opcw synthesis · 5 content overview of the status of chemical demilitarisation worldwide ron...

OPCW

Synthesis

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Summer Issue – August 2000

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

0P5425-Synthesis 8-2000 23-08-2000 12:31 Pagina 1

Based on United Nations Map No. 3933 Rev. 2March 2000

MONACO

Svalbard

LIBERIA

CÔTE D'IVOIRE G

HAN

A

TOG

OBE

NIN

CAMEROON

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

GABON CONGO

Cabinda

ANG

NAMIB

St. Helena

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

SENEGAL

GUINEA

BURKINA FASO

NIGERIA

MALI

ALGERIA

MAURITANIA

Western Sahara

NIGER

LIBY

MOROCCO

TUN

ISIA

SPAINPORTUGAL

Aruba

Greenland

ICELAND

POLA

GERMANY

NETHERLANDSBELGIUM

FRANCE

Bermuda

Turks andCaicos Islands

GUYANA

French Guiana

GAMBIA

GUINEA-BISSAU

SIERRA LEONE

CAPE VERDESAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA DOMINICA

SAINT LUCIA BARBADOSSAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

GRENADA

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

SURINAME

BRAZIL

URUGUAY

Falkland Islands(Malvinas) South

Georgia

Tristan da Cunha

Gough

Ascencion

COLOMBIA

VENEZUELA

PERU

BOLIVIA

GalapagosIslands

CANADA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEXICO

BELIZE

HONDURASGUATEMALA

EL SALVADORNICARAGUA

COSTA RICA

PANAMA

CUBA

HAITI

JAMAICA

BAHAMAS

Alaska

HawaiianIslands(U.S.)

NorthernLine

Islands

KIRIBATI

Easter Island

DOMINICANREPUBLIC

SouthernLine

Islands

FrenchPolynesiaCook

Islands

PitcairnIslands

CHIL

E

ARGENTINA

ECUADOR

PARAGUAY

South Sandwich

Islands

Puerto Rico

(U.S.)

British Virg

in Islands

U.S. Virg

in Islands

NORWAY

SWEDEN

UNITEDKINGDOM

IRELANDDENMARK

LIECHTENSTEIN

LUXEMBOURGCZECH

S

HUAUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND

SAN

MARINO

ITALY

AL

MALTGibraltar

Azores

Madeira Is.

Canary Is.

ARAB JAMA

124

ANDORRA

Number of Number InspectorInspections of Sites Days

Abandoned Chemical Weapons 14 11 358Chemical Weapons Destruction 173 15 32,020FacilitiesChemical Weapons Production 178 63 3,340FacilitiesChemical Weapons Storage 115 33 4,252FacilitiesDiscrete Organic Chemicals 8 8 144Old Chemical Weapons 27 21 613Other 1 1 88Schedule 1 71 32 1,269Schedule 2 130 127 3,943Schedule 3 60 60 1,130

TOTAL 777 371 47,157


* Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmiragreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has notyet been agreed upon by the parties.

The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Organisation forthe Prohibition of Chemical Weapons concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

SOMALIA

ESTONIA

LATVIALITHUANIA

MADAGASCAR

MAURITIUSReunion

SEYCHELLES

KIRIBATI

Kosrae

Truk Is.

Aleutian Isands (U.S.)

Yap Is.

Rodrigues

Taiwan

Sakhalin

albard

Novaya Zemlya

BELARUS

DJIBOUTIERITREA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.

EGYPT

SUDAN

ETHIOPIA

KENYA

UGANDA

COMOROS

MEROON

ON CONGO

DEMOCRATICREPUBLIC

OF THE

CONGORWANDA

BURUNDI

PembaZanzibar

UNITED REPUB.OF

MAL

AWI

ZAMBIA

MOZAMBIQUE

ANGOLA

NAMIBIA ZIMBABWE

BOTSWANA

1 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2 CROATIA

3 YUGOSLAVIA

4 SLOVENIA

5 THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

SOUTHAFRICA

SWAZILAND

CHAD

LIBYAN

POLAND

NY

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

KAZAKHSTAN MONGOLIA

CHINA

SAUDIARABIA

INDIA

PHILIPPINES

JAPAN

MALAYSIA

INDONESIAPAPUA

NEW GUINEA

AUSTRALIA

NEWZEALAND

Y

SWEDEN

FINLAND

CZECH REP.SLOVAKIA

UKRAINE

REPUBLIC OFMOLDOVAHUNGARY

AUSTRIA

ROMANIAN

ARINO

ITALYBULGARIA

GREECEALBANIA

TURKEYARMENIA

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

UZBEKISTANTURKMENISTAN

ISLAMICREPUBLIC

OF IRAN

IRAQ

JORDAN KUWAIT

BAHRAIN

UNITED ARABEMIRATES

OMAN

YEMEN

CYPRUS

LEBANONISRAEL

MALTA

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN NEPAL

MYANMAR

THAILAND

LAO PEOPLE'S DEM. REP.

QATARARAB JAMAHIRIYA

LESOTHO

TANZANIA

Jammu andKashmir (*)

SYRIANARABREP.

BHUTAN

BANGLADESH

CAMBODIA

VIET NAM

REPUBLICOF KOREA

DEM. PEOPLE'SREP. OF KOREA

BRUNEIDARUSSALAM

SINGAPORE

PALAU

VANUATUFIJI

TONGA

TUVALUNAURU

SAMOASOLOMONISLANDS

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIAMARSHALL

ISLANDS

SRI LANKA

MALDIVES

KurilIslands

RyukyuIslands

Hainan

Luzon

Mindanao

Sulawesi

East Timor

Java

Borneo

Cocos(Keeling)Islands

Tasmania

New Caledonia

Tokelau

Wallis andFutune Islands American

Samoa

Guam

NorthernMarianaIslands

KerguélenIslands

NicobarIslands

AndamanIslands

LaccadiveIslands

Socotra

Sumatra

123

4

5GEORGIA

AZERBAIJAN

Status of the ConventionStatus as of 1 August 2000

States Parties – 135

EIF Pending – 0

Signatory states which have yet to ratify – 37

Non-signatory states with have yet to accede to the Convention – 21


SynthesisAugust 2000

Editor-in-ChiefKevin Beesley

Editorial BoardMichael CarlingMarta LaudaresNadine McNeilPamela MillsRuth MöhlenkampJohan RautenbachRobert RiggAfshaan ShafiJens-Erik SundbyRalf Trapp

Graphic DesignerBARLOCK Graphic Design

PhotosCarole DunkGreen Cross InternationalHuntsman ICI Holland BVDSM Heerlen

OPCWJohan de Wittlaan 322517 JR The HagueThe Netherlands

www.opcw.org

© 2000 The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

SYNTHESIS is a quarterlypublication of the Organisation for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons-OPCW, ISSN 1029-4376.The Editorial Board of SYNTHESISencourages contributions from itsreadership.The views expressed inSYNTHESIS reflect those of theauthors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the OPCW.

