our urgent tasks

8/13/2019 Our Urgent Tasks

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OUR URGENT TASKS

This is a statement of the urgent tasks of the Communist Party of the Philippines in the light of thed Plenum of the Central Committee and the most recent circumstances. Here included are the conditions,es, methods, trends and reasons involved in carrying out such tasks.

We must unite wholeheartedly and firmly to carry out these tasks for the single purpose of winning theand-death struggle against the fascist dictatorial regime of the U..-!arcos cli"ue and in the processy forward the people#s democratic revolution in a comprehensive way.

$ach one of us in the Party must take as much assignment and responsi%ility as possi%le, fearing neithership nor sacrifice and always devoting ourselves to serving the people. &ll of us must e'ert the utmostt to lead our people towards national li%eration and social emancipation.

ARRY FORWARD THE ANTIFASCIST, ANTIFEUDAL AND

ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT!

We must resolutely carry forward the antifascist, antifeudal and anti-imperialist movement. This is theent com%ative e'pression of our general line of people#s democratic revolution against U.. imperialism,alism and %ureaucrat capitalism.

The !arcos fascist dictatorship is the main force of armed counterrevolution and is ruthlesslyucting a civil war. Thus, we must give first place to the antifascist movement. We must do everything weo push forward the democratic armed revolution against the fascist armed counterrevolution.

$verywhere in the country we must focus on the a%uses of the !arcos fascist dictatorship. (n the entirecolonial and semifeudal history of the Philippines, there is no regime more infamous than this for the

ical tyranny and economic crisis it has unleashed against the %road masses of the people.

The )new society* +varia%ly calling itself )constitutional authoritarianism*, )crisis government* andlately )new democracy* is %ut the old society gone far worse and far more intolera%le. The reactionaryhas shorn itself of all its %ourgeois democratic em%ellishments and is nakedly acting as the coercive

ument of the %ig comprador-landlord-%ureaucrat cli"ue of !arcos and U.. imperialism.

We have the !arcos fascist dictatorship as the narrowest and weakest target on which to concentrateroadest and strongest possi%le attack %y the people. ut to achieve the most profound, most wide-ranging

most forward results in the antifascist movement, we must deli%erately and clearly link it to the antifeudalanti-imperialist movements. (t is only thus that we can effectively strike at the very essence and main of the reactionary state.

therwise, we would %e merely calling for the restoration of formal democratic rights and worn-out

esses of the ruling system. /ike %ourgeois democrats, and not proletarian revolutionaries, we would %eg after forms and we would %e missing the content of a people#s democratic revolution.

To deepen the antifascist movement, we must vigorously wage the antifeudal movement. y doing so,evelop the main force for overthrowing or causing the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship. We respond

ess to the main demand of the people#s democratic revolution and win the a%iding interest of the mosterous class, the peasantry, in the armed revolution.

To raise the level of the antifascist movement, we must vigorously undertake the anti-imperialistement. We must make U.. imperialism pay the ultimate price for having masterminded the !arcos


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st dictatorship and having %een the most aggrandi0ed %y it. The longer !arcos stays in power, theger the anti-imperialist movement should %ecome.

o long as we pay comprehensive attention to the antifascist, antifeudal, and anti-imperialist movement,e is no chance for U.. imperialism and the local reactionaries to confuse the people and derail thelution one day %y simply replacing the current fascist dictatorship with another.

The !arcos fascist dictatorship is a measure of the weakening and desperation of the entire rulingm, rather than of strengthening and sta%ility. This open terrorist rule is the a%solute proof that the rulinges can no longer rule in the old way.

The political crisis continues to worsen. The split among the reactionaries has continued to widen andme more virulent. The revolutionary mass movement, under the leadership of the revolutionary

etariat, has proven to %e resilient and has e'panded and intensified, instead of %eing crushed %y the fascistterrevolution.

Though at first taken %y surprise %y the ultra-rightist coup, !arcos# political rivals have gone on tominate anti-!arcos propaganda in their so-called %ailiwicks and maneuver for influence in the very sameionary armed forces manipulated and used %y !arcos for his fascist autocratic purposes. (n the years to

e, the gun will %ecome more important than ever in the conflicts of the reactionaries.

The alliance of the !acapagal, &"uino, /ope0 and !anglapus groups is not idle. Though U..rialism continues to get what it wants from the !arcos fascist dictatorship, it has already assured thisnce that it should do what it can to stand in reserve in the face of !arcos# gross unpopularity. U..ic opinion and certain U.. %usiness interests recogni0e the fact that even as the !arcos fascisttorship is a short-term asset for U.. imperialism, it is a long-term lia%ility.

The !arcos fascist dictatorship has given no "uarters to its political rivals. The ultra-rightist coup of'ecutive against co-e"ual %ranches of the reactionary government, against the constitutional conventionagainst all kinds of opposition carried e'tremely vindictive measures. Properties have %een e'torted forpersonal gain of !arcos and his henchmen. The !arcos press monopoly and other !arcos assets in farr enterprises consist mainly of ro%%ed property.

The series of fake referendums have in progression served to merely endorse the ar%itrary martial lawlamation and the autocratic rule of !arcos. The )new* constitution, the indefinite nonconvening of theim national assem%ly, the supplantation of national and local elections %y presidential appointment andpro1ection of (melda as second-in-command and successor of the fascist dictator close every peacefulue to political power for !arcos# political rivals.

The %road masses of the people have suffered most from the fascist counterrevolution. !ore than 23ent of victims of illegal mass arrests and mass detention, massacres, assassination, torture, forced massuation, illegal searches and looting, se'ual molestation, %om%ardment, e'tortion and the like come fromanks of ordinary people. Hundreds of thousands have %ecome victims of direct physical a%use %y thests.

&t least three million people have %een displaced, especially in the countryside, through fascistmidation. People have %een forced to a%andon their homes, crops and small landholdings due to enemy

nterinsurgency* campaigns, e'pansion of corporate farming, )infrastructure* pro1ects and real estate

ulation.The elimination or drastic diminution of political and economic rights and opportunities is causing

cula%le suffering to the %road masses of the people. (n such a situation, more people are lia%le to sufferession of the most direct and %rutal kind.

The mass organi0ations of national-democratic character and the critical press are %anned. The workersdeprived of their right to strike and the effective e'ercise of their trade union rights. The right of theants to self-organi0ation is sa%otaged %y military operations and %y the imposition of the )samahang


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n*. The students, together with their teachers, are under close guard and even student governments andications are prohi%ited.

$very means of democratic e'pression is shut off. &ll forms of mass action opposing fascist, feudalimperialist a%uses are e'pressly prohi%ited. $ven private conversations are lia%le to %e considered

mor-mongering*. wnership and operation of even mimeographing machines and other minor printingpment are also severely restricted. There are not only the written penalties %ut also the far more severelties imposed %y the fascist torturers, murderers and e'tortionists.

Under the suffocating fascist martial rule, the %road masses of the people have no course %ut to fight. They learn daily to resist their enemy. The !arcos fascist dictatorship has stood out as the %est teacheregative e'ample. The learning process is so deep-going that the people increasingly detest not only thecos fascist dictatorship %ut also the entire ruling system.

The !arcos fascist dictatorship has, instead of effecting )peace and order*, fanned the flames of armedtance. The 4ew People#s &rmy, led %y the Party, has only strengthened itself and e'panded in the face ofst a%uses and %ar%arities. There are now tested guerrilla forces of the people#s army in all regionsde !anila-5i0al.

The armed resistance for self-determination among the people of southwestern !indanao has %eened and fueled %y the a%uses of the !arcos fascist dictatorship. This has constituted a great thoughect support to the revolutionary armed struggle of the 4ew People#s &rmy.

& revolutionary underground is thriving all over the country. This is composed mainly of %asiclutionary forces led %y the Party. &llied forces and other antifascist forces also have their ownrground activities. (n time to come, a powerful groundswell will overthrow the !arcos fascisttorship.

The !arcos fascist dictatorship is e'tremely isolated and is under fire from all directions. Contrary towishes it cannot %e at the center of a )%alancing act* %etween left and right. (t is the ultra-right. (t hase itself the target of a %road antifascist movement.

The economic crisis has rapidly worsened, making the core of the political tyranny more rottenyday. This crisis is generated %y the !arcos fascist dictatorship through its own profligacy anduption and its su%servience to U.. imperialism which is shifting the %urden of its crisis to a semicolonialndent like the Philippines.

&ll our Party cadres and mem%ers must %e well ac"uainted with the fast changing economic data in thetry as a whole and in the local areas where they are so that they can give clear su%stance to theiraganda and agitation.

