Operation Market Garden 17 September, 1944 The powers that be hoped Market Garden would be the last major operation of WWII in the European theatre — that final push to end the war by Christmas 1944. As it was, things turned out differently. Had this operation gone according to plan then Western military history after 1944 would have been quite different. After the Normandy invasion of June 6th, 1944, the Allied forces were pinned down by the Germans and it took the Allies another 10 weeks to break out from their bridgeheads. On August 20th German resistance was crushed and a combined force of more than a million Americans, British, Canadians, French, Polish and Dutch troops were able to advance with speed and determination through France and Belgium in pursuit of the retreating Wehrmacht. In fact it took Allied tank divisions a mere 6 days to advance more than 560 km. Brussels and Antwerp were liberated on 3rd and 4th of September, respectively. The following day — also known by the Dutch as Dolle Dinsdag (Mad Tuesday) — the routed Germans began a chaotic retreat through southern Netherlands in the direction of Heimat. Following the (re)capture of Antwerp, the Allied forces took a bit of a breather. this turned out to be a tactical error. True, Antwerp had been liberated but its docks were still unusable because the Germans still controlled both banks of the important Scheldt estuary. This pause in the Allied advance allowed the German 15th Army to regroup, bring in reinforcements and escape from Zeelandic Flanders. The 15th Army reached North Brabant very much in tact and when the Allies resumed their offensive on September 6, the Wehrmacht was ready and waiting. The Allied offensive hit a sticky patch as severe differences in military strategy reared their heads. Eisenhower thought a push across a broad front toward the Rhine and Ruhr was the best way forward while Montgomery believed in a spearhead offensive which would split the German forces in the Netherlands and thereby open up the route to the Ruhr. Montgomery got his way and the 1st Allied Airborne Corps were placed under his command. On September 17, 1944, the British 30th Army Corps, from their bridgehead in Belgium, would lay down a “carpet” of airborne troops and advance through Valkenswaard, Eindhoven, Veghel, Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem to the IJsselmeer. The codename was “Market.”

The “carpet” would be laid by the American 101st Airborne Division near Eindhoven, the 82nd American Division near Nijmegen and the British 1st Airborne Division, with a compliment of Polish paratroopers, near Arnhem. The plan was to quickly capture and hold the bridges across the canals and rivers and keep them open for the advancing 30th Corps of the British second army. The codename was “Garden” and the flanks of the 30th Corps were to be protected by the 8th and 12th British Army Corps. Meanwhile, major changes were taking place within the German high command. Hitler was unhappy with developments and recalled Günther van Kluge, the commander of western operations. Van Kluge, who had earlier replaced von Runstedt, knew exactly what to expect. Rather than face the Fuhrer’s wrath, van Kluge committed suicide on the way back to Germany. His successor was Field Marshal Walter Rommel. On September 4th, Goering offered Rommel 20,000 paratroopers and ordered 10,000 Luftwaffe personnel to be retrained as infantrymen. The newly-trained infantrymen were offered to Model for his defence of the Albert canal. Colonel General Kurt Student was given command of Goering's brand new paratroopers and the German 15th Army. Model moved his headquarters to Oosterbeek while Student established a base in Vught. Neither of the men had the slightest clue their headquarters were located within the Allied forces landing area. But this was not all, by pure coincidence remnants of the elite 9th Hohenstaufen and 10th Frundsberg Panzer divisions also arrived in Gelderland around September. These corps had escaped from France and the original intention had been for them to briefly recuperate and reassemble in the Veluwe before returning to battle as soon as possible. Both elite divisions came under the direct command of the experienced and energetic Obergruppenführer Willi Bittrich. The original name of the Allied operation had been “Comet” and not “Market Garden". On August 23 Montgomery explained the plan to Eisenhower. He also declared that the successful execution of his plan required the suspension of all Allied advances in France. Eisenhower rejected this idea out of hand because there was no way either Patton or Bradley would ever accept such a proposal. On September 6 Montgomery tabled a new plan — still codenamed "Comet” in which the British 1st Airborne Division would land and capture the bridges at Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem. From the bridgehead in Belgium a second army would move out in a double spearheaded action: one would advance Den Bosch while the other headed toward Arnhem-Nijmegen.

