human beings, we need both

action and speech to communicate ourselves to other human beings. In so

doing, we express our latent selves, and we become individuals through this

disclosure.

It is action which Arendt sees as the defining activity of humanity, as “neither beast

nor a god is capable of it” (Arendt 1989, p. 22-23), as it requires and stands witness

to the presence of other human beings. An animal may also labour, but they will only

do so as an extension of their species. By contrast, human beings engage in action as

individuals. These spontaneous actions made in concert with other autonomous

agents take place in a political realm which Arendt likens to “webs” of relationships;

the political realm is not a firm place, but spontaneous and continuous, like the action

itself. Thus, we can never fully predict the consequences of an action. Yet it is

precisely this spontaneity and unpredictability that makes the act liberating; it occurs

against the expected, against the fatalistic belief in the automatic historical processes,

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such as the Singularity or our inevitable self-destruction through climate change.

Action is faculty that allows us to free ourselves from such expected historical

processes that would otherwise be the cause of our ruin (Ibid, p. 181-184, 188-192,

232, 246-247; 1993, p. 168-171).

Arendt arranges the triad in a hierarchy which she believes conveys the view of the

ancient Greeks. Neither labour nor work were enough to be considered “authentically

human [ways] of life” (Arendt 1989, p. 12-13). Nevertheless, each activity had their

place. Labour is interrelated with life itself, while work provides a degree of durability

to these deeds through the actual physical space for action in the form of the agora or

the city itself and the laws that facilitate political action (Ibid, p. 8-9, 120, 188, 194-

195, 207-208).

Although Arendt found the normative basis for her theory in the ideas of the ancient

Greeks, she did not wish for a return to the polis (Arendt 1993, p. 156-157): The

purpose of their analytical triad was rather to show that, while labour and work had

their place in determining the human condition, what was problematic was the

“generalization” of their standards for a world occupied by human beings – the

political realm. Her contention was rather with the notion that the logics of labour or

work had replaced action as the dominating activity of the public realm (Arendt 1989,

p. 156-157). Labour, Arendt argued, had come to dominate the public realm in the

way in which the modern consumer’s society, emulating the logics of biological

metabolism, had assumed a self-perpetuating cycle of production and consumption in

which the modern human being cannot enjoy freedom, which for Arendt is itself

tantamount to spontaneous action (Ibid, p. 96-101, 126-135).

Work, on the other hand, was useful in explaining the way in which the language of

means and ends had come to define the idea of politics in the modern age (Arendt

1989, p. 153-159, 220-230); a matter on which we will elaborate upon in the following

section.

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6 Fabricating human beings for the future

Work is the activity that concerns the “work of our hands”, and it is the realm of the

craftsmen. It is distinct from the activity of action in that the activity of work is guided

by a model that is reified through the process of fabrication. Because this process

serves towards the creation of a designated end, the activity is defined by a logic of

instrumentality. All of nature becomes potential material for reification, and the

material, in turn, is defined by its potential to attain a desired end (Arendt 1989, p.

136, 139-144, 153-159). Arendt contended that the logic of work has been

“generalized” outside of its boundaries to such an extent that it characterizes a great

deal of the “modern age” (Ibid, p. 305):

“[His] instrumentalization of the world, his confidence in tools and in the

productivity of the maker of artificial objects; his trust in the all-

comprehensive range of the means-end category, his conviction that every

issue can be solved and every human motivation reduced to the principle of

utility; his sovereignty, which regards everything given as material and thinks

of the whole of nature as of ‛an immensive fabric from which we can cut out

whatever we want to resew it however we like...’”

In particular, Arendt argued that the ancient philosophers were a decisive influence

on modern thinking on politics as a process of fabrication. The ancient philosophers

turned to the fabrication process as an inspiration for the shaping of the realm of

human affairs for its reliability, as it would mitigate the unpredictability of action in

the political realm. Plato was particularly influential: Mirroring the platonic idea of

an abstract “good” which existed as an eternal idea outside of reality, he believed that

the political realm could only be good to the extent it realized the abstract image that

informed its shaping. To accomplish this, Plato split action into two components:

knowing and doing - and subsequently, thought and action were separated from one

another in a manner mimicking ruler and the ruled. Plato’s ideal vision of public

affairs mirrored the household, with a ruler who knows what to do and the ruled who

carry out the actions to realize the knowledge of the ruler; the “Philosopher King”.

