osservatorio strategico€¦ · its foreign policy. the atlantic region is the most integrated...

CENTRO ALTI STUDI

PER LA DIFESA

CENTRO MILITARE

DI STUDI STRATEGICI

Osservatorio

Strategico 2019 Issue 1

The Military Center for Strategic Studies (Ce.Mi.SS), founded in 1987 and located at

Palazzo Salviati in Rome, is headed by a Major General (Director) or an Officer of

equivalent rank. The Center is organized on two departments (Strategic Monitoring-

Research) and an External Relations Office. The activities are regulated by the Decree of

the Minister of Defense 21 December 2012.

The Ce.Mi.S.S. carries out study and research activities on strategic, political and military

matters for the needs of the Ministry of Defense. It contributes to the development of

culture and knowledge in favor of the Italian national community.

The activities conducted by Ce.Mi.S.S. are focused to the study of political, economic,

cultural, social and military phenomena and on the effect of the introduction of new

technologies, or phenomena that determine appreciable changes in the security scenario.

The level of analysis is strategic.

For the conduct of study and research activities, Ce.Mi.S.S. employs:

a) military and civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defense with suitable experience and

professional qualification. These personnel is employed by means of temporary

postings, on the basis of the provisions given by the Chief of Defense on an annual

basis, after consultation with the Secretary General of the Defense / National Director of

Armaments;

b) collaborators not belonging to the public administration, (selected in compliance with

specific provisions established on the basis of the subject of the study among experts of

proven specialization).

For the development of culture and knowledge of matters of interest to the Defense,

Ce.Mi.S.S. establishes collaborations with universities, institutes and research centers,

Italian or foreign, and publishes the studies of greater interest.

The Minister of Defense, after consulting the Chief of Defense, in agreement with the

Secretary General of the Defense / National Director of Armaments, for the themes of

respective interest, issues the directives regarding strategic research activities,

establishing the general guidance for the analysis and collaboration activities with the

homologous institutions and defining the study subjects for the Ce.Mi.SS.

The researchers are free to express their thoughts on the topics. The content of the

published studies reflects exclusively the thinking of individual authors, not official position

of the Ministry of Defense or of any military and / or civil institutions to which the

researchers themselves belong

OsservatorioStrategico

2019Issue 1

CENTER FOR ADVANCEDDEFENCE STUDIES

MILITARY CENTERFOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Osservatorio StrategicoYEAR XXI ISSUE I - 2019

DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed in this volume are of the Authors; they do not reflect the official opinion of theItalian Ministry of Defence or of the Organizations to which the Authors belong.

NOTES

The articles are written using open source informations.

The “Osservatorio Strategico” is available also in electronic format (file pdf and ebook) at the followinglink: http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/CeMiSS/Pubblicazioni/OsservatorioStrategico/Pagine/default.aspx

Osservatorio Strategico 2019

This book has been editedby Military Center for Strategic Studies

DirectorRear-Admiral Arturo FARAONE

Deputy Director Col. A.F. Marco Francesco D’ASTAChief Department of Strategic Assessment

Graphic and layout Massimo Bilotta - Roberto Bagnato

AuthorsClaudia Astarita, Claudio Bertolotti, Claudio Catalano, Francesca Citossi, Marco Cochi,Fabio Indeo, Gianluca Pastori, Luca Puddu, Paolo Quercia, Francesco Davide Ragno, Alessio Stilo.

Printed by Typography of the Center for Advanced Defence Studies

Military Center for Strategic StudiesDepartment of Strategic Assessment

Palazzo SalviatiPiazza della Rovere, 83 - 00165 – ROME - ITALYtel. 00 39 06 4691 3204 fax 00 39 06 6879779

e-mail [email protected]

Closed in June 2019 - Printed in July 2019

ISBN 978-88-31203-03-6

Osservatorio StrategicoIndex

Euro/Atlantica (USA-NATO-Partners) 8The European elections and their transatlantic impact Gianluca Pastori

European Defence Initiatives and technological development 12An assessment of Franco-German Future Air Combat System Claudio Catalano

The Balkans and the Black Sea 17The new liquid borders of South Eastern UnionPaolo Quercia

Mashreq, Gran Maghreb, Egypt and Israel 21Libya: the siege of Tripoli and the strategic stalemateClaudio Bertolotti

Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa 24The prospects for the post-Bashir political transition in SudanMarco Cochi

Persian Gulf 30Middle East in 1979Francesca Citossi

Horn of Africa and Southern Africa 36The political transition in EthiopiaLuca Puddu

Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus 41The expansion of Russian influence in AfricaAlessio Stilo

Southern and Eastern Asia 48Hong Kong versus China: who won the war on the extradition law?Claudia Astarita

Latin America 53An end or a beginning? The European Union - Mercosur negotiationsFrancesco Davide Ragno

Pacific 57ASEAN summit: regional challenges and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical arenaFabio Indeo

5

Thematic Area

Index

The economical dispute between US and China affects the global economy. The possible consequences in the geopolitical regions in case of agreement or tariffs

Euro/Atlantica (USA-NATO-Partners) 64Gianluca Pastori

European Defence Initiatives and technological development 66Claudio Catalano

The Balkans and Black Sea 68Paolo Quercia

Mashreq, Gran Maghreb, Egypt and Israel 70Claudio Bertolotti

Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa 72Marco Cochi

Persian Gulf 75Francesca Citossi

Horn of Africa and Southern Africa 77Luca Puddu

Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus 79Alessio Stilo

Southern and Eastern Asia 83Claudia Astarita

Latin America 85Francesco Davide Ragno

Pacific 87Fabio Indeo

Focus

The consequences of the historic meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un on the border between the two Koreas 91Claudio Catalano

Acronyms list 94

6

Osservatorio

Strategico

Euro/Atlantica (USA-NATO-Partners) Gianluca Pastori

Osservatorio Strategico 2019– Year XXI issue I 8

The European elections and their transatlantic impact

The European elections of May 23-26, 2019 will not impact only on the EU internal dynamics

but also on the system of the transatlantic relations. The provisional results (updated at June 26)

allot 182 seats on 751 to the Christian-democratic European People’s Party (EPP), 154 to the

Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), 108 to the liberals of Renew Europe, 75

to the Greens-European Free Alliance, 73 to the sovereigntist forces of Identity & Democracy (ID),

62 to the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), 43 to European Free and Direct

Democracy (EFDD), 41 to the Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left

(GNU/NGL), and the remaining 13 to minor forces and non-inscrits MPs1. In the next weeks, this

picture will grow simpler. Once inaugurated, the Parliament will choose the new President of the

European Commission (EC), the vice-presidents and the twenty-seven commissioners, one for

each member state. Then the procedures will be open to appoint the heads of the different

institutions; first of all, the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), since the mandate of the

current President, Mr. Mario Draghi, is expiring on October 31. It will be a long process, which the

electoral results make more difficult, since the traditional EEP/S&D majority has lost more than

seventy MPs, passing from 54% of the total seats to 43%.

As stated above, the results of this process will be important not only for the future of the EU.

The EU is a US strategic partner and, in an historical perspective, one of the greatest successes of

its foreign policy. The Atlantic region is the most integrated economic area worldwide. Regional

trade is worth 5.5 trillion dollar/year and supports some ten million jobs. Scientific and technological

cooperation, as well as cooperation in the industrial sector, is fundamental for both the US and the

EU and not even the recent cooling down of the bilateral relations seems to have affected this state

of things. Finally, the European countries are a traditional US political and military ally; a security

bond – embodied in the Atlantic Alliance and in NATO – lasting since 1949 despite the tensions

that repeatedly affected it. In recent years, US political events have placed the US-EU relationship

under increasing strain. However, many common interests remain, covering the full spectrum of

the political, economic and military dimensions. This is why, for the new European institutions too,

transatlantic relations will remain on the top of the agenda.

In the commercial field, the European Parliament (EP) ratifies the agreements that the EC

signs and has an advisory role on its mandate. In this way, the new Parliament can have a part in a

possible EU-US agreement. On March 14, 2019, the EP rejected (with a non-binding decision) a

draft resolution to open negotiation with Washington2. The background was the compromise

reached in summer 2018 by the President of the EC, Jean-Claude Juncker, and President Trump

to defuse a trade war on the tariffs imposed on US aluminum and steel imports. Aim of the Trump-

Juncker compromise was opening negotiation on tariffs affecting the industrial sector (already quite

low) and to harmonize the regulatory standards. However, on the terms of a possible agreement

there are different positions among both parliamentary groups and member states, with Germany

largely in favor and France largely against. Agriculture (which was not part of the Juncker-Trump

compromise) is another critical sector, due to the relevance that some states attach to regulations

on subsides, genetically modified organisms and geographical indications. 1 Updates are available at the EP Internet page: https://election-results.eu. Non-inscrit MPs are members of parties

that do not belong to a political group. 2 For a timeline of the US-EU trade negotiations see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-

and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-eu-us-trade-talks; on the Juncker-Trump compromise see US and EU reach deal to calm trade war fears – as it happened, “The Guardian”, July 26; 2018,

https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2018/jul/25/trump-juncker-trade-talks-tariffs-cars-business-live.

https://election-results.eu/

http://www.europarl/

Euro/Atlantica (USA-NATO-Partners)


In the energy sector, despite growing LNG import from the US3, both the Congress and the

administration have talked about possible sanctions to stop the building of the Nord Stream 2

pipeline that, once completed, will significantly increase EU dependency from Russia4. Finally, if

the US decision to postpone the adoption of tariffs on automotive imports has smoothed tensions,

it has not ruled out a possibility that could heavily impact on the future of the EU-US agreement5.

Open questions do not regard only goods. Services (mostly digital services) are the fastest

growing sector in both US and Europe. US and Europe together account for some 75% of world’s

digital content production, while in 2017 the US exported to Europe more than 200 billion dollars in

digital services. The US are also the main consumer of European digital enabled services “outside

of the bloc”. All these flows could be negatively affected, in the future, by different choices in terms

of privacy and data protection. The US-EU Privacy Shield currently regulating the transatlantic data

exchange impacts on the activities of 4,000 firms and is revised on a yearly base (the last revision

dates to October 2018). In the past, the EP has already asked the suspension of the Shield due to

its non-compliancy with the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and until the

US will not appoint a permanent data protection authority as required in the Shield itself. Moreover,

the EU is in the process of adopting new rules in the data protection sector, first of all, an ePrivacy

Regulation aimed at replacing the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive (2002) as a

new step towards the completion of the digital common market. In this sector, the EP is traditionally

in favor of a restrictive approach to data protection while the sector’s operators (and the US great

players among them) point out how too tight regulations could have negative consequences on

technical innovation and led to financial losses worth billion dollars.

Technology transfer and data protection impact on EU-US relations also through the debate

on the role of firms like Huawei and ZTE and on the growing weight of China in the EU economy.

There are several positions on how to deal with this new Chinese prominence. Officially, the EU

considers China a “systemic rival” but different member states have other attitudes. In March 2019,

Italy signed a non-binding memorandum of understanding (MoU) in view of a possible participation

to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while eleven EU members states from central and eastern

Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,

Slovakia, and Slovenia) participate, together with Beijing, to the "16+1" forum (which could become

“17+1” with the possible accession of Greece6). In several EU countries Chinese firms are active in

the infrastructure sector (from port and harbor management to the development of last-generation

TLC systems) and this presence could increase after the signing and ratification of the investment

agreement that Beijing and the EC are negotiating since 2013. At EU level, there are fears of an

excessive opening toward the PRC. The Italian MoU raised cold reactions in Brussels as well as in

Washington7, while a recent EU document defines China no more a “strategic partner” (as it has

3 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2313_en.htm. On the US side the figures of the Energy Information

Agency (EIA), Europe’s liquefied natural gas imports have increased lately, but remain below 2011 peak, Oct. 25, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37354.

4 S. Holland, T. Gardner, Trump considering sanctions over Russia's Nord Stream 2 natgas pipeline, “Reuters”, June

12. 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gazprom-nordstream-usa/trump-considering-sanctions-over-russias-nord-stream-2-natgas-pipeline-idUSKCN1TD267.

5 N. Chrysoloras, B. Baschuk, EU, Japan Reprieve from Trump Car Tariffs May Be Short-Lived, “Bloomberg”, May 16, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-16/eu-japan-reprieve-from-trump-s-auto-tariffs-may-be-short-lived.

6 E. Kavalski, China’s “16+1” Is Dead? Long Live the “17+1”, “The Diplomat”, March 29, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/ 2019/03/chinas-161-is-dead-long-live-the-171; on Italy and the “Belt and Road Initiative” see A. Chatzky, China’s Belt and Road Gets a Win in Italy, Council on Foreign Relations, New York - Washington, DC, March 27, 2019, https://

www.cfr.org/article/chinas-belt-and-road-gets-win-italy. In the past, two other EU countries have entered the BRI: Greece (August 2018) and Portugal (January 2019).

7 A Giuffrida, Italy rattles US and EU with likely support for China's Belt and Road, “The Guardian”, March 20, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/20/italy-rattles-us-and-eu-with-likely-support-for-chinas-belt-and-road; Italy’s plan to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative ruffles feathers, “The Economist”, March 21, 2019; on the possible

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2313_en.htm

https://thediplomat.com/%202019/03/chinas-161-is-dead-long-live-the-171

https://thediplomat.com/%202019/03/chinas-161-is-dead-long-live-the-171

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/20/italy-rattles-us-and-eu-with-likely-support-for-chinas-belt-and-road

The European elections and their transatlantic impact


been for more than fifteen years) but a “negotiating partner; maybe a sign of the Union’s will to find

a new balance in its relations with a country that is increasingly perceived as both an economic

and technological challenger and a political competitor, promoting with its international posture a

different institutional model and an alternative system of governance8.

In the military field, the expenditure of the European NATO members has been a constant

source of complaints from the US, although it has been Donald Trump who, recently, raised the

issue with the greatest strength. In the last few years, the tensions that this attitude has fuelled

have led several actors to revive the idea of a European defence identity. Despite the EP has a

limited role in this realm, it adopts the EU budget, which funds the Common foreign and security

politics (CFSP) and, in its framework, the Common security and defence politics (CSDP). From this

point of view, the next Parliament will play a role in setting the level of ambition of the European

defence by defining, among the other, the amount of the European defence fund (EDF). The target

is reaching 13 billion euros in 2021-27, so to finance a long list of joint industrial projects, as well as

the mechanism of the Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), which in its turn keeps together

twenty-five states in thirty-four common programs9. A wealthy EDF would mean more resources to

be devoted to common defence, in line with the American requests. However, Washington has

repeatedly expressed its annoyance for the fact that its national industries will be excluded from

the procurement programs founded by the EDF; it has also reaffirmed the well-known fears that the

military efforts of the European countries could be in contrast with their NATO role. In its turn, the

EU has repeatedly affirmed that its aim is searching a synergic relationship with NATO, avoiding

competition and duplications, and that the projects currently under way only aim at strengthening

its defence capabilities in line with the pursuit of the common goals.

In this perspective, a strengthening of the Eurosceptical forces (both right- and left-wing) and

of their vision of security as mostly a national issue could lead to a decline in common expenditure,

with negative effects not only on the existing programs but also on the broader system of the

transatlantic relations. In the past months, the launch of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2)

has shed light on of the differences existing among the EU member states and among them and

the United States10. These differences risk to grow deeper, on the one hand due to a “Brexit effect”

that pushes on the foreground the clash between integrationist and sovereigntist forces, on the

other due to the weakening of the “centrist bloc” traditionally controlling the EP. It was this bloc that

– due also to its weight in the other European institutions (the EC and the European Council) – has

been able, until now, to elaborate the Union’s defence and security vision and to incorporate this

vision into a series of common mission. With reference to the “Brexit” process, some analysts have

pointed out the risk of an over-politicization of the defence issue and warned against the negative

consequences of transforming the debate on this issue into a partisan one11. On the other hand,

the risk is that, due to the new political balance, this process of “partisanization” could gain strength

impact on EU-China relations of Italy’s accession to the BRI see the remarks by F. Manenti, The Italian Gateway for BRI toward Europe, CeSI - Centro Studi Internazionali, [Rome], 2018.

8 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, EU-China - A Strategic Outlook, JOIN(2019)5 Final, Strasbourg, 12.3.2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/ communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf; an analisys of the implòicatrions of this new posture is in V. Zeneli, Italy Signs on to Belt and Road Initiative: EU-China Relations at Crossroads?, “The Diplomat”, Aprli 3, 2019, https://the diplomat.com/2019/04/italy-signs-on-to-belt-and-road-initiative-eu-china-relations-at-crossroads.

9 N. Wallace, European Parliament approves defence R&D deal with national governments, “Science/Business”, April 18, 2019, https://sciencebusiness.net/news/european-parliament-approves-defence-rd-deal-national-governments.

10 On this aspect see G. Pastori, La NATO e la sfida di un’identità militare europea: la European Intervention Initiative (EI2), “Osservatorio Strategico [CeMiSS]”, vol. 20 (2018), n. 1, pp. 13-19.

11 On these aspects see, recently, A. Pannier, European defence cooperation after Brexit: The Politics of Acronyms, “Atlantic Community”, Feb. 20, 2019, https://atlantic-community.org/european-defence-cooperation-after-brexit-the-politics-of-acronyms.

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/%20communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/%20communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf

https://the/



in the next months, due also to the sensitiveness of some tasks that the European armed forces

are discharging (maritime patrolling, border security, immigration control).

As already said, it still needs several weeks to the EP to be fully operative. However, in the

formation of the parliamentary groups some elements are emerging, apparently contradicting the

early assumptions. First, the expected (and, in certain quarters, feared) “sovereigntist wave” largely

failed to materialize, although in several countries the Eurosceptical forces have scored a relevant

success. Second, the elections have confirmed the crisis of the traditional centre-right (EPP) and

centre-left (S&D) forces, as well as the trend towards a greater fragmentation of the political space.

These dynamics have already affected – although on different scale – many European countries in

the last ten years but at EU level they are a brand-new challenge to the parties that have led the

process of integration and, until now, have tried – more or less successfully – to control it. Another

question relates to the impact of the new European balance on the domestic politics of the different

member countries and on their international posture. The problem is twofold. The strengthening of

the sovereigntist parties at EU level will promote their strengthening at national level too and -- in

case -- such a strengthening will impact on their attitude toward their international partners, first of

all the United States? In recent years, the relations between the US administration and an EU led

by the “centrist bloc” has been of the difficult; on the other hand, it is not sure that a strengthening

of the Eurosceptical forces within the EP could really affect this state of things.

What seems to be sure is the fact that the new EU political balance, while not jeopardizing

the EPP/S&D leading role (which could be strengthened by extending the alliance to the liberal

forces of “Renew Europe”), will make increasingly difficult to elaborate a meaningful consensus,

especially on a set of politically sensitive issues like human rights, trade and immigration, on whom

the “centrist bloc”, in the past, has already shown some weakness. Emphasizing this weakness,

acting on the cleavages existing within the “centrist bloc”, could be an effective strategy, for the

Eurosceptical forces, to capitalize their electoral success and to gain a greater political leverage12.

Excluding the UK (where Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party, with 30.5% of the votes, gained 29 seats on

73, five more of the seats gained in 2014 by UKIP with 26.6% of votes), the option of an exit from

the Union is not in the political horizon even of the most radical and anti-European forces. Rather,

the true issue at stake seems to be the definition of the Union’s political birder, i.e. the distribution

of power between national and supranational (“common”) institutions. A division that – as stated

above – will impact on the EU ability elaborate its own politics and to cope with the challenges it

will be faced in the coming years, from the definition of its potential role in the emerging multipolar

international orders to the response to give to the global challenges of security, development and

environment protection.

12 Divide and Obstruct: Populist Parties and EU Foreign Policy, The German Marshall Fund of the United States,

Washington, DC, May 27, 2019, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/divide-and-obstruct-populist-parties-and-eu-foreign-policy.

European Defence Initiatives and technological development Claudio Catalano


An assessment of Franco-German Future Air Combat System

From 17 to 21 June 2019, the Paris Air Show was held in France. The Air show takes place

every odd year - the Farnborough air show in the UK takes place in even years - and it represents

an opportunity to get an overview of aeronautical and space programs in Europe.

This year in particular, it is an opportunity to take stock of the Franco-German cooperation in

defence programs, two years after the July 2017 bilateral declaration, which contained a list of

collaborative military programmes, including the Future Air Combat System (FCAS) programme

and the new Main Ground Combat System (MGCS).

Furthermore, the possibility of a Brexit, with the United Kingdom leaving the European Union

(EU), remains a possible threat to European cooperation in armaments, given that the British

Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB) is a relevant, integral and integrated component

of the European DTIB.

In this regard, at the Farnborough air show in July 2018, the United Kingdom officially

announced the launch of the "Team Tempest" for a sixth generation fighter. The UK Combat

Aircraft Strategy, published in July 2018, reports on the Main Gates according to which the

programme will continue with funding if it achieves its objectives and if the reduction in GDP

caused by Brexit will not make the funds available for the programme unavailable.

A short history of the French-German Future Air Combat System

FCAS programme was born as an Airbus Defence and Space proposal to the Luftwaffe for a

future multi-role fighter to replace the Tornado Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) with a 2030

horizon. Though it exists also an alternative hypothesis of a Eurofighter optimized for ground

attack. The United Kingdom has retired the Tornado last year, and in Italy, the radiation is in

progress, because in the two countries the Lockheed Martin F-35 shall replace Tornado.

The Luftwaffe has included the Airbus concept in the 2016 Militäriche Luftstrategie of

January 2016 as a Next Generation Weapon System (Nächste Generation Waffensystem -

NGWS).

The Franco-German declaration of 13 July 2017, which contains a list of bilateral defence

programs, extended the NGWS to France, establishing a "NGWS within the FCAS" or in the family

of combat aircraft, which includes a New Generation Fighter (NGF) to replace the Luftwaffe

Tornado (or optimized Eurofighter) and to shoulder the French Rafale with a 2035/2040 horizon.

At the Berlin Air Show, on 24 April 2018, the French and German chiefs of defence signed

the High Level Common Operational Requirements Document.

At the Meseberg Franco-German Council of Ministers, on 19 June 2018, the French and

German defence ministers, Florence Parly and Ursula von der Leyen, signed the letter of intent.

Ministers Parly and Von der Leyen defined the industrial organization for the FCAS in the

margins of the European Council of 19 November 2018:

A two-years Joint Concept and Architecture study entrusted with Dassault and Airbus;

An engine demonstrator study entrusted with French aeronautical engines producer Safran, as

prime company and German company MTU Aero Engines, as first supplier;

An aircraft demonstrator study entrusted with Dassault as a prime company and Airbus as first

supplier.

It has also been established that France will be the leader in the FCAS programme, while

Germany will be the leader for the unmanned strategic reconnaissance (UAV) "EuroMALE 2025"

programme and for the MGCS.

European Defence Initiatives and technological development


Spain is part of the Airbus group and through the defense minister, Margarita Robles, announced

on 3 December 2018 that she has sent a letter to France and Germany asking for membership of

the FCAS.1 By 2025, the Spanish air force will have to replace 20 Boeing F-18 fighters and by

2030 the remaining 65 F-18 fighters in service.

Moreover, on 6 February 2019, ministers Parly and von der Leyen, meeting at Gennevilliers in

France, the site of a Safran industrial plant, announced two news on the November 2018 FCAS

initiatives:

Safran and MTU industrial agreement to jointly develop FCAS programme engines;

The notification of the contract for the definition of the general architecture and the industrial

organization of the SCAF entrusted to Dassault and Airbus for a value of 65 million euros.2

On 14 February 2019, the letter of intent for Spain's accession to the FCAS programme was

signed. The Spaniards will have to invest 25 million euros a year for participating in the

programme.3

On 17 June 2019 - the first day of Paris Air Show – it was signed the agreement that extends

the FCAS to Spain, in the presence of President Emmanuel Macron, and the defence ministers of

the three countries concerned: Florence Parly, Ursula von der Leyen and Margarita Robles.

FCAS capabilities

According to French Ministry of Defence declarations, the SCAF will include the following

missions: to rethink the 3rd dimension fight; cope with future operational challenges; meet the

needs of air-to-air and air-to-ground missions; board on the future carrier; ensure interoperability

with NATO and EU assets; develop the European DTIB.

Moreover, it shall make use of cutting-edge technologies to deal with threats; it shall consist

of collaborative and interconnected platforms and shall exploit artificial intelligence.4

Artificial intelligence shall be utilized to collect and analyze big data and, thanks to a tactical

"cloud" technology, FCAS will inaugurate "collaborative combat", dialoguing with all friendly or

allied systems on the battlefield. Furthermore, the FCAS shall perform the nuclear attack mission.5

It has also been clarified that the main component of the FCAS is a sixth generation fighter,

not a fifth plus as some analysts had thought, with operational requirement to be defined, and with

the ability to direct one or more combat or reconnaissance UAVs according to the US Air Force

"Loyal Wingman" concept. Stealth capabilities, for example, will no longer be as important as for

the fifth generation, because passive radar systems and other types of sensors being developed

could make current stealth technologies obsolete.6

At Paris Air Show, the first mock-up of the New Generation Fighter (NGF) - the sixth-

generation multi-role fighter - was shown, and new information was given on the FCAS program

whose maiden flight is scheduled for 2026.

From 2040 and on, the French FCAS family will therefore include, in addition to the NGF

entering into service: the Rafale, whose retirement is expected in 2060/2070, the AWACS

(Airborne Warning and Control System) surveillance aircraft, the EuroMale UAV 2025, and the

1 Spanish Ministry of Defence press release “España insta su participación como socio de pleno derecho en el futuro

caza europeo” 3 December 2018 2 Ministére des Armées press release, 6 February 2019. https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-

presse/communiques/communiques-du-ministere-des-armees/communique-de-presse-du-ministere-des-armees4 3 “L’Espagne va monter au bord du futur avion de combat franco-allemand” La Tribune, 13 February 2019. 4 Ministére des Armées press release “Une LPM de renouveau: Système Combat Aérien Du Futur (SCAF) 5 Interview with “Général Lavrigne: le SCAF sonnera l’heure du combat collaboratif” Le Figaro, 17 June 2019. 6 Christina Mackenzie “French Air Force deputy talks strategy, Brexit and future fighter jets” Defense News, 16 June

2019 https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/paris-air-show/2019/06/16/french-air-force-deputy-talks-strategy-brexit-and-future-fighter-jets/

https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/communiques/communiques-du-ministere-des-armees/communique-de-presse-du-ministere-des-armees4

https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/communiques/communiques-du-ministere-des-armees/communique-de-presse-du-ministere-des-armees4

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/paris-air-show/2019/06/16/french-air-force-deputy-talks-strategy-brexit-and-future-fighter-jets/




future electronic warplane CUGE (Charge Utile Guerre Électronique/useful electronic warfare

payload) “Archangel”.7

The German FCAS family shall include, in addition to the NGF: the Eurofighter Typhoon still

in service, the EuroMale 2025 and the successor of the Electronic Countermeasure Tornado

(ECR), which could be a UAV.

The NGF shall be integrated with “Remote Carriers” unmanned aircraft, to be controlled by

the fighter pilot, in an Air combat cloud (ACC) that manages a “system of systems”.

In this regard, MBDA - the Anglo-Franco-German-Italian joint venture company operating in

the missile sector - has unveiled the “effectors” for the “loyal wingman”, these are: the “Smart

Glider”, a lightweight glide weapon developed on the French requirement for in service fighters and

FCAS, and powered version of the wingkit-equipped weapon “Smart Cruiser”, available in a light

(150kg) or heavy (250kg) version. The “effectors” by exploiting artificial intelligence and tactical

connection shall be able to operate in “swarms” and carry out reconnaissance or attack tasks,

including electronic warfare, allowing the fighter and its pilot to stay out-of-range of enemy

weapons.8

It is very interesting that MBDA, being a French, German and British company, will be able to

develop these systems for both the FCAS and its British competitor the “Tempest”.

Analysis, assessments and forecasts

The FCAS keeps on experiencing political and economic obstacles. Some of these questions

have been quoted in the previous issues of the Osservatorio Strategico (OSS number 1 and 2 of

2018) such as the French Parliamentary report of MP Larsonneur,9 as well as French concerns

over the German Parliament’s vetoes on arms export authorizations to Gulf countries, which could

be a key export markets for the FCAS.

Currently, the German Parliament has doubts about the FCAS program. If the CDU is in

favor of giving maximum freedom to France for arms exports, including the Middle East, the SPD is

more rigid in this regard.10 Tough, with the resignation of the SPD president, Andrea Nahles, the

SPD positions are less clear and predictable.11

Furthermore, soon before the Paris Air show, on 5 June 2019, the German Parliament

Budget Committee voted to release the first loan of € 32.5 million for the two-year concept and

architecture study entrusted to Dassault and Airbus.12

However, in February 2019, the German Parliament Budget Committee had asked Airbus

Defence and Space for a complete list of all management personnel down to the third tier,

including in-depth information on their geographical locations, individual job functions, and

programmes in which they are involved. This is because the German MPes fear that the FCAS

workshare may not be equal to the French one. Not having received an answer before the vote,

the commission inserted a note into their approval text that makes answering the February request

7 Christina Mackenzie “French Air Force deputy talks strategy, Brexit and future fighter jets” Defense News, 16 giugno

2019 https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/paris-air-show/2019/06/16/french-air-force-deputy-talks-strategy-brexit-and-future-fighter-jets/

8 Craig Hoyle “MBDA unveils weapon concepts for European FCAS” Flight Global, 16 giugno 2019 https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/paris-mbda-unveils-weapon-concepts-for-european-fca-458962/

9 Jean-Charles Larsonneur “Avis fait au nom de la Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2019 (n° 1255) Tome VII, Défense Équipement des Forces – Dissuasion N° 1306” Assemblée Nationale Constitution du 4 Octobre 1958, XV legislature, registrato il 12 ottobre 2018. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/budget/plf2019/a1306-tVII.asp#P128_11349

10 Thomas Hanek, Renata Riedel “Partner feiern Start des neuen Luftwaffensystems FCAS” Handlesblatt 17 giugno 2019 https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/ruestungsprojekt-partner-feiern-start-des-neuen-luftwaffensystems-fcas/24463666.html

11 Ninon Renaud e Anne Bauer “L’Allemagne fait un geste sur l’avion de combat du future” Les Echos, 6 giugno 2019 12 Ninon Renaud e Anne Bauer “L’Allemagne fait un geste sur l’avion de combat du future” Les Echos, 6 giugno 2019



https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/paris-mbda-unveils-weapon-concepts-for-european-fca-458962/

http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/budget/plf2019/a1306-tVII.asp#P128_11349

https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/ruestungsprojekt-partner-feiern-start-des-neuen-luftwaffensystems-fcas/24463666.html

https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/ruestungsprojekt-partner-feiern-start-des-neuen-luftwaffensystems-fcas/24463666.html



a condition for entering into follow-on agreements with France on FCAS.13 The February list was

received shortly before the start of the Paris Air show, so the signing of the agreement took place

without any delay.

Nevertheless, according to reports by Reuters and Handelsbatt, on 14 June 2019, soon

before the opening of the show, the CDU and SPD defence and budget chairman wrote a letter to

minister von der Leyen asking reassurance that the German companies Rheinmetall and

KraussMaffeiWegemann (KMW) shall be MGCS prime companies. Since 2015, KMW has been

incorporated with Nexter into the French-German company KNDS, but KMW and Nexter are still

two companies controlled by KNDS, a company under Dutch law.

Recently, the German government has speculated to separate KMW and wanted

Rheinmetall to acquire it, to consolidate German land sector, and to develop nationally Leopard II

replacement. Currently, KMW manufactures the chassis of Leopard II, and Rheinmetall its turret

and ammunition. In two meetings at the German Ministry of Defence, however, Rheinmetall and

KMW representatives argued against this acquisition.

CDU and SPD request Rheinmetall to acquire KMW by 30 September 2019, to consolidate

the German land sector, or to assure German leadership on MCGS by assigning the first contract

to one of the two German companies. Failing to do so, every further decision on the FCAS will be

blocked in the German Parliament.14

This is a serious threat is, as in autumn, the German Parliament shall vote on the contracts

for FCAS subsystems studies involving Thales, Hensoldt, Rohde & Schwarz for electronics and

avionics, and MBDA and Diehl for weapon systems, totaling approximately 200 million euros.

This raise the possibility of a new veto.15

Adding to that, the German Parliament has not yet discussed the nuclear attack mission,

which the French consider one of the missions of the NGF of the FCAS. Considering the

antinuclear stance of some German political parties, the German Parliament could reject it, thus

raising a “sine qua non” to the French that would jeopardize the continuation of the programme.

Considering the political disputes and the high cost of FCAS programme (from 8 to 10 billion

euros in total), it is very likely that the FCAS will be canceled with the French entering the Tempest,

as suggested by the Larsonneur report, while the Germans will develop autonomously the

successor of the Leopard II, and the Luftwaffe shall keep in service the Eurofighter and EuroMale

up to 2040.

