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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFWASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE \Subject: Justification for US Military Interventionin Cuba (TS) ,-. .

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attachedMemorandum -for .the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, v/hichresponds to a^recLuest of that office for brief but precisedescription of "pretexts which would provide justificationfor US military intervention in Cuba.2. The ..Joint Chiefs of .Staff recommend that theproposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submissionsuitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that therewill be similar submissions from other agencies and thatthese inputs will be used as a basis for developing atime-phased plan. Individual projects can then beconsidered on a case -by-case basis.3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will begiven the primary responsibility for developing militaryand para -military aspects of the basic plan. It is

recommended that this responsibility for both overt andcovert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs ofStaff.For the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SYSTEMATlCALi^^iH\^

CUSSlFiCAllM-CM^y^ ttL. L. LEMK'TTZERChairmanJoint' Chiefs of St'

1 EnclosureMemo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM ArjTOMATrCEEGRADIMG; DOD DIE 5200,10

DOES NOT APPLY


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/ TOP SECRETJCS 1969/321IS March,a96gPage 2165

MbBKI COPY NO. 1SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTE BY THE SSCKETARIES- ' to the

JOINT CHIEFS OP STAPFon

NORTHWOODS (S)A report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-

ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

P. J. BLOUINM. J, INGELIEOJoint Secretariat

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* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint SecretariatE^CtUDfD FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATICREGRADIWG; DOD DIRECTIVE520Q.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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-- *- _J owf-UWi^9 March I962

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MDJOINT CHIEFS OP STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THECARIBBEAN SURVEY GROaP

to theJOINT CHIEFS OP STAFK

onCUBA PROJECT CTR')

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requestedthat he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staffon this matter by 13 March 1962.

BtCLUDED FROM GDS

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TUSTIPICATION POR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM1. As requested* 'by chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precisedescription of pretexis which they consider would provideJustification for US military intervention in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext

for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a politicaldecision which then would lead to military action.

3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course ofactiwn proposed** by the US Navy relating to generatedinstances in the Guantanamo area.

4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.DISCUSSION

.5- The suggested coursesof action appended to Enclosure Aare based on the premise that US military intervention willresult from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions whichplace the United States in the position of suffering justif-iable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nationsforum should be favorablyâffected by developing the inter-national image of the Cuban government as i-ash and irresponsible,and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace ofthe Western Hemisphere.

6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at thepresent time it will continue to hold good only as long asthere can be reasonable certainty that US military interventionin Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is

* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations,Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, fromChief of Naval Operations, subjeot: "Instances toProvoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March I962,on file in General Craig's office.

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as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSRto the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of theWarsaw pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet basesin Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore,since time appears to be an important factor in resolution ofthe Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the timeframe of the next few months.

CONCLUSION7, The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A

satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However,these suggestions --should be forwarded as a preliminary submissionsuitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputsfrom other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single,integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on theob;3ective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS8. -It is recommended that:

a. Enclosure A together \d.th its attachments should beforwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval andtransmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project,

b. This paper NOT be_forwarded to coimnanders of unifiedor specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwar,ded to US ,officers assignedto NATO act'ivities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, USDelegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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gmmMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECREa?ARY OP DEFENSESubject: Justification for US Military Interventionin Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attachedMemorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, whichresponds to a request* of that office for brief but precisedescription of pretexts which wovld provide justificationfor US military intervention In Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposedmemorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitablefor planning piirposes. It is assumed that there will besimilar submissions from other agencies and that these inputswill be used as a basis for developing a time -phased plan.Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-casebasis. ... _ . }>

3. Further, It is assumed that a single agency will begiven the primary responsibility for developing military andpara-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommendedthat this responsibility for_fcpth overt and covert militaryoperatioEsbe assigned the Joint Chiefs of^taff

.

* Memorandum for Gen Gralg from Chief of Operations, CubaProject, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March1962, on file:.ln Gen Craig's office

Enolostire A

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

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MEMORAMDUM FOR CHIEF OP OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECTSubject: Justification for US Military Interventionin Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandtim from Chief of Operations^Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE",dated 5 March 1962, Vfhich requested brief but precisedescription of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staffconsider would provide Justification for US railltaJT inter-vention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwardedas a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.It is assumed that there will be similar submissions fromother agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basisfor developing a time-phased plan. The indivldtial projectscan then be considered on a case-by-case basis. -^-' '^

3. This plan. Incorporating projects selected from theattached suggestions, or from other sources, should bedeveloped to focus all efforts on a specific ultimateobjective which would provide adequate justification forUS military intervention. Such a plan jroylld enable a logicalbuild-up of incidents to be combined with other seeminglyunrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective andcreate the necessary impression of Cuban rashness andirresponsibility on a large scale, directed at othercountries as well as the United States. The plan would alsoproperly integrate and time phase the courses of action tobe pursued. The desired resultant from the execution ofthis plan would be to place the United States in the apparentposition of suffering defensible grievances from a rash andirresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter-national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the WesternHemisphere.

iS't!',"!;^ Appendix toEnclosure A

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4, Time is an important factor irs resolution "of the Cubanproblem. Therefore, the plan should he so time-phased thatprojects would he operable within the next few months.

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt militaryintervention, it is recommended that ^^i^^J^fyjespjDnsibilityfor developing military and para-military aspects of the planfor both overt and covert military operations be assigned theJoint Chiefs of Staff.