Hence, forming the public domain according to a predetermined design or shape

understood only by the Philosopher King - similar to how the idea of a table informs

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the craftsman - would lend some degree of predictability to the tumultuous political

realm. This perception would come to define modern political theory, Arendt writes,

in which utopian designs of the public realm would inform the “foundation of a new

body of politic”; the instrumentality of work – the language of means and ends –

defines political thought, “rather than the... understanding of action itself” (Arendt

1989, p. 188-190, 192-195, 220-230).

Transhumanists share these views of the political realm - the resentment of its

unpredictability and the desire to replace it with the logic of fabrication - yet they

differ in one regard: Arendt writes that the ancient philosophers’ scepticism towards

the political “rests on a suspicion of action rather than on a contempt for men” (Arendt

1989, p. 222). Transhumanists, however, base this suspicion on the deficiency of our

biology. Just as Plato’s “attempt to replace acting with making” in order to critique

democracy “will turn into an argument as against the essentials of politics” (Ibid, p.

220), so too does the transhumanist imperative to remedy our deficiencies turn into

an argument against the basis of the political itself.

As a result, there is a scepticism towards democracy in general within this narrative

due to our deficient biology making us fall short of our potential as active, informed

citizens. The solutions to the looming issues such as climate change, Persson and

Savulescu (2012) argue, will not find a solution in democracy, “unless the will to act

morally grows stronger in the public” (p. 104). Furthermore, the authors remain

concerned over the pluralism that characterizes liberal societies, the argument being

that it could have a destabilizing effect that raises the likelihood of “ultimate harm”;

the self-destruction of human civilization as a whole. This plurality, along with the

sizes of liberal democracies, also result in these countries experiencing a greater

likelihood of minority discrimination (Ibid, p. 93-95).

The transhumanist imperatives are informed by a vision of the future which is

inevitable in one way or another. The transhumanist dream of evolution through an

individual self-enhancement market will come to pass regardless of our moral

quandaries simply as a result of market forces. In the more pessimistic strand, our

species faces certain extinction due to our inherent deficiencies of our biology that

make us incapable of reckoning the consequences of our actions. Because of the

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unreliability of political action and the fickle motivations of individuals, the potential

for human engineering are especially worth exploring, if not necessary. For instance,

the consumerist pattern of capitalist societies is linked to many environmental issues.

At the same time, any attempt to restrict the affluent consumerist lifestyle that citizens

in first world countries enjoy would likely fail, as such efforts would receive little in

the way of popular support (Persson & Savulescu 2012, p. 76-81). Liao et al (2012)

likewise argue that behavioural solutions to environmental problems would likely not

suffice as “many people lack motivation to alter their behaviour in the required ways”.

When discussing the necessity to reduce our red-meat eating in order to reduce our

collective carbon imprint, the authors argue that “[w]hile reducing the consumption

of red meat can be achieved through social, cultural means, people often lack the

motivation or willpower to give up eating red meat even if they wish they could.” (p.

207-208)

Other technological solutions to mitigate these existential risks on a larger scale can

be found in the writings of Bostrom (2006) and Yudkowsky (2004). Bostrom

describes this solution to internal dangers as the singleton, which he defines as “a

world order in which there is a single decision-making agency at the highest level”,

which would possess several powers (p. 48):

...(1) [T]he ability to prevent any threats (internal or external) to its own

existence and supremacy, and (2) the ability to exert effective control over

major features of its domain (including taxation and territorial allocation).

