operations in the middle east from 7th february, 1941 - the london gazette

8/7/2019 OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM 7TH FEBRUARY, 1941 - The London Gazette

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SUPPLEMENTTOLondonGazetteO f TUESDAY, the 2nd of JULY, 1946b y

Registered as a n ewspaperW E D N E S D A Y , 3 JULY, 1946

The War O f f i c e ,July, 1946.OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM 7 TH F E B R U A R Y , 1941T O I5TH JULY, 1941T he following Despatch was submitted to theSecretary of State for War on $thSeptember, 1941, by GENERAL SIR

ARCHIBALD P. W A V EL L , G.C.B.,C.M.G., M.C., Commander-in-Chief, in theMiddle East.OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.7th FEBRUARY, 1941, TO i5th JULY, 1941.Situation after Capture of Benghazi.1. While the operations in the Western Desertand Cyrenaica, described in mydespatch cover-ing the period 7th December, 1940, to 7th Feb-ruary, 1941, were taking place, a campaignwhich was to prove of almost equal importance

-to the fortunes of the British Forces in theMiddle East was being fought in Greece and.Albania.The unprovoked an d treacherous attack of theItalians on Greece which ha d begun at the end o f October, 1940, had been repulsed by a swiftGreek counter-stroke, and the Italians had beendriven back into Albania. During the winter,of 1940/41 the Greeks, in spite of appallingconditions of weather and in most difficult-country, gradually forced the Italians back in.Albania and had hopes of driving them out ofAlb ania altogether. A small British air forcewith certain army units for its protection an dservice, had (been in Greece since November.2. At first the senior partner of the Axis ha dseemed to be disinterested in the Italian mis-iortunes in Albania as well as in Libya, butearly in 1941 German troops were fully estab-lished in occupation of Rumania and it becameclear that a further movement south-east wasimpending. The attitude of Bulgaria, obviouslyto be the next victim of German aggression, didnot long remain doubtful, and it soon becamefairly certain that her rulers did not intend toresist a Germ an advance through Bulgaria,which might be directed either at Turkey or atGreece, our only two remaining allies in Europewho were likely to resist German aggression.3. In the middle of January, while operations.against Tobruk were still in progress, I had been

ordered by the War Cabinet to visit Greece an dto make an offer to the Greeks of armouredtroops, field artillery, anti-tank artillery andanti-aircraft guns to assist their forces in thedefence of Salonika and Macedonia againstpossible German aggression. I was in Athensfrom I3th to I7th January and had a series ofconferences with the Greek Premier, GeneralMetaxas, and the Greek Commander-in-Chief,General Papagos. As a result, the offer of theBritish Governm ent was declined, mainly on thegrounds that the landing of further Britishforces in Greece was likely to provoke Germanaggression without being strong enough tocheck it. Had this offer been accepted, it isimprobable that it w ould have been possible tocontinue the operations in Cyrenaica beyondTobruk. After the refusal of assistance by theGreeks, an offer was m a d e by the Prime Minis-ter of assistance, especially by air forces, toTurkey, which was also declined on similargrounds.4 . Immediately after the fall of Benghazi on7th February, I received a telegram from theChiefs of Staff setting out a new policy for theforces in the Middle East. General Metaxashad died towards the end of January and thenew Greek Government ha d sent a request on8 th February fo r information as to what helpwe could afford them in the event of a Germanattack. The War Cabinet accordingly directedthat no operations were to be undertakenbeyond the frontier of Cyrenaica, which shouldbe held with the minimum possible force neces-sary to secure the flank of our Egyptian base,and that it was essential to be able to send thelargest possible army and air 'forces from th eMiddle East .to assist the Greeks against a Ger-m an attack through Bulgaria. At the same timethe operations against the Italian Dodecanese,which were in preparation, were to be pressedon and undertaken at the earliest possiblemoment.5. The Chiefs of Staff's telegram stated thatthe Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, and the Chiefof the Imperial General Staff, General Sir John


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3424 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946Dill, were setting out by air for Cairo on I2thFebruary to discuss our policy and strategy inthe Middle East. They were delayed owing tobad weather in the Mediterranean and did notarrive in Cairo till late at night on igth Feb-ruary, five valuable days being thus lost at acritical time. Shortly after their arrival, on2 2 n d February, British representatives, includ-ing Mr. Eden, General Sir John Dill, Air ChiefMarshal Sir Arthur Longmore (Air OfficerCommanding-in-Chief, Middle East) and my-self flew to Greece and held a series of conver-sations that evening at Tatoi Palace nearAthens.Military Position in Middle East at beginning ofFebruary.

6. It is necessary at this stage to recapitulatethe troops available in the Middle East Com-mand and their state of readiness for battle.The following formations existed:In Western Desert 7th Armoured Division.6th Australian Divison.

In Egypt 2nd Armoured Division.New Zealand Division.6th British Division (inprocess of formation).Polish Brigade Group.In Palestine 7th Australian Division.9th Australian Division.In Eritrea (Engaged in front ofKeren).

4th Indian Division.5 th Indian Division.In East Africa ist South AfricanDivision,nth African Division,I2th African Division(about to begin opera-tions against Kis-mayu).7. Of the above, the 7th Armoured Divisionhad been fighting continuously for eight monthsand was mechanically incapable of furtheraction; only a fraction of its tanks had suc-ceeded, thanks to most skilful maintenance, inreaching Beda Fomm for the final engagementof the Cyrenaican campaign. It was obviousthat the armoured vehicles of this divisionwould require a complete overhaul and wouldbe in workshops for many iWeeks to come. Forall practical purposes the 7th Armoured Divi-sion had ceased to be available as a fightingformation.The 2nd Armoured Division, which arrivedfrom the United Kingdom on ist January, 1941,

consisted of two Cruiser regiments and twoLight Tank regiments only, the other tworegiments of the division having been sent ou tsome months previously to bring up to strengththe 7th Armoured Division which had alwaysbeen short of two regiments of its establish-ment. These two regiments of the 2nd ArmouredDivision ha d formed part of the 7th ArmouredDivision throughout the Western Desert opera-tion an d shared with the rest of the 7thArmoured Division the same mechanicalexhaustion.Thus all the armoured troops available werethe four regiments and Support Group of the2 nd Armoured Division, and from these I hadto find armoured forces fo r both Cyrenaicaan d Greece. The Commander of the 2ndArmoured Division^ Major-General J. C. Tilly,on arrival in Egypt gave me a most alarming

account of the mechanical state of his twoCruiser regiments, of which he said the trackswere practically worn out, while the engineshad already done a considerable mileage. Hehad been informed that fresh tracks would besupplied him in the Middle East, which hadbeen specially made in Australia. After someinvestigation these tracks were discovered buton trial proved to be practically useless; andthe two Cruiser regiments continued with theirold tracks, which it was hoped would give lesstrouble in the desert than they had at home.8. Of the three Australian divisions, the 6thAustralian Division had taken part in theCyrenaican campaign from Bardia to Benghazi,was seasoned and fully equipped and had notsuffered heavy casualties. The 7th AustralianDivision had had no training as a division andwas still in process of equipment, while the gthAustralian Division had only recently arrived,was only partially trained and was very shortof equipment.The New Zealand Division was fully trainedand equipped and available for operations, butthe 6th British Division, which was beingformed out of various British battalions inEgypt, had practically speaking no existence asa division and was without artillery and sup-porting arms; it was being trained for landingoperations against the Italian Dodecanese. ThePolish Brigade Group was available but wasno t fully equipped.

The 4th and 5th Indian Divisions wereengaged in front of Keren; it was hoped,should Keren fall and the campaign in Eritreabe concluded, to withdraw one of these divisionsto garrison Cyrenaica; meantime neither divi-sion could be reckoned as available.Of the troops in East Africa, the SouthAfrican Division had been provided by SouthAfrica for the operations in East Africa onlyand had not been released for operationsfurther north, while the two African divisionswere not suitable in personnel, training * orequipment fo r operations in North Africa or onthe continent of Europe.9. Thus the maximum force that could bemade available for Greece was part of the 2ndArmoured Division, the New Zealand Division,tw o Australian Divisions (the 6th and 7th) andthe Polish Brigade Group, and of these boththe 7th Australian Division and the PolishBrigade Group were still incomplete in equip-ment.It was not considered that any smaller forcethan th e above would be likely to affect th eoperations in Greece, but the despatch of thisforce involved removing from the Middle Eastpractically the whole of the troops which werefully equipped and fit for operations.10. At the time when the decision as to themaximum force which could be despatched toGreece had to be made, there seemed no seriousrisk to our position anywhere in North Africa.The Italian armies in Cyrenaica had been socompletely defeated that any counter-attackby them could be ruled out for some time tocome, practically the whole of their armouredfighting vehicles and nearly all the Italianartillery in North Africa had been captured ordestroyed and the fighting value of the Italiantroops remaining in Tripolitania could, for allpractical purposes, be discounted.Though unconfirmed reports had been re-ceived from time to time of the preparation ofGerman troops fo r despatch to Libya and of


