open / closed platform strategies: how, when &...

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Open / Closed Platform Strategies: How, When & Why Marshall Van Alstyne Boston University & MIT [email protected] Geoffrey Parker Freeman School of Business, Tulane [email protected] © 2011 MIT Center for Digital Business. All rights Reserved.

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Open / Closed Platform Strategies: How, When & Why

Marshall Van Alstyne Boston University & MIT [email protected] Geoffrey Parker Freeman School of Business, Tulane [email protected]

© 2011 MIT Center for Digital Business. All rights Reserved.

Technology platforms are defining much of the “new economy”. How do you manage the ecosystem and

set strategy?

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

Technology Smackdown

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

Technology Smackdown

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

Technology Smackdown

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

Technology Smackdown

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

7

Can we help explain convergence?

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

Platforms & Applications

• Platform: Components used in common across a product family whose functionality can be extended by 3rd parties (Boudreau 2007) characterized by network effects (Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne 2009).

• Examples: 1. Desktop OS: Unix, Mac, Windows

2. PDAs: Palm, Psion, Newton

3. Game Consoles: Wii, Xbox, Playstation

4. Network Switches: Cisco, IBM, HP

5. Multimedia: Adobe/Flash, MS/Silverlight, Google-Apple/HTML5

6. Payment Systems: Paypal, Google Checkout, Visa, Apple, Mobile Felica

7. Mobile Devices: iPhone, Android, Symbian, Blackberry

8. Enterprise Systems: Salesforce, Oracle, i2, IBM, SAP

9. Social Networks: Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, Monster, Twitter

10. Batteries: Sony, Panasonic, Sanyo, A123

11. Web Search: Google, Bing+Yahoo!, Baidu

12. Ebooks: Amazon, iPad, Nook, Sony

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

1981-1997 Microsoft beats Apple

Apple launched the personal computer market but Microsoft licensed widely, building a huge developer ecosystem. By the time of the antitrust trial, Microsoft had more

than 6 times the number of developers.

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

Apple passes Microsoft May 26, 2011

Using a platform strategy, Apple becomes the most valuable tech firm in the US, representing $222 Bn to Microsoft’s $219 Bn. Chart shows % growth.

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

11

Remember this contest?

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

12

Question: What are “network

externalities?”

Hint: they matter for pricing,

winner-take-all markets, and

strategy…

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

13

A “network externality” is a

demand economy of scale.

Examples: phone, fax, IM, email

networks.

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

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Supply vs. Demand Scale

Economies

Price

Quantity

Demand

Supply

• Rising average costs

• More competitive supply

• Oil, Soda, Bread

Standard Goods

Demand

Supply

• Falling average costs

• Monopolistic supply

• Utilities, Semiconductors

Cost Econ of Scale

Demand

Supply

• Often falling avg cost

• Monopolistic supply

• OS, IM, MMOG

Demand Econ of Scale

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

15 FAX

(Re)interpreting Network

Externalities

• “Network Externalities”

are demand economies

of scale.

• They imply at least some

level of interaction as

when I email you, or you

FAX or IM me.

Phone E-Mail

IM

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

16

A “2-sided” network externality

crosses markets from consumers

to developers or developers to

consumers

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

17

A two-sided network has

four network effects

• A same-side effect for each side, i.e., preference regarding number of other users on own side

• A cross-side effect in each direction, i.e., preference regarding number of users on other side

Side 1

Platform

Provider

Side 2

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

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Each network effect can be

positive or negative

+ same-side : Player-to-player contact in Xbox MMOG, end-user PDF sharing.

- same-side : competing suppliers in Covisint auction, competing dates on Match.com

+ cross-side : merchants & consumers for Visa, developers & end-users for Windows

- cross-side : Digital Rights Management costs to consumers. Advertising clutter to viewers.

Side 1

Platform

Provider

Side 2

A New Business Model is Born As the Old Model Dies

Blockbuster Netflix

This is directly relevant to the IPC transition from direct mail to online.

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

A New Business Model is Born As the Old Model Dies

Tower Records Apple iTunes

This is directly relevant to the IPC transition from physical to digital.

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

Apple iPod pre-Platform

User Apple Content

$ $

(1) Standard linear supply chain (2) User matches MP3 player to library

(3) Minimal network effects

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

Apple iPod post-Platform

Apple

$ $ User Content

(1) Triangular platform supply network (2) Apple owns financial chokepoint (3) Apple matches users to content

(4) Stronger network effects © 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

Message for IPC: A great standalone product (e.g. eBox) might not be sufficient.

How Apple is killing standalone platforms

Zune

Usr Mus

Kindle

Usr Book

PSP

Usr Gam

MP3

User Music

Video

TV

Games

Dvpr

Web

HTML

eBooks

Publi

Calls

User

Microsoft Sony Amazon

Apple has vastly stronger network effects. Sony could have done this – has many great standalone products. Google is not making this mistake with Android

© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

24

Openness vs. Control

Your

Share

Industry Value Add

Open

Proprietary

Your reward = (Value added to industry) x (Your share)

Source: Shapiro & Varian „99

Maximum protection ≠ Maximum Value

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne © 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

Does Openness Work?

Openness adds value to Facebook – overtaking MySpace!

How should a firm manage the

platform ecosystem?