For any inquiries, address changes,or to request copies ofSYNTHESIS, please contact theMedia and Public Affairs Branch at:

Tel.: +31 70 416 3710Fax: +31 70 306 [email protected]

‘Destruction of chemicalweapons means a process bywhich chemicals are converted inan essentially irreversible way to aform unsuitable for productionof chemical weapons, and whichin an irreversible manner rendersmunitions and other devicesunusable as such.’Part IV(A), section C, paragraph 12, of the Annex on Implementation and Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention


5

CONTENT

Overview of the Status of Chemical Demilitarisation Worldwide Ron Manley — 6

International Assistance to Russia Valery Semin — 12

Review Conferences: Challenges and Opportunities Graham Pearson — 16

Fifth Session of the Conference of the States Parties of the OPCW — 20

New Chairman of the CSP Interview with Ambassador Lagos — 20

Spotlight on National Authorities The Netherlands — 22

Green Cross International Interview with Stephan Robinson — 24

Facilitating Chemical Weapons Destruction Paul Walker — 27

US Funding for Shchuch’ye in Jeopardy Seth Brugger — 30

New Permanent Representatives — 33

Newcomers — 34

Outreach Activities The Director-General Visits Cuba — 35Director-General’s Visit to the Czech Republic — 35First Regional Meeting of National Authorities in Latin America and the Caribbean, Lima, Peru — 36National Course organised by the National Authority of Bulgaria — 36Regional Workshop on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Havana, Cuba — 37Regional Workshop on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Dubrovnik, Croatia — 38Singapore Regional Forum 2000 — 38Seminar on Alternative Destruction Technologies,Tarnow and Krynica, Poland — 39

Headquarters Events — 39

Forthcoming Events — back cover

On the Cover The US Army began storing chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll, a US territory in the South Pacific,in 1971. Since 1985, the island has been the focus of the Army’s Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project (CSDP) and is thesite of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS), the world’s first full-scale facility designedspecifically for the disposal of chemical weapons.To date, two and a half million pounds of nerve and mustard agent havebeen destroyed under the watchful eye of the US Environmental Protection Agency. By the end of the year 2000, chemicalweapons disposal activities at Johnston Atoll are to be completed, the facility dismantled, and administration of the island isto be handed over to the US Fish and Wildlife Service, which will operate it as a national wildlife refuge.A number ofexotic and rare species of flora and fauna make their home on Johnston Atoll.Photo Courtesy of US Fish and Widlife Service.


6

OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUST 2000 – OVERVIEW

The OPCW has come a long way in the threeyears since the entry into force (EIF) of theChemical Weapons Convention, and we aresteadily moving towards the achievement ofthe Convention’s ultimate objectives.

OVERVIEW OF THESTATUS OFCHEMICALDEMILITARISATIONWORLDWIDE, ANDTHE WAY AHEAD

By Ron Manley


7

General

Today, 135 States have committed themselves to the goals of theCWC.What does this impressive number of States Parties mean

in concrete terms? In short, it means that the majority of the world’sknown stockpiles of chemical weapons and production capabilities arenow subject to the CWC’s verification regime. A further 37 States havesigned the Convention – thereby identifying themselves with its objectand purpose – but have yet to complete the legislative and legal stepsnecessary to obtain full membership. This means that only about 20countries remain entirely outside the influence of the Convention.Themembers of the Organisation are continuing to make strenuous effortsto bring these remaining countries into the fold, and it is our firm beliefthat our membership will continue to grow and that the OPCW will,within the foreseeable future, achieve its ultimate aim of universalmembership.

The provisions of the CWC are focused on a broad spectrum of issuesrelated to the complete elimination of existing chemical weapons (CW)stockpiles and their associated production facilities. The generalprovisions for CW destruction, and for the implementation of theverification regime relating to their destruction, are stipulated in ArticleIV of the Convention and Part IV(A) of its Verification Annex.Those forthe associated chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) are setout in Article V of the Convention and Part V of the Verification Annex.

Existing CW Stockpiles and Progress in National CW Destruction Programmes

S ince the EIF of the Convention, the OPCW has been successfullyapplying the verification regime at CW-related facilities. This regime

is divided into four main programmes, including the verification ofmodern (post-1946) CW stockpiles located at CW storage facilities(CWSFs), the verification of the destruction of such chemical weaponsat chemical weapon destruction facilities (CWDFs), the verification anddestruction of (pre-1946) old and abandoned chemical weapons(OACW), and the destruction/conversion of former chemical weaponsproduction facilities (CWPFs). The systematic verification of thedestruction of chemical weapons is a core element of the verificationregime.

The Convention does not establish any specific requirements in relationto the type of technology to be employed to destroy chemical weapons,but it does stipulate the main principles to be adopted. Each State Partymay determine how it shall destroy its declared CW stockpile, and mayselect the most appropriate technology on the basis of existing resources,qualified personnel, technical experience, and budgetary concerns.Operations at CWDFs must, however, also be carried out in accordancewith national safety standards and environmental requirements. Allprocesses, however, must satisfy the following definition from paragraph12 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex: ‘chemicals are converted in anessentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of CW


8


and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions andother devices unusable as such.’

Four States Parties have declared CW stockpiles, and haveinformed the Secretariat of their long-term plans toperform CW destruction operations at up to 34 CWDFs.These facilities, which cover all the various categories ofchemical weapons, include continuously and non-continuously operating facilities, as well as mobile CWdestruction units. When changes to national programmesoccur that affect the annual destruction plans of a given StateParty, it is required to notify the Secretariat promptly.

In accordance with the national declarations, destruction atCWDFs of chemical weapons in Categories 1, 2 and 3 willtotal approximately 70,000 tons of CW agents, includingapproximately 8.4 million filled CW munitions/containers.The bulk of the declared CW stocks are held by the RussianFederation and the United States of America. As of July 2000,4,790 metric tonnes (MT) of CW agents and 1.3 million CW

filled munitions/containers hadbeen irreversibly destroyed in thepresence of OPCW inspectionteams–approximately 4,029 MTof nerve agents (GB,VX), 226 MTof blister agents (HD), 1 MT ofprecursors (QL, DF), 464 MT ofbinary CW, and 70 MT ofCategory 2 CW.

Past experience has shown thatthe issues of national legislationand of the selection of the CWdisposal technology, including its

comprehensive consideration and assessment, testing andsub-sequent adoption, followed by the design andconstruction of the CWDF, are both a time- and resource-consuming process. The Convention stipulates a relativelyshort time period – ending in 2007, 10 years after the EIF ofthe Convention in 1997 – within which the existing CWstockpiles are to be destroyed.

The CW destruction facilities must satisfy any possible publicconcerns (i.e. they must operate in a safe manner in order toavoid a release of CW agent into the environment). Theymust reduce to the minimum extent possible the level of riskassociated with the transportation of these hazardousagents, and must also avoid any negative impact on the localinfrastructure.This has sometimes contributed to significantdelays in the CW destruction programme of some StatesParties. Provided that the appropriate safety andenvironmental protection measures are in place destructionis without question the safest option, as continued storagewill result in the gradual deterioration of CW stockpileswhich will, in turn, inevitably increase the risk of an accidentalrelease of chemical agent.

An on-site disposal concept has been adopted by all thedeclared CW possessor States Parties. In particular, thisapproach is planned to be applied to all seven continentalCW destruction facilities, as well as to the Johnston AtollChemical Disposal System in the United States of America,and also to the seven planned major CW destructionfacilities in the Russian Federation. The United States ofAmerica has adopted the incineration of CW agents andthe thermal treatment of the associated metal parts as itsbaseline technology. An investigation into possiblealternative, new technologies, is, however, now under wayin the United States. In the Russian Federation, researchand development on CW destruction originally focused onlow-temperature destruction processes and the ability torecycle some valuable components such as arsenic (As)–as, for example, in the case of the disposal of lewisite. Itshould be stressed that, while the Secretariat’s function isnot to influence a State Party’s selection of the technologyfor CW destruction, the Secretariat is obliged to be familiarwith the technology as a whole, including the design andcapacity of the destruction facility/units, and to take intoaccount specific features of the technological process inorder to correctly develop and apply the on-siteverification regime. In order to ensure a robust andeffective verification regime both sides need to review anddiscuss the general procedures for CW delivery,temporary storage and inventory, in addition to agreeingupon the end-points of destruction, in relation to the CWagent and the metal parts. As stipulated in the Convention,the State Party should provide both detailed facilityinformation and any additional information on theimprovement of existing methods and the development ofnew methods for the destruction of CW.