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946 3425their progress via Italy and Sicily, no definiteinformation to justify our expecting the pre-sence of German troops in Africa had beenreceived up to the middle of February. Ourintelligence from Italy was meagre in theextreme an d usually unreliable; no r were suffi-cient long range aircraft available for more thana very occasional reconnaissance of shipping inItalian harbours or in Tripoli. From NorthAfrica itself our intelligence reports were prac-tically none, since no service of agents hadbeen established there during the period beforeItaly came into the war nor was it possibleno w to establish one. We were thus workingalmost entirely in the dark as to the possibilityof German formations being sent to Libya, andon the whole the balance of our information wasagainst any such troops having been sent orbeing on their way to Libya. Actually, thelanding of a German Light Armoured Divisionat Tripoli had begun early in February.I estimated that it would be at least twomonths after the landing of German forces atTripoli before they could undertake a seriousoffensive against Cyrenaica, and that, therefore,there was not likely to be any serious threatto our positions there before May at the earliest.I accordingly considered that a garrison of onearmoured brigade and one division would besufficient to leave as a flank guard in Cyrenaicaand that it would be safe to leave comparativelyunequipped and untrained troops there so longas their training and equipment would becompleted by May, by which time I hoped tohave reinforcements available of at least oneIndian Division from the Sudan.I had intended originally that the divisionto be left in Cyrenaica should be the 6thAustralian Division, and that the 7th AustralianDivision should be the first Australian divisionto proceed to Greece. This would mean thatat least one fully equipped and seasoned divi-sion would be available for the defence ofCyrenaica for the first month or so, since itwas calculated that the despatch of the totalforce to Greece would take 10 weeks to com-plete. General Blarney, commanding theAustralian Forces, insisted, however, and as itproved rightly so, that the 7th Division wasnot sufficiently trained or equipped and thatthe 6th Division must be the first to proceed.This involved relieving the 6th Australian Divi-sion at once by the gth Australian Division,which was only partially trained and equipped.Th e armoured troops (for (the defence ofCyrenaica would have to be found by takingon e -brigade from the 2nd Armoured Division,leaving the other brigade available for despatchto Greece; iboth brigades would consist of oneCruiser regiment and one light tank regimentonly. I decided to send part of the SupportGroup with each brigade and to send the Head-quarters of the 2nd Armoured Division toCyrenaica. General Tilly, soon after reachingEgypt, had died and Major-General Gambier-Parry was now in command of the division.


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3426 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946General Staff, accompanied by my Chief ofth e General Staff, proceeded to Turkey fo rdiscussions with the Turkish Government andGeneral Staff. Though the Turks showedthemselves still cordial to the alliance andapproved our action in supporting Greece, theyprofessed themselves unable, owing to lack ofmodern equipment, to take any action shouldthe Germans enter Bulgaria, or to give assist-ance to the Greeks should the Germans attackthem. While these conversations were still inprogress the Germans, on ist March, enteredBulgaria.

13. From Turkey the party proceeded directon a further visit to Athens. On arrival therethey found to their dismay that GeneralPapagos had changed his attitude. He hadnot, apparently for political reasons, orderedthe withdrawal of the troops in Macedoniato the Aliakhmon Line and he now declaredthis to be impossible in view of the Germanentry into Bulgaria, since the troops might beattacked while in process of withdrawal. Healso stated that any withdrawal of reservesfrom Albania was impossible. He now pro-posed that the British contingent should land atSalonika and be sent forward to hold the ad-vanced line in Macedonia which he had agreedat the previous conference was strategicallyunsound.The British representatives were thereforefaced with the situation that, instead of a strongan d effective Greek force to hold the AliakhmonLine, there would only be one weak division,an d that there was every prospect of the Greekforces being defeated in detail. In these cir-cumstances I was summoned to Athens and aseries of long conferences took place between2nd and 5th March, as a result of which itwas decided that the Greek army should leavethree divisions in Macedonia to defend the pre-pared positions on the frontier, but would con-centrate on the Aliakhmon Line three divisions'and seven independent battalions, to hold theline and prepare it for defence until th e arrivalof the British contingent, which would be dis-embarked mainly at the Piraeus, except forcertain units an d stores which would be landedat Volos. This was a very unsatisfactoryarrangement in comparison with the originalproposal but it was found impossible to per-suade the Greeks to move back the troops inMacedonia, and the alternative of refusing tosend aid to the Greeks altogether seemedpolitically impossible.

14. The despatch of the British force toGreece began on 5th March. The formationswere to proceed in the following order:ist Armoured Brigade.New Zealand Division.6th Australian Division.Polish Independent Brigade Group.7th Australian Division.It was estimated that the programme wouldbe completed by nth May.Concentration of British Forces in Greece15. General Sir H. M. Wilson had beenselected for command of the British forces inGreece, his place in Cyrenaica being taken byLieut.-General P. Neame from Palestine.General Wilson arrived in Athens on 4th March,bu t owing to the insistence of the Greek Govern-ment on the avoidance of anything that mightbe held to provoke the Germans he was com-pelled for a month to remain incognito under

the pseudonym of Mr. Watt. This restrictionhampered him in supervising the occupation ofthe Aliakhmon position and in reconnoitring theground over which operations might take place.Several representations to the Greek Govern-ment, however, were met with a request that hisincognito should be preserved, although it wasquite obvious that the Germans were wellinformed both of his presence and of the landingof British troops. It was agreed with the GreekGovernment that General Wilson, when thetime came, should be in command of all thetroops, British and Greek, in the Aliakhmonposition. This force was subsequently entitled"W"Force. The Greek portion of it wasknown as the Central Macedonian Army. Itsoriginal composition was the I2th Division fromMacedonia (six battalions, one field battery, oneor two mountain batteries and a group of seven150 mm. guns); the 20th Division from Fiorina(six battalions, one or two field batteries andone or two mountain batteries); and theigth Mechanized Division from Larissa, whichhad only recently been formed, had little train-ing and was of slight value. The igth Divisionwas removed to another front on the arrival ofthe New Zealand Division. There were alsoseven battalions to be withdrawn from WesternThrace. This Greek force consisted of secondline troops of doubtful fighting value, and wasa very poor substitute for the original force offive good divisions promised by GeneralPapagos.

16. The general situation in Greece at thistime was that practically the whole of the Greekarmy was involved in Albania, where some300,000 troops had been concentrated. Theaim of the Greek army in Albania ha d been,ever since their successful counter-attack at theend of 1940, to reach the line Berat-Valona.Not only would this line enable them consider-ably to shorten their front, but it was estimatedthat if the port of Valona passed out of Italianhands, the Italians would be quite unable tosupport the large force they had assembled innorthern Albania. The Greeks had madefrequent representations to the British Govern-ment that British naval and air forces shouldcombine to prevent the transport of reinforce-ments from Italy across the Adriatic to Albania.In the narrow waters of the Adriatic it wasimpossible to maintain a sufficient naval force,and our air resources were never sufficient tokeep up a heavy scale of attack on the ports inItaly or Albania. Consequently the Italianswere able to keep up a continual flow of rein-forcements into Albania and to prevent theGreeks from attaining their main objective ofValona. As a result of the appalling conditionsof their long winter campaign the Greek armyhad begun to deteriorate in morale and fightingvalue.

When the German menace developed itwouldobviously have been sound strategy for theGreeks to withdraw from Albania to a shorterfront, so as to make available reserves fornorth-eastern Greece to meet the Germanattack. General Papagos, however, whilerecognising the theoretical soundness of thismove, felt that a withdrawal would have adisastrous effect on the morale of the Greekarmy after its series of successes over theItalians. Further, the lack of mechanicaltransport and shortage even of pack animals,together with the very poor communications


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946 3427available, made it almost impossible to transferany considerable portion of the Greek armyfrom the Albanian front elsewhere without verylong delays. A further consideration that in-fluenced General Papagos in delaying anytransfer of troops till too late was the hopethat, the Yugoslavs might yet join the Allies,and by attacking the Italian forces in the rearcompel the evacuation or surrender of theItalian army in Albania. This would haveenabled a large proportion of the Greek armyto be transferred to meet the Germans withoutloss of morale.

17. The undeveloped state of communicationsin Greece and the poor equipment of the Greekarmy must be borne in mind throughout inconsidering the operations in Greece. Greece isfor th e most part a country of high an d difficultmountains with poor communications, wherepack transport or ox wagons are the normalmeans' of communication. There are few goodroads and these are usually narrow where theypass through the mountains, making the use ofmechanical transport extremely difficult. TheGreek army was almost entirely unprovidedwith mechanical transport, except such as wehad supplied, while our own troops on amechanized basis and without pack transportoften found extreme difficulty in workingmechanical transport on the difficult, hilly roadsor in the conditions of deep mud in the plains.The climate during March and April is severein the hilly country, where snow falls werefrequent, and there was much rain in the plains,rendering th e poor roads even more difficult.So far as was possible, the Greek troops withtheir pack transport held the hilly country,while the British forces were employed to coverth e main roads by which alone their mechani-cal transport could operate.

18. The first flight of the British force disem-barked at the Piraeus on yth March, nearly aweek after the Germans had entered Bulgaria.The first fighting troops to arrive were theist Armoured Brigade Group, under BrigadierH. V. S. Charrington-r^It consisted o f:4 th Hussars (Light Tanks).3rd R.T.R. (Cruiser Tanks).2 R.H.A. (25-pounders).Northumberland Hussars (Anti-tank).3rd. Cheshire Field Squadron, R.E.Rangers (Motor Battalion).It completed its concentration in the forwardarea about- 2ist March, and was given the taskof operating east of the defensive position inorder to cover th e occupation of the positionand the preparation of demolitions by the RoyalEngineers.. The next to arrive was the New ZealandDivision, under Major-General Freyberg, whichwas concentrated on the right of the position,in the Katerini area, by 2nd April. The 6thAustralian 'Division, under Major-General SirIvan Mackay, was still in process of arrivalwhen the Germans invaded Greece.

