organizations and integration in international systems

Organizations and Integration in International SystemsAuthor(s): Edward MilesSource: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Jun., 1968), pp. 196-224Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013501 .

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Organizations and Integration in International Systems

EDWARD MILES UNIVERSITY OF DENVER

In this paper, I propose to develop a research design in an attempt to facilitate theory-building in the study of international organizations. Having done this I will describe some applications of this approach in teaching.

I have proceeded in this particular way because I am concerned that most, though not all, of the seminars with which I am familiar, and most of the textbooks in international organization which are still being written, reflect a disproportionate emphasis on only a few of the organizations which make up the United Nations and, to a lesser extent, the League of Nations.1 There are at the last official count,2 2,134 intergovernmental (IGO's) and nongovernmental (NGO's) international organizations in existence, and this does not

1 For a similar complaint, see George A. Codding, Jr. "A Systems Approach to the Comparative Study of International Organization," unpublished paper prepared for the Study Group on Intemational Organization of the European Center of the Camegie Endowment for Intemational Peace, 1966. See, especially, p. 2:

There are numerous studies in depth of the United Nations. There are a few isolated studies of individual specialized agencies and other autonomous intergovernmental international organizations. Studies of a comparative nature are extremely few and have been focused on a limited number and type of organization or concept. The result is an imbalance which is be- coming worse as the number of international organizations continues to increase and the functions of international organizations continue to evolve. 2 Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organiza-

tions, 11 (1966), Brussels.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

196



INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS 197

take into account the multitude of international business corpora- tions of which there are considerably more than 3,000.3

TABLE 1 * POPULATION GROWTH IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS* *

Category 1951-1952 1960-1961 1964-1965 1966-1967

UN Family 22 21 21 21 European IGO's 9 8 8 Other IGO's 100 125 150 165 NGO's 957 1,254f 1,701t 1,920f Total 1,079 1,409 1,880 2,134

* Taken from Adrea Rosenberg, "International Interaction: A Preliminary Proposed Taxonomy of International Organizations," unpublished mimeographed paper, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, March 1967, p. 13. A revised version of this paper was published in International Associations, 11 (1967), pp. 721-30).

* Sources: Union of International Associations. Yearbook of International Organizations, Brussels, 4th ed., 8th ed., 10th ed., and 11th ed.

f This figure includes the special international organizations which were created in response to and to have special relationships with the European Economic Community.

Two additional assumptions underlie the perspective to be developed here. These may be stated as follows:

a. Certain properties are common to all organizations (e.g., leadership, division of labor, the allocation of resources, etc.) and differences in operation and function are to be explained most broadly in terms of internal structure, task, and external environment (both ecological and social).

b. The formation and operation of varying types of international organizations represents only different aspects of broader processes of international integration.4

Following on the first assumption, my concern was to survey the literature of organizational behavior in order to cull those propositions which, even intuitively, appear relevant to the study of inter-

3 Rosenberg, loc. cit. 4 For an early, if not the first, systematic statement relating international

organizations to international integration see: Richard Van Wagenen, Research in the International Organization Field: Some Notes on a Possible Focus, Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton University, 1952, esp. p. 36.

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national organization. I recognize the inherent limitations of this activity since most of the theory of organizational behavior which now exists has been constructed with data derived from modern, industrial, and particularly Western, society. My primary task, however, is at least to begin to construct a general conceptual framework for the study of international organization to facilitate comparative empirical research through the formation and testing of hypotheses. Even those propositions in organizational theory which appear not to be relevant for the study of international organization will yield valuable insights when the reasons for their non-relevance are determined, for such analyses will highlight those variables that are peculiar in their operation to both the international and domestic arenas.

While the first assumption leads to a consideration of organizations per se on a comparative basis, the second assumption boosts me into another level of analysis. At this point I am really asking: What are the roles and functions of varying types of international organizations in processes of international integration that are operative in particular international systems? I will have more to say about this problem later on.

The outcome I am seeking is not the immediate construction of a general theory of international organization-an aim which would surely be chimerical-but, at first, partial theories applicable to limited ranges of data. My first major hope, therefore, is to build integrated sets of conceptual schema for comparing international organizations empirically. Thus I hope to arrive at various combinations of logically related, verifiable propositions about all kinds of international organizations.

The basic material which we currently lack in proceeding along these lines of inquiry is, I think, an empirical taxonomy of international organizations. In the absence of such a taxonomy, I shall make the following distinctions:

International Organization:5 This is the overall process resulting in different kinds of relatively simple or complex and relatively permanent interaction systems which cross (at least two) national boundaries.6

5 I use the term here in the sense of "to organize internationally." It is not meant to refer to a discrete entity.

6 This definition is adapted from the approach to the study of organizations





Intergovernmental Organizations: These represent one species where the members are primarily, though not solely, nation- states. Transnational or Non-governmental Organizations: Another species where the members are not nation-states but other groups or organizations integrated on the basis of specific interests. Supranational Organizations: The members here are once again primarily nation-states but the organizations have the capacity to make allocative decisions which are automatically binding on their members.7

If I may be allowed one final disclaimer, I wish to emphasize that what I will propose is not the only way to develop theories of international organization.8 My claim is merely that the organiza-

developed at The Ohio State University by Eugene Haas, Thomas Drabek et al. -See, for instance: Thomas Drabek et al., "A Theory of Organizational Stress," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Montreal, Canada, December 28, 1964.

7 For a more comprehensive attempt at developing a taxonomy, see Rosen- berg, op. cit.

8 For an alternative conceptualization see: Michael Haas, "A Functional Approach to International Organization," The Journal of Politics, 27 (1965), pp. 498-517. This is an attempt to apply Gabriel Almond's functional categories to the analysis of international organization. The only major quarrel I have with Haas concerns his definition: International Organization ". . . con- sists of intergovernmental institutions, members of which perceive each other to be basic units of the world polity." (p. 500.) As he correctly points out this excludes altogether non-governmental, private international associations because, he claims, ". . . their role in international system function performance is minimal ...." (Ibid., n.8.) It seems to me, however that there is no empirical justification for this presumption, especially if one, at random, takes note of the effect of the International Law Association (ILA) on the work of the International Law Commission leading to the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. A similar pattern exists between the ILA, the Institute of International Law, and the UN General Assembly on the emerging law of outer space and on Soviet attempts to have the concept of "peaceful co- existence" assume legal dimensions.

