opposition to defendant flores' motion for summary judgment

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OPPOSITION PAGE 1 OF 17 09-cv-01024 (PR) RS

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff

files his Opposition to Defendants’ Flores and City of San Jose Motion for

Summary Judgment.

In this opposition, Plaintiff will show that, for the purposes of

determining whether Defendant Flores is entitled to qualified immunity,

Defendant Flores exercised the use of force during Plaintiff’s arrest that

was objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff will also show that a genuine

issue of material fact exists as to whether the amount of force used was

James Alan Bush (DWF967-08086698)885 North San Pedro AvenueSan Jose, California 95110

Plaintiff in pro per

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

James Alan Bush,

Plaintiff,

v.

Officer Miguel Flores (#3881),

Defendant.

Case No. 09-cv-01024 (PR) RS

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 56]

Judge Richard Seeborg

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excessive and unreasonable.

FACTS

When the events at issue in this case took place, Plaintiff was in his

apartment, resting in bed while suffering from an acute sinus infection

for which he was under the care of a physician.

Shortly before Defendant Flores’ arrival, Plaintiff’s roommate, Mr.

Long Thang Cao, received a phone call from the defendant, which served

as a prearranged signal to him to open both the apartment and apartment

building doors. As Mr. Cao opened, and left open, both doors, Defendant

Flores yanked Mr. Cao outside and then entered the apartment building

hallway.

According to Mr. Cao’s testimony in a related criminal proceeding,

Defendant Flores yelled to plaintiff to exit his apartment, which

plaintiff did immediately. At no time did plaintiff yell at Defendant

Flores, nor did Defendant Flores knock on or request that plaintiff

open his already open apartment door, nor did Defendant Flores identify

himself or announce his intention to arrest the plaintiff -- all facts

corroborated by Mr. Cao under oath, and, in part, by Defendant Flores in

the same proceeding.

Plaintiff, who had been sleeping as a result of an illness, and who was

awakened suddenly by the shouting of the defendant and the brandishing of

guns, which left him in a confused and disoriented and intimidated state,

asked the defendant to identify himself, due to the fact that the lights

in the apartment building hallway were turned off and flashlights were

shown directly in plaintiff’s eyes, rendering plaintiff unable to ascertain

visually the identity of the defendant as a police officer.

Without complying with plaintiff’s request, and without warning,

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Defendant Flores deployed his Taser at point-blank range, which caused

plaintiff’s rib to shatter, Defendant Flores then ordered plaintiff to lay

face-down on the ground and put his arms behind his back, which plaintiff

did.

Defendant Flores, after turning on the hallway lights, ground his knee

into plaintiff’s back with such force as to break plaintiff’s rib while

applying the handcuffs. After the plaintiff was secured, Defendant Flores

yanked plaintiff to his feet by his left arm, causing the avulsion of a

shoulder bone.

Defendant Flores’ abuse of the plaintiff continued during an

interrogation in a hospital emergency room approximately an hour later,

where Defendant Flores repeatedly ordered the plaintiff to sit up in his

hospital bed, even though plaintiff had a Taser prong embedded in his rib

and ha suffered multiple fractures at the hands of the defendant only an

hour prior.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

Contrary to the legal argument presented in Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, the standard of reasonableness for the purposes of a

determination of qualified immunity in an excessive force case is distinct

from the standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment. A

court hearing an excessive force claim must ask first whether the facts,

when taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (versus the

officer), would establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and only

if the answer is affirmative should the court address the immunity issue,

which focuses on whether the law was clearly established at the time of

the incident (see Section III.). [Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007

(2002)].

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I. DEFENDANT FLORES USED EXCESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE FORCE DURING THE

COURSE OF PLAINTIFF’S ARREST

The question as to whether the use of force is objectively

reasonable for the purposes of an excessive force claim is

determined by analyzing the severity of the crime at issue, whether

the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer

or others, whether he actively resisted arrest or attempted to evade

arrest by flight, whether the physical force applied was of such an

extent as to lead to an injury, the possibility that the plaintiff

was violent or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the

action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the

possibility that the plaintiff was armed, and the number of persons

with whom the officer must contend at one time [Brown v. Rinehart,

575 F. Supp. 2d 620 (D. Del. 2008); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430

F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2005); Leopardi v. Township of Maple Shade, 363 N.J.

Super. 313, 832 A.2d 943 (App. Div. 2003)].

II. PLAINTIFF COMMITTED NO CRIMES PRIOR TO HIS ARREST NOR WAS HE

SUBSEQUENTLY CONVICTED OF CRIMES FOR WHICH HE WAS ARRESTED

Defendant Flores did not have a reasonable suspicion of any crime

prior to plaintiff’s arrest; moreover, all charges filed by Defendant

Flores against the plaintiff were either dropped or dismissed.