19. The attitude of the Yugoslav Govern-ment had, as already indicated, been mostuncertain. Finally, towards the end of March,they signed an agreement with th e Germans.This caused deep resentment to the greater partof th e Yugoslav nation and led to a coup d'etaton the 27th 'March in which the existingGovernment was overthrown and a new oneformed, pledged to defend Yugoslavia againstan y German attack. The reaction of the

Germans was practically immediate, and on6 th April German forces invaded both Greeceand Yugoslavia.Although repeated efforts had been made toget into touch with th e Yugoslav authoritiesand to concert some-plan of action in the eventof Yugoslavia defending herself against aGerman attack, it had proved impossible toget the Yugoslavs to agree to any plan ofcombined action or even to a meeting. Ongth March the Yugoslav General Staff ha d sentan officer in mufti, under th e name of Mr.Hope, to Athens fo r discussion, but he had hadno power to commit the Yugoslav General Staffto any plans and did not even seem to be awareif an y plan existed. Eventually, after th ecoup d'etat, the C.I.G.S., Sir John Dill, flew toBelgrade on ist April, but was unable to obtainagreement to a combined plan of action. Twodays later a meeting was arranged with con-siderable difficulty at Fiorina, at which GeneralPapagos and General Wilson met GeneralJankovitch, the newly appointed YugoslavDirector of Military Operations and Intelligence.The discussions revealed that the Yugoslavswere completely unready, had no practical planof action, had an entirely exaggerated idea ofthe strength of the .British forces in Greeceand had .made no preparations to meet aGerman attack. The German attack tookplace tw o days later and no further touch w asobtained with the Yugoslav army.German Counter Attack in Cyrenaica.2 0. Before describing th e campaign in Greeceit will be convenient to turn to events inCyrenaica. During March, while the concentra-tion in Greece w as proceeding, th e situation inCyrenaica gave me increasing cause fo ranxiety. Eyidence accumulated of the presenceof German armoured troops in Libya; but, asalready explained, our intelligence reports fromItaly an d Libya were so scanty and so fewaircraft were available fo r long-range reconnais-sance that we remained very much in the darkas to the enemy's real strength or intentions.I still considered, from the evidence available,that an enemy attack w as unlikely before th emiddle of April at the earliest, and I hopedthat it might not take place before May, bywhich time I hoped to be able to strengthenconsiderably the force in Cyrenaica.

21. The position in Cyrenaica was renderedmore difficult b ^ y the German air attacks onBenghazi. These began soon after our occupa-tion and in the absence of any effective defence,since practically all available fighter aircraftand anti-aircraft guns were required for Greece,made it hazardous to bring shipping intoBenghazi. By the third week in February,the air attacks had become so heavy that itwas agreed that the .Navy should not risk anymore shipping into Benghazi until an effectiveair defence could be provided. This meant thatal l supplies had to be brought from Tobruk,increasing the line of communications to theforward troops by more than 2 00 miles. Thiswas most serious, since it meant that practicallyall the transport available had to be used intransporting supplies and the mobility of theforward troops was greatly affected. In par-ticular, the 2nd Armoured Division had to besupplied from dumps, instead of having its owntransport. This fact later had a very seriouv*effect on operations.


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3428 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 194622. The shortage of transport was probablythe most hampering factor on all operations inthe -Middle East during the -first six months of1941. I had been informed by the War Officethat from January onwards a supply of some3,000 vehicles a month would arrive in theMiddle East from the United States; and Ibased m y plans for the organisation of my

troops an d operations on the arrival of thistransport. In fact, during the first four months,less than half of the amount promised arrived(2,341 in January, 2,094 in February, 725 inMarch, 705 in April). The consequent shortagehampered operations in Cyrenaica, in Crete, inIraq, and in Syria. The force sent to Greecewas made up to its full complement of trans-port at the expense of other theatres, and thewhole of this transport, some 8,000 vehicles,was lost in the evacuation of Greece.23. Our covering forces, towards the end of

March, on the frontier of Cyrenaica, just eastof Agheila, 150 miles south of Benghazi, con-sisted of the 2nd Armoured Division, less istArmoured (Brigade Group in Greece. The divi-sion comprised an armoured car regiment, the3rd Armoured 'Brigade and a portion of theSupport Group. The armoured car regiment,the King's Dragoon Guards, were only newlyconverted from horsed cavalry to this role andhad little experience of the desert. The 3rdArmoured Brigade consisted of the 3rd 'Hussars(light tanks), 5th Royal Tank Regiment(Cruisers), and 6th Royal Tank Regiment,armed with captured Italian tanks. Of theabove, 3rd Hussars had had, at the end ofMarch, only 2 9 light tanks in action out of theirestablishment of 52, and these were in a poormechanical state; the 5th Royal Tank Regi-ment had only 23 cruisers available out of 52,and these had done a very considerable mileageand were in an even poorer mechanical state.6th Royal Tank Regiment had, on 30th March,only one squadron available, while the secondwas formed two days later, the day after theenemy attack began. They had had little timeto become accustomed to the Italian tanks.Headquarters 2nd Division had only arrived inthe forward area in the third week in Marchand had not had time to settle down; the sameapplied to the Support Group, which consistedof the Ts t Tower Hamlets, the I04th RoyalHorse Artillery (25-pdrs.), 3rd Royal HorseArtillery (Anti-Tank Regiment), and onecompany Royal Northumberland -Fusiliers('Machine-gun Regiment). The whole forma-tion was unpractised and required at leastanother month to find its feet. I hadhoped that this period would be available beforethe enemy attacked. I did not become awareof the dangerously poor mechanical state of thearmoured troop', till a few days before theenemy attack. The strongest position fordefence on the Cyrenaican frontier was west ofAgheila, where some salt marshes confined theapproaches from the west. I had given ordersthat this position should be occupied, but owingto the transport shortage mentioned above, itwas found impossible to carry out the main-tenance of the force if it pushed forward thisadditional 40 miles.

24. My instructions to General Neame, com-manding in Cyrenaica, were that, if attacked,he was to fight a delaying action between hisforward position, east of Agheila an d Benghazi.I told him that he should not hesitate to give

up ground if necessary as far as Benghazi, andeven to evacuate [Benghazi if the situationdemanded it, but to 'hold on to the high groundabove Benghazi for as long as possible. The9th Australian Division had only two brigadesforward, the third having to remain back atTobruk owing to shortage of transport. Iinstructed General Neame to conserve hisarmoured troops as much as possible, since Icould not provide him .with any armouredreinforcements before May and withoutarmoured troops his whole position would becompromised. I still believed at this time thatno enemy advance in strength was probablefor another three or four weeks.

25. Before describing the enemy's counterattack, it may be mentioned that on 2ist Marchthe last Italian detachment left in Cyrenaicahad been captured. This was the force occupy-ing Jarabub Oasis, which had retreated therein the middle of December after the battle ofSidi iBarrani. It originally comprised about8 00 Italian and 1,200 native troops. Ever sincethen it had been merely observed by thedivisional cavalry regiment (mechanised) ofthe 6th Australian Division. I had not thetransport available to maintain a larger forceat such a distance from the main line of com-munications and estimated that the exhaustionof its supplies would compel the surrender ofthe force. Although practically the whole ofthe native troops had surrendered, the Italianpart of the garrison was still in its defences bythe middle of March and was being supplied byair. Since the force observing Jarabub wasrequired in Greece I determined to attack andcapture the garrison. This was carried outby the 2nd/9th Australian Infantry battalionunder Brigadier Wootten, and the DivisionalCavalry Regiment already in front of Jarabub.In face of a skilfully conducted attack thegarrison surrendered, putting up a poor fightin spite of its strong defences.

26. On 3ist March the enemy counter offen-sive against our troops in Cyrenaica began.The attacking force consisted of the 5th GermanLight Armoured Division and two Italiandivisions (one armoured, one motorised). Itwas supported by a considerable air force, theenemy being numerically superior throughoutthe operations, although they did not make fulluse of this superiority, largely as a result ofthe initiative and aggressiveness of our R.A.F.During the first three days the 2nd ArmouredDivision withdrew slowly northwards, and bythe evening of 2nd April was north of Agedabia.The enemy so far had not pressed his advancewith much vigour. Our intention was that thearmoured force should maintain a position fromwhich they would be on the flank of any enemyadvance by the main road to Benghazi andwould also block any attempt to turn our posi-tions in Cyrenaica by taking the desert route toMechili. The Commander of the 2nd ArmouredDivision had originally intended to counterattack the enemy north of Agedabia if oppor-tunity offered; but on being warned that notank reinforcements were available and that heshould not attack unless a specially favourableopportunity offered, he decided to continue thewithdrawal.