The current situation in relation to the destruction ofchemical weapons is that all four of the States Partieswhich declared the possession of chemical weapons havebegun, in one form or another, to destroy their respectivestockpiles. To date, as much as 67% of OPCW inspectordays have been spent at destruction facilities, which meansthat a considerable proportion of the available inspectorresources are being utilised to continuously monitor thedestruction of chemical weapons. Moreover, as destructionoperations in declared possessor States Parties gathermomentum, the requirements for monitoring operatingdestruction facilities will continue to increase substantially.The Secretariat and Member States are therefore currentlyexploring the possibility of new operational concepts formonitoring destruction operations which, while ensuringmaintenance of the required degree of confidence, will, atthe same time, allow the Secretariat to continue to meet itsother verification responsibilities with the available inspectorresources.

The United States of America has taken a leading role inthe destruction of chemical weapons, and has significantly

The discovery ofadditional old and abandoned chemical weapons is an ongoing and unpredictableprocess.


moved ahead of the CW destruction schedule establishedby the Convention. Since EIF, this State Party has destroyedmore than 16% of its CW stockpile. It should also be notedthat the first United States CWDF prototype plant atJohnston Atoll (JACADS) is rapidly approaching its lastdestruction campaign, and should complete its tasks by thebeginning of next year.

In 1999, the United States successfully completed thedestruction of 258,548 binary projectiles and 457.6 MT ofone of the two chemical components used in this weaponsystem. The success of this campaign can be attributed inpart to the cooperation extended by both sides to theestablishment of on-site verification procedures, includingthe selection and installation of monitoring equipment.Thelessons learned from this campaign were taken intoaccount when verification activities at other CWDFfacilities were being planned.

In 1999, India and another State Party destroyed more than1% of their declared stockpiles, thus meeting therequirements of the Convention for the first phase ofCategory 1 CW destruction. Both of these States Parties,along with the United States, will now proceed with thePhase II requirement of the Convention – the destructionof 20% of their CW by 29 April 2002.

The situation in the Russian Federation is, however, moreproblematic. Due to economic difficulties, the RussianFederation was unable to meet this important deadline,and the Conference of the States Parties, at its Fifth Sessionin May of this year, decided to grant an extension to theRussian Federation’s obligation to meet the intermediatedeadline for the destruction of 1 percent of its Category 1chemical weapons stockpiles. The Russian Federationnevertheless remains firmly committed to the CWC, as isclearly attested by its recent actions. Russia has submitted

to the Secretariat plans for the destruction of Category 3chemical weapons – i.e. of powder and burster charges forchemical munitions. As for the broader issue of theelimination of Russia’s stockpile of Category 1 chemicalweapons, substantial international assistance will beneeded to ensure their destruction within the timelinesprovided for in the Convention. The commencement ofCategory 1 destruction at the Gorny CWDF is currentlyplanned for the fourth quarter of 2001.

CW Stockpile Destruction Technologies

T he level of technical innovation in the field of CWdestruction is very high. This was demonstrated

during the presentations given at the recent DERAConference (CWD 2000) held in The Hague, in May of thisyear. A large variety of destruction technologies can, intheory, be applied to the destruction of chemical weapons.The selection, evaluation and assessment of a giventechnology is based on its level of development, as well ason the reliability and stability of its operational parameters.The type of CW agent and the mode of CW agent storage(containers or munitions) must also be taken into account.Assembled chemical munitions (projectiles, mortars, mines,rockets) require mechanical operations (reverse assembly,drilling, cutting, etc.) in order to facilitate access to theinternal cavity, so that the liquid or solid chemical agent canbe removed for final destruction. This dismantlingoperation includes the separation of the resulting materials(toxic agent, explosives, metal parts, fuzes, burster charges)and their final disposal within different process streams.These principles have all been applied in the baselineincineration technology currently in use in the USA.

Since the EIF of the Convention, the overwhelming amountof CW agent processed has been destroyed byincineration, with the subsequent thermal treatment of theassociated metal parts. This method of destruction isexpected to continue to be the dominant process in thenear future, as this technology is applicable to the UnitedStates facilities at TOCDF – scheduled to operate until2003 (42.3% of the US stockpile), as well as to the threenew US CWDFs located in Anniston (7.1% of the USstockpile), Umatilla (11.6% of the US stockpile), and PineBluff (12% of the US stockpile). A shift in the balancebetween incineration and alternative technologies withinthe United States is expected with the commencement ofCW destruction at the two CWDFs planned to be locatedin Newport, Indiana, and Aberdeen, Maryland. The newtechnologies are likely to be based on CW agent hydrolysisfollowed by fur ther post-treatment of the products (e.g.super critical water oxidation/ biodegradation).

9

The selection, evaluationand assessment of a giventechnology is based on itslevel of development, aswell as on the reliability and stability of itsoperational parameters.


10

In the Russian Federation, the first large-scale CWdestruction facility (currently under construction at Gorny)will use alkaline hydrolysis and/or ammonolysis of the

lewisite followed by electrolysis, thuspermitting the recovery of the arsenic.Another planned large-scale continuouslyoperating facility destroying nerveagents will use low-temperatureneutralisation technology, followed bythe solidification of the reactionproducts.

CW destruction technology continuesto be developed and, as in the case ofother industrial facilities, all technologiesare likely to be upgraded or modifiedon the basis of new research anddevelop-ment and the introduction ofmore advanced technologies.

Some technical challenges are related to the condition ofthe CW stockpiles.These may influence the application ofthe verification regime on site. For example, the processingand quantification of the viscous CW agents is not easy. Inmany cases, the condition of CW agent (particularlymustard gas) which has been stored for a long period issuch that it often cannot be completely drained from a bulkstorage tank or munition. In the case of ar tillery munitions(projectiles, mortars), complete thermal treatment may, inthe worst case, need to be performed without any priordraining of the CW agent.

Approaches to the Destruction of Old/Abandoned CW

A s a result of the extensive production, transfer andstorage of chemical weapons during the First and

Second World Wars, and the large-scale use of CW duringWorld War I, the problem of old and abandoned chemicalweapons now confronts many countries. Certain activitiesrelated to the disposal of OCW are an integral part ofnational programmes relating to both the clearing of testranges and soil reclamation. The discovery of additional oldand abandoned chemical weapons is an ongoing andunpredictable process. Most are obsolete, and many areleaking. Often there is no indication of either the kind ofchemical agent which they contain or their origin. Althoughsuch OACW do not pose a significant threat to the objectand purpose of the Convention, they do pose a threat tothe environment, and States Parties remain responsible fortheir safe destruction when they discovered.

Eleven States Parties have so far declared approximately40 sites as containing OACW, more than 30 of which havereceived inspections. A number of countries hadsuccessfully carried out destruction programmes for OCWeven before the entry into force of the Convention. InIndonesia, for example, Dutch and Indonesian experts hadby 1979 completed the destruction by incineration of 45MT of bulk mustard produced by the Dutch in the 1940s.Also, in the early 1990s, Canada completed the destructionof its mustard and lewisite stocks and of a small quantity ofnerve agent. Destruction operations for OCW have beenongoing in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdomof Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for example, for anumber of years.

Most countries use similar methods for the recovery anddestruction of old chemical weapons. These methodsinvolve investigating the site and locating the weapons,unearthing and identifying the recovered munitions, andremoving and transporting them to a temporary storagefacility. Prior to demilitarisation there is usually a preparationphase consisting of cleaning (e.g. using a high-pressurewater jet or blasting with pellets of solid carbon dioxide)and X-raying each item individually to assess its internalstructure. With regard to the technologies used to destroyold chemical munitions, the general approach taken bydifferent States Parties involves the mechanical disassemblyof individual munitions – a time-consuming and hazardousprocess – followed by thermal (incineration) or chemical(neutralisation) treatment of the chemical agent andcontaminated scrap. The final disposal of all explosivecomponents is generally performed by explosive detonation.

In the United States, the destruction of recovered CWmunitions is covered by the national non-stockpile chemicalmaterial programme. Mobile CW destruction systems arebeing developed for this purpose. The first mobile system,MMD-1, is under final testing before it becomes operationalat Dugway Proving Ground. The US is also developing atransportable emergency destruction system (EDS) to treatrecovered chemical warfare materials. This system is designedto treat explosively configured chemical munitions that aredeemed unsafe for mechanical handling or transport.

