open access book publishing and the prisoner’s dilemma · 3 marcel knöchelmann open access book...

Open Access Book Publishing and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

A Theoretical Approach to a Description of the Slow Scalability of Open Access Book Publishing

Published: June 2017

Marcel Knöchelmann

Contact: [email protected]

UCL Centre for Publishing

Department of Information Studies

119 Foster Court

University College London Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT

Submitted in May 2016.

Abstract

Open Access is an established mode in academic book publishing. Yet, publishing houses only dare to

scale open access in small steps. Books, especially monographs, are still the preferred medium to communicate scholarship in many disciplines, foremost in the arts, humanities, and social sciences.

The overall market of academic books is in recession. Large scale Open Access publishing may be a

solution. This essay explores the current situation of Open Access book publishing by applying the

prisoner’s dilemma to publishing houses. The results show theoretically that to adapt Open Access on a large enough scale required a systematic approach in which all publishing houses would have to act.

Keywords

Open Access, Book Publishing, Game Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma

DOI: 10.14324/111.9781911307679.11

Online: ucldigitalpress.co.uk/BOOC/Article/1/19/

Cite as: Knöchelmann, M. (2017) Open Access

Book Publishing and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A

Theoretical Approach to a Description of the Slow Scalability of Open Access Book Publishing,

BOOC, UCL Press, London,

https://doi.org/10.14324/111.9781911307679.11

mailto:[email protected]

https://ucldigitalpress.co.uk/BOOC/Article/1/19/

https://doi.org/10.14324/111.9781911307679.11

2 Marcel Knöchelmann Open Access Book Publishing and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Table of Contents

1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 3

2 Academic Book Publishing ............................................................................... 3

2.1 Market Inefficiency..................................................................................... 3 2.2 Open Access and Publishing Costs .............................................................. 6

3 The Prisoner’s Dilemma ................................................................................... 8

3.1 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................... 8 3.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma Applied to Academic Book Publishing ................. 9

3.3 Discussion of the Applied Prisoner’s Dilemma.......................................... 13

4 Conclusion and Outlook ................................................................................. 14

Reference List......................................................................................................... 16

Table of Figures

Figure 1: Price elasticity of demand........................................................................... 4

Figure 2: The PD in its standard form in a payoff matrix ........................................... 9

Figure 3: PD with two publishers ............................................................................ 10

Figure 4: PD with two publishers and lower prices. ................................................. 11

Figure 5: The generalised PD. ................................................................................. 12

Figure 6: Formalised representation of the open access payoff ................................. 13

All figures are created by Marcel Knöchelmann.


1 Introduction

Open access publishing can offer a solution for an important publication model

and its recessive market: the academic book (Ferwerda et al., 2013). In the

humanities and social sciences, the long form is the preferred publishing form

(Frosio, 2014). Its market, though, is recessive (Simba, 2016), with print runs

declining. This is a problem not only economically, but also for the research

itself, as with fewer disseminated books the reach of the research decreases.

Open access1 book publishing (hereafter OABP) can be a solution as it

increases the reach of research. However, the scaling of OABP has been rather

slow, with many publishers still searching for sustainable business models.

They seem to be in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (from here on PD), in which the best

solution for all does not align with the dominant strategy in a competitive

market, as will be described.

This essay describes the academic book publishing market in order to apply the

PD, and the analysis of PD shall offer insights into the scalability of open

access in academic book publishing.

2 Academic Book Publishing

This chapter focuses on describing the academic2 book publishing market.

Section 2.1 pinpoints market characteristics and its inefficiency, whereas 2.2

focuses on OABP, considering the background of basic book publishing price

and cost calculations.

2.1 Market Inefficiency

Academic books are “edited volumes, reference works, handbooks, conference

proceedings, and academic monographs (original research) published in

hardback and as ebooks at high prices and destined for the libraries”, as defined

by Clark and Phillips (2014, loc. 2073/or 20%). These books are sold

1 When referring to open access in this essay, gold open access is meant. However, much of the

analysis is also applicable to green open access. 2 Hereafter all descriptions of markets and subjects (publishers, books) refer to academic

publishing.


worldwide, mostly to libraries. That makes it a market in terms of the range of

product,3 since geographical boundaries barely exist.4 The actual market size of

book publishing can hardly be assessed with reliable numbers (Esposito, 2015).