The point I am making here is that different types of private international associations perform, in various contexts, the articulation, aggregation, and supervisory functions and provide for both innovation and boundary maintenance. The role of cross-national management and labor groups in the Eu- ropean integrative process is also a reflection of this. The crucial questions here are: which of these organizations perform what functions in what ways, under what conditions, with what effects?

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tional theorists have done much which we can adapt for our own purposes. In the process of applying their work, the boundaries of our knowledge about international organization may be considerably extended.

Organizational theory and the comparative study of international organization: Some linkages

Several scholars have demonstrated that approaches to organizational analysis may be characterized in terms of certain perspectives which a particular researcher adopts.9 The oldest model is, of course, the Weberian rationality model which was originally applied to the study of modern bureaucracy. In this perspective, the organization is viewed as an instrument or tool for the attainment of stated goals. Consequently, the goals determine the internal division of labor and specialization of function within the organization in order to promote the rational coordination of action.

The second major perspective is labeled the "natural system"; its heritage stems from Comte to Parsons and beyond. This mode of analysis views the organization as an organic whole operating within a particular environment. The organization is still defined in terms of a goal (organizations are systems of action oriented toward the attainment of specific goals10), but there is the recogni- tion that goal attainment constitutes only one of the functions of an organization. The "natural-system" theorists have performed a most useful service in throwing light on the latent patterns within organizations, particularly those relative to survival and equilibrium maintenance. It is apparent, however, that they also implicitly assume a rather high degree of functional interdependence within the organization."'

The foregoing paragraphs represent, in capsule fashion, charac-

George Codding has also attempted a partial exploratory application of Gabriel Almond's categories. See Codding, op. cit.

9 See Alvin Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in Robert Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard Cottrell, Jr., eds., Sociology Today (N.Y.; Basic Books, 1959), pp. 400-28; W. Richard Scott, "Theory of Organizations," in Robert Faris, ed., Handbook of Modern Sociology (Chicago; Rand McNally & Co., 1964), pp. 485-529; Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), esp. pp. 20-57.

10 Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 16-17.

11 See Gouldner, op. cit., p. 420.





terizations of these approaches as ideal types but very much, if not most, of the current work achieves a blending of the two models both conceptually and empirically. There is, though, a third approach, called the member-interactional (M-I) model, which es- chews the criterion of goal altogether, at least in defining the organization.12

In answer to the question: "What is an organization?" proponents of the M-I model would reply: "A relatively permanent and relatively complex, discernible interaction system." As indicated previously, this approach does not begin by hypothesizing a goal as the basic definitional variable, because its proponents argue that to begin by focusing on goals really begs a most important question, to wit: to what extent does goal congruence exist within a particular organization? Furthermore, we have been alerted to the fact that there can be high and consistent disparity in goal perception among members within different kinds of organizations and still they exist.13 In addition, the work done by Hall et al. suggests that a number of other structural characteristics are much more important than goals in explaining why certain organizations cluster.14

Definitional problems aside, the M-I group posit four characteristics which, at the highest level of generality, are applicable to all organizations, regardless of type.15 These are:

(a) normative structure: both official and unofficial, depending on the source of the norm, referring to patterns of norms related to specific positions within organizations. This, of course, includes the variable of role relationships;

(b) interpersonal structure: referring to sets of stable person- to-person expectations over time, thereby focusing on the relationships of various position incumbents;

12 See Drabek et al., op. cit. and Thomas Drabek, Laboratory Simulation of a Police Communication System Under Stress (Columbus, Ohio; Disaster Research Center, Ohio State University), in press.

13 See, for instance: Linda Collen, The Relevance of Goals for Organiza- tional Analysis, unpublished M.A. Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1964.

14 Richard Hall et al., "An Examination of the Blau-Scott and Etzioni Typologies," The Administrative Science Quarterly, 12 (1967), pp. 118-39.

15 Drabek et al., op. cit. and J. Eugene Haas and Thomas Drabek, "Com- munity Disaster and System Stress: A Sociological Perspective," paper presented at the Conference on Social and Psychological Factors In Stress, Behavioral Sciences Division, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, at the University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, April, 1967.




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(c) resource structure: comprising physical resources available to organizational members, their ecological placement, and sets of ideas about their appropriate and potential utilization; and

(d) performance structure: patterned interaction sequences in the behavior of participants.

The organization is perceived to be linked with the environment through specific demands and/or demand-relevant cues, such as- tornado forecasts for community disaster organizations, and organizational behavior (i.e., output) is seen as the result of the interaction of all of the above with organizational demands and capabilities. Consequently, each characteristic has both internal and external dimensions. The interrelationship of all these concepts may be represented diagramatically as follows:

EXTERNkL /k DE-MANDS /

DE',AN DEMAND- RELEVANT

cue~s

FIGURE 1. A Paradigm of the M-I Approach to the Study of Organizations* * The path of the arrows is meant to be purely illustrative. No definite

theoretical route is implied.

Now, in constructing the linkages between organizational theory and international organization, one could apply in toto any one of the three major approaches to organizations which exist-i.e., either the rational approach, the natural system approach, or the member- interactional approach. However, even if we avoid slavish application and attempt to control for the perceived differences of various kinds of international organizations as compared with domestic or-





ganizations, I do not think that the empirical pay-off will be high. However, of the three major approaches which exist, my prefer-

ence is for the member-interactional perspective for a number of reasons: (a) this approach has proven operational to an exception- ally high degree; (b) it rejects the variable of organizational goal as a basic definitional criterion, suggesting useful applications to international organization; (c) its categories are universal. The approach provides, in a relatively precise and operational way, a basis for the sustained comparison of international organizations, of domestic organizations, and of the one with the other. In turn, the member-interactional perspective facilitates the transfer of tested insights and hypotheses in comparative studies of organizations in general to any number of variables, e.g. goals, stress, influence and authority structures, and the relationship between these variables with performance structure and output. At the same time, from the various bodies of organizational theory as a whole, one can borrow methods for empirical testing which, if carefully handled, can result in cumulative additions to knowledge.

Characteristics of international organizations which tend to make them different from domestic organizations

This is a question which will have to be confronted rather early in any attempt to apply organizational theory to international organization. What follows is a tentative outline of what I think are the more salient differences and similarities between the two types of organizations. The list is not meant to be exhaustive.