Prices have %een soaring since 6278 %ut these have %een soaring even more rapidly since the impositionascist martial rule. Price increases have %een %y several hundreds of percent since 6279. (mportedmodities lead the way. The repeated oil price increases o%tained %y the U.. oil companies alone havea ma1or factor in pushing up prices in the country.

evere scarcities of locally produced commodities have %een occurring and have %een pushing up priceuse the main focus of the fascist regime is to encourage production of raw material for e'port and %uildhe )infrastructure* for it. :omestic prices of e'porta%le commodities have risen so fast %ecause e'ports%eing made without prior attention to local needs. ;ood production is also grossly inade"uate and foodirements are dependent on imports.

The income of the toiling masses are forced down to yield high profits to the U.. and other foreignopolies and the local e'ploiting classes. Wage levels have sunk too far %elow the price of %asicmodities. The wage increases recently announced %y the fascist regime do not correspond to the inflatione 6278 and can %e completely circumvented due to the loopholes provided %y the antila%or fascist regime.

(t is openly admitted in watered-down statistics of the reactionary government that the purchasinger of the peso has gone down from 62>


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avos. This is %ad enough. ut the fact is that the purchasing power of the peso has certainly gone down toess than 98 centavos.

&ccording to no less than the 4ational $conomic :evelopment &uthority, the top economic agency offascist regime, a worker must earn P=3.88 daily for his family to su%sist. &nother agency, the Privateelopment Corporation of the Philippines, has also arrived at the slightly higher figure of P=


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& great deal of foreign loans incurred %y the !arcos fascist dictatorship has %een used to put up ill-ned and inflationary )infrastructure* pro1ects %eneficial essentially to the foreign investors and the localoiting classes. The purpose is not only to make propaganda out of showy pu%lic works %ut also to enrichascist dictator and his henchmen through contract-pulling, kick%acks and real estate speculation. !arcosontrolling interests now in the ma1or local construction firms and related companies.

The manipulation of pu%lic works is an old %ureaucrat-capitalist method of self-enrichment whichcos has indulged in an unprecedentedly colossal manner. )(nfrast ructure* pro1ects are always priced highe the actual inflationary trend. & ma1or part of the )cost* of every construction pro1ect represents the

uption of the fascist dictator and his top henchmen. The %urden that is the fascist dictatorship#sligacy and corruption is always passed on to the people in the forrn of higher ta'es and higher tollges or service fees.

The ta' %urden has increased a%ruptly so many times. This increased from P %illion in 627= and has continued to rise. &nd yet revenues of the reactionary government fall far short'penditures. The %udgetary deficit for fiscal year 627=-73 is P3.8 %illion, almost e"uivalent to the totalet of only a few years ago. &side from foreign %orrowing, the fascist dictatorship has had to resort toy local %orrowing. &t P98.7 %illion in fiscal year 627=-73, the local pu%lic de%t is now rapidlyoaching P>8 %illion, skyrocketing from the 6279 figure of P2.7 %illion.

The new development in the %udgeting of the reactionary government under fascism is the rapid increaseppropriations for the military and the num%er one position of military e'penditures. efore fascist martial

e'penditures for pu%lic education and pu%lic works always vied for the top position, with those for theary running a poor third. ut of the total 627=-73 e'penditures of P6A.3 %illion, the share of the militaryore than P=.8 %illion, including some P6.8 %illion for intelligence.

n the whole, the e'penditures of the reactionary government has %een mainly for %eefing up theonnel and e"uipment of the reactionary armed forces, increasing salaries and privileges of militaryers, purchasing office materials and vehicles, ac"uiring pu%lic works e"uipment, paying privateractors, maintaining the general payroll, servicing pu%lic de%ts and the like. (n every money transactionlving the fascist dictatorship, there is the inevita%le cost that goes for graft and corruption.

There is no economic development whatsoever. :eterioration is the precise word for it. The grossonal product is no gauge for economic growth. The transactions of the reactionary government, thegn monopoly capitalists and the local e'ploiting classes compose the %ulk of this gross national product., this can %e no %asis for per capita income . !ore than 28 percent of the people live the lives of theoited workers and peasants.

The %road masses of the people are suffering the worst kind of life since the end of World War (( . Theyand their democratic rights and the improvement of their livelihood. With the !arcos fascist dictatorshiprting to %rutal methods to escape responsi%ility, the %road masses of the people have no choice %ut toge in various forms of resistance.

The workers are clamoring for higher wages and their right to strike. They must lift themselves from thera%le life of e'tremely low wages and rapidly rising price of %asic commodities. enefits hard-earned

ugh several decades of workers# struggle have %een eliminated or drastically reduced. While opposing thekers# interests, the fascist regime su%1ects the workers# pay checks to withholding ta'es and various kinds

ecial levies. There is no way out %ut to undertake the strike movement.

:espite the fascist prohi%itions, the masses of workers have gone on to make strikes, slowdowns,wns, delegations, trooping the offices, demonstrations and other forms of mass protest. The more thannty workers# strikes and four street demonstrations %etween cto%er last year and Bune this year is aal for far %igger storms to come in !anila-5i0al and other areas. The workers have proven that they cand firm against fascist intimidation and in many cases have actually won some of their demands.

The peasant masses are opposed to the rapidly rising costs of their su%sistence and production, theary operations against them and the people#s army, the higher land rent and loss of tenancy rights under


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ogus land reform, the onerous conditions of the supervised credit system +!asagana 22, the heavy leviested under the )samahang nayon* and the )%arangay,* the depression of their real income, the loss ofestead rights and the e'pansion of corporate farming.

The soil for the revolutionary antifeudal movement and armed struggle in the countryside is more fertileever %efore. $verywhere the peasant masses welcome the people#s army. Without this condition, the

l and weak people#s army would not have grown in strength and would have %een crushed %y the enemy.n in cases where the 5ed fighters were forced out from an area %y e'tremely large enemy forces, theyediately come upon a favora%le situation in the area to which they shift.

The ur%an petty %ourgeoisie are also hard pressed %y the economic crisis and feel a%used %y thedemocratic policies of the fascist dictatorship. Their limited and often fi'ed incomes are ravaged %ytion. Those who own some small enterprises or prac tice some profession resent the ever-increasing ta'es.intelligentsia resent the !arcos press monopoly and are steadily gaining courage to speak out their mindsact accordingly.

The student masses and some of their teachers are stirring. eing the most concentrated section of theligentsia, apart from those in the government service who have to act more cautiously, they are steadilyfesting their service against not only the repressive conditions in campuses %ut also the rampant evils ofascist puppet dictatorship in society as a whole. They are an effective link of the ur%an petty %ourgeoisie

e toiling masses.

The national %ourgeoisie are discriminated against in favor of the foreign monopoly capitalists. They%eing forced into %ankruptcy or a%sorption %y the foreign monopolies to which even retail trading has

given %ack. The fascist dictatorship keeps on increasing the ta' %urden on them. They resent the factwhile ta'es are collected from them, there is no effective representation of their interests.

There are groups and groups among the national %ourgeoisie opposed to the !arcos fascist dictatorship.y are steadily speaking out their minds in legal organi0ations, forums and pamphlets. ome of theseps are secret in nature and hanker for some solution like the assassination of !arcos and the conveninge interim national assem%ly and lay themselves open to manipulation %y another set of puppets of U..rialism.

Though the !arcos fascist dictatorship has %een put up avowedly in the interest of the comprador %ig

geoisie and the landlord class, the economic crisis has %ecome so serious that spoils are %ecoming moremore limited for division among them. There is a growing split %etween those who are satisf ied with thecos fascist dictatorship and those who are not. This is fertile soil for the maneuvers of !arcos# politicals. & case in point is the disenchantment of the %loc of sugar landlords after %eing deprived of a directon e'ports and dollar earnings.

The o%1ective conditions for making revolution are e'cellent more than ever %efore. The %asicradictions in Philippine society are intensifying. (nstead of saving the ruling system, the !arcos fascisttorship has further 1eopardi0ed its very e'istence. &ll that is needed is to resolutely strengthen such

ective forces of the revolution as the Party, the 4ew People#s &rmy, the mass organi0ations and the localns of political power.

URTHER STRENGTHEN THE PARTYAND RECTIFY OUR ERRORS!

We must further strengthen the Party ideologically, politically and organi0ationally. We have madee modest achievements on the %asis of which we can advance further. ut we have also had certain errorsweaknesses which we must rectify so that we will not %e weighed down and dragged down %y these and sowe will win more and greater victories.


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The reesta%lishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines on the theoretical foundation of'ism-/eninism-!ao Tsetung Thought constitutes a victory of profound and far-reaching significance inPhilippine revolution. We have set down and clarified the correct ideological and political line of they.

To set the Philippine revolution on the correct course, we have studied and researched into the historycircumstances of the ;ilipino people and the Party and put out the necessary documents and writings fordification of all ;ilipino revolutionaries. (n the process, we have successfully critici0ed and repudiatedong-standing revisionist lines of the /avas and Tarucs which polluted and suffocated the old merger

y.