The United Kingdom, to ensure funds for developing Tempest, will invite States to participate

in the programme by the summer of 2019, then taking a decision by the end of 2020. Japan and

Sweden, which already collaborate with British aerospace industry, will be invited for sure.

Italy has not yet officially made its choice in favor of the FCAS or Tempest, although the

Spanish press release of December 2018 - which announced Spain to join the FCAS - stated that

Italy and the Netherlands, countries that operate the F-35, already participate at Tempest

programme, and that only one future fighter programme will remain in Europe.16 The British

subsidiary of Leonardo's Electronic Division participates in the “Team Tempest” from the

beginning. The CEO of Leonardo SpA, Alessandro Profumo, stated on 11 June 2019 at the

13 Sebastian Sprenger “German spat over Airbus could spoil fighter fest at Paris Air Show” Defense News, 7 June 2019

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/06/07/german-spat-over-airbus-could-foil-fighter-fest-at-paris-air-show/

14 “Union and SPD Threaten Temporary Freeze of Fighter Jet Project” Defense-Aerospace.com, 18 June 2019 http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/203542/german-dispute-on-tank-project-work_share-may-block-fcas-funding.html

15 Cfr.: Ninon Renaud e Anne Bauer “L’Allemagne fait un geste sur l’avion de combat du future” Les Echos, 6 June 2019

16 Spanish Ministry of Defence press release of 3 December 2018 (footnote no. 1) has announced Italian and Dutch participation to Tempest and the possibility that the two programmes may be merged.



http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/203542/german-dispute-on-tank-project-work_share-may-block-fcas-funding.html

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/203542/german-dispute-on-tank-project-work_share-may-block-fcas-funding.html



preliminary press conference of Paris Air show, that while joining Tempest it is a political decision,

he hoped that “Italy would come on board sooner or later”.17

The recently published Ministry of Defence multi-year Planning Document 2019-2021

includes in the programming not yet funded, the new item for the development of a new sixth

generation European fighter for national air defence, which is the main task of the Tempest, as a

successor to the Eurofighter Typhoon air defence fighter.

17 Sylvia Pfeifer, Tobias Buck “Spain teams up with France and Germany to build stealth jet” The Financial Times, 18

June 2019

The Balkans and the Black Sea Paolo Quercia


The new liquid borders of South Eastern Union

The 2019 annual report of the Commission on the prospects of enlargement towards the

European Union for the countries of the Western Balkans appears to photograph a situation of

substantial stalemate, which gives non-indication of decisive progress in the near term. The region

appears to be in a limbo where the European option still is a realistic scenario, but it should

confront with a diminishing political determination both from the EU countries and from the

applicant ones. The progress of the countries of the region appears to be too slow, with numerous

cases of regressions from the point of view of political stability, while the overall economic climate

remains generally stagnant, and the geopolitical complexity of the region is growing, with the

increasing presence of extra Europeans actors. The growing relevance on non-European actors is

not negative per-se, but they are pursuing smaller and less ambitious political agenda than that of

European enlargement and in, a phase of EU impasse, they are perceived as alternative paths.

This is favored by the fact that the approach of non-European powers is less invasive and more

sustainable, being able to make their way among the governments of the region, taking advantage

of the uncertainties of the enlargement process.

From the point of view of enlargement, the Western Balkans region is substantially divided

into three blocks: 1) the so-called frontrunners, Serbia and Montenegro, the only two countries to

have opened accession negotiations with the EU but that are facing growing criticisms for their

democratic and parliamentary standards; 2) the second group, made up of Albania and Northern

Macedonia, two countries for which the Commission recommended last year the opening of

negotiations, but this decision has been delayed at the June 2019 European Council summit, due

to the resistance of some EU countries that want to delay the EU enlargement process; 3) finally

Kosovo and Macedonia, the two countries of the Western Balkans still blocked by questions of

international status and internal constitutional disputes: Kosovo due to the lack of recognition of its

independence by some European countries; Bosnia and Herzegovina due to internal divisions and

vetoes placed by representatives of the Serbian entity.

It is true that last year the European Union adopted a new strategy for the Europeanisation of

the Western Balkans that would envisage hypotheses of a new enlargement of the Union in 2025.

But the division of the Western Balkans into three different classes of enlargement progress, the

worsening political climate in different Western Balkans countries and the lack of political cohesion

in the European Union willingness to expand it to new members, risk leaving this strategy on paper

and the whole region fragmented and blocked in an unfinished enlargement process; a process

that has started over 15 years ago in Thessaloniki and that it can’t be taken open for too long.

With the reduction of economic resources globally available, the increase in skepticism

towards the EU's ability to transform Balkan societies according to European standards and the

increase in geopolitical competition with other attraction poles, new geopolitical priorities other than

enlargement emerged in Union, reducing the political climate of supporting the capacity of the

Balkan countries to meet European standards. This has led in some European countries with less

strong historical ties to the Balkans to a change in the public opinion and in the governments’ will

on the support of the short-medium term enlargement of the Balkan region in Europe. This has

meant that all those standards that once represented benchmarks (such as the reduction of

corruption, the increase in the effectiveness of the rule of law, the gaps in democratic standards ,

the ethnic conflicts, the transition to the market economy) that the candidate countries could reach

with the decisive technical and economic help of the European Union, have now become

The Balkans and the Black Sea


numerous barriers that the countries of the region must in large part be able to fill with their own

capacities.

These standards must be achieved before obtaining European status and it is no longer

enough to show that you are walking in the right direction or to profess a Europeanist or Euro-

Atlantic faith. The verifying eye of Brussels has become more severe also because the process of

Atlantic enlargement of the region, with the inclusion of Albania and Montenegro, it is substantially

concluded.

Another factor of complexity that has changed the political climate for the European enlargement of

the Balkans is represented by the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. This conflict must be considered

internal to the wider region of South Eastern Europe, which extends to part of the Black Sea

quadrant. It must not be forgotten that the Ukrainian crisis itself is linked to the delimitation of the

spheres of influence between Europe and Russia and that some of the countries of the Western

Balkans, such as Serbia, Montenegro or Bosnia and Herzegovina, are as well in a similar situation

overlapping spheres of influences.

The European Union today appears to many to be no longer genuinely determined and

interested in expanding the Euro-Atlantic (or even just the European) model towards the Western

Balkan region, at least not at any cost. Still, it is worried that this space, if left geo-politically

unfinished, could be occupied by interests of other non-European geopolitical actors. Once this

concern was mainly linked to the Russian presence, but today the Balkan chessboard is much

more de-structured and confused, since there is a growing influence of new actors, such as China,

Turkey or the Arab Emirates. The advancement of these new actors in the region is not only the

result of the delays in the processes of enlargement of the Union, but also of the effects of

globalization and the transformations that took place in the same international relation system.

In part, they are favored by the Balkan countries themselves, which offer their political, ethnic or

religious differences to be exploited by competing international actors. This polarized approach

toward different international actors, but without siding definitively with either one or the other and

keeping the doors open for different geo-political alternatives, has long been one of the political

character of the region, and in part can be traced back to the history of the Yugoslav non-alignment

posture during the cold war. However, what appears clear today that it is that the economic

element, more than the ideological one, is decisive in this polarized scenario. The maximization of

economic advantages and the imperative of attracting foreign investments in a region historically

characterized by low growth, high unemployment and low return on investment, brings the

geopolitical need to play on different tables while reiterating that Europe remains the main point of

arrival. This process is facilitated by the fact that none of the main players alternative to the

European Union that have interests in the region, such as Russia, China and Turkey, have a

hostile or geopolitical posture alternative to the Union. None of them asks for a privileged or

exclusive relationship with the Western Balkans, but rather they pursue the implementation of

specific projects or interests, with a more functionalist than regional approach. That is, the region is

seen not a geopolitical value as such, but mostly instrumental to other projects (energy transfer,

the construction of infrastructural transport corridors, the advancement of a specific vision of

political Islam, an obstacle to NATO's advance). We can say that is generally lacking an approach

of political integration between the countries of the region. Nevertheless, the interests of China,

Turkey, Russia and other countries in the Western Balkans do not necessarily have an anti-

European character, indeed one part of the “value” of the region is precisely connected with the

future perspective of the European enlargement: being able to build one's own economic presence

and strategic Influence on the political choices of the Western Balkan countries offers the

The new liquid borders of South Eastern Union


possibility of greater political returns in a future when these countries will become members of the

European Union. In the vision of the non-European powers the geopolitical utility of the Western

Balkans is given precisely by its proximity to the European Union region and to their presumed

geopolitical "destiny" of inclusion in it. Thus, despite the strategic competition for the region

between EU countries and other non-European powers, there isn’t any incompatibility between the

European destiny of the Balkans and the privileged relations that the countries of this region can

build with political systems outside Europe. In this, the region reflects its centuries-old history of

being a crossroads of encounter / clash between three great historical-political state powers:

European Catholic, Slav-Orthodox, and Turkish-Ottoman/Islamic.

The European Union remains the main economic power and the first commercial and

investment partner for the region, but the strategic investments of China, Russia, Turkey and also

United Arab Emirates are advancing, especially with regard to the energy sector, infrastructure and

transport and capital loans, and in the field of cultural or religious cooperation. However, in our

opinion, the advancement of the economic and political interests of external actors cannot be seen

as the advance of alternative geopolitical projects to that of the European integration of the region,

but rather the signal of the reduced European interest in the development of the region and the

continuing socio-economic difficulties of almost all the countries of the Western Balkans.

Among the various forms of non-European influence in the Western Balkans region and

more generally in the whole range of countries ranging from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, two

deserve to be observed with particular attention. The so-called Three Seas initiative and the 17 + 1

initiative.

The Three Seas initiative (also called the Intermarium) is a platform for political cooperation

launched in 2015, with American support, which sees two of the main US / NATO allies in the

region as the main actors: Poland and Romania. The initiative aims to compact the space between

the Baltic and the Adriatic / Black Sea, the area of the so-called New Europe that represents a

geopolitical hinge between Old Europe and Russia. The initiative aims in particular to strengthen

connectivity between countries in the region, especially in the energy field along a North - South

axis rather than East - West. In this approach, there is a rather strong trace of the American and

Polish vision of reducing the energy dependence of Central, Eastern and Balkan countries from

Russia and from the geopolitics of the pipelines that carry Russian gas through Eastern Europe.

This objective is pursued by integrating the energy systems of the countries of the region through a

system of interconnectors and creating LNG terminals in the Adriatic, Black Sea and Baltic for the

reception of LPG tankers. This should reduce the energy dependence of this region on Russia and

strengthen its internal political cohesion. LNG would be supplied by US allies in the Middle East

region, from the USA itself (the first US LNG ship arrived in June 2017 in the Polish Świnoujście

terminal) or simply from the market and private operators.

The initiative of 17 + 1 represents instead an almost specular Chinese initiative for the

Western Balkans region and Eastern Europe, with which Beijing builds and strengthens its political

and economic presence in the region, within the wider Belt and Road initiative. The project was

launched in 2012 as 16 + 1 and was extended to Greece in 2019. It represents Beijing's political

and economic effort to advance its agenda in South Eastern, Central and Balkan countries,

particularly in the transport, science, finance and investment fields. It includes 12 member

countries of the European Union and confirms Beijing's role as an emerging global economic and

political power. Within this role, the region should be seen as the terminal of an extensive Afro-

Asian connectivity network and Chinese presence, especially relevant for Beijing due to its

dimension as the final link in its long supply chain that sees European markets as a strategic point

for Chinese goods.



These two initiatives, both American and Chinese, parallel and overlapping are insisting in

the same region, offering - due to the deteriorated political climate between the US and China in

recent years (well evidenced in the American National Security Strategy of 2017) - ample

opportunities for competition and fragmentation of the geopolitical system of South Eastern Europe

and the Balkans. It is a less obvious split than that with Russia, but equally significant on a global

geopolitical level.


The Western Balkan region and more generally that of South Eastern Europe have been

experiencing a reduction in the European political commitment for their stabilization and accession

to the EU for several years. The latest political developments inside and outside Europe and the

political developments in the Balkan region confirm the moment of stalemate of the euro-

integration process and shows no indication that the process of European integration of the

Western Balkans will be resumed shortly. Achieving the goal of a new enlargement of the Union for

2025 appears difficult to achieve, also in the light of the increase in tensions between Kosovo and

Serbia, the Western Balkan country considered the most promising candidate for enlargement.

In this geopolitical vacuum the extra-European economic and political interests are advancing, in

particular those of USA, Russia, China and to a lesser extent Turkey. Each of these countries has

a different relationship with the European Union but all see in the European integration difficulties a

risk / opportunity scenario in which to strengthen their direct and indirect presence. However, the

progress of the economic and political interests of EU external actors in our opinion cannot be read

as the advance of geopolitical projects alternative to European integration but rather the signal of

the reduced European interest in the development of the area and the continuing socio-economic

difficulties of almost all the Western Balkan countries. Ultimately, the European Union does not

have much to fear from these initiatives as long as it develops its own geopolitical vision of the

region even beyond enlargement policies, which in themselves do not represent and do not

replace a foreign policy. Being confronted in this territory with powers such as USA, China, Russia

and Turkey requires the development of an approach no longer oriented to the Western Balkans

only as a foreign neighbor, but also as a global geopolitical chessboard. This implies that the

European Union should also equip itself for this region with a strategy of collaboration with each of

the external actors that are developing relevant geopolitical initiatives for this area, especially

China, Russia and Turkey.

Mashreq, Gran Maghreb, Egypt and Israel Claudio Bertolotti


Libya: the siege of Tripoli and the strategic stalemate

The siege of Tripoli and the activism of the Libyan “Islamic State”

On 4 April, forces of the LNA - Libyan National Army entered the city of Garian, 100

kilometres south of Tripoli, and launched an assault that was expected to consign the city to

General Khalifa Haftar. Haftar also justified this offensive by declaring his intention to counter the

"private militias and extremist groups" that, in his opinion, were gaining influence due to al-Sarraj.

Overall, the offensive caused more than 75,000 people to abandon their homes and provoked the

death of at least 510 people, according to data provided by the World Health Organization. Around

2,400 people were wounded, and more than 100,000 people – among whom hundreds of migrants

– were trapped in the clashes. Early in June the LNA forces attacked the military part of Tripoli

airport and hit two Turkish targets: a cargo AN-124 and a drone; on June 30 the air traffic was

suspended in "Mitiga", the only operational airport in Tripoli, due to another bombing by General

Haftar’s air force.

The conquest planned by the head of the Tobruk army should have been completed quickly

and without bloodshed. But unfortunately this was not the case, also because of the mobilisation of

the militias from Misrata – the most militarily powerful city in Libya – in support of Tripoli’s

Government of National Accord (the GNA). Three months after the failed conquest, the scenario

shows a strategic stalemate where the long-term siege did not offer the besiegers any

opportunities for a favourable outcome. Also the besieged had a limited scope of action having to

manage not only a busy capital city with over a million inhabitants but also the difficult balance

among tribal militias.

At the end of June, the situation appeared even less favourable for the Haftar forces, who

lost terrain and were obliged to assume a defensive position following to the encirclement

manoeuvre by al-Sarraj’s allies who managed to lock some enemy units in a sort of bulge south-

west of Tripoli. This operational stop follows the loss of Gharyan, starting point of Haftar’s offensive

of April 4. The city was reconquered some days earlier by some Tripoli militias with a manoeuvre

on the ground supported by the GNA air force. These were two strategically relevant episodes

because on one side, the GNA deprived the LNA of its main logistic hub (Gharyan), and on the

other side, it shows Haftar’s inability to his external supporters since he lost contact with his troops

who suffered an inversion in their position from besiegers of Tripoli to besieged.

The overall picture shows however that also al-Sarraj’s forces are facing big difficulties, firstly

with regard to the ability of operating in depth: shortcomings in logistics, substantial limits in the

command, control and communications chain have until now prevented and most probably will

further prevent Tripoli from going beyond the positions just reconquered. In the short medium term,

therefore the scenario could go back to the status quo ante.

In this increasingly chaotic situation, re-emerged the Libyan franchise of the Islamic State

claiming responsibility for the armed attack in the town of Fuqaha, in the Giofra district, in which

three people were killed – among whom the President of the village Council and the chief of the

municipal guard. The action also resulted in the interruption of communications lines and power

supply as well as in the destruction of some buildings. This episode may well be considered

marginal in the global complex of violence in Libya yet it confirms that the Islamic State remains a

dynamic element, capable of acting and carrying out targeted actions on Haftar’s forces while they

were engaged in the attempt of conquering Tripoli and acquiring control of the lines of

communication and supply.

Mashreq, Gran Maghreb, Egypt and Israel


The political front

A comprehensive analysis of the Libyan situation can be summarized in the consolidation of

the two main blocks leading to a growing polarization of the conflict, which can be defined as a

proxy-war, with local actors flanked by external players with an increasingly relevant role.

On one front, there is the Tripoli faction. The Government of National Accord, led by Fajez al-

Sarraj and officially recognized by the international community, is directly supported on the

political, diplomatic and military level by the United Kingdom, Tunisia, Qatar, Turkey, Morocco and

Algeria in a context of active opposition to the other competitor, General Khalifa Haftar, despite the

presence of an Islamist component playing a fundamental role inside the Tripoli GNA. The last

days of June were characterized by the delivery to the Tripoli militias of military equipment coming

from external supporters1. In particular Turkey who supposedly provided the GNA forces with the

missile systems UCAV BAYRAKTAR TB2 and some dozens of protected vehicles MRAP KIRPI

and VURAN made in Turkey2: several pictures have been published on the official websites of the

GNA and the unofficial websites associated with the Tripoli government. The delivery would have

taken place through the merchant ship "Amazon" flying the Moldovan flag but managed by the

Turkish company Akdeniz Roro Sea3.

On the other front, there is the Tobruk government, supported by the Libyan National Army

led by General Khalifa Haftar and with the direct backing of Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and

United Arab Emirates. Among Haftar's supporters there would also be France which in April, while

continuing to sit at the international diplomatic table, blocked the official declaration with which the

European Union intended to ask Haftar to stop its military offensive4.

The United Arab Emirates, for example, acquired the right to use a Niger military base along

the Libyan border and keep sustaining Haftar’s forces in Fezzan (Saba area) through ISR actions

(intelligence, surveillance and recognition) and attacks on the ground. 5 As concerns the

equipment, the LNA recently received from the UAE some Russian middle range anti-aircraft

systems PANTSIR-S1 mounted on vehicles MAN SX45.6 The officially neutral United States

moved forward a formal disengagement but did not withdraw their operators from Libya.

Al-Sarraj and Haftar are not only confronting each other on the battlefield, they are also very

active in diplomacy, carrying out numerous trips and meetings in Libya and abroad looking for

political and material support. Al-Sarraj went to Tunisia (22 May), Algeria (23 May), Malta (27 May)

and Mecca (31 May), while Haftar was in France (22 May), Saudi Arabia (Mecca, 28 May) and

Russia (Moscow, 31 May).

The military front

On the military front, the contraposition is between two sides made up of hundreds of groups

and militias that apparently could seem organic and structured but actually, their roles and loyalty

rely on a subtle balance of tribal dynamics. The siege of Tripoli represents a true impasse both on

the political and diplomatic level and from an operational point of view. It has come to a stalemate

because the tribes “resisted” Haftar’s advance within their areas of interest and action, refusing any

agreement with him and contributing to the assessment of the positions south of Tripoli. In June,

the LNA was able to control the areas of Tarhouna and Ghryan and it tried to compete with the

GNA units for the areas of Asbi’ah and Ben Gashir airport, 34 kilometres south of Tripoli. Haftar in

1 Criscuolo G., Libia, il Presidente turco Erdogan sfida il mondo. A Tripoli i civili insorgono contro il governo di Sarraj e i

jihadisti, Report Difesa, 21 May 2019. 2 Ibidem. 3 Ibidem. 4 Baczynska G, Guarascio F., France blocks EU call to stop Haftar’s offensive in Libya, Reuters, 10 April 2019. 5 Mottola A., Si mette male per Haftar?, Rivista italiana Difesa, Portaledifesa.it, 27 June 2019. 6 Ibidem.

Libya: the siege of Tripoli and the strategic stalemate


the meantime has militarized the oil infrastructures of the oil crescent region, using the seaport of

Ras Lanuf and airfield of Es Sider for combat activities.

Al-Sarraj can count on about 300 different groups; among them, the militias from Misrata and

Zintan are the best equipped and with more operational capabilities thanks to their armoured

vehicles. The most important are the Tripoli Protection force (made up of dissuasion forces-Rada,

Katiba Ghnewa, a revolutionary brigade from Tripoli, Katiba Nawasi and some minor ones), the

National Mobile Force, the counter-terrorism forces from Misrata (led by generae Mohammad al-

Zein), Katiba Halbous, the 166th brigade and other minor militias from Misrata, the Samood Force,

also known as Fakhr or Pride of Libya (under Salah Badi, who is also commander of the Misrata

battalion that last year had a fundamental role in the heavy clashes in Tripoli ); and also the Zintan

forces – the units under general Osama Juweili from Misrata and under Imad Trabulsi, head of the

Special Operations Force –, battalions al-Daman, “33” from Tajoura, Fursan Janzour and the units

from Zuwarah and Zawiyah (battalions al-Nasr, Abu Surra and Faruk)

The LNA is supposedly 25.000 men strong. A significant number of them is foreign. Some of

the most important units of the Tobruk forces are the 9 Tarhouna brigade, the Zintan forces

(General Idris Madhi’s and Mukhtar Fernana units), the Bani Walid combatants (among whom

battalions 52nd , 60th, al-Fatah and the 27 infantry brigade), the al-Wadi battalion form Sabratah,

the West Zawiyah Counter Crime Force of Sorman, brigades 12 (Brak al-Shati), 18, 26, 73, and 36

Special Force, 106 from Benghasi, battalions 115, 116, 127, 128, 152, 155, 173. Finally, there is a

significant presence of foreign combatants from Sudan.

As the competition for the Libyan oil assets becomes harsher, the Italian interests are

affected

The current escalation of violence could result in a wider conflict for the control of the

country’s oil resources. Libya’s oil reserves are estimated at around 48 billion barrels, making it the

first oil reserve in Africa and the ninth worldwide. Technically reserves obtainable by fracking are

estimated around 26 billion barrels. Oil and gas exports represent around 90% of Libya’s global

income and any serious perturbation implies a significant decrease of such income.

The national economy is a typical rentier where the State is also the main employer and pays

salaries to about 1.8 million people (one third of the total population).

The GNA controls the extraction facilities offshore, but since 2016 Haftar controls

infrastructures and terminals in Eastern Libya and has recently acquired control of those in the

South (El Sharara and El Feel).

Income from oil exports still flow into the Libya Central Bank in Tripoli (under GNA control)

while the National Oil Corporation (NOC), a public/private joint venture (exclusively Italian - ENI)

with a dominant position in the country’s oil sector, has been trying to stay out of the political

conflict and keep a neutral position. This choice was not enough to protect it from some targeted

actions aimed at hitting the Italian interests in energy in Libya: in June, there was an air attack to

the Mellitah Oil & Gas depot (partnership ENI/NOC) in Tripoli. Michele Marsiglia, President of

FederPetroli Italia declared he considered such action «as a strong signal against Italy, and in

particular ENI, the first and only partner of the country’s National Oil Corporation (NOC)».

Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa Marco Cochi


► More than one hundred days have elapsed since the dismissal of President Omar al-Bashir in

Sudan. The hopes of the beginning of a new phase in the history of the African nation, based on

free elections and democracy, seem to materialize together with the possibility of a real change

in the country. After the agreement reached on July 5 between the Transitional Military Council

(TMC) and the Forces for freedom and change (FFC). A painful agreement resulting from long

negotiations, which had abruptly been interrupted, after the security forces opened fire on the

permanent protest sit-in that presided over the army headquarters in Khartoum last 3 June.

The prospects for the post-Bashir political transition in Sudan

On 11 April, after nearly four months of incessant street protests, the army forced Omar

Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir to resign as president of Sudan. The authoritarian leader came to power in

June 1989 thanks to a bloodless coup. The end of the three-decade regime certainly constitutes a

turning point in the history of a country that since independence, proclaimed first of January 1956,

has been marked by a succession of coups d'état, internal conflicts and two civil wars. The last of

which, between May 1983 and January 2005, caused almost two million victims, four million

displaced persons and an incalculable number of cases of human rights violations.

In his long tenure at the helm of the country, al-Bashir held elections only twice: in April 2010,

when he received 68.24% of the votes, and in April 2015, when the presidency was re-elected with

a striking 94.05% of the votes. An overwhelming majority that led the opposition to denounce

alleged fraud and state that the elections were a farce to extend the life of the regime1.

Nevertheless, the National Congress Party (NCP) again chose al-Bashir, as a candidate for

the presidential elections scheduled for 2020. A decision that indicates how the former president

benefited from popular success, probably thanks to improved living conditions in some areas of the

country.

Support that did not fail even after 4 March 2009, when the International Criminal Court (ICC)

of The Hague issued an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in

Darfur. Sudan's western region, theatre since 2003 of a civil war that has caused at least 300

thousand deaths and the exodus of over two million people2.

The outbreak of the revolt

The end of the 30-year power of Omar al-Bashir and the subsequent dissolution of the NCP

are rooted in the severe economic crisis in which the African nation pours for a long time. Crisis

that on last 19 December forced the government to triple the price of bread (1 to 3 Sudanese

pounds)3. A decision that triggered the first real revolt extended to the whole country.

The demonstrations began spontaneously in the city of Atbara, in the northeast of Sudan, not

far from the capital Khartoum. Within a few days, the protests spread like wildfire to other cities

involving the capital, then Gadaref, Um Rawabah, Port Sudan and many others. The dissent soon

found a heterogeneous and well-organized political side, which took shape in the platform of the

Forces for Freedom and Change (DFC) to which the major opposition networks joined. Starting

with the Sudan Call, the largest coalition wide, involving the major anti-government parties, the

1 David Smith, Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir extends 26-year presidency with 94.5% of the vote, in «The Guardian», 27

April 2015. www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/27/sudan-bashir-elected-majority-vote 2 www.coalitionfortheicc.org/cases/omar-albashir 3 Manifestations au Soudan : derrière le prix du pain, un ras-le-bol général, in «Le Monde Arabe», 24 December 2018.

https://bit.ly/2ZHd1ld

Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa


SPLM-N armed liberation movement (Sudan People's Liberation Movement - North) and some civil

society networks. The National Consensus Forces (NCF) and the Gathering of Unionists in

Opposition (GUO) joined the Sudan Call, which together constitute a large part of the political

opposition. In addition to the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), the network that joins

many professional categories.

All these organizations have given rise to a general crescendo of anti-government

demonstrations, during which began to demand the resignation of the president. Al-Bashir reacted

by declaring a state of emergency for a year, dissolving the central government and the local

administrations. As well as imposing to Parliament to postpone the constitutional amendments that

would have allowed it to stand again in the 2020 elections4.

The establishment of the Transitional Military Council

To prevent the street riots from leading to a bloody armed uprising, on 11 April the army

arrested al-Bashir with his deputy, Ali Osman Taha, and the president of the NCP, Ahmed Haroun,

also wanted by the ICC for war crimes in Darfur. After ousting al-Bashir, the armed forces set up a

Military Transitional Council (TMC) in order to lead the phase of transfer of powers, which in the

initial project should have been concluded after two years with new elections.

Immediately after assuming the leadership of the country, the TMC introduced restrictive

measures, which provided for the suspension of the Constitution, the state of emergency for three

months and the prohibition of any public demonstration. In addition to the imposition of thirty days

of night curfew. The terms of the handover decided by the TMC have fueled the discontent among

all opposition movements and the main pro-democracy civil society organizations, which had called

for a civilian-led transition authority.

In the first hours that followed the coup de main, the military junta tried to negotiate with the

opposition, immediately lifting the curfew and removing General Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf from the

leadership of the Counsil. Because the High officer was a leading figure in the Omar al-Bashir's 30

year regime. In his place, he appointed former Chief of Staff Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan,

considered a personality more prone to dialogue compared to his predecessor5.

These initial signs of openness to negotiation were not sufficient to reassure the Sudanese

worried that the military coup, despite having eliminated al-Bashir from the political scene, was only

a mere facade operation. It was always present the suspect that having forced al-Bashir to leave

office was a move to rehabilitate the armed forces image. Because they were integral part of the

power system of the deposed president.

To achieve a true transition to democracy, already in the aftermath of the Bashir era, activists

called for more substantial changes, which could not been achieved with the military junta to

manage the transition phase. For this reason, they invited the people to continue the protests,

although they were aware of the risk, then materialized, of a resurgence of violence.

The scepticism of the protesters against the TMC intentions was widely shared in an analysis

by the International Crisis Group (ICG), a non-profit non-governmental organization, which

highlighted several unknowns relating to the management of the political transition in one of the

African countries more marked by conflicts6.

4 Khalid Abdelaziz, Sudan’s Bashir declares state of emergency, dissolves government, in «Reuters», 22 febbraio

2019. https://reut.rs/2G7uFGA 5 Yasmine Issa, Sudan’s new transitional leader promises civilian government and to ‘uproot’ Bashir regime, in «Arab

News», 13 aprile 2019. https://bit.ly/2GlMbbx 6 International Crisis Group, Africa Statement, Charting a Way Forward in Sudan’s Unfinished Transition, 12 April

2019. https://bit.ly/2YjcOE4



The bloody repression against civilians in Khartoum

Negotiations between civilians and the military on how to handle the transition stalled on 3

June, when Sudanese security forces launched a bloody action against unarmed civilians, which to

express their claims had organized a sit-in in front of the country's military headquarters in

Khartoum. The armed intervention has caused at least 35 deaths and hundreds of wounded7.

It was carried out just few days after the announcement of a national strike and the failure of

previous negotiations between the government and protesters. Negotiations locked on the crucial

point of assigning executive leadership to civilians.

The harsh repression against protesters gathered in a permanent occupation was operated

by a paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF); a militia led by General Mohamed

Hamdan Dagalo, better known by the nickname of Hemedti8. The high-ranking official was one of

the former Janjaweed commanders, an irregular unit hired by the Khartoum government.

The militia during the Darfur war was responsible for unheard-of violence and war crimes against

members of the fur, maasalit and zaghawa, the non-Arab communities in the region9.

In the days of bloody repression, Amnesty International claimed that in Khartoum the militia

used the same violent tactics employed during the past decade during the war in Darfur10. While

after the massacre, Alaa Salah, the 22-year-old student who became the symbol of protests

against the al-Bashir regime, said: "For years Hemedti has killed and burned in Darfur. Now Darfur

has arrived in Khartoum"11.

The most powerful Sudanese general

Currently Hemedti is the deputy head of the CMT and, according to several analysts, he

would be the most powerful of the generals who govern the country, even more influential than

Burhan himself12. Furthermore, its power has also been legitimized by several foreign states,

interested in forging new alliances with Sudan, which until March 2014 was considered a strategic

partner of Iran, then to approach progressively Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Sunni Arab

countries of the Persian Gulf13.

A shift that, according to an analysis by the Middle East Institute (MEI), would have been

dictated by the possibility of obtaining economic aid at a very difficult time for the country,

particularly after the independence of South Sudan14. In the days following the coup that deposed

al-Bashir, Hemedti exploited the opportunities offered by the new alliances to find legitimacy even

from the outside. For this reason, in May, he met the powerful Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin

Salman, reiterating the alliance between the two countries and receiving assurances from Riyadh

on the support for the new military regime. Reassurances also arrived after visits to Egypt and the

United Arab Emirates.

7 edition.cnn.com/2019/06/03/africa/sudan-gunfire-khartoum-intl/index.html 8 Jason Burke, Zeinab Mohammed Salihin, At least 30 Sudanese protesters feared killed as security forces attack

Khartoum sit-in, in «The Guardian», 3 June 2019. https://bit.ly/2WluMcO 9 Jason Burke, Hemedti: the feared commander pulling the strings in Sudan, in «The Guardian», 29 maggio 2019.

https://bit.ly/2XcbNgZ 10 www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/sudan-fresh-evidence-of-government-sponsored-crimes-in-darfur-shows-

drawdown-of-peacekeepers-premature-and-reckless/ 11 Declan Walsh, Sudan Ousted a Brutal Dictator. His Successor Was His Enforcer, in «The New York Times», 15

giugno 2019. www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/world/africa/sudan-leader-hemeti.html 12 https://pressfrom.info/us/news/world/-291214-brutal-sudanese-militia-leader-plays-a-bigger-role-in-war-torn-

nation.html 13 www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/12/sudan-siding-with-saudi-arabia-long-term-ally-iran 14 Giorgio Cafiero, Is a Sudanese-Iranian rapprochement possible?, Middle East Institute, 9 May 2019.

www.mei.edu/publications/sudanese-iranian-rapprochement-possible



However, the organizations that had led the protests in the months prior to the coup did not

surrender to the overwhelming power of the military, who immediately after the June 3 repression

announced wanted to manage in full autonomy the electoral process within nine months. In this

way, the military leaders have de facto denounced the previous agreements laboriously reached

with the opposition, which provided for a three-year transition period, entrusted to a civil

government.