The basic difference between domestic organizations and (international) intergovernmental organizations lies in the nature of the membership of the latter. Nearly every other difference between the two follows from the fact that the primary members of intergovernmental organizations are relatively autonomous nation-states. (Because of insufficient data, I shall not be considering here what the relevant differences might be between transnational organizations and domestic organizations. My impression, however, is that although certain organizations are transnational, this feature does not by itself explain any major differences between them and domestic organizations.)

Other major differences between international and domestic organizations occur within:




204 EDWARD MILES

A. Internal Structure 1. In international organizations there is a basic bifurcation

in the nature of membership between administrative and representational ideal types with attendant confficts in loyalties."6

FIGURE 2. Typology of Membership and Loyalties in Intergovernmental Organizations

Focus of Attachment Membership Organization Nation-State

Administrative 1 2

Representational 3 4

In Figure 2, the ideal types would be along the diagonal (Nos. 1 and 4), but in real terms one would expect to find a series of mixes between types 1 and 4 and 2 and 3. As a result of this bifurcation in membership and loyalties, and given a relatively high degree of member-autonomy, the centralized control of internal and external resources by the organization itself will always be tenuous and problematic.

2. Organizational clients are generally coincidental with membership; this includes the world for general organizations and all of a particular geographic area for regional organizations, even if not all the actors within that area are members of the organization.

3. Organizational Inputs (Demands and Expectations) (a) Administrative perceptions, interests, and policies. (b) Representational perceptions, interests, and policies. As a result of the basic bifurcation, these perceptions, interests, and policies may or may not coincide. Conflict, therefore, could lead to organizational immobility or disintegration.

16 On the general problem of loyalties in international organizations, primarily IGO's, see: Harold Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization (Princeton: Center for the Study of World Political Institutions, 1955).





4. Internal behavior in international organizations is not really different in kind from any other organizations. It involves, to varying degrees-bargaining, persuading, co- ercing, compromising, deciding, administering.

B. External Characteristics 1. Organizational Outputs (Decisions and Actions). The

salient differences here may be measured in terms of the type of activity engaged in and the structure of the environments in which behavior takes place. We would want to include, also, differences relating to the varying impacts of organizational decisions and directives on members. Again, in functional terms, the implementation of decisions may not be different in kind. It will involve, to varying degrees-recommending, conciliating, enforc- ing, appraising, and terminating.

In dealing with organizational inputs and outputs, it would be necessary and most valuable to move up one level of generality and deal with the whole question of input and output functions.17 As a result of the initial explorations, it seems that attempts to combine the work of Gabriel Almondl8 and David Easton'9 and to apply this to international organization can be very fruitful.

My initial impression is that we may wish to restate some of the functional categories to make them more appropriate for the specific qualities of international organizations, as Michael Haas has done.20 We may even wish to add new ones, as Dag Hammarskjold2l

17 See the work by Michael Haas, op. cit., and George Codding, op. cit. 18 I am thinking particularly of the introduction to Gabriel Almond and

James Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-64; Gabriel Almond. "A Develop- mental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, 17 (January 1965), pp. 183-214; Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966).

19 David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, 1965); and A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965).

20 Haas, op. cit., suggests that "rule supervision" instead of "rule adjudication" is more in line with what actually happens in international organizations.

21 I am referring here to Hammarskjold's description of "preventive diplo- macy" as a function of the UN. See: "Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, 16 June 1959-15 June 1960", General Assembly Official Records: 15th Sess. Supplement #1 A (A/4390/Add. 1).

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and Inis Claude22 have done. The point is that a whole new avenue for innovative research is opened and ought to be exploited.

Problems in constructing an empirical taxonomy of international organization

Even those who are not familiar with the literature on international organization will recognize from the bibliographical essay by Ronald Yalem23 that implicit taxonomies exist, based either on goal or task, the degree of universality of membership, geographic area, or on a mixture of all or some of these. At one point in the seminar which I shall describe later on, we explicitly use the criteria of composition of membership and task. But we do not really know if these are the factors which differentiate various kinds of international organizations and, if so, to what extent. As a result, every generalization which is made that cuts across all kinds of international organizations should be accompanied by a twinge of con- science and the realization that the generalization may at best be trite and at worst wrong. Our confidence in these kinds of statements can be raised only if we generate the research which will test the empirical utility of the traditional taxonomies.

Important work was done in the field of organizational theory at Ohio State University under Eugene Haas which can fruitfully be adapted to our purposes.24 Haas and others developed an empirical taxonomy of a sample of 75 domestic organizations in Ohio on the basis of 99 characteristics. While the sample was not repre- sentative, a deliberate attempt was made to "optimize variability" in the selection of organizations. These included, inter alia, several kinds of government agencies, educational and religious organizations, labor unions, ethnic associations, and social and recreational

22 Claude has suggested that "collective legitimization" is a function of the UN. See The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 73-104.

23 Ronald Yalem, "The Study of International Organization, 1920-1965; A Survey of the Literature," Background, 10 (May 1966), pp. 1-56.

24 See Eugene Haas et al., "Toward a Typology of Organizations," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Ohio Valley Sociological Association, in Toledo, Ohio, May 3, 1963. This was later printed in Raymond Bowers, ed., Studies on Behavior in Organizations (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1966), pp. 157-80. See also, Norman Johnson: Toward a Taxonomy of Organ- izations, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1963.




INTERNATI-ONAL SYSTEMS 207

organizations. The 99 characteristics studied were placed in classes ranging from organizational goals through degree of formalization of authority structures, to horizontal and vertical complexity, etc.25

The whole purpose behind this effort, as Haas and his colleagues put it, was as follows:

It was felt that if there is to be a useful taxonomy of organizations, it must reflect the characteristics which can, in fact, be found among the myriad of organizations which can be examined. In other words, it was decided to let the data indicate which variables tend to 'hang together' in the world of organizational phenomena as we can observe and record it. The aim, then, is to isolate a number of 'natural' classes of organizations, each of which represents a homogeneous grouping of organizations. Whether or not organizations can be clustered together into homogeneous classes when a large number of variables is being employed is a question which only the data can answer. The research currently underway should provide at least a tentative conclusion.26

The utility of this approach, it is argued, lies in its contribution to the refinement of hypotheses, in serving as a check on ". . . the validity and utility of existing typologies based on logical and intu- itive considerations," and in facilitating the prediction of organizational decisions or change in specified conditions.27

There are some problems with this attempt, particularly with regard to the nature of the sample, the way in which some of the variables were made operational, and the implicit assumptions behind the initial, pre-empirical classification. Nonetheless, it represents an immensely fruitful innovation in the comparative study of organizations. For our purposes, this method of deriving a taxonomy can be applied to the study of international organization once we overcome two obstacles: (a) the problem of securing reasonably reliable empirical indicators of organizational characteristics; and (b) the accessibility of information. These are difficult obstacles but they are not a priori insurmountable.