An industry-wide survey5 of ALPSP (Association of Learned and Professional

Society Publishers) in 2009 found that 24,213 titles are published per year with

a total backlist of 349,183 titles (Cox, 2009, p.8). Most of those titles are

monographs, with the humanities and social sciences leading in terms of

subject areas (Frosio, 2014).

To assess this market theoretically in order to apply the PD, it is essential to

differentiate between the behaviour of book and journal market: the price

elasticity of demand. This will help us to determine the main characteristics of

market behaviour – one of which, arguably, is inefficiency.

The price elasticity of demand is the “percentage change in quantity demanded

of a good resulting from a 1% increase in its price” (Pyndick and Rubinfeld,

2013, p.33), or:

If Ep is less than 1, demand is inelastic. In other words, a change in price will

leave the demand relatively unchanged, i.e. the demand is not price-contingent

(Raa, 2013). This inelasticity is said to be due to missing substitutes on the

demand side (Pyndick and Rubinfeld, 2013).

3 As this essay looks specifically at book publishing, the definition of the market deviates from

the actual market definition in which the product is information and not a physical product. 4 Geographical submarkets do exist and, in business strategy, do matter as they can offer a

strategic advantage to sell internationally, rather than to a domestic submarket only. However,

this essay looks at the academic book publishing market as a whole, which is why geographical

submarkets are not of interest. 5 Surveyed were "400 academic and scholarly publishers covering a representative range of

commercial, university press and non‐profit publishers, of all sizes, worldwide" with viable

responses from 171 distinct publishers (Cox, 2010, p.347).

Figure 1: Price elasticity of demand


Inelastic demand can be seen in the academic information market in general,

however, more for journals and less for books. In the journal market,

substitutes of articles are imperfect (McCabe, 2004). This led to a severe

increase of prices in journal publishing. In comparison, the book publishing

market behaves differently. Firstly, it has not had such a large increase in

prices in recent years (SSIC, 2015; UCSB Library, 2014). Secondly, the reason

for the increase in prices is altogether different from that of journal publishing.

This becomes clearer when looking more closely at how the products are

developed.

The number of book titles published has increased over recent years, whereby

each title, especially with regard to monographs, has become more and more

specialised, serving the requirements of niche audiences. However, more books

do not necessarily mean more original research. Books are often re-packagings

or new editions of older material (Adema, 2015). This leads to a higher output

of specialised titles, each of which, it is assumed will be sold in lower

quantities. Print runs have declined massively over recent years (Collins et al.,

2011), with Caren Milloy stating that monograph print runs have declined from

2,000 to 200 per title in the last 30 years (2013). The rising prices of

monographs alone do not compensate for declining sales, nor do they drive

growth. And whereas journal publishing can still deliver high profit margins

(Larivière et al., 2015), most published books barely break even (Lambert,

2015). The rise in prices for books is a matter of covering costs rather than

making monopolies on information. Publishers broaden supply to compensate

for declining revenue. In return, that does mean that each single title in book

publishing is less imperfect as a substitute than a journal article is,6 which

supports the argument of a more elastic demand in book publishing.7 This

6 That means that in journal publishing, a 1% change in price barely affects demand, whereas

in book publishing, a 1% change in price can lead to a change in demand of about, say, 0,5%-

1%. Thus, the demand is still inelastic, but much less inelastic than in journal publishing. 7 In addition, a similar argument can be made when positioning the researcher as the customer

who wants to buy a publication place in an open access environment, like Hanauske et al. do


detail will be important when applying the model of the PD to the market later

on.

2.2 Open Access and Publishing Costs

The previously stated number of backlist (349,183) and front list titles (24,213)

published annually incorporates a certain amount of open access (OA) titles.

This is only a fraction when considering the complete title list on the Directory

of Open Access Books: 4,438, made available by 150 publishers (DOAB,

2016).8

Compared with the journal market,9 this share of OA titles appears to be rather

small. This might be due to different mechanisms – book publishing is much

more complex. The costs and prices are higher, which leads to higher funding

requirements for OABP.

Academic books, especially monographs, are priced at £50-£160 ($70-$220)

(Milloy, 2013). The average revenue can hardly be pinpointed as sales vary.