The platforms that bring together the opposition groups have firmly rejected the TMC's

decision to call new elections within nine months, objecting that the construction of a democratic

system cannot be solely entrusted to the outcome of the polls. A position based on the fact that

without a consolidated political substratum there is only the risk of legitimizing the momentary

power position.

This approach motivated the opposition to request the formation of a transitional civilian

government for a period of three years. A reasonable time that would allow the affirmation of civil

society, the adoption of constitutional reforms and the structuring of new parties. As well as the

possibility of regulating the electoral process in the most suitable way.

After the sit-in massacre outside Khartoum's army headquarters, the expectations of a true

change of government seemed to be rather uncertain. And the civil disobedience campaign,

launched by the SPA throughout Sudan after the events of June 3, ended six days later with the

heavy toll of 118 dead15. All of this suggested that the demands of the opposition would hardly

have been met.

International intervention

After the repression of the first decade of June, Sudan seemed to have slipped back into

military authoritarianism16. So much to induce the Office of the High Commissioner for Human

Rights (OHCHR) of the United Nations to demand the urgent deployment of a mission aimed at

monitoring the political transition process17.

Britain and Germany proposed a Security Council resolution by to condemn the excessive

use of force by the Khartoum military against civilians. However, China, backed by Russia, blocked

the bid of resolution. Beijing's veto was widely predictable given China's significant investments in

the country, not to mention that Asian power is the main buyer of Sudanese and South Sudanese

oil. While a few days earlier, Moscow had signed a technological and military cooperation

agreement with Khartoum18.

Instead, the reaction of the United States was very decisive; on 10 June, they appointed a

long-time diplomat as Donald Booth to hold the post of special envoy for Sudan. In addition,

through Makila James, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Africa and the Sudans, said they were

ready to consider all options to the Sudanese authorities, including economic sanctions and

restrictions on travel visas19. James's warning came during a hearing at the Foreign Affairs

subcommittee of US House of Representatives. She reiterated that the United States would in no

way accept the permanence of a unilateral military government, in addition to stressing, "should

there be new violence on the part of the army against protesters, Washington would be ready to

trigger new sanctions"20.

15 https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/09/africa/sudan-civil-disobedience-intl/index.html 16 Zeinab Mohammed Salih, Jason Burke, Khartoum protests resume after Sudan military admits abuses, in «The

Guardian», 14 June 2019. https://bit.ly/2XMowY3 17 https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1040021 18 www.uawire.org/russia-signs-military-deal-with-sudan 19 www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001331576/sudan-now-threatened-with-sanctions-as-crisis-continues 20 Ibidem



Equally determined was the African Union (AU) reaction, which on 6 June suspended the

Sudan based on article 4 (p) of the Regional Organization's Constitution, which provides for the

condemnation and non-recognition of unconstitutional changes of government21. The AU could

have launch sanctions, resorting to the application of Article 23 contained in Chapter 8 of the

African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted on 30 January 200722.

The AU action combined with that of Ethiopia was decisive in finding a solution to the political

stalemate that prevented the reaching of an agreement between the TMC and the FFC. The first

attempts at Ethiopian mediation had failed, after the military junta rejected the proposal to form a

mixed transitional government, composed of 15 representatives; 8 civilians and 7 military23.

The turning point to find a solution that would satisfy both sides came on 5 July, when the

relentless mediation work of the AU envoy, Mohamed Hacen Ould Lebatt, and the Ethiopian prime

minister, Abiy Ahmed, overcame the rock of the composition of the Sovereign Council, which

emerged several times from the negotiations.

The agreement came with a Sovereign Council made up of five CMT members and five FFC

members, plus an eleventh guarantee figure. For the first 21 months, the generals will manage the

transition, expressing their president. Then, it will be the transitional government with a civilian

majority to guide the Council and lead the country to elections over the next 18 months.

A total of three years and three months of transition, to which a further three months must be

added to appoint a transitional parliament, in which the FFC would have guaranteed a large

majority.


In examining the ongoing confrontation between the networks of pro-democracy activists and

the military junta, it is important to highlight that last May the two sides had laboriously managed to

agree on the patterns of an agreement built around an executive led by a Sovereign Council,

replacing the current government run by the military authorities. The Sovereign Council, which was

to be composed mostly of civil authorities, would manage Sudan's transition for a period of three

years before coming to elections.

In examining the hard confrontation between the networks of pro-democracy activists and the

military junta, it is important to point out that already last May the two sides had laboriously

managed to agree on the patterns of an agreement built around an executive led by a Sovereign

Council, which would handle Sudan's transition for a period of three years before coming to

elections.

What happened next is not entirely clear. According to various reports, some members of the

TMC were not satisfied with the agreement reached, fearing that it would give too much power to

civilians. As a result, the RSF and other elements close to General Hemedti denounced the

agreement and decided to resort to the use of force to disperse the protesters outside the army

headquarters.

It is striking that the repression of 3 June came after the first state visits by the leaders of

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which since the beginning of the transition have

generously supported the CMT, both financially and politic. With these assumptions, the

International Crisis Group reports that it is widely believed among activists that these three

countries would encourage Sudanese officials to refuse compromises and adopt the hard line24.

21 https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7758-treaty-0021_-_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_e.pdf 22 www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=493fe2b6 23 www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2019/6/24/sudan-generals-call-for-joint-au-ethiopia-transition-plan 24 International Crisis Group, Africa Statement, Sudan: Stopping a Spiral into Civil War, 7 June 2019.

https://bit.ly/2Xpfy67



This possibility would appear to be contradicted by the 5 June note in which Riyadh publicly

expressed "great concern" about the loss of life in Sudan, calling for an immediate resumption of

dialogue. While the Emirates have never concealed the fear of the dramatic consequences of the

outbreak of a civil war in Sudan. Egypt, the current president of the Assembly of the African Union

and one of the main regional players, should have every interest in avoiding an escalation in

Libyan style in neighbouring Sudan. In addition, it is possible that these three countries have

exerted some pressure on the military junta to reach the July 5 agreement.

However, the formation of the Sovereign Council composed of military and civilians is due in

large part to the determination of the protesters, always determined not to give way to the military,

who with general strikes and lockouts showed that the popular protest could continue to make the

country ungovernable. However, it is very unlikely that Hemedti can accept being politically

marginalized in a context from which the political and security balances of the future Sudan will

emerge. Although this time it will have to be much more inclusive towards civilians and not to

forget, that in these weeks its paramilitary militias have been protagonists of sudden changes and

bloody coups.

Based on these premises, it clearly emerges that regional and international actors will have

to step up their efforts to ensure a peaceful transition, which allows Sudan to legitimize a transitory

administration led by civilians and the military.

Persian Gulf Francesca Citossi


Middle East in 1979

The year 1979 for the Middle East, and in particular the Persian Gulf area, represented a

radical change in regional and international strategic relations. That year shaped the structure of

the modern Middle East and those events explain many current dynamics1.

The Shah of Iran fled the country in January: long-standing protests and the erosion of his

government accelerated the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The ferment inspired the Shiites

of Saudi Arabia, about 60,000 in the Qatif region that took the streets causing a crackdown by the

government. In May, the Iraqi Shia community, under the Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr leadership,

attempted to emulate the events of neighboring Iran, but was crushed down by the repression of

Saddam Hussein’ Baathist regime. In November, the Saudi Juhayman al-Otaibi and his rebels

occupied the Mecca’ Great Mosque for two weeks, hoping to oust the royal family. In the wake of

protests for this event and incited by Khomeini darts, a hundred of protesting Pakistani students

assaulted the US Embassy in Islamabad. In December, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan

in support of the government, galvanizing Muslims around the world against the atheist communist

invasion.

It is worth to mention that following the September 1978 Camp David Accords, in March

1979 the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement was signed in Washington. This lead to other Arab

states’ condemnation of Egypt, resulting in the transfer of the Arab League headquarters from

Cairo to Tunis2, the suspension from the Arab League until 1989 and the economic and political

boycott.

Forty years later, and thirty years after Ayatollah Khomeini death, the historical legacy of

those events is conditioning stability, beyond the regional sphere, which brought international

relations from the red threat to the holy war3, marking also a deep crack between the Sunni and

Shia communities4.

Iran: the Islamic Revolution

In the 1970s, Iran was the ideal country to apply the Nixon Doctrine5. The region was

vulnerable and rich in natural resources, too far away to be managed directly, the leader had a

western orientation (during the 1973 oil crisis Iran asked for the lifting of the embargo6), Tehran

had considerable armed forces and the regime seemed to be stable. Shah Reza Palhavi was the

perfect candidate to play the Gulf gendarme role. The appearance was however very different from

reality. Ayatollah Khomeini – a minority representative in the Shia clergy – since 1963 had

gathered around him more and more supporters (students, leftists, Islamists) from his exile in Iraq7.

It was the SAVAK, the not- so-secret police of the shah, which kept the state apparatus upright

with brutal methods.

Top-down hyper-growth and westernization had a strong impact: inflation, corruption,

inequalities and inadequate public services for rapid urbanization, mass influx of foreigners and

1 D. W. Lesch, 1979: The Year That Shaped the Modern Middle East, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 2001. 2 C. S. Wren, “Egypt to obstruct Arab League’shift”, The New York Times, April 8, 1979; https://nyti.ms/2FJ3aUr. 3 C. Hitchens, “Dio non è grande”, Einaudi, Torino, 2007, pag. 235. 4 G. Kepel, “Sortir du chaos, les crises en Méditerranée et au Moyen Orient”, Gallimard, 2018, pagg. 40-49. 5 S. Talbott, “What Iran’s revolution looked like from inside the shah’s palace”, Brookings, January 24, 2019;

https://brook.gs/2Ttrpel. Dottrina Nixon: la cosiddetta “vietnamizzazione” prevedeva un progressivo disimpegno diretto di Washington ma col potenziamento di un governo filo-americano locale che tutelasse gli interessi USA.

6 B. Weinraub, “Shah of Iran Urges Arabs To End Their Oil Embargo”, The New York Times, Dec 22, 1973; https://nyti.ms/2FIKSCG.

7 S. Maloney, “1979: Iran and America”, Brookings Institution, Jan 24, 2019; https://brook.gs/2WFSwF5.

https://nyti.ms/2FJ3aUr

https://brook.gs/2Ttrpel

https://nyti.ms/2FIKSCG

https://brook.gs/2WFSwF5

Persian Gulf


cultural frictions. Despite the repressive methods, the popular protests mounted. Eventually,

suffering from leukemia since 1974, in January 1979 the shah left the country never to return.

The commemoration date for the beginning of the Revolution ("The dawn of ten days") is 11th

February 1979, when some protesters briefly attacked the US Embassy in Tehran. The Carter

Administration, not without bad feelings, decided a few months later to welcome Reza Palhavi for

humanitarian reasons. As response, in November the US embassy was assaulted again and

occupied for 444 days with 66 hostages. The shah afterwards left the United States (President

Carter lost his second term on the Iranian dossier) initially for Panama and then for Egypt where he

died in 1980: President Sadat honored him and 15 months later, he was assassinated. Jubilation

demonstrations were reported in Tehran and a street was named after his killer, Khalid al-

Islambouli.

The Iraqi invasion of Iran began in September 1980: the dramatic change in relations

between Iran and the United States encouraged the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, to initiate the

attack and the United States, taken by surprise by Khomeini's success, to provide aid to Baghdad.

The military assistance and equipment provided during those years of conflict, a bloody war that

dragged on for eight years, broadened and deepened the Iranians’ anti-American sentiment.

Despite a consistent "rally around the flag" effect that coalesced the country, the hostage

seizure was essentially fruitless and politically counterproductive for Iran. The crisis was also a

watershed in Ayatollah Khomeini’ political life. Previously prudent and pragmatic, he became a

modern and determined revolutionary. Imperialism and (American) liberalism became intrinsically

negative words, while the revolution had become sacred. From a strategic point of view, the

revolution represented the loss of a crucial pivot for the United States8. Moreover, the United

Kingdom complete withdrawal from the Persian Gulf had occurred few years earlier (1971 is the

independence year of the small, but very rich, Gulf States: the "trucial states" then the United Arab

Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman) damaging Western interests in the area.

The United States and Iran suspended diplomatic relations in 1979, resumed only in 2015

with the signing of the JCPOA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, from which in May 2018 the

Trump Administration withdrew unilaterally, re-imposing severe sanctions and re-triggering

increasing mutual threats9.

In the meanwhile, the Iranian population has grown from 36 to 82 million people, increasingly

suffering from sanctions10, calling for democracy, social justice, and contrast to progressive

impoverishment 11 and galloping inflation.

Tehran remained within the terms set by the agreement12 for over a year since Washington’

withdrawal. It has increased the production of enriched uranium exceeding the threshold (3.67%

for enrichment, 300 kg as stock limit and 130 tons for heavy water as foreseen in the JCPOA)13 at

the end of June14.

8 Z. Brzezinski, “Power and Principle. Memoirs of a National Security Advisor”, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York,

1983, p. 356. 9 N. Carl, “Iran’s Balancing Act: Khamenei’s Strategic Thinking at a Critical Juncture”, Critical Threats, May 17, 2019;

https://bit.ly/2JrcFeB. 10 S. Jalili, “Iran marks 40th anniversary of Islamic revolution”, Al Jazeera, 11 Feb, 2019; https://bit.ly/2DueVfv. 11 F. Khosrokhvar, “Les acteurs de la démocratisation, grands perdants de l’évolution des mouvements sociaux en

Iran”, L’Orient-Le jour, 26 janvier 2019 ; https://bit.ly/32bJfay. 12 A. Dixit, “Important for Iran to Implement its JCPOA Commitments, IAEA Director General Says”, International Atomic

Energy Agency, June 10, 2019; https://bit.ly/2J03mRk. 13 UNSCR 2231/2015, rif. Art 41, cap. VII UN Charter. 14 “Iran nuclear deal: Tehran exceeds enriched uranium limit”, Al Jazeera, July 1st 2019; https://bit.ly/2xq1Zox.

https://bit.ly/2JrcFeB

https://bit.ly/2DueVfv

https://bit.ly/32bJfay

https://bit.ly/2J03mRk

https://bit.ly/2xq1Zox

Middle East in 1979


In an exchange of mutual accusations - fueled by attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf of

Oman15, by cyber-attacks and sanctions against some Pasdaran commanders and Ayatollah Ali

Khamenei16- both sides reaffirm their non-belligerent will, while Riyadh and Abu Dhabi fully

embraced Washington's line of action 17.

On 7 July 2019, the ultimatum that Iran has given to Europe expired. That was meant to

carry on with the commercial agreements provided by the JCPOA through the INSTEX system18-

Instrument Supporting Trade Exchanges - which became operational after 5 months19, but was

judged insufficient by Tehran authorities20.

Iraq: the failed revolution

In the wake of the Iranian revolution, the Iraqi Shia community - 60% of the total population -

incited Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, founder of the Islamic party Dawa ("The Call", his son-in-law is

Moqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Shiite front and winner of the 2018 Iraqi elections) to become their "

Iraqi Ayatollah Khomeini " and to lead the revolt against the Baathist regime21. The Baath party – a

socialist movement, "Resurgence" in Arabic - was under Saddam Hussein’ leadership, he expelled

Ayatollah Khomeini from Najaf in 197822, after 13 years of exile. Hussein became President in July

1979, and operated a massive internal purge strengthening his personal power.

Al-Sadr wanted to reconcile Western modernity with classical Shia thought and was at odds

with the traditional Shia quietist view of Islam that usually kept away from politics. In May, protests

began in Baghdad and in the predominantly Shia provinces in the south of the country (every

Friday Shia Iraqis from all over the country went to Al Sadr in Najaf to declare their loyalty and

support to the revolution). After 9 days of continuous protests the regime intervened by besieging

Najaf and arresting al Sadr, leading his sister, Bint al-Huda, to become a pre-eminent activist and

an icon of Islamic feminism. Clashes between security forces and protesters continued, leading to

al-Sadr release, but thousands of his supporters were tortured and executed.

The militant movement strongly opposed the new President: in 1980, al-Sadr and his sister

Bint al-Huda were accused of the failed assassination attempt on Deputy Prime Minister Tariq al-

Aziz and were executed, thus ending any attempt of rebellion, crushed in a bloodbath by the

Baathist regime. Unlike Iran, the Iraqi Shia community lacked the support of large sections of the

society, even though it recorded the Kurdish revolutionaries’ sympathies. That repression was at

the roots of the rift between the Iraqi Sunni and Shia communities, bringing the latter from the

harsh marginalization of the Saddam Hussein’ Baathist period, supported mainly by the Sunnis, to

the post-2003 period of revenge for the repression suffered during the past decades.

Saudi Arabia: the taking of the Mosque

The 1744 pact between Muhammad bin Saud and Muhammad ibn'Abd al-Wahhab is the

founding pillar of Saudi Arabia. The Saud hold military and political power with the religious support

of Abn al-Wahhab’ descendants, head of religious affairs. They legitimize the monarchy political

power by approving the succession and the king’ decisions.

15 “Two oil tankers attacked in Gulf of Oman”, The Guardian, 13 Jun 2019; https://bit.ly/2R9LwxC. 16 D. E. Sanger, D. D. Kirkpatrick, I. Kershner, “Trump Threatens ‘Obliteration’ of Iran, as Sanctions Dispute Escalates”,

The New York Times, June 25, 2019; https://nyti.ms/2X7NVzm. 17 “The Iran-US Trigger list”, International Crisis Group, 20 June 2019; https://bit.ly/2FGUq18. 18 A. Eqbali, S.E. Rasmussen,“German Foreign Minister, in Tehran, Seeks to Save Iran Nuclear Deal”, The Wall Street

Journal, June 10, 2019; https://on.wsj.com/2KLKckh. 19 “INSTEX chief in Iran for talks over EU trade channel”, Iran Daily, March 12, 2019; https://bit.ly/2FFqjao. 20 “Iran nuclear deal: Enriched uranium limit breached, IAEA confirms”, BBC, July 1st 2019; https://bbc.in/2XAJ3lJ. 21 R. Alaaldin, “Iraq’s failed uprising after the 1979 Iranian revolution”, Brookings Institution, March 11, 2019;

https://brook.gs/2u2akNg. 22 B. Riedel, “What Iran’s revolution meant for Iraq”, Brookings Institution, January 24, 2019; https://brook.gs/2CM7S1k.

https://bit.ly/2R9LwxC

https://nyti.ms/2X7NVzm

https://bit.ly/2FGUq18

https://on.wsj.com/2KLKckh

https://bit.ly/2FFqjao

https://bbc.in/2XAJ3lJ

https://brook.gs/2u2akNg

https://brook.gs/2CM7S1k

Persian Gulf


The Sheikh family enjoys a privileged position in state institutions and plays a key role in the

Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, the Ministry of Education and the

Ministry of Islamic Affairs. The founding monarch, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, secured their support in his

ambitious unification campaign after the First World War. The discovery of oil and natural gas in

1938 helped to consolidate the Saudis authority, pacifying the scattered tribes in the kingdom and

generating the foreign powers’ significant interest.

Although the relationship between the two powers has not always been harmonious, the

deep bond of the ruling house with the Wahhabi has never failed, even though modern state

management requirements have often clashed with the vision of the Sheik family.

In the 1970s, some members of the Saudi community believed that power had profoundly

distorted the Saudi establishment. The influx of petrodollars in Saudi Arabia, accompanied by

evidence of increasing liberalization, widened the gap between the royal family and the

conservative society. Juhayman al-Otaibi, a former corporal of the Saudi armed forces and a firm

believer in conservative ideology, armed with his religious education and military training, began to

recruit other believers. Al-Otaibi motivated the siege of the Mosque by stating that the House of the

Saud had lost its legitimacy due to the corruption and imitation of the West. He attacked the ulama

for not protesting against the policies that betrayed Islam, he accused them of accepting

domination of corrupt rulers in exchange for honors and wealth and he affirmed that his brother-in-

law was the Mahdi (a fundamental figure of Islamic eschatology that re-proposes the messianic

idea typical of Judaism and Christianity). Daesh recalled his arguments, many years later23.

On November 20th, 1979, the first day of the Islamic year of the fifteenth century, the al-

Haram Mosque was occupied by a group of few hundred well-armed men, organized under Al-

Otaibi leadership24. The siege lasted more than two weeks before the Saudi special forces, in

collaboration with the Pakistan Special Services Group (SSG) and the French Groupe

d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale (GIGN), managed to regain control of the mosque,

resulting in 244 victims25, of which 117 were attackers.

The Saudi police - in a combination of disbelief, slow communications and lack of planning -

responded only few hours after the blitz, rejected by the militants’ gunshots hidden in the upper

part of the Great Mosque. In a short time the rumors of a coup d'état, Iranian interference and the

return of the Mahdi leaked abroad, leading the government to interrupt all communications within

and outside the kingdom. Rumors of Iran's interference coincided with the mass Shia

demonstrations in the Saudi region of Qatif protesting against their treatment by the authorities

(there was widespread looting and dozens of deaths) raising serious fears in Riyhad and

Washington. Ayatollah Khomeini accused the United States and Israel of the siege of the most

sacred sanctuary of Islam.

After the capture of Al-Otaibi and his group, most of the insurgents were sentenced to death,

but some of the surviving rebels went on to join an embryonic movement called Al Qaeda.

An uncomfortable reality for the House of the Saud became evident: Islamic fundamentalists

posed a threat26. The Saudi government eliminated the siege from the public memory, invested

millions of dollars to improve the Great Mosque security, suppressed dissent and abandoned

social reforms to meet the Wahhabis requests. The government began to enforce a strict religious

code, the police suppressed commercial activities that did not close down for the five daily prayers

and women were excluded again from public life.

23 Kepel, 2018, pag. 47. 24 S. Rakowski, “How the 1979 Siege of Mecca Haunts the House of Saud”, Stratfor, Jul 2, 2017;

https://bit.ly/2GDMLCm. 25 Y. Barmi, “Can Mohammed bin Salman break the Saudi-Wahhabi pact?”, Al Jazeera, 7 Jan 2018;

https://bit.ly/2Hepk35. 26 K. Knipp, “1979: A fateful year for the Middle East”, DW, 11.02.2019; https://bit.ly/2RIpcf1.

https://bit.ly/2GDMLCm

https://bit.ly/2Hepk35

https://bit.ly/2RIpcf1

Middle East in 1979


The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice - the religious police - massively

benefited of the government's injections of money and assumed a more important role in

controlling the Saudis life.

The Islamic Republic established in Iran embodied a power model that threatened the

legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy, pushing Riyhad to export a more militant form of Wahhabism:

this ideology rooted in the Pakistan and Afghanistan madrasas.

Pakistan: the attack at the US embassy

The Pakistani newspapers had resumed the Ayatollah Khomeini’ accusations to the United

States and Israel regarding the taking of the Mosque of Mecca, fostering the already strong anti-

American Pakistani sentiment, following the suspension of premises construction for uranium

enrichment.

On November 21st, a day after the capture of the Great Mosque, hundreds of protesting

students from the Qaid-e-Azam University attacked the US Embassy in Islambad and set it on fire.

They belonged mostly to the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party27, a conservative Islamist movement.

The attack lasted 7 hours with 155 hostages28, causing 4 victims29 and 20 million dollars of

damages, arousing words of admiration from Tehran. The importance of the event is linked above

all to the consequences of the Revolution in Iran30 which encouraged disenchanted protesters

against Western developmental models31, the growing influence of the Jamaat party and the

Islamization promoted by General Zia-ul-Haq.

Following the next month’ Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, General Zia began to cooperate

with the United States32 and Saudi Arabia for the mujahideen training, thus marking the beginning

of the alliance with Washington and some of the Jamaat party madrasas supported the

mujahideen. After the 2001 attacks, the Washington-Islambad relationship materialized in the "war

on terror"33 and against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

From 1977 to 1989, General Zia, due to political convenience but requiring legitimacy,

started a progressive Islamization of the country, with the support of Jamat-e-Islami, encouraged

by the results of the Iranian Revolution. The laws concerning the hooded crimes – sharia law -

were immediately applied (criminalization of adultery and stoning, cutting of hands for theft,

offenses against the Prophet were punishable by capital sentence etc.). This intensified the

tensions between the Sunni and Shia communities, 20% of the population, galvanized by Iranian

events, and the madrasas spread widely with Saudi funding.

Afghanistan: the Soviet invasion

During the first three decades of the Cold War, the Afghan government received remarkable

amounts of economic and military aid from the USSR and US economic assistance. These

resources allowed the state to undertake a limited number of modernization projects in education,

communication and industrialization that required a closer relationship between the center and the

periphery. The overthrow of the Afghan monarchy in 1973, the following Soviet invasion in 1979

and the heavy Soviet military presence in the 1980s caused the militarization of the Afghan

suburbs by the United States, facilitated by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan34.

27 M. Afzal, “1979: Another embassy under siege”, Brookings Institution, Jan 24, 2019; https://brook.gs/2JdL6mA. 28 “The DEA Museum Lecture Series, February 23, 2011, Randy Sayles; https://bit.ly/2RKiaWY. 29 M. T. Kaufman, “Body of 2d American Is Found in Islamabad Embassy”, The New York Times, Nov 23, 1979;

https://nyti.ms/2KO6S3c. 30 I. Al Marashi, “1979: The year that made the Middle East”, TRTWorld, 21 Feb 2019; https://bit.ly/3004VVe. 31 W. L. Cleveland, M. Bunton, “A History of the Modern Middle East”, Westview Press, Boulder, 2016, pagg. 351-446. 32 L. Wright, “The double game”, The New Yorker, May 8, 2011; https://bit.ly/2KOHZEB. 33 “1979: Mob destroys US embassy in Pakistan”, BBC, 21 November 1979; https://bbc.in/2JjE3Zx. 34 U. Shavit, Al-Qaeda’s Saudi Origins, Middle East Qarterly, Fall 2006, pp. 3-13.

https://brook.gs/2JdL6mA

https://bit.ly/2RKiaWY

https://nyti.ms/2KO6S3c

https://bit.ly/3004VVe

https://bit.ly/2KOHZEB

https://bbc.in/2JjE3Zx

Persian Gulf


The influx of large quantities of weapons and funds exacerbated the historical ethno-linguistic,

sectarian and regional divisions and encouraged alternative social and political structures and local

governance processes in the periphery35.

Post-1978 social and political instability allowed millions of Afghan men to participate in

various forms of opposition to the state, as well as free illegal movement of goods across

international borders. They experienced first-hand the fragility and absence of the central Afghan

state as opposed to the local government and the domination of the warlords divided along ethnic

lines36 (Rabbani, Dostum, Massud, Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan, Fahim and others) and each of them

with his international referent. To the West the Afghanistan intervention represented a chapter in

the Cold War, another war by proxy, while to the regional actors it was the beginning of the jihad to

defend themselves from the cultural attack.

The openly expressed ethnic and sectarian divisions reflected the organization and the

operations of the various Washington-sponsored mujahideen groups - in application of the Carter

Doctrine 37 - and supported by Islamabad. They competed with each other for the material and

political favors of their Western benefactors, receiving more than 10 billion dollars during the

Eighties38. These divisions caused armed clashes among the mujahideen, especially in the period

between the 1989 Soviet forces withdrawal and the 1992 United States complete withdrawal from

the region. It opened up the period of abandonment and disappearance of the country from the

international scene and interests, becoming fertile ground for the Taliban movement in the anarchy

that followed. The radicalization of Islam in Afghanistan began immediately after the United States,

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia39 undertook the mujahideen patronage.

In 1989, with the Soviet troops withdrawal, infrastructures, social services, economic

activities, entire communities were destroyed, leaving the devastated and impoverished country

with over one and a half million victims, one million of mutilated people, 4 millions of refugees, 3

million of displaced persons and a territory littered with mines. Most of the Afghan refugees had

fled to neighboring Pakistan. Thanks to Saudi support,40 volunteers ready to fight converged from

all over the world in the Pakistani refugee camps and madrasas. The many widowed mothers who

could not provide for their children entrusted the madrasas, the schools to learning the principles of

the Islamic religion, filled up with pupils that became Taliban41. The Wahhabi influence

strengthened the population conservatism and the extremist groups proliferated: the names of the

jihadists who had passed through the training camps ended up in the lists of "The base", al-Qaeda.

35 M. J. Hanifi, “Causes and Consequences of the Destabilization of Afghanistan”, Middle East Institute, April 18, 2012;

https://bit.ly/2Yp5abR. 36 D. Mukhopadhyay, “Warlords as Bureaucrats: the Afghan experience”, Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment,

Middle East Program, Washington, n. 101, August 2009; https://bit.ly/2Lsi9Gb. 37 E. Giunchi, Afghanistan, Carocci Editore, Roma, 2007, pagg. 75-99. Secondo la Dottrina enunciata dal Presidente

Carter nel 1980, ideata dal consigliere Zbigniew Brzezinski, Washington avrebbe utilizzato la forza militare nel Golfo Persico a tutela dei propri interessi per limitare l’influenza sovietica.

38 A. Rashid, Talebani, Feltrinelli Editore, Milano, 2001, pag. 36. 39 M. A. Zahab, O. Roy, “Islamist Networks: the Afghan-Pakistan Connection”, Hurst&Company, London, 2004, pagg.

12-18. 40 Giunchi, 2007, pag. 91. 41 Z. Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan”, Council on Foreign Relations, July 4, 2014; https://on.cfr.org/2H92Tc2.

https://bit.ly/2Yp5abR

https://bit.ly/2Lsi9Gb

https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zbigniew_Brzezinski

https://on.cfr.org/2H92Tc2

Horn of Africa and Southern Africa Luca Puddu


The political transition in Ethiopia

Introduction

Ethiopia's path to the 2020 general election came to a standstill on 22 June, when an alleged

coup attempt shaken the country's political and military chain of command to its foundations.

In Bahr Dahr, capital of the regional state of Amhara, a shooting between federal soldiers and local

security forces caused the death of regional president Ambachew Mekonnen and some senior

officers of his administration; at the same time, in Addis Ababa, the Chief of Staff of the federal

armed forces Seare Mekonnen was killed by his bodyguard at the end of a shooting in his private

house. Bahr Dahr's events were immediately framed by the ruling party in the Amhara region - the

Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) - as a coup attempt against regional institutions, to which the

Prime Minister then linked the events in Addis Ababa. Abiy Ahmed's press office attributed the

responsibility for the assassination of Seare Mekonnen to "people in his close entourage and

bought by hired elements, (who) have attacked him (…) (while) he was coordinating and leading

response to the coup with strong sense of mission"1.

If the immediate objective of the coup was to highlight the weakness of the federal

authorities, the latter reacted with a diametrically opposed narrative. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed

symbolically appeared in front of the television in a military suit, standing as the guardian of the

established order, while the police forces brought the situation under control neutralizing the

alleged grey eminence of the operation: the head of security of the state of Amhara, Asaminew

Tsige. The news of the coup also pushed the international community to stand in defence of Abiy

Ahmed's political course. The spokesman for the European Union foreign policy representative

condemned the murders and called for the peaceful continuation of the transition to elections2.

The Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs of the Trump administration proposed a

straightforward interpretation of the matter, framing it as the consequence of malcontent by

elements of the old regime against the reformist path imprinted by the new Prime Minister3.

The unresolved knots in the Amhara

The hypothesis that the events of Bahr Dahr and Addis Ababa are part of a coordinated plan

to overthrow the federal government has raised a number of concerns4. These objections were

partly encouraged by inaccuracies in the system of information exchange within the state

apparatus and by the contradictions of the first official reconstructions. According to the Federal

Police Office, for example, the bodyguard responsible for the murder of Chief of Staff Seare

Mekonnen died in the course of the fight. However, this version was contradicted by the Prime

Minister's office and finally rectified the following Monday by the same police, who announced the

detention of the culprit in a government hospital5.

Another element that suggests a more complex reading of the clash between the old and the

new political course concerns the political profile of the alleged coup leader, Asaminew Tsige, who

distinguished himself in the past as a bitter opponent of the TPLF. In 2009, the officer had already

been arrested as part of the operation to dismantle an alleged coup cell of the Ginbot-7 nationalist

1 Ethiopia Observer, 22 June 2019. See: shorturl.at/EMWY3 2 Canberra Time, 25 June 2019. See: shorturl.at/aqrY0 3 Reuters, 23 June 2019. See: shorturl.at/esIM5 4 Crisis Group, Restoring Calm in Ethiopia after High-Profile Assassinations, 25 June 2019. Vedi: shorturl.at/joxH9 ;

Morris Kiruga, Ethiopia at a crossroads, 27 June 2019. Vedi: shorturl.at/FMO28 5 Ethiopia Observer, 24 June 2019. shorturl.at/dnqA7

Horn of Africa and Southern Africa


party, although the U.S. embassy of the time expressed doubts that "renowned and respected

military and police officers residing in the capital with their families can plot against the

government”6. Rehabilitated in 2018 by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's amnesty, Asaminew Tsige

was co-opted into the regional government system as head of the Amhara State security forces,

but without changing his anti-tigryan posture. His mandate was characterized by open support for

the irredentist cause, with references to the need to restore the historical rights of the Amhara on

some territories disputed with Mekellé.