25 For the complete lists see: Ibid., pp. 66-68 or Haas et al., op. cit., pp. 8-10 & 12.

26 Ibid, p. 7. 27 Haas et al., op. cit., pp. 1-3.




208 EDWARD MT S

International organizations and international integration Earlier in the paper28 I argued that the phenomenon of organiz-

ing internationally can be looked upon as one aspect of processes of international integration operative in any international system. Later I shall describe how the roles and functions of particular organizations are evaluated in two of these processes. For the moment, in view of the wide disparity among definitions of and approaches to integration, I shall explain exactly what I mean by integration.

In the many approaches to the subject, one can discern that integration involves as a minimum common denominator increasing coordination and cohesion among formerly separate units in any system of interaction. The problem arises, however, both in making this development operational and in adding other dimensions to the process and making them operational.

So far it has been useful to make the minimum common denominator operational in terms of the centralization of decision- making, including effective control in the execution of decisions, and to categorize as exhaustive two ideal types of integration: assertive and consensual. The variable pertaining to the centralization of decisionmaking is defined as both the number and type of decisions being taken by the emerging central unit over time. Thus the degree of integration at any one point in time can be measured both in terms of the degree of centralization (i.e. the number of decisions over which the center has effective control) and the functional scope of decisions taken (this includes a categorization of decisions in terms of their effect on centralization).

By proceeding in this fashion I do not imply that the other variables often considered (e.g. national values, interaction, communication, etc.) are not important. All I propose is to measure their effect in terms of the major variable. Thus, as the literature usually suggests, one can rank certain types of interaction, communication, decisions, etc. in terms of their expansive effect on centralization.

Although both assertive and consensual integration are elite- oriented processes, some important differences exist between them. Within the assertive ideal type, I think there is only one necessary and sufficient condition for integration: effective control over the agencies of coercion by the central unit. But the viability and

28 See supra, pp. 3-4.





efficiency of the system over time will depend upon less nakedly coercive measures being used less often. Also, assertively integrated systems are usually more functionally diffuse than consensually integrated ones, but neither functional diffuseness nor specificity is by itself a reliable indicator of either type of integration.

The consensual ideal type involves a syndrome of familiar variables: voluntary participation, similarity or complementarity of interests, complementarity of social structures, etc. But there is no single condition which is both necessary and sufficient for consensual integration.

Teaching the comparative analysis of international organization: One approach

The seminar in which I attempt to explore the theoretical notions described is divided roughly into three parts, each one of which introduces a general problem.29 The first three weeks serve as an introduction both to organizational and integration theory.30 The sec-

29 Some of the difficulties which both students and instructor run into stem from the fact that the seminar runs for one quarter only (10 weeks) as half of the International Law and Organization sequence. If the student wishes to do more work in either law or organization, however, he may pursue his interests in several specialized tutorials.

The seminar, therefore, is designed deliberately to introduce the student to the thinking on which the course is based and to a number of problem areas in the study of international organization. I realize that this confronts the student who has had relatively little previous work in this field with substan- tial but, I think, necessary difficulties.

30 I have found the work by Gouldner, Scott, and Etzioni cited previously (see supra, p. 200 n.9) to me the best introduction to the problems of organizational theory for the uninitiated. In addition, I find the following particularly valuable: Philip Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organiza- tions," American Sociological Review 13 (1948), pp. 25-36; Herbert Simon, "Comments on the Theory of Organizations," American Political Science Re- view 46 (1952), pp. 1130-39; Peter Blau, "The Research Process in the Study of The Dynamics of Bureaucracy," in Philip Hammond, ed., Sociolo- gists at Work (New York & London; Basic Books Inc., 1964), pp. 16-49; and W. Richard Scott, "Field Methods in the Study of Organizations," in James March ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), pp. 261-304).

The second week continues the general discussion on organizational theory, but with a heavy emphasis on structures of authority. I rely most heavily on the following: Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organiza- tions (New York: The Free Press, 1961); Hans Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 196-264; Peter Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of




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ond four weeks deal with the League of Nations and the United Nations as examples of security-oriented, general intergovernmental organizations. And the last three weeks deal with approaches to the study of international integration, using Western Europe and the Communist System as examples.

In choosing the League and the UN31 I have obviously differ- entiated types of international organizations by using the characteristics of composition of membership and task. As a result, I deal with only those organizations whose members are (potentially all) existing nation-states. Furthermore, the primary formal task for which the organization exists is the minimization of unauthorized coercion in the international arena, commonly expressed as the preservation and maintenance of international peace and security.

During this period we look in some detail at the origins of these organizations, their structures, politics, and functions, and we ap- praise them as mirrors of their corresponding environments. More specifically, we want to evaluate the performance of the League within its own international system and to account for differences in the experience and evolution of functions between the League

Authority," American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), pp. 305-16; Warren Bennis, "Leadership Theory and Administrative Behavior: The Problem of Authority," Administrative Science Quarterly, 4 (1959), pp. 259-301; Gresham Sykes, "The Structure of Authority," Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (1953), pp. 146-50; Gresham Sykes, "The Corruption of Authority and Rehabilitation," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, Inc., 1965), pp. 191-97; and Robert Peabody, Organizational Authority (New York: The Atherton Press, 1964.)

Week III of the seminar is devoted to the linkages between organizational theory and the study of intemational organization, and integration theory. For the latter I rely particularly on: Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 1-138 & 459-500; James Rosenau's review of Haas, "Transforming the Intemational System," World Politics 28 (April, 1966), pp. 525-45; Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1965), pp. 3-96 and 285-328; Karl Deutsch, Polit- ical Community at the International Level (New York: Doubleday, 1955); and Philip Jacob & James Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 1-45.