Appendix toEnclosure A

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uiLuiHL nHnuLir.^ nuruKnANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A W.Ll HWVdW-

PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY IMTEKTON1I0N IH OUBA

(Note: The courses of action whioh follow are a preliminarysubmission stiltable only for planning purposes^ They arearranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.Together with similar inputs from other agencleSj they areintended to provide a point of departure for the developmentof a single. Integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan wouldpermit the evaluation of individual projects within the contextof oiunulatlvej correlated actions designed to lead inexorablyto the objective of adequate Justification for US militaryintervention In Cuba)

1. Since It would seem desirable to use legitimateprovocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cubaa cover and deception plan, to include requisite prellmlna3?yactions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,could be executed as an Initial effort to provoke Cubanreactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince theCubans of Imminent Invasion would be emphasized. Our militaryposture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapidchange from exercise to Intervention If Cuban response Justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated Incidents will be plannedto take place in and around Guantanarao 'to*^ give genuineappearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not inohronologlcal order):

(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.(2) Land friendly Cubans In uniform "over-the-fence"

to stage attack on base.(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the

base.(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly

Cubans )

Annex to Appendix7 to Enclosure A

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tiifiiii-.,-- -^M.iiM vtrtttftttmir: iroi uiin iftrromr j^iiiiiw(5) Blow up arrauuDitlon Inside the base; start fires.

(6) Bvirn aircraft on air base (sabotage),(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into bass.

Some damage to installations,(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea

or vicinity of (juantanamo City.(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.

(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires napthalene.(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals

for mock-victiins (may be lieu of (10)).b. United States would respond by executing offensive

operations to secure water and power supplies, destroyingartillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in

several forms:a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and

blame Cuba.b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anyv^here

in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such Incidentin the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular resultof Cuban attack from t^ie air or sea, or both. The presenceof Cuban planes or ships merely Invefs^gating the intent ofthe vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the shipwas taken "under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiagowould add credibility especially to those people that mighthave heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US couldfollow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by USfighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existentcrew. Casualty lists In US newspapers would cause a helpfxawave of national indignation,4, We could develop a Conmiunisfc Cuban terror campaign in

the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

Annex to Appendix8 to Enclosure A

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. uLuiiu I. orcbmnfirmrtrN -: H Ofotr^The terror campaign could te pointed at Cuban refugees seekinghaven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubansenroute to Florida (real or simulated). We coiad foster attemptson lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to theextent of wounding In Instances to be widely publicized.Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spotsj theairest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documentssubstantiating Cuban Involvement also wquld be helpful Inprojecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could besimulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the veinof the l4th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). Weknow that Castro Is backing subversive efforts clandestinelyagainst Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua atpresent and possible others. These efforts can be magnified andadditional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantagecan be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force tointrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-a6 orC-45 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at. night.Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupledwith "Cuban" messages to the Communist uxidergroimd In theDominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which wouldbe found, or intercepted, on the beach.'' ^^

6. Use of Mia type aircraft by US pilots could provide .additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks onsurface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraftby MIG type planes would be useful as oomplementary actions.An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that theysaw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport wereto announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestionappears to be the security risk Inherent In obtaining or modify-ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG couldbe produced from US resources In about three months

Annex to Appendixto Enclosure A^lOiitl

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7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft ishould appear to continue as harassing raeasures condoned by thegovernment of Cuba, Concurrently, genuine defections of Cubancivil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrateconvincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot downa chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States toJa^iaioa, Guatemalaj Panama or Venezuela. The destination wouldbe chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba,The passengers could be a group of college students off on aholiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest tosupport chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AEB wo\:LLd be painted andnumbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registeredaircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in theMiami area. At a designated time the diipllcate would be

substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would beloaded with the selected passengers, all boarded undercarefully prepared aliases. The actual registeredaircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actualaircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south ofFlorida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carryingaircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directlyinto an auxiliary field at Eglin AKB vrhere arrangements willhave been made to evacuate the passengers and return theaircraft to its original status. The drone aircraftmeanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. Whenover Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter-

. national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating heis under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmissionwill be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which willbe triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio

10 Annex to Appendixto Enclosure A


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vrw aVHIlIk HI Huiunnstations In the Western HfiiM^^'^^a^t^^tell the US whathas happened to the airoraft' instead of the TJS tiTying to"seil" the Incident,9. It la possihle to create an incident which will maice It

appear that Oomraimlst Cuhan MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraftover International waters in an unprovoked attack,

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will he dispatchedIn trail from Homestead AEBj Florida, to the vicinity of GuhaTheir mission will be to reverse coiirse and simulate fakiraircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida.These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights atfrequent Internals. Crews would be briefed to remain atleast 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would berequired to carry live ammunition in the event that hostileactions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would flytail-end Charley at considerable Interval between aircraft.mxie near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast thathe had been junked by MIGs and was going down. No othercalls would be made. The pilot would then fly directlywest at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, anEslln auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the properpeople, quickly stored and given a xTew tail number. Thepilot who had performed the mission under 'an alias, wouldresume his proper identity and return to his normal placeof business. The pilot and aircraft would then havedisappeared.

G. At precisely the same time that the aircraft waspresumably shot down a submarine or small surface craftwould disburse F-iOl parts, parachute, etc., at approximately15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilotsreturning to Homestead would have a true story as far asthey knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatchedand parts of aircraft found.

11 Annex to Appendixto Enclosure A

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