Bostrom provides several suggestions as to what form the singleton could take, such

as an undetectable machine intelligence that enforces a certain conduct; a world

government, democratic or otherwise; or the evolution of humans into a single

cohesive entity, such as a “transcending upload”. Because of the existential risks such

as those described above, Bostrom believes it is more likely than not that such a

singleton would come to pass, especially paired with the likely advancements

surrounding security technologies such as surveillance and mind control that could

enable the realization of the singleton (2006, p. 48-50, 53). Yudkovsky (2004),

advocating for a form of a singleton that would take the shape of a “friendly AI”,

conceptualizes a Coherent Extrapolated Volition, which is the extrapolated will of

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individuals which shares cohesion with most other individuals (p. 3-11). Since this

“friendly AI” operates on and extrapolates our own desires and wishes, disagreeing

with it would be “dangerous and harmful” for us; we would be acting against our own

interests (p. 33). After all, who could oppose a ruling entity that only wishes to see

our own interests safeguarded and fulfilled? Let the ruler rule, while the ruled concern

themselves with other things.

Yet, such a retort is rooted in an insufficient view of politics as merely the safeguard

of the sovereignty of the individual and the protection of our freedom to pursue our

interests (See Mill in Hughes 2004, p. 11). Hence, transhumanists do not infuse

democratic arrangements with any intrinsic value on their own; instead, they were

only a necessity as a result of our limited biology (Hughes 2010, p. 628-630). Because

we will have the technological capacities to intervene directly in the make-up of the

human being, we will not only have better, more reliable ways of tackling issues

which require immediate measures, but we will also have unlocked a new means of

self-realization. With our biological selves subject to the fabrication process, we

become means for the realization of the “idea” of the transhuman.

The application of the logic of work to politics is not a novel notion in of itself: After

all, Arendt had noted this in the totalitarian regimes pursuing utopian designs (Arendt

1989, 228-229). Likewise, Enroth (2014) has observed how issues, through the

discourse of governance, came to be addressed as technical rather than political

matters. Yet while these observations concerned the shaping of the public space or

the framing of issues that have potential to be political, what the transhumanists

propose goes beyond depoliticization: Rather than removing issues from the public

realm, the technologies advocated by the writers of this movement to address our

deficient biology would mean to adjust (and reduce) the very basis of the political

itself, that is, the distinctiveness of human beings that inform the plurality which

allows for action to take place (Arendt 1989, p. 175-176).

Yet even if Arendt’s political theory may provide explanatory power as to why there

is tension between the transhumanist desire for enhancement and diversity, why

should we accept Arendt’s view of politics to begin with? To elaborate upon this, we

must turn our focus to the essence of her theory: Freedom.

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7 The freedom found in action

Arendt means to accomplish two things in particular with her political theory: First,

she means to separate our view of the political from the philosophical traditions of

political theory, which, as we have observed, meant to control the unpredictability of

the political by deferring to a stable and peaceful abstract “idea” (See also Buckler

2011, p. 3). Second, her theory means to criticize the dehumanizing consumption

society in which the political has been reduced to become solely about security of the

individual’s interests and ensuring that individuals could be left to their own devices

with as little intervention from the state as possible. Because “the maintenance of life”

has come to dominate the political, the political has become overshadowed by the

administration of the “the gigantic and still increasing sphere of social and economic

life” (Arendt 1993 p. 149-151, 155). In such a consumption society, there was no

longer any way for human beings to become equal as individuals in the political

realm; all activities became connotated with the survival of society at large, with

human beings merely being reduced to specimens of the human species (Arendt 1989,

p. 320-321). Arendt’s theory is a claim to take back agency in a world where the

possibility of expressing oneself through action has been reduced.

For that reason, no matter how we may be liberated from necessity, this would not be

sufficient for someone to be free (Arendt 1989, p. 70-71). In an interesting passage,

Arendt argues that (Arendt 1993, p. 160; my emphasis):

The necessity which prevents me from doing what I know and will may arise

from the world, or from my own body, or from an insufficiency of talents,

gifts, and qualities which are bestowed upon man by birth... all these factors,

the psychological ones not excluded, condition the person from the outside

as far as the I-will and the I-know, that is, the ego itself, are concerned; the

power that meets these circumstances, that liberates... willing and knowing

from their bondage to necessity is the I-can. Only where the I-will and the I-

can coincide does freedom exist.