Even the dynamics of Bahr Dahr's clashes do not fit perfectly with the archetype of the coup

d'état. As head of a regional police force, Asaminew Tsige could hardly have mobilized sufficient

consensus around his person among the national armed forces. In addition, coup leaders in Africa

usually try to occupy state institutions in the capital, so as to directly affect national and

international politics. A possible success in taking over the regional state of Amhara, on the

contrary, would have triggered the regional militia into an open confrontation with the federal army

from a position of legal and military weakness, while the difficult relations of Bahr Dahr with the

Sudanese administration would not have allowed to rest on logistical support across the border.

The same hypothesis that the general could use Bahr Dahr as a springboard for the creation of an

independent administration from Addis Ababa seems remote, given the absence of secessionist

pressures within the Amhara electorate and the nationalist profile of Asaminew Tsige.

An alternative reading key could place Bahr Dahr's incidents within the broader framework of

the latent tensions between the federal government and the administration of the Amhara regional

state. Although the ADP is the second largest shareholder in the federal government, the renewal

of its ruling class in recent months had created a gap between the regional administration, more

attentive to local interests, and ADP exponents close to the federal government, which were more

aligned to Addis Ababa. The appointment of Asaminew Tsige to the ADP Central Committee and

to the command of the regional security forces had exacerbated these frictions. It was, in fact, an

attempt by the former president of the state of Amhara, Gedu Andargatchew, to partially change

the political orientation of his party in view of the elections, containing the nationalist competition of

the pan-Ethiopian coalition of Berhanu Nega - the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice - or new

ethnic-chauvinist formations such as the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA). Asaminew

Tsige's mandate had in fact been marked by heated anti-TPLF rhetoric and subtle criticism of

ethnic federalism, while the recruitment of new police forces had increased the assertiveness of

the Amhara state in the border disputes with its neighbours in Tigray and Benishangul, as well as

in the management of relations with internal minorities. Paradigmatic of this tendency was the

dispute with the Qemant community, which has recently established an autonomous administration

within the Amhara region. The Qemant campaign for self-determination had been dismissed by the

general as a manoeuvre of the TPLF to shift attention from the dispute over the Wolqai district7.

This aggressive stance had exacerbated relations between Addis Ababa and the regional

administration: at the beginning of 2019, the federal armed forces had opened fire on armed

protesters in the north of the Amhara region in response to the latter's attempt to block a convoy of

Sur Construction, accused of smuggling arms for the Qemant militias in the west8. At the same

time, paramilitary groups had begun to operate in a border district - Metekel - in nearby

Benishangul, claimed by formations such as the NaRA as an integral part of the historical Amhara

homeland.

6 Wikileaks Telegram 09ADDISABABA2916_a. See: shorturl.at/elX78

7 For a summary of the ethnic issue in northern Ethiopia, see: The Ethnic Issue in Ethiopia, Strategic Observatory No. III, 2018.

8 Sur Construction is a company of the parastatal conglomerate EFFORT, controlled by TPLF. ESAT News, 11 January 2019. shorturl.at/hiq13



The hawk within the Amhara establishment had been scaled back following the renewal of the ADP

Executive Committee and the regional state presidency in March 2019, which had shown a clear

strengthening of the pro-government side. The reshuffle of party leaders had mainly involved the

former regional president Gedu Andargachew, while the post of secretary had remained firmly in

the hands of Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Makonnen. In addition, the election of Ambachew

Mekonnen to the presidency of the region instead of Gedu Andargachew marked the rise of a first-

hour supporter of Abiy Ahmed, who had already recruited him as an advisor on industrial issues9.

The reshuffling of the ADP seemed instrumental to defusing border disputes and bringing the

region back along a path of greater cooperation with the federal government. In fact, Asaminew

Tsige was deemed to be close to being dismissed from the regional police directorate10.

The increase of violence between the Amhara and Gumuz paramilitaries in the south during the

spring, however, had shown that the regional administration had not yet managed to bring the

various militias under its control. In May, the Vice-President of Benishangul called for the opening

of a commission of inquiry into Metekel's violence, while other opposition movements explicitly

pointed the finger at the NaMA for its role in training militias11. The affair had also carved a rift in

the relations between the ODP and the ADP: Oromo leaders suspected Asaminew Tsige of

complicity with the armed groups involved in the clashes12; at the same time, street demonstrations

in Bahr Dahr and Gondar had publicly attacked for the first time the mandate of Abiy Ahmed,

accused of not adequately protecting the Amhara citizens in Metekel13. The arrest of the NaMA

spokesman in the days following the Bahr Dahr clashes seems to confirm the welding between the

former head of regional security and some constellations of the Amhara political galaxy. The next

regional president in succession of Ambachew Mekonnen will have to strengthen the relationship

with the federal government and neighbouring regions as well, but also intercept the requests of

those groups marginalized by the events of June.14

Other points of friction

While the events of Bahr Dahr were somewhat linked to political nodes in the Amhara

regional state, the death of the Tigrayan general Seare Mekonnen is likely to create additional

frictions between the components of the government coalition in Addis Ababa. Seare Mekonnen

entered the list of succession to the top of the Ethiopian armed forces in February 2018, when he

was appointed deputy chief of staff along with two other generals - Adem Mohammed and Berhanu

Jula - representing the Amhara and Oromo respectively15. The decision to create from scratch the

figure of the deputy chief of staff and assign it to a triumvirate was indicative of the will of the then

prime minister, Dessalegn Hailemariam, to prepare the ground for a gradual rebalancing in the

governance of the armed forces, assigning greater specific weight to the ADP and the ODP at the

expense of the TPLF. Abiy Ahmed continued to move in this direction with the promotion of Seare

Mekonnen to Chief of Staff in place of the Tigrayan General Samora Yunis that of Adem

Mohammed at the head of the intelligence services in place of the current TPLF-politiburo

Getachew Assefa, and the consolidation of Berhanu Jula as the only deputy of staff.

The appointments made after the 22 June events, on the other hand, sanctioned a sudden

acceleration in this process, allowing the Prime Minister's party to acquire greater control of the

military.

9 Ethiopia’s Amhara region president resigns, New Business Ethiopia. Vedi: shorturl.at/bhBDN 10 Morris Kiruga, Ethiopia at a crossroads, 27 June 2019. Vedi: shorturl.at/FMO28 11 Ethiopian region demands proble into killings at Sudan border, Bloomberg, 7 May 2019. Vedi: shorturl.at/chpNY 12 Crisis Group, Restoring Calm in Ethiopia after High-Profile Assassinations, 25 June 2019. Vedi: shorturl.at/joxH9 ; 13 Protesters like Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to Judas the traitor, The Axum Times, 3 May 2019. Vedi:

shorturl.at/dhBCH 14 General Asaminew Tsige’s funeral in Lalibela, Borkena News, 27 June 2019. shorturl.at/vBEJW 15 Ethiopia Observer, 7 June 2018. Vedi: shorturl.at/zOPWX ; Horn Affairs, 3 February 2018. Vedi: shorturl.at/bgoqv



The promotion of Adem Mohammed to the position of chief of staff of the armed forces and of the

Oromo general Demelash Gebremikael to the head of the National Intelligence Security Service

(NISS) implicitly assigned to the ODP the box left by the TPLF, reserving four of the five top

positions in the hierarchy of the armed forces to the Oromo establishment16.

The balance of power within the federal army is only one of the various points of debate

between the TPLF and the central government in Addis Ababa. Bahr Dahr's events could fuel the

debate on the degree of interference that the federal government can legitimately exercise in the

internal affairs of the regions: an issue on which the TPLF raised a barrier when the federal

government intervened against the President of the Somali regional state in 2018, or when it

attempted to capture Getachew Assefa, the former head of NISS and member of the TPLF

politburo who was accused of human rights violations by the Ethiopian attorney general.

The nature of centre-periphery relations is particularly important in the light of the new arrest order

issued at the end of May against Getachew Kassa by the federal police17. Both parties should have

no interest in pushing the confrontation forward. On the one hand, Addis Ababa might want to

avoid a frontal clash with the TPLF and launch a police operation that does not include the active

collaboration of Mekelle, since this move could provoke the destabilization of the north of the

country. At the same time, the TPLF needs to find a modus vivendi with the new rulers in the

capital in order to avoid diplomatic isolation, while also containing the activism of new political

parties and civil society associations that threaten its hegemony in Tigray18.

For the country’s stability to be restored, it is essential to find a synthesis between the federal

army and regional militias. Regional security forces were originally introduced for internal law

enforcement purposes, but the gradual enlargement of the ranks and multiplication of prerogatives

in some cases elevated them to semi-independent counter-powers, as in the Somali regional state

of former president Abdi Iley19. In the last twelve months, the spread of ethnic chauvinism and the

weakening of federal authority have encouraged rather than stopped the process of rearmament at

the regional level, while the liberalization of the political arena favoured the entry into the police of

individuals with new political orientations. In Bahr Dahr, for instance, Asaminew Tsige's forces

were an integral part of the Amhara regional police20. The management of centre-periphery

relations is complicated by the fragmentation of the new EPRDF ruling class at the regional level

and the crumbling of top-down governance that had distinguished the previous regime21. What is

happening in the Afar and Somali regional states suggest that regional administrations are more

keen to follow the short-term interest of their electorate, rather than a wide-ranging plan

coordinated by the federal government. In both the Somali state and Afar, the new party leadership

was established following pressure for internal reform from Addis Ababa22. In spite of the common

political patron, the two regions entered into a harsh dispute in May, when the Somali executive

announced the rejection of the 2014 referendum on the common administrative border and

reinvigorated a long-standing conflict between Afar and Somali Issa for control of disputed lands23.

16 Prime Minister's Office; Ministry of Defence; Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed

Forces; NISS. 17 Ezega News, 25 May 2019. See: shorturl.at/dos48 18 Berhane Kahsay, Getachew Assefa a revered hero of our generation, Tigrai Online, May 9 2019. Vedi:

shorturl.at/eHIK7 ; Getachew Temare, Detained Tigrayan youth land blow on TPLF, Ethiopia Insight, May 15 2019. shorturl.at/bzBF0

19 Mahmood Mamdani, The trouble with Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism, New York Times, 3 January 2019. shorturl.at/ikLRZ

20 Ethiopia: 37 killed in another region after coup attempt, AP News, 26 June 2019. Vedi: shorturl.at/ouzD7 21 Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Ethiopian federalism: autonomy versus control in the Somali region”, Third World Quarterly,

Vol. 25, No. 6, 2004. 22 Abubeker Yasin Gebro, Afar People in Ethiopia: between a wind of hope and discontent, Global Research Network

on Parliament and People, 5 february 2019. Vedi: shorturl.at/dgkvZ 23 Simone Rettberg, “Contested narratives of pastoral vulnerability and risk in Ethiopia’s Afar region”, Pastoralism, 1 (2),

2010; Addis Standard, 4 May 2019. See: shorturl.at/aQSZ8



Analysis, assessments and forecasting

The events of June suggest that the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2020 may be

postponed to a date to be set: a hypothesis that could be supported by a wide range of political

forces .24

The coming weeks will be an important test for the stability of northern regions. The events in

Bahr Dahr force the ADP to re-think its political perimeter, but the successor of regional president

Ambachew Mekonnen will need to maintain talks with other political groups.

The renewal of the military leadership following the assassination of Chief of Staff Seare

Mekonnen strengthens the ODP's influence on the armed forces. These developments could lead

to realignment between the other members of the EPRDF coalition and change the balance of

power within the federal government.

24 R. Léfort, K. Tronvoll, Ethiopian elite lost in electoral maze under Abiy’s gaze, Ethiopia Insight, 27 february 2019.

shorturl.at/jrsK9

Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus Alessio Stilo


The expansion of Russian influence in Africa

In recent years the Russian Federation has increased its presence in Africa, both bilaterally

and in its multilateral dimension, although the Black Continent does not appear among the

prominent points, in terms of political-strategic priority, in the most recent versions of two of the

most important official documents published by the Kremlin: the Foreign Policy Concept1

(December 2016) and the National Security Strategy2 (December 2015).

In the latter, the purpose is to develop and improve political, economic, commercial and

technical-military cooperation and in the security, humanitarian and educational sectors with the

African partners3. On the other hand, the Foreign Policy Concept highlights the prevention and

resolution of conflicts in Africa, as well as the management of post-conflict phases4. Today, Russia

benefits from the relations cultivated by the Soviet Union with various African states during the

Cold War era. At that stage, even if Moscow did not have its own military base, military assets of

the USSR made frequent naval visits and long-term accesses to bases in Egypt, Libya, Algeria,

Tunisia, Ethiopia, Somalia and Guinea5.

The Russian commitment in Africa is mainly concentrated on mineral resources, nuclear-

driven energy cooperation and supply of weapon systems and strategic advice. However, the most

relevant sector is nuclear energy, one of the main vectors of the Russian geopolitical agenda6.

Rosatom, the Russian state company that became a world leader in providing nuclear reactors,

serves as the spearhead of this strategy7.

The largest project in Africa is the El Dabba nuclear power plant (4.8 GW), located in Egypt,

whose construction began in 2015 (30 billion dollars invested, 25 financed by Moscow through a

loan) and which should end in 20228. A similar model was replicated in Nigeria where, in 2016,

Rosatom signed an agreement aimed at installing the first nuclear power plant (4.8 GW), which

should fill Nigeria power shortfall9. Moreover, in March 2018 Rosatom signed an agreement to

build the first nuclear power plant in Sudan, as part of the broader Khartoum program aimed at

1 Relations with African states are mentioned only in points 92, 95 and 99 of the document (out of a total of 108 points).

See: “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016)”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1 December 2016 (http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248).

2 Relations with African states are mentioned only in paragraph 96 (out of a total of 115 paragraphs).See: “Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015 – Full-text Translation”, 31 December 2015 www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf

3 Ivi, p. 25 (point 96). 4 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, point 99. 5 Jakob Hedenskog, Russia is Stepping Up its Military Cooperation in Africa, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI

Memo 6604, December 2018, p. 2. 6 Madison Freeman, “How Russia, China Use Nuclear Reactors To Win Global Influence”, Defense One, 13/07/2018

(https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/china-and-russia-look-dominate-global-nuclear-power/149642/?oref=d_brief_nl).

7 Névine Schepers, Russia’s Nuclear Energy Exports: Status, Prospects and Implications, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, Paper No. 61, February 2019, p. 12.

8 “Dabaa Nuclear Project wins award as one of 3 best electricity projects in Middle East”, Al-Masry Al-Youm, April 16,

2019 (https://ww.egyptindependent.com/dabaa-nuclear-project-wins-award-as-one-of-3-best-electricity-projects-in-middle-east/).

9 “Russia Returns To Africa – Analysis”, Eurasia Review, 18/06/2019 (https://www.eurasiareview.com/18062019-russia-returns-to-africa-analysis/?fbclid=IwAR1RFvN78qa6Tx607TgesM_SFZ8ASFGWKYAfo2t-0F23a10asOusY4n_cCI).

http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248

http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf

http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/china-and-russia-look-dominate-global-nuclear-power/149642/?oref=d_brief_nl

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/china-and-russia-look-dominate-global-nuclear-power/149642/?oref=d_brief_nl

https://ww.egyptindependent.com/dabaa-nuclear-project-wins-award-as-one-of-3-best-electricity-projects-in-middle-east/

https://ww.egyptindependent.com/dabaa-nuclear-project-wins-award-as-one-of-3-best-electricity-projects-in-middle-east/

https://www.eurasiareview.com/18062019-russia-returns-to-africa-analysis/?fbclid=IwAR1RFvN78qa6Tx607TgesM_SFZ8ASFGWKYAfo2t-0F23a10asOusY4n_cCI



Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus


generating more than 5000 MW of electricity by 2020, and implementing a four-reactor plant by

203010.

Similar agreements for the development of civil atomic energy programs have been

stipulated (or are about to be stipulated, after signing the Memorandum of Understanding) by

Rosatom with Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia, South Africa, Uganda, Namibia, Ghana, Tanzania,

Rwanda, Republic of the Congo11. In just four years, Rosatom has essentially replaced the former

French multinational Areva (the current Orano) as the first supplier of civil nuclear power of the

Black Continent12.

Russian companies have also invested in the mining and metallurgical sectors, in particular

in extracting and processing of manganese, gold, nickel, platinum, diamond and aluminium, in this

case through mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures with African public companies or joint

investments. The countries involved are South Africa, Nigeria, Guinea, Angola, Botswana,

Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, and Sierra Leone. This sector allows Moscow to obtain 87%

of its manganese requirements from Africa and 16% of chromium, which are essential metals for

the national industry in the nuclear, aeronautical and petrochemical sectors. Russian investments

in the hydrocarbons sector (especially oil and natural gas), notably in Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana,

Algeria and Mozambique, are important as well.

By contrast, the Russian Federation exports mainly wheat, refined oil products and steel to

Africa. This interchange has increased the bilateral trade from 7 billion dollars in 2010 to 20.4

billions in 201813. By way of example, in 1993, following the dissolution of the USSR, bilateral trade

had collapsed to 760 million dollars14.

A further element is the cooperation in the military and security field, where Moscow is active

in providing anti-terrorism training, armaments and advisors. This resulted in stipulating of

cooperation agreements with 21 states, since 2015 (the last one with Mali15), besides the

possibility of establishing bases or logistic centres in Egypt, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mozambique,

Sudan and the Central African Republic. Since 2015, Moscow has strengthen its military

cooperation in Africa and now it is the leading supplier of military goods and technology on the

continent, with an amount of 36.7% of the total. The top five recipients of Russian military exports

are Algeria (58.64%), Egypt (35.96%), Uganda (5.17%), Sudan (2.63%) and Angola (2.11%)16.

Some Russian investments, both public and private, are allegedly protected – according to an

investigation by Le Figaro on the alleged presence of private paramilitary groups in the Central

10 “Russia to start construction of nuclear power station in Sudan next year: minister”, Sudan Tribune, 17/03/2018

(http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article64962). 11 Kennedy Kangethe, “Kenya among African countries setting up peaceful nuclear energy”, Capital Business,

17/12/2018; “Ethiopia and Russia sign three-year nuclear power plan”, Global Construction Review, 17/04/2019;

“Rosatom and the Republic of Zambia signed a general contract for the construction of a Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology”, Rosatom.ru, 15/05/2018; Alexander Winning, “Russia's Putin raises nuclear deal at Ramaphosa meeting during BRICS”, Reuters, 30/07/2018; Frederic Musisi, “Uganda, Russia sign pact to develop nuclear power”, Daily Nation, 20/06/2017; “Russia, Namibia preparing to sign agreement on peaceful atom on possible NPP construction – Lavrov”, Interfax, 05/03/2018; “Ghana embarks on nuclear power project”, Government of Ghana Official Portal, 13/08/2015; “Russian firm plans to build research nuclear reactor in Tanzania”, The East African, 31/10/2016; Dan Ngabonziza, “Rwanda, Russia Sign Nuclear Energy Deal”, KT Press, 20/05/2019; “Russia and Congo have signed the intergovernmental agreement of the cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy”, Rosatom.ru, 24/05/2019.

12 “Russia Returns To Africa – Analysis”, Eurasia Review, 18/06/2019. 13 Ibidem. 14 Susanne M. Birgerson, Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, Roger E. Kanet, La politique russe en Afrique: désengagement ou

coopération?. in «Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest Année», Vol. 27, No. 3 (1996), p. 154. 15 “Russia And Mali Ink Military Cooperation Deal”, Intelligence Briefs, June 28, 2019

(https://intelligencebriefs.com/russia-and-mali-ink-military-cooperation-deal/?fbclid=IwAR28P8OjBz-Mojp9u4U-UlGtNXUF2vJRTc_bH_f8Eg6BT7hbTk1BC-RWZIM).

16 Ibidem.

http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article64962

https://intelligencebriefs.com/russia-and-mali-ink-military-cooperation-deal/?fbclid=IwAR28P8OjBz-Mojp9u4U-UlGtNXUF2vJRTc_bH_f8Eg6BT7hbTk1BC-RWZIM

https://intelligencebriefs.com/russia-and-mali-ink-military-cooperation-deal/?fbclid=IwAR28P8OjBz-Mojp9u4U-UlGtNXUF2vJRTc_bH_f8Eg6BT7hbTk1BC-RWZIM



African Republic, where, however, there is the only official Russian contingent of peacekeepers –

by private contractors companies such as the Wagner Group and the Patriot Group17.

However, the event scheduled for next October (2019) serves as a veritable watershed:

it testifies the start of a new phase in relations between Russia and the Black Continent. In fact, in

Sochi there will be the first Russia-Africa Summit, an event that will host forty African delegations,

planned for several months and supervised directly by President Vladimir Putin. The meeting will

be co-chaired by Putin himself and by the Egyptian President, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi.

This event was anticipated by the 26th annual meeting – which took place in Moscow – of

the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), a multilateral pan-African financial institution of

which Russia has been one of the three international shareholders (together with China and India)

since December 2017, through its Russian Export Center. On the sidelines of the general meeting

of the banks, Afreximbank and the Russian Export Center signed a memorandum to facilitate

further cooperation between Russian and African companies. During the previous (25th) annual

meeting of Afreximbank (in Abuja), Russia requested and obtained the subsequent meeting in

Moscow, thus succeeding in having two global events carried out on Russian soil, in the same

year, aimed at bolstering relations with the Black Continent18.

Afreximbank has financed several Russian companies in Africa. As an example, last year it

granted a $40 million credit line to Uralchem (the biggest producer of ammonium nitrate and the

second biggest producer of ammonia and nitrogen fertilizer in Russia) for the supply of 65,000 tons

of fertilizers in Zambia. In 2018, the bank also collaborated with the Russian Export Center for

managing of over 50 billion dollars of transactions. Afreximbank also plays a facilitating role in the

negotiations between Russian companies and public and private African economic actors.

In the light of the prospects for the development of economic cooperation between the

Russian Federation and African countries, Afreximbank even expects that Russian-African trade

will reach 40 billion dollars by 2023.

The president of Afreximbank, Benedict Oramah, underlined the Russian role in the

investments that Africa needs for its infrastructures and for the transfer of technologies, which are

essential to the extraction and processing of raw materials19.

Russia's renewed efforts to expand its influence in Africa include therefore a series of

vectors, from agriculture to raw materials, from military cooperation to funding, which are allowing

Moscow to exercise its political-economic-commercial-military projection and to compete on the

Black Continent with the United States and with the other actors involved in Africa (France, China,

India, Turkey, Japan, above all)20.

17 Tanguy Berthemet, “Alain Barluet, Pourquoi les Russes s'implantent-ils en Centrafrique?”, Le Figaro, 21/10/2018

(http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2018/10/21/01003-20181021ARTFIG00095-pourquoi-les-russes-s-implantent-ils-en-centrafrique.php).

18 Ristel Tchounand, “Afreximbank Annual Meetings 2019: d'une pierre deux coups pour la stratégie africaine de la Russie”, La Tribune Afrique, 21/06/2019 (https://afrique.latribune.fr/finances/banques-assurances/2019-06-21/afreximbank-annual-meetings-2019-d-une-pierre-deux-coups-pour-la-strategie-africaine-de-la-russie-821161.html).

19 Ristel Tchounand, “Stratégie économique: Comment la Russie veut se repositionner en Afrique”, La Tribune Afrique,

27/06/2019 (https://afrique.latribune.fr/economie/strategies/2019-06-27/strategie-economique-comment-la-russie-veut-se-repositionner-en-afrique-821666.html).

20 Luke Harding, Jason Burke, “Leaked documents reveal Russian effort to exert influence in Africa”, The Guardian, 11/06/2019 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/leaked-documents-reveal-russian-effort-to-exert-influence-in-africa).

http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2018/10/21/01003-20181021ARTFIG00095-pourquoi-les-russes-s-implantent-ils-en-centrafrique.php

http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2018/10/21/01003-20181021ARTFIG00095-pourquoi-les-russes-s-implantent-ils-en-centrafrique.php

https://afrique.latribune.fr/finances/banques-assurances/2019-06-21/afreximbank-annual-meetings-2019-d-une-pierre-deux-coups-pour-la-strategie-africaine-de-la-russie-821161.html



https://afrique.latribune.fr/economie/strategies/2019-06-27/strategie-economique-comment-la-russie-veut-se-repositionner-en-afrique-821666.html

https://afrique.latribune.fr/economie/strategies/2019-06-27/strategie-economique-comment-la-russie-veut-se-repositionner-en-afrique-821666.html

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/leaked-documents-reveal-russian-effort-to-exert-influence-in-africa

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/leaked-documents-reveal-russian-effort-to-exert-influence-in-africa



Events

The historic post-Nazarbayev elections in Kazakhstan

Presidential elections were held in Kazakhstan on 9 June, the first historic consultations without

Nursultan Nazarbayev in office. In fact, on March 19 Nazarbayev announced his resignation

from the presidency (his presidential term would have expired in 2020), transferring the job to

the then Senate president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev21. The eldest daughter of Nazarbayev,

Daria, who had already held the positions of Deputy Prime minister (September 2015 -

September 2016) and President of the Senate’s Commission for Foreign Relations, Defence

and Security, replaced Okayed in the highest seat of the Senate22. After almost thirty years at

the helm of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev will retain the honorary title of "Leader of the nation”23.

From an institutional point of view, however, at the end of May the Senate approved a measure

that allows Nazarbayev to remain at the top of the Council for National Security for life, which

has been transformed from a purely advisory body to an institution aimed at analysing and

evaluating every aspects (internal and external) concerning national security and, above all,

coordinating the activities of all state structures connected to internal and external security

(ministries, local administrations, police forces, intelligence)24.

Confirming the forecasts25, the June 9th elections designated Tokayev, who obtained almost

71% of the vote, as Nazarbayev's successor26. A career diplomat, the new Kazakh President is

considered, as far as foreign policy is concerned, a continuator of the multi-vectorial policy

adopted by his predecessor, which has been expressed through the strengthening of the

partnership with the main international players – Russia, China, United States and EU – and the

integration of the national economy into regional and global markets27. Tokayev also suggested

and obtained, by way of a decree approved by Parliament on March 23, to rename the Kazakh

capital Astana, which became Nur-Sultan to honour “the name of the First President”28.

A similar posture has been recently confirmed by Nazarbayev, by proposing a three-level

dialogue oriented towards the development of Central Asia: 1) A first dialogue between the four

great actors: the United States, Russia, China and the EU; 2) A second level of dialogue

between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its Asian

counterpart, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA);

3) A third level which represents a dialogue centered on the economic aspects, between the

21 Peter Leonard, “Kazakhstan's leader resigns after almost 30 years in power”, EurasiaNet, 19/03/2019

(https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstans-leader-resigns-after-almost-30-years-in-power). 22 “Dariga Nazarbayeva elected Kazakhstan’s senate chairperson”, TASS, 20/03/2019

(https://tass.com/world/1049522); “Dariga Nazarbayeva appointed Vice PM of Kazakhstan”, KazInform, 11/09/2015 (https://www.inform.kz/en/dariga-nazarbayeva-appointed-vice-pm-of-kazakhstan_a2817022).

23 О Первом Президенте Республики Казахстан - Лидере Нации, Конституционный закон Республики Казахстан от 20 июля 2000 года N 83-II (“About the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - The Leader of the Nation”, Constitutional law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 20 July 2000 n. 83-II), Presidency of the Republic of Kazakhstan (http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/constitutional_laws/o-pervom-prezidente-respubliki-kazahstan-lidere-nacii).

24 “Парламент принял закон о Совете Безопасности” (Parliament approved the Security Council Law), Senate of the

Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan (http://parlam.kz/ru/senate/press-center/article/35994). 25 “Kazakhstan set to confirm veteran leader's choice for president”, Reuters, 06/06/2019

(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-election/kazakhstan-set-to-confirm-veteran-leaders-choice-for-president-idUSKCN1T71BW).

26 Dilshat Zhussupova, “Tokayev wins Kazakhstan’s presidency with 70.76 percent of vote, official preliminary results say”, The Astana Times, 10/06/2019 (https://astanatimes.com/2019/06/tokayev-wins-kazakhstans-presidency-with-70-76-percent-of-vote-official-preliminary-results-say/).

27 Nargis Kassenova, “The Elections and Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Continuity But For How Long?”, PONARS Eurasia, 25/06/2019 (http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/elections-and-kazakhstan%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy-continuity-how-long?fbclid=IwAR2xobb6zUcFT18FtCzGZ6NsoL5_CoyxXvugj-AM0u7eQAC6erRMJGUT-Fo).

28 Aidana Yergaliyeva, “Astana renamed as Nur-Sultan”, The Astana Times, 23/03/2019 (https://astanatimes.com/2019/03/kazakh-president-signs-decree-amendment-to-constitution-renaming-astana-to-nur-sultan/).

https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstans-leader-resigns-after-almost-30-years-in-power

https://tass.com/world/1049522

https://www.inform.kz/en/dariga-nazarbayeva-appointed-vice-pm-of-kazakhstan_a2817022

http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/constitutional_laws/o-pervom-prezidente-respubliki-kazahstan-lidere-nacii

http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/constitutional_laws/o-pervom-prezidente-respubliki-kazahstan-lidere-nacii

http://parlam.kz/ru/senate/press-center/article/35994

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-election/kazakhstan-set-to-confirm-veteran-leaders-choice-for-president-idUSKCN1T71BW

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-election/kazakhstan-set-to-confirm-veteran-leaders-choice-for-president-idUSKCN1T71BW

https://astanatimes.com/2019/06/tokayev-wins-kazakhstans-presidency-with-70-76-percent-of-vote-official-preliminary-results-say/

https://astanatimes.com/2019/06/tokayev-wins-kazakhstans-presidency-with-70-76-percent-of-vote-official-preliminary-results-say/

http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/elections-and-kazakhstan%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy-continuity-how-long?fbclid=IwAR2xobb6zUcFT18FtCzGZ6NsoL5_CoyxXvugj-AM0u7eQAC6erRMJGUT-Fo

http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/elections-and-kazakhstan%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy-continuity-how-long?fbclid=IwAR2xobb6zUcFT18FtCzGZ6NsoL5_CoyxXvugj-AM0u7eQAC6erRMJGUT-Fo

https://astanatimes.com/2019/03/kazakh-president-signs-decree-amendment-to-constitution-renaming-astana-to-nur-sultan/

https://astanatimes.com/2019/03/kazakh-president-signs-decree-amendment-to-constitution-renaming-astana-to-nur-sultan/



EU, the Eurasian Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)29.

As far as domestic policy is concerned, on the other hand, the first significant act of the new

Kazakh Head of State is the announcement of a loan-forgiveness program for over three million

citizens (more than one sixth of the population) and the end of bank bailouts: in the past ten

years the government has injected over 18 billion dollars into lenders to prevent the sector from

collapsing under the weight of bad debts30.

The measure follows a certain tension with some segments of the population, which protested

at anti-government rallies during the days of the presidential elections, culminating with the

arrest of about 4000 people31. Tokayev decreed the establishment of a forum called National

Council of Public Trust (under the Presidency of the Republic), in order to calm the

demonstrators: it should act as a consultative body through which political party leaders, non-

governmental organizations and representatives of the civil society can discuss economic and

social issues.

The change at the top of the Presidency of the Republic seems to be a prelude to a solution of

continuity, in the light of the proximity of the successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, to Nursultan

Nazarbayev. The similar process that took place in neighbouring Uzbekistan after the death of

Islam Karimov, in 2016, could have inspired this succession. As stated by Johanna Lillis,

however, Karimov's successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, while formally following the legacy of his

predecessor, inaugurated a series of political and economic reforms aimed at shaping a new

course32.

New EU strategy for Central Asia

On 17 June, the Council of the European Union adopted a new strategy towards the Central

Asian countries. The new approach was drafted in the previous month by the European

Commission, which on May 15 had forwarded a joint statement to the European Parliament and

the Council, hoping for a “stronger, modern and non-exclusive partnership with the countries of

Central Asia so that the region develops as a sustainable, more resilient, prosperous, and

closely interconnected economic and political space”33.

While emphasizing the successful outcome of relations between the EU and Central Asian

countries (since the implementation of the first EU Strategy on Central Asia in 2007), the

Council adopted the recommendations of the Commission, committing itself to conclude and

implement Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with every state of the region34.

29 Georgi Gotev, “Kazakhstan calls EU’s new Central Asia strategy ‘visionary’”, EURACTIV, 29/05/2019

(https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-asia/interview/kazakhstan-calls-eus-new-central-asia-strategy-visionary/). 30 Nariman Gizitdinov, Anthony Halpin, “Kazakh Leader to Wipe Out Debt of the Poor, End Bank Rescues”, Bloomberg,

26/06/2019 (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-26/kazakh-leader-to-wipe-out-debts-of-the-poor-end-bank-bailouts).

31 “Kazakhstan: Police now say they detained 4,000”, EurasiaNet, 18/06/2019 (https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-police-now-say-they-detained-4000).