The possibility of using new technologies is much higher atsmall-scale OACW destruction installations, in comparisonwith the large-scale continuously operating facilitiesdesigned for the destruction of modern chemical weapons.The destruction site in Civitaveccia, Italy, for example,includes three plants for OCW destruction: the mustardgas (HD)/phenyldichloroarsine (PD) destruction plant, theadamsite demilitarisation plant, and the ammunition dis-charging plant. The mixtures of HD and PD are destroyedby the liquid phase oxidation of the mixture by concentrated

The destruction ofCWPFs or theirconversion forpeaceful purposes isemerging as aproblem of technicalcomplexitycomparable to thatof the destruction ofchemical weapons.



hydrogen peroxide, followed by neutra-lisation with lime.The reaction mass is mixed with cement and sand to form aconcrete that is poured into specially reinforced concretecontainers.

The dismantling and subsequent thermal treatment of oldchemical weapons as carried out in Munster, Germany is welldocumented. In the Republic of Slovenia recovered chemicalshells with phosgene fill have been destroyed in hermeticallyisolated chambers by alkaline hydrolysis of the agent.

Poland has recently completed its programme for thedestruction of adamsite. The destruction technology usedwas developed in Poland and was found to be efficient,relatively inexpensive, and environmentally friendly.

A bilateral agreement was reached last year betweenChina and Japan on the destruction of the chemicalweapons abandoned by the former Imperial JapaneseArmy on the territory of China. This important step willlead to further progress towards the resolution of thisparticular long-standing problem. It is anticipated that theselection of the preferred method of CW destruction willbe finalised in time for destruction to star t in 2004.

Destruction/Conversion of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

A lthough attention tends to focus on the destructionof chemical weapons, it is just as important to

eliminate the capacity to produce chemical weapons as it isto destroy the weapons themselves. All 61 CWPFs declaredby the following countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, China,France, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, the RussianFederation, the United States of America, the UnitedKingdom, and one other State Party – have been fullyinactivated and verified by OPCW inspectors. The OPCWhas also certified the complete destruction of 22 of the 61declared chemical weapons production facilities. TheOPCW is aware of the difficulties, related mainly todecontamination, involved in the destruction of CWPFs. Thedestruction of CWPFs or their conversion for peacefulpurposes is emerging as a problem of technical complexitycomparable to that of the destruction of chemical weapons.

The conversion of CWPFs for use for peaceful purposes isessentially an alternative method of achieving theirdestruction. Three facilities have so far been certified ashaving been fully converted for use for peaceful purposes.The Conference of the States Parties has approvedrequests to convert a further nine facilities for use forpeaceful purposes, but these have yet to be fully converted.All of the remaining facilities have been fully inactivated, andwill continue to be regularly inspected by the Organisation’sinspectors until they have been destroyed or converted.

The elimination of these chemical weapons and theirassociated production facilities is an ongoing process, onewhich will continue for a number of years. Whilst muchremains to be done, significant progress has been made, andthe Organisation has every reason to remain optimistic thatthis steady progress will be maintained.

11

Mr Ron G. Manley Ron Manley was born in Cornwall, United Kingdom. He was awarded a BA with First Class Honoursin Chemistry and Materials Science and joined the UK Ministry of Defence in 1960, where he worked for more than 30 yearsin a range of fields related to the development of effective defensive measures against the use of Chemical Weapons. From1991 to 1994 he was Chairman of UNSCOM’s Destruction Advisory Panel, which was directly responsible for the technicaloversight of CW destruction operations in Iraq. He took up the position of Head of the Chemical Demilitarisation Branch ofthe Verification Division of the Provisional Technical Secretariat in September 1993 and held this post until April 1997. At theentry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997 he became the Special Adviser to the Director-General ofthe OPCW and in June 2000 he was appointed Director of the Verification Division.

…moreover, as destructionoperations in declaredpossessor States Partiesgather momentum, therequirements formonitoring operatingdestruction facilities will continue to increase substantially.


12

B efore signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC),and again before ratifying it,Russia repeatedly

warned that, given its difficult economic situation, itspolitical will to actively participate in the chemicaldisarmament process could be realised only with sizeablesupport from the international community. The leaders ofseveral industrially developed Western countries pledged toprovide such assistance.

More than seven years have passed since the signing of theCWC, and more than two years have now elapsed sinceRussia became a fully-fledged member of the OPCW. Whatis the current status of international assistance for thedestruction of stockpiled chemical weapons in Russia? Asof 20 May of this year the total amount of gratuitousassistance pledged for this purpose amounted to US$ 370million, while only US$ 240 million of this amount has actuallybeen allocated so far. Experts believe that the total cost ofdestroying the Russian chemical weapons arsenal stands atapproximately US$ 6 billion. In other words, the internationalassistance currently available to Russia amounts to merely 6%of the required total amount. Moreover, the foreign donorsuse part of the funds allocated by them to finance their ownadministrative and technical costs associated with theimplementation of the chemical destruction assistance pro-grammes.

Therefore, if it is to destroy its chemical weapons stockpileswithin the timelines stipulated by the CWC, Russia mustallocate US$ 950 million annually from its budget to fullyimplement the corresponding federal programme by 2007,or US$ 475 million annually, if the deadline to destroy itsCW stockpiles is extended until 2012.

Status of the US Assistance Programme

Since 1992, under the Cooperative Threat ReductionAgreement (otherwise known as the Nunn-LugarProgramme), the USA has been assisting Russia in its efforts

to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles and demilitariseits former chemical weapons production facilities.The totalamount of pledged assistance is US$ 300.5 million. As of 20May 2000, US$ 192.1 million of this amount had beenallocated.

The US has provided assistance in the following three majorareas:

Assistance in the construction of a chemical weaponsdestruction facility in the town of Shchuch’ye, in theKurgan region. The US funds were to be used to financeinitial phase construction works. So far Russia has preparedthe justification of investments and the feasibility study forthis facility. In cooperation with American experts, weevaluated the two-stage chemical weapons destructionprocess developed by Russian scientists. We are currentlyfocusing on designing and manufacturing chemical muni-tions dismantlement process lines, as well as on scaling upthe chemical weapons destruction process for the facility inShchuch’ye. Parsons (Pasadena, USA), a well-knownengineering and construction company, is acting as the USgeneral contractor. However, the actual construction workhas not yet started, and is not likely to start in the fore-seeable future.

Assistance in the demilitarisation of former chemicalweapons production facilities. Aid is being provided forthe ‘Khimprom’ (‘chemical production’) facilities in the citiesof Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk.

Establishment of a central analytical laboratory tocontrol activities in the field of chemical disarmament.The laboratory operates on the premises of the StateScientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry andTechnology in Moscow, the leading researcher anddeveloper of chemical weapons destruction technologies.

The efficiency of the Nunn-Lugar Programme is sometimesaffected by the pragmatism of our American counterparts(including their attempts to occasionally use this assistance

DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND DEMILITARISATION OF CHEMICAL

WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

INTERNATIONALASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA

OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUST 2000 – INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

By Valery Semin


13

package as a lever to bring political pressure to bear uponRussia in the area of disarmament in general), as well as bythe red tape which our projects have to cut through toobtain clearances from the relevant US executive andlegislative bodies. Each Defence Appropriation Act relatedto this programme generally contains over a dozen variousconditions and provisions which have the effect of slowingdown the flow of funds into assistance projects. The factthat assistance packages have to be approved by the USCongress on an annual basis for each fiscal year hinderslong-term planning, as there is no certainty from one yearto the next that work which has already commenced will infact be continued. Assistance is in the form of servicesprovided by American companies, and of supplies ofAmerican equipment which is sometimes incompatiblewith equipment manufactured in Russia. The total amountof pledged assistance does not always tally with the actualallocations, which are considerably more modest. Asignificant portion of the allocated funds goes to financethe administrative and technical expenses of the Americanside, while in other cases the funds remain unclaimed for avariety of reasons.