27. The 3rd April was the unfortunate dayof these operations. It was intended to con-tinue the gradual withdrawal east of andparallel to the Benghazi road, and the force


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946 3429was in process of taking up position aboutSoeleidima, when a report was received that alarge enemy armoured force was approachingMsus, where the principal dump of petrol an dsupplies for the armoured division was. As aresult of this report there was considerable con-fusion. The Support Group finally continuedits retirement to Regima on the left flank ofthe 9th Australian Division, while the 3rdArmoured Brigade moved to .Msus. On arrivalthere it found that the detachment guarding thedump had destroyed all the petrol on hearingthat the enemy were approaching. From nowonwards the movements of the 3rd ArmouredBrigade were almost entirely dictated by thelack of petrol. Benghazi ha d been evacuatedon 3rd April, after extensive demolitions. Onthe night of 3rd/4th April, General Neamedecided, in view of the weakness of the 2ndArmoured Division, which had been reduced,more by mechanical breakdowns than by enemyaction, to about a -dozen Cruisers, 20 light tanksand 20 Italian tanks, to withdraw th e wholeforce to the line of the Wadi Derna-Mechili. Heordered 9th Australian Division to withdrawto the Wadi Derna; and ordered 2nd ArmouredDivision to Mechili, where it would join the 3rdIndian Motor Brigade which had been movedfrom the Tobruk area to protect that place.The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade consisted of threemotorised Indian cavalry regiments which hadrecently arrived in Middle East and had beensent to Cyrenaica to complete their training.

The Brigade had no armoured vehicles, and Iha d warned General Neame of the danger ofexposing it to attack by the enemy's armouredtroops.28. The gth Australian Division, after repul-sing an enemy tank attack at Regima, withdrewwithout particular incident and in good order.It was found impossible, in view of the develop-ment of events to the south, to maintain aposition on the 'Wadi Derna, and the Divisionwas finally withdrawn to Tobruk, where oneof its brigades already was. It had established

itself west of the Tobruk defences by 7th April.29. The fate of the 2nd Armoured Division.was very different. From 4th April onwards,owing to breakdown of communications anddifficulties as regards petrol supply, Head-quarters 2nd Armoured Division was neverproperly in touch with the whole of the forceunder its command. The enemy air forcerepeatedly attacked the Division and made aparticular set at wireless vehicles and at petrolcarrying transport, which still further increasedthe difficulties of communication and petrolsupply. Headquarters 2nd Armoured Divisionfinally reached Mechili on the evening of 6th.April. The intention was that 3rd ArmouredBrigade should follow it to Mechili but owingto shortage of petrol the Brigade Commanderappears to have decided to go to Derna. He,with his Brigade Headquarters and the greaterpart of the remains of the Brigade, were cut offin Derna and captured. The King's DragoonGuards (armoured cars) and the SupportGroup had also gone by Derna and the majorityof them succeeded in making good their with-drawal to Tobruk. The Support Group foughta skilful and determined action on the easternoutskirts of Derna and checked a strong enemyforce, putting out of action a number of tanks.3 0. Thus on 7th April the force in Mechiliconsisted of the Headquarters 2 nd Armoured

Division (practically all unarmoured vehicles),3 rd Indian Motor Brigade and elements ofcertain other units, including spart of the 1stRoyal Horse Artillery. Enemy troops hadarrived at Mechili on the afternoon of 6thApril; they seem to have consisted of motorisedinfantry and artillery.. The Indian MotorBrigade had no difficulty in holding them offand captured some prisoners. On 7th Aprilthe enemy made a series of small attacks onMechili which were easily beaten off, a numberof prisoners being captured. Demands fromth e enemy fo r surrender were treated with con-tempt. The whole force could have withdrawnon this day, but it was still hoped that theremains of the 3rd Armoured Brigade wouldjoin it, and it was not till evening that orderswere received from Force Headquarters towithdraw to El Adem, south of Tobruk.

On 8th April an attempt was made to breakou t of Mechili at dawn. The enemy had bythis time been reinforced by armoured troops,an d our troops came under heavy artillery andmachine gun fire. Certain parties which showedgreat determination and resource, managed toescape. In particular the detachment of theist Royal Horse Artillery with some Indiantroops broke away to the south and eventuallyreached Sollum on nth April. Another partyof the 18th Indian Cavalry Regiment withsome Australian Anti-Tank guns also got away.The remainder of the force, including prac-tically the whole of the Headquarters of theDivision, was captured.31. There was a further misfortune to theforce during the night of 6th/7th April. Lieut. -General Sir Richard O'Connor and Lieut. -Colonel Combe, nth Hussars, had been sentup to Cyrenaica to assist General .Neame duringthe withdrawal in view of their knowledge ofthis area and of desert operations. All threeofficers remained ibehind at Barce after ForceHeadquarters had gone back through Dernatowards Tabruk. They were proceeding torejoin their Headquarters when they were heldup by an enemy mechanised patrol which hadpenetrated towards Derna and were all threetaken prisoner.32. The disaster to the 2nd ArmouredDivision can be attributed mainly to the poormechanical state of its vehicles, nearly halfof which were in workshops while the remainderwere in no condition for a prolonged retreat;to the shortage of transport which tied theDivision to a vulnerable system of -dumps; tothe change of plan consequent on the reporton 3rd April of the enemy being at Msus; andfinally to the breakdown of communicationsdue to loss of wireless vehicles by enemy actionan d lack of opportunity fo r charging batteries.The loss of this armoured force created adangerous situation since there were fewarmoured vehicles left available for the defenceof Egypt, an d without an armoured force itwas extremely difficult in the open desert tocheck the enemy advance.

33. I decided that it was essential to holdTobruk, in order to secure the large reservesof supplies there and to prevent the enemyobtaining the use of the port and water supplyfor his further advance. The Italian defences,which had an outer perimeter of some 2 7 miles,were extremely extended for the force avail-able. I ordered a (brigade of the 7th AustralianDivision to .be embarked and sent round to


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3430 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946Tobruk to strengthen the defence. It arrivedin Tobruk on 7th April. Some tanks whichhad been under repair in Toibruk were availablefo r the defence and I reinforced this armoureddetachment -with some more tanks from Egypt.A mobile force consisting of the remains ofthe Support Group of the 2nd ArmouredDivision, strengthened by certain other detach-ments, was left outside the defences of Tobrukabout El Adem. This force was driven backto the Egyptian frontier about Sollum bynth April and from this date Tobruk becameinvestedOperations in Greece, 6th April to ^oth April.

34. The situation of the Imperial Forces on6th April when the German attack opened wasthat the ist Armoured Brigade Group and theNew Zealand Division had arrived complete inthe forward area and that the 6th AustralianDivision was in process of arrival. The I2thand 20th Greek Divisions were in the line butthe so-called "mechanised "i9th Divisionhadbeen moved across the River Axios an3 putunder the command of the Eastern MacedonianArmy, when the New Zealand Division tookup its position.

35. The line held ran from the Aegean Seaeast of Mount Olympus to Veria and Edessa andthence northwards to the Yugoslav frontier.Its length was approximately 100 miles,through 'high mountains in which there werefour main passesthose on either side of MountOlympus and those at Veria and Edessa. Therailway ran between Mount Olympus and thecoast, and roads .through each of the otherpasses.The New Zealand Division held the right ofthe line, including the two Olympus Passes;the 6th Australian Division was to assume thedefence of the Veria Pass with one Brigade, thesecond being at Kozani, and the third inreserve. On the left of the Australians alongthe mountains was the 20th Greek Division; theI2th Greek Division, which was being relievedby the arrival of the Dominion troops, was alsodesigned for a position in the mountains, forwhich its pack and ox-drawn transport was assuitable as our mechanical transport was un-suitable.The position was naturally a strong oneprovided it was not turned through Yugoslavia.If the Germans succeeded in forcing a waythrough Yugoslavia the whole 'position couldbe outflanked from an easy valley which ranfrom Monastir down to Kozani. As early as27th March General Wilson had begun to forma detachment at Amynteion to watch this gap,consisting of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment, the27th 'New Zealand Machine-gun Battalion, lesstw o companies, and the 64th Medium Regi-ment, the whole under Brigadier Lee. On 8thApril, three days after Germany invadedYugoslavia and Greece, it became clear thatYugoslav resistance in the south had collapsedand that from Monastir southwards the roadwas open to the Germans. To meet this threatit was decided that no further relief in theVeria Pass should be undertaken by units ofthe 6th Australian Division, and that a forceshould be formed about Veve under Major-General Mackay, consisting of igthAustralian Infantry Brigade, less one battalion,with a Field Regiment and an Anti-Tank Regi-ment. Brigadier Lee's force was added toGeneral Mackay's and later the remainder of

the ist Armoured Brigade, after blowing thedemolition belts east of the main position, alsojoined his command. At the same timeMajor-General Freyberg was ordered to moveon e brigade group of the (New Zealand Divisionto Servia as a pivot on which any subsequentwithdrawal from the north could be based.These moves were completed early on lothApril.36. The line was now held as follows:

On the right was the -New Zealand Division,on e brigade group of the 6th Australian Divi-sion, the bulk of the 12th Greek Division (whoserelief had been interrupted by the diversion ofGeneral Mackay's command to Amynteion) andcertain other troops. All troops in this sector,Greek and Dominion, were under the commandof General Blarney.The centre sector, under Greek command,included the 2oth and part of the I2th GreekDivision.The left sector, about Amynteion, consistedof the troops described above under the com-mand of General Mackay, who was directlyunder the command of General Wilson.O n I2th April the 6th Australian Divisionand the New Zealand Division, hitherto calledthe ist Australian Corps, became known as the"Anzac Corps." The revival of this historictitle was welcomed with pride by all in thecorps.