Furthermore, Plaintiff had not committed any crime in the presence

of Defendant Flores, and, thus, no exigent circumstances existed to

support the use of force or the degree of force used.

Finally, Plaintiff has never been arrested for arson or any other

offense that involved knives or needles. Plaintiff also has never

been convicted or any violent crime.

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In Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2003), it was

established that the amount of force used by police officers in

subduing the plaintiff, who had not committed any crime and had

incurred shoulder injuries, was excessive for Fourth Amendment

purposes, especially considering that the plaintiff was bound hand

and foot and lying face-down on the floor, and, therefore, there was

no reason to believe that the plaintiff was a danger to himself or

others, including the officer.

III. PLAINTIFF POSED NO THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF DEFENDANT FLORES OR

OTHERS DURING AND AFTER HIS ARREST

Plaintiff, the only person who was present besides the officers

involved and the only person subjected to arrest, was outnumbered

4 to 1. The police officers involved, including Defendant Flores,

were armed, whereas Plaintiff was not; moreover, per Defendant

Flores’ testimony in a related criminal proceeding, Plaintiff was

not suspected of having any weapons at the time of his arrest, and,

because the plaintiff was wearing only a pair of tight-fitting jeans

with no bulging pockets, the fact that plaintiff had no weapons was

immediately discernible to Defendant Flores.

Plaintiff exhibited no violent or dangerous behavior before

or after he was secured and under the control of the defendant,

especially afterwards, when the majority of Plaintiff’s injuries

occurred. The act of exiting Plaintiff’s apartment and of facing the

defendant as instructed, which was described by Defendant Flores as

the squaring of Plaintiff’s shoulders, could not have been reasonably

interpreted as a threatening gesture, especially considering the

size, age and weight of each of the four officers relative to that

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of the plaintiff, and considering that this act could not have been

interpreted as active resistance or an attempt to flee.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Flores’ behavior and conduct

upon entering the plaintiff’s apartment building was of such a

nature to make the plaintiff fear for his life. Without warning to

the plaintiff, and without identifying themselves, Defendant Flores,

with gun drawn and shouting, made a motion as though he was about

to discharge a firearm, and, accordingly, it is sufficient that the

apprehension suffered by the plaintiff was that of a reasonable man

under the same circumstances. After all, Plaintiff had committed no

crime in the presence of the defendant or any crime for which he

subsequently convicted, making it unreasonable for him to assume

he was under arrest. Thus, the acts of Defendant Flores in making

the arrest should not have been done in a threatening and menacing

manner.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s alleged failure to immediately comply

with Defendant Flores’ orders to lay on the ground should not be

considered a threatening gesture or active resistance. In Brown

v. City of Golden Valley, 534 F. Supp. 2d 984 (D. Minn. 2008), it

was clearly established at the time of the arrest, that a city

police officer’s tasering of a nonviolent arrestee without warning

constituted an unreasonable exercise of force, and thus an officer

was not entitled to qualified immunity from the arrestee’s § 1983

claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment; the arrestee

was nonviolent, was not fleeing or resisting arrest, and was suspected

of only a minor, nonviolent crime, having disobeyed two orders to get

off the telephone with a 911 operator.

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IV. DEFENDANT FLORES EXERCISE OF FORCE CAUSED SIGNIFICANT PHYSICAL INJURY

TO PLAINTIFF AND CONTINUED TO USE FORCE FOR UP TO ONE HOUR AFTER

PLAINTIFF WAS SECURED

Any use of serious physical force by a police officer, especially

force substantial enough to cause a significant injury, after

plaintiff was handcuffed, is objectively unreasonable for the

purposes of a police officer’s qualified immunity defense to an

excessive force claim arising from an arrest [Polk v. Hopkins, 129

Fed. Appx. 285, 2005 FED App. 0336N (6th Cir. 2005)].

According to plaintiff’s medical records (see related note below),

Defendant Flores deployed a Taser at plaintiff at point-blank range,

which caused plaintiff’s rib to shatter due to Defendant Flores’

proximity to the plaintiff and the velocity at which a Taser prong

travels when deployed.

As plaintiff lay face-down on the ground with his hands behind

his back, Defendant Flores ground his knee into plaintiff’s back

directly above the Taser prong with enough pressure and force to

cause a second, distinct injury, namely, a broken rib.

After securing plaintiff with handcuffs, Defendant Flores yanked

plaintiff’s arm with such force as to cause an avulsion to a shoulder

bone. (See Exhibit “A”.)

