open / closed platform strategies: how, when &...
TRANSCRIPT
Open / Closed Platform Strategies: How, When & Why
Marshall Van Alstyne Boston University & MIT [email protected] Geoffrey Parker Freeman School of Business, Tulane [email protected]
© 2011 MIT Center for Digital Business. All rights Reserved.
Technology platforms are defining much of the “new economy”. How do you manage the ecosystem and
set strategy?
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
Platforms & Applications
• Platform: Components used in common across a product family whose functionality can be extended by 3rd parties (Boudreau 2007) characterized by network effects (Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne 2009).
• Examples: 1. Desktop OS: Unix, Mac, Windows
2. PDAs: Palm, Psion, Newton
3. Game Consoles: Wii, Xbox, Playstation
4. Network Switches: Cisco, IBM, HP
5. Multimedia: Adobe/Flash, MS/Silverlight, Google-Apple/HTML5
6. Payment Systems: Paypal, Google Checkout, Visa, Apple, Mobile Felica
7. Mobile Devices: iPhone, Android, Symbian, Blackberry
8. Enterprise Systems: Salesforce, Oracle, i2, IBM, SAP
9. Social Networks: Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, Monster, Twitter
10. Batteries: Sony, Panasonic, Sanyo, A123
11. Web Search: Google, Bing+Yahoo!, Baidu
12. Ebooks: Amazon, iPad, Nook, Sony
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
1981-1997 Microsoft beats Apple
Apple launched the personal computer market but Microsoft licensed widely, building a huge developer ecosystem. By the time of the antitrust trial, Microsoft had more
than 6 times the number of developers.
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
Apple passes Microsoft May 26, 2011
Using a platform strategy, Apple becomes the most valuable tech firm in the US, representing $222 Bn to Microsoft’s $219 Bn. Chart shows % growth.
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
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Question: What are “network
externalities?”
Hint: they matter for pricing,
winner-take-all markets, and
strategy…
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
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A “network externality” is a
demand economy of scale.
Examples: phone, fax, IM, email
networks.
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
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Supply vs. Demand Scale
Economies
Price
Quantity
Demand
Supply
• Rising average costs
• More competitive supply
• Oil, Soda, Bread
Standard Goods
Demand
Supply
• Falling average costs
• Monopolistic supply
• Utilities, Semiconductors
Cost Econ of Scale
Demand
Supply
• Often falling avg cost
• Monopolistic supply
• OS, IM, MMOG
Demand Econ of Scale
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
15 FAX
(Re)interpreting Network
Externalities
• “Network Externalities”
are demand economies
of scale.
• They imply at least some
level of interaction as
when I email you, or you
FAX or IM me.
Phone E-Mail
IM
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
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A “2-sided” network externality
crosses markets from consumers
to developers or developers to
consumers
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
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A two-sided network has
four network effects
• A same-side effect for each side, i.e., preference regarding number of other users on own side
• A cross-side effect in each direction, i.e., preference regarding number of users on other side
Side 1
Platform
Provider
Side 2
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
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Each network effect can be
positive or negative
+ same-side : Player-to-player contact in Xbox MMOG, end-user PDF sharing.
- same-side : competing suppliers in Covisint auction, competing dates on Match.com
+ cross-side : merchants & consumers for Visa, developers & end-users for Windows
- cross-side : Digital Rights Management costs to consumers. Advertising clutter to viewers.
Side 1
Platform
Provider
Side 2
A New Business Model is Born As the Old Model Dies
Blockbuster Netflix
This is directly relevant to the IPC transition from direct mail to online.
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
A New Business Model is Born As the Old Model Dies
Tower Records Apple iTunes
This is directly relevant to the IPC transition from physical to digital.
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
Apple iPod pre-Platform
User Apple Content
$ $
(1) Standard linear supply chain (2) User matches MP3 player to library
(3) Minimal network effects
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
Apple iPod post-Platform
Apple
$ $ User Content
(1) Triangular platform supply network (2) Apple owns financial chokepoint (3) Apple matches users to content
(4) Stronger network effects © 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
Message for IPC: A great standalone product (e.g. eBox) might not be sufficient.
How Apple is killing standalone platforms
Zune
Usr Mus
Kindle
Usr Book
PSP
Usr Gam
MP3
User Music
Video
TV
Games
Dvpr
Web
HTML
eBooks
Publi
Calls
User
Microsoft Sony Amazon
Apple has vastly stronger network effects. Sony could have done this – has many great standalone products. Google is not making this mistake with Android
© 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
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Openness vs. Control
Your
Share
Industry Value Add
Open
Proprietary
Your reward = (Value added to industry) x (Your share)
Source: Shapiro & Varian „99
Maximum protection ≠ Maximum Value
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne © 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
Does Openness Work?
Openness adds value to Facebook – overtaking MySpace!
How should a firm manage the
platform ecosystem?
Windows: Multithreading, Disk
Compression, Internet Browsing,
Streaming Media, Instant Messaging,
…
Openness & Time: Having opened its platform, does Microsoft (or Cisco
or Google or Apple) kill its ecosystem by bundling developer value into
Windows?
iPhone: Flashlight, Voice Memo,
shake-to-shuffle, iBooks, Voice
Control, … © 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Should Apple have opened the
iPod?