37. The first contact was made with theenemy on 8th April, when detachments of theist Armoured Brigade encountered elements ofthe enemy on the line of the iRiver Axios. Onthe evening of loth April, General Mackay'sforce was attacked in the Amynteion area. Thisdeveloped next day into the first serious engage-ment, which lasted for two days. Although theenemy attack was held and heavy casualtiesinflicted on him, it was obvious that theOlympus-Veria-Amynteion position could notbe held for ever. The position was much tooextended for the troops available; there had notbeen time to consolidate it properly; the leftflank w as protected only by a Greek cavalrydivision on an extremely wide front, andbetween this cavalry division and the Greekforces in Albania there was a large gap throughwhich the enemy were likely to penetrate.

A new line was therefore decided on, thatrunning from Mount Olympus along th e line ofthe River Aliakhmon. This was a strongposition provided that the Yugoslavs and theGreeks were able to close the roads by whichthe line could be turned. The withdrawal beganon the night nth/i2th April and was com-pleted by dawn on the I3th. But during itscourse it became obvious that the i2th and20th Greek Divisions were disintegrating. Theysoon became thoroughly disorganized and onlya few sub-units retained any fighting value.This was due in no way to lack of courage orfighting spirit, but to their lack of modernarmament and their ox-drawn transport, whichw as too slow and unwieldy as soon as it becamenecessary to embark on a long move. Thewithdrawal of General Mackay's force fromAmynteion had to be covered by the istArmoured Brigade, who carried out successfulcounter-attacks on enemy armoured fightingvehicles. During this withdrawal the brigadeexperienced considerable mechanical trouble,similar to that of the 3rd Armoured Brigade in


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946 3431Cyrenaica, and had to leave many of their tanksbehind.38. While the withdrawalwas in progress thenews reaching General Wilson was of suchgravity that he already began to consider thenecessity for further withdrawal. It wasreported that the Yugoslav army in the southhad capitulated and it became obvious thatthe Greek armies in Albania were incapable ofwithdrawing to take their place in the line westof General Wilson's force and in fact that ve'rylittle reliance could be placed on the fightingability of the Greek army. The difficulties thatGeneral Papagos had foreseen in any attemptto withdraw from Albania and its effect onGreek morale ha d been justified an d wereincreased by the collapse of the Yugoslavs.General Wilson therefore decided to continuethe withdrawal to the Thermopylae Line, whichcould be held at least temporarily by theImperial forces alone. A t a meeting betweenGeneral Wilson an d General Papagos on I4thApril General Papagos approved this decisionan d made for the first time a suggestion thatth e British forces should evacuate Greece toavoid further fighting and devastation of thatcountry.3 9. Meanwhile, under circumstances of greatdifficulty, the Anzac Corps had taken up itsne w line and on it had had its first experienceof the intense aerial bombardment by' theGerman Air Force against its positions and itslines of communication. No great enemypressure was developed against its positions,although on the morning of I5th April, deter-mined small-scale attacks were made in boththe Servia and the Katerini Passes. An attackon the positions of the 4th New Zealand Brigadein the 'Servia Pass was repulsed with the loss tothe .enemy of 180 prisoners and at least severalhundred killed an d wounded. O ur losses werenegligible. The Greek troops, which had beenunder General Wilson, had reverted to Greekcommand on the occupation of the new posi-tion.4 0. General Wilson was anxious for thesafety of his left flank during this ne w with-drawal, the more so as the Germans were knownto have broken through the Greek troops atKleisoura. Consequently, a force had to befound to block th e roads leading southwardsfrom th e Grevena and Matsova areas into th eLarissa Plain. Actually, no threat came fromthis flank and the main danger to the with-drawal arose from the speed with which theenemy followed it up from th e north an d fromth e heavy attack launched against a combinedNew Zealand an d Australian force in thePeneios Gorge. This attack began late onI5th April and was pressed home by infantryand tanks, which proved to be the leadingelements of one armoured and one mountaindivision. The i6th Australian Infantry Bri-gade which had been detailed to form a leftflank guard on the Larissa-Kalabaka road wasdiverted, except for one battalion, to cover thewestern exit of the Peneios-Gorge and to affordsupport to the 2ist New Zealand Battalion,which was holding the gorge alone. The attackwas made in such strength as to necessitate thetransference of the weight of the defence fromwest to east. The defence of the gorge wascarried out with such spirit that when at laston the evening of i8th April the Germans weremasters of the gorge, the main body of the

Anzac Corps had successfully withdrawn pastits western exit. The 2ist New ZealandBattalion had been overrun and the whole ofthe 2nd/2nd Australian Battalion had beenforced off their line of withdrawal into the hillsafter a stubborn fight against greatly superiorforces. This action, together with other minorones, and the use of skilful demolitions, pre-vented the enemy's armoured and mechanizedunits from following up closely. During th efirst tw o vital days of the withdrawal, enemy airaction had fortunately been prevented by mistand low clouds, bu t from Larissa onwardscolumns on the road suffered air attack withoutrespite. Otherwise, thanks to the rear-guardactions described above, the withdrawal wassuccessfully carried ou t under the orders ofGeneral Blarney almost without interference,

41. By the morning of 2oth April, the with-drawal to the Thermopylae line was practicallycomplete. This naturally strong position wasoccupied by the New Zealand Division on theright from the sea to the summit of the moun-tains, covering the coast road; while the othAustralian Division occupied the Brailos posi-tion covering the main road to Thebes andAthens. The ist Armoured Brigade, which bythis time had lost the greater part of its tanksfrom mechanical failure, was in reserve an dprotected the right and rear of the Anzac Corpsagainst a threat from Euboea. The weaknessof the position lay in the fact that the disin-tegration of the Greek forces made possible aGerman penetration on the extreme left of theline about Delphi.

4 2 . Meanwhile in anticipation of the possiblenecessity of the evacuation of Greece, a com-mittee of the Joint Planning Staff ha d beenformed in the Middle East and was sent toAthens on I7th April under Rear-AdmiralBaillie Grohman. The general situation inGreece no w betokened the near end of Greekresistance. Th e Greek forces on the left of theImperial troops had already disintegrated andit was obvious that little more could be expected 'from the Greek armies in Albania. The Piraeushad been so heavily bombed that it was prac-tically unusable as a port, so that to sendfurther reinforcements or supplies to Greece ha dbecome a matter of extreme difficulty. Icancelled the sailing of the Polish Brigade andth e 7th Australian Division and went to Athensmyself on iQth April. The Greek Prime Ministerhad committed suicide on i8th April. I sawGeneral Wilson an d General Blarney and hadaudience with His Majesty the King, who wasnow acting as head of his Government. It wasdecided, with the full approval of His Majestythe King and the Greek Government, that theevacuation of the British forces was essential.It was obviously impossible, in view of theoverwhelming superiority of the German airforce, to use the Piraeus or any other port forth e re-embarkation of the force, which wouldhave to take place from open beaches. Iinstructed General Wilson that the embarkationshould take place on as wide a front as possiblean d that an y troops w ho were cut off or wereunable to embark on the beaches selectedshould not surrender but should make for thePeloponnesus, where there might be possibilitiesof evacuating them later.

4 3 . General Wilson originally selected 28thApril as the first night fo r embarkation, butthe capitulation of the Greek army in the Epirus


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3432 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946on 2ist April made it necessary to advancethe date, since it was now possible that a Ger-m an force might reach Athens from th e westbefore the Imperial forces could be re-embarked.It was accordingly decided to begin the em-barkation on the night 24th-25th April and toendeavour to complete it in three nights. Thetime had afterwards to be extended.

4 4 . The withdrawal from the Thermopylaeposition to the beaches was covered by abrigade group of the New Zealand Division,which inflicted severe casualties on the enemyand knocked out a considerable number oftanks on 26th April.On 23rd April the remaining Hurricanes,about twelve in number, on which reliance hadbeen placed to protect the convoys during thefirst part of their journey from Greece, were,owing to unavoidable lack of A.A. defences, alldestroyed on the ground at Argos by enemyaction. The embarkation programme wasaccordingly revised to enable a greater numberof troops to be embarked in the Peloponnesuswhence the journey to Crete would be shorterand less exposed to air attack. Fortunately,however, the plan remained elastic, and whenthe Corinth Canal was cut by enemy para-chutists in the early morning of 26th April, itwas possible again to change the plans and toembark the 4th New Zealand Brigade from abeach east of Athens, Porto Rafti, instead offrom th e Peloponnesus.

45. Thanks to the excellent arrangements bythe Royal Navy, the air cover of some fewBlenheim fighters and the good work of theJoint Planning Staff sent to Greece, theembarkations were carried out according toplan except in two places. At Nauplion onthe night of 26th-27th April, some 1,700personnel had to be left behind owing to one ofthe ships, which had been set on fire by enemybombing, having blocked the channel, so thatthe destroyers could not get alongside the.quay. Another merchant ship which conveyedtroops from this place was bombed and set onfire soon after leavingGreece and two destroyerswhich picked up the survivors from the shipwere both sunk by bombs within a few minutesof each other. Some 7 00 troops are believed tohave lost their lives. 'These were practicallyth e only casualties during the voyage fromGreece.The second failure to embark personnel wasat Kalamata, in the south of the Peloponnesus,on the night of 28th-2gth April. The seniorofficer at this port had neglected to make properarrangements for local protection or recon-naissance, and a German force entered the townan d reached the quays just as embarkationwas due to begin. By the efforts of a numberof officers who got together small parties andorganised counter attacks on their own, theenemy was driven out and 150 prisoners taken.But in the meantime the Royal Navy had beeninformed that the Germans were in the townand that the quays were mined, and noinformation appears ever to have reached themthat the enemy had been driven out again. TheNaval Commander, therefore, naturally decidednot to risk his valuable forces by entering theharbour. The troops at Kalamata are believedto have numbered some 8,000, including 1,500Yugoslavs. The greater part of the remainderwere labour units and details, and compara-tively few were fighting troops. Unfortunately,

among them were the first reinforcements ofthe New Zealand Division.46. The total number of troops sent toGreece was approximately 57,660; of these closeon 43,000 were safely re-embarked. All guns,transport and equipment other than personalwere, however, lost. In view of the completeenemy air superiority, the re-embarkation of so

many troops may be considered an extremelyfineperformance. It was due to the magnificentwork of the Royal Navy, the good staff arrange-ments made by those concerned, and the disci-pline and endurance of the troops themselves.Of the troops re-embarked, about 27,000were landed in Crete and the remainder takenback to Egypt. The reason for landing so manytroops in Crete was to shorten the sea journeyand to make possible quicker and more frequentjourneys.Summary of Greek Operations.