Nevertheless, the USA remains the largest internationaldonor for the Russian chemical weapons destructionprogramme. In June 1999, the Cooperative Threat ReductionUmbrella Agreement was extended for another seven-yearterm by a Protocol, now awaiting ratification by the StateDuma. Even if the ratification process for this Protocol wereto take longer than is currently expected, this would be solelyattributable to unexpected procedural difficulties.

The resolution passed by the US Congress, in October1999, to suspend funding for the construction of theShchuch’ye facility has led to serious complications. Theofficial reasons quoted in the resolution include insufficientfunding by Russia for the construction of social infrastructurefacilities in Shchuch’ye, delays in the allocation of land for theconstruction of the chemical weapons destruction facilitythere, and a reconsideration of the previous US assessmentof the threat posed by Russian chemical weapons to US

national security. Russia has grave concerns about thisresolution, since it may have, and already has, adverselyaffected the attitudes of a number of potential donorcountries to the provision of assistance to Russia. As aresult, Russia may be unable to destroy its chemical weaponsstockpiles and to meet the deadline determined by theCWC. We have complied with most of the conditionsstipulated by the US Congress, and have reason to hope thatthe funding of this programme will be restored in the nextfiscal year, FY-2001. However, the final decision is not ours tomake.

Cooperation with European Countries

The Federal Republic of Germany has been providingassistance for chemical destruction in Russia since October1993. The total amount of assistance allocated so far hasbeen DEM 58.5 million. Substantial work has been carriedout under this programme to manufacture, test and delivertechnological equipment to the chemical weaponsdestruction facility in the Settlement of Gorny, in theSaratov region, where construction is now nearingcompletion.

Within the framework of our joint programme withSweden, initiated in 1993, the risk assessment of thechemical weapons storage facility in the settlement ofKambarka, in the Republic of Udmurtia, has been carriedout. A Public Outreach Centre has been set up there, andmedical equipment has been supplied to the local hospital.The total amount of assistance provided under thisprogramme so far is SEK 4.4 million.

Finland is about to embark on an assistance programme thatwill include the delivery of an environmental monitoringsystem to the chemical weapons storage facility in thesettlement of Kambarka. The total amount of assistance sofar is FIM 6 million.

By voluntarily assuming anobligation to destroy, over aperiod of 10 years, 40,000tons of chemical warfareagents stockpiled by theformer Soviet Union, Russiahas undertaken to solve aglobal problem whichtranscends purely nationalboundaries, and which hasimplications for the entireinternational community.


14

The European Union has allocated funds to finance thedemilitarisation of former chemical weapons productionfacilities in Dzerzhinsk, in the Nizhni Novgorod region, andin Novocheboksarsk, in the Republic of Chuvashia, as wellas the construction of the main CW destruction buildingand an environmental monitoring system at the chemicalweapons destruction facility in Gorny, in the Saratov region.The total amount of assistance so far is EUR 15.9 million.

In late 1998 we signed an agreement with The Netherlandsfor the provision of assistance in the amount of NLG 25million. The funds will be used to provide technologicalequipment for soil improvement at the Kambarka facility,and to finance the construction of some other top priorityRussian chemical weapons destruction facilities.

Italy has appropriated ITL 15 billion to assist Russia in theconstruction of social and engineering infrastructure facilitiesin the settlement of Kizner, in the Republic of Udmurtia, andin the town of Shchuch’ye, in the Kurgan region.

Switzerland has been providing assistance by financingpublic outreach projects implemented in the areas in whichchemical weapons destruction facilities are to be located.Approximately US$ 300,000 have been spent over the lastthree years. Those funds have been used to conduct publichearings in chemical weapons storage areas, to establishinformation centres, to publish brochures for the localpopulation providing relevant information on chemicalweapons destruction facilities to be built near the chemicalweapons facilities, and to conduct research to assess thestate of health of the local population, and the state of theenvironment in the chemical weapons storage areas. Thisprogramme, implemented with the active involvement ofthe International Green Cross, has helped to form positiveattitudes concerning the problem of chemical weaponsdestruction.

Problems Related to the Implementation ofAssistance Programmes

Analysis of Russia’s experience of the implementation ofinternational assistance programmes has helped us toidentify a number of problems that reduce the efficiency ofthese efforts. Firstly, there are differences between nationallegislation in different States Parties to the Convention. Theneed to resolve legal issues slows down negotiations onlegal frameworks, as, for example, during the preparation ofassistance agreements with both the Netherlands andFinland.

Secondly, in several cases problems arose due to loopholes inthe Russian legislation, which lacked the requisite legal norms.In this context, in May 1998, the Russian State Duma passed anew law and granted tax exemption status to foreigntechnical assistance projects, thus eliminating a number ofbarriers in this area. However, our legislation still needs somefine-tuning to create a favourable environment for foreignprivate and corporate investors who might finance chemicaldisarmament programmes in the relevant Russian regions.

Thirdly, there is a lack of coordination between Russia and thedonor states in the area of chemical weapons destruction.For instance Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden financeprojects currently being implemented in Kambarka, in theRepublic of Udmurtia.Germany has focused its efforts on thefacility in Gorny, in the Saratov region.The USA is working onShchuch’ye, in the Kurgan region, while Italy plans to becomeinvolved in the construction of several infrastructure facilitiesin Kizner, in the Republic of Udmurtia. As a result of this, socialand engineering infrastructure facilities are currentlyscheduled for construction in Kambarka and Kizner, whileRussia’s current priorities also include the Gorny andShchuch’ye facilities. This has led to a regrettable lack ofconsistency in the application of international assistancefunds.

In this regard, Mr José Bustani, the Director-General of theOrganisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW), made an important proposal when he suggestedthe creation of a permanent coordination committee oninternational assistance to Russia, in order to boost itsefforts to fulfil its obligations under the Convention in atimely manner. The committee is intended to coordinatethe work being done by the current donors, and also toattract other OPCW States Parties to cooperate in thisarea. It is envisaged that the committee will consist ofrepresentatives of the relevant Russian agencies and thedonor states. Representatives of potential donors may alsoparticipate in the work of this committee, as observers. Thecommittee will seek to promote exchanges of informationrelating to the implementation of assistance programmes,as well as to coordinate donor efforts in Russia, and todirect the funds allocated by donors to finance the highestpriority components of the Russian chemical weaponsdestruction programme. As Russia is prepared to conductconsultations on the composition, functions, andprocedures of the committee, the proposal of the OPCWDirector-General can therefore be implemented withinthe shortest possible time.

Fourthly, the involvement of new donor countries in theassistance effort was previously hampered by insufficienttransparency in the implementation of the Russian chemicalweapons stockpiles destruction programme, and by thefragmentary nature of Russian proposals related to thehighest priority assistance projects. These issues were largelyresolved in the course of three conferences of donorcountries held in the period 1998 – 2000 in The Hague andMoscow, with facilitation by the European Union, theNetherlands, and the OPCW. These events led to a deeper

The resolution passed by the US Congress,in October 1999, to suspend funding forthe construction of the Shchuch’ye facilityhas led to serious complications.

OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUST 2000 – INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE


OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUSTUS 2000 – RUSSIAN DESTRUCTION

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understanding by the donor states of the problems faced byRussia, and encouraged new donors to join the assistanceeffort. For example, Canada and Norway voiced their desireto provide assistance to Russia during the most recentconference in The Hague in March 2000.