32 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: A president called Tokayev. A future called Nursultan”, EurasiaNet, 20/03/2019 (https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-a-president-called-tokayev-a-future-called-nursultan).

33 European Commission, “The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership”, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 15/05/2019, p.1, cit.

34 “Central Asia: Council adopts a new EU strategy for the region”, Council of the EU, Press release, 17/06/2019 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/17/central-asia-council-adopts-a-new-eu-strategy-for-the-region/).

https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-asia/interview/kazakhstan-calls-eus-new-central-asia-strategy-visionary/

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-26/kazakh-leader-to-wipe-out-debts-of-the-poor-end-bank-bailouts

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-26/kazakh-leader-to-wipe-out-debts-of-the-poor-end-bank-bailouts

https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-police-now-say-they-detained-4000

https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-police-now-say-they-detained-4000

https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-a-president-called-tokayev-a-future-called-nursultan

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/17/central-asia-council-adopts-a-new-eu-strategy-for-the-region/

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/17/central-asia-council-adopts-a-new-eu-strategy-for-the-region/



The document highlights how the extent of European relations is linked to the readiness of each

Central Asian state to undertake reforms aimed at strengthening democracy, human rights, rule

of law and the judicial independence, as well as to modernize and diversify the economy35.

The main points include the role played by the Central Asian states in supporting the peace and

reconstruction process in Afghanistan: the Council reiterates that strengthening connectivity

between Central Asia, Afghanistan and South Asia is an essential tool for peace, prosperity and

stabilization of the area36, not to mention issues related to security and the prevention of

terrorism.

The new European strategy for Central Asia aims overall to promote Euro-Asian connectivity, in

the light of the importance of the region in European energy policy and of the commercial

potential of an area populated by seventy million inhabitants. For this purpose, the EU has

allocated, for the period 2014-2020, 1.1 billion euros to development cooperation with Central

Asian states, including over 454 million for regional programmes (of which 115 million for

Erasmus+)37: 62% more than in the previous program38.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the European Union has negotiated and then

concluded Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with the fledgling independent

Central Asian republics (except for Turkmenistan, whose agreement was signed in 1998 but not

yet ratified). The acceleration of the approach between the EU and Central Asia was due to two

factors: the need to respond to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which is reconnecting

Europe with East Asia through the historic Central Asian trade routes, and the signs of

openness to the outside world39 (since 2016) shown by the most populous state of the area,

Uzbekistan, which has long been isolated40. The process underwent therefore a change in

2017, when the Council asked the EU Commission and the High Representative for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy to prepare, by the end of 2019, a proposal for a new European

strategy towards the area.

Russia will build the first nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan

On 2 May, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced, during his visit to Tashkent that

he agreed with the Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev the site for the construction of the first

nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan41.

Last February, Mirziyoyev approved the document proposed by the government for the

development of the nuclear energy sector in the decade 2019-2029, aimed at constructing and

starting up – by 2030 – of an atomic power plant (with a total capacity of 2.4 GW) in the central

region of Navoi.

35 “Council Conclusions on the New Strategy on Central Asia”, General Secretariat of the Council, Doc. No. 10221/19,

Brussels, 17/06/2019, p. 2 (point 5). 36 Ivi, p. 3 (point 7). 37 “EU builds a strong and modern partnership with Central Asia”, European Union External Action, Factsheets,

Brussels, 15/05/2019 (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/62412/new-eu-strategy-central-asia_en).

38 Martin Russell, The EU's new Central Asia strategy, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 633.162 – January 2019, p. 3.

39 By way of example, Uzbekistan has begun to play an important role in the peace process in Afghanistan. In March 2018 he organized a conference (in Tashkent) attended by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and several Foreign Ministers, including Russian Sergei Lavrov, Chinese Wang Yi, Turkish Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Shannon. The final declaration supported the Kabul government in “launching direct talks with the Taliban, without any preconditions”. See: “Tashkent Conference Backs Afghan Government's Peace Offer”, RFE/RL's Uzbek Service, 27/03/2018

(https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-offers-host-talks-taliban-afghanistan/29127849.html). 40 Martin Russell, The EU's new Central Asia strategy, p. 2. 41 Лавров: Россия и Узбекистан согласовали площадку для строительства АЭС, Sputnik, 02/05/2019

(https://tj.sputniknews.ru/asia/20190502/1028818770/russia-uzbekistan-soglasovali-ploshchadku-dlya-stroitelstva-aes.html).

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/62412/new-eu-strategy-central-asia_en

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/62412/new-eu-strategy-central-asia_en

https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-offers-host-talks-taliban-afghanistan/29127849.html

https://tj.sputniknews.ru/asia/20190502/1028818770/russia-uzbekistan-soglasovali-ploshchadku-dlya-stroitelstva-aes.html

https://tj.sputniknews.ru/asia/20190502/1028818770/russia-uzbekistan-soglasovali-ploshchadku-dlya-stroitelstva-aes.html



The construction of the plant should begin in 2022 (with the start of production scheduled for

2028), and the initiative should be partially financed through preferential Russian loans42.

Jurabek Mirzamakhmudov, General Director of Uzatom, said in an interview that such a choice,

from the Uzbek side, is justified by the need to double the demand for electricity (up to 117

TWh), according to forecasts until 2030. Uzbekistan, currently dependent on natural gas, which

represents 85% of its energy production, would therefore need to diversify the sources in order

to achieve its future goals. According to the estimates of the International Monetary Fund,

Tashkent should grow with an average of 5-6% per annum up to 2023, with a parallel increase

in population and a subsequent increase in internal energy consumption43.

42 “Uzbekistan, Russia agree on site for nuclear plant”, EurasiaNet, 02/05/2019 (https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-

russia-agree-on-site-for-nuclear-plant). 43 “Uzbekistan’s nuclear aspirations”, Nuclear Engineering International, 09/04/2019

(https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featureuzbekistans-nuclear-aspirations-7145738/).

https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-russia-agree-on-site-for-nuclear-plant

https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-russia-agree-on-site-for-nuclear-plant

https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featureuzbekistans-nuclear-aspirations-7145738/

Southern and Eastern Asia Claudia Astarita


Hong Kong versus China: who won the war on the extradition law?

On Sunday, June 9th, around one million people took to the streets in Hong Kong to protest

against a new bill that allows local citizens’ extradition to China, Macao and Taiwan. The legislation

was presented on June 10th and was scheduled to be discussed on the 12th by local authorities.

The Hong Kong governor, the pro-Chinese Carrie Lam, defended the new measure as a necessary

tool to bridge the current dangerous legislative vacuum that could transform the Special

Administrative Region into a paradise for criminals in search of a safe haven. After all, the law was

designed after a 19-year-old boy from Hong Kong returned to his hometown last February after

killing his girlfriend in Taiwan during what should have simply been a trip to celebrate Valentine's

Day. Although Taipei had asked for his extradition, in order to take him to trial based on local

justice for a crime committed in his territory, the request was not met by virtue of the absence of an

agreement on that matter1.

On the basis of the new law, anyone accused of a crime who is punished with more than

seven years of imprisonment could be extradited to China, Macao or Taiwan, depending on who

has jurisdiction over the case, provided that the head of the executive agrees on the extradition

and following a first reading by Hong Kong courts. China is certainly not known for its fair and

transparent judicial system. So much so that the "legislative vacuum" Carrie Lam is referring to is

indeed a void that the British who negotiated the Basic Law in 1997 wanted to create to ensure that

the former colony could maintain a functioning legal system2. The opposite compared to mainland

China where, according to the estimates of the scholar Li Yongzhong, a percentage that fluctuates

between 10 and 20 per cent of suspects regularly "disappears" and then reappears at a later stage

on television or elsewhere to present an official apology or to communicate the sentence that was

imposed on them during the trial and the number of years they will be spending in prison. If his

evaluations are correct, in China about 100,000 people could "disappear" in 2019 alone, a figure

further clarifying why Hong Kong people are against the new extradition law. A law that is

threatening the foundations of the rule of law-based system that, since 1997, has protected Hong

Kong and Hong Kong people from Chinese interference3.

Before discussing what happened, it is opportune to reflect on two orders of considerations.

First, it is interesting to see how a problem between Hong Kong and Taiwan has been used

to offer China the chance to legalize a forced extradition system. Still, it is important to highlight

that a single bill has been designed to regulate extradition to Macao, China and Taiwan.

This second detail is particularly significant because it puts the People's Republic of China

and Taiwan on an equal footing, at a time in which Xi Jinping's line on Taiwan is becoming

increasingly rigid and clear, going in the direction of the "inevitable reunification"4. The new Hong

Kong legislation seems almost to want to take advantage of a "lucky coincidence" to support the

1 Daniel Victor, Tiffany May, “How a murder case in Taiwan led to Hong Kong’s political crisis”, The Irish Times, 16

June 2019. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/how-a-murder-case-in-taiwan-led-to-hong-kong-s-political-crisis-1.3927571

2 Evan Fowler, “Why the extradition law will pass, despite the largest protest in Hong Kong history”, Hong Kong Free Press, 11 June 2019. https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/11/extradition-law-will-pass-despite-largest-protest-hong-kong-history/

3 Peter Dahlin, “Can you get a fair trial in China? The extradition row reaches a supreme court in Europe”, Hong Kong Free Press, 18 June 2019. https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/18/can-get-fair-trial-china-extradition-row-reaches-supreme-court-europe/

4 Laura Andrieu, “Pour Xi Jinping, la réunification entre la Chine et Taïwan est «inévitable» ”, Le Figaro, 2 January 2019. http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2019/01/02/01003-20190102ARTFIG00091-pour-xi-jinping-la-reunification-entre-la-chine-et-taiwan-est-inevitable.php

Southern and Eastern Asia


Beijing line towards Taiwan, as if the acceptance of a jurisdictional control by China over Hong

Kong could create a precedent useful to impose the same standard on Taiwan. The extradition law

proposed by Hong Kong does nothing but legalizing a method allowing Beijing to interfere on local

political and judicial freedom. A method that has been used since 2015, when five Hong Kong

authors, known to have written, published or sold books criticizing the Chinese Communist Party,

disappeared and then reappeared a few months later on Chinese public television where they offer

their official public excuses for assuming "bad behaviours" that could potentially damage Party and

the country5.

The extradition law is only the latest example of an initiative confirming China’s interest in

strengthening its grip over Hong Kong. In 2018, all independent parties have been banned, and a

couple of months ago the leaders of the "Umbrella Revolution" were convicted of "civil

disobedience and public nuisance", and now they are in prison6. In October, Financial Times

journalist Victor Mallet got his visa to Hong Kong, where he had been invited to attend a

conference involving activist Andy Chan, denied. Even the well-known writer Ma Jian, a dissident

now living in the UK, who had been invited to present his new book "China Dream" at the Hong

Kong International Literature Festival, got his visa cancelled last November following “the sudden

cancellation of the event”7. When the news became viral, his speech at the Festival was re-

included in the program, the author flew to Hong Kong, and he subsequently shared that he felt

continuously at risk for the whole duration of his stay there. Today, protests against the extradition

law have been condemned by Beijing as "violent movements driven by the West", while Carrie

Lam has called them "illegal riots".

It is important to emphasize the significance of the governor's choice to use the expression

"riot". This term was used to attribute a legal responsibility to the actions of the demonstrators, in

order to be able to pursue them at a subsequent stage. Moreover, differently from what happened

in 2014, protesters voluntarily decided not to identify any leader in their movement, just to avoid

giving the authority the chance to persecute them, as it happened in 2014.

Again, as in 2014, the protesters condemned the police for their "disproportionate" reaction.

In the bouts of early June, about 80 people were injured due to the police using tear gas, pepper

spray and rubber bullets. The police have in fact chosen to intervene to prevent the crowd from

occupying the central districts of the city, thus avoiding the recurrence of a situation similar to that

of 2014, when the protesters remained in the streets for 79 consecutive days.

On Saturday, June 15th, the Hong Kong governor announced the suspension of the

extradition law, convinced that this step back would have convinced the protesters to clear the city.

However, as many as 2 million people marched the following Sunday to request the final

revocation of the bill and the resignation of Carrie Lam8.

The release of the 22-year-old activist Joshua Wong, the main leader of the 2014 "Umbrella

Revolution", before the completion of the original period of imprisonment due to good conduct,

certainly contributed to giving new life to the protest. "We want to put pressure on the governor

Carrie Lam, the bad administrator of Hong Kong, to withdraw the law," he told the international

5 Alex Palmer, “The Case of Hong Kong's Missing Booksellers”, The New York Times, 3 April 2018,

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/magazine/the-case-of-hong-kongs-missing-booksellers.html 6 The Umbrella Revolution is a peaceful protest that began on September 26, 2014 in Hong Kong and lasted for 79

days. The population manifested to demand universal suffrage as required by the Basic Law signed by China in

1997. The symbol of the protest were the yellow umbrellas protesters used to defend themselves from police tear

gas.

7 Ma Jian, “Hong Kong Was My Refuge, Now Its Freedom Is at Stake”, Time, 13 June 2019.

https://time.com/5605999/ma-jian-hong-kong-freedom/?utm_source=time.com&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=the-brief&utm_content=2019061710am&xid=newsletter-brief

8 “Hong Kong protests: Carrie Lam sorry for extradition controversy”, BBC, 18 June 2019.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48673259



press, "and we will do so by going ahead with civil disobedience and direct action, to show the

whole world how the people of Hong Kong live. We will not be silent facing this new abuse of

President Xi Jinping and Carrie Lam. Lam must resign"9.

If it is true that, as some analysts have suggested, Wong's anticipated release, announced

together with the decision to suspend the the debate on the extradition law, could be interpreted as

another Beijing's "conciliatory" attempt to induce protesters to clear the city, the young activist and

his supporters certainly did not interpret it as such. On the contrary, they chose to take advantage

of the provision to further fuel the ongoing protests.

If at first the city seemed willing to demonstrate peacefully waiting for the government to

respond on their requests and to guarantee legal and judicial autonomy for Hong Kong, on July 1st

the situation precipitated. A large group of protesters besieged and occupied the parliament,

transforming what should have remained a peaceful protest in urban guerrilla, and creating frictions

among the local population. On the one hand, it is clear that the movement will not stop as it

happened in 2014. On the other hand, young protesters have lost the support of the business

community, which at first was on their side sharing the fear of the possible consequences of the

approval of the extradition law, and the one of civil society, which remains faithful to the non-

violence line.

To try to maintain control over the island and induce protesters to return home, on July 9th the

governor Carrie Lam met the press to declare the draft law on extradition "dead". Despite this

significant and unexpected move, people emphasised they would have remained in the streets

waiting for Hong Kong Chief Executive resignations and the promise of a more democratic future.


However risky it is to try to anticipate how Beijing will manage this crisis, it is important to try

to frame possible future scenarios.

1) The Hong Kong crisis is very difficult to manage, at both local and national level. At the local

level, protesters are calling for Carrie Lam’s resignation, but it is clear that even if the current

governor should take a step back, another one that will remain very close to Beijing could only

replace her. Such a choice could transform Hong Kong into an ungovernable city: citizens could

indeed convince themselves that, under any circumstances, they could organize massive

protests to force any government to step back and guarantee the survival of the "one country,

two systems" principle.

At the national level, the Hong Kong protest could create a very dangerous precedent, and this

is the reason why the Party will have to intervene. Allowing people to believe that by

persevering with civil disobedience it might be possible to push Beijing to change its mind is too

risky, because it could induce other minority groups to adopt the same strategy to protect what

they perceive as their rights10.

2) Although this scenario seems less and less likely, Hong Kong could decide to continue to fight

for the values and principles it believes in, without following a real strategy.

A defensive/protective posture would be certainly wiser and more effective than a deliberately

provocative one, especially when trying to challenge the People's Republic of China, where the

values in which Hong Kong believes, from freedom of expression, to independence, judicial and

civil rights, are still seen as deeply destabilizing.

9 “Hong Kong ancora in piazza. Il movimento vuole la testa di Carrie Lam”, EuroNews 17 June 2019. 10 Laurent Thomet, “Hong Kong protests a rare defeat for China’s Xi Jinping and the Communist Party, say analysts”,

Hong Kong Free Press, 18 June 2019. https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/18/hong-kong-protests-rare-defeat-

chinas-xi-jinping-communist-party-say-analysts/



3) Another possibility is that Hong Kong chooses, once again, to continue raising the price of a

compromise while risking losing the advantage it already gained. This already happened in

2014, when Beijing decided to withdraw the concessions made facing what it considered an

unacceptable and stubborn challenge

In 2014, Hong Kong people started a massive protest to demand free elections and universal

suffrage11. Although the Basic Law of 1997 had foreseen this opening up of the Hong Kong

political system, Beijing deemed it too risky to proceed too quickly. At the same time, to facilitate

the achievement of a compromise, the Party proposed Hong Kong to proceed with an electoral

reform that would have created a more representative, democratic and transparent system,

allowing Hong Kong citizens to choose their political representative in a short-list of three

candidates pre-selected by Beijing. Hong Kong protesters labelled Beijing offer as an

“unacceptable mockery”, but the consequences of their confrontative statement proved to be

very different from what they expected: President Xi Jinping changed his mind, he imposed

Carrie Lam as Chief Executive of the new "rebel province", and he massively increased the

level of control on the island.

The general feeling emerging from what happened during the last few weeks is that Hong Kong

has not learned its lesson: the controversial extradition law has been suspended, but for Hong

Kong people this it is not enough, and they are now asking for its cancellation. Carrie Lam

apologized both for having mishandled the debate on the new law and for the violence with

which the police confronted protesters, and even her admission of responsibility was not

considered sufficient for a city that is now asking for its resignation12.

Since Beijing does not trust Hong Kong at least as much as Hong Kong does not trust Beijing,

the risk the former colony is now running in is that the Party, considering its requests as

excessive and insatiable, decides to find a compromise resorting to real or simulated force, in

order to stop Hong Kong rebellious attitudes once and for all and avoid that the suspension of

the extradition law could be interpreted as an Hong Kong success over Beijing, thus

encouraging other territories, such as Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan, to take to the streets to give

greater visibility to their respective claims13.

Now it is up to Beijing to announce its next move, but it is hard to define a plan because, on the

one hand, the situation is very delicate and, on the other hand, it is impossible to predict how

Hong Kong will decide to react. For the moment, the Party has published an editorial in the

China Daily (Hong Kong edition) in which it underlines how the local government was able to

listen to the voices of the people, respect it and react accordingly, suspending the debate on the

extradition law. This is certainly an unusual and suspicious position14.

11 Hong Kong electoral and political system is unique. The power is in the hands of the Legislative Council (the

parliament), composed by 70 members. These members are elected partially directly and by universal suffrage and partially indirectly by “functional bodies”. These bodies represent the main corporations, whose members are mostly pro-Chinese, by choice or convenience. The head of the Executive branch of the Government is instead nominated by an Election Committee composed of 1,200 members, but no Governor can be voted without having received Beijing approval.

12 Kris Cheng, “Anti-extradition protest organiser ‘disappointed’ by Hong Kong leader’s refusal to retract bill and resign”, Hong Kong Free Press, 18 June 2019. https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/18/anti-extradition-protest-organiser-disappointed-hong-kong-leaders-refusal-retract-bill-resign/

13 Cary Huang, “Hong Kong’s extradition protests may have given Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, a boost Beijing won’t appreciate”, South China Morning Post, 19 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3014950/hong-kongs-extradition-protests-may-have-given-taiwans-president

14 Kathy Zhang, “HK government “respects, treasures, core values”, China Daily, Hong Kong edition, 17 June 2019.



Interpreting it as a way to distance oneself from what happened and validate Hong Kong claims

would be wrong. It is more realistic to think that Beijing has actually been struck by Hong Kong

initiative and stubbornness, and has decided to buy time to reflect on its next move in order not

to risk any further loss out of this difficult confrontation. In addition, we should not forget that

China is currently very busy on the American front, and it needs to avoid that by dealing with the

Hong Kong problem it will create a new wave of anti-China protests15.

In Hong Kong, there are people who are convinced that this time will be different, because

Beijing is aware that it already tried in many ways to increase the level of pressure and control

over the former colony without ever being able to get the desired result, as the population did

not allow China to succeed. The most optimistic analysts are arguing that, since there are no

other ways to go or strategies to try, Beijing should rather accept Hong Kong will and give the

green light to the full implementation of 1997 Basic Law. However, the Party is not ready to take

this step. On the contrary, it will continue tightening its grip over Hong Kong, especially if the

latter will continue challenging Chinese unity with civil disobedience.

15 Emanuele Rossi, “Così la Cina ha rubato il futuro ad Hong Kong. La versione di Forchielli”, Formiche, July 2019,

https://formiche.net/2019/07/hong-kong-cina-forchielli/

Latin America Francesco Davide ragno


An end or a beginning? The European Union - Mercosur

negotiations

"President, I congratulate you; during his presidency it was obtained ... twenty years of

negotiations: we signed the Mercosur-European Union agreement ": this is the way in which the

Argentine Foreign Minister, Jorge M. Faurie, visibly moved, informed his President, Mauricio Macri,

last 28 June1. The agreement between the European Union and Mercosur puts an end to the

negotiations, started in 1995 with the signing of the Acuerdo Marco Interregional, which

experienced accelerations and slowdowns, going through more than twenty years of history of two

extremely complex international institutions2. Twenty years in which these institutions have

changed profoundly, both in institutional terms and in terms of collective imagination. Twenty years

in which the international politics has profoundly changed.

It seems very far away the Nineties when global commercial interconnections represented

the privileged form for the economic development of the single States. The agreement, in short,

today seems to have a completely different flavour. Accepted with the praise of all the main

political leaders involved (from Jair Bolsonaro, President of Brazil, to the President of the European

Commission, Jean-Claude Junker, passing through Tabaré Vázquez, President of Uruguay), the

end of the negotiations represents a real and true challenge for South American countries, for their

economic and political life. A challenge that comes during difficult time, except for the case of

Paraguay: Argentina and Uruguay are involved in the presidential elections to be held next

autumn, while Brazil is still dealing with the 'Lava Jato' scandal, which has overwhelmed a large

part of the political class. To the internal criticalities of the Member States have to face, also, those

of the European Community institution that for over ten years has been living in a sort of political

apnea.

Mercosur: between XX and XXI century

Rising substantially from intergovernmental agreements between Argentina and Brazil during

the 1980s (to which Uruguay and Paraguay were added in the early 1990s), Mercosur is a regional

integration treaty that took shape in order to coordinate national economies to meet the challenges

in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War. The Presidents of Argentina, Brazil,

Paraguay and Uruguay shared the spirit of the 'roaring Nineties': lowering customs barriers and

liberalizing economies, among the four countries of the Southern Cone, the ultimate goal of

Mercosur was to create a common market, stimulating international and internal trade3. An idea, in

line with the principles of free market that with the fall of the Communist Block seemed to have a

great circulation on the European continent as on the American Hemisphere and that, during the

last decade of the XX century, become to give the first results. Starting in 1999, the economic

crises that crossed the region (especially involving the two main partners of Mercosur, Argentina

1 «”Tenemos acuerdo Mercosur-UE”, le informo Faurie con emocion a Macri», in Telam, 28/06/2019 [available on line

at https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201906/371157-acuerdo-mercosur-union-europea- comercio-faurie-mensaje-macri-whatsapp.html, last access: 30/06/2019].

2 «Abre en Paraguay ronda decisiva en negociacion UE-Mercosur», in Deutsche Welle, 21/02/2018, [available on line at https://www.dw.com/es/abre-en-paraguay-ronda-decisiva-en-negociacion-ue- mercosur/a-42684880, last access: 30/06/2019].

3 For a complete analysis of the first years of Mercousr, see: G.L. Gardini, L’America Latina nel XXI Secolo. Nazioni, regionalismo e globalizzazione, Roma, Carocci Editore, 20152, pp. 71-78.

Latin America


and Brazil) worsened the economic performances of the members and, in general, deeply limited

the propulsive thrust of the process of economic integration4.

At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the first negotiations between Argentina and

Brazil in the 1980s had focused attention on political forms: during its gestation, Mercosur seemed

an institution that would guarantee democratic political systems precisely in a moment in which a

good part of South-American Countries were ending the dark season of the military regimes of the

Sixties and Seventies of the last century. At the time of signing the Treaty of Asunción, which gave

birth to the organization in 1991, the political question remained on the sidelines. Only with the

1998 Ushuaia Protocol, the so-called 'democratic clause' took on prominence in the process of

regional integration: "the full validity of democratic institutions is essential for the development of

integration processes", as stated by art. 1 of the agreement, signed by the Member States of

Mercosur as well as by Bolivia and Chile5.

During the first years of the XXI century, the process of economic integration moved on two

levels: on the one hand, we tried to give an answer to the faint institutionalization of Mercosur,

deepening the integrative process; on the other, an attempt was made to broaden the boundaries

of regional integration. Regarding the deepening of institutional ties, in 2002 the Olivos protocol

was signed which defined the dispute resolution procedures, from which the Permanent Audit

Court took shape. In 2005, the protocol that constituted the Parlasur (Mercosur Parliament) was

signed and, in 2010, the Mercosur High General Representative was created. The integration of

national markets, in other words, was accompanied by institutional consolidation. As for

enlargement, during the Nineties, Mercosur expanded its borders to include Chile, Perú, Ecuador,

Bolivia and Colombia as associated countries. During the first years of the XXI Century, then,

Venezuela and Bolivia asked to become members: in the first case the process determined the

inclusion of Venezuela a few years later (a temporary inclusion considering that the country was

suspended by Mercosur in 2017), while the second is still in progress.

The deepening and the enlargement of the integration project showed its aporias starting

from the first years of the XXI Century. The Mercosur seemed an institution superseded by other

forms of regional integration that in those years were forming, with variable geometries, far and

wide for Latin America. On the one hand, the Alba (Alianza Bolivariana para las Américas) which

originated from the opposition to the United States, bringing together Countries such as Cuba,

Nicaragua and Venezuela; the Unasur (Unión de las Naciones Sudamericanas) founded in 2008;

the Alianza para el Pacifico, founded in 2011, which brought together Chile, Colombia, Mexico and

Peru around the Asian pivot6. In addition to this, the political and economic crises that the

Mercosur member States were experiencing were profoundly marking the project of economic

integration: from the economic-political crisis of the chavista-madurist political regime in

Venezuela, to the negative performances of the economy in kirchnerist Argentina, going through

the crisis of political legitimacy that struck the Brazilian ruling class. Do not forget the political crisis

that Paraguay experienced in 2012, with the impeachment of the President Ferdinando Lugo.

4 D. Sica, Mercosur: Evolucion y perspectivas, Documento de Abeceb, marzo 2006 [available on line at

http://www.memorial.sp.gov.br/images/noticia/000590/Sica_Informe_Seminario_Memorial_Final.pdf, last access: 30/06/2019].

5 «Protocolo de Ushuaia sobre el compromiso democratico en el Mercosur, la Republica de Bolivia y la Republica de Chile» [available on line at http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/4054/1/1998_protocolo_es_ ushuaiacomprodemocraticomcs- bych.pdf, last access: 30/06/2019].

6 For a complete and exhaustive point of view on Latin American Integration in XXI Century, see: veda G.L. Gardini, P. Lambert (eds.), Latin American Foreign Policies. Between Ideology and Pragmatism, New York, Palgrave Macmillan,

2011.

An end or a beginning? The European Union - Mercosur negotiations


As the political scientist, Andrés Malamud, pointed out a few years ago, "Mercosur suffers

from the Rashomon syndrome: it has a different function for each member country and lacks a

common institutional identity. For Brazil, it is the main tool for managing its relations with Argentina

[...]. For Argentina, it is a tool to be subject to Brazil and to share its global leadership.

For Paraguay, there is a fatality deriving from history and geography [...]. For Uruguay, however, it

was an opportunity that has become a burden, but ideological and good neighbourly issues keep it

tied to the blockade. And for Venezuela, Mercosur could be the last reinsurance against political

instability and socio-economic collapse"7. In this context, Mercosur seemed to have completed its

propulsive force, in some respects, having completed its mission and, in other respects, seemed to

be experiencing the definitive crisis8.

The European Union-Mercosur Treaty

The negotiations between the EU and Mercosur concluded in the last week of June in this

political and economic climate. The main goal of the agreement is harmonizing the legislation in

order to reduce the levels of State discretion on the application of economic policies; increasing

access to goods, services and capital by increasing international economic competition in order to

allow the production of value added goods in the Mercosur countries; promoting greater integration

and cooperation between the EU-Mercosur countries and, in the Latin American case, among the

latter's member countries. In this sense, these Countries will enjoy the complete and immediate

liberalization of 80% of manufactured goods exported to Europe. Mercosur members will have

about 15 years to liberalize gradually sensitive sectors (the agreement establishes a liberalization

of 90% of finished products imported from Europe). As regards the first sector, the EU intends to

liberalize 99% of agricultural imports from Mercosur (just over 80% of the products will have no

customs tax, while the remaining part will be regulated with fixed quotas or preferences). There is

also the intention to promote greater cooperation also in terms of exchange of expertise, know-

how, technical and financial assistance with particular attention to small and medium-sized South

American companies. Finally, the integration between the two commercial partners is promoted

also through the removal of non-tariff barriers that limit international trade: among them, health and

phytosanitary protocols, forms of self-certification of products at the origin of the production chain,

promotion of predictability and transparency of rules.

The agreement also seeks to develop gradual forms in its application in order to avoid

economic-productive shocks for the Mercosur countries. In this sense, Mercosur himself

communicates the advantages for those countries that have made agreements with the European

Union both in terms of trade and in terms of increasing foreign direct investment9.

In short, there is a desire on the part of the governments of the Member States to open up to

the world economy. An opening that has been promised and longed for on several sides, but which

until now seemed extremely timid. An opening that imposes important challenges on the economic

world of the Mercosur countries. The political context, however, is not the best: the presidential

elections in Argentina and Uruguay generate uncertainties and indecisions that do not bode well

for the reforms desired. It should not be forgotten, then the difficult institutional balance in Brazil,

where President Bolsonaro does not have solid parliamentary support. In this sense, the EU /

Mercosur agreement runs the risk of becoming a point of arrival rather than a starting point for the

countries of South America.

7 A. Malamud, «El Mercosur: mision cumplida», in Revista SAAP, vol. 7, n. 2, 2013, p. 280-281. 8 F.D. Ragno, «La fine del Mercosur», in Osservatorio Strategico, a. XVIII, n. V, 2016, pp. 44-48. 9 For data and economic scenarios, see: https://www.mercosur.int/todos-los-datos-sobre-el-historico- acuerdo-

mercosur-ue/, last access: 30/06/2018.

Latin America


The challenges of the agreement

Now the season of applying the agreement is opened with important political meanings.

The Presidents of all Mercosur members have emphasized its historical significance.

This, however, must be read within the political dynamics of each country. A very critical editorial

appeared on the columns of Página 12, a newspaper very close to the Peronist opposition in

Argentina, which wrote: "The announcement of the Mercosur-EU agreement made by Macrismo

falls within the definition of fake [news]: something false that is not what it seems. It is not a final

agreement; the details have not been defined; [...] it is a political announcement during the

electoral campaign; not from general benefits for the Argentine economy; imports will increase and

exports will decrease because the Brazilian market will be lost at the hands of Europeans”10. In this

sense, the interpretation of the EU-Mercosur agreement is bent to the electoral needs of the

moment: to oppose it, in short, means to oppose President Macri, who is seeking re-election.

Similar solicitations also came from former Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim (leader coming

from the Partido dos Trabalhadores, the main opponent of the Bolsonaro Presidency) who claimed

that the agreement comes "at the worst possible moment" because the main partners of Mecorsur,

Argentina and Brazil, "They are fragile politically and economically"11.

These two criticisms concerns two crucial points in the analysis of the reception of

negotiations in South America. First, there are the economic changes, which the Mercosur partners

need, to exploit clearly the possibilities arising from the agreement with the EU. It is not 'just'

economic policy reforms but rather the promotion of a series of measures in order to facilitate

economic liberalization: these are, for example, the development of infrastructures both road and

port or the improving of the transparency of international economic transactions. The second

strategic point shows the traits of the extremely critical economic moment that the Mercosur

countries are experiencing: from the endemic inflationary problem that afflicts the economies of

most of the South American States, to the international debt of the latter that has been increasing

in recent years. Extremely problematic are the conditions of South American economies that even

today are too dependent on the price of international goods of which they are the main exporters.

In this sense, with the EU-Mercosur agreement on the one hand the governments of the

Mercosur countries are called to enormous challenges and, on the other, the political moment does

not seem the most inclined to respond to the aforementioned challenges. The electoral disputes

and the political / economic crises that cross the area do not seem, now, to help resolve the major

political and economic development hubs of the Member States. The question therefore seems

reasonable: is the EU-Mercosur treaty a starting point for initiating economic reforms in South

American countries or is it a goal in itself because it represents a simple desideratum of the

governments of those same countries?