47. As will be seen from the above account,the .expedition to Greece was ill starred from thefirst. The change of plan by the GreekCommander-in-Chief after the first decision todespatch a force resulted in the position onwhich the Imperial forces were to concentratebeing held by a very inadequate Greek forceinstead of the five organised divisions whichGeneral Papagos had promised. The uncer-tainties of the Yugoslav attitude seriouslyaffected the plans both of ourselves and of theGreeks, while the complete collapse of theirarmies on the German invasion exposed theflank of what was otherwise an extremelystrong position. The German attack took placewhile the Imperial force was still in processof concentration and before it had time to getproperly settled down. That the Greek armywhich had fought so heroically against theItalians disintegrated so rapidly under theGerman attack is not surprising. They hadalready been strained to the uttermost andneither their organisation nor equipment weresufficiently up to date to enable them to facethe German army. Finally the enemy bombingattacks on the Piraeus closed the only good port,deprived us of any chance of removing any ofour heavy equipment and made the re-embarka-tion of the personnel of the force an extremelyhazardous operation. Thus, while the wholeexpedition was something in the nature of agamble, the dice were loaded against it from thefirst. It was not really such a forlorn hope*from the military point of view as it may seemfrom its results.Situation in Middle East after Greek Campaign.48. The situation in the Middle East at thebeginning of May was full of anxiety. I wasthreatened with having to undertake operationssimultaneously in no fewer than five theatreswith my resources in men and material veryseriously depleted iby the losses in Greece.There was an obvious possibility, which wassoon confirmed, that the enemy would under-take operations against Crete; or he mightreinforce his effort in the Western Desert,which though checked for the present stillconstituted a serious menace to Egypt;responsibility for dealing with the revolt inIraq was handed over to Middle East fromIndia hi the first week in May; the Germanswere making use of air bases in Syria whichmight constitute a very serious threat to thedefence of the Canal and Egyptian ports as


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946 3433well as to Palestine; and finally there stillremained the remnants of the Itah'an forces inAbyssinia to be cleared up if possible beforethe rainy season set in.

To deal with these many responsibilities myresources were completely inadequate. Toequip the-forces for Greece I had had to stripmany units of weapons and transport and allequipment that could not be carried had been 'lost. Transport was still reaching Middle Eastin very limited quantities and was the chiefobstacle to completing for war a number ofunits and formations. My armoured troops,except for the detachment in Tobruk, consistedonly of one weak battalion of Cruiser tanks andone, also incomplete, of "I "tanks. Theformations which had fought in Greece, the6th Australian Division and the New ZealandDivision, required rest, reorganisation andre-equipment, but were at present dividedbetween Crete and Egypt. The yth AustralianDivision was complete but had one brigadelocked up in Tobruk. The gth AustralianDivision was in the Tobruk defences. The 6thDivision had never been completely formed. Ithad only two infantry brigades (22nd Guardsand i6th) and one other battalion, the Buffs.The I4th (Brigade, which should have completedit, had been transferred to Crete. Of these twobrigades, the 22nd Guards Brigade had 50 percent, of its transport,' while the i6th Brigadeand the Buffs had practically none. It hadonly one field regiment of artillery and onlytwo field companies of Engineers. The PolishBrigade was not complete in transport. Theist Cavalry Division in Palestine had beenstripped of. its artillery, Engineers, Signals andtransport to provide for the needs of otherformations; it could provide one motorisedcavalry brigade by pooling the whole of thedivisional motor transport. Of the unbrigadedinfantry battalions, two were under orders toreinforce Malta, and the remainder were hardput to it to 'find the necessary guards andescorts for the prisoners of war (of whom therewere still over 100,000 in Egypt) and otherinternal security duties in Egypt and Palestine.All these battalions were short of transport andwere equipped for static duties only.

From the above, which included no singlecomplete formation available, I had to providefor the defence of the western frontier of Egypt,the defence of Crete, the restoration of thesituation in Iraq and for a possible commitmentin Syria. The German attacks by air on theCanal which began in February caused a freshcommitment, since large numbers of observerswere required to watch for mines dropped in theCanal. Eventually the Egyptian Army tookover a large part of this duty, and thus gavemost effective aid to the defence of the Canal.The 4th Indian Division was on its way fromEast Africa and the ist South African Divisionwould be available very shortly. But the moveof both of these divisions depended on theprovision of shipping, which was hard to comeb y -

49. The enemy advance in Cyrenaica hadbeen checked on the frontier of Egypt and theactive defence of the garrison of Tobruk con-stituted a menace to the enemy's line of com-munications, which was likely to prevent hisfurther advance. He had made one determinedattack on Tobruk on ist May and had beenseverely repulsed with heavy losses in tanks

and in men. But the garrison of Tobruk wassmall for the perimeter it had to defend and itwas known that another German armoureddivision, which might include as many as 400medium tanks, had been landed in Libya andwas on its way to the forward area, where itwas expected to appear early in May. If theenemy also reinforced ihis air forces in Libyaand delivered a determined attack on theTobruk defences and harbour, we might behard put to it to maintain 'the Tobruk garrison.

50. The 6th Division, as already stated, hadbeen preparing and training for an operationagainst the Italian Dodecanese. Since, however,the Navy had been unable to support any ex-pedition against the Dodecanese while engagedin convoying our troops to Greece, it had beennecessary to postpone the operation until thecompletion of the move (to Greece. When theGerman counter-offensive against Cyrenaicatook place, it was necessary to move the 6thDivision from their training areas to man the

f . defences of Mersa Matruh, to guard against aGerman break through to the Delta. The 7thAustralian Division (less one brigade in Tobruk)had also to be used for the defence of theWestern Desert, and the Polish Brigade to manthe Delta defences. The one incompletearmoured brigade was also allotted to thewestern defence of Egypt.Thus, practically the whole of the resourcesat my disposal had to be used to safeguard theEgyptian base against the threat from the west;the one mobile force which could be improvisedin Palestine, the cavalry brigade group, wassoon to be despatched to the rescue of Habban-iyeh in Iraq; and my only reserves in Egyptand Palestine were the New Zealand andAustralian reinforcements.51. There was on its way across the 'Mediter-ranean a convoy of ships containing some 200tanks to re-equip the 7th. Armoured Divisionand to counter the German armoured troops inthe Western Desert. They were due to arrivein Egypt on I2th May, and all preparations to

equip these tanks with the necessary fittingsfor use in the desert, and to place them inaction with the least possible delay were made.The great majority of these tanks, however,were "I "tanks, the limited range and slow-ness of which made them ill-suited for useagainst fast moving German tanks in the wideopen spaces of the Western Desert.The convoy duly reached Egypt on I2th Maywith the loss of one ship containing 57 tanks,which was sunk by a mine. The problem nowwas whether these tanks could be manned andput into action before the German reinforce-ments arrived in the forward area. It wasoriginally hoped that it might be possible toget all the tanks unloaded, through the work-shops and ready for action by about the end ofMay. This estimate was to prove optimistic.T he Defence of Crete.52. Meanwhile the arrangements for thedefence of Crete were my particular preoccupa-tion. Evidence accumulated fast of theGerman intentions. There was a large con-centration of German aircraft in the south ofGreece, and information of the presence ofairborne troops and of preparations for anattack on Crete on a large scale by air and bysea.M y original intention after the evacuation ofGreece had been to relieve the Australian and


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3434 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946New Zealand troops which had been landed inCrete by the infantry of the 6th Division, so asto enable the 6th Australian Division and theN ew Zealand Division to be reorganized, inPalestine and Egypt respectively, as soon aspossible. During the early part of May, how-ever, the Royal Navy was fully engaged in theoperations necessary for the passage of theconvoy mentioned in para. 51 above throughthe Mediterranean, and was unable to providethe necessary escorts for any large shippingmovements between Crete and Egypt. Later,it became obvious that there would be no timeto effect reliefs before the German attackdeveloped and that it would be necessary tomeet that attack with the troops already inCrete and to defer any question of relief untilthe German attack had been repulsed. Further,the German attacks on shipping to Crete wereso intensive as to make it difficult and dan-gerous for shipping to approach the island. Ivisited Crete on 3oth April and placed Major-General Freyberg in command. I instructedhim to organize the defence of the island withthe troops available and with such additionalresources as I was able to send him from Egypt.