We have disseminated the works and propagated the scientific revolutionary teachings of !ar', $ngels,n, talin and !ao and we have successfully critici0ed and repudiated oviet modern revisionism and

al-imperialism. Chairman !ao#s works have %een widely circulated %ecause they not only deal correctlyela%orately with pro%lems of a people#s democratic revolution in a semicolonial and semifeudal countryalso %ecause they contain the latest and most comprehensive summing-up of the e'perience of the worldetariat and people.

To propagate the !ar'ist-/eninist stand, viewpoint and method, we have undertaken study courses, putanalyses of current national and international events, promoted further researches of national and regional

es and re"uired social investigations and criticism and self-criticism as methods for raising ourogical level and improving our practical work.

(n our ideological re%uilding, we have had to lay stress on studying %asic !ar'ist-/eninist principlescom%ating the modern revisionism of the oviet and local renegades. We have had to rely considera%ly onks dealing with successful revolutions led %y fraternal parties a%road. We ourselves have had to gough more revolutionary e'perience than what we started with in order to deepen our grasp of !ar'ism-nism. &nd "uite a num%er of our Party cadres are of petty-%ourgeois %ackground who definitely have %ook learning than e'perience.

Under these circumstances, the dogmatist tendency more than the empiricist has %een most prominentng those ideologically in error. (nstead of making concrete investigations and analyses in linking with thees, there are some of us who would rather rest content with parallelisms, analogies, "uotations andsemongering. There is even the notion that we do not deserve to %e called revolutionaries if we cannota successful revolution a%road.

There are also those who seem to grasp the %asic principles and lessons derived from our criticism anddiation of the /avas and Tarucs %ut fail to grasp our own course of development and the differentrete circumstances that we are in. They fail to understand that we can advance only step %y step and thatannot apply on ourselves completely the same course of thinking and action demanded of the /avas andcs on the %asis of forces availa%le to them and circumstances o%taining at the end of World War ((.

While the dogmatist tendency prevails among those in error, there are also those who remain immersedheir own narrow and limited e'perience either %ecause they are given no chance of developingogically or are merely %row%eaten or they systematically react to the dogmatist tendency with their own

dance of theoretical study.

&fter more than seven years, our reesta%lished Party has gained enough e'perience to %e in a new stagenowing clearly the specific characteristics and specific re"uirements of our revolutionary struggle in thee country and in the various localities. (t is in this spirit that we call for rectification of ideologicals.

Those who have an advantage in %ook learning must link themselves closely to and learn from theng masses of workers and peasants and from our comrades who have an advantages in e'perience. &tame time, comrades who are of worker and peasant status must not shirk the responsi%ility of relatinge'perience to theory and asking that theory must %e disclosed in a language easy to understand.


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There is paucity of e'changes of worthwhile e'periences within the Party, especially %etween ourral regional Party organi0ations. To promote these, the Central Committee is putting out 5e%olusyon asnternal and theoretical %ulletin, e'clusively for Party mem%ers. We intend to pu%lish here, apart fromments and directives from the Central Committee, mainly documents emanating from regional Partyerences and articles that are the result of the application of !ar'ist theory in the course of concretelutionary practice, social investigations, study courses and criticism and self-criticism sessions.

We also intend to undertake conferences among representatives of various regional Party organi0ationsencourage the attendance in regional Party conferences of representatives of other regional Party

ni0ations. (n this way, the most detailed yet discreet e'changes of e'perience are made possi%le.

We urge all Party mem%ers to contri%ute to the general effort of giving !ar'ism a national form. Weld disa%use ourselves of the idea that only a few theoreticians know theory and know how to apply it. Weriumph only if the entire Party consistently applies !ar'ist-/eninist theory on the concrete conditions ofhilippine revolution.

The Party has esta%lished its political leadership of the proletariat in the revolution %y laying down,fying and carrying out the general line of people#s democratic revolution. This is a great victory. Wemade clear the character, the motive forces, targets and perspective of this revolution.

The character of the revolution is determined %y its essential task, which is to li%erate the people fromgn and feudal domination and esta%lish an independent and democratic Philippines. uch a task can %emplished only %y waging armed struggle as the main form among the motive forces to isolate and destroyarget or enemy.

&t the helm of the motive forces is the proletariat. (t takes as its main ally, the peasantry whose demandand is the main content of the people#s democratic revolution and from which the main contingents of thele#s army can %e drawn. The %asic alliance of the toiling masses of workers and peasants is the soliddation for the united front which must win over the ur%an petty %ourgeoisie firstly and the nationalgeoisie secondly.

The targets of the revolution are the comprador %ig %ourgeoisie and the landlord class. ur currentlutionary struggle against the !arcos fascist dictatorship is more than a struggle against the rulinge. (n the course of fighting this cli"ue, we must develop the strength to weaken the entire ruling system

hen topple it in the end.The perspective of the people#s democratic revolution is socialism. The socialist revolution must %egin

the completion of the people#s democratic revolution. Though we are ready to give concessions to they %ourgeoisie and national %ourgeoisie in a period of transition, we shall no longer pass through a fulle of capitalist development as in the case of the old democratic revolutions %efore the era of imperialismproletarian revolution.

(n line with the people#s democratic revolution, we have esta%lished the 4ew People#s &rmy andched the revolutionary armed struggle. ur st rategic line is to encircle the cities from the countryside andugh a protracted period of time develop rural %ases from which to advance to sei0e political power.

/ike the Party, the people#s army started from scratch and immediately launched revolutionary armedgle. The people#s army has grown in strength step %y step, won military victories against powerful odds

won the hearts and minds of millions %y its heroic deeds.The people#s army has %een the main instrument of the Party in organi0ing the peasant masses.

dreds of thousands of people in the %arrios have come directly under the %arrio organi0ing committeesni0ed %y our guerrilla s"uads and armed propaganda teams. We have esta%lished small guerrilla %asesfar more e'tensive guerrilla 0ones, carried out mass movements and initiated land reform. (n the face offascist enemy, we have continued to organi0e and lead large masses of people. $ven when our %arrioni0ing committees collapse in one area due to a massive and prolonged enemy campaign, those in others increase to more than make up for the losses and even these losses are temporary, still open to recovery.


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(n support of the mass movement and armed struggle in the countryside, great mass movements have%een raised %y the Party in the cities. The first "uarter storm of 6278 and succeeding mass actions inila-5i0al and other ur%an areas have %roadcast our revolutionary propaganda all over the country and

yielded to us a considera%le num%er of Party and non-Party activists who have %een shifted to thetryside or who continue to develop the revolutionary mass movement in the cities.

(t is a matter of necessity in the countryside to e'pand at a rate fast enough to have a wide area foreuver for our guerrilla forces. ;or the purpose, we have %een setting up the %arrio organi0ing committees.e we have re"uired the organi0ation of these committees to follow the policy of the antifeudal united, many of these are so hapha0ardly organi0ed that unrelia%le elements creep in, prevail over the poor and

dle peasants and flaunt their functions while the enemy is not yet around.

The error of hapha0ard organi0ing oftentimes characteri0ed %y lack or insufficiency of socialstigation and %y yielding mem%ership in the %arrio organi0ing committee to whomever are the initialacts in a %arrio, leads on to another error. The work of consolidation is not attended to. The %asic massni0ations for peasants, workers, women, youth, children and cultural activists are not organi0ed andili0ed to ensure sustained all round mass support for the revolution. Thus, the surrounding waters may %e%ut shallow.

When we cannot apply the principle of com%ining a few cadres from the outside with many local

ists, i t is even very likely that the scope of our political work is narrow. Thus, we must handle well theionship of e'pansion and consolidation, of making the guerrilla 0one and the guerrilla %ase a gooding front for us.

(n cases of errors with disastrous results, the principal tendency has %een adventurism or )/eft*rtunism. With mass support wide or narrow %ut shallow there are those who engage in military actions

nst enemy troops and then when enemy reaction rises, they do not know where to go or the enemy catcheswith them. They fail to recogni0e that to support and ensure the success of any important action, military

herwise, re"uires painstaking mass work.

There are petty-%ourgeois elements who are still unremolded and who think that it suffices to %eat them -- make sweeping propaganda %ut forget to do solid organi0ational work among the masses -- and who

think that the military action of a few courageous men must precede solid organi0ational work among thees.

5elying on a mere committee dominated %y unrelia%le %ut prestigious personalities has also spawnedmandism. The chairman and the chief of defense of the %arrio organi0ing committee often neglect to havecollective life within the committee. &nd in the a%sence of militant mass organi0ations, the trend is tor people around and make them do what is %eyond their level of consciousness and organi0ation.

While we oppose )/eft* opportunism as the principal tendency among those of us in error, we must alson guard against 5ight opportunism. ur insistence on taking the mass line, esta%lishing the %asic massni0ations and laying the foundation for a truly people#s war should not %e twisted to mean the indefiniteponement of tactical military offensives even when conditions for them are already ripe.