Per Dr. Cazmo J. Lukrich, M.D., plaintiff’s physician, all of

the aforedescribed injuries were sustained exactly as plaintiff

describes.

In Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008), the court held

that a police officer’s application of substantial or significant

pressure on a suspect’s back while that suspect is in a face-down,

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prone position after being subdued and/or incapacitated constitutes

excessive force under the Fourth Amendment requirements. Also,

in Byrd v. Clark (1986, CA11 Ga) 783 F.2d 1002, a court held that

evidence in a Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 action involving injuries

received by a plaintiff during a scuffle with police at a police

station was sufficient to preclude summary judgment on the issue of

excessive force, where the evidence showed that, while there may

have been some justification for the officer’s use of force against the

plaintiff, there was a dispute as to whether the force was applied

after the plaintiff ceased to resist the officer, and whether the

injuries were sufficiently serious to the plaintiff’s shoulder, since

the severity of the injury, while not a determinative factor in

assessing whether or not a constitutional violation has occurred, is

certainly probative of the amount of force used. {See Section III.]

An hour later, while plaintiff was in the emergency room,

Defendant Flores repeatedly ordered the plaintiff to sit up while he

and another investigator interrogated him, even though the plaintiff

had just sustained multiple fractures at the hands of Defendant

Flores.

A note about proof of plaintiff’s injuries:

Plaintiff intended to offer answers to interrogatories from Dr.

Cazmo J. Lukrich, M.D., an employee of Defendant Santa Clara County

Department of Correction, in order to prove the continued and

excessive use of force by Defendant Flores after the plaintiff was

retrained and to establish which injuries sustained by the plaintiff

resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly

excessive; however, because the Clerk failed to properly serve the

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aforementioned defendant, Plaintiff was precluded from obtaining an

order compelling an answer to the aforementioned interrogatories,

which was denied on the ground that Santa Clara County Department of

Correction is not a named defendant.

Should the Court had still considered denying Plaintiff’s Motion

to Compel Answer to Interrogatories even if the aforementioned

defendant had been properly served, Plaintiff cites Crawford-El v.

Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (U.S. 1998), in which the court state that a

trial judge should give priority to discovery concerning issues that

bear upon the qualified immunity defense asserted by a government

official, such as actions that the official actually took, since that

defense should be resolved as early as possible.

This case law citation also could be applied to the denial of

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery against Defendant Flores,

which sought an order compelling Defendant Flores to answer

interrogatories which sought information relevant to overcome the

defense of qualified immunity. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion on

the ground that Defendant Flores answered 25 interrogatories already,

and that, when Plaintiff propounded a set of interrogatories upon

Defendant Flores, which are erroneously described as additional, that

the plaintiff exceeded the 25-question limit. In fact, Defendant

Flores never answered any interrogatories propounded upon him, and

has thus far failed to demonstrate otherwise; rather, Defendant

Flores filed objections to a set of interrogatories propounded upon a

different defendant in a separate case in which he is not a party,

taking advantage of an error by the Clerk, who misdirected the

interrogatories, in order to avoid answering incriminating questions.

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V. DEFENDANT FLORES IS NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY STANDARD FOR

DETERMINING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The standard of reasonableness for the purposes of a determination

of qualified immunity in an excessive force case is distinct from the

standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment. [See

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d

396 (1982); Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007.] The process for

determining qualified immunity was explained by the Supreme Court in

Saucier v. Katz, 533 .S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001),

which held that a court required to rule upon the qualified immunity

issue in an excessive force claim must first ask whether “the facts

alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right”

when taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. [Id. at 201,

121 S. Ct. 2151.] Second, the court must determine whether the right

was clearly established so that it would be “clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

[Id. at 201-02, 121 S. Ct. 2151.]

Courts have typically applied Saucier using a three-part test

in which they inquire (1) whether the claimant has alleged the

deprivation of an actual constitutional right; (2) whether the right

was clearly established at the time of the alleged action; and, if

both of these questions are answered in the affirmative, (3) whether

an objectively reasonable officer would have believed that the action

taken violated that clearly established constitutional right.

To support his claim that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s

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Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force

during the course of an arrest, Plaintiff must define what constitutes

excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, and, then, how that

the defendant employed force that was unreasonable under the

circumstances in order to establish that a Fourth Amendment violated

based on excessive force occurred.

When determining whether the force used to effect a particular

seizure is reasonable, there must be careful attention to the facts

and circumstances of the arrest, including the severity of the crime

at issue, whether the plaintiff posed an immediate threat to the

safety of the defendant or others, and whether the plaintiff actively

resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest by flight. [Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989).]

