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Opening Address by Air Vice-Marshal Warren McDonald, AM, CSC

Deputy Chief of Air Force

Chief of Air Force Symposium, Crown Conference Centre, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

27 February 2017

Chief of Air Force, visiting Service chiefs, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Australia – The Lucky Country Donald Horne, an Australian author, wrote in the 1960s about ‘The Lucky Country’- this country. To paraphrase, he said:

Australia is a lucky country … that lives on other people's ideas … Its ordinary people are adaptable [but] so lack curiosity about the events that surround them that they are often taken by surprise.1

Not particularly complimentary. But I would like to use Horne’s observations to look at strategic depth through an Australian lens—the need to develop our own ideas by embracing complexity; the importance of engaging industry as a partner in our capability development; and the need to build global awareness for ourselves and for the sake of our regional alliances and partnerships in this globalised, interconnected world. But first, what is this country I speak of? It has a coastline of some 25 000 km and is the largest country in the world without land borders. We are surrounded by three oceans and three seas. There are three times more sheep than people, and it takes every ounce of patience to drive the four days required from Sydney to Perth.2 Such vastness gives rise to a belief in strategic depth, a fact upon which numerous Australian Defence policies were crafted.

1 Donald Horne, The Lucky Country (Penguin, 1964). 2 2014 figure – “The sheep-to-person ration [in Australia is] 74 million sheep to 23.5 million people.” The Weekly Times, News Limited, August 21, 2014.

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Geographical Depth

Figure. 1 – Australia’s geographic depth gives rise to belief in its strategic depth

Strategic Depth – Does Size Matter? What is strategic depth? A common view is that it equates to territory, vast distances or geographical size in which to manoeuvre. Back in the 1960s and 1970s, Australians were fascinated with size. It was the prized currency, and we had plenty of it. So fascinated were we with size that ridiculous man-made monoliths rose from the ground in the form of the Big Banana and the Big Pineapple – and let us not forget the Big Potato. These are only a handful of the monuments that we constructed to celebrate size over substance in this vast land of ours.

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Australian Big Things

Figure. 2 – Australia’s sense of humour mixes with its fascination with size

I can remember my excitement as a child taking the long road trip from my small town – where excitement was not an everyday occurrence – to see the big Banana. Upon arrival it was impressive for its size, but it was a hollow idol and lacked any form of complexity. In those times – when we were blinded by size at the expense of developing longer lasting and more complex outcomes – we could excuse those who believed we could rely on Australia’s vastness to provide endless strategic depth. Geographic Depth Does Not Equal Strategic Depth Australia possesses a lot of geography. But when one has an excess of something it is generally taken for granted and its disadvantages overlooked. This in turn can lead to an uncomfortable surprise. We believed in time past that there was time to react, time to develop an answer to whatever was needed in any strategic circumstances that might arise. In my view, Australia confused geographic vastness for strategic depth and lost sight of the importance of remaining globally engaged. The rise of cyber warfare and hypersonics are but two examples. Simply put, such things could make us very unlucky, very fast.

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A Changed World

Figure. 3 – Hypersonics, cyber and other technologies have all but eliminated “geographic depth”

True Strategic Depth Provides Options In A Changed World In my opinion, strategic depth equals options. To gain strategic depth in the modern world you cannot rely on luck – you must generate your own ideas, seek out complexity, be comfortable with it and engage widely. It is a long game. I would offer that strategic depth is built on such things as well-developed policy, diplomatic discourse, education, military and industrial capabilities; and the development and testing of one’s ideas. Kill-Webs Vs Kill Chains – Investing In Enablers States who seek to shortcut their way to strategic depth often invest in one big thing, usually a military capability. When such states are placed under pressure, their response is generally predictable, singular in nature and linear in execution. North Korea is a good example of such a state. While I do not wish to draw too many parallels, there is a lesson here about investing or believing in ‘the one big thing’. For Australia’s armed Services, that one big thing has largely been platforms – ships, tanks, aircraft – at the expense of enablers. However, the dominant view of the platform being at the centre of the fight is shifting, and it is shifting fast. With modern warfare – as Admiral Manazir from the US Navy put it to Australia’s Williams Foundation last year – there is the need to move to a kill-web, so that the combat potential of a fully-integrated force is brought to bear in our warfighting environments.