There have %een manifestations of the 5ight opportunist tendency in the countryside. To consciously letnrelia%le elements in %arrio organi0ing committees and rela' with the transitory advantages that theyide is one. To en1oy the conveniences of one %arrio and fail to venture out and do mass work in anothero is another. To remain fi'ed on going after local %ad elements and fail to push forward the land reformhe armed struggle is still another.

(n the cities, there is the )/eft* opportunist notion prevalent among those of us in error that there can %eevolutionary struggle when there are no strikes, demonstrations and other conspicuous mass protestns. They fail to recogni0e that it is perfectly revolutionary struggle to lay down the foundation for theseer forms of political action %y doing solid organi0ational work among the masses.


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There is also the notion among those of us in error that sweeping propaganda work suffices to mo%ili0epeople. There is still another notion that the economic struggle of the workers can %e slurred over,eas we must grasp it at its own level and steadily raise it to the level of the political struggle.

There have also %een instances of 5ight opportunism in a certain region. ne is the proposal torimpose the slogan demanding general election in the country on other slogans asserting the democratics and interests of the %asic masses. &nother is making flimsy demands to avoid even only %asic traden demands and the necessary preparations for pushing them forward.

While we have pointed out that sweeping propaganda does not suffice %y itself in revolutionary work,ecogni0e that it is of great importance and that without it mass organi0ing is without an advance noticealso without direction. We need to step up our propaganda work if we are to enhance our all-roundlutionary work. ur capacity for propaganda and agitation will certainly rise as the %asic masses are wellni0ed and activists from their ranks increase.

The corrective measures that we need to undertake in our political work will %e dealt with moreoughly in succeeding sections of this statement.

The mem%ership of the Party is drawn generally from the ranks of activists of the revolutionary massni0ations and 5ed fighters of the 4ew People#s &rmy. (t is clear that our mem%ership is closely linkedthe masses and em%edded in the revolutionary mass movement. ut up to now, our Party is mainly a

e party. We have thus remained a small party.

The Party started with less than a score of Party mem%ers coming from the old merger party and 73pective mem%ers in late 62


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The fascist martial rule cannot %e used as the main reason for the slow growth of the Party. Thetures of this tyrannical rule has %een more than compensated for %y the deep-going hatred and growingtance of the %road masses of the people. (n no year has the enemy struck down more than five percent of

mem%ership of the Party. The Party should %e a%le to achieve a high rate of growth %ecause it is small %utposed mostly of cadres, if only we grasp the necessity and importance of mass mem%ers of the Party fromanks of the workers and peasants.

The !anila-5i0al %ased national %ureaus served positively from 6276 to 627> not only asnistrators of the city-%ased national mass organi0ations %ut also as schools for a considera%le num%er ofParty recruits. (n the first year of martial rule, it also served positively to direct the orderly retreat of the organi0ations suddenly forced to go underground. ut in 627=, it %ecame very clear that the national

aus had outlived their purposes.

(t is admitted that the period of one year after the first year of martial rule and %efore their dissolutionuly 627= constituted a %ig delay which unduly restricted the disposition of good cadres for variousonal Party organi0ations eager and ready to get them.

(t remains our policy to e'pand the Party %oldly on the %asis of the revolutionary movement and withoutng in a single undesira%le. We must follow the reasona%le standards set %y the Party constitution and we

increase the num%er of Party mem%ers who are of worker and peasant status. (n this regard, we must

in mind that we do not wish to %e an e'clusively cadre party.

We want a large mass of Party mem%ers who are of worker and peasant status %ecause this is a measuree effectiveness of our revolutionary work, %ecause we want to accomplish gigantic tasks that mainlyern and involve them and %ecause we want to counteract and dilute the negative influences that Party%ers coming from other classes are lia%le to %ring into the Party.

The Party upholds democratic centralism as its %asic organi0ational principle. This is centrali0edership %ased on democracy and democracy guided %y centrali0ed leadership. y this principle, we cand and act united and well informed on any important matter. We must apply this principle consistently.

The committee system at every level of leadership, from the Central Committee down to the %ranchutive committee, is the most important tool of the principle of democratic centralism. The leadingmittee at a certain level is the point of concentration for an entire Party organi0ation on that level and for

r organs and lower organi0ationsD and within the collectivity of the committee democracy, is carried overthe lower ranks.

With so few Party mem%ers taking on large tasks, there is a tendency for a far fewer Party leaders toon large tasks. When the Party leaders are often attending to large tasks in different places and have

culties in often coming together, there is always the danger that single Party leaders decide matters thatld %e taken up in a committee.

Thus, there are conditions for the phenomenon of one-man monopoly of affairs to arise. (ndeed it hasn in the Party and we have %een com%ating this for a long time. Until now, it persists %ecause theitions for it to keep on arising persist.

The standard organi0ational solution to this pro%lem is to have a smaller standing committee morey convened than the full and large committee to act and decide on matters under the guidance of standing

cies. ;or instance, there is the Political ureau of our Central Committee, then there is the $'ecutivemittee and still there is the ?eneral ecretariat. There is the e'ecutive committee of the regionalmittee and then there is the secretariat.

(t takes good 1udgment %ased on e'perience and full grasp of policies for a Party leader to make ampt decision on an urgent matter. He could %e like an army commander in an emergency military situation.always as soon as possi%le he must su%mit his decision or action to a collective %ody.

&ny Party leader can initiate or propose a draft or anything, though it is the chairman or the secretaryis e'pected to perform this leading role. ut there must %e some preparatory meeting in a smaller


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mittee %efore presentation of matters %efore the plenary meeting of a larger committee. (n this way, thereoroughness in preparation and in the entire process of decision-making.

ureaucratism is also an error contravening the spirit of democratic centralism. ur cadres should notthemselves to merely receiving reports %ut they should go down for worthwhile periods of time to lowers and to the grassroots to investigate for themselves the %asis for policies, verify reports and study the

ectness or incorrectness of policies.

?oing down to the grassroots is good for the remolding of high and middle level Party cadres. We domean to say that they a%andon their functions in the leading organs %ut for them to perform these %etter.we do not mean that they dissipate their efforts in going around to many places. ut they must go downvestigate typical or critical situations +whatever is the main pro%lem that needs close attention and linkselves closely with the masses.

The central leadership no less has undertaken certain special pro1ects re"uiring special detachment ofonnel, heavy fi'ed investments and special methods of work that are not assured of effective or sufficientort %y the masses in the vicinity of operation. These should no longer %e undertaken %ecause these easily

failure and unduly preoccupy the leadership with matters of secondary importance to a self-reliantlutionary movement.

&t lower levels of the Party, there have also %een instances of %usiness and other pro1ects that tend toact Party leaders from their fundamental tasks. (f these pro1ects are %eneficial to the revolution, theyld %e undertaken %y trustworthy personnel without wasting the time of Party leaders and without riskingesources of the Party which are much needed for other purposes.

&ll leaders and mem%ers of the Party must %e diligent and thrifty. $very moment must %e sei0ed tonce the revolution. $very centavo must %e spent wisely. Upon our diligence and thrift, we can fruitfully

y out the policy of self-reliance.

(n this period of fascist martial rule, the Party must not only %e vigilant %ut e'tra-vigilant. We mustcontempt for the enemy strategically %ut we must take serious, meticulous account of him tactically. The

that the Party has always %een underground and involved in armed struggle since the very %eginningws that it has always %een prepared and e"uipped to face the worst of eventualities. ut there areera%ilities that we must %e aware of so that we can guard against them.

(n the cities, we must %e aware that the open activists of legal progressive organi0ations %efore fascistial rule have %een used %y the enemy as unwitting tracers of the Party underground. !any of theseists have %een apprehended and some of them are proven or merely suspected Party mem%ers. We musty the policy of shifting or reassigning those Party mem%ers who can no longer effectively work in theirent ur%an assignment.

(n the countryside, the Party mem%ers on the manhunt list of the enemy should adapt to the fluidity ofguerrilla act ivity. The risks are also high in the countryside %ecause we have mere guerrilla s"uads and atmost guerrilla platoons. ut certainly, here we can rely on mass support that is %igger over wideriguous areas than in the cities. Party mem%ers who cannot work freely in the cities can work here far freely.

(n %oth cities and countryside, a num%er of comrades have sacrificed their lives and lim%s or have fallen

the hands of the enemy and have suffered the most e'cruciating torture and the torment of incarceration.e include some mem%ers of the Central Committee and various regional Party committees.

We honor and emulate our martyrs and heroes. &nd we convey to our comrades in prison to steelselves further while in prison and turn the prison into a school. We should learn from their e'perience.

ong as our regional Party organi0ations keep on growing through revolutionary struggle, there is always as for cadres to come forward and replenish as well as reinforce the Central Committee and the regionaly committees.


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nly so few among those who have fallen into the hands of the enemy have %ecome traitors or %etrayers.e are also those few who cannot stand the difficulties of the struggle and drop out or surrenderselves to the enemy. &ll these renegades are only a handful and do not make even two percent of thosehave fallen into the hands of the enemy. We should learn from their negative e'amples.