However, with a print run of about 200-300 titles and partly discounted prices,

an average revenue of £14,000 ($20,000) per title can be assumed (Gasson,

2004). This income is not without high costs. A study10 among American

university presses reveals that monograph publishing costs exceed most

income solutions by far, ranging from $15,140 at the lowest to a high of

$129,909 per title, with average costs of around $40,000 (Maron et al., 2016,

p.17). Other studies found lower costs, for instance an average of €12,000

($16,700) in the Netherlands (Ferwerda et al., 2013), or $25,000-$30,000 as

stated by Jennifer Crewe (2004). Though book prices increased from 1980-

(2007). However, the difference between journal and book publishing is not as big on this side

of the market. Researchers seek maximum impact for their research, which is strongly

connected to the positioning of the brand among the research community in both book and

journal publishing. This issue could be further analysed in another article using the theory of

the two-sided-market. 8 These numbers are not for the same year, but nevertheless they illustrate how minute the

percentage of open access titles within the whole market is. 9 Open access journals have a share of 2.3% of the overall journal market (Esposito, 2014). 10 The study gathered data on 382 monograph titles, published in the fiscal year 2014 by 20

university presses of varying size (Maron et al., 2016).


2010 by 400-1000% depending on the subject field (Barclay, 2015), this is not

enough to compensate for declining sales. "When you are selling 300 books,

you can’t cover costs" as Robert Darnton puts it for Harvard Magazine

(Lambert, 2015).

This is a dilemma in itself as it leads to a downward cycle of higher prices and

decreasing sales. It could be alleviated by open access, with various factors

supporting this argument. For instance, open access as a publishing model

scales better than paid access (Suber, 2015), and open access publications

increase reach and discoverability of a title more than cannibalising11 printed

versions (Ferwerda et al., 2013). In addition, open access in general becomes

increasingly compulsory as funders and public bodies make it a requirement

(Collins et al., 2015).

Such advantages do come at a cost. Whereas some publishers charge around

$12,000-$17,500 for making a title open access (Bunz, 2013), others like Open

Book Publishers charge £3,000-£5,000 ($4,200-$7,000) (Milloy, 2013).

External market participants who deploy alternative activities to convert paid

publications to open access are known to charge around $15,000 (Luminos,

2016) or $12,000 (Knowledge Unlatched, 2015). The viability of the different

models cannot be assessed easily. Most certainly, there are arguments on the

researcher side that the charges are too high (Terras, 2013; Bunz, 2013). These

arguments, however, hardly consider the value of professional publishing,

assuming instead that OA merely makes use of the World Wide Web: simply

uploading a PDF to a server. That may be open, but that is not professional

publishing. As Martin Weller writes, “the reason academics are going to

publishers and not just sticking their own books up online is that they get a

range of benefits from the publisher” (2012). This range varies, but it is mostly

an extensive list of activities (O’Sullivan, 2013). All of these activities incur

11 Cannibalism is the effect that one product or version of a product diminishes sales of another

product or version of a product, when both are offered by the same company. In this case, it

refers to open access editions diminishing sales of printed editions to a certain extent.


product-based and overhead costs which barely decrease when publishing open

access. In addition, intangible assets like brands add value to a product and,

thus, create return for the researcher in the form of reputational capital (Eve,

2015).

These variables can hardly be captured by a fixed publication charge.

However, with the argument being that open access only partly cannibalises

sales, OABP should be able to scale faster. The following analysis tries to

model a possible dilemma that could be a reason for the slow rise of OABP.

3 The Prisoner’s Dilemma

The PD has been applied to open access publishing in various ways (Brown

and Boulderstone, 2008; Murray-Rust, 2010; Eve, 2014), sometimes with

librarians, researchers, or publishers as the prisoners. In the following, the

theoretical framework of the PD will be described and then applied to OABP.

3.1 Theoretical Framework

The PD draws attention to details of cooperation and strategies of maximising

outcome, and it does not require a particular domain. With its applicability to

various situations, it offers a great range of thought experiments for phenomena

in humanities, social sciences, and philosophy (Peterson, 2015).

As Shaw (2015) describes it, the standard model (figure 2) is that two subjects

are imprisoned and accused of having committed a crime. There is no evidence

so the police have to rely only on the interrogation of the prisoners. They’ll be

interrogated simultaneously in different rooms and cannot talk to each other.

The sentences will be as follows:

If both subjects don’t talk, both will be sentenced with an obligatory 1-

year imprisonment.

If one defects the other while the other does not talk, the latter gets a 3-

year charge while the defector will be released.

If both defect each other, both will be sentenced for 2 years.