53. British forces had been first sent to Creteon ist November, 1940. The force sent wasonly the Headquarters of an infantry brigade,two battalions, 2nd Battalion The Black Watchand ist York and Lancaster Regiment, andcertain other details. There was then a Greekdivision in the island; there seemed no immedi-ate threat to Crete, and the only requirementwas to secure Suda Bay as a refuelling base forthe navy. The defensive arrangements were allmade with this end in view. There was at thetime no prospect of the island becoming an airbase, and the coast defences, anti-aircraftdefences and infantry defences, were designedsolely to protect the naval anchorage at SudaBay.Towards the end of November the whole ofthe Greek 'troops in the island were removed.One additional British battalion (ist WelchRegiment) was sent to Crete in February, andorders were issued to prepare a base for onedivision. Meanwhile an aerodrome was underconstruction at Maleme, west of Canea, and thelanding ground at Heraklion in the east of theisland was being improved. With the constantshortage of aircraft in the Middle East, however,it was never possible to station any aircraftpermanently in the island. At the end ofNovember a Commando was sent to the island,its object -being to carry out raids on theadjacent Italian islands. Otherwise the -garri-so n remained at three battalions until after theevacuation from Greece. During the operationsin Greece, however, Suda Bay became ofgreater importance to the Navy and it wastherefore decided to send the Mobile Naval BaseDefence Organisation (M.N.B.D.O.), which hadlately arrived in the Middle East, to improve thedefence of Suda Bay.

54. In the light of after events, if we hadbeen able to develop th e defences of Crete morehighly during th e early period of occupation,we could have made the enemy's task in seizingit even more costly than it was. The value ofth e island was fully appreciated, but the con-stant shortage of troops and material in theMiddle East was an effective obstacle to anylarge-scale defence measures, and any workwould have been at the expense of other com-mitments in the Middle East, which at the time

appeared more important. Engineer units andequipment were always short, and were moreurgently required in Greece, in the WesternDesert and elsewhere. It was already necessaryseverely to ration steel for reinforced concreteworks in the Western Desert and on thenorthern frontier of Palestine; and shipping toCrete was always scarce. It has been sug-gested that local labour could have been em-ployed, -but practically all able-bodied men inthe island were serving in the Greek forces inAlbania, while to collect the inhabitants fromthe long and poorly developed island a con-siderable quantity of transport would have beenrequired, and this, as already stated, was thechief difficulty in all theatres in the MiddleEast.

55. The total troops in Crete when theGerman attack took place was approximately28,600. Of these the great majority were inneed of rest and reorganisation after the opera-tions in Greece. There was a shortage of equip-ment of all kinds, and a proportion of thepersonnel was unarmed.' Improvised units wereformed from these men and were equipped withsuch' arms as were available. It was intendedto evacuate from the island 'before the Germanattack all such personnel as could not usefullybe employed in the defence; but owing to theshortage of shipping and escorts mentionedabove it was only possible to remove a smallproportion before the German attack. As anadditional embarrassment, there were 16,000Italian prisoners of war, captured by theGreeks, under guard on the island.Every effort was made to send stores and.material to increase the means of defence; nineinfantry tanks, a number of captured Italianguns, a certain amount of transport, and otherarms and equipment were shipped. A con-siderable proportion, however, was sunk onthe voyage, as the enemy scale of attack onshipping rapidly increased in intensity. Thematerials sunk included about half the fieldguns and more than half the engineer storesrequired fo r constructing defences.56. The island of Crete is about 160 mileslong and about 40 miles wide. It is verymountainous and there is only one main roadwhich runs the whole length of the north coast,on which are all available harbours. The roadsfrom north to south are few and poor. It ispossible to find landing places in the south ofthe island, but there are usually no easy exitsfrom them and no communications with therest of the island. It had always been intendedto develop landing .places on the south of theisland and roads from them to the north, inorder to avoid the exposed passage round thenorth of the island; but there had never been,fo r the reasons given above, sufficient meansto carry this out.

57. General Freyberg disposed his troops infour sectors as follows: (a) Heraklion.CommanderBrigadier Chappell.Two British battalions.Three Greek battalions.300 Australian riflemen.250 Artillerymen armed as infantry.(6 ) Retimo.CommanderBrigadier Vasey.H.Q. igth Australian Infantry Bri-gade.Four Australian -battalions.Six Greek battalions.


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946 3435{c) Suda Bay..CommanderMaj.-Gen. Weston, R.M.i6th and I7th Australian battalions,both improvised.Some 1,200 British riflemen, formedfrom various units.io6th Regiment, R.H.A., armed asinfantry.

Two Greek battalions.(d) Maleme.CommanderBrigadier Puttick, N.Z.Div.4th New Zealand Brigade in areawest of Canea.5th New Zealand Brigade inMaleme area.'loth (Improvised) Infantry Brigadeof composite battalions formedfrom various N ew Zealand per-sonnel and two Greek battalions.One additional Greek battalion.There were anti-aircraft defences round SudaBay and at Maleme and Heraklion. The fieldartillery consisted of captured Italian gunsintended for static defence only. Two infantrytanks had been provided for each of the aero-dromes at Heraklion, Retimo and Maleme; andthree additional "I "tanks were also sent tothe island. The single means of land communi-cation between the various sectors was the roadwhich ran along the north coast of the islandand was obviously likely to be the target ofenemy air attack. . The shortage of transport

in any case prevented the .possibility of large-scale reinforcement from one part of the islandto another. Each of the three main groups,at Heraklion, at Retimo, and in the Suda Bay-Maleme area, had to fight as a separate force.The general scheme of defence was the same at-each, to prevent enemy landings on the aero-dromes and landings, whether air-borne or sea-borne, at the beaches.58. The main enemy attack was preceded byair attacks, principally on Suda Bay and onshipping, which gradually increased in in-tensity. It soon became obvious that it wouldbe- impossible for our small force of fighter air-craft to maintain itself on the island and that itwould merely be destroyed on the ground. Itwas accordingly decided to withdraw the few.-aeroplanes that remained, which was done onigth May. There were thus none of our air-craft on the island during the attack, excepttw o Hurricanes which reached Crete on 23rd"May.59. In a communication sent to me threedays before the attack, General Freyberg re-ported that he had just returned from a final'tour of the defences and felt greatly encouraged.He described the excellent morale of the troopsand the strenuous efforts to render the island-as strong as possible. He said in conclusionthat while he did not wish to be over-confident,"he felt that at least the defenders would give a.good account of themselves, and trusted thatwith the aid of the Navy, Crete would be held.He did not anticipate, any more than anyoneelse, the overwhelming strength in which theGerman Air Force was to make the attack, nor"how carefully and skilfully their plans had beenlaid nor the losses they were prepared to acceptto attain their object.

60. The- main enemy attack began soon.afterdawn on 20th May, with a heavy bombing.attack on Maleme aerodrome. Under cover of

the clouds of dust and smoke which resulted,and while the bombing was still in progress,between 50 and 100 gliders landed troops ina river bed west of the aerodrome, whence theyattacked the aerodrome. About the same timelarge numbers of parachutists began to landnear Maleme, south and south-west of Caneaand on the Akrotiri Peninsula north of SudaBay, where gliders also landed. The greatmajority of these parachutists were accountedfor, but a certain number succeeded in estab-lishing themselves at various points and causedsome trouble. His Majesty the King of Greecehad a narrow escape from a party of para-chutists which landed near the house in whichhe was. He made his escape with difficulty,and then under the protection of a platoon ofNew Zealanders, crossed the mountains bynarrow, tracks to the south coast, where he wastaken off by a destroyer.^In the afternoon, similar attacks by para-cKutists were made against Heraklion andRetimo. At the former it is estimated thatabout 2,000 were landed, the great majority ofw hom had been killed or captured by' thefollowing morning. At Retimo, about 1,700appear to have landed; the majority of thesewere also accounted for, but a party of about100 succeeded in establishing themselves inbuildings on the route between Retimo andSuda Bay, and thus cut off communications byland between Retimo and Force Headquartersduring the remainder of the fighting. An effortto dislodge this party made several days laterw as unsuccessful.Altogether, it is estimated that over 7,000men, armed and equipped with great fore-thought, were landed on this day from the air.They suffered extremely heavy casualties andonly at Maleme aerodrome did they succeed inestablishing any serious footing.61. On 2ist .May, every effort was made toeject the enemy from Maleme aerodrome. Theexperience of the previous day had shown what

tremendous support was afforded to the enemyby his air forces, which made movement byday almost impossible. A night attack wastherefore made by the 20th -New ZealandBattalion and the 28th Maori Battalion, whorecaptured almost the whole of the ground lost,but were exposed at daylight to intensivebombing by the enemy air forces and compelledto withdraw.During the 2ist and 22nd May troop-carryingaircraft continued to land on and about Malemeaerodrome although under artillery fire. It isestimated that as many as 600 troop carrierslanded on one day. Their losses must havebeen extremely heavy, but they were able toestablish a sufficiently strong force to drive backour troops in the Maleme sector with the aidof intensive support from bombing .and fightingaircraft, which made movement by day prac-tically impossible.