An initial reading of this passage might suggest that Arendt equates freedom with

liberation from its opposite, necessity. Yet what defines action is its character as the

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“actualization of the human condition of natality”. It is the manifestation of a

beginning that has appeared out of seemingly nowhere, a “miracle” that occurred

“against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability”. This miracle

is that which will “[save] the world, the realm of human affairs from its normal,

‛natural’ ruin” (Arendt 1989, p. 178, 247). Habermas, in reading Arendt’s emphasis

on natality, highlights that it bears an importance because it is a beginning that is not

at our disposal. Natality is a “bridge that connects the natural world with the

awareness of the adult subject”. The birth brings “the indeterminate hope” that

“[shatters] the power of the past over the future” (p. 62-63). Given the spontaneous

and unpredictable nature of action, and the relationship between necessity and the

“normal, ‘natural’ ruin” (Arendt 1989, p. 247), this warrants a reading of Arendt’s

notion of freedom as action taking place in spite of necessity. Action is the unexpected

expression of both an individual’s agency and their identity in rebellion of routine

structures that constrain us.

In stark differentiation to the fabrication logic of work, action can never be planned,

and its outcomes never controlled reliably. Because of its freedom from the temporal

processes that initially may seem inevitable, it allows us to take back agency in places

where we might deem it impossible to change the existing circumstances. We find

therefore a mutually reinforcing relationship between politics and freedom in its

associated activity of action; without the presence of our peers, we could not

distinguish ourselves through action. Without this political realm, we would not be

able to experience freedom by acting in the present. This makes political life

something desirable in and of itself; it not only allows us to meet the circumstances

that condition our existence, but it also allows us to define ourselves beyond them. In

the political realm, we can publicly express our identities.

The performative emphasis of politics of Arendt’s political theory has been criticized

as hollow in content and as an activity that merely serves a vain, secular quest for

immortality, in which “Arendt’s citizens begin to resemble posturing little boys

clamoring for attention and wanting to be reassured that they are brave, valuable, even

real.” (Pitkin 1981, p. 338) I suggest that this is intentional because Arendt is careful

not to assign any substantive content as to what politics should entail or what it should

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promote precisely because such an effort would be caught within the language of

means and ends of which she is so staunchly critical. Her emphasis is instead on the

sustained engagement itself, which we maintain through thoughtful action.

Nevertheless, Arendt’s political theory is of the normative kind, in which engaging in

political activity, regardless of what it “produces”, bears intrinsic value. Given the

antipolitical in its various expressions - the thoughtless, mass conformism of modern

consumer’s society or the totalitarian regimes in which lives are merely means to an

end - we can extrapolate that actions in the political are conscious actions in which

individuals engage that promote the possibility of further action. This would exclude

efforts that infringe upon other members’ ability to disclose themselves in the political

realm, or actions which actively bear a homogenizing effect of human experiences,

and in turn, human subjectivities (Arendt 1989, p. 38-46, 57-58, 229).

It stands to clarify that Arendt did not imply that the conditions which informed the

activities of her conceptual triad were fixed: On the contrary, she wrote that they never

regulate our activities “absolutely” and could be overcome to the point where their

associated activities “would no longer make sense” (Arendt 1989, p. 9-11). Therefore,

it is possible that the condition of plurality could be diminished to such an extent that

it would be difficult to speak of action as a general activity, as would be the case if

human beings came to be “endlessly reproducible repetitions of the same model”

(Ibid, p. 8).

Bearing the Arendtian theoretical lens, we must view the transhumanist quest for

freedom from the labours of our biological being with great scepticism for two

reasons: First, not only must we contend that the path to freedom lies not in the

transhumanist desire to free ourselves of the biological, as this would only engender

passivity and reduce our existence to a “lifeless life”; it would be liberation from

necessity at the cost of plurality, and at the cost of the prospect of experiencing

freedom through action.