The PD has been applied to economics in various situations and is an important

model of Game Theory. Game Theory is about theoretical frameworks which

model "situations of conflict and cooperation between rational decision

makers" (Tadelis, 2013, p.xi). In a PD, the subjects act in the way to gain the

highest payoff for themselves. As they do not know whether the other player

cooperates, they will avoid the risk of being punished (i.e. try to “cooperate

alone” C,D or D,C). This leads to the unique Nash equilibrium12 in D, D as the

dominant strategy (Vega-Redondo, 2003). A Nash equilibrium describes that

each subject is doing “the best it can given what its competitors are doing”

(Pyndick and Rubinfeld, 2013, p.458).

3.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma Applied to Open Access Book Publishing

In the following, the PD will be applied to OABP in different forms in order to

offer insights into dominant strategies. However, this model also shows that in

12 As named after the mathematician, who described this mix of strategies in 1951

(Pindyck&Rubinfeld, 2013).

Figure 2: The PD in its standard form in a payoff matrix. The formalised standard

strategies can be seen on the right side. The case of both defecting each other leads to a

punishment payoff P. The case of both cooperating leads to a rewarding payoff R. In the

case that one defects the other, the defector receives the temptation payoff T while the

other gets the sucker’s payoff S. As the names indicate, the temptation and the sucker’s

payoffs mark the highest and the lowest payoffs possible, as the requirement for payoffs

in the PD is: S < P < R < T (Rapoport, 1965).


order to scale OABP, the market as a whole has to be taken into account, as

will be discussed in 3.3.

Let us assume that two publishers are going to publish a book in the same field.

As has been argued in 2.1, libraries and researchers are not compelled to

purchase both books, as they are likely to be substitutable. In addition, library

budgets are under constraints and they only invest in books their respective

universities actually need, unless they have a budget surplus. If one title would

be open access and the other paid access (OA,PA or PA,OA), more libraries

could invest in the paid title as they would have a budget surplus due to

receiving the open access title for free. In this case, only a fraction of libraries

would purchase a printed edition of the open access title. If all titles were open

access (OA,OA), libraries would purchase the same amount of each book as

they would not have any economic preference for one title. However, the

amount of purchased print titles would be lower than in the all-paid situation

(PA,PA) as not all libraries require to have both digital and print editions. This

model would lead to the PD in figure 3.

The situation13 shows that prices of both books are set at $75, with assumed

sales of 200, leading to a revenue of $15,000. As mentioned above, one

13 All numbers of this model are average numbers according to the research in section 2.2.

Figure 3: PD with two publishers deciding between publishing a title as open access (OA)

or paid title (PA).


publisher would profit from publishing a paid title while the other publishes it

as open access. The paid title would gain more sales, while the open access title

would generate less, but with an additional publishing fee of $10,000. If all

titles were open access, the payoff would be a revenue that is smaller than the

original revenue, but – combined with the publishing fee – would lead to more

income than the original situation in which none of the books was open access.

The best strategy for all would be to publish open access. But as no publisher

risks getting the smallest payoff (OA,PA or PA,OA), the dominant strategy is

the paid model (PA,PA).

This model works only in the particular situation described above, and if the

restriction holds that open access editions only partly cannibalise printed

editions. This surely varies with the purchasing power of libraries and the

elasticity of the product. But even in the situation that publishers offer the

printed edition for a lower price, a similar PD could be assumed, as in figure 4.

Here again, it would be more rewarding if all titles were published open access

(OA,OA). However, this model is also true only under certain circumstances –

which can vary: publishers may not know which titles competitors are

Figure 4: PD with a situation as in figure 3, but with lower prices for printed versions of

the open access titles. In this case, the open access edition does not cannibalise the

amount of sold titles when all publish open access.


planning, and libraries may not purchase using this assumed rigorously rational

behaviour.

Yet, the strength of the PD does not lie in predicting behaviour. Rather, it

provides a theoretical framework to suggest how subjects choose strategies and

this framework, if applicable, can be applied to various situations (Peterson,

2015). Therefore, and to discuss insights more generally in section 3.3, figure 5

shows the generalised payoff matrix. It states the requirements that must be

true in order for the PD to be applied to OABP.14

The matrix shows the different payoffs for certain strategies of publishers.

Interestingly, it provides information about how a single publisher could assess

whether open access would be more rewarding than paid access, with the

implicit attribute that the payoff for all publishing open access (OA,OA) is

more rewarding than the payoff for all publishing paid access (PA,PA), in case

the publishing fee is greater than the reduced revenue. This can be represented

in the formula in figure 6.

14 These requirements are the same as in figures 3 and 4. Though, in these the generalised

forms are filled with information of a particular case, i.e. sales data for a single title.