Alternative Assistance Programmes

On the basis of Russia’s experience, it has concluded thatthe gratuitous assistance provided by foreign countries islimited to an extent which renders it inconsistent with themagnitude of the tasks which it aims to resolve. If we are toattain more tangible results, we need to secure theparticipation of the international financial community in thisprogramme. This participation could take various forms,including the provision to Russia of large, very long-termloans on favourable terms (some loans could even beinterest-free) by international financial and credit institutionssuch as the IMF, the World Bank, the EBRD, etc. It could alsoinvolve some or all of the following: the granting of access tofunds allocated under special-purpose programmes run bythe governments and some private foundations; theencouragement of private and corporate investment inareas in which chemical weapons destruction facilities arescheduled for construction, and investment into formerchemical weapons production facilities; the restructuring andannulment of a proportion of Russian debt to creditorcountries and major holders of its debt securities (G-7states, leading members of the IMF, the World Bank, and theParis and London Creditor Clubs), provided that any suchdebt relief funds are used solely to finance the chemicaldisarmament effort in Russia. We believe that we areentitled to international support for the resolution of theseissues. By voluntarily assuming an obligation to destroy, overa period of 10 years, 40,000 tons of chemical warfareagents stockpiled by the former Soviet Union, Russia has

undertaken to solve a global problem which transcendspurely national boundaries, and which has implications forthe entire international community.

The achievement of this objective will require Russiangovernment agencies and local administrations involved inchemical destruction to conduct additional analysis and tofocus on creating a favourable investment climate, primarilythrough coordinating both its programmes aimed at thedestruction of chemical weapons and its demilitarisation offormer chemical weapons production facilities, as well asthrough coordinating regional economic developmentplans. It is also necessary for Russia to carefully examine theopportunities presented by the existing programmes offoundations and international financial institutions, with aview to providing funds for the construction of social andengineering facilities in the chemical weapons destructionfacility areas. To do this, Russia may need to establish aspecialised centre to analyse its options for increasing theamount of international assistance, and to coordinate itsefforts in this critically important area.

Conclusion

Although Russia has shown the political will to fulfil itscommitment to destroy its chemical weapons stockpileswithin the timelines set by the Convention, and notwith-standing the fact that the interested government agencies aredoing everything in their power to secure sufficient funds tofinance this extremely expensive programme, the possibilitycannot be ruled out that it may be unsuccessful in its attemptto significantly increase the amount of foreign assistance inthis area. The relative quiescence of industrially developednations in helping Russia to destroy its chemical weaponsstockpiles, and recent developments in US policy whichappear to aim at a reduction in such assistance, may compelRussia to reluctantly consider an extension of its chemicalweapons destruction deadline which is in line with its ownfinancial capabilities.

Dr Valery V. Semin is currently the Principal Counsellor and Head of the International Assistance Office in the Ministry forthe Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Previously, he served as the Consul for Scientific Affairs at the Russian Consulatein San Francisco, USA, and prior to that, as a Department Head at Tula State University in Russia.

Dr Semin holds bachelors, masters, and doctorate degrees from Tula State University in mechanical engineering, and a DScfrom the Blagonravov Mechanical Engineering Institute. He has published widely in Russian and international journals andholds Russian patents on 15 inventions.

Legislation still needs some fine-tuning to create a favourableenvironment for foreign privateand corporate investors whomight finance chemicaldisarmament programmes in therelevant Russian regions.


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REVIEW CONFERENCES

CHALLENGESAND OPPORTUNITIES

The First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (the‘CWC’) will, in accordance with paragraph 22 of Article VIII of the CWC,

22. The Conference shall not later than one year after the expiry ofthe fifth and the tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention,and at such other times within that time period as may be decided upon,convene in special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of thisConvention. Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific andtechnological developments. At intervals of five years thereafter, unlessotherwise decided upon, further sessions of the Conference shall beconvened with the same objective.

be carried out not later than one year after the expiry of the fifth yearafter entry into force of the CWC. In other words, not later than oneyear after 29 April 2002.There is, in addition, provision in paragraph 26of Part IX of the Verification Annex, on Activities Not Prohibited under thisConvention in accordance with Article VI:

26. At the first special session of the Conference convened pursuantto Article VIII, paragraph 22, the provisions of this Part of the VerificationAnnex shall be re-examined in the light of a comprehensive review of theoverall verification regime for the chemical industry (Article VI, Parts VII toIX of this Annex) on the basis of the experience gained.The Conferenceshall then make recommendations so as to improve the effectiveness ofthe verification regime.

requiring the CWC First Review Conference to carry out a compre-hensive review of the overall verification regime for the chemicalindustry as detailed in Article VI and in Parts VII to IX of the VerificationAnnex and to make recommendations to improve the effectiveness ofthe verification regime. It is encouraging to note that Director-GeneralBustani, in his opening statement1 on 15 May 2000 to the Conference ofthe States Parties at its Fifth Session, said that:

About two years from now the Conference will have to undertake areview of the operation of the Convention, including a comprehensivereview of the verification regime for the chemical industry, at what isknown as the First Review Conference.

He went on to say that he would direct the OPCW Secretariat to star tpreparations for the First Review Conference in the very near future,and pointed out that This review exercise will, of course, require the guidanceand active participation of States Parties, as well as of their chemical industries.

As the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)2 , under ArticleXII,which states that:

Five years after entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it isrequested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting aproposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference ofStates Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, toreview the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring thepurposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, includingthe provisions concerning negotiations of chemical weapons, are beingrealized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific andtechnological developments relevant to the Convention.

has been carrying out Review Conferences at broadly five year intervalssince its entry into force on 26 March 1975, and will carry out its FifthReview Conference in late 2001, it is informative and valuable to examinethe challenges and opportunities for the CWC Review Conference bydrawing upon the experience of the BTWC Review Conferences.

The BTWC Experience

The BTWC has held Review Conferences on the following dates:

First Review Conference 3 – 21 March 1980Second Review Conference 8 – 26 September 1986Third Review Conference 9 – 27 September 1991Fourth Review Conference 25 November – 6 December 1996

Each Review Conference has concluded with the adoption by consensusof a Final Declaration which commences with a few preambular para-graphs, and then considers in turn the Preamble and each of the Articlesof the BTWC – as the Review Conference is required to review theoperation of the Convention, with a view to assuring the purposes of thepreamble and the provisions of the Convention,..., are being realized. As hasbeen noted in successive Final Declarations3 , The States Parties recognizethat the principles contained in this Solemn Declaration can also serve as abasis for further strengthening of the Convention.

The successive BTWC Review Conferences have provided opportunitiesfor the States Parties to extend their understandings of the provisions ofthe BTWC, and have indeed served to strengthen that Convention.Whilst there have been undoubted opportunities at the ReviewConferences, challenges have also had to be faced and addressed at them.

OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUST 2000 – CHALLENGES

By Graham S. Pearson


17

At the BTWC Review Conferences the principal issues have arisen inthe consideration of Article I, which is the basic prohibition, and ofArticle V, which is the undertaking for consultation and cooperationwith regard to the operation of the BTWC, as well as of Article X,which is the undertaking to facilitate the fullest possible exchange forpeaceful purposes. It is useful to consider these in turn.

Article I

The basic prohibition of the BTWC is enshrined in the general purposecriterion of Article I, under which the States Parties undertake never inany circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquireor retain:

(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin ormethod of production, of types and in quantities that have no justificationfor prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.

Prior to the Review Conferences, the Depositary Governments (theRussian Federation, the UK and the USA) have each prepared paperson new scientific and technological developments relevant to theBTWC, since it, in Article XII, specifically requires that Such review shalltake into account any new scientific and technological developmentsrelevant to the Convention. In practice, the Preparatory Committeemeetings prior to the Review Conferences have agreed to invite anyStates Parties that wish to do so, including the Depositary Governments,to submit to the secretariat4 information on new scientific and techno-logical developments relevant to the BTWC. For the Fourth BTWCReview Conference, such information was provided by Cuba, Germany,Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA, and was circulated to thedelegations in a consolidated paper5 prepared by the secretariat.

The Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference on Article Ireaffirmed that the prohibition in Article I applied to scientific andtechnological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, bio-technology, molecular biology, genetic engineering and any applicationsresulting from genome studies. Furthermore the Final Declarationreaffirmed also that the BTWC unequivocally included ‘all microbial andother biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, aswell as their components, whatever their origin or method of production.’ Inlooking forward to the Fifth BTWC Review Conference it will benecessary and appropriate, for the review of new scientific andtechnological developments, to consider what advances might usefully

be specifically referred to in the Final Declaration in order to ensure thatthere are no perceived omissions or exclusions which might beexploited in a way that is inconsistent with the objectives and purposesof the BTWC. It will be important to give consideration to the inclusionof language in the Final Declaration which unequivocally reaffirms thatthe coverage of the prohibition in Article I is all embracing.

Examples of issues that are likely to be addressed in consideration ofArticle I relate to bioregulators, which are essential for normal bodilyfunctions, but can cause harm if administered in unusual quantities, andalso to genetic recombinations. Further issues relate to the use of pestsor vectors as a method of warfare or for hostile purposes, a topic thathas arisen during the negotiation of the Protocol to strengthen theeffectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC6.

A more challenging issue that is also addressed in the consideration ofArticle I relates to non-compliance. This is a difficult issue, as it is the non-compliance of States Parties that is being addressed – and as thoseStates Parties are participants in the Review Conference, they can dilutethe language adopted for the Final Declaration – as happened in 1996 atthe Fourth Review Conference. It is nevertheless important thatconcerns about non-compliance are addressed – it is unsatisfactory ifstatements are made, as by the United States in 1996, that the numberof States possessing or seeking to possess biological weapons had morethan doubled since the entry into force of the BTWC. After all, if onelooks back to the Third Review Conference in 1991, significantstatements were then made about the alleged non-compliance of theSoviet Union and Iraq, without subsequent events leading to asatisfactory resolution of the issues in either case. The Final Declarationon Article I needs to reinforce and strengthen the norm that biologicalweapons are totally prohibited.

Another issue that arose in 1996 related to the prohibition of use; thisillustrates the value of the Review Conferences in strengthening theBTWC.The BTWC, unlike the CWC, does not contain specific languagereferring to use. In 1996, Iran proposed at the Review Conference thatthe BTWC be amended to include an explicit prohibition of use. In theReview Conference, use was considered in a number of places. In thePreamble to the Final Declaration, new language was added in which theStates Parties solemnly declare:

Their recognition that purposes of this Convention include the prohibitionof use of biological weapons as contrary to the purpose of the Convention.

Professor Graham Scott PearsonGraham Pearson is a Visiting Professor inInternational Security, Department of PeaceStudies, University of Bradford, UK, where he isactive particularly in the area of biologicalweapons arms control. Until his retirement fromthe British Ministry of Defence in 1995, he wasDirector General and Chief Executive of theChemical and Biological Defence Establishmentat Porton Down. He has published numerousarticles on chemical and biological weaponsand their arms control, and he is co-editor, withProfessor Malcolm Dando, of Strengthening theBiological Weapons Convention: Key Points forthe Fourth Review Conference. Recently, he haswritten a book,“The UNSCOM Saga: Chemicaland Bioloigical Weapons Non-Proliferation”,published by Macmillan/St. Martin’s Press(1999).


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OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUST 2000 – CHALLENGES

This was strongly underpinned by language on Article I that ‘TheConference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way and underany circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is notconsistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, iseffectively a violation of Article I of the Convention.’ and also that "TheConference reaffirms the undertaking in Article I ... in order to excludecompletely and forever the possibility of their use.’ In addition, language onArticle IV (national implementation measures) stated that ‘the Conferencereaffirms that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological)and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited by the Convention.’ The effect ofthe consideration of this matter by the Review Conference was thus tomake it explicitly clear that the States Parties to the BTWC regard it ascompletely excluding the use of biological or toxin weapons.

Article V

Under this Article, States Parties undertake to consult one another and tocooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to theobjective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Theconfidence-building measures (CBMs) agreed at the Review Conferencein 1986 and extended and strengthened in 1991 fall under this Article. Atthe Fourth Review Conference in 1996, little attention was paid, becauseof the ongoing Ad Hoc Group consideration of a Protocol, to the CBMsother than to continue to urge all States Parties to complete full andtimely declarations in the future. At the Fifth Review Conference, theoutcome of the Protocol negotiations will be apparent, and it will betimely and appropriate to give more detailed consideration to thequality of the information provided under the CBMs, as theseobligations will continue for all States Parties. It is evident that there ismuch variation between States Parties in the attention given to theprovision of information under the politically binding CBMs – very fewhave provided annual responses – and it will be appropriate to examinehow the quality of the information provided by States Parties can beboth harmonised and upgraded. Considerable benefit would be derivedfrom making the CBM information more widely available, as it is clear tothose engaged in the field that some of the information is inaccurate –something which hardly contributes to building confidence.

Another topic for consideration under Article V are the procedures,adopted at the Third Review Conference, to strengthen the implemen-tation of Article V. It was subsequently noted at the Fourth ReviewConference that these procedures had not yet been invoked. They wereinvoked by Cuba in 1997 in respect of the outbreak of Thrips palmi in thatcountry, and it will therefore be appropriate to examine and review theprocedures at the Fifth BTWC Review Conference. One point that mightusefully be considered is the provision of information to the public, as it isimportant for the strength of the BTWC for the general public to knowthat it is alive and functioning well – there is a close interrelationshipbetween this and the public and professional awareness campaign whichhas been called for by successive Review Conferences in theirconsideration of Article IV, which addresses national implementationmeasures. There is little point in raising public and professional awarenessif the operations of an international treaty are cloaked in secrecy, as thebenefits accruing from it will not be evident.

Article X

Under this Article, States Parties undertake to facilitate, and have the right toparticipate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials andscientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological(biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. At previous Review

Conferences there has been much discussion leading to a lengthystatement in the Final Declaration, but without significant subsequentaction. For example, the Fourth Review Conference requested theSecretary-General to collate on an annual basis, and for the information ofStates Parties, reports on how this article is being implemented. No suchreports have appeared, probably, wholly or in part, due to an absence ofagreement as to what information States Parties should provide to theSecretary-General to enable the preparation of such a report. However,the period since the Fourth Review Conference has seen continuedintensive discussion in the Ad Hoc Group negotiations of specificmeasures to implement Article X, and it is evident that Article VII of theProtocol has successfully identified a range of specific measures that willmeet this objective. In addition, it has become evident that there areseveral initiatives in other fora, for example for the improvement ofbiosafety standards worldwide, which will require the setting up ofcompetent national authorities and a system of inspections of facilitieswhich will over time contribute to improved safety, health, prosperity andsecurity.7 Consequently, it will be necessary to focus under the BTWC andits Protocol on those activities which the future Organisation is best fittedto carry out,while avoiding unnecessary duplication.

Pointers for the CWC Review Conference

One of the significant advantages enjoyed by the CWC, in sharpcontrast to the BTWC, is the existence of the OPCW, which has in itsSecretariat the capabilities to obtain, collate and provide information tothe States Parties prior to the Review Conference. This should enablethe CWC Review Conferences to be more effective and efficient inconducting their reviews of the operation of this Convention. As with theBTWC Review Conferences, the CWC Review Conferences arerequired to take into account any relevant scientific and technologicaldevelopments. In addition, the CWC First Review Conference isrequired to carry out a comprehensive review of the overall verificationregime for the chemical industry (Article VI, Parts VII to IX of this Annex) onthe basis of the experience gained, and The Conference shall then makerecommendations so as to improve the effectiveness of the verificationregime.

It is also noted that two topics have recently been identified forconsideration at the CWC First Review Conference – the application ofthe low concentration guidelines to the transfer of Schedule 2chemicals, and the meaning of ‘production by synthesis’ (Part IX of theVerification Annex8. The report of the third session of the ScientificAdvisory Board issued in April 20009 considered how it should con-tribute to the preparations for the First Review Conference, andidentified areas of science and technology that might be analysed insome detail, with respect to how current developments could impacton the scientific foundations of the CWC:

Areas that may deserve detailed study could include chemical analysis,equipment and instruments, biosynthesis and other trends in chemicalmanufacturing, biotechnology, remote sensing, nano-technology (bothwith respect to analysis and synthesis), and bioassays.