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Kill-Webs

Figure. 4 – The “kill-web” involves multiple, same- or near-time ISR, targeting and strike capabilities

Most in the audience are aware that we call enablers the ‘glue projects’, networks being a prime example. As modern warfare progresses, glue projects will become more than just enablers. They will be the core of combat capability and displace the dominance of the platform. As such, these projects are becoming increasingly important to the Australian Defence Force of the future. Moving From Platforms To Enablers Through a Changed Organisational Posture In the past, as I have discussed, the Services were focused on the big platforms. They were not inclined to contribute either personnel or resources to solve the network problems faced by owners of Defence’s key enablers. In the Australian Defence Organisation, the enablers and networks were owned by what we now call “the Strategic Centre” – organisations like Defence’s Estate and Infrastructure Group and the Chief Information Officers’ Group. These were manned only in part by military personnel, if at all. This was despite these areas providing critical support to our deployed and homeland forces. In Araldite terms, if the Strategic Centre was ‘Part A’, and responsible for solving network issues; the Services were ‘Part B’, and held the resources required to solve common Defence problems. However, the Services were reluctant to provide sufficient personnel and resources to do so. As a consequence, our Defence organisation remained a sticky mess. This is changing. Plan Jericho – a Response To Needed Enablers In 2015, in recognition of the pitfalls of focusing on ‘the big platforms’ or ‘the next big thing’, the Chief of Air Force launched Plan Jericho. This plan was designed to allow Air Force to focus on its force-generation requirements as well as addressing Air Force’s growth, taking place alongside the growth of our sister Services, Army and Navy. To put a fine point on it, the Chief recognised that our platform-centric focus was detrimental to the development of a complex and capable joint force. Of the three themes in Plan Jericho, I draw your attention to the first, ‘Harness the combat potential of a fully integrated force’. I would also point out that, of the 16 projects under Plan

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Jericho, over a quarter are devoted to realising this aim of maximising the potential of an integrated air power capability as part of a joint force. Does Air Force Focus Only On Other People’s Ideas? But back to Donald Horne – do we live on other people's ideas? Over my career, I have had the good fortune of interacting with Armed Forces from a wide range of countries, who shared their ideas and concepts with us. To be frank, during these interactions, I, on numerous occasions, felt that we were left wanting for the development of our own concepts. I had little to offer. I noted that we were far too tactical and that our collective curiosity to explore and develop our own ideas was almost intangible. We had capable people – adaptable people, as Horne said – but why did we have so little to offer at Airmen-to-Airmen talks? Was it because we had convinced ourselves that we had time to adapt to an emerging issue or surprise? Or was it because we were too comfortable in our distant setting, and underestimated the importance of global engagement and awareness? The Air Warfare Centre – Air Force Develops Its Own Ideas To ensure the Air Force both remained aware of its strategic and tactical environment and developed its own ideas, Chief of Air Force drove Project 3 under Plan Jericho, the establishment of an Air Warfare Centre. This had an initial operating concept of February 2016 – this is done, complete; and a final operating concept date of 2020 – we are on track.

Air Warfare Centre

Figure. 5 – The Royal Australian Air Force’s Air Warfare Centre represented a step-change and paradigm shift

for Air Force Donald Horne would be disappointed that we sent a team to scour the world for other people's ideas – your ideas – on how to develop our Air Warfare Centre. However, he might give his approval to the fact that it was not just a copy of other nation's solutions. It was developed specifically for our needs.