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No! It does 1 thing only, so make it “insanely great” and own it.
Most firms can only
concentrate on most
valuable apps
Profits increase when
others add to platform‟s
“Long Tail”
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Which applications to absorb?
Apps offered by
Platform Sponsor
Apps offered by
Developers
Rule 1: Absorb the highest value applications from the ecosystem. This adds
value for users and mitigates threat of disintermediation.
Example: Apple iPad absorbed e-books
Example: Microsoft Windows absorbed web browsing
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Anything else to absorb?
Apps offered by
Platform Sponsor
Apps offered by
Developers
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Anything else to absorb?
Rule 2: Absorb features that emerge in multiple places in the ecosystem. This
increases compatibility, ensures efficient implementation, and benefits other apps.
Examples: Operating systems support for (i) spell check (ii) cut & paste (iii) PDF.
When do Winner-Take-All
Networks Emerge? 1. Large Supply/Demand
Effects (FB vs gas engine)
2. Large Multi-Homing Costs
(OS vs credit cards).
3. Anywhere access?
(MMOG vs HMO).
4. Niche specialization is less
feasible.
Windows
Cyworld Korea
has ¼ pop
Cyworld US
closed. © 2011 Parker & Van Alstyne
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
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Bundling & Envelopment
Bundling Components to
Foreclose Markets
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Independent Pricing: Spreadsheet
50 0 100
100
Spreadsheet
Charge 50
Sell to ½ mkt
Make 25
Word Processing
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Independent Pricing: Word Processing
100
100
0 Spreadsheet
50
Charge 50
Sell to ½ mkt
Make 25
Word Processing
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Independent Pricing Word & Excel
100
100
0 Spreadsheet
Word Processing
50
Charge 50
Sell to ½ mkt
Make 25
Incumbent
Profits from
both markets
are 50
Buy
Word
Buy
Both
Buy
Excel
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Competitor WordPerfect (or Lotus)
undercuts price
100
100
0 Spreadsheet
50 Incumbent
profits drop
from 50 to 255
Charge 49
Sell to 0.51 mkt
Makes ~25 Word
Processing
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Pricing Word & Spreadsheet as a Bundle
Charge $100 for 2
Sell to ½ market
Make 50
(same combined
profits as before)
100
100
Spreadsheet 0
Source: Nalebuff 1999
Word Processing
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Competitor WordPerfect (or Lotus)
undercuts price but makes ½ as much
Charges $49
Sells to .25 mkt
Makes 12.25
Incumbent
Bundled
profits fall only
half as much
Entrant profits
cut by half
100
0 100 Spreadsheet
Word Processing
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Side by Side Comparison
Product B
Pro
duct
A
Incumbent profit: .5x.5=.25
Entrant profit: .49x.51.25
Independent Sales
Product B P
roduct
A
Incumbent profit: 1*.5-.125=.375
Entrant profit: .5*.25=.125
Bundled Sales
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Other Effects: Network Effects
© 2010 Van Alstyne
Spreadsheet
Word Processing
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
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Rhapsody
Who are the players?
Where are the network effects?
What would you do?
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Apple + AT&T
Apple
Microsoft
Real Audio & Envelopment
• RA pioneers
streaming audio
• Mobile phone
service bundles
music in service
agreement.
• …like playing 3D
chess.
Users Content
Real Audio
Yahoo!
Cellphone
Svc
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Issues Continued…
Will your platform be this?
Or this?
44
P0
Usr Biz
P2
U2 B1
P3
B2
P4
B3
P5
B4
P6
B5
P1
U1
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
Cloud Computing & Business Model Experimentation Smart Grid Energy Platform Standards (WSJ 5-18-09!)
Coming Platform Applications
Electronic Medical Records (Google, Microsoft, WebMD …)
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
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Conclusions
• Business models that give strategic advantage in network markets: – Design products for 1) proprietary complementarity, 2) price
sensitivity, 3) developer value add, and 4) low marginal costs.
• Winning Standards Battles: Winner-take-all platforms arise from both supply and demand economies of scale. – Find ways to manipulate 1) multi-homing costs, 2) same & cross-
side network effects, and 3) localization 4) bundling.
• Platform envelopment is a means of bundling a competitor‟s users or technology “money side” into your platform. – Explains convergence!
© 2011 Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne
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Questions?
“Two Sided Network Effects” Parker & Van Alstyne Management Science, Oct. 2005; 51(10), pp. 1494–1504. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1177443
“Strategies for Two-Sided Networks” Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne Harvard Business Review Oct. 2006.
“Opening Platforms: How, When & Why” Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne Ch. 6 in Gawer, A. (ed) (2009) Platforms, Markets and Innovation, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1079712
“Innovation, Openness & Platform Control” Parker & Van Alstyne (2008) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1079712
"Six Challenges in Platform Innovation and Open Licensing," Parker & Van Alstyne Communications & Strategies, no. 74, Q2 2009, p. 17-36. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559013
“Platform Envelopment” Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne; Strategic Management Journal (forthcoming 2011). http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496336