On the 7th of September division commanders for both operations received orders to proceed. Unfortunately heavy storms in the English Channel and increasing German resistance resulted in a delay of several days. On September 10 the operation was called off because Montgomery believed the risks to be too great. He immediately put his staff to work on a new plan with practically the same goals though, this time around, there would be no advance on Den Bosch. However the new plan would include two American airborne divisions as a surprise element. Montgomery strongly believed a “coup de main” could be implemented because the Germans would never expect an airborne landing in Arnhem. Montgomery had absolute faith in his plan which involved liberating the Netherlands and penetrating deep into the heart of Germany with a powerful but pencil thin, thrust into the heart of Germany. Eisenhower, on the other hand, feared that an offensive over such an extended and narrow front would be extremely vulnerable. With the benefit of hindsight Eisenhower’s misgivings turned out to be well founded. Nevertheless, on September 12 a staff meeting took place in London where a decision was made to go ahead and begin the rechristened “Operation Market Garden” on the 17th of September. The southern segment of the Arnhem carpet would be laid down by the 101st Airborne Division at Son and Veghel. Their mission was to capture and hold the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal, the South Willemsvaart, the Dommel and Aa. The 82nd Airborne Division would land at Grave, Overasselt and Groesbeek. They were tasked with capturing the bridges over the Meuse at Grave, at least one of the bridges over the Maas-Waal canal and the bridge over the Waal at Nijmegen. Furthermore, the hills near Groesbeek/Beek needed to be captured and help. A decision was made for the operation to be carried out in daylight in order to avoid the dread German night fighters

Given the huge numbers of men (more than 34,000) and the incredible amount of ammunition, jeeps, howitzers, food and medicine necessary for the operation, it was logistically impossible to transport everyone and everything to the landing zone in a single day — there were simply not enough aircraft available. Neither was it possible to do this in two days so it was decided to do this over three landing waves on three consecutive days. It was a breathtaking spectacle: the thousands of aircraft; huge gliders preceded by Spitfires, Mustangs, Hurricanes and Mosquitos must have been apocalyptic character. It was the prelude to the largest military operation ever carried out on Dutch soil but Operation “Market Garden” was the greatest airborne operation in history: 13,000 aircraft and 2,600 gliders. Nothing since has ever come close to this. The records of this battle have entered the history books: both the 101st and the 82nd Airborne Division carried out virtually all of their missions successfully, albeit with a day and a half delay. The most crucial moment of the entire operation came on Wednesday, September 20. The 82nd Airborne Division had spent three days engaged in extremely heavy fighting on the southern side of the Nijmegen Waal Bridge, but had failed to capture the bridge. So Gavin came up with a plan to cross the Waal, 3 km downstream, using large canoes. It was a masterstroke and it worked. However of the 26 boats that attempted the first crossing, only 13 made it across the Lentse. At that crossing alone, at least 100 Americans were either killed or wounded. The Americans eventually managed to capture the northern ramp of the bridge just as four tanks of the Grenadier Guards, under the command of Peter Carrington, approached the bridge from the south. Sergeant Robertson, had already written down a will and testament, was the first to cross the first bridge. He expected it to be blown up at any moment. Twice he jumped from one tank to another, following direct hits from German guns. Driven on by a mixture of adrenaline and euphoria, Robertson sprinted across the largest bridge span in Europe toward the village of Lent in the direction of Arnhem. Carrington, who was in the last tank across the bridge realised he would have to defend the bridge alone until reinforcements came, and that took another 40 minutes. “The blackest 40 minutes” of his life as he later recounted on Dutch television.