The Party reflects the ini"uitous society outside. Thus, there are errors and weaknesses. &nd there arefew who go over%oard completely and %ecome traitors. (t is clear that within the Party the law ofradiction and the law of class struggle operate. ut our Party mem%ers in general are certainly good. They stands united to further strengthen itself.

UILD THE REVOLUTIONARY MASS MOVEMENT

N THE COUNTRYSIDE!

We must %uild the revolutionary mass movement in the countrysideD and we must %uild the %asic massni0ations for the peasants, youth, women, children and cultural activists to %e a%le to generate it. 4oth can %e accomplished in mo%ili0ing the great masses if our propaganda teams and guerrilla s"uads limitorgani0ing to the %arrio organi0ing committees and small local armed groups.

The key point in our rural mass work is to arouse and organi0e the peasant masses in the shortesti%le time and carry out the land reform movement step %y step. (n the course of focusing attention on theni0ation of the peasant association in a typical farming %arrio, the other %asic mass organi0ations can%e organi0ed. The peasant activists can easily move the youth, women, children and cultural activists ofown class to accomplish their self-organi0ation.

The farm workers# association, the union of nonagricultural workers and fishermen#s association are%asic mass organi0ations that should %e organi0ed wherever there is a %asis. (n cases where there aredy mass organi0ations positively working for the people#s interests, all that we do is to adopt them andform them further into revolutionary organi0ations.

There is really no point in feeling sorry that there is a paucity of Party cadres to attend to rural massk. & propaganda team or guerrilla s"uad can rely on the local mass activists and can cover so many

os, even as many as twenty within si' months. (t is even possi%le for one, two or three e'periencedes from the outside to work initially with the local mass activists and cover several %arrios within aively short period.

The local mass activists emerging at every stage of the process of developing the revolutionary massement are themselves prospects for recruitment into the Party. Through this process, new Party mem%erson arising and local Party %ranches can %e esta%lished.

We must rely on and trust the masses. o long as we grasp their interests, needs and demands throughal investigation and close contact with them, we can arouse and guide them to set themselves into motion.y can very well organi0e and mo%ili0e themselves along the correct path. There are always enoughists arising from their own ranks to firm up the revolutionary direction of their movement.

There must %e a series of careful steps in organi0ing the people in a %arrio, especially under the present

h conditions of fascist martial rule. There are four of these steps which culminate in the full organi0atione %asic mass organi0ations.

The first step is to get relia%le contact men or liaison men in a %arrio that we wish to organi0e. The%er of these can range from three to ten. Within the shortest possi%le time, we should form them into what

may call the %arrio liaison group. This has %een called the )%arrio organi0ing group* in Central /u0on andorgani0ed group of contacts* in outhern Tagalog.

Usually, we can get the contact men in a %arrio %ecause of our preceding mass work in an ad1oiningo. This is advancing wave upon wave. (t is inevita%le that the people in one %arrio have relatives and


14/31

ds in the ne't %arrio. ometimes too, we can reach a %arrio where work must %e done and get the contactor liaison men %ecause a Par ty mem%er, a 5ed fighter or activist or any relia%le person has relatives ords in that %arrio.

Preliminary social investigation can %e done on a %arrio in a day or a few days, depending on the%ility and knowledgea%ility of our initial contact men. The shortcomings of some of these contact men%e made up for %y further contacts. We must gather all the general and specific information we need topolitical work in the %arrio.

There is e'pediency in forming the %arrio liaison group from out of the contact men that we initiallye to know through relia%le intermediaries. &lthough we try immediately to put the %est availa%le men inroup, it may not %e possi%le all the time to get the %est representatives of the people in the %arrio. &ftert takes time to develop revolutionary activists. ometimes, the contact men may all come from only oneof sitio of a %arrio or from only one section of the %arrio population.

ut we must make sure that the mem%ers of the %arrio liaison group are desirous of revolution, areents of the e'ploited classes, are known to %e honest and good people, have e'tensive relations in theo, are intelligent and resourceful and are conscientious in performing the tasks that we give them.

The functions of the %arrio liaison group include assisting us in social investigation, conducting initialaganda among the people, putting us in touch with the positive forces and elements in the %arrioually and secretly, and making sure that we are secure in our entry into, stay in and e'it from the %arrio.hese functions involve the smoothening of our initial relations with the people in the %arrio.

The %arrio liaison group replaces the %arrio organi0ing committee. ome similarities %etween the twopparent. ut there are %asic differences %etween them.

The %arrio liaison group is no longer empowered nor e'pected to act as an em%ryo of people#srnment in the %arrio. (ts mem%ers do not have the unwritten vested privilege to %ecoming automaticallyhief moving force %ehind the mass organi0ations to %e esta%lished. We depart from the old pernicioustice of giving initial contact men this privilege and therefore we remove or drastically reduce theition for unrelia%le elements to creep into the mass organi0ations.

The group is also under strict advice not to e'pose themselves as the organi0ers of mass meetings. &tsame time, we take care that it does not know more than it should a%out the actual widening andening of organi0ational and political work %eing done in the %arrio. f course, the mem%ers of the groupve political education from us and are tested through work and at least some of them can advance fromg mere contact men. ut the group as a whole does not en1oy any automatic privilege of knowing detailsnd its liaison work.

The second step is for our guerrilla s"uad, propaganda team or cadres to move from one part of theo to another or fan out to several parts at one time to conduct deeper social investigation and carry out

y meetings among the people, especially the poor peasants, farm workers and lower-middle peasants. Weld do everything possi%le to link ourselves closely with the e'ploited masses.

ur mass work should %ear fruit initially in the form of the people#s organi0ing groups. These includepeasant organi0ing groups for the poor and lower-middle peasants, the youth organi0ing group, theen#s organi0ing group and such other organi0ing groups that have a %asis. These are %ased on a division

rritory +sitios and parts of the %arrio center if much larger than the sitio.The organi0ing groups should %e a%le to win the ma1ority of people in their respective fields and initiate

ists to arouse and mo%ili0e them. &t this point, local activists should start to ar ise inside and outside theni0ing groups. The cadres of the Party should make sure through propaganda and study meetings on thenal democratic revolution that politics takes command of all activities.

We must grasp the antifeudal class s truggle as the key link of our rural mass work and we must upholdpoor peasants, farm workers and lower-middle peasants as the most relia%le and resolute revolutionarye in a typical farming %arrio. ut we cannot go far in the antifeudal struggle if we fail to link it well with


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ntifascist and anti-imperialist struggle not only %y way of providing the %asic antifeudal forces with thecomprehensive political view %ut also %y way of %ringing into active play all other positive forces in the

tryside for the revolutionary cause.

The third step can %e taken soon after the esta%lishment of the people#s organi0ing group in all or moste parts of the %arrio. There is already a wide and deep %asis for esta%lishing the people#s organi0ing

mittees on a %arrio-wide scale.

We have already found out who is fit for what function within each committee. The %asic functions toapportioned are those that pertain to organi0ation, education, economy, defense and health. Thertioning of functions should %e settled well within the committee %y the mem%ers upon our guidance. The

mittees should %e capa%le of raising the enthusiasm of the ma1ority of the people in their respective fieldshe revolution and coming into coordination with struggles launched over areas that include severalos.

/ike the organi0ing groups %ased on the parts of the %arrio, which must %e retained as their support, thele#s organi0ing committees should %e an underground force. They must know how to cover their activitieswhatever legal and traditional organi0ations there are in the %arrio and must know how to dissem%le, use

lutionary dual tactics, %efore the enemy or unrelia%le elements.

&s early as the successful esta%lishment of the peasant organi0ing committees over a large area in thetryside, even only some scores of %arr ios, it is possi%le to take such a simple and easy first step towardsreform as the reduction of land rent through the systematic withholding of a certain part of the crop

out the landlords# knowledge. The campaign to reduce interest rates and eliminate usuryD arrange faires with the merchantsD promote savings, mutual aid and simple e'change of la%or and nonpayment ofs under !asagana 22D raise production and productivityD and the like can %e pushed.

(n cases where the landlords have cunningly a%andoned the old practice of sharecropping on the %ases ofctual crop and resorted to the )leasehold* system +the system of high fi'ed land rent promoted %y the

cos fascist dictatorship and %y the /ava revisionist renegades, the tenant masses should deliver only aof the rent and claim %ad crop or some plausi%le reason for the nonpayment of the full rent. (f all theants claim the same reason, the landlords will %e at a lossD they cannot threaten so many with evictionhey might as well simply write into their records the undelivered part of the rent as )de%ts*.

Harvest after harvest, the process of peacea%ly outmaneuvering the landlords can %e done until theye to terms with the peasants. The landlords# threat to deprive the tenants of credit for su%sistence oruction will %e rendered naught %y the peasants# gains from land reform, their thrift, mutual aid andle e'change of la%or and alliance with the well-to-do peasants who come under persuasion not to engageury.