VI. PLAINTIFF SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION

The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint show that the defendant

violated a constitutional right, in that, Plaintiff alleges that,

after his hands were cuffed behind his back and while he was lying

face down on the ground, the defendant pinned the plaintiff to

the ground and broke a rib, and, then, after having been notified

of an existing injury to his left shoulder by the plaintiff, the

defendant, instead of using the plaintiff’s right arm, as suggested

by the plaintiff, pulled the plaintiff to his feet using his left arm

with enough force to break the plaintiff’s shoulder. (Amendment, at

¶ 17.) At the time the aforementioned injuries occurred, Plaintiff

was neither attempting to flee or actively resisting arrest. (Id. at

¶ 16.) In fact, Defendant states that, after he deployed his Taser,

the plaintiff “was apprehended without further incident.” (Report,

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at page 4); moreover, Defendant admits that he “was responding to a

relatively minor complaint that Plaintiff had shut off the lights of

a building” in which Plaintiff was living. {MSJ, at page 7.)

In Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1997), qualified

immunity was denied to a police officer accused of breaking the

plaintiff’s arm while putting on handcuffs. After the plaintiff

“docilely submitted to arrest,” the officer bent the plaintiff’s arm

in a way that caused discomfort, When the plaintiff complained, the

police officer, “with a grunt and a blow,” broke his arm so severely

that it required surgery for multiple fractures. (Id.) The court

concluded that such use of force was excessive and that the officer

was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

In Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2 (2007), the court denied qualified

immunity to a police officer who increased the pressure on the

plaintiff’s ankle several seconds after the plaintiff stopped

resisting arrest and stated that the pressure already applied was

hurting his previously injured ankle, stating that an objectively

reasonable officer would have believed that his conduct violated a

clearly established constitutional right to be free from unreasonable

force, especially when considering that the increased use of force

resulted in a broken ankle. (Id.}

In Aceto v. Kachajian, 240 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Mass. 2003), the

court stated that, at the time police allegedly injured arrestee by

handcuffing her behind her back, it was clearly established, for the

purposes of qualified immunity, that when a non-threatening, non-

flight risk, cooperating arrestee for a minor crime tells the police

she suffers from an injury that would be exacerbated by handcuffing

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her arms behind her back, the arrestee has a right to be handcuffed

with her arms in front of her, even if the injury is not visible.

In Ference v. Township of Hamilton, 538 F. Supp. 2d 785 (D.N.J.

2008), the court held that the officer was not entitled to the

defense of qualified immunity on an excessive force claim based

on allegations that he painfully twisted the arms of handcuffed

arrestee, and that it was clearly established that such conduct was

not within the bounds of appropriate police responses.

In Schreiber v. Moe, 445 F. Supp. 2d 799 (W.D. Mich. 2006), the

court held that the police officer did not have qualified immunity

from a § 1983 claim that he used excessive force, when the officer

allegedly kicked arrestee in his ribs five times after he was

handcuffed, and, that it was clearly established that the application

of force to a secured arrestee was illegal. Based on the above, the

factual scenario presented in Plaintiff’s claim permits a common

sense determination by this Court to conclude that, for the purposes

of qualified immunity analysis, the defendant violated the plaintiff’s

right to be free from unreasonable seizures, as it is unreasonable

and thus a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to

use physical force on a citizen who has been arrested and restrained,

and is securely under police control, and is not attempting escape.

VII. THE LAW WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED

Whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the

time of the plaintiff’s arrest such that it would “be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted,” as required per Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151,

is determined by whether existing case law gave the defendant “fair

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warning that [his] conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights.” [Suboh v. Dist. Attorney’s Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93

(1st Cir. 2002).]

Although the aforementioned cases emphasize the obvious

unconstitutionality of increasing the use of force used on a

restrained arrestee to such a degree that broken bones result, they

also effectively demonstrate that the law protecting the plaintiff

form the defendant’s continued use of force was clearly established,

and the Court should conclude that both materially similar cases

and general Fourth Amendment principles gave the defendant fair

warning that it was unconstitutional for the defendant to apply force

to an arrestee who was placed in control of the defendant and was

complicit in the orders given by the defendant [Amendment, at ¶ 16],

and, particularly, after the plaintiff warned the defendant that he

was hurting a previously injured shoulder [Complaint, at ¶ 4, page

6].

(The Court should note that, in Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678

(7th Cir. 2008), it was held that, with regard to an excessive force

claim, the defense of qualified immunity may be defeated by (1)

pointing to a clearly analogous case that established a right to be

free from the type of force the officer used on the arrestee; or (2)

showing that the force was so plainly excessive that, as an objective

matter, the police officers would have been on notice that they were

violating the Fourth Amendment.)