31 I must admit to a certain amount of discomfort in doing so for the reasons outlined on pp. 206-7. But students who enter the seminar have diverse undergraduate backgrounds and I think it important to have them know something about these two organizations. I am therefore reduced to empha- sizing that much more systematic attention needs to be paid to regional security organizations, intergovemmental technical organizations, non-governmental technical and professional organizations, transnational business organizations, etc.





and the UN. Some time is spent in investigating the role performance of the UN vis-a-vis the minimization of unauthorized coercion on the basis of the case studies available since 1945. Finally, we attempt to estimate the effect of certain environmental variables, e.g. bipolarity, rapid expansion of membership since 1955, ad- vancing technology, etc. on the UN.

In carrying on this activity the students are required to work on at least two levels of generality. They must master the specific case studies and other material dealing with the two organizations per se. Moreover, they must attempt comparative analysis at a higher level of generality using categories of propositional inventories culled from the literature on organizational behavior in the first three weeks. This task of building propositional inventories is carried on throughout the seminar and students are encouraged to compose their own propositions and to go through at least the logic of testing them.32

Admittedly, most of the propositions we have played with so far are low-level two-variate propositions33 but we hope to refine and re-work these into more useful multivariate propositions wher- ever possible. In any event, working with propositions is an effective heuristic method in getting the student to apply organizational theory to the study of international organization and to begin to think in general about the comparative study of organizations.

The research cited about the role of goals in organizations suggests a number of questions for research on international organizations, and seminar discussions are oriented around the following needs. We need to look systematically at the degree to which goal congruence exists in different types of international organizations and then to discover whether and to what extent differing degrees of goal congruence influence performance structure and organizational output.

In addition, we need to enlarge our knowledge of the structures of authority and influence in these organizations and their impact on performance structure and output. For instance, it is necessary to

32 Two books are particularly useful for this stage of the seminar. They are: Hans Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification fn Sociology (New York: The Bedminster Press, 3rd ed., 1965); and Allen Barton, Organizational Measure- ment (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1961).

33 See Appendix A for a sample of the propositions used.




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ask: to what extent are authority structures in international organizations based on internal performance criteria? External performance criteria? Neither? Command of internal and external resources? Also, are authority structures specific to the task? If so, under what conditions does spill-over take place? What degree of congruence exists between formal authority structures, informal authority structures, and influence structures? With what effect on organizational behavior as a whole?

Returning to the basic bifurcation in membership and loyalties referred to earlier, it may be that this is crucial only in general security-oriented intergovernmental organizations. But the UN, for instance, is really not a single organization but a complex interacting system of organizations. We need to know, therefore, to what extent the performance structure of the General Assembly and Security Council differs from other agencies and why. We also need to know how regional security-oriented intergovernmental organizations differ among themselves, with general organizations, and with regional non-security-oriented organizations. Furthermore: to what extent do transnational organizations and intergovernmental technical organizations differ among themselves and with each other? What is the nature and effect of interpersonal structures in different types of international organizations? What is the relationship between normative, interpersonal, and performance structures in different kinds of international organizations? With what effects on organizational output?

Unfortunately, we have at this time almost no answers to all these questions, because the comparative analysis has not been done. We offer the sample of propositions, therefore, as the second step in the construction of middle-range theory. Admittedly, these propositions vary greatly in informative value, but they are useful both as teaching and theory-building devices. In any attempt to apply them to international organization they must necessarily lead to specific qualifications in terms of particular variables such as type of organization, nature of membership, task, etc. This will give us a relatively clear idea of the range of application of each set of propositions which, when tested, can result in economical codifica- tion of and cumulative additions to our knowledge about international organization.

In the eighth week of the seminar we return to a theme intro-





duced in the third week, that is, the whole problem of the definition and measurement of international integration. At that time we attempted to survey all approaches to the study of this phenomenon and to delineate the areas of agreement and disagreement. Now, we consider two specific case studies of integration, the Communist System34 and the European Economic Community,35 and we con- front the question of the roles and functions of specific organizations within these integrative processes.

Using the Communist System since 1947 as an example of an assertively integrated system undergoing considerable change, we examine in detail the roles and functions of the following organizations: the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the infrequent ad hoc party meetings (and, collaterally, the absence of a general, multilateral Party organization since the demise of the Cominform), the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, the International Broadcasting Organization, and the Organization for the Collaboration of Railways. And using Westem Europe as an example of consensual integration (in travail) we look particularly at the European Coal and Steel Community, Eu- ropean Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Agency. However, we also spend time on the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (now the Organization for Eco-

34 For the Communist System, we rely most heavily on the monographs published by the Stanford Studies of the Communist System: Jan Triska et al., The World Communist System; R. J. Mitchell, A Theoretical Approach to the Study of Communist International Organizations and World Communist Com- munity Building; Edward Miles with John Gillooly, Processes of Interaction Among the Fourteen Communist Party-States: An Exploratory Essay. A more complete collection of the SSCS monographs, edited by Professor Jan Triska, will be published by Bobbs-Merrill & Co. in 1968. In addition to the above, we also use George Modelski, The Communist International System (Princeton University, Center of International Studies, 1960; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Organization of the Communist Camp," Western Political Quarterly, 18 (1964), pp. 294-316.

35 As far as the published books and articles on West European integration are concerned there is certainly an embarras de richesse. We use, inter alia, the following: Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); Leon Lindberg, Political Dynamics of European Eco- nomic Integration, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963); Francis Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, eds., The Atlantic Community, (New York: Praeger, 1963); and Karl Deutsch et al., France, Germany and the Western Alliance (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967).




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nomic Cooperation and Development), the Council of Europe, NATO, and the Western European Union.

The initial reaction of the first-year graduate students to the whole enterprise varies from mild surprise to shock, particularly because organizational analysis is new to them. But once the intro- ductory period is over and some adjustment to the perspective sets in, they generally find the propositions to be useful tools for linking the case studies and other material with the wider, comparative concems of this approach to the study of international organization.

Conclusion In these pages I have offered a personal conception of how some

research and teaching on international organization ought to be carried on because I think there exists a rather serious gap in our knowledge about the whole field. I would be grateful if the approach presented here moved anyone to criticism, suggestions, demolitions, and the proposal of alternative strategies.

I wish to acknowledge the critical evaluation of my colleagues: Professors Vincent Davis, David Bayley, and Thomas Drabek. I have benefited, also, from the reactions of students participating in the two seminars on which this exercise is based.