10 A. Zaiat, «El acuerdo Mercosur-Ue es ‘fake’», in Pagina12, 2/07/2019 [available on line at

https://www.pagina12.com.ar/203747-el-acuerdo-mercosur-ue-es-fake, last access: 2/07/2019]. 11 J. Dias Carneiro, «Ue fechou acordo ‘com pressa’ porque Mercosul esta em situacao fragil, diz Celso Amorim», in

BBCNews, 28/06/2019 [available on line at https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil- 48808097, last access:

2/07/2019].

Pacific Fabio Indeo


ASEAN summit: regional challenges and cooperation in the Indo-

Pacific geopolitical arena

The 34th ASEAN summit (the Association of South East Asian Nations) - which was held in

Bangkok (Thailand) - ended on 23 June and was attended by all heads of state, ministers and

political and economic authorities representing the ten countries of this regional organization:

Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and

Vietnam. “Advancing Partnership for Sustainability" was the main theme of the summit, expressing

the intention of ASEAN members to strengthen regional cooperation in order to promote and to

incentive a sustainable development.

ASEAN countries have adopted a strategic document named "ASEAN Leaders’ Vision

Statement on Partnership for Sustainability", within which they express their availability to put in

place concrete efforts and a joint commitment to achieve an enhanced cooperation aimed to

promote a Partnership for Sustainability, which will be able to cover all ASEAN spheres of

interests: as a matter of fact, the document refers to sustainable security – which can be achieved

boosting mutual trust -, the economic growth, the sustainable development and the sustainable

human security.1

With this document, the ASEAN heads of state give their contribution to the concrete

realization of the ASEAN traditional slogan “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”, focusing

their initiatives to the sustainable development:2 they expressly recall Bangkok Declaration of 1967

which defines the role of the regional organization “to promote regional cooperation in the spirit of

quality and partnership and to secure for its peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace,

freedom and prosperity”.3

In his opening keynote speech, Thai General Prayut Chan-o-cha – which has become Prime

Minister after Parliamentarian elections held on March 24, 2019 – highlighted that Thailand’s

economic potential can provide a great contribution to ASEAN’s sustainable development. In fact,

as hosting country of the event, Thailand tried to play a mediator role among different issues and

colliding interests expressed by Southeast Asian member countries, regarding not only bilateral

and regional relations, but also the relations with the external actors, mainly China and United

States.4

One of the most debated and divisive issues within ASEAN concerns the problem of the

Rohingya population’s repatriation, nearly 740,000 individuals that are currently hosted in refugees’

camps in neighbouring Bangladesh: they fled from Myanmar following an antiterrorism operation

leaded by the army in the Rakhine province in 2017.5 After his arrival to the Bangkok summit, the

Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad promised that his country would provide assistance

1 ASEAN, ASEAN Leaders’ Vision Statement on Partnership for Sustainability, https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/1.-

ASEAN-Leaders-Vision-Statement_FINAL.pdf 2 Ibidem 3 ASEAN, The ASEAN Bangkok Declaration, Bangkok, 8 August 1967, https://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-

bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/ 4 Jitsiree Thongnoi, Asean summit: splits over China put Thailand’s Prayuth Chan-ocha in the hot seat, The South

China Morning Post, June 22, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3015615/asean-summit-splits-

over-china-put-thailands-prayuth-chan-ocha

5 United Nations, Rohingya Refugee Crisis , UN News, https://news.un.org/en/focus/rohingya-refugee-crisis

Pacific


and support to the Rohingya refugees, also reiterating criticism toward Burmese civilian leader

Aung San Suu Kyi, which refused to condemn openly the right violations suffered by Rohingya.6

We can observe the lack of an ASEAN’s shared position towards Rohingya issue, especially

because the organization pays more attention to the humanitarian side of the problem, avoiding

taking positions that could trigger political consequences. One of the main matters to address is

the refusal of Burmese authorities to grant them citizenship or to recognise basic rights because

Rohingya are legally classified as illegal migrants from Bangladesh.7 The approach of Southeast

Asian nations can be explained by the ASEAN’s adhesion to the principle of non-interference in the

internal affairs of another member state, as established in the Bangkok Declaration 1967.

The final declaration of the ASEAN summit includes all different subjects which were

successfully discussed during the meeting, and the future challenges.8

In the document, ASEAN countries have confirmed their commitment to further move

towards an economic integration, which is the basis of the ASEAN Economic Community,

conceived as an inclusive and sustainable framework of regional cooperation within which trade

and economic relations are deepen and without barriers. In this perspective, Brunei sultanate has

recently joined the small group of ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and

Vietnam) which compose the ASEAN Single Window (ASW), a regional initiative to connect and

integrate the singular national initiatives, namely the National Single Window. The main goal is to

speed up customs procedures and to promote ASEAN economic integration, easing the electronic

exchange of border documents among the member states of this regional organization.9

The current ASW members would like to see that other ASEAN countries will join this initiative in

the near future, allowing ASW to have a regional coverage.10

Another challenging task that ASEAN representatives have try to deal with is the marine

debris: through the Bangkok Declaration on Combating Marine Debris in ASEAN Region, member

countries are engaged to contain the problem, working to encourage a regional cooperative

approach and adopting measures such as the reduction of plastic use.11

According to the Conservancy Ocean Report, in 2017 four ASEAN nations (Philippines,

Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam) and China were responsible of more than half of eight million

tonnes of plastic waste that ends up in ocean every year.12 South Asia heavily suffers from the

waste problem, producing each year billion tonnes of waste, which are not dumped: furthermore,

they also imports trash from the most developed economies, such as United States and Canada.13

6 "Malaysia’s PM vows to help Rohingya", The ASEAN Post, June 22, 2019,

https://theaseanpost.com/article/malaysias-pm-vows-help-rohingya 7 Human Right Watch, Burma/Bangladesh: Burmese refugees in Bangladesh,

https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm 8 ASEAN, CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT OF THE 34TH ASEAN SUMMIT BANGKOK, 23 JUNE 2019 ADVANCING

PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABILITY, https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/Final_Chairs-Statement-of-the-34th-ASEAN-Summit_as-of-23-June-2019-12....pdf

9 "ASEAN Single Window2, http://asw.asean.org/; "Asean on course for national single window", The Bangkok Post, April 5, 2019, https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/1656784/asean-on-course-for-national-single-window

10 ASEAN, CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT OF THE 34TH ASEAN SUMMIT BANGKOK, 23 JUNE 2019 ADVANCING PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABILITY, https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/Final_Chairs-Statement-of-the-34th-ASEAN-Summit_as-of-23-June-2019-12....pdf

11 ASEAN, Bangkok Declaration On Combating Marine Debris In Asean Region, https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/2.-

Bangkok-Declaration-on-Combating-Marine-Debris-in-ASEAN-Region-FINAL.pdf 12 Ocean Conservancy, Building a clean swell, Report 2018, pp.14-17, https://oceanconservancy.org/wp-

content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-2018-ICC-REPORT.pdf 13 "ASEAN promises to tackle ocean waste", The ASEAN Post, June 23, 2019, https://theaseanpost.com/article/asean-

promises-tackle-ocean-waste

ASEAN summit: regional challenges and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical arena


ASEAN’s strategic vision on the Indo-Pacific region

The formal adhesion of ASEAN member countries to the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-

Pacific”14 can be considered the main relevant success of the Bangkok summit. The Indonesian

President Joko Widodo firstly proposed this geopolitical strategic document.15

Some weeks before the Bangkok summit, the Indonesian government tried to court

diplomatically the other ASEAN members in order to push them to approve this strategic

document: in particular, Singapore expressed its reluctance asking a more deepen discussion on

some issues. The key idea of this Jakarta-backed project is to elaborate an ASEAN shared vision,

which has to be equidistant between China and United States - which have colliding interests in the

same geopolitical area - also developing an autonomous cooperation framework in the economic

and security spheres.16

The “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” appears as the regional reaction to both the US

Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) and to the dominant position that China probably aims

to achieve in the Indo-Pacific space, through the development of the Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership and the maritime dimension of the Belt and Road Initiative: ASEAN

countries have clearly expressed their will to avoid that external powers can decide which are

regional priorities to deal with.17

The states geographically located in the Indo-Pacific maritime region and along the Indian

Ocean are characterized by a strong dynamism and by a relevant economic growth, so they

appear dangerously exposed to the effects and repercussions of the geopolitical changes. One of

the ASEAN’s main goals is to contribute to building regional economic and security architecture,

based on cooperation and inclusiveness in Southeast Asia, which will be able to provide benefits

for all involved population in terms of peace, prosperity security and stability. The document

approved in the Bangkok meeting expressly confirm that this strategic vision is profoundly inspired

by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and its principles such as the

peaceful settlement of disputes and renunciation of threat or use of force. In this geopolitical

concept, Asia-Pacific region and Indian Ocean are not conceived as contiguous territorial spaces

but as closely integrated and interconnected regions, within which ASEAN plays a role of strategic

centrality.18 Moreover, the Indo-Pacific region is also defined as a region of dialogue and

cooperation - instead of rivalry - that will provide prosperity and development for everyone.

In order to achieve these goals, ASEAN states have to enhance their cooperation mainly in

three fields: maritime cooperation, connectivity and UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030.

Maritime cooperation represents a key factor to deescalate tensions, frictions and conflicts,

considering the unsolved maritime disputes and the frequent claims of the involved states:

furthermore, an open dialogue among the Indo-Pacific countries appears essential to promote a

sustainable use of the maritime resources and to fight against marine debris.

Concerning maritime disputes, during the Bangkok summit there were several bilateral

meetings involving heads of state and ministers of the ASEAN countries: the meeting between

Indonesian President Widodo and the Filipino leader Duterte was surely fruitful, because both

14 ASEAN, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-

Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf 15 Dian Septiari, ASEAN leaders adopt Indonesia-led Indo-Pacific outlook, The Jakarta Post, June 23, 2019,

https://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2019/06/23/asean-leaders-adopt-indonesia-led-indo-pacific-outlook.html 16 Resty Woro Yuniar, Indonesia reveals frustration with Singapore over delay in Asean adopting President Joko

Widodo’s Indo-Pacific concept, The South China Morning Post, June 16, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3014651/vision-impaired-singapore-deliberately-delaying-indonesian

17 Prashanth Parameswaran, Assessing ASEAN’s New Indo-Pacific Outlook, The Diplomat, June 24, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/assessing-aseans-new-indo-pacific-outlook/.

18 ASEAN, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-

Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf

Pacific


leaders announced the completion of the ratification process of the exclusive economic zone

boundary.

Even if the parties aim to conclude a final agreement in the coming months, this bilateral

meeting was an important step to improve the relations between Indonesia and Philippines, in

order to regulate fishing activities (also avoiding tensions and dangerous escalations) hampering

illegal fishing of national vessels in the other’s country territorial waters. A similar meeting also

involved the Indonesian leader with the Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan Phuc, without

concrete results excepting a generic commitment to accelerate the demarcation process of the

maritime boundaries between these two countries 19

The cooperation in the connectivity sphere also implies the precondition to provide maritime

security and navigation freedom, promoting the integration and interconnectivity among the

countries situated along Indian and Pacific oceans.20

The urgent necessity to adopt a shared and effective Code of Conduct in the South China

Sea is a priority for ASEAN nations, helping them to settle and prevent various disputes. The Final

Declaration of the summit clearly underlines the renovated cooperation between ASEAN countries

and China and the ongoing negotiations as a significant progress: ASEAN countries hope that the

first draft of the Code of Conduct could be ready by December 2019. However, ASEAN nations

show a divergent approach toward China - from the positive approach of Cambodia to the

Vietnam’s firm opposition against Chinese projects to realize artificial islands and to undertake

autonomously offshore energy explorations - could delay this ongoing process.

Early before the summit, the collision between a Filipino fishing boat and a Chinese vessel

have revitalized tensions in the South China Sea: this incident occurred in the Reed Bank, a

hydrocarbons-rich maritime area in the Manila’s exclusive economic zone, which is also claimed by

Beijing authorities. President Duterte adopted a soften language, describing the incident as

accidental and not a deliberate action of Chinese ship, also stressing that the collision must not

lead to a war scenario with China.21

Nevertheless, Filipino President has complained and expressed concerns for the delays of

the negotiations related to the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, worrying that new further

incidents could happen in the future, triggering tensions and conflicts that ASEAN nations could not

be able to peacefully settle, without the adoption of a shared code of conduct.22

During the summit has also emerged a common position of ASEAN nations towards the

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) promoted by China: negotiations should

be concluded within 2019.23 RCEP has been conceived as a free-trade agreement, which will also

include India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, accounting for 40 percent of global

trade and representing half of the world’s population. Through RCEP China would like to extend its

influence on the Indo-Pacific trade, filling the vacuum linked to the decision of the American

President Trump to abandon the Trans Pacific Partnership (TTP) project. According to the ASEAN

perspective, RCEP will contribute to create an open and global trade environment, based on

inclusiveness and on shared rules that will ensure benefits for all allowing addressing the

19 Jarryd de Haan, 2019 ASEAN Summit: Outcomes for Indonesia, Future Directions, June 26, 2019,

http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/2019-asean-summit-outcomes-for-indonesia/ 20 ASEAN, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-

Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf 21 Arianne Merez, Filipino fishing boat was ‘sideswiped’ during Reed Bank incident, says Duterte, ABS-CBN News,

June 26, 2019, https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/26/19/filipino-fishing-boat-was-sideswiped-during-reed-bank-incident-says-duterte

22 Allan Nawal, PRRD disappointed over delay in ASEAN Code of Conduct, Philippine News Agency, June 23, 2019, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1073114

23 Phuwit Limviphuwat, Asean finalises common position on RCEP, The Nation, June 23, 2019,

https://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/breakingnews/30371577

ASEAN summit: regional challenges and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical arena


challenges of a global economy as well as preserving the centrality and reliability of the ASEAN

regional bloc.24 In spite of this, some of the potential members have expressed their doubts and

concerns: Australia and New Zealand appear worried about the lack of labour protection and

environmental safeguards, while India and Japan are traditionally wary of China, which is a long-

term political and economic rival.25


ASEAN’s heads of state have adopted important economic and political decisions during the

summit: their implementation will considerably increase the strategic relevance of the Southeast

Asian countries in the geopolitical maritime chessboard between Indian and Pacific Ocean.

The establishment of a shared and autonomous ASEAN vision on the Indo-Pacific region -

compared to US and China’s initiatives - shows their strong intention to play an active and influent

role in the regional issues.

Moreover, it appears more realistic to assume that the implementation of this strategic vision

should necessarily take into account the different international projects that focus on this area,

such as the China’s maritime Belt and Road Initiative and the impact of the Regional

Comprehensive Economic Partnership, because of the involvement of regional powerful players

like Australia, Japan, and India.

The adoption of a Code of Conduct to regulate disputes on the South China Sea represents

the main goal to achieve in the short term, in order to settle the frequent tensions involving China

and ASEAN nations which can realistically lead to a dangerous condition of conflict, weakening the

regional security architecture. In spite of some progresses and ongoing negotiations, the possibility

to reach an agreement on a shared code of conduct is heavily influenced by the Beijing approach,

mainly because the maritime routes which cross these disputed waters are fundamental for China

to preserve energy and trade security: consequently, it is necessary to provide security along these

Sea Lines of Communication to protect Chinese strategic interests.

The divergent positions of Southeast Asian countries towards the Rohingya’s dramatic

humanitarian crisis is a weakness factor which negatively affect the attempts to build a regional

political dialogue. Undoubtedly, the possibility to organize an effective repatriation of Rohingya in

Myanmar appears not realistic in the short term, due to the permanent conflict scenario, which

characterizes Rakhine’s Burmese state.

24 ASEAN, CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT OF THE 34TH ASEAN SUMMIT BANGKOK, 23 JUNE 2019 ADVANCING

PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABILITY, pp. 4-5, https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/Final_Chairs-Statement-of-the-34th-ASEAN-Summit_as-of-23-June-2019-12....pdf

25 "ASEAN summit – Southeast Asian nations wary of US-China trade row", Deutsch Welle, June 22, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/asean-summit-southeast-asian-nations-wary-of-us-china-trade-row/a-49305191

Thematic Area

"The economical disputebetween US and China affects the

global economy. The possibleconsequences in the geopoliticalregions in case of agreement or

tariffs”

Euro/Atlantica (USA-NATO-Partners) Gianluca Pastori


According to the most part of the analysts, the main risk related to the current trade war

between US and China is a large-scale contraction of international commerce, with the related

negative impact on the global economic growth. According to Bloomberg’s figures, for example, the

full deployment of the conflict would lead in 2021 to a 600 billion dollar decline in global GDP in the

worst-case scenario1. However, the distribution of gains and losses would be quite uneven.

According to UNCTAD’s figures published in February 2019, a 25% US tariff on 200 billion dollars

of Chinese goods could lead – both directly and indirectly – to a decline of Chinese export worth

205 billion dollars and to a decline of US export worth 94 billion dollars. On the other hand, the

export from the EU countries would increase of 71 billion dollars, the export from Mexico of 28

billion dollars, the export from Japan of 24 billion dollars, the export from Canada of 22 billion

dollars, the export from South Korea of 14 billion dollars, the export from Australia, Brazil and India

of 11 billion dollars each, the export from del Vietnam of 8 billion dollars, and the export from South

Africa of 2 billion dollars2. Thus, according to UNCTAD, more than 80% of the trade reduction due

to US and China tariffs would be replaced by imports from third parties that, from this point of view,

would be the real winners of the match3.

However, the economic aspects are just part of the problem. Despite US declarations, the

issue at stake in the current trade war is not just the balance of payments but the wider problem of

Beijing’s emergence in some industrial sectors that the US deems as critical in the coming years.

“Made in China 2025” is an important program to increase PRC’s national capabilities in the hi-tech

sector and to transform the country from a low-price/low-added-value final goods producer into a

technological leader offering high-added-value goods and capital goods in the global market.

The results reached since 2015 -- when the program was started -- have been significant, as

attested by the position that Chinese firms like Huawei and ZTE have reached in the TLC sector

worldwide. MiC2025 focuses on the ten key sectors of IT, robotics, green energy and vehicles, new

materials, aerospace equipment, railway equipment, power equipment, ocean engineering and

high-tech ships, medicine and medical devices, and agriculture machinery. It also focuses on

components and base materials (which must be 40% country-made in 2020 and 70% country-

made in 2025), on shrinking costs (by 30% in 2020 and by 50% in 2025), and on reducing polluting

emissions (by 22% in 2020 and by 40% in 2025)4.

MiC2025’s ambitious targets have been often criticized, with reference to both their feasibility

and the way in which they are pursued. According to these critics, the program is largely based on

the appropriation of foreign intellectual capital. The US has repeatedly raised this point, which

Beijing dismisses as a politically-motivated attack5. Washington has also presented tariffs as a tool

to protect its intellectual capital; in other occasions, tariffs have been justified in terms of national

1 B. Holland, C Sam, A $600 Billion Bill: Counting the Global Cost of the U.S.-China Trade War, “Bloomberg”, May 27,

2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-us-china-trade-war-economic-fallout. 2 World Economic Forum, Who gains when the US and China fight over trade?, June 4, 2019,

https://www.weforum.org/ agenda/2019/06/chart-of-the-day-who-gains-when-the-us-and-china-fight-over-trade. 3 Trade Wars: The Pain and the Gain, UNCTAD, Geneva, Feb. 2, 2019, https://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?

OriginalVersionID=1989. 4 On MiC2025 and its implications, see the report ed. by A. Amighini and S. Miracola, Made in China 2025: Only About

Tech Leadership?, ISPI - Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, Milan, Aug. 3, 2018; more recently, see E.B. Kania, Made in China 2025, Explained, “The Diplomat”, Feb. 1, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/ 02/made-in-china-2025-explained; on some doubts related to the projects, see J. McBride, A. Chatzky, Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global Trade?. Council on Foreign Relations, New York - Washington, DC, May 13, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/ backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade.

5 U.S. intellectual property complaints a 'political tool': China state media, “Reuters”, May 20, 2019, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-china-ip/u-s-intellectual-property-complaints-a-political-tool-china-state-media-idUSKCN1SQ03G.

https://www.weforum.org/

https://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx

https://thediplomat.com/2019/%2002/made-in-china-2025-explained

https://thediplomat.com/2019/%2002/made-in-china-2025-explained

https://www.cfr.org/



security, due to the relations that some Chinese firms would allegedly entertain with the country’s

Armed Forces and intelligence bodies6. To further complicate this scenario, some measures have

secondary nature, i.e. they do not hit only Chinese subjects but also third parties having relations

with them; a praxis that the US Congress and several administrations have already adopted in the

past and that the EU has frequently criticized. On the background, there are the negotiations that

continue – although amid ups and downs – to reach a trade agreement and that explain some

tactical “stiffening” in the last months7.

Reaching such an agreement would be beneficial from different points of view, for both US

and China and the international system. However, many differences remain. The fact that several

aspects crisscross behind the commercial dimension makes the problem more complex.

Finally, the trade war with China is not the only one the US are facing. In the last few years, the

Trump administration has opened several fronts, with the EU, with the NAFTA countries (Canada

and Mexico), and with several Asian countries8. Aims change from case to case; sometimes, tariffs

are adopted to obtain some concessions, sometimes they have a retaliatory value, sometimes they

aim at reaching different results, not necessarily of economic nature (such as the threat to impose

new tariffs on Mexico if it will not adopt more effective measures to stop illegal emigrations toward

the US9). Closing one of these fronts – although unconnected – has direct and indirect effects on

the others, establishing precedents, setting standards or shedding light on the relative strength of

the parties involved; elements that, in their turn, reverberates on the current tug-of-war between

Washington and Beijing, emphasizing its fluctuations and leading to its re-orientation in the light of

the evolutions of the overall scenario.

6 On this aspect see, e.g., Z. Doffman, CIA Claims It Has Proof Huawei Has Been Funded By China's Military And

Intelligence, “Forbes“, Apr. 20, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/04/20/cia-offers-proof-huawei-

has-been-funded-by-chinas-military-and-intelligence/#3ac9adb72084. 7 On the restart of negotiations after the May stalemate, see G20 summit: Trump and Xi agree to restart US-China

trade talks, “BBC News”, June 29, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-48810070. 8 For a partial list of these measures, see. Tariff wars - Duties imposed by Trump and U.S. trading partners, “Reutres”,

May 31, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-tariffs-factbox/factbox-tariff-wars-duties-imposed-by-trump-and-u-s-trading-partners-idUSKCN1T10D4.

9 T. Wilkinson, N. Bierman, U.S. and Mexico strike a deal on migration, staving off Trump's tariff plan, “Los Angeles Times”, June 7, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-us-mexico-tariffs-immigration-talks-20190607-story.html.

https://www.bbc.com/news/

European Defence Initiatives and technological development Claudio Catalano


The Trump administration has imposed since 2018, a series of custom duties and sanctions

on a few countries. After some postponements, these include also the European Union (EU).

In March 2018, the United States steel and aluminum import duties were imposed on China

for steel and aluminum imports. On 1 June 2018, these duties were extended also to materials

from US allied countries such as EU, Japan, Canada and Mexico. For Canada and Mexico the re-

discussion of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) led on November 30, 2018 to

the new agreement "United States, Mexico, Canada Agreement" (USMCA).

More recently, the United States has announced its intention to launch a procedure to

impose 25% duties on a list of goods originating in the EU. This initiative was established in

response to EU aid to Airbus, for the financing of the development of various models of aircraft, aid

that the World Trade Organization (WTO) declared WTO-inconsistent in May 2018.

In February 2019, an investigation by the US Department of Commerce identified a threat to

US national security in car imports from Europe. For this reason, the Trump administration has

decided to raise duties to the automotive and auto parts sectors of the EU. On April 12, 2019, the

list of the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) was published, listing the

European goods to be subjected to duties, totaling € 11.2 billion. This list includes two sections: the

first concerns only civil airplanes and helicopters and civil aerospace components produced in

France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom – State parties to the Airbus group - the second

includes a series of food and textile products, including many traditional products of the "made in

Italy", and other products and raw materials.1 The US administration formal decision was

scheduled for 18 May 2019, or 90 days from the activation of the procedure in February.

The procedure would be the same as the steel and aluminum duties on, but exports of

European cars and car components to the United States are worth about 47 billion euros, or ten

times the value of EU steel and aluminum supplies.

Although Italy is not part of Airbus, and notwithstanding FCA having an important constituent

in the United States, duties have been envisaged for the Italian automotive sector. Germany is the

most exposed, because it is worth 57% of European car exports in the United States.

At the same time the agreement between the United States and the EU on the cutting of

duties on industrial goods was being negotiated, on which an agreement was reached in July

2018. In mid-May 2019 – when the deadline for the decision on duties at car was approaching - a

new session was scheduled in Washington.

In response to the duties, the European Commission, through the Trade Commissioner,

Cecilia Malmström, announced as a countermeasure that it was ready to draw up a list of

American products to be submitted in turn to duties, for a total value of € 20 billion.2

US President Trump therefore decided on 17 May 2019 to postpone the decision on raising

duties on the EU and Japan to negotiate a solution in six months.

At the beginning of July 2019, the USTR added further items to the list of EU products, worth

an additional 4 billion dollars for a total value of 21 billion dollars.3 The formal decision on the list is

further scheduled to 5 August 2019.

1 Office Of The United States Trade Representative [Docket No. USTR–2019–0003] Initiation of Investigation; Notice of

Hearing and Request for Public Comments: Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute, 12 April 2019 https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/Preliminary_Product_List.pdf

2 Philip Blenkinsop “Exclusive: EU tariffs to target 20 billion euros of U.S. imports – diplomats” Reuters 12 April 2019 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-eu-exclusive/exclusive-eu-tariffs-to-target-20-billion-euros-of-u-s-imports-diplomats-idUSKCN1RO1VK

3 Press release “USTR Proposes Additional Products for Tariff Countermeasures in Response to Harm Caused by EU Aircraft Subsidies” 1 July 2019 https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/july/ustr-proposes-additional-products

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/Preliminary_Product_List.pdf

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-eu-exclusive/exclusive-eu-tariffs-to-target-20-billion-euros-of-u-s-imports-diplomats-idUSKCN1RO1VK

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-eu-exclusive/exclusive-eu-tariffs-to-target-20-billion-euros-of-u-s-imports-diplomats-idUSKCN1RO1VK

https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/july/ustr-proposes-additional-products

https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/july/ustr-proposes-additional-products



According to Il Sole 24 Ore:

"The White House has raised its sights on the EU after Boeing, in great difficulty for the 737

Max crisis, presented a request for" urgent intervention "together with the Association of US

aerospace producers on Airbus aid last month”.4

The fact that the Trump administration utilizes sanctions or duties as a negotiating move for

trade negotiations is supposed by several analysts. Often the restrictions are only announced and

then promptly withdrawn if the desired results are obtained from the commercial point of view,

unless the counterpart envisages counter-measures, as in the case of duties on European cars.

On the Huawei affair, the EU responded on 26 March 2019 with a series of actions aimed at

increasing data security and 5G networks, in particular a risk assessment at the national level by

15 July 2019 and at European level by the 'ENISA by 1 October 2019, following which further

interventions will be made.5

Huawei's exclusion would affect European governments’ investments for 5G infrastructures.

The main problem is the delay in the programmes in finding an alternative supplier, but above all it

is possible a significant increase in costs. This is because Huawei of China is not the only

company possessing 5G networks advanced technology, there are American and European

suppliers (such as Verizon, T-Mobile or Eriksson and Nokia), but the Chinese are the only ones to

sell this technology at very low price. A British report has calculated an additional £ 7 billion to

replace Huawei’s 5G networks in the UK.6

In the case of Huawei, however, there is an important trade-off between costs and national

security. The European governments chose cost saving, while the Americans gave an accent on

network security.

In March 2019, Germany decided not to comply with the American request, and not to

exclude any operator in 5G networks tenders, thus including Huawei. Because of Huawei

blacklisting in the US “Entity List” on 16 May 2019,7 the Netherlands and France shared the

German decision.8

The first effect of the blacklisting was Huawei's decision to sell the 51% stake it held in

Huawei Marine Networks, a joint venture established in 2008 with the British company Global

Marine Systems specializing in new telecommunications submarine cables, including the internet.

Another Chinese company Hengtong Optic-Electric has taken over from Huawei, so the

submarine cables, which constitute a significant part of the "Cyber security physics" remain in

Chinese hands.9

4 Translated from Italian: Riccardo Barlaam “Più lunga la lista dei dazi Usa contro i prodotti europei” il Sole 24 Ore, 3

luglio 2019 5 European Commission - Press release “European Commission recommends common EU approach to the security of

5G networks” 26 March 2019 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1832_en.htm 6 Matthew Field “Cutting out Huawei from 5G network would cost Britain £7bn” The Daily Telegraph, 5 April 2019

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2019/04/04/cutting-huawei-5g-network-would-cost-britain-7bn/ 7 Department of Commerce “Huawei and Affiliates Entity List rule effective” 17 May

2019https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/2394-huawei-and-affiliates-entity-list-rule 8 Laurens Cerulus “Macron: Blocking Huawei ‘not best way to defend national security’” Politico, 16 May 2019

https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-block-huawei-not-best-way-to-defend-national-security/ 9 Natasha Bernal “China's Huawei to sell undersea cable business” The Daily Telegraph, 3 June 2019

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2019/06/03/chinas-huawei-sell-undersea-cable-business/

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1832_en.htm

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2019/04/04/cutting-huawei-5g-network-would-cost-britain-7bn/

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/2394-huawei-and-affiliates-entity-list-rule

https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-block-huawei-not-best-way-to-defend-national-security/

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2019/06/03/chinas-huawei-sell-undersea-cable-business/

The Balkans and the Black Sea Paolo Quercia


Trade war, sanctions and other forms of political control of exports has increasingly became

in recent years a new form of non-kinetic conflict, which openly uses economic instruments with

coercive purposes. Customs duties, sanctions and trade restrictions are no longer introduced for

market reasons (protectionism, consumer protection, environmental protection, and protection of

domestic industries) but more and more often for strategic reasons. In other words, the objective of

the restrictive measures is not anymore economic in its nature but it is linked to national security.

The economic-financial instruments (duties, tariffs, blacklists, import or export bans, visa-ban etc.)

are specifically constructed and employed as an alternative to the military instrument with the aim

to coerce the target country / leader / person or legal entity of an enemy country.

The new use made by the Trump administration of sanctions and trade wars is perfectly

indicated in the new 2017 US national security strategy, where economic security and national

security are merged into a single concept. This approach will certainly characterize the entire

Trump presidency, but it could extend well beyond it, even regardless of the results of the US

presidential elections of November 2020.

This new era of financial and trade warfare is due to last also in the long term and practically

all the geopolitical and geo-economic areas of the world will be affected by it; the instability of the

current international context is creating a diffuse low-level conflictual environment that stretches

into an integrated chessboard where conflicts do not take place along precise and identified fault-

lines but they connect numerous distant theaters like Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Russia, Europe,

Asia - Pacific, Syria, Ukraine, North Korea, Iran. These areas are interconnected by the US grand

strategy of containing China, Russia and Iran at the same time on a global level.

With regard to South Eastern Europe, the effects of trade wars and the renewed use of the

sanction instrument have the following two significant critical aspects:

Consequences of the trade and technological wars between the USA and China and their

effects on the One-Belt-One-Road project, whose final point of arrival reaches the Balkan

Peninsula. Investments in the port sectors are considered strategically sensitive by the US if

carried out in NATO countries or in key regions for NATO security. In this context, the future of

the 17 + 1 initiative promoted by Beijing has a particular value. An escalation with significant

and permanent US tariffs against China could lead Beijing to review its relationship with Eastern

Europe and Russia and to increase its strategic commitment towards the Eastern

Mediterranean and South Eastern Europe. A US-China trade agreement would instead lead to a

reduction in the strategic value of South Eastern Europe for Beijing.

The future of sanctions against Russia, following the Ukrainian conflict and the annexation of

Crimea and Russian counter-sanctions against Europe. The future of the Western Balkans and

the widening of internal divisions among the countries of the region are increased by the failure

to implement the Minsk agreements and the continuing regime of economic sanctions towards

Moscow, a situation that perpetuates the frozen conflicts in the area and polarizes the region in

pro or against Moscow camps. Now the sanctioning regime towards Russia is staling; there are

no conditions to remove it, but it has essentially exhausted its function. It produced no

significant long-term effects on the Russian economy and did not produce a change in

Moscow's international posture. The sanctioning regime towards Russia and the trade war with

Beijing are in reality two forms of economic pressure that can hardly be pushed both at the

same time at the highest levels; otherwise, this would lead China and Russia to an even-

stronger collaboration, particularly in the Mediterranean and Eurasia. If this convergence were

to occur, it would be difficult for many countries in the Euro-Atlantic area to follow the US in this



double economic and commercial confrontation with both Moscow and Beijing. Also due to the

existence of a full-fledged Iran sanction regime.