During the nights 2ist/22nd May and22nd/23rd May the Royal Navy interceptedand sunk large numbers of small craft trans-porting enemy troops, but suffered considerablelosses during daylight from enemy air attack.6 2 . On 24th May and 25th May the fightingcontinued with the same intensity. The enemycontinued to land troops and to force back ourline f r o m . the Maleme area towards Canea,which ^was heavily bombed and almost


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3436 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946destroyed. General Freyberg now abolished theseparate Maleme sector and put the NewZealand troops who had formerly occupied itunder 'General iWeston, Royal Marines, thecommander of the M.N.B.D.O.-

63. I had meanwhile been sending to theisland such reinforcements as were availableand could be transported. 'By this time nomerchant ship had any chance of survivalwithin 50 miles of the island, and the onlymeans of sending reinforcements was by fastwarship which could reach Suda Bay undercover of darkness, disembark their troops andge t clear of the island before dawn. Thislimited both the number and type of troopsthat could be sent, even if such reinforcementshad been available. It was, for instance, im-possible to send any more guns by this method.As already stated in para. 48, the reinforce-ments available were in any case extremelylimited, in all three battalions (2nd Battalionthe Queen's, 2nd Battalion Argyll andSutherland Highlanders, ist Battalion LeicesterRegiment) and two battalions of Layforce, abody of specially picked troops who had beensent out from th e United Kingdom fo r com-bined enterprises. 'Headquarters i6th InfantryBrigade and 2nd Queen's set out for the island,but the ship in which they were being trans-ported was hit during the passage and had toreturn to Alexandria. Of the reinforcementssent, the Leicester's and Argyll and SutherlandHighlanders were landed at Tymbaki on thesouth of the island and the former regimentand part of the latter made their way overlandto the (Heraklion sector; the remainder of thereinforcing units were landed at Suda Bay.

64. 26th (May proved the critical- day. Ourline west of Canea was broken an d driven backon Suda Bay, so that a considerable portionof the base area fell into enemy hands SudaBay became no longer tenable. All troops weremuch exhausted and the enemy air bombingwas as intensive as ever. The enemy had bythis time landed some 30,000 to 35,000 troopson the island. Early on the morning of 27thM ay General Freyberg decided that evacuationwas inevitable, and reported to me accordingly.In view of the situation he described and theimpossibility of sending further reinforcements,I gave orders for the withdrawal of our garrisonsfrom Crete.

65. Meanwhile the troops at Heraklion hadhad considerable fighting but had never beenseriously pressed. The enemy had, however,continued to land troops in a valley to the east,outside the range of our defences, and wasgradually accumulating a large force there. Thewhole of the garrison, except those woundedwho could not be moved, were evacuated bycruiser an d destroyer on the night of 28th-2QthMay. At the moment of embarkation there weremany indications that an attack was about tocome in from th e force which had been built upto the east, and which had been joined by tanksand additional troops landing from the sea nearMatea.

66. It is impossible at present to relate thefull story of events at Retimo. Headquarters,iQth Australian Brigade, ha d been summonedto Suda Bay area early in the battle and thecommand passed to Lieut.-Colonel I. Campbell.Communication by land had been blocked bythe enemy detachment described above; the

garrison had no cyphers and was unable tocommunicate except by W/T in clear. GeneralFreyberg reported that he was unable tocommunicate to the defenders the decision towithdraw and asked that an aeroplane might besent to drop orders on the garrison. The aero-plane never returned and it is now known thatthe orders were never received. The 2/ist and2/nth Australian Battalions under Lieut. -Colonel Campbell held their position until3ist May, when, after gallant fighting, theywere overwhelmed by greatly superior forces in-cluding tanks. Most of the garrison becameprisoners; a few escaped to the hills and smallparties reached Egypt some weeks later.67. The remains of the troops from theMalemeCaneaSuda Bay area withdrewsouth across the island to Sphakia. The with-drawal was covered in the early stages byLayforce, 5th New Zealand Brigade andigth Australian Brigade, the two latter workingas one force. 4th New Zealand Brigade, somelight tanks of 3rd Hussars, some guns and abattalion of Royal Marines also covered theretreat, which, in spite of very great difficultieswas carried out with much bravery anddetermination, under the direction of GeneralWeston. This withdrawal by troops who hadalready endured six days of the sternest fightingimaginable was a magnificent performance. Theonly blot on the story of the defence of Cretewas the indiscipline of a certain proportion ofthe disorganized and unarmed elements of theforce whom it had not been possible to evacuate. before the attack. When the withdrawal to thesouthern beaches began, they much hamperedboth the retirement and orderly embarkation.The road ends some miles short of the beachand thence there are only rough paths down tothe beach. The climb from the beach to thehigh ground above, which was held by the rear-guard troops, took a minimum of two hours.68. The first evacuation from Sphakia tookplace during the nights of 28th-29th and2gth-3oth May, when the wounded and non-fighting troops were mostly embarked. On3oth May the enemy made contact with therearguard, but was repulsed and made littlefurther effort to interfere with the re-embarka-tion.The Navy had sustained heavy losses in shipsduring the passage to and from Crete, and it hadbeen decided that the evacuation must end onthe night of 3ist May-ist June. The embarka-tion during the last two nights was carried outunder conditions of considerable difficulty,rations and water were limited and the troops,scattered in various hiding places during theday to shelter from enemy air attack, weredifficult to collect for embarkation. I orderedGeneral Freyberg to return to Egypt on thenight of 30th-3ist May, and he and his staff weretaken off by flying boat. General Westonremained in command and was taken off on thefollowing night. It is regretted that a con-siderable number of troops had to be leftbehind, including an Australian battalion andth e bulk of Layforce, who had all fought mostskilfully and gallantly to the end.Out of the total of 27,550 Imperial troops onthe island at the beginning of the attack,14,580 were evacuated (7,130 out of 14,000British, 2,890 out of 6,450 Australians, 4,560out of 7,100 New Zealanders). What proportionof the 13,000 casualties were killed andwounded cannot yet be determined.


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1946 343769. The failure to hold Crete was due mainlyto the overwhelming superiority of the enemyaircraft and the way in which it was handledin conjunction with ground troops. Officers whohad fought through the last war and had beenengaged in France during this war have ex-pressed their opinion that the bombardment the

troops underwent in Crete was severer and morecontinuous than anything they had everexperienced. The handicap under which theforce laboured in regard to lack of equipmentand the difficulties of reinforcing the island witheither men or material have been explained,but it was the enemy air force which was thedeciding factor. Even had the German attackbeen beaten off it is very doubtful whether thetroops in Crete could have been maintained inface of the enemy air force, which made theapproach of shipping to the island mosthazardous.The troops, including the Greeks on theisland, fought magnificently under the moststern conditions, and deserve the very greatestcredit fo r their efforts. General Freyberg an dGeneral Weston, and the subordinate com-manders under them such as BrigadiersPuttick, Chappell, Hargest, Vasey and ColonelCampbell, set a fine example to their men andhandled their troops with determination andskill.The work of the Royal Navy in preventingthe enemy attempts at invasion by sea and inevacuation of the troops in spite of extremelyheavy losses in ships and in men was beyond allpraise. To Admiral Sir Andrew Cunninghamhimself, who took the responsibility of orderingthe evacuation to proceed in spite of the losses,the Army owes a deep debt of gratitude.Although they were completely outmatchedin numbers, the Royal Air Force never failedto do their utmost to support the Army. Thoughthey were obliged to operate from distant placesin Egypt, they attacked to the utmost of theirability and in spite of 'heavy and inevitablelosses.70. The defence of Crete, though unsuccess-ful, undoubtedly frustrated th e enemy plan fo rfuture operations by destroying so large aportion of his air-borne troops. The totalenemy losses were at least 12,000-15,000, ofwhom a very high proportion were killed.The defence saved in all probability Cyprus,Syria, Iraq and perhaps Tobruk.Thus our losses in Crete, though heavy, werevery far from being in vain, and the gallantresistance of .the force saved our position in theMiddle East at a critical time. The fighting inCrete may prove a turning point of the war.Revolt in Iraq.71. While ou r preparations for the defenceofCrete and of 'the .Western Desert were absorbingpractically our whole attention and resources,a critical situation in Iraq suddenly made freshdemands on Middle East.Our relations with the Iraq Governmentduring the war had become increasingly unsatis-factory. By treaty Iraq was pledged to giveus assistance in war and to permit the passageof .British troops through Iraq. There was aBritish Military Mission with the Iraq Armysand the Royal Air Force had stations at Hab-baniyah, some 4 0 miles west of Baghdad, andat Shaibah, near Basra. For the protection ofthe R.A.F. establishments there were locallyenlisted Iraq Levies.

All operational aircraft were removed fromIraq early in the war, and there remained onlya few obsolete machines at Shaibah and a depdtand .training school at Habbaniyah with trainingaircraft only.72. Although the Iraq Government, aftersome pressure, broke off diplomatic relationswith Germany, they did not declare war; andwhen Italy entered the war they did not evenbreak off relations with the Italian Governmentand allowed the Italian Legation to remain inBaghdad, a hot bed of anti-British propagandaand espionage. As the military successes of theAxis powers increased, so did the unfriendlyinfluence of Rashid Ali become more effectivein controlling the conduct of the Iraq Govern-ment. The Mufti of Jerusalem and other mal-contents from Palestine, to whom Iraq hadgiven asylum, formed a centre of anti-Britishintrigue. A force had been under preparationin --India for use in Iraq shbuld enemy forcesreafch that country, but the situation in MiddleEast after the Italians entered into the warand the Japanese threat to Malaya made itnecessary to divert this force in other directionswhich were of more urgent importance.73. Early in 1941 it was decided to takediplomatic action to try and improve relationswith the Iraq Government and to this end SirKinahan Cornwallis w

operations in the middle east from 7th february, 1941 - the london gazette

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