APPENDIX A SAMPLE OF THE PROPOS1TIONAL INVENTORY USED

The inventory was constructed on the basis of three simple categories: (a) propositions related to the internal structure of organizations; (b) propositions related to the external relations of organizations; (c) propositions related to feedback processes between organizations and their environments. We found that the literature on organizational behavior is replete with propositions of the first category, perhaps reflecting the extent to which the Weberian model still dominates organizational analysis. On the other hand, there was a striking paucity of propositions in category (b) and only a limited number in category (c). People who adopt the "natural system" model, of course, tend to pay the most attention to these kinds of questions.

In working on the whole problem of environmental relationships, it seems to me more fruitful operationally to begin by assuming that any organization may have several environments and that these may be either issue-or task- specific. The number of such environments and degree of overlap will have to be empirically determined.36

36 Of all the discussions on this problem which I have seen I find the following most fruitful: Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspec- tive in Human Affairs (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965);





A. Propositions related to the internal structure of organizations.37 Organizational Goals 1. When the organizational goal is diffuse and difficult to achieve, survival of the organization becomes a dominant interest in decision- making.

( Miles ) 2. Goals are inextricably tied to the existence and stability of the organization, and thus existence and stability of the organization are likely to be overtly acknowledged as primary goals by the membership.

(Woodard-in Seminar) 3. When the organizational goal is diffuse and difficult to achieve, organizational strain will occur unless some measure of task expansion takes place. This may, in turn, result in different kinds of organizational strain.

(Miles-Revised in Sem.)

4. When the organizational goal is diffuse, displacements in goal priority will tend to occur more frequently.

(Miles-RIS) When the organizational goal is diffuse, task expansion will tend to to occur more frequently. (Miles-RIS)

5. The more people with strong professional orientations take over managerial roles, the greater the degree of conflict between organizational goals and professional orientations (i.e. the greater the degree of organizational strain).

( Etzioni )

6. The motivation of members to participate in the organization is increased to the extent that member goals are compatible with formal and informal organizational goals.

(Thompson-adapted)

7. Organizational goals (as formally stated in constituting documents) and member goals compete overtly. This competition is perceived as legitimate by the membership.

( Woodard-Sem. ) 8. Ambiguity in formal organizational objectives facilitates the ability of the leadership to elaborate less ambitious short-range aims reflecting its modest private expectations of success.

( Etzioni )

9. Commitment to firm objectives prior to the evolution of a reliable clientele undermines the ability of the leadership to develop less ambitious (and less controversial) plans.

( Haas )

Arthur Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," in James March, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), pp. 142-93; and Allen Barton, op. cit., pp. 20-28.

37 Identification of sources is provided in Appendix B.




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10. The lowest commonly agreed upon goal is the only one that can effectively be sought over time.

(Green-Sem.) 11. Organizational experience indicates those goals that can be at- tained. Some goals lose significance as a result of futile attempts at achievement. Reinforced behavior patterns tend to seek those goals that have been successfully implemented by the organization in the past.

(Green-Sem.) Authority, Compliance, and Legitimacy 1. Perceptions of authority will vary with the personalities and experi- ences of the participants in the authority relationship, the kind of organization in which these relationships take place, and the level in the hierarchy from which authority is viewed.

(Peabody) 2. As organizations grow more complex and hierarchical levels are added, importance of authority of position increases.

(Peabody) 3. The basis of professional authority is knowledge, and the relationship between administrative and professional authority is largely affected by the amount and kind of knowledge the professional has

(Etzioni) 4. The ability of an organization to control its members arises either from specific positions, persons, or a combination of both.

(Etzioni) 5. The degree to which an organization selects its participants affects its control needs in terms of the amount of resources and effort it must invest to maintain a level of control considered adequate in view of the goal.

(Etzioni) 6. The more inclusive the communications networks in the internal structure of the organization, the more effective the organization in achieving compliance.

(Miles) 7 The greater the reinforcement of identitive commitments of members to a set of values, the more effective the organization in achieving compliance.

(Parsons-Etzioni) -8. The less internalization of organizational goals by participants occurs, the greater the increase in differentiation between organizational goals and achievement, the greater the increase in delegation of authority.

(March and Simon) 9. The greater the increase in delegation of authority, the less the difference between organizational goals and achievement.

(March and Simon)





10. The greater the increase in delegation of authority, the greater the increase in departmentalization, and the greater the diversification of interests among the sub-units in the organization.

(March and Simon) 11. The more charismatic leaders emerge within the established "head" positions in an organization, the more organizational legitimacy is increased.

(Etzioni-Adapted) 12. The greater the perceived rewards accruing from membership in an organization, the higher the degree of support given to the organization.

(Verba-Adapted) 13. When the cost of being a member becomes too great for any incumbent as compared with the rewards available through membership, the less the support given to the organization by that incumbent.

(Green-Sem.) Authority in International Organizations 1. Internal authority structure rests primarily on remunerative power relationships rather than coercive or normative power relationships. Members are involved for calculative reasons rather than alienative or moral reasons. International organizations, therefore, can usually be characterized as possessing a utilitarian structure of participation and authority rather than either a coercive or normative structure.

(Etzioni) 2. In international organizations, the more ambiguous the organizational directive, the higher the degree of compliance among organizational members. However, the higher the level of value consonance, and the more specific the organizational directive, the higher the degree of compliance among members.

(Miles-RIS) 3. In international organizations, expertise is seldom a basis for authority; in functionally specific sub-systems, however, expertise may tend more often to be the basis of authority structures.

(Woodward-Sem.) 4. Most international organizations tend to be characterized by the presence of multiple authority structures which control and direct the organizations' efforts.

(Lyons-Wolfe-Sem.) 5. In international organizations, informal authority structures (e.g. regional groups, caucasing groups, etc.) compete with each other and with the formal authority structures.

(Woodward-Sem.) 6. Change in the organizational performance structure usually results from a shift in the informal authority structure rather than from manip- ulation of members by formally constituted authority.

(Woodward-Sem.)




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7. When relations between the major participants in an international organization are characterized by perceptions of conflict greater than those of cooperation or shared values, it seems unlikely that: (a) the organization will be able to act effectively with respect to

that conflict; and (b) the organization will be able to adapt itself to meet changes in

its environment. (Lyons-Wolfe-Sem.)