&ny despotic landlord who a%uses his tenants is lia%le to %e punished %y the people#s army or secretps of peasants. (t would not pay for him to refuse to come to terms with the peasants. (t would %ecult for his overseers and for sca%s to show their faces %efore the peasant masses.

:epriving the landlord of a part of the land rent and demanding fair terms from merchants andeylenders can %e achieved only if the peasant masses are well organi0ed, united and have a high level ofical consciousness.

(n a typical farming %arrio, the ma1ority of the population are poor and lower-middle peasants +mostnts %elong to these strata. n this %asis, the peasant organi0ing committee plus the other people#sni0ing committees can have their way through the %arrio councils of the reactionary government. Usingactics of the united front, peasant organi0ing committees can enhance their strength.

The peasant organi0ing committees can actually control the %arangay councils or any legal organi0ationurposes of holding pu%lic meetings favora%le to the peasant masses and for revolutionary dual tactics inace of the enemy. (n effect, they can function as the em%ryo of the people#s governmental authority onown strength, supplemented with cooperation of their allies who are often very much their own relatives

personal friends.


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The fourth step in organi0ing the %arrio people is to fully organi0e the %asic mass organi0ations. (td seem as if the people#s organi0ing committees and groups are a skeleton taking full flesh. &ll mem%ersenlisted and they elect the leading committees of their respective mass organi0ations. The peasantciation includes mainly the poor and middle peasants.

f course, like the antecedent organi0ing committees, the %asic mass organi0ations cannot %e fullyni0ed all at the same time, say in one day or one night. There is the law of uneven development andrences of conditions. ut we must strive that in one definite period in a %arr io or group of %arrios, all the

c mass organi0ations are fully organi0ed. This re"uires planning and consistent work.

The fascist enemy has %een more alert to peasant associations and far more intolerant towards themthe other mass organi0ations. We must %e fle'i%le in adopting legal forms for the peasant associations.

must use different names for them in different %arrios. (n handling them for the revolutionary cause, we%e good at com%ining illegal and legal methods. There must %e open legal activities and clandestine

al activities.

We should %e fully aware of our strength and we should not overstep it. (t is understanda%le if, foridera%le period of time in a given group of %arrios, the antifeudal movement is capa%le only of effectingreduction and other agrarian reforms in the manner that we have descri%ed in discussing the third step.

While e'perience has shown that mass organi0ations other than the peasant association are lessected and less su%1ected to evil measures %y the enemy, we must take the same precautions that we takeaving the peasant association. Whenever the enemy comes to know that a mass organi0ation is led %y they, it is lia%le to %e su%1ected to the most vicious attacks.

$ven when we are still at the second step of organi0ing the people in a %arrio, we should start to carry!ar'ist ideological instruction and recruit into the Party the most advanced elements among the massists so that %y the time we reach the third or fourth step, we shall have %een a%le to esta%lish the local

y %ranch in the %arrio, with a group in every sitio and ma1or part of the %arrio center. &t the fourth step,hall also have Party groups within the %asic mass organi0ations.

Upon the esta%lishment of the %asic mass organi0ations and the local Party %ranch, it %ecomes possi%leta%lish the %arrio revolutionary committee as the organ of democratic political power. (t shall simply %e aer of putting together the representatives of the Party, the %asic masses and allied forces.

(n our old areas where the %arrio organi0ing committees are relia%le and are of sound character, weld work as fast as possi%le for their dissolution %y esta%lishing the %asic mass organi0ations, the local

y %ranch and the organ of democratic political power. We can speak of working fast here, at least fasterin new areas, %ecause we have known the people and worked with them long enough.

When the %asic mass organi0ations flourish, the revolutionary mass movement can make great strides.olutionary studies and propaganda %ecome more widespread and vigorous than %efore. /and reformmes firm. The a%le-%odied volunteers from every mass organi0ation can %e formed into the local militiagiven military training and duties. The campaign for higher production %ecomes effective. $very massni0ation has a special agricultural plot or cottage enterprise to support the revolution. Cultural activitiessom and raise the people#s fighting spirit against the enemy. Health work is also attended to on a masse.

Under these circumstances, the foundation for greater military victories %y the 4ew People#s &rmy isThe people#s fighting spirit is ever rising. There is a%undant material support for the revolutionary

d struggle %ecause of land reform, higher production and special production. The local militia are aerful reserve and au'iliary force of the people#s army. The Party %ecomes well-rooted in the localities %yg into its ranks the most advanced local activists.

URTHER STRENGTHEN THE PEOPLES ARMY AND CARRY FORWARD THE

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED STRUGGLE!


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We must further strengthen the 4ew People#s &rmy as the main form of organi0ation under theership of the Par ty and carry forward the revolutionary armed struggle as the main form of our people#sgle. We have esta%lished a good %asis for the further strengthening of the 4ew People#s &rmy.

ur 5ed fighters have a high level of political consciousness and are closely linked with the masses.

y s"uad has a Party group within it and oftentimes the ma1ority of the 5ed fighters are Party mem%ers.Party %ranch is at presently %ased on the platoon.

The people#s army has grown in rifle strength from early 623 rifles andguns that it started with. The people#s army now has guerrilla forces in all regions outside !anila-5i0alhas a total of twenty guerrilla fronts.

$ach regional army organi0ation is led %y a regional Party committee. The nationwide e'pansion of thele#s army under the direction of the Central Committee is a far cry from its %eginnings in the secondict of Tarlac.

ur army has gained invalua%le e'perience and has %ecome tempered. (t has undergone the acid test ofive and prolonged enemy campaigns. We recall Tarlac of 62, orsogon of

-73 and &urora of 6273. &t the peak of his campaigns, the enemy always employs a num%er of troops than a hundred times %igger than ours, with the support of paramilitary forces, heavy weapons and themodern means of communications and air and land transport.

ur heroic 5ed fighters and Party cadres together with the masses have overcome tremendous odds.pite all the enemy campaigns, marked %y the most wicked forms of )population control,* the people#sy has on the whole grown in armed strength. We have suffered some set%acks. There is not a singleonal army organi0ation which has not suffered serious set%acks at varying times. ut the e'pansion,ing and recoveries %y our guerrilla forces have more than compensated for the losses.

ecause of the nationwide e'pansion of the people#s army, the enemy cannot concentrate his com%atps on one region without risking the advance of our forces in other regions. o far, he has not had thesure of inflicting a total or strategically decisive defeat on all our forces in any single region. Within aon, the e'istence of several guerrilla fronts tend to weaken the enemy campaign whether directed againstr any of these.

:espite all our achievements in %uilding the people#s army, our overall armed strength is still so smallomparison to that of the enemy who is several hundreds of times stronger. The course of historicallopment and the current %alance of forces, particularly our level of armed strength, determine the mode of

warfare, which is guerrilla warfare.

There is no course for us %ut to grow in strength step %y step. ur revolutionary armed struggle is 1usten1oys a%undant support from the people. o long as we adhere to a correct strategy and tactics, we shall

w from small and weak to %ig and strong. To repeat, we shall do so step %y step.

ur people#s war is protracted. (t shall take a long period of time to change the %alance of forceseen us and the enemy. We must recogni0e further that at the %ack of the local reactionaries is U..rialism. This superpower will keep on supplying and assisting them at the least. (t regards the Philippines

n important %ase for maintaining itself as a Pacific power and as a position of strength in &sia.

The worldwide decline of U.. imperialism, especially after its failed war of aggression in (ndochina, isnitely favora%le to our revolutionary armed struggle. ut we must also recogni0e that U.. imperialism ise moment hardening its position in the Philippines precisely as a result of its defeats elsewhere and, for atime to come, only a deep-going people#s war can s trike effectively at its foothold.

;riendly forces a%road cannot e'tend military assistance to us as much as we may need or wish. Wereconcile ourselves to the irony that when we need such assistance most it is most difficult for us to get


18/31

he single imperialist power dominating the country is not yet an easy pushover in terms of the ne't fews. &nd his prior hold on our small archipelagic country is a serious factor to contend with.

We have to maintain a high degree of self-reliance in our people#s war. We must rely on ourselves mostinly to a degree higher than many revolutionary armed movements a%road. There is no course for us %utways raise our determination to get all that we need for the armed struggle from our people and from the

my himself in the %attlefield.

ur strategic line in our people#s war is to encircle the cities from the countryside until such time thatecome capa%le of moving on the cities from sta%le revolutionary %ases in the countryside. ;or a long, we have to develop guerrilla warfare on a nationwide scale so as to convert into our advantage thedvantage of fighting in a small archipelagic country, whose countryside is so vast in relation to the citiesragmented into so many islands.

We are at the stage of the strategic defensive and we are precisely at its early su%stage of developingrilla warfare from almost nothing. ;rom almost nothing %ecause of the revisionist line of the /avas andcs that threw away all previous revolutionary gains of the people.