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see how Operation “Market Garden” was hindered mistakes in operational planning and by numerous missed opportunities in the field. These are summarised below. First off, there was the failure by the 30th British Corps to push on towards Woensdrecht and the Kreekrakdamby following the conquest of Antwerp. This would have completely blocked off the German 15th Army’s escape route. That the Guards Armoured Division did not cover those last few kilometres turned out to be a final nail in the coffin of Montgomery's plan. In the second place, 80,000 well-equipped Germans were able to break through Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland and on to North Brabant. It was later determined by the Germans that the Wehrmacht was, at the time indeed ripe for the kill. The fact Operation “Market Garden” became bogged down after the first 4 days was largely due to pressure from units of the German 15th Army. Market Garden fell into the doldrums; hardly any of the timetables were met and the Allied forces did not reach Nijmegen until the afternoon of September 20 which was 36 hours too late. Because of this, Arnhem remained beyond the reach of the ground forces. Thirdly, the destroyed bridge at Son delayed the advance of ground forces by more than 8 hours. Fourth, The logistical planning, which was essential for an operation such as this, were a mess. The entire British 30th Corps, with more than 20,000 vehicles, including many heavy tracked vehicles, was supposed to advance along the narrow road from Valkenswaard to Nijmegen. The only route from Eindhoven to Nijmegen was through Son, Veghel and Grave. The road became blocked whenever a vehicle was taken out of action because of mechanical failure or enemy fire and this led to an irreparable loss of time. Furthermore, the planners had overlooked the fact that ambulances and other army vehicles would also be returning, on the same road, in the direction of Eindhoven. With all the misery, chaos and congestion, the Corridor was rightly called: “Hell's Highway.”

In the 5th place, in order to gain a surprise advantage through the deployment of airborne troops, one needs to drop the men as close to the target as possible. This was not at all the case in Operation “Market Garden” — with the exception of Grave. The dropping at the Rhine bridge was far west of Arnhem, on the Ginkel Heath to be exact and the Groesbeek drop was also too far from the Nijmegen bridge. The argument for selecting these drop zones was to avoid taking fire from the heavy German anti-aircraft units. However, it later appeared that these guns could have been put out of action with a simple air strike. In addition to all this, there were the virtually unusable radio communications equipment of the British at Arnhem and the incredibly incorrect weather forecasts. Finally, countless books have been written about the betrayal by the double agent Christiaan Lindemans, a.k.a. King Kong. He is said to have given information about Operation Market Garden to German counterintelligence. It is documented that Lindemans offered this information in exchange for the release of a captured member of his family. As it turned out, the German Abwehr attached no credence to Lindemans’ story. The recorded minutes of meeting on September 14, 1944, at Bittrich’s staff quarters — in which both Model and Harzer participated — says absolutely nothing about the imminent airborne landings at Arnhem and Nijmegen. Had the German commanders been aware of this, then surely Model would not have have placed his headquarters in Oosterbeek and Student would not have located his headquarters in Vught. Then there is the matter of the commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division, if an invasion was imminent why did he head off to a spa on the 16th of September? Surely the bridges at Arnhem and Nijmegen would have been much better protected, the airfield at Deelen would not have been dismantled and on September 16 all German forces in the Netherlands would have been placed on Alarmstufe I. Finally Hans Rauter, the SS and Polizeiführer in Nederland, took a day off on Sunday, September 17th! The question still remains: was Operation Market Garden a success or a battle lost? There is no simple yes or no answer to this question. Around the world people often talk about the lost "Battle of Arnhem" and this sentiment is not incorrect — after all, the ultimate objective to end the war before Christmas, 1944, failed. That said, there was certainly no lack of bravery and perseverance in the battle for Arnhem, which can rightly be considered a heroic struggle of lightly armed paratroopers against a superior force of heavily armed German Elite troops. When looked at from the perspective of captured territory and the number of liberated Dutch then one can certainly speak of a successful operation. All of the bridges in Brabant and Nijmegen, with the exception of one, were captured which meant the Americans, despite heavy losses, accomplished their mission. Finally, more than one million Dutch citizens avoided another winter famine and, after four years of German occupation, the Netherlands was finally free. C.H.L.H. ten Horn 17 September, 1993 Bibliography, includes: "Corridor to the Rhine", Hen Bollen "The liberation of Eindhoven", Karl Margry Geraadpleegde literatuur ondermeer: “Corridor naar de Rijn”, Hen Bollen “De bevrijding van Eindhoven”, Karl Margry