8. Legitimacy is increased when decisions taken are perceived by members as being consistent with overall purpose.

( Cusack-Sem. ) 9. The authority of an international organization rests ultimately on its ability to use coercion. (cf. #1)

(Menke-Sem.) Organizational Decision-Making 1. The higher the level of hierarchy in an organization, the more prevalent innovative or nonprogrammed decision-making will be.

(Peabody) 2. The more organizations are multi-purpose, the higher will be internal conflict over allocation of resources.

(Etzioni) 3. The greater the free flow of ideas in the communication process, the greater the facility in finding solutions to problems, but the more difflcult coordination becomes.

(Blau and Scott) 4. The greater the problem solving done by joint or group decision, the more the immediate superior will be called upon to settle differences, thus the greater his influence.

(Thompson) 5. As the degree of organizational stress increases, the rate of unofflcial decision-making also increases.

(Drabek et al.) 6. As the degree of organizational stress increases, the incumbents increasingly limit their activities to tasks of the highest priority.

(Drabek et al.) 7. As the degree of organizational stress increases, the modes of communication shift increasingly to maximize speed.

(Drabek et al.) 8. The greater the degree of role conflict experienced by a particular position incumbent at time one, the greater the degree of change in his performance structure at time two.

(Drabek et al.) 9. The greater the degree of dissension as to priorities of organizational demands between any two position incumbents or structural units at time one, the greater the degree of change or performance structure at time two.

(Drabek et al.)





10. The higher the location of organizational strain in the structure of the organization at time one, the greater the degree of change in performance structure at time two.

(Drabek et al.) 11. The broader the range of issues on the agendas of international organizations, the larger the number of "interest groups" that are created within it.

(Alger)

B. Propositions Related to the External Relations of Organizations This category itself may be spurious. It was designed to collect those propositions relating either to the ways in which organizations carry on external relations and/or to the factors which determine what rela- lations are carried on with whom. We found, however, that these concerns are subsumed under more general treatments of the relationships between organizations and their environments. 1. The greater the degree of functional specificity of organizations, the more effective they are in achieving organizational goals.

( Miles ) 2. The more overlapping memberships exist among organizations, the greater the degree of reciprocal interpenetration, the higher the degree of responsiveness of each organization to changes occurring in the others.

(Blau and Scott-Adapted) 3. Membership in international organizations is expansive and universal membership itself becomes an organization goal.

( Woodard-Sem. ) 4. In intemational organizations, the roles of members are determined primarily by extra-organizational factors.

(Woodard-Sem.)

C. Propositions Related to Feedback Processes between Organizations and their Environments 1. The type of organizational inventions made at a particular time in history is directly related to the social technology available.

(Stinchcombe) 2. The type and degree of specialization of function in an organization is directly related to the size of the area in which the organization exists.

(Blau and Scott) The type and degree of specialization of function in organization is directly related both to the number of members and to the capabilities, influence, and level of participation of individual members.

(Seminar) 3. The greater the number and variety of formal organizations in a communal group, the more solidary the group is likely to be.

(Stinchcombe) 4. The higher the degree of differentiation in the social group, the greater the multiplication of organizations.

( Miles )

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5. The higher the degree of differentiation in a social group, the greater the degree of functional specificity of organizations formed.

( Miles ) 6. The greater the degree of symmetry between organizational norms and environmental values, the more eiective the organization is likely to be.

(Miles) 7. Precedents tend to become habitual responses to the situations for which they are defined.

(March and Simon) 8. When faced by a problem in the non-organizational environment, a member strongly attached to the organization will react in a manner that is in harmony with the norms of the organization.

(Presthus) 9. A high degree of internal conflict arises within an organization as a result of equally acceptable alternative decisions concerning required action to meet a situation.

(March and Simon) 10. The highest degree of internal cohesion within the organization occurs when its existence is threatened from the environment.

(Green-Sem.) 11. The sooner organizational action is required to respond to demands, the greater the degree of change in the performance structure.

(Drabek et al.) 12. The more the increase in organizational demands is unanticipated, the greater the degree of change in performance structure.

(Drabek et al.) 13. The greater the degree of organizational stress, the greater the change in performance structure.

(Drabek et al.) 14. In international organizations, increasing communication between groups tends to standardize their members and perhaps in the long run to increase their disposition to cooperate and to subordinate themselves to a single organization.

(Wright) 15. When the level of goal attainment is high, the greater the overlapping of membership in international organizations with less than universal membership, the more these organizations will contribute to an integrated world society.

( Alger-Carlson-Adapted ) 16. The frequency and extent of organizational task expansion is directly related to the degree of bureaucratization reached within the organization.

(Weber) 17. The construction of an organizational ideology based upon a minimum common denomination of shared goals, sufficiently specific as to provide a guide to action compatible with basic goals, and pointing to





needs, expectations, and demands in the environment susceptible of systematic transformations, is a prerequisite for successful, continuing task-expansion.

( Haas ) 18. The development of organizational task-expansion is directly related to the quality of organizational leadership.

(Haas) 19. Organizational task-expansion in the security field is an uneven and tenuous process since successful action by the organization depends upon the convergence of widely conflicting private interests.

( Citrin )

Further Specific Propositions Concerning the Interrelationships between International Organizations and their Corresponding Environments

During the Seminar Session on February 23, 1966, (which was the first quarter this course was offered) the instructor suggested that the following sets of variables were characteristic of the current international arena, thereby constituting part of the environment for any intemational organization: 1. Bipolarity, loose bipolarity, and ideological confrontation among and between many participating units, including the major ones. 2. Increasing polycentricity within the two major alliance systems and in the arena as a whole as a result of the rapid emergence of new states since 1955. 3. The exponential advance of technology in a variety of fields with consequent social ramifications. This includes, also, the refinement and proliferation of nuclear capabilities among some participating units. 4. The existence of international organizations of varying types, giving rise to cross-cutting memberships which may in some way impinge upon varying kinds of international conflict.

The seminar as a whole was divided into four groups and to each was assigned one of the sets of variables stated above. The task of each group was to construct a series of basic, interrelated propositions concerning the effect of each set of variables on international organizations in general and security-oriented intergovernmental organizations in particular. In addition, each group was to consider the effect of the existence and operation of these international organizations on their corresponding environments.

Group 1: Propositions Concerning Set #1 All these propositions have specific reference to regional security-oriented

intergovernmental organizations: Note: The existence of a bipolar world situation rendered collective secu-

rity by universal intergovernmental security-oriented organizations ineffective. Regional security organizations are viewed as a response (or better, an alternative) to this failure of collective security.