Second, the discourse of evolutionary enhancement or the need to remedy our

deficient biology is incompatible with Arendt’s emphasis on individuals experiencing

freedom from temporal processes through action as a result of their quality of

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uniqueness, “in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever

lived, lives, or will live.” (Arendt 1989, p. 8). Instead, an evolutionary discourse, in

order to make us compatible for comparisons in a timeline, assumes a deterministic

outlook in which we are merely the sum of the capacities bestowed upon us by our

biology; we are only members of the species of humankind.

Hence, the pursuit towards enhancement or the transition to a new, better species is

misguided on the basis that we do not enjoy freedom by defining ourselves as human

beings or posthumans, but as unique beings. It may be that we may frame

posthumanity as an improvement in an evolutionary timeline when compared to

humanity as we know it today, but this cannot apply to human beings acting as

individuals in the present; as such, they defy comparison in relation to any progress.

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8 Conclusions

With the lens of Arendt’s political theory, we must view the transhumanist agenda to

enhance or adapt the human being with great scepticism for several reasons: First, it

is a misguided effort, as transhumanism confuses freedom with liberation from

necessity. Second, because it addresses enhancement or compatibility of our biology

with the current order of things, it bears a deterministic outlook in which we cannot

transcend our biology, to which our flaws and our merits are owed. Third, the

discourse of progress necessitates that the capacities are viewed in light of a timeline,

which is incompatible with the uniqueness inherent in the human condition. Finally,

the adjustment of human beings towards a designated end is antithetical to human

plurality; as such, transhumanism does not merely constitute depoliticization; it is

antipolitical.

As the introductory paragraph by Arendt suggests, the transhumanist agenda of

human enhancement is not a “neutral” technical matter, but a political question that

warrants questioning. Transhumanism is not only problematic in its instrumentality

and scepticism towards the agency of humans and the affected societies at large to

address the problems, it is also locked to a view of our future as already determined

by processes that appear outside of our control. Such a view engenders passivity and

only helps perpetuate a feeling of helplessness before the inevitable future that will

happen regardless of our own desires, and to which we must be adapted to if we are

to cope with it.

Yet this belief is also illusory: Though plurality may be reduced and our capacity for

action may be restrained in various ways, that capacity is never fully diminished. We

always have the potential to determine our own fate and take charge of the

development of our society through collective, conscious actions. Arendt’s theory

reminds us that there is no future that is fixed, and that through action, we may free

ourselves from the predetermined fates predicted by the historical and natural

processes. We must therefore reject the inevitability of the transhumanist vision; we

will always possess the power to determine our future.

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As discussed above, previous criticisms against transhumanism have primarily

centred on how the new biological conditions will affect what we consider humanity

(Fukuyama 2001; Agar 2010) or how transhumanism obscures “social determinants

in social issues” such as the current climate crisis (Dévédec 2018, p. 497). Yet the

latter critique is itself based in the means-oriented, reductive view of the political as

a social dimension of problem-solving. I have argued here that the greater loss is

instead the loss of the freedom we experience through the expression of ourselves in

the political realm.

The disclosure of our identity through action entails a non-negotiability with the

demands of the external society. In the political realm, we are equals, each with our

own autonomy. This gives us the ability to question: Whose future am I unfit for?

Towards what end must I be enhanced? In the political realm, we cannot be reduced

to mere means, nor can we accept any dystopian future that awaits us should we not

adapt. As human beings, we must ourselves take part in the discussion and ask

ourselves whether the transhumanist vision is something desirable or not.

The debate surrounding transhumanism will continue, but this paper will hopefully

have contributed to the realization that the premises of transhumanism, such as the

inevitability of technological progress and usage of enhancement technologies to the

necessity of adopting them, are up for question. In other words, we must remember

to “think about what we are doing” (Arendt 1989, p. 5).

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AbstractAcknowledgments1 Introduction2 Transhumanism: enhancing the individual and remedying our deficiencies3 Critics against transhumanism3.1 The comparison with eugenics3.2 Dévédec: The anthropology of deficiency

4 Beyond depoliticization5 Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition6 Fabricating human beings for the future7 The freedom found in action8 ConclusionsReferences