We have only to look at how much armed strength we have in each of the eight regions outside !anila-l to know the magnitude of hard work that we have to do to further increase our s"uads and platoons.n it shall take another magnitude of hard work to advance from the present phase of s"uads and platoons.

(n the whole country or in an entire region, we are on the strategic defensive in the face of the largemy forces encircling us. ut we are capa%le of tactical offensives. (n parts and parts of the countryside,

an achieve local superiority. &t a given moment and in a limited area, we can put a small enemy unit inightest %ag and crush it.

We must launch tactical offensives as the most essential content of our strategic defense. We simplyse to engage our small forces in any strategically decisive engagement with the far larger forces of the

my. 4ot in any region or guerrilla front should this happen. Enowing that large forces of the enemy isi%le, as everything is from a !ar'ist viewpoint, we must take the initiative of maneuvering the enemy to

de his forces and then concentrating our small forces at only that part of the enemy which we are sure ofng out at a given place and time.

We should accumulate the small victories from our am%ushes and raids. ver a period of time, suchries should give %irth to more guerrilla s"uads and platoons. Then our capacity to destroy the enemy will

ease. The highest mark of initiative in our guerrilla warfare is annihilating the enemv and capturing hispons. We should not waste our precious limited ammunition and we should plan well the disposition andnsity of our lines of fire on a given target. There is no point in killing enemy troops if it is not in these of depriving them of the weapons which they would refuse to yield.

We must learn well the rudimentary tactics of guerrilla warfare. We disperse to do propaganda andni0ational work among the masses. We concentrate a superior force to destroy the enemy. We shift ore round to avoid a superior enemy force, learn more a%out it through the masses and through our ownnnaissance and move to an advantageous position politically and militarily.

We can apply our guerrilla tactics well only if we have the wide and deep organi0ed support of thele and we have eliminated the enemy informers and %ad elements who are incorrigi%le. With the

ni0ed masses screening out the enemy, rendering him %lind and deaf, we can foil his attempt toentrate his forces on our small forces. $ven when he is still preparing to attack us, we can learn through

masses his strength and movements and as a result we can act appropriately.

When the enemy is on some short-term offensive and wants to move in on us in superior force, we mustive him of a target and we let him punch the air and there%y e'haust himself. We can remain on the activeeither %y laying an am%ush on a weak part of the enemy disposition, attacking the enemy in an entirelyrent area or simply going elsewhere to do mass work. We should never accept or undertake any %attlewe are not sure of winning. We may not %e a%le to smash an enemy offensive %ut certainly we canrate it.


19/31

(n all our e'perience, it is the massive and prolonged army campaigns, marked %y forced massuation and all kinds of %ar%arities, that have %een our most outstanding pro%lem in the %attlefield. The

my has launched such campaigns in areas where we are relatively strong over a wide area. &t the earlye of such enemy campaigns, when enemy control is not yet tight, we must make him pay as much of ay price as we can e'act from him, without pre1udice to the prompt shifting of our main guerrilla forces toternative guerrilla front or area.

$nemy campaigns, whether short-term or protracted, are very costly to the enemy. That is why theary %udget of the fascist dictatorship keeps on rising. 5epeatedly frustrating them and depriving them ofget will undermine the resources of the reactionary government and also undermine the morale of enemyps who also suffer some deprivations for nothing.

There is nothing wrong a%out shifting when faced with enemy forces ten or a hundred times stronger.is neither accepting defeat nor flightism. This is preserving our forces to destroy the enemy another day.areas that ad1oin or are a short leap from the area %eing encircled %y the enemy and under his heavyentration are also fertile soil for revolution. esides, we can always recover any )lost* area after

etime.

o as not to %e merely forced to shift to an uncertain destination %y an enemy campaign, we should %eared long %eforehand for such an enemy campaign %y developing alternate guerrilla fronts and %y

oying propaganda teams in areas where guerrilla warfare is to %e developed from scratch or is to arise the shifting of guerrilla forces from elsewhere.

The unpopulated forest areas are good passageways and offer good points for schooling and temporaryats. ut to simply wait out a massive and prolonged enemy campaign of a%out one year to two years inorests is to fall for the siege tactics of the enemy. (t is also artificial to %ring a considera%le num%er ofmed masses with you in this kind of retreat. !ovement will %e hampered. ;ood will soon run out andted kaingins are easily detected %y the enemy.

When the masses are %eing forced to evacuate, legal mass struggle should %e launched to oppose andthe evacuation. $ven when the forced mass evacuation is already done these legal mass struggles can go

or the restitution of damage to their crops and homes, for %etter treatment and rationing at evacuationers and for their early return to their evacuated homes.

ome of the masses or selected families can also %e directed %y us to shift mainly on their own and %yrent ways to the area where we are shifting There are many of those who might have relatives and friends. r there are pu%lic lands there which they can open like other people do.

Whenever the time comes for us to recover an area previously a%andoned %y us and then a%andoned %yenemy, we must disarm the )home defense units* left %y the enemy and increase the weaponry of thele#s army. We must clean up those who have %lood de%ts &nd we must %e alert for spies planted in thet of the masses.

We have insisted that for a start in every region we must develop our guerrilla fronts on favora%lein, that is to say, forested, mountainous and hilly terrain with population. (t is in this kind of terraine enemy rule and influence are usually weak and where we can esta%lish our guerrilla %ases within thetest possi%le time at this stage. Here we not only have a wide area for maneuver %ut also easily achieveh in our maneuvers. Here we can %est apply the tactics of )luring in* the enemy. He can not come inout first e'posing himself and alerting us. (t would %e easy for us to %e on the look-out and prepare foroming.

We have also directed that for a start in a region, two or three guerrilla fronts on such a terrain shouldsta%lished. We have %een concerned with the possi%le dissipation of our limited Party cadres andurces %y a previous current that we should have a guerrilla force in every province. ut any regionaly organi0ation can have more than two or three guerrilla fronts, whenever development and conditions

mit.


20/31

While we must take advantage of the most favora%le terrain for our guerrilla warfare, we must strive toe forward from the mountain to the plains and coordinate the revolutionary forces in the mountains and inlains as well as those in the %arrios and in the towns. (n dealing with the islands, we should attend to ther islands first and then the minor ones.

This early, we must also pay attention to the coastal areas. This is important inasmuch as we are anpelagic country.

Conditions are not yet ripe for having a well-known central revolutionary %ase, where the Centralmittee of the Party and the general head"uarters the 4ew People#s &rmy are seated. We should keep the

my guessing and ignorant where our principal leaders are in the countryside. ut certainly at this stage, weld %e firmly taking the steps towards creating such a %ase in the %est possi%le location.

The emergence of the central revolutionary %ase presupposes the achievement of a higher stage in ourle#s war and takes into consideration the development of nationwide guerrilla warfare and internationallopments involving U.. imperialism. We still have a long road to traverse in this regard. f all the

onal Party and army organi0ations, the most directly concerned in %ringing a%out the conditions for thegence of the central revolutionary %ase are 4orthwest /u0on, 4ortheast /u0on and Central /u0on.

(t remains the long-term strategic task of the revolutionary forces of /u0on to destroy the main forces ofnemy. The day is certain to come when the forces from the north and south of /u0on will converge onila-5i0al in a general offensive. (t also remains the long-term strategic task of the revolutionary forces ofdanao and the isayas to draw the forces of the enemy and disperse them. &t certain times, the %ulk of

my forces can %e drawn to !indanao. The area for maneuver for us here is as wide as that in the threeons north of !anila-5i0al, and the people#s army can either take advantage of or coordinate its effortsthe resistance of the angsa !oro &rmy, if integration of the latter is not possi%le.

We have repeatedly pointed to the present low level of armed strength of the 4ew People#s &rmy. Toify this strength, we must give full play to the participation of the people in the revolutionary armedgle. We should not limit this participation to merely providing for the material needs of the full-time 5eders and watching out for the enemy.

We must give political-military training to as many a%le-%odied men and women from the massni0ations and from time to time get the re"uired num%er of volunteers from them to participate in well-

ned military actions where their inferior weapons can %lend with more advanced weapons of the fulltimefighters. (n the hands of so many people inferior weapons can prove to %e superior and yet we make sureat the core of such weapons as %olos, spears, %ows and arrows and homemade e'plosives are good guns.

When the people#s com%ative spirit is kept high %y continuous political education and military training,will make do with any weapon and will use every trick and ruse to disarm the enemy even with %ares. The most important thing is the people#s revolutionary determination and wisdom. (n the future,lar uprisings or insurrections will arise over e'tensive areas.

UILD THE REVOLUTIONARY MASS

MOVEMENT IN THE CITIES!

We must %uild the revolutionary mass movement in the cities %y developing the trade unions, themunity organi0ations, school organi0ations and others and engaging them in a %road democraticement that is distinctly antifascist and anti-imperialist, a movement sympathetic to and supportive of thenctly antifeudal movement in the countryside.