Finally, we must not forget that the principles of trade wars do not only concern the relations

between the great powers, but are also applied at regional level, in the conflictual relations

between countries in the region. Examples of this can be seen in the ongoing trade war between

Kosovo and Serbia (with the 2019 imposition of 100% duties for products imported into Kosovo

from Serbia). Pristina took this decision in retaliation for Kosovo's failure to enter Interpol,

boycotted by Serbia and by countries that do not recognize Pristina's independence; and between

Russia and Ukraine, countries among which there are numerous disputes before the WTO and

mutual restrictions on imports. There is no European trade embargo against Crimea, but specific

new investments are prohibited and economic relations with selected and identified persons and

entities of Crimea are prohibited.

Mashreq, Gran Maghreb, Egypt and Israel Claudio Bertolotti


There has been much speculation regarding what U.S. foreign and economic policy will

influence in Maghreb and Mashreq because of the decision of the U.S. President Trump regarding

the relationship with foreign partners.

Taking into consideration the statements and the approach of the National Security Advisor

John Bolton, Trump administration is confronting with a trade environment far different from that

faced by its predecessors: in many African nations, the United States is simply no longer the

investor of choice. US trade with the continent has lagged since 2008, while rival powers—

including China – have amped up their diplomacy, trade, and investment. This has already

undermined US competitiveness in the region, and the trend is escalating. Bolton underlined that

China and Russia are conducing “predatory practices” in Africa1: this provoked a worsening

indebtedness, exacerbating corruption and fueling exploitative labor practices. However, it is

necessary to underline that many African countries benefit considerably from Chinese investment,

particularly in infrastructure.

As evidenced by the Atlantic council and reported by the African Growth and Opportunity Act,

what emerges is that the U.S. administration’s tendency to portray Africa is the stage for great

power competition: this may impose to African countries negative outcomes, in particular if this

approach will be amplified by diplomatic strong-arming or a reduction in aid. Nevertheless, the

intentions have to be compared with the capabilities to act and influence in Africa: Washington has

far fewer strategic imperatives in Africa than China does; it has less capability to compete with

China in obtaining energy resources or financing infrastructures.

What emerges, according to the U.S. Center for strategic & International Studies, is that “the

tariffs tension risks to indirectly undercutting U.S. goal of promoting African self-reliance, increasing

U.S.-Africa trade and investment, and countering China’s expanding influence on the continent.

U.S. protectionism risks adding to the perception that the U.S. is apathetic toward the region.

Meanwhile, China has used the trade war to sow anti-U.S. sentiment and bolster its image as

Africa’s favored foreign partners”2.

Maghreb and Mashreq: observing Egypt

Maghreb and Mashreq are not a regional priority for Trump. However, it is clear that the

policies of Washington will have consequences for the countries of the Maghreb and Mashreq

countries that will suffer from the planned punitive tariffs. Egypt, for example, the potentially most

affected country in the Mashreq, face massive job losses and earning opportunities, with all the

consequences that this entails for their already fragile economy and the population in dire poverty.

According to the “German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of African Affairs”, Egypt

exported about 170,000 tons or $102 million worth of steel to the United States in 2017, accounting

for about 3% of total US imports, with rising tendency3. According to the metallurgical chamber of

industry of Cairo (MIC)4, the estimated Egyptian steel exports will be characterized by a potential

further increase. Furthermore, according to the MIC, Egyptian exports to the United States could

even continue to increase and take the place of those countries that were unlikely to be exempted

from US tariffs, such as Turkey5.

1 Bolton says 'predatory' China is outpacing the U.S. in Africa, The Washington Post, 18 dicembre 2018. 2 Devermont J., Chiang C., Innocent Bystanders: Why the U.S.-China Trade War Hurts African Economies, CSIS Brief,

9 April 2019. 3 Kohnert D., Trump's tariff's impact on Africa and the ambiguous role of African agency, MPRA Paper No. 87764, 8

July 2018. 4 Trump steel tariffs: Harming Egypt’s exports?, Al-Ahram Weekly, 19 March 2018. 5 Kohnert D., Trump's tariff's impact…, cited.

Mashreq, Gran Maghreb, Egypt and Israel


On the other hand, under certain conditions the trade dispute could even produce positive

externalities for Maghreb and Mashreq producers. As suggested by many analysts, the African

countries will benefit because China will look to import more from Africa; for example, the

retaliatory tariffs of up to 25 percent imposed by China on U.S. agricultural imports could produce

collateral benefits for Egypt in citrus and wine imports to China.

As reported by “The diplomat”, “the consequence of the trade war between the United States

and China is a mixture of harm and opportunity. Harm comes from the potential of China dumping

cheap products into domestic African markets, and concerns over the possibility of reduced export

opportunities to China due to soft demand. But there is also optimism about opportunities to fill the

exports gap to the United States and even to fill some commodities export gaps left by the United

States in China itself”6. “The most lasting positive consequence could be to energize African

policymakers and stakeholders to redouble efforts at economic reform: the trade war may provide

African countries with even greater incentives to reduce dependence on major country investments

and aid and to create investment environments that allow countries to become part of the global

supply chain on their own terms”7.

6 Girard B., What Will the US-China Trade War Mean for Africa?, The Diplomat, 25 October 2018. 7 Ibidem.

Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa Marco Cochi


United States and China reached the second truce in seven months in trade war, at the G20

summit in Osaka, pledging to resume negotiations to freeze the new duties. At the negotiating

table, the Chinese presidents, Xi Jinping, and the US, Donald Trump, have not set any timetable,

while the divergences between the two super powers remain profound: US wanting to reduce their

trade deficit and Beijing did not intend to renounce its technological ambitions.

However, the meeting would seem to have eased the tensions that culminated last 2 June

with the publication by the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, of a

White Paper, translated into eight languages1. In the Paper Beijing found that the commercial

dispute with Washington is destabilizing for the world economy. An opinion shared few days later

by Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in her

concluding speech at the G20 summit in Fukuoka2.

The truce reached in Osaka could give an initial response to the urgent need to find a

solution to the Sino-American dispute over international trade. Especially due to the commitment

made by the US president not to impose new duties on Beijing's exports3.

A possible easing of restrictions could give new impetus to the resumption of the talks, which

were abruptly interrupted last 10 May. When had entered into force the increase of duties from 10

per cent to 25 per cent on US$200 billion of goods exported from China to the United States.

In response to the new protectionist measures decided by the Trump administration, last 1st June,

the retaliation of Beijing arrived. Have been raised customs tariffs from 10 per cent to 25 per cent

on 2,493 products from US, for a total of about US$60 billion.

From the point of view of the real economy, these high additional taxes damage the

exchanges between Chinese and US companies, with a consequent reduction for world trade and

global demand. All this will affect the performance of the two largest economies in the world and

will have repercussions on the entire world economic sphere, which according to the IMF tariffs

could subtract about 0.3 percent from global GDP in 20204.

Maurice Obstfeld, Professor of Economics at the University of California and former director

of the Research Department at the International Monetary Fund, is of the opinion that the trade war

will have negative consequences also for the large number of developing countries that do

business with the Asian power5. Above all the African ones, which in the last fifteen years have

benefited from the huge flow of Chinese capital. Professor Obstfeld highlights how China is the

main trading partner of Africa's most developed economies. Therefore, if its products are hit by US

tariffs it could produce a chain effect on the continent6.

It therefore appears evident that the dispute between the United States and China is

destined to have significant repercussions also on the sub-Saharan Africa countries. Despite their

incidence on global trade is less than 2 per cent7, could suffer a drastic slowdown of growth

prospects and strong tensions on financial markets.

1 In Full: China’s White Paper on U.S. Economic and Trade Talks, in «Bloomberg», 3 June 2019.

https://bloom.bg/313n5Xo 2 Jess Shankleman, Lagarde Says U.S.-China Trade War Looms Large Over Global Growth, in «Bloomberg», 9 June

2019. https://bloom.bg/2WJu7gp 3 Roberta Rampton, Michael Martina, Trump says China trade talks ‘back on track’, new tariffs on hold, in «Reuters»,

29 June 2019. https://reut.rs/2KNg87Q 4 https://blogs.imf.org/2019/05/23/the-impact-of-us-china-trade-tensions/ 5 How will a global trade war affect Africa?, in «Aljazeera», 21 July 2018. https://bit.ly/2Lzpwgc

6 Ibidem 7 www.intechopen.com/books/emerging-issues-in-economics-and-development/international-trade-the-position-of-

africa-in-global-merchandise-trade



Another factor to take into consideration is that the decrease in global growth caused by the

war of duties will have repercussions on the prices of raw materials, from which the economy of

many sub-Saharan states is highly dependent. An addiction that relates mainly to China, from

which most of exports of the resources-rich African nations come.

South Sudan for example gets 95 per cent of its foreign revenue from oil exports to China,

according to IMF data. For Angola, 60 per cent of its exports are oil and minerals to Beijing.

Meanwhile, China takes 45 per cent of Zimbabwe’s exports of diamonds and other minerals8.

In turn, the African Development Bank (AfDB) warns that the trade tensions could cause a 2.5 per

cent reduction in GDP in resource-intensive African countries and a 1.9 per cent reduction for oil

exporters by 20219.

The AfDB expects in particular a significant impact in the commercial sectors, especially

towards the most exported raw materials such as minerals, oil and food stuffs10. Among the latter,

one of the most affected is soy, a legume used for human nutrition and as feed for farm animals, of

which China is the largest buyer on a global scale. At one time, Asian power purchased from US

one third of its needs, worth US$ 12 billion, but since July 2018, when it has retaliated against the

import of soy from the United States of a 25 per cent duty, has almost zeroed the orders.

After the application of the heavy additional tax, Chinese companies purchased the legume

from smaller producers, including feed companies operating in Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda and the

Democratic Republic of the Congo. This has generated a significant shortage of soy in the four

African countries and a consequent increase in the price of around 25 per cent: from the original

520 dollars per ton to 650 in recent months11.

An analysis carried out by the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, indicates that

three key factors will need to be monitored to determine the repercussions of the current clash

between the world's economic giants on African economies: the prospects for the dollar, the impact

of the commercial dispute on prices of raw materials and the US trend of interest rates12.

Through these elements, it will be possible to establish how much the commercial tension

between the United States and China will affect the economic events of the individual African

states. Most of which has already registered a much slower growth of export earnings compared to

foreign debts. In addition, this is already one of the most worrying effects for African countries of

the ongoing trade dispute between Washington and Beijing, as it raises concerns about the

capacity these states have to repay their debt.

It should also be emphasized, that the commercial dispute between the two super powers

comes at a particularly critical moment for the sub-Saharan economies heavily dependent on

exports of raw materials. Many entrepreneurs in the area have not yet recovered from the end of

the 'commodities super cycle', which between 2014 and 2016 produced a drastic drop in prices of

the whole sector. From oil to gold, from copper to ferrous metals.

8 Abdi Latif Dahir, Africa’s resource-rich nations are getting even more reliant on China for their exports, in «Quartz

Africa», 26 April 2019. https://bit.ly/2KP4Per 9 Judd Devermont, Catherine Chiang, Innocent Bystanders: Why the U.S.-China Trade War Hurts African Economies,

CSIS Report, 9 April 2019. https://bit.ly/2Zr96cq

10 US-China trade tensions could hit African growth: AFDB, in «France24», 8 February 2019. https://bit.ly/2IK56wB

11 Gavin du Venage, How Africa became collateral damage in US-China trade war, in «The National», 17 April 2019. https://bit.ly/2PcshCA

12 Ronak Gopaldas, What does a global trade war mean for Africa?, Observer Research Foundation, 18 July 2018.

https://bit.ly/2WCaMOd

The economical dispute between US and China affects the global economy.

The possible consequences in the geopolitical regions in case of agreement or tariffs


The decline in export earnings has highlighted the weakness of many sub-Saharan nations,

inherent in dependence on one or two primary export sectors. Moreover, the same nations were

not able to implement policies aimed at reducing the high production costs. Mainly due to the lack

of infrastructures, electricity networks and efficient transport, which after the start of the trade war

prevented Chinese companies from moving quickly in Africa13.

Finally, it should be noted that on 21 March 2018, 44 African Union (AU) member states

signed the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

An agreement establishing a mega continental free trade area to increase exchanges and regional

supply chains, eliminating 90 percent of tariff barriers on trade between participating countries. In

addition, it is significant that in the same days when the Washington administration ordered the

imposition of new duties to put limits on global trade, Africa bravely decided to go against the

current to reach the economic self-sufficiency of its States.

13 Marek Dabrowski, Yana Myachenkova, Free trade in Africa: An important goal but not easy to achieve, in «Bruegel»,

13 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2KV65wU

Persian Gulf Francesca Citossi


The Middle Eastern area, more specifically the oil producing Gulf States, could become the

main battleground between Washington and Beijing with Iran playing a key role 1.

The trade war could lead to an increase in the capital cost and a decrease in investments,

thus leading to a decrease in global growth: the most vulnerable sectors are transport, banks and

real estate. Although the increase in crude oil prices is positive for exporters, the increase in

interest rates and tougher monetary conditions could slow down the performance of the

economies2 of the area. UAE steel exports to the US have already suffered from the 25% tariff

imposed by Washington.

China is trying to carve out its strategic-regional and military space in the Middle East: the

first and main objective is Iran, the second the Persian Gulf area and the third the relationship with

Russia3.

Beijing is the world's largest consumer of crude oil; because of the decline in domestic

production, it must expand its refining and storage capacity to decrease exposure to the volatility of

the global energy market. Washington's attempt to reduce Iran's exports to zero is a strategic

threat to China, its first importer. It is therefore very likely that Beijing will ignore the sanctions and

will continue business as usual, even if the purchases of Iranian crude oil are executed through the

(sanctioned) Iranian Central Bank. The People's Bank of China is the subject of secondary

sanctions imposed by the Trump Administration4.

Furthermore, Tehran is an important element of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); it received

8.5 billion dollars in loans from the Export-Import Bank of China in 2018.

Economic commitment and security relations are key points in the relations with the Gulf

States and China is trying to ease tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for both countries it is

indeed an essential trading partner. In 2017, the Saudi king Salman signed a Memorandum of

Understanding worth 65 billion dollars for agreements on various sectors including petrochemical

and technology. Chinese diplomats have sought to establish links between the Saudi Vision 2030

program and the BRI. During the China Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF, established in

2004, is a formal dialogue initiative between China and the Arab League which includes 21

members and aims to promote cooperation in various fields) Beijing has committed itself to

contributing to the Gulf area with 23 billion of dollars in development aid. President Xi Jinping

visited the United Arab Emirates to discuss economic cooperation - 60% of China's trade with

Africa and Europe goes through the UAE - and regional security. Recently, Chinese patrols near

the Gulf of Oman and Aden were intensified; Beijing established also a base in Djibouti, Bab-el-

Mandeb (a strategic entry to the Red Sea and then the Suez Canal) that faces US base Camp

Lemonnier just 11 kilometers away.

Moscow has taken on the firm role of leading negotiator in Syria trying to reduce tensions

between Israel, Iran, its proxies and the Assad regime for which support China, in harmony with

Russia, vetoed to UN interventions. The two powers’ support to Iran, however, is likely to remain

limited: Tehran only plays the observer role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO,

including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan) that

1 S. Salacanin, “China-US trade war impact on the Middle East”, The New Arab, 20 September 2018;

https://bit.ly/2NptGsj. 2 S. Khan, “US-China trade war may crimp some GCC economic sectors in 2019”, The National, December 31, 2018;

https://bit.ly/2BPTLI3. 3 O. Daniels, “How China is Trying to dominate the Middle East”, The National Interest, August 28, 2018;

https://bit.ly/31giot8. 4 K. Johnson, R. Bramer, “Trump’s big Iran Oil Gamble”, Foreign Policy, April 22, 2019; https://bit.ly/2GtcE5Q.

https://bit.ly/2NptGsj

https://bit.ly/2BPTLI3

https://bit.ly/31giot8

https://bit.ly/2GtcE5Q

Persian Gulf


provides for economic, security, cultural cooperation, and it has been negotiating since 2006 for

member admission.

The BRI band is an interesting strategic space for observing Sino-Russian dynamics. China

uses Iran to develop the BRI around Russian territory indeed. Infrastructure investments in the

energy sector could strengthen Iran's ability to export liquefied natural gas to Europe, but the issue

of secondary sanctions will remain central even if European states were able to circumvent them

through the INSTEX payment system5.

While the United States is an energy exporter, thus reducing the strategic importance of the

Middle East due to the domestic shale oil, this is not the case for China, whose energy needs are

constantly growing. A large part of the imported crude oil comes from OPEC members and Beijing

has replaced the UAE as first investor in the area. Washington's disengagement could lead to a

new hegemonic role for Beijing6 which BRI, for example, far exceeds the scope of the Marshall

Plan involving 80 countries. Washington not only has no alternative, but generally, it simply

proposes military responses to the violent criticalities of the Middle Eastern area, creating an anti-

American Sino-Chinese bloc as Henry Kissinger predicted decades ago.

China is increasingly reinforcing its strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia - which is

massively purchasing armaments and war technology7 - Iran, Iraq and the UAE, without forgetting

other OPEC and GCC members. It committed itself to the International Production Capacity

Cooperation fund for the Middle East to facilitate industrial investments in the context of the free-

trade agreement established with the Gulf Cooperation Council in order to support the economic

diversification so important for the Gulf States. China, after the imposition of new duties, has

canceled imports of crude oil and GPL from the USA replacing them with Iranian imports that are

cheaper: Iran is now one of the most important energy suppliers for the People's Republic of

China. The security of the Middle East and of the energy supplies will be defined in the next two

decades by the balance of power between the United States, Russia and China and at the regional

level between the Saudi Arabia-UAE and the Iran-Qatar fronts.

5 “System to circumvent US sanctions on Iran ready soon: German FM”, Al Jazeera, 10 Jun 2019;

https://bit.ly/2WrPRNR. 6 A. Cohen, “Will China Replace The US As the Middle East Hegemon?”, Forbes, Feb 14, 2019; https://bit.ly/2JdIAws 7 “Saudi Arabia buying new missile technology from China: Report”, Al Jazeera, June 6, 2019; https://bit.ly/2Yl8HYx.

https://bit.ly/2WrPRNR

https://bit.ly/2JdIAws

https://bit.ly/2Yl8HYx

Horn of Africa and Southern Africa Luca Puddu


The Middle Eastern area, more specifically the oil producing Gulf States, could become the

main battleground between Washington and Beijing with Iran playing a key role 1.

The trade war could lead to an increase in the capital cost and a decrease in investments,

thus leading to a decrease in global growth: the most vulnerable sectors are transport, banks and

real estate. Although the increase in crude oil prices is positive for exporters, the increase in

interest rates and tougher monetary conditions could slow down the performance of the

economies2 of the area. UAE steel exports to the US have already suffered from the 25% tariff

imposed by Washington.

China is trying to carve out its strategic-regional and military space in the Middle East: the

first and main objective is Iran, the second the Persian Gulf area and the third the relationship with

Russia3.

Beijing is the world's largest consumer of crude oil; because of the decline in domestic

production, it must expand its refining and storage capacity to decrease exposure to the volatility of

the global energy market. Washington's attempt to reduce Iran's exports to zero is a strategic

threat to China, its first importer. It is therefore very likely that Beijing will ignore the sanctions and

will continue business as usual, even if the purchases of Iranian crude oil are executed through the

(sanctioned) Iranian Central Bank. The People's Bank of China is the subject of secondary

sanctions imposed by the Trump Administration4.

Furthermore, Tehran is an important element of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); it received

8.5 billion dollars in loans from the Export-Import Bank of China in 2018.

Economic commitment and security relations are key points in the relations with the Gulf

States and China is trying to ease tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for both countries it is

indeed an essential trading partner. In 2017, the Saudi king Salman signed a Memorandum of

Understanding worth 65 billion dollars for agreements on various sectors including petrochemical

and technology. Chinese diplomats have sought to establish links between the Saudi Vision 2030

program and the BRI. During the China Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF, established in

2004, is a formal dialogue initiative between China and the Arab League which includes 21

members and aims to promote cooperation in various fields) Beijing has committed itself to

contributing to the Gulf area with 23 billion of dollars in development aid. President Xi Jinping

visited the United Arab Emirates to discuss economic cooperation - 60% of China's trade with

Africa and Europe goes through the UAE - and regional security. Recently, Chinese patrols near

the Gulf of Oman and Aden were intensified; Beijing established also a base in Djibouti, Bab-el-

Mandeb (a strategic entry to the Red Sea and then the Suez Canal) that faces US base Camp

Lemonnier just 11 kilometers away.

Moscow has taken on the firm role of leading negotiator in Syria trying to reduce tensions

between Israel, Iran, its proxies and the Assad regime for which support China, in harmony with

Russia, vetoed to UN interventions. The two powers’ support to Iran, however, is likely to remain

limited: Tehran only plays the observer role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO,

including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan) that

1 S. Salacanin, “China-US trade war impact on the Middle East”, The New Arab, 20 September 2018;

https://bit.ly/2NptGsj. 2 S. Khan, “US-China trade war may crimp some GCC economic sectors in 2019”, The National, December 31, 2018;

https://bit.ly/2BPTLI3. 3 O. Daniels, “How China is Trying to dominate the Middle East”, The National Interest, August 28, 2018;

https://bit.ly/31giot8. 4 K. Johnson, R. Bramer, “Trump’s big Iran Oil Gamble”, Foreign Policy, April 22, 2019; https://bit.ly/2GtcE5Q.

https://bit.ly/2NptGsj

https://bit.ly/2BPTLI3

https://bit.ly/31giot8

https://bit.ly/2GtcE5Q



provides for economic, security, cultural cooperation, and it has been negotiating since 2006 for

member admission.

The BRI band is an interesting strategic space for observing Sino-Russian dynamics. China

uses Iran to develop the BRI around Russian territory indeed. Infrastructure investments in the

energy sector could strengthen Iran's ability to export liquefied natural gas to Europe, but the issue

of secondary sanctions will remain central even if European states were able to circumvent them

through the INSTEX payment system5.

While the United States is an energy exporter, thus reducing the strategic importance of the

Middle East due to the domestic shale oil, this is not the case for China, whose energy needs are

constantly growing. A large part of the imported crude oil comes from OPEC members and Beijing

has replaced the UAE as first investor in the area. Washington's disengagement could lead to a

new hegemonic role for Beijing6 which BRI, for example, far exceeds the scope of the Marshall

Plan involving 80 countries. Washington not only has no alternative, but generally, it simply

proposes military responses to the violent criticalities of the Middle Eastern area, creating an anti-

American Sino-Chinese bloc as Henry Kissinger predicted decades ago.

China is increasingly reinforcing its strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia - which is

massively purchasing armaments and war technology7 - Iran, Iraq and the UAE, without forgetting

other OPEC and GCC members. It committed itself to the International Production Capacity

Cooperation fund for the Middle East to facilitate industrial investments in the context of the free-

trade agreement established with the Gulf Cooperation Council in order to support the economic

diversification so important for the Gulf States. China, after the imposition of new duties, has

canceled imports of crude oil and GPL from the USA replacing them with Iranian imports that are

cheaper: Iran is now one of the most important energy suppliers for the People's Republic of

China. The security of the Middle East and of the energy supplies will be defined in the next two

decades by the balance of power between the United States, Russia and China and at the regional

level between the Saudi Arabia-UAE and the Iran-Qatar fronts.

5 “System to circumvent US sanctions on Iran ready soon: German FM”, Al Jazeera, 10 Jun 2019;

https://bit.ly/2WrPRNR. 6 A. Cohen, “Will China Replace The US As the Middle East Hegemon?”, Forbes, Feb 14, 2019; https://bit.ly/2JdIAws 7 “Saudi Arabia buying new missile technology from China: Report”, Al Jazeera, June 6, 2019; https://bit.ly/2Yl8HYx.

https://bit.ly/2WrPRNR

https://bit.ly/2JdIAws

https://bit.ly/2Yl8HYx

Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus Alessio Stilo


Russia

The US-China trade dispute is contributing to strengthen the relationship between China and

Russia, which follows a trend established in 2014, when Western sanctions for the Crimean issue

prompted Moscow to move closer to Beijing. China has become the main Russian economic

partner (while Moscow is the tenth economic partner of Beijing): in 2018, the volume of their trade

reached the record amount of 107.06 billion dollars (84.07 in 2017, 69.52 in 2016)1. Beijing mainly

exports electromechanical goods, while importing oil, coal and wood from Moscow. Recently,

Russian ministries of Economic Development and Agriculture prepared a proposal aimed at

discussing the possibility to reduce further import duties on goods with China, to allow Beijing to

increase its import of Russian agricultural goods2.

The recent trade dispute between the US and China is pushing Beijing and Moscow to

bolster their relationship not only in economic-commercial terms, which are nevertheless

significant: after being sanctioned by the United States, Chinese Huawei signed an agreement with

the largest Russian telecommunications company (MTS) to develop the 5G network in Russia3; at

the same time, Moscow offered Huawei the possibility of using a Russian software ecosystem on

several devices of the Chinese company4.

As confirmed by the presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping during the International

Economic Forum in St. Petersburg5, Moscow and Beijing are also sharing a common position on

global political issues, such as support for Maduro in Venezuela and for Iran6, as well as on

economic and financial issues of strategic importance, such as the common willingness to de-

dollarize trade and to increase gold reserves7.

Central Asia

Central Asian states could benefit from the trade dispute between the US and China. In fact,

China could increase investments in the area, which are already on the rise as far as some

projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are concerned. The Central Asian region also

produces some agricultural goods that Beijing has purchased for a long time from the United

States, mainly soy and sorghum, two essential goods for the production of meat, whose

consumption is increasing in parallel with the change in the eating habits of Chinese citizens.

Kazakhstan has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of Chinese investments: in mid-2018,

Kazakh wheat exports to Beijing rose by almost 50%. In June of the same year, the Ministry of

Agriculture announced that it would triple its wheat supply to China by 2020 (compared to 2016

levels).

1 “Russia’s trade with China surges to more than $107 billion”, Russia Today, 14/01/2019

(https://www.rt.com/business/448783-russia-china-trade-turnover/). 2 “Russia plans to discuss reducing import duties with China”, TASS, 19/06/2019 (https://tass.com/economy/1064549). 3 “China's Huawei signs deal to develop 5G network in Russia”, The Guardian, 06/06/2019

(https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jun/06/chinas-huawei-signs-deal-to-develop-5g-network-in-russia). 4 “Russia offers software ecosystem for smartphones to Huawei — source”, TASS, 11/06/2019

(https://tass.com/economy/1063295). 5 “Russia-Cina: Forum San Pietroburgo conferma alleanza strategica e obiettivi comuni”, Agenzia Nova, 07/06/2019.

6 María R. Sahuquillo, Macarena Vidal Liy, “Rusia y China impulsan su relación bilateral a un nivel “sin precedentes”, según Putin”, El Paìs, 06/06/2019 (https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/06/05/actualidad/1559758989_489176.html).

7 “Greenback Losing its Share in World Market Amid De-Dollarisation Drive - Russian Economy Minister”, Sputnik, 06/06/2019 (https://sputniknews.com/business/201906061075686713-greenback-losing-share-in-world-market-dedollarisation/).

https://www.rt.com/business/448783-russia-china-trade-turnover/

https://tass.com/economy/1064549

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jun/06/chinas-huawei-signs-deal-to-develop-5g-network-in-russia

https://tass.com/economy/1063295

https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/06/05/actualidad/1559758989_489176.html

https://sputniknews.com/business/201906061075686713-greenback-losing-share-in-world-market-dedollarisation/

https://sputniknews.com/business/201906061075686713-greenback-losing-share-in-world-market-dedollarisation/



Soybeans, which were the most important American agricultural product exported to China, are

another good which could be supplied to Beijing by Kazakhstan (in 2018 Beijing signed an

agreement to purchase 100 tons of soybeans with a supplier from northern Kazakhstan)8.

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are also gaining more and more importance, for Beijing, as

sellers of agricultural products, as acknowledged by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi; in return,

Beijing is expanding its investments in infrastructure and energy diversification in the two countries,

particularly in the hydroelectric, solar and wind sectors9. Uzbekistan is benefiting from the BRI:

it signed a $ 20 billion deal in new Chinese infrastructure and energy projects10.

The other factor for the growing China-Central Asia interconnection is the Chinese industrial

overcapacity, due to the abundance of steel and aluminium foundries. Therefore, the projects

linked to the BRI allow the People's Republic to export cheaper industrial plants to the Central

Asian states in exchange for local infrastructure, exploiting loans granted by Chinese banks. In the

latter case, the Contracting States assume the risk associated with what has been defined as the

“debt trap”, that is the series of political implications deriving from the excessive exposure to

Chinese loans by fiscally weak states, in order to support the megastructures planned in the BRI

project11.

Regardless of the outcome of the ongoing trade war, the regional trend seems prone to

deepening bilateral relations between China and the Central Asian states. The possible tightening

of the sanctioning regime would only accelerate the current trend, inducing Beijing to replace

structurally American agricultural products with those of the nearest Central Asian countries12.

Caucasus

Caucasus is taking on a growing role within the Sino-American rivalry, too. During the Trump

presidency, the United States are back to being interested in the region, as witnessed by the visit

of the National Security Advisor, John Bolton, in the three countries of the area, in October 201813,

mainly due to Washington's tensions with Iran, but also due to the regional role as a large energy

corridor and geopolitical fault line, where the interests of other external actors clash. However, in

this framework, Caucasus will probably remain a factor – albeit of growing interest, not vital14 –

which has more influence on American policies towards Russia and Iran than on the US-China

dispute, as claimed by Stratfor15.

8 Sam Reynolds, “Central Asia sees opportunity in US-China trade war”, EurasiaNet, 23/07/2018

(https://eurasianet.org/central-asia-sees-opportunity-in-us-china-trade-war). 9 Laura Zhou, “China looks to Russia, Central Asia for support amid tensions with US”, South China Morning Post,

28/05/2019 (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3012017/china-looks-russia-central-asia-support-amid-tensions-us).

10 Stefan Hedlund, “Uzbekistan emerging from isolation”, Geopolitical Intelligence Services, Report Scenarios, 15/02/2019 (https://www.gisreportsonline.com/uzbekistan-emerging-from-isolation,politics,2801.html).

11 Lucy Hornby, Archie Zhang, “Belt and Road debt trap accusations hound China as it hosts forum”, Financial Times, 23/04/2019 (https://www.ft.com/content/3e9a0266-6500-11e9-9adc-98bf1d35a056).

12 Tristan Kenderdine, “Towards a Central Asia and Caucasus Trade Bloc for Belt and Road”, The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 30/10/2018 (https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13539-towards-a-

central-asia-and-caucasus-trade-bloc-for-belt-and-road.html). 13 Georgi Gotev, “Bolton tests the Caucasus waters ‘to advance American interests’”, Euractiv, 24/10/2019

(https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/news/bolton-tests-the-caucasus-waters-to-advance-american-interests/).

14 Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski, U.S. Policy Toward the South Caucasus: Take Three, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, May 2017 (https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/31/u.s.-policy-toward-south-caucasus-take-three-pub-70122).

15 “Azerbaijan, Armenia: Washington Turns Its Attention to the South Caucasus”, Stratfor, 25/10/2018

(https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/azerbaijan-armenia-washington-turns-its-attention-south-caucasus-bolton).

https://eurasianet.org/central-asia-sees-opportunity-in-us-china-trade-war

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3012017/china-looks-russia-central-asia-support-amid-tensions-us

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3012017/china-looks-russia-central-asia-support-amid-tensions-us

https://www.gisreportsonline.com/uzbekistan-emerging-from-isolation,politics,2801.html

https://www.ft.com/content/3e9a0266-6500-11e9-9adc-98bf1d35a056

https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13539-towards-a-central-asia-and-caucasus-trade-bloc-for-belt-and-road.html

https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13539-towards-a-central-asia-and-caucasus-trade-bloc-for-belt-and-road.html

https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/news/bolton-tests-the-caucasus-waters-to-advance-american-interests/

https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/news/bolton-tests-the-caucasus-waters-to-advance-american-interests/

https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/31/u.s.-policy-toward-south-caucasus-take-three-pub-70122

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/azerbaijan-armenia-washington-turns-its-attention-south-caucasus-bolton




On the other hand, Beijing is increasing its interest towards the area, which serves as the

“middle corridor” of the Belt and Road Initiative, compared to the low profile adopted until some

years ago by both parties (the three Caucasian states were more concentrated, from an economic

point of view, on the markets of post-Soviet countries, Russia and the European Union). Regional

projects in the transports and energy fields, in particular the launch of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway

(BTK) and the developments in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (TITR) project

have changed the dynamics: BRI could fit with the intent of the three Caucasian countries

(Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) to become connectivity hubs between Europe and Asia.

China's trade with Azerbaijan, the largest economy in the region, has grown 800 times (in 2017) as

compared to the early 1990s, accounting for 5% of Baku's total foreign trade16. A similar trend was

registered in Georgia: in 2017, Beijing became the third Tbilisi partner in terms of bilateral trade17,

not to mention the strategic nature of the Analia port project as a commercial transit corridor within

the Chinese BRI18. A similar trend has been observed with Armenia: in recent years, China has

become Yerevan's second commercial partner, according to official Armenian statistics19.


The ongoing trade dispute between the United States and China could have a variable

impact on the region.

As far as the Caucasus is concerned, despite the inclination of the last years towards the

strengthening of economic ties, the region remains a low priority for the expansion of Chinese

companies, mainly due to the small size of local markets. Therefore, both in the case of a US-

China agreement and of a tightening up of the sanctioning regime, the current trend towards the

intensification of commercial ties between China and the Caucasian states is likely to continue,

without involving a closer (bilateral) political-strategic link20. However, from this point of view, it is

reasonable to expect the United States to maintain the same profile adopted during the recent

years: strengthening ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia (which, on its part, is trying to rebalance its

relationship with Russia), and countering the Russian influence in Armenia.

Central Asia is undergoing a recalibration of bilateral trade relations between Beijing and

each state of the region, regardless of the outcome of the US-China dispute. The general trend of

recent years, based on the Chinese export of industrial artefacts for local infrastructure and import

of agricultural products, could be accelerated if the sanctioning regime were tightened. However,

even in the case of an agreement, it is reasonable to expect the maintenance of this attitude, given

that China needs to export industrial plants and to import commodities and agricultural goods for

the growing domestic demand.

As far as Russia is concerned, the US sanctions regime (both against Moscow and against

Beijing) is increasingly pushing the two great Eurasian actors towards deepening not only their

economic-commercial partnership, but also the political-strategic one. Despite attempts to improve

Russian-American relations under Trump's presidency, the ongoing trend towards an increase in

16 “The foreign trade of Azerbaijan, Foreign Trade by countries (Turnover by countries)”, The State Statistical

Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan (https://www.stat.gov.az/source/trade/?lang=en). 17 Mu Xuequan, “Georgia's foreign trade up 13 pct in 2017”, Xinhua, 22/01/2018

(http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/22/c_136915952.htm). 18 Fuad Shahbazov, New Caspian–Black Sea Transit Corridor Boosts Geostrategic Importance of South Caucasus, in

«Eurasia Daily Monitor», Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 16, No 47, April 3, 2019 (https://jamestown.org/program/new-caspian-black-sea-transit-corridor-boosts-geostrategic-importance-of-south-caucasus/).

19 “Chinese School Inaugurated In Armenia”, Azatutyun.am, 22/08/2018 (https://www.azatutyun.am/a/29447816.html). 20 Vasif Huseynov, Ayaz Rzayev, “Is China’s Economic Expansion in the South Caucasus a Myth?”, The Diplomat,

29/11/2018 (https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/is-chinas-economic-expansion-in-the-south-caucasus-a-myth/).

https://www.stat.gov.az/source/trade/?lang=en

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/22/c_136915952.htm

https://jamestown.org/program/new-caspian-black-sea-transit-corridor-boosts-geostrategic-importance-of-south-caucasus/

https://jamestown.org/program/new-caspian-black-sea-transit-corridor-boosts-geostrategic-importance-of-south-caucasus/

https://www.azatutyun.am/a/29447816.html

https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/is-chinas-economic-expansion-in-the-south-caucasus-a-myth/



Sino-Russian trade could remain continuous, regardless of the outcome of the dispute between the

United States and China.

Southern and Eastern Asia Claudia Astarita


At the end of June, a few hours before the beginning of the G20 in Osaka, China and the

United States agreed on the need to interrupt a trade war that has been going on for more than a

year now, reopening a dialogue that could lead to an acceptable compromise for both parties1.

This is a very positive news for Asian countries, as nations such as Japan, South Korea and

India have been suffering a lot because of the US-China trade war.

As far as Japan is concerned, 2015 statistics, the latest ones that are sufficiently updated to

allow a balanced analysis, shows that the amount of goods that the country sold to the United

States and to other markets through China has a total value of 34.6 billion dollars. A figure that

represents about 5 percent of Japanese exports for that year2. The risk that Japan is facing,

therefore, is that the imposition of new trade barriers will end up having a strongly negative impact

on the demand for Japanese goods abroad.

The "Japanese contribution" to Chinese exports is significant, particularly in the sectors

targeted by Donald Trump's tariffs. We are talking about 3.3 percent for the technology sector, 0.8

percent for textiles and clothing, 2 percent for electronic machinery and 1.6 percent for all other

types of machinery. January 2019 data (8.6 billion dollars) recorded a 17 percent drop in the

customs value of Japanese exports to China. It is therefore realistic to imagine an even sharper

contraction for the first half of this year.

Japan is certainly not the only country that is suffering because of this trade war. In 2015,

China's re-export accounted for 19 percent of Chinese exports. We are talking about 370 billion

dollars out of a total of 200 billion. If Japan's contribution to this quota has been of 1.8 percent,

Taiwan generated an additional 1.7 percent and South Korea pushed up to 2.2 percent.

Seoul is particularly in trouble. For six consecutive months, the government has experienced

a contraction in exports. The most serious was registered in May, -11.7 percent, caused by the

collapse of semiconductor prices, which represent about a fifth of South Korea's exports to China

(the contraction of the full sector was -33 percent). Companies producing cosmetics are also

suffering a lot.

Korean multinationals are so concerned about the fact that the commercial dispute may not

be resolved in the short term that they have already started transferring some of their production

lines to Vietnam, in order to continue to benefit from re-export to the United States3. Samsung, for

example, recently invested 17.3 billion dollars in Vietnam, building eight factories and a research

and development center there, turning the country into its largest smartphone production base

outside national borders.

The country that is likely to suffer the most for the trade war between China and the United

States is India. On the one hand because, like other Asian powers, it is economically dependent on

China, where it exports very high quantities of raw materials and semi-finished products, which are

then used in the production of goods which are in turn exported. On the other hand because,

during the last few weeks, Donald Trump has embraced an anti-Indian narrative that has led the

local press to talk about a possible "second trade war" between India and the United States.

1 The very first tariffs have been imposed in March 2018. 2 Yasuo Takeuchi, “US-China trade war threatens Japan’s ‘indirect exports’”, Nikkei Asian Review, 5 March, 2019,

https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/US-China-trade-war-threatens-Japan-s-indirect-exports 3 Rainer Michael Preiss, “South Korea Gets Caught In The Crossfire Of The U.S.-China Trade War”, Forbes, 31 May

2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rainermichaelpreiss/2019/05/31/south-korea-gets-caught-in-the-crossfire-of-the-u-s-china-trade-war/#dfd93e14d801



Yet, until a few months ago, New Delhi considered the economic dispute between Beijing

and Washington as an economic and strategic opportunity4. Economic because India had

imagined being able to replace the Chinese productions that Washington no longer wanted to

import from the People's Republic. Strategic because the country could have played this card also

to encourage countries like Taiwan, Japan and South Korea to invest in India to be able to access

the American market more easily.

Today the situation has changed a lot. In March, the United States lifted the exemption from

payment of duties on aluminium and steel to India, after the two countries failed to agree on a

package of new regulations for e-commerce companies. At the beginning of June, Trump chose to

withdraw the United States from a very special trade agreement they had with India, thanks to

which a series of Indian products could be imported into the United States with no customs tariffs

applied5. In mid-June, the Indian government introduced customs duties on 28 American products

as a form of retaliation against what they considered an unexpected and unjustified measure. If it is

true that, by examining the numbers, a trade war between Washington and New Delhi will never

reach the complexity of the one between Washington and Beijing (the United States imports 83

billion dollars goods from India, nothing compared to the 558 they buy from China), certainly this

deteriorations of bilateral relations erase all chances for New Delhi to take any advantage from the

China-US arm wrestling, unless India decides to more actively support American anti-China’s

posture6.

4 “India among countries to benefit from US-China trade war: UN”, Times of India, 5 February 2019,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/67851028.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

5 This is the "Generalized System of Preferences" program, which allows developing countries to sell their products to American consumers. Thanks to this system, in 2018 $ 142 billion goods were exported to the United States.

6 Swaran Singh, “US-India trade war is more myth than reality”, Global Times, 4 June 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1153095.shtml?fbclid=IwAR26ZL0BN_b57lP7-KFslXZlxtISWIZiLQS2oq5nW8SgNhffSNLU2GfP8Xg

Latin America Francesco Davide ragno


With the closing of the Osaka G20, the commercial dispute between the United States and

China seems to have reached an important turning point. Although the meeting in Japan did not

have the best wishes, given the sanctions imposed by the US on five Chinese technology

companies in the days immediately preceding the G20, the trade war reached a temporary

ceasefire. In this sense, the scenarios that are being prefigured are extremely volatile especially for

a context like the Latin American one, strongly linked, economically and not only, to both the two

superpowers. A context that, although with variable geometries, has been going through a new

political and economic cycle in recent years. It’s seem a lifetime ago when criticisms of the United

States were being raised by a large number of the Latin America governments. Ended the

presidencies of the Kirchners in Argentina and Correa in Ecuador (just to mention a two examples),

the anti-imperialist rhetoric seems to be deeply minority in Latin America. With this crisis, economic

policies also seem to have changed. And the trade war between the US and China puts a further

variable to these changes that cross the region.

The economic dispute, in fact, has caused a substantial uncertainty in the markets,

especially in the weak markets of the Latin American States. This uncertainty has turned into an

extreme volatility of national currencies. Both economies with problematic performances -such as

Brazil- and solid economies -such as the Chilean or Uruguayan economies- have experienced a

substantial appreciation of the dollar on their national currencies1. All this, on the one hand, greatly

facilitates foreign investment in the area2. On the other hand, however, it puts in difficulty the

governments of the region that are refinancing their international debt, both through the issue of

National bonds and by resorting to the support of some International Financial Institutions.

Few days ago, the International Monetary Fund has granted a new loan to Ecuador of Us $ 251

million that is added to the loans obtained by the Inter-American Development Bank, the

Development Bank of Latin America and the World Bank - sums , these, which seem to be

destined to rise in the coming months3. And it is not only Ecuador that makes use of the

International Monetary Fund: even Argentina and Colombia in recent months have received

important support from International Financial Institutions. And, in hindsight, the public debt (both

national and international) has been increasing in Latin America4. Which, in an economic situation

of continuous appreciation of the dollar with respect to Latin American currencies, makes the

repayment of the contracted debt more challenging.

The uncertainties triggered by the "trade war" between Beijing and Washington, however,

may also represent an opportunity for growth for some countries. It is on this aspect that a report

published a few months ago by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

(Unctad) was concentrated5. The overview that emerges shows how Mexico could be the great

"winner" of this dispute by increasing exports by more than Us $ 26 million, both to the United

States and to China - a figure that represents about 6% of the commercial volumes of Mexico's

1 P. Bernal, «The devaluation of the Latin American currencies can be traced to Argentina», in LatinAmerican Post,

22/05/2018 [available on line at https://latinamericanpost.com/21208-the-devaluation-of-the-latin-american- currencies-can-be-traced-to-argentina, last access: 29/06/2019].

2 K. Peddicord, «Strong Dollar Creates Opportunity in These Top Latin American Markets», in Forbes, 9/05/2019

[available on line at https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenpeddicord/2019/05/09/strong-dollar-creates-opportunity- in-these-top-latin-american-markets/#313b974173d4, last access: 29/06/2019].

3 FMI aprueba segundo desembolso para Ecuador por 251 millones de dolares», in El Mercurio, 29/06/2019 [available on line at https://ww2.elmercurio.com.ec/2019/06/29/fmi-aprueba-segundo-desembolso-para-ecuador- por-251-millones-de-dolares/, last access: 29/06/2019].

4 J. Zuniga Quevedo, «La deuda publica en America Latina», in Panoramica, 7/04/2019 [available on line at www.panoramical.eu/columnas/44148, last access: 29/06/2019].

5 Unctad, Trade Wars: The Pain and the Gain, 4/02/2019

[vhttps://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1989, last access: 29/06/2019].

Latin America


annual exports. Much less advantageous, according to the Unctad report, would be the economies

of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru.

Finally, there is the Venezuelan vexata quaestio: the tug-of-war between Donald Trump and

XI Jingpin could condition the resolution of the crisis. The Caracas government, the Maduro

Presidency crisis and the recognition of Juán Gaidó were the battleground between the United

States and China6. If the rapprochement between the two international contenders will only be

temporary, it is unlikely that it will affect the destiny of Venezuela. If, instead, the context changed

and the ceasefire between Washington and Beijing was lasting, Venezuela would have some more

chances to come out of one of the biggest crises in its history.

Both the economic dispute and its resolution are in some ways a problem and, in other

respects, an opportunity for the countries of Latin America. It will be the responsibility of the Latin

American ruling classes that the needle of the scales inclines more to one side than to the other.

6 «Xi says China will play ‘constructive role’ on Venezuela», in Reuters.com, 5/06/2019 [available on line at

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-china/xi-says-china-will-play-constructive-role-on-venezuela- idUSKCN1T606W, last access: 29/06/2019].

Pacific Fabio Indeo


The so called “trade war” between Washington and Beijing will naturally have a global impact

and influence, not only because world markets are deeply interconnected but also because the

main world powerful actors - United States and China - are involved in this dispute. Since his

election, the US President Donald Trump has accused China of unfair trade practices, so

undertaking different economic initiatives aimed to reduce imports from China and to contain the

high and heavily unbalanced trade deficit. Following the imposition of tariffs on Chinese imports,

Beijing has reacted imposing tariffs on US goods, but the situation has further worsened on May

2019 when Trump decides to increase tariffs on US $200 billion worth of goods (including furniture

and household appliances) from 10 percent to 25 percent.1

Even if ASEAN nations appear worried about the consequences of the worsened Sino-

American relations and about the negative influence on the global economy and on the free trade’s

principles because of the US tariffs imposition, these countries look at this trade war between

Washington and Beijing according to a different perspective: as a matter of fact, some of the

Southeast Asian countries are the main beneficiaries of this US hardening approach towards

China.

ASEAN relations with these two world largest economies are based on different interests and

reasons: China is the main trade and economic partner for the countries of this regional bloc, due

to the ASEAN-China free trade agreement and the inclusion of Southeast Asian countries on geo-

economic corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative, which have cemented this economic cooperation.

At the same time, the United States are equally important on the economic and strategic

perspective.

However, following the further increase of tariffs affecting China, goods produced in

Southeast Asia have become economic and attractive for the American consumers.2

The imposition of tariffs on Chinese goods has intensified a growing process of relocation –

even if this process starts before the Sino-American trade war, due to the rising production costs in

China - of companies, especially low-value and labour-intensive work firms, such as garment and

footwear. According to a 2018-survey of the American Trade Chamber China and American Trade

Chamber Shanghai, 1/3 of the 430 firms operating in China relocated their production or have

taken into consideration this possibility, in order to mitigate the negative impact of tariffs.3

Consequently, countries geographically contiguous to China - Thailand, Malaysia and

especially Vietnam - are profitably benefiting of this relocation process, because they are able to

offer competitive economic conditions to develop a manufacturing production, which can supplant

Chinese one.4 It is interesting to observe that this relocation process from China to Southeast Asia

mainly concerns manufacturing industries, which export their production to the US markets, while

the firms, which produce goods also for other markets, generally remain in China.

Among ASEAN nations, Vietnam appears as the main beneficiary of this relocation process

triggered by the US tariffs. Vietnamese economy is characterized by an amazing growth rate - +7

percent in 2018, the largest growth in Southeast Asia – which legitimizes the country as an

attractive pole for foreign direct investments (+ 81 percent): the geographical proximity to China

1 Jason Thomas, ASEAN to gain most from trade war, The ASEAN Post, May 13, 2019,

https://theaseanpost.com/article/asean-gain-most-trade-war 2 Ibidem 3 "Impacts of the US-China Trade War on ASEAN", in ASEAN Focus, ASEAN Studies Centre. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak

Institute, Issue 1, vol.26, 2019, pp. 30-32, www.iseas.edu.sg 4 loh Foon Fong, Expert: Asean should avoid taking sides in US-China trade war, The Star, June 18, 2019,

https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2019/06/18/expert-asean-should-avoid-taking-sides-in-uschina-trade-war/#h1diQb1i00h0SXvL.99

Pacific


and the large availability of labour force with low wages is attracting several transnational

companies and firms from China.5 From January to May 2019, Vietnamese exports to the US

increased 28 percent.6

Mainly Chinese firms have relocated their production abroad, in order to protect their exports

to the United States, and Vietnam is one of the favourite destination to produce goods which are

labelled as made in Vietnam: in the first four months of 2019, Chinese investments in Vietnam

accounts for approximately 65 percent of the total for 2018, even if these deep economic and trade

relations are source of concern for the Vietnamese population, which fear the negative impact of

the Chinese economic expansionism.7

There are several examples of Chinese firms which have transferred their production in

Vietnam: the Shenzhen H&T Intelligent Control – an electronics manufacturer initially based on

Guangdong province - has decided to open a new unit in Vietnam, where the company has

relocated the production of control mechanism for appliances; the GoerTek – which assembles

components for Apple - will invest $260 million to realize a new plant in Bac Ninh northern

Province; TCL company will realize a new plant to produce nearly 3 million televisions each year,

while also Lenovo group would like to invest in Vietnam (near Hanoi) to build a factor for computer

parts which will be mostly exported to the United States.8

In fact, since the imposition of tariffs Chinese investments are increasing not only in Vietnam

but also in all Southeast Asia: in the first five months of 2019, these investments exceeded $1.5

billion.9

Overall, ASEAN region is able to attract foreign direct investments thanks the fast economic

growth - ASEAN region is the fifth largest economy in the world – playing the role of alternative

supply chain for the production of goods and components to be exported. A study of the Economic

Intelligence Unit shows that Southeast Asian nations have different expertise and highly

specialized economies, which allow them to legitimize themselves as an alternative supply chain

compared to China.10 For instance, Thailand and Malaysia hold an important automotive sector

and they could increase their specialization in the production of single-small auto parts to be

exported to US markets, while Vietnam is one of the regional leader in the textile sector and -

together with Malaysia - in low-end manufacturing of technology products, electronic components

for laptops and mobile phones.11

From the EIU report also emerges that Singapore (together with Japan, South Korea and

Taiwan) will suffer the greater economic damages and disruptions due to the Sino-American trade

war, because China represents the major destination market for Singapore’s exports of

intermediate and final ICT goods.

5 Luc Can, Vietnam Amidst the US-China Trade War: High Risks, Big Gains, in ASEAN Focus, ASEAN Studies Centre.

ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Issue 1, vol.26, 2019, pp. 28-29, www.iseas.edu.sg 6 Tomoya Onishi e Yusho Cho, Trade war steers Chinese investment toward Southeast Asia, Nikkei Asian Review,

June 10, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade-war/Trade-war-steers-Chinese-investment-toward-Southeast-Asia

7 "Hanoi is the winner in the US-China trade war", Asia News, June 10, 2019, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Hanoi-is-the-winner-in-the-US-China-trade-war-47244.html

8 Tomoya Onishi e Yusho Cho, Trade war steers Chinese investment toward Southeast Asia, Nikkei Asian Review, June 10, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade-war/Trade-war-steers-Chinese-investment-toward-Southeast-Asia

9 Ibidem 10 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Creative disruption Asia’s winners in the US-China trade war, 2018,

https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/US_China_trade_war.pdf?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWVRCa1lUa3pNMkl6TURJdyIsInQiOiJrdTI0M1NwQ0Z1TGxzQXBkWFd2SFwvMkVMZnZ1dEpyRWZ2RUlcL3BvYVk3azZkR1JCWXBXaWRpejAyUmR1bEZGZ0hGT0tjQVBUblFDQ3hFUGpMdTRHYVg0OWpkXC9ac0RjNGVrQmgwZ1ZOQ3g5QXZUUk5YR0pRcE4wb2d5ZlZrc2lsayJ9

11 Ibidem; "Here are the Asian countries that win and lose from the trade war", CNBC, November 8, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/08/us-china-trade-war-countries-in-asia-that-will-be-winners-or-losers.html;




In the short term, ASEAN countries will benefit of the effects of US tariffs against China,

enhancing their national economies: however, it is necessary for them to draw up a balanced

policy to survive in this trade war, based on a neutrality, which can preserve the profitable relations

with both contenders.12 As a matter of fact, US-Cina trade war reflects Washington’s protectionist

approach in the economic sphere, which is a kind of threat to the multilateralism in the current

global economic scenario, also negatively affecting the implementation of the free trade agreement

(the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, RCEP) which ASEAN nations would like to

ratify (together with China and the other Indo-Pacific actors) by 2020.

Australia is in a very complicated position within the China-US trade war: in fact, China is the

main trade partner for Canberra’s government, while the United States is the main source of

foreign direct investment in the country.

In the last two years, bilateral relations between Australia and China have progressively

worsened, since the Australian government decided to follow American approach toward Chinese

telecommunications equipment providers, excluding ZTE and Huawei companies from building

Australia’s 5G infrastructures and network, invoking national security grounds.13 Chinese

authorities have expressed their disappointment about this decision, which could compromise

economic cooperation in several relevant sectors.

In the energy field, Australia is the China’s main LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) supplier,

exporting 32 billion cubic metres of LNG in 2018 (the second largest energy market after Japan for

Australian LNG exports), which accounts for nearly 50 percent of Beijing’s total LNG imports.14

The main concern for Australian authorities is a potential reduction of coal exports to China:

coal is an essential component for steel production, but US decision to impose 25 percent tariffs on

Chinese steel will push Beijing to use mostly its own huge coal reserves, reducing imports from

abroad, firstly from Australia. In the first months of 2019, Australian coal exports to China fell 21

percent.15

In addition, in this case, the main problem is linked to the consequences of the protectionist

measures in the different world markets, which are profoundly interlinked in a global dimension.

In fact, a growing protectionist approach in the economic domain will necessarily produce a

negative impact on some states, which have an export-led economy - such as Australia, 22

percent of its gross domestic product comes from exports – because they will suffer the

protectionism adopted by their main destination markets (China and Singapore in the Canberra’s

case).16

12 Agnes Anya, Benefits of US-China trade war for ASEAN only temporary: Expert, The Jakarta Post, June 25, 2019,

https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/06/25/benefits-of-us-china-trade-war-for-asean-only-temporary-expert.html

13 "Rischi per la sicurezza: l’Australia mette al bando la cinese Huawei dalla rete 5G", Il Sole 24 Ore, 23 Agosto 2018, Rischi per la sicurezza: l’Australia mette al bando la cinese Huawei dalla rete 5G

14 BP, British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, pp. 40-41, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2019-full-report.pdf

15 Bob Carr, Australia could be the big loser in a US-China trade deal, not that Donald Trump seems to care, South

China Morning Post, April 11, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3005496/why-australia-could-be-big-loser-us-china-trade-deal

16 "Caught in the crossfire. What do the Trade Wars means for Australia?", The Australian Business Review, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/what-do-the-trade-wars-mean-for-australia/news-story/25f8f3b3e3b9a63b67dbbb9d7f6e870a

Focus Claudia Astarita


The consequences of the historic meeting between Donald Trump

and Kim Jong-un on the border between the two Koreas

On Sunday, June 30th, US President Donald Trump and his North Korean counterpart, Kim

Jong-un, met briefly in the demilitarized zone of Panmunjom, on the border between the two

Koreas. The media reported that everything started from a tweet, the one with which, during the

G20 in Osaka (Japan), Trump invited Kim to join him at Panmunjom to "shake hands and say

hello"1. The vice-foreign minister of North Korea has described this unexpected call as "very

interesting", emphasizing this meeting as another opportunity to deepen the personal connection

between the two leaders and improve bilateral relations between the two countries.

The two presidents shook hands in North Korean territory. Trump called this moment

"historic", Kim "extraordinary". Yet, to understand the real extent of this furtive and unexpected

handshake, it is necessary to contextualize it within the framework of the evolutions that have

characterized the North Korean chessboard in recent weeks.

In the midst of an exchange of letters between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un that the latter

began on June 11th, the North Korean president welcomed Xi Jinping to Pyongyang on June 21st,

for the first official visit by a Chinese president since 20052. An encounter that, despite the official

rhetoric emphasizing the existence of an "invincible" bond and the need to remain united

"regardless of what may happen in the future", did not lead to any concrete step forward or

agreement3. China has shown that it wants to avoid seeing the level of instability on the peninsula

increasing, but it also made clear that it does not want to replace the role the United States have

been playing in this crisis.

The 250 characters Tweet with which Trump sent his invitation have shown both the extreme

complexity of the crisis and the leading position that the United States maintain in its management.

The American President wrote, “After some very important meetings, including my meeting with

President Xi of China, I will be leaving Japan for South Korea (with President Moon). While there, if

Chairman Kim of North Korea sees this, I would meet him at the Border/DMZ just to shake his

hand and say Hello(?)!" Trump's phrase highlights several elements: first, that the United States

are continuing to dialogue with South Korea to find a compromise on the crisis, silencing all the

controversy on the hypothesis that, following the failure of Hanoi’s summit in February, most likely

for reasons related to the difficulty of finding a compromise on nuclear power, Seoul considered the

possibility of continuing trying to find a compromise with Pyongyang even without Washington’s

support.

The emphasis given to the meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping during the G20 is the

second important element. This meeting is presented as a positive one, which led the two leaders

to choose to restart the dialogue to find a compromise on the trade war, and in which they certainly

talked about North Korea. The outcome is clear: if China and the United States are willing to find a

solution to their economic controversies, they will certainly be willing to do the same regarding the

1 Hyung-Jin Kim, “N. Korea says Trump’s offer to meet Kim ‘very interesting’”, AP News, June 29th, 2019,

https://apnews.com/2b1bb1fd65824c45b6ea4a0251aee60a 2 Kylie Atwood, “Kim Jong Un's 'beautiful' letter to Trump contained no details on way forward, source says”, CNN,

June 13th, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/12/politics/kim-trump-letter-lacked-details/index.html 3 Jane Perlez, “Friendlier Days for North Korea and China? Maybe Not”, The New York Times, June 21st, 2019,

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/world/asia/xi-jinping-north-korea-visit.html

Focus


North Korean crisis, reducing Kim Jong-un’s capacity to create transversal consensus in Asia, as

he recently tried to do by talking, separately, to Russia, China and South Korea4.

Trump is impromptu on the Demilitarized Zone not only made clear that this option is not

viable, but he also reiterated that the United States are the only country allowed to reshape the

terms of the final compromise.

Discussing future scenarios, the New York Times has speculated that Trump might be ready

to accept North Korea to freeze its nuclear program as a sufficient condition to ease the grip of

sanctions5. This would mean requiring Kim not to build new weapons while allowing him to keep

those already in his possession.

Although Trump staff rejected this possibility considering it completely unfounded, it is

certainly true that the dialogue with North Korea has been going on for more than a year now, and

that Trump has a strong interest to reach an agreement allowing him to claim the merit of solving

this crisis. In addition, Pyongyang would not benefit either from prolonging the current state of

crisis nor from a conflict. Therefore, the consolidation of a pragmatic scenario can be considered

realistic.

Kim Jong-un has embedded the notion of North Korea as a nuclear power in the

Constitution, which is also why it is so difficult for the regime to accept to dismantle its arsenal

without receiving anything in return. From the point of view of internal propaganda, it would be like

accepting the umpteenth interference in the name of an ideal of peace imposed from the outside.

Trump, on the other hand, seems to have understood that in order to continue pulling the

strings of the game, it is necessary to change the rhetoric of the negotiations, taking into

consideration North Korean needs.

The American President has abandoned the Hanoi Summit because of North Korean

resistance on the nuclear issue. However, even if Trump will have to take a step back on this point

in the near future, it would be unfair to accuse him of strategic hypocrisy. In Vietnam, the United

States clarified that they are not interested in following Beijing’s suggestion, which is to reduce

progressively sanctions because of minor steps forward on the military front. American

intransigence, together with the Chinese difficulty of offering a viable alternative route (Beijing

cannot afford to openly confront the United States as if it does that the country might suffer the

consequences on both political -Xinjiang and South China Sea, and economic -trade war, level),

convinced Kim to revise his position6.

Today more than ever, the North Korean leader needs economic aid. Not wanting to loosen

his grip on political dissent, which he must keep to prevent the discontent generated by the existing

economic hardness from exploding, Kim needs investments, and the only chance for him to get

them is by talking to Washington7.

Finally, finding a viable and sustainable solution to the Korean crisis, even in case

negotiations will be opened to countries such as Russia and China, will bring Trump a huge

electoral advantage for 2020 consultations. The rhetoric of the opportunity of supporting a

progressive dismantling of North Korean nuclear capacity by highlighting how loosening sanctions

is necessary to support a leader who has shown a clear interest in "talking constructively", but also

that this measure could be easily end effectively revoked if Kim will not keep his words could work

4 “Kim Jong-un in Russia for Vladimir Putin summit”, BBC, April 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-

48032592 5 David Cole, “New York Times: Trump administration mulling plan that would accept North Korea as a nuclear power”,

CNN, July 1, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/01/politics/north-korea-nuclear-freeze-trump-

administration/index.html 6 If the North Korean leader had wanted to confirm the impossibility of making concessions on nuclear power, he would

never have accepted to meet Trump so suddenly at the border. 7 Stephen Collinson, “Trump's North Korean gambit is already a political win”, CNN, July 1, 2019,

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/01/politics/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-diplomacy-2020-election/index.html

The consequences of the historic meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un on the border between

the two Koreas


not only in the United States and North Korea, but also in China and South Korea. If the crisis is

solved by the end of the year, the merits of this success will have to be attributed to Donald Trump.


Acronyms list

ADP: Amhara Democratic Party

AU: African Union

BREXIT: British exit from the European Union

BRI: Belt and Road Initiative

CDU: Christian Democratic party of Germany

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy

DFC: Declaration for freedom and change

DoD: Dipartimento della Difesa degli Stati Uniti

DTIB: Defence Technological and Industrial Base

EC: European Commission

ECB: European Central Bank

ECR: European Conservatives and Reformists Group

EDF: European Defence Fund

EFDD: European Free and Direct Democracy

EI2: European Intervention Initiative

ENISA: Agenzia europea per la cibersicurezza

EP: European Parliament

EPP: European People’s Party

ePR: ePrivacy Regulation

EPRDF: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front

EU: European Union

FCAS: Future Air Combat System

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GDPR: General Data Protection Regulation

GNU/NGL: Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left

GUO: Gathering of Unionists in Opposition

ICC: International Criminal Court

ICG: International Crisis Group

ID: Identity & Democracy

IT: Information Technology

LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas

MALE: Medium Altitude Long Endurance

MEI: Middle East Institute

MGCS: Main Ground Combat System

MiC2025: Made in China 2025

MoU: Memorandum of Understanding

MP: Member of Parliament

NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement

NaMA: National Movement of Amhara

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCF: National Consensus Forces

NCP: National Congress Party

NGF: Next Generation Fighter

NGWS: Next Generation Weapon System or Nächste Generation Waffensystem

NISS: National Intelligence Security Services

Acronyms list


ODP: Oromo Democratic Party

PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation

PRC: People’s Republic of China

RSF: Rapid support forces

S&D: Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats

SPA: Sudanese Professionals Association

SPD: Social Democratic party of Germany

SPLM-N: Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North

TLC: Telecommunication

TMC: Transitional military council

TPLF: Tigray People’s Liberation Front

UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UK: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

UKIP: United Kingdom Independence Party

UNCTAD: UN Conference on Trade and Development

US: United States

USMCA: United States, Mexico, Canada Agreement

USTR: Office of the United States Trade Representative

WTO: World Trade Organization

Printed by typography fo theCenter for Defence Higher Studies

The “Osservatorio Strategico” puts together analysis and reports by

specialized researchers.

The areas of interest monitored during year 2019 are:

Euro/Atlantica (USA-NATO-Partners);

European Defence Initiatives and technological development;

The Balkans and the Black Sea;

Mashreq, Gran Maghreb, Egypt and Israel;

Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa;

Persian Gulf;

Horn of Africa and Southern Africa;

Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus;

Southern and Eastern Asia;

Latin America;

Pacific.

The essence of the “Strategic Monitoring” is made by the different

contributions (structured into main events and critical analysis) regarding

the mentioned areas.

Claudia AstaritaHong Kong versus China: who won the war on the extradition law?

Claudio BertolottiLibya: the siege of Tripoli and the strategic stalemate

Claudio CatalanoAn assessment of Franco-German Future Air Combat System

Francesca CitossiMiddle East in 1979

Marco CochiThe prospects for the post-Bashir political transition in Sudan

Fabio IndeoASEAN summit: regional challenges and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical arena

Gianluca PastoriThe European elections and their transatlantic impact

Luca PudduThe political transition in Ethiopia

Paolo QuerciaThe new liquid borders of South Eastern Union

Francesco Davide RagnoAn end or a beginning? The European Union - Mercosur negotiations

Alessio StiloThe expansion of Russian influence in Africa

Thematic Area

The economical dispute between US and China affects the global economy. The possible consequences in the geopolitical regions in case of agreement or tariffs

Focus

Claudia AstaritaThe consequences of the historic meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un on the borderbetween the two Koreas

osservatorio strategico€¦ · its foreign policy. the atlantic region is the most integrated...

Documents