It is important to recognise that the CWC Review Conferences, whichoccur at five-year intervals, are very different from the regular sessionsof the Conference of the States Parties (COSP) – and that care needsto be taken to ensure that they are not diverted into considering thenormal business of the COSP. An examination of the list of areas


19

identified by the SAB shows that a number of these topics are moreappropriate to the normal business of the COSP – topics such aschemical analysis, equipment and instruments, remote sensing, nano-technology (with respect to analysis) and bioassays – because theapplication of these developments to the implementation of the CWCis not constrained by the CWC itself. On the other hand, the remainingtopics of biosynthesis and other trends in chemical manufacturing,biotechnology, and nano-technology (with respect to synthesis) areappropriate to the Review Conference, which can be expected toreaffirm that the definition of toxic chemicals in Article II Definitions,which states that, ‘This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their originor their method of production’, embraces all advances and developmentsin biosynthesis and other trends in chemical manufacturing, biotechno-logy, and nano-technology (with respect to synthesis).

It would be reasonable, as with the BTWC, for the OPCW Secretariat –some six to nine months before the CWC Review Conference – to inviteany States Parties that wish to do so to submit information on newscientific and technological developments relevant to the CWC forcirculation to States Parties prior to the Review Conference. One topicthat could usefully be addressed by States Parties in their submissions onsuch developments relates to the implementation of the general purposecriterion enshrined in the definition in CWC Article II of chemicalweapons as being ‘Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except whereintended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as thetypes and quantities are consistent with such purposes.’ It is evident that, forquite understandable reasons, the OPCW has rightly focused its attentionduring its first years on the declaration and destruction of chemicalweapons, with less attention to the verification of the general purposecriterion. At the First Review Conference, it will be timely to address theimplementation of the verification of the general purpose criterion.Additionally, it will be important for the future strength of the CWC toaffirm that any advances from relevant scientific and technologicaldevelopments are embraced by the basic prohibitions of the CWC and toensure that there is no gap—or perceived gap—between the prohibitionsof the CWC and those of the BTWC.

The comprehensive review of the overall verification regime for thechemical industry will attract much attention, even though the experienceof the implementation of this regime across all States Parties to the CWCwill have been more limited because of the delay in the submission of thedeclarations from industry in the USA and the limited experience of theapplication of the regime to DOC/PSF facilities. The meaning of‘production by synthesis’ in this context will need to be addressed. It will,nevertheless, be important to gain maximum benefit from thisopportunity to make recommendations for the improvement of theeffectiveness of the CWC regime.

Another area that will attract much attention is in the review of theoperation of Articles X and XI of the CWC.As Director-General Bustaninoted in his statement to the Conference of the States Parties at its FifthSession, in May of this year, on the fostering of international cooperationfor peaceful purposes in the fields of chemical activities10 , such fosteringis ‘at one and the same time one of the foundation blocks and one of theConvention's strategic objectives.’ and furthermore ‘the fostering ofinternational cooperation is thus an important instrument for making theConvention a truly universal and steadfast legal norm against chemicalwarfare.’ In another parallel with the BTWC Review Conferences, StatesParties will expect the CWC Review Conference to make progress inrealising the aspirations of many of the developing countries. It would bebeneficial if the Secretariat could also extend an invitation to all States

Parties some six to nine months prior to the Review Conference tosubmit information on approaches aimed at achieving the purposes ofArticles X and XI, for circulation to States Parties prior to the ReviewConference.

The review of the operation of Article VII national implementationmeasures can be expected to result in language parallel to that whichappeared in the Fourth BTWC Review Conference Declaration, whichnoted the importance of ‘inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientificand military education programmes of information dealing with theprohibitions and provisions contained in the Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925.’ Indeed, one can expectdebate about how best to improve public awareness in all States Parties– and indeed also in States not party – of the benefits arising from thesuccessful implementation of the CWC.

Conclusions

The Review Conferences of the CWC – like those of the BTWC –provide important opportunities to take stock of the operation of theConvention, and to extend the understanding of the States Partiesregarding the purposes of the Convention – thereby strengthening theConvention. It is important to focus the consideration of the CWCReview Conference on issues that will strengthen the CWC, therebymaximising the benefits of the Review Conference – rather than to bediverted into addressing matters that are more appropriate to thenormal business of the Conference of the States Parties. Although twoyears may seem a long time, it is not too early to star t considering whatmight be achieved at the CWC First Review Conference, while notingthat it will in the meantime be possible to learn useful lessons from theforthcoming Fifth BTWC Review Conference, to be held late in 2001.

NOTES1 Graham S. Pearson,Visiting Professor of International Security, Department of

Peace Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford,West Yorkshire BD7 1DP, UK.Previously Director-General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down.1Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Opening Statement by the Director-General to the Conference of the States Parties at its Fifth Session,C-V/DG.11, 15 May 2000.Available at <http://www. opcw.org>.

2 United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Productionand Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), 16 December 1971.

3 See, for example, United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Final Declaration, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996,BWC/CONF.IV/9, Part. II. p. 14-29, 1996.

4 This is a temporary secretariat provided by the UN Secretary-General to support the Review Conference. It is thus a short-lived secretariat—and is quitedifferent from the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW.

5 United Nations, Background Paper on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/CONF.IV/4,Add.1 and Add.2

6 For information on the Protocol see for example, Graham S. Pearson,The Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention is Within Reach,Arms Control Today, 30, No. 5, June 2000, pp. 15-20.

7 See, for example, Graham S. Pearson, Maximizing the Security Benefits from Technical Cooperation in Microbiology and Biotechnology, University of Bradford, Department of Peace studies, Briefing Paper No 29, July 2000.Available at <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc>.

8 Daniel Feakes, Developments in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Quarterly Review no 30, CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No 48, June 2000, pp. 24-33.

9 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Report of the Third Session of the Scientific Advisory Board, SAB-III/I, 27 April 2000.

10 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Statement by the Director-General under Agenda Item Seventeen Fostering International Cooperation for Peaceful Purposes in the Field of Chemical Activities,C-V/DG.13, 18 May 2000.


20

OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUST 2000 – SPREKENDE KOPREGEL

Having been elected as Chairman for theConference of the States Parties to the OPCW,how would you describe your experience withthe CWC compared with other disarmamentregimes?

In fact, this is my first involvement at thechairperson level in the area of disarmamentand arms control. So far, I can only describemy experience as excellent, on the basis ofthe recent fifth session of the Conference ofthe States Parties. I was pleased to observethe good mood and professionalism displayedby the Member States.

During your year as Chairman, what are yourprimary goals and objectives?

Well, the two cornerstones of the CWC aredisarmament and nonproliferation. And theStates Parties are doing very well in this area,which gives me encouragement. I am happy tobe a part of their activities, and am willing andready to support them to the extent that I canto achieve our goals. As far as my goals areconcerned, I will echo the message that wassent by UN Secretary-General Annan duringthe last session of the Conference: ‘Keep themomentum going.’ In both aspects –disarmament and nonproliferation, theOPCW is doing very well.

In your role as Chairman, to what extent do youbelieve you can play a proactive role in shapingthe future of the Organisation? What would yoube especially proud to achieve during yourtenure?

I believe that, in my role as chairman, my maingoal will be to provide support to foster theobjectives of the Executive Council. As I havestated to the Director-General, the activitiesof the Executive Council that I have witnessedthus far can only be described as successful.

Much stress is placed on the issue of achievingthe universality of the Convention. While it isundoubtedly a priority, it is not an end in itself.What are your views on this?

The Issue of the universality of the conventionis very important. To date, we have 135 StatesParties that have pledged their commitmentto the