VIII. IT WAS OBJECTIVELY UNREASONABLE FOR DEFENDANT FLORES TO BELIEVE THAT

HIS CONDUCT VIOLATED A CLEARLY ESTABLISHED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

Even though the Court can conclude that the law was clearly

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established against the increased use of force on a suspect who

is subdued and cooperating, “the unlawfulness of such conduct is

readily apparent without clarifying case law.” [Brady v. Dill, 187

F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Wilson, 526 U.S. at 613, 119 S.Ct.

1692).]

While it is true that police officers are often forced to make

split-second judgments about the amount of force that is necessary in

a particular situation—especially in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—the situation in which the defendant

was placed did not require an immediate choice between alternative

courses of conduct. After having placed plaintiff securely under

his control, the defendant was neither in imminent anger nor was

he facing an unusual and unexpected situation when he broke the

plaintiff’s shoulder and rib. Rather, Defendant Flores clearly had

a choice as to whether to use the plaintiff’s right or left arm to

pull him to his feet, and, instead of using the plaintiff’s right arm

after having been informed of an existing injury to the plaintiff’s

left shoulder, deliberately jerked the plaintiff’s left arm with such

force as to result in further damage to the plaintiff’s shoulder.

The question, therefore, becomes whether the defendant’s

deliberate act was such an obvious violation of the Fourth

Amendment’s general prohibition on unreasonable force that a

reasonable officer would not have required case law on point to be

on notice that his conduct was unlawful, thereby constituting a

genuine issue of material fact to be determined by the jury, and

thus precluding summary judgment based on the defense of qualified

immunity.

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IX. A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF

FORCE USED WAS EXCESSIVE

A. THE QUESTION OF THE AMOUNT OF FORCE USED IS DETERMINED BY THE

JURY

In Davidson v. Allan (1925) — Va. —, 130 S.E. 245, the Court

ruled that the question of the amount of force used is one for

the jury. Similarly, in Coles v. McNamara (1924) 131 Wash. 377,

230 Pac. 430, the Court stated that “[i]t is the general rules

that the jury is the arbiter of the amount of force.”

B. PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES SHOW THAT THE AMOUNT OF FORCE USED WAS

EXCESSIVE

Although an officer may use such force as is reasonably

necessary to effect the arrest, the degree of force necessary

is an issue for the jury if there is a demonstrable physical

injury as a result of the officer’s action. (Id.)

While the use of the Taser by Defendant Flores had an

appreciable impact on the plaintiff, Plaintiff does not

necessarily claim that Defendant Flores’ use of a Taser, on

its own, was excessive; rather, the use of a Taser was simply

a part of a whole course of unnecessary and improper conduct.

Defendant Flores not only shattered plaintiff’s rib by deploying

the Taser at point-blank range, but fractured plaintiff’s

rib by pressing his knee of plaintiff’s back, and also

broke plaintiff’s shoulder by hyperextending it (see Exhibit

“A”), even though the plaintiff was unarmed, subdued and in

handcuffs, and never attempted to harm the defendant or anyone

else in any way. Regardless of whether Defendant Flores was

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reasonably mistaken about the legality of using some force to

secure the plaintiff when he first arrived on the scene, he had

adequate time to assess the situation and to conclude that the

plaintiff posed no safety or flight risk after the handcuffing;

and, even if the plaintiff had initially resisted Defendant

Flores’ efforts to detain him, this fact does not warrant the

amount of force used, in that Defendant Flores continued to

exert force against the plaintiff even after he was handcuffed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the relief requested by Defendant Flores

should be DENIED.

Dated: August 25th, 2010

James Alan BushPlaintiff in pro per

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EXHIBIT A PAGE 1 OF 2 09-cv-01024 (PR) RS

Plaintiff hereby submits Exhibit “A”, in support of his Opposition

to Defendants’ Officer Flores and City of San Jose Motion for Summary

Judgment, which shows an avulsion to the plaintiff’s shoulder, proving

significant injury thereby.

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James Alan Bush (DWF967-08086698)885 North San Pedro AvenueSan Jose, California 95110

Plaintiff in pro per

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

James Alan Bush,

Plaintiff,

v.

Officer Miguel Flores (#3881),

Defendant.

Case No. 09-cv-01024 (PR) RS

EXHIBIT A

Judge Richard Seeborg

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EXHIBIT A PAGE 2 OF 2 09-cv-01024 (PR) RS

opposition to defendant flores' motion for summary judgment

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