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For the Air Force personnel in this room, the Chief's intent is clear – the Air Warfare Centre stands as a reminder and agitator to us all to develop our own ideas and concepts; and to be focused on the sum of all things as opposed to the platform we are thinking about, the platform that happens to be our favorite, or the platforms in which terms we have traditionally conceived our warfighting solutions. The Challenge Of Change – Transforming From Within The stand up of this organisation was not without its challenges. Bringing the Air Warfare Centre into being highlighted the stovepipes that we had developed over time. The key focus of the Air Warfare Centre was to bring the best warfighters together, so they could develop tactics and procedures that will aid in winning the modern, networked fight. It was a difficult task to wrestle the best people from our wings and squadrons. Our fighting elements were internally focused on their own training and requirements. This struggle added weight to past accusations – in particular, that we were training and operating in splendid isolation from each other and the broader Australian Defence Force. The move to bring together our best warfighters in the Air Warfare Centre is already proving its worth. Previously, we ran a Fighter Combat Instructor's Course every two years to produce six fast jet combat instructors. It used a large number of Australian Defence Force assets. Now, we use the same assets and train a multitude of disciplines on various aircraft types and capabilities to produce 60 air warfare instructors. Change like this adds depth and options to a nation, not luck. Industry – Developing New Thought By Working With The Source To further increase the options that we can provide, Air Force must continue to invest in industry. We have for some considerable time failed to realise the benefits of doing so. But it is only by partnering with industry that we can best contribute to our strategic depth. To assist with this endeavour, Air Force has reached out and worked with numerous companies to better understand their capabilities and constraints. We have engaged at all levels, and I thank industry for its patience and contribution while we have done this.

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Industry – Fundamental Input to Capability

Figure. 6 – Air Force seeks to work more integrated with industry

Last year I posed a frank question to a respected industry leader. My question was, ‘What do you see when we engage you?’ The answer was, ‘Some naivety.’ He was right. And his response made me all the more determined to expose our junior personnel to you, so that they will be sophisticated partners in the future. The third theme of Plan Jericho is industry focused. We are putting this into practice with activities we are undertaking with companies represented in this room. You will also find the importance of industry articulated in the Chief's Air Force Strategy. This is based on his clear understanding of where modern combat is taking us, towards a networked fight. Both Defence and industry must work together, more than ever, to ensure open system architecture becomes a reality to support the warfighter. Air Force Strategy – A Clear Basis For Direction This year, to ensure even further that Air Force’s future did not reflect Donald Horne’s 1960s observations, the Chief of Air Force launched the Air Force Strategy. It has five vectors—joint warfighting capability; people capability; communication and information systems; infrastructure; and international engagement. The focus of these five vectors is complementary to and reinforces the objectives of both the 2016 Defence White Paper and Plan Jericho.

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Air Force Strategy

Figure. 7 – The Air Force Strategy provides five clear vectors for Air Force to focus on as it becomes a fifth-

generation Air Force The fifth vector, international engagement, is a response to Horne’s final rebuke—that Australians ‘so lack curiosity about events that surround us that we are often taken by surprise’. In the past, perhaps, Australians could distance themselves from the world as a result of geographic depth. This is no longer viable. The 2016 Defence White Paper makes clear the importance of being globally engaged, as does the Air Force Strategy. Through engagements such as the Avalon International Airshow we can better understand each other and the importance of sharing ideas. The Chief has asked for your feedback on the ideas we are exploring, some of which you will see at Avalon. He asked that the feedback be robust so that we can truly test their validity. Australia – The Capable Country How do we measure success when all these strategies, plans and projects are in play? Could it be when Australia becomes known for its strategic depth, known for being able to provide strategic, tactical and operational response options speedily to its Government and allies in concert with industry, while being fully cognisant of the pressures modern technology can place on our geographical vastness? Could a measure of our success be when our three Services have moved far enough away from the belief that big platforms will always be at the centre of strategic advantage, and move to a point where they fight for the network – joint force enablers – to take centre place? Or perhaps could it be when all Australians become aware that we can be lucky once or twice, but to continue being lucky in today’s world we must work harder than ever? For me though, the measure of success would be an Australian author of equal calibre to Horne, an author with a discerning eye, a critical mind and a deft hand writing a title for a new book: Australia–The Capable Country.