Figure 5: The generalised PD. Each strategy leads to a particular payoff, price*n, whereas n

(α, β, γ, δ) defines the amount of sales that each publisher would get in this strategy. All

strategies offer different sales (α, β, γ, δ), depending on cannibalism effects and budget

spending behaviour of libraries, as discussed for figure 3 and 4.


3.3 Discussion of the Applied Prisoner’s Dilemma

With many economists urging caution with economic modelling (Rodrik,

2015), the described situation in chapter 3.2 should be analysed carefully as it

only provides information about a particular situation. Nonetheless, the

inductive process of finding a generalised explanation for the situation provides

hints that go beyond the situation itself. As Mäki identifies the use of a specific

example to provide insights into more general circumstances, the "example is

chosen to isolate a specific mechanism, and hence can make some arbitrary

simplifications. In that sense it is not intended as a general model" (2003,

p.209).

As the costing analysis indicates, open access cannot alleviate financial

pressure on book publishing. However, the PD suggests that a more open

market could create economic incentives for publishers to offer open access.

Contrary to this is the assumption that publishers would rather not offer

potential bestsellers as open access, as then the high revenue could not be

absorbed due to the free digital version. This again shows how important it is

to have accurate information on OA/print cannibalism effects. Statistics

indicate that they might not be too severe, as readers prefer hard copies: about

90% of revenue stems from printed editions (Cox, 2010).

Figure 6: Formalised representation of the open access payoff. The requirement of the PD is

that the payoff of PA,PA (all paid access) is smaller than the payoff of OA,OA (all open

access): P<R. In the standardised PD, the payoffs are original (γ) sales * price for P, and

reduced (β) sales * price plus the publishing fee f for R. This can be transformed to the

equation that the publishing fee f must be bigger than the price * original sales less the

reduced sales. In other words, the publishing fee must at least compensate for the

cannibalism effect.


However, the requirement of the PD that P<R (open access publishing as more

rewarding) is only true if the cannibalism effect is not bigger than the

compensation of the publishing fee: f > p(γ-β). This could especially be a risk

for new or smaller publishers, as, presumably libraries would rather go without

the titles of unknown publishers than without those of well-known brands.

Thus, economically, newer or smaller publishers have less incentive to scale

open access. Some external initiatives such as Knowledge Unlatched or

Luminos try to mitigate risks by dividing them amongst a community/crowd.

The efficiency of this model is confronted with two probable limitations.

Firstly, how do these initiatives make sure that the whole quality spectrum is

offered and not only the predictable “low revenue titles”? Secondly, the

budgeting source on the library side is unclear, especially when these models

scale. This is in general a problem that underlies the whole transformation

process to open access: in order for open access to offer economic incentives to

publishers, P<R (open access publishing as more rewarding) must hold true.

Following that logic further, this means that the whole market becomes more

valuable, which has to be borne by funders and libraries (Collins et al., 2015).

Hence, the funding source is as crucial as (and goes alongside with) the

strategic offering of publishers. As long as funding for OABP remains

uncertain for individual researchers, open access cannot scale.15

4 Conclusion and Outlook

The analysis shows that the PD can indeed be applied to OABP, which offers –

in a generalised form – insights into the scalability of open access. In addition,

it can be concluded that open access would be economically better for

individual publishers if the whole market shifted in its favour.

This, however, should not preclude an acknowledgement that open access

offers even non-economically rewarding improvements for the whole market

15 This could change if competition through more external activities (Open Library of the

Humanities, Knowledge Unlatched, etc.) increases, as more competition would assumedly

drive prices down.


(Murray-Rust, 2010), with open science as a systematic approach (Scheliga and

Friesike, 2014). Arguably, the biggest threat in an increasingly open market is

missing discoverability, and many publishers do not address this problem

effectively even in the paid content market16 (Cox, 2009).

In the end, it is the researcher who has to opt for open access, with funding

bodies and policy makers still struggling to find sufficient requirements for

funding open access long form publishing (Showers, 2014). This – and here the

PD helps to point us in the right direction – is accompanied by insufficient

knowledge about cannibalism effects and availability of funding.

Future research could try to analyse these complex issues. In terms of the PD, it

would be interesting to apply it to journal publishing or, as Hanauske et al.

(2007) have attempted, the researcher as prisoner.

16 The ALPSP study (2009) found that only about 40% of ebook publishers provide sufficient

MARC records alongside their publications.


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