Windows: Multithreading, Disk

Compression, Internet Browsing,

Streaming Media, Instant Messaging,

Openness & Time: Having opened its platform, does Microsoft (or Cisco

or Google or Apple) kill its ecosystem by bundling developer value into

Windows?

iPhone: Flashlight, Voice Memo,

shake-to-shuffle, iBooks, Voice

Control, … © 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Should Apple have opened the

iPod?

27

No! It does 1 thing only, so make it “insanely great” and own it.

Most firms can only

concentrate on most

valuable apps

Profits increase when

others add to platform‟s

“Long Tail”

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Which applications to absorb?

Apps offered by

Platform Sponsor

Apps offered by

Developers

Rule 1: Absorb the highest value applications from the ecosystem. This adds

value for users and mitigates threat of disintermediation.

Example: Apple iPad absorbed e-books

Example: Microsoft Windows absorbed web browsing

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Anything else to absorb?

Apps offered by

Platform Sponsor

Apps offered by

Developers

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Anything else to absorb?

Rule 2: Absorb features that emerge in multiple places in the ecosystem. This

increases compatibility, ensures efficient implementation, and benefits other apps.

Examples: Operating systems support for (i) spell check (ii) cut & paste (iii) PDF.

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

31

Winner-Take-All Markets

When do Winner-Take-All

Networks Emerge? 1. Large Supply/Demand

Effects (FB vs gas engine)

2. Large Multi-Homing Costs

(OS vs credit cards).

3. Anywhere access?

(MMOG vs HMO).

4. Niche specialization is less

feasible.

Windows

Cyworld Korea

has ¼ pop

Cyworld US

closed. © 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

33

Bundling & Envelopment

Bundling Components to

Foreclose Markets

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Independent Pricing: Spreadsheet

50 0 100

100

Spreadsheet

Charge 50

Sell to ½ mkt

Make 25

Word Processing

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Independent Pricing: Word Processing

100

100

0 Spreadsheet

50

Charge 50

Sell to ½ mkt

Make 25

Word Processing

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Independent Pricing Word & Excel

100

100

0 Spreadsheet

Word Processing

50

Charge 50

Sell to ½ mkt

Make 25

Incumbent

Profits from

both markets

are 50

Buy

Word

Buy

Both

Buy

Excel

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Competitor WordPerfect (or Lotus)

undercuts price

100

100

0 Spreadsheet

50 Incumbent

profits drop

from 50 to 255

Charge 49

Sell to 0.51 mkt

Makes ~25 Word

Processing

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Pricing Word & Spreadsheet as a Bundle

Charge $100 for 2

Sell to ½ market

Make 50

(same combined

profits as before)

100

100

Spreadsheet 0

Source: Nalebuff 1999

Word Processing

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Competitor WordPerfect (or Lotus)

undercuts price but makes ½ as much

Charges $49

Sells to .25 mkt

Makes 12.25

Incumbent

Bundled

profits fall only

half as much

Entrant profits

cut by half

100

0 100 Spreadsheet

Word Processing

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Side by Side Comparison

Product B

Pro

duct

A

Incumbent profit: .5x.5=.25

Entrant profit: .49x.51.25

Independent Sales

Product B P

roduct

A

Incumbent profit: 1*.5-.125=.375

Entrant profit: .5*.25=.125

Bundled Sales

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Other Effects: Network Effects

© 2010 Van Alstyne

Spreadsheet

Word Processing

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

42

Rhapsody

Who are the players?

Where are the network effects?

What would you do?

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Apple + AT&T

Apple

Microsoft

Real Audio & Envelopment

• RA pioneers

streaming audio

• Mobile phone

service bundles

music in service

agreement.

• …like playing 3D

chess.

Users Content

Real Audio

Yahoo!

Cellphone

Svc

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Issues Continued…

Will your platform be this?

Or this?

44

P0

Usr Biz

P2

U2 B1

P3

B2

P4

B3

P5

B4

P6

B5

P1

U1

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

Cloud Computing & Business Model Experimentation Smart Grid Energy Platform Standards (WSJ 5-18-09!)

Coming Platform Applications

Electronic Medical Records (Google, Microsoft, WebMD …)

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

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Conclusions

• Business models that give strategic advantage in network markets: – Design products for 1) proprietary complementarity, 2) price

sensitivity, 3) developer value add, and 4) low marginal costs.

• Winning Standards Battles: Winner-take-all platforms arise from both supply and demand economies of scale. – Find ways to manipulate 1) multi-homing costs, 2) same & cross-

side network effects, and 3) localization 4) bundling.

• Platform envelopment is a means of bundling a competitor‟s users or technology “money side” into your platform. – Explains convergence!

© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne

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Questions?

“Two Sided Network Effects” Parker & Van Alstyne Management Science, Oct. 2005; 51(10), pp. 1494–1504. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1177443

“Strategies for Two-Sided Networks” Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne Harvard Business Review Oct. 2006.

“Opening Platforms: How, When & Why” Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne Ch. 6 in Gawer, A. (ed) (2009) Platforms, Markets and Innovation, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1079712

“Innovation, Openness & Platform Control” Parker & Van Alstyne (2008) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1079712

"Six Challenges in Platform Innovation and Open Licensing," Parker & Van Alstyne Communications & Strategies, no. 74, Q2 2009, p. 17-36. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559013

“Platform Envelopment” Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne; Strategic Management Journal (forthcoming 2011). http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496336

[email protected]

[email protected]