We must pay principal attention to the masses of workers and other ur%an poor. We must get thekers mainly through their workplace and trade unions and also through the communities, where they areed with the other ur%an poor. We must also pay attention to the ur%an petty %ourgeoisie, especially theent masses and their teachers.


21/31

(n undertaking an open democratic movement in the cities, we can invoke the very laws of theionary state which contain hypocritical terms and reform concessions 1ust to ena%le us to go into thet of the masses. &mong the masses, we can create a revolutionary underground and transform legalni0ations or %uild new ones that can militantly yet legally carry forward the national-democratic line stepep.

Com%ining legal and illegal methods, we can develop the revolutionary mass movement in the cities.main tactic is to turn the ta%le against the enemy or to use another metaphor, to take the enemy#s fortresswithin %y strategem +%ut preparations for this are protracted and cannot %e separated from the progress

e revolutionary armed struggle in the countryside.

The open and legal democratic mass movement cannot %e firm, vigorous and well-directed without theal Party at the core. The Party as an underground force must %e the %ack%one of this movement. (t musthe guide, nurturing the movement at every step and seeing to it that the ne't step is taken upon thening of conditions for it.

&s in the countryside, there is nothing discouraging a%out the smallness of the Party amidst the largees in the cities. o long as the mass movement develops, activists emerge and make themselves availa%leecruitment into the Party. Thus, the Party is strengthened to achieve more and assume greater tasks.

(t is only through a reinvigorated mass movement that we can raise the new forces to tackle the newtion created %y fascist martial rule. There is no other way to solve such pro%lems as the constrictions andalthy conspiratorial tendencies of a narrow underground and the enemy#s cunning in looking out for the

y %y merely tailing known activists of days %efore martial rule.

(n this time of severe economic crisis, the masses of workers are stirring and pushing forward theiromic struggle. We must get into this economic struggle and raise it to the level of the political struggle sothe entire working class will not only %e a%le to fight most effectively for its own interests %ut also linkf fully with the rest of the people in the powerful flow of the people#s democratic revolution.

There are immediate conditions and issues which make easy the transformation of the economic strugglea political struggle. &s previously pointed out, the wage and living conditions of the workers aremely pushed down and %enefits put into law %y virtue of several decades of workers# struggle have %eenically reduced %y the fascist dictator. &nd to top these all, the workers are prohi%ited from e'ercising

right to strike in most enterprises 1ust %ecause they are categori0ed as )vital industries* and )e'portstries* %y the fascist dictatorship. (n the main, these are enterprises owned %y U.. and other monopolyalists and %y the %ig comprador %ourgeoisie and %ig landlords.

Whenever the employer gets wind of a plan among the workers to make a mass petition for theovement of their conditions, the easiest thing for him to do is to make )preventive suspensions* and toon the troops and police to show up and %ully the workers. f course, when the strike, slow-down, sit-n or any mass protest action is already on, the armed minions of fascism show up to make arrests ande all sound and fury a%out )su%versives*, )economic sa%otage* and )national discipline*.

The masses of workers have e'perienced the right to strike in times far %etter than the present. Theirent e'perience of intensified oppression and e'ploitation is e'tremely intolera%le to them. Thus, nount of fascist intimidation has deterred them from mass protest actions. These have already developedconcerted strikes and street demonstrations.

We must promote the strike movement and must make it so widespread and so intense to demonstrate tontire nation and people that the fascist ruling cli"ue and %ig %ourgeoisie are so puny and weak and son to the core. We must promote the economic strikes and transform them into political strikes andical demonstrations. We must hit the %ig %ourgeoisie +and foreign monopoly capitalists and theprador %ig %ourgeoisie the hardest. The rate of e'ploitation is highest in their enterprises.

We are presently at the stage of making the economic strikes more widespread. $ven at this stage, theical dimension of such strikes is already coming to the force. We must make solid preparations to %ring multitudes of workers to the streets and pla0as for political demonstrations.


22/31

(n the face of fascist martial rule yellow la%or leaders have %ecome more discredited than ever. The topr aristocrats of the country have %latantly placed themselves in the payroll of the fascist dictatorshipr the so-called Trade Union Congress of the Philippines. thers have %een so cowed and discouraged %yunion restrictions that they have turned to other occupations.

The trade union movement has %ecome more than ever a fertile ground for the revolutionary work of they. The masses of workers are already aware that when the Party is in their midst their economic strugglemes resolute and militant and they %ecome e"uipped with a profound political understanding of theirtion and with a wide range of tactics.

ur propaganda has had some effects. 4ormally, it should outstrip our organi0ational work. ut ouraganda and prestige have too far outstripped what solid results there should %e for our organi0ational

k. We should solve the pro%lem not %y reducing our propaganda. n the other hand, we should ceaselesslyase and amplify it. We should intensify not only our written propaganda of a general character %ut also

orms of ver%al and nonver%al agitation suited to the most specific conditions. ut we must harvest theof propaganda and agitation.

We must conduct organi0ational work among the workers more vigorously than ever %efore inunction with our propaganda and agitation. ince long %efore the fascist rule, the Party has devised thekers# organi0ing committee as an underground force for organi0ational e'pansion among the workers. ut

ing from e'perience in the countryside, specifically in connection with organi0ing a trade union where is none yet, we do not immediately form this committee from out of those workers whom we meet at the

nning.

We can go through a process akin to that in organi0ing the present masses. ;irst step is to organi0e as aer of e'pediency the workers# liaison group from out of those workers with whom we can have relationse %eginning. econd step is for mem%ers of this secret group to introduce to us more workers, comingevery ma1or part of an enterprise, so that we can form a secret organi0ing group in every ma1or part of

enterprise.

Third step is for us to draw representatives or the %est elements from the organi0ing groups to form thekers# organi0ing committee. &t every step, we must deepen our social investigation and provide politicalation and appropriate instructions to the workers that we come into contact with and organi0e.

The workers# organi0ing committee retains the organi0ing groups as its su%sidiaries and improves theirposition whenever necessary. y the time that the committee is esta%lished, it shall have %een ready to up the list of workers# demands to which the ma1ority of the workers are to %e won over %efore theoyers and his agents get wind of it. (t takes only one, two or three capa%le Party cadres to work with the

mittee.

The workers# organi0ing committee can %e formed ahead of the workers# organi0ing group only in casesre we are certain right away that relia%le and capa%le mem%ers are on hand at the %eginning at least forst trade union work. uch cases occur whether the o%1ective is to form a trade union where there is none,

ansform an already e'isting one or to put up one trade union against a thoroughly discredited one.

(n any case, the workers# organi0ing committee and its organi0ing groups are a good means for givingto the emergence of worker activists within them and outside them. The process of winning over therity of workers to a list of union demands, creating the militant unity necessary to pursue such demandsdeveloping the political consciousness of the worker masses are conditions for the emergence of aidera%le num%er of worker activists.

$ven only at the stage of the workers# organi0ing committee and organi0ing groups, our Party cadresld draw into the Party the advanced elements from the ranks of worker activists. Those who are throughthe mass course on the trade union work and the national-democratic revolution can %e immediately

duced to !ar'ism, their very own class ideology to which they are very receptive.


23/31

The ideological, political and organi0ational work of the Party %ranch and the groups under it in therprise is the %est guarantee that revolutionary politics is in command of trade union work. The Partych forms and directs the Party groups em%edded in the leadership of the trade union.

The workers# organi0ing committee and its organi0ing groups are dissolva%le upon the esta%lishment ofParty %ranch and groups within the enterprise and the a%sorption of all the worker activists into theture of the trade union. The organi0ing groups can %e converted into group stewards and certainly a

%er of their mem%ers can "ualify to %e mem%ers of the Party groups. !ore and more workers can %e putstudy circles organi0ed %y the Party.

(t is necessary for some of our Party cadres to draw salaries and allowances from trade unions so as tote their full time to trade union and political work. ut Party mem%ers should not monopoli0e the high

s in the trade union, and the mem%ers of the secretariat of the Party %ranch should not necessarily %ecomehighest leaders of the trade union. We must allow the democratic %roadness of the trade unionD there canood union leaders who cannot yet comply with the re"uirements of Party mem%ership. &nd moreover, weot want to let the enemy cripple the Party %ranch %y simply clamping down on the trade union or its openership.

(n further consideration of tactics in the face of the fascist enemy, trade unions under the effectiveership of the Party should not %e replaced under only one chosen legal la%or federation. This is to prevent

nemy from singling out one nest for attack. ur trade unions can varia%ly %e independent or mem%ers ofous la%or federations. We must determine the %est possi%le status of each trade union.

The Party secretly links and coordinates all our trade unions. ur )independent* unions can retaine income from mem%ership dues and are somewhat saved from control %y the reactionary trade unioners. ut when mem%ers of different la%or federations, our unions h

our urgent tasks

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