1. Regional security-oriented intergovernmental organizations arise in response to specific threats. Conversely, as the threat diminishes (in appearance or in reality) the organization will tend to disintegrate unless task expansion takes place.




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2. If there exists a community of interests other than security, task expansion can be successful in maintaining the organization. (If task expansion cannot take place the organization will tend to disintegrate.) 3. As a consequence of bipolarity, initially, one power is crucial to the security of the members, and this power tends to dominate the organization. 4. As bipolarity decreases, as one member becomes less crucial as regards security, and as task expansion becomes more important, an increasing interdependency in relation to task expansion becomes important to the success of the maintenance of the organization. 5. In terms of the initial organizational goal (i.e. security), organizational effectiveness decreases as one power dominance decreases. 6. As the identity of the goals of the members becomes increasingly disparate (within or without the organization), the organization in terms of its goal decreases in effectiveness.

Group 11: Propositions Concerning Set #2 Increasing polycentrism as a variable in the international environment. A. As polycentrism increases, the number of possible combinations of major

power groups increases. Amount of political confrontation increases.

B. As we move along a continuum from bipolarity to polycentrism, the potential role in the resolution of disputes of the most general security- oriented organization increases. 1. Second and third rate powers have an increased role. 2. The role of regional organizations, which have at least one major power as a member, in the resolution of disputes decreases as polycentrism increases. 3. With polycentrism the administrative arm of the general security organization increases in role and prestige. 4. With polycentrism, membership participation increases in the general security organization. 5. The role of regional organizations, without major power members, increases in the resolution of internal disputes.

C. Increasing regional integration has a corollary in wider community disintegration. 1. Polycentrism leads to increasing regional integration via an increase in regional organizations. 2. Increasing polycentrism leads to a proliferation of ideologies and consequently to greater value differentiation.

Group III: Propositions Concerning Set #3 Tentative propositions concerning the relationship between technological

advances and international organization.

Communication and transportation: A. The widespread dissemination of information through the development

of mass communication tends to transfer public international forums into propaganda contests; it therefore tends to be distintegrative in that it increases rigidity and reduces the possibility of compromise.

B. The ease of communication and transportation can lead to increased





and freer personal contacts (among elites) which may lead to greater integration.

C. In a crisis situation, the rapidity of communication and the consequent reduction in reaction time may be disintegrative since, by reducing the time available for the consideration of alternatives, mediation of differences, etc., it may either render a decision impossible or lead to the adoption of what proves to be an unsatisfactory plan of action.

D. In a crisis situation advanced communication and transportation facili- ties may facilitate task/goal accomplishment since they permit the organization to respond quickly.

E. Advanced technological instruments for the accomplishment of tasks (goals?) are irrelevant if the organization is unable to arrive at a decision.

General technological developments: F. The existence of a general international organization tends to promote

greater diffusion of technological developments and innovations. G. The greater the diffusion of technological developments and innova-

tions, the greater the expectations of assistance and the demands for participation on the part of the underdeveloped nations with respect to a general international organization.

Weapons technology: H. Rapid advances in weapons technology, by raising the destructive

potential of war, may lead to a low level of cooperation, among an- tagonists within the organization to prevent their utilization.

L Proliferation of nuclear weapons is disintegrative in that it increases the anxieties of nations and may lead to more reliance on the nation's own defenses rather than on a security organization.

Group IV: Propositions Concerning Set #4 International organizations and cross-cutting membership

1. Cross-cutting membership in international organizations is related to integration as a process. 2. Integration at the regional level is disintegrative at the universal level.

Demands of membership in a regional security-oriented organization may compete with demands of membership in a universal security- oriented organization.

3. A state's membership in an international organization may in- tensify conflict perceived by national decision-makers between the values of international cooperation and national policy preferences. 4. Cross-cutting membership in international organizations decreases bipolarity. 5. Cross-cutting membership in international organizations follows bipolar lines. 6. Membership which cuts across bipolar lines is integrative. 7. Common membership of developing and developed states in international organizations increases the demands of developing states. 8. Membership on the part of developing nations in international organizations increases the utility of bipolarity to gain national policy preferences of the developing nations.




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APPENDIX B IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCES

Alger, Chadwick. "Non-resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5 (1961), pp. 128-45. " "Hypotheses on Relationships between the Organization of Inter- national Society and International Order," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1963, pp. 36-46.

. "Personal Contact in Intergovernmental Organizations," in Herbert Kelman ed., International Behavior, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 521-46.

Blau, Peter and W. Richard Scott. Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co.), 1962.

Carlston, Kenneth. "Development and Limits of International Adjudication," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1965, pp. 177-82.

Citrin, Jack. United Nations Peacekeeping Activities, University of Denver, Monograph Series in World Affairs, 1 (1965-66).

Cusack, David. Seminar participant, Winter Quarter, 1965-66. Drabek, Thomas et al. "A Theory of Organizational Stress," paper presented

at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Montreal, Canada, December 28, 1964.

Etzioni, Amitai. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, (New York: The Free Press, 1961).

. Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964).

Gerth, Hans and C. Wright Mills (eds.). From Max Weber (New York: Ox- ford University Press, 1958).

Green, Ronald. Seminar participant, Winter Quarter, 1965-66. Haas, Ernst. Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University

Press, 1964). Lyons, Diann. Seminar participant, Winter Quarter, 1965-66. March, James and Herbert Simon. Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958). Menke, David. Seminar participant, Winter Quarter, 1965-66. Parsons, Talcott. Structure and Process in Modern Societies, (Glencoe, Ill.:

The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960). Peabody, Robert. Organizational Authority (New York: Atherton Press, 1964). Presthus, Robert. "Toward a Theory of Organizational Behavior," Administra-

tive Science Quarterly, 3 (1958), pp. 48-72. Stinchcombe, Arthur. "Social Structure and Organizations," in James March

ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), pp. 142-93.

Thompson, Victor. Modern Organization (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961). Verba, Sidney. Small Groups and Political Behavior (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

University Press, 1961). Wolfe, I. Michael. Seminar participant, Winter Quarter, 1965-66. Woodard, Kim. Seminar participant, Winter Quarter, 1965-66. Wright, Quincy. "International Conflict and the United Nations," World

Politics, 10 (1957-58), pp. 24-48.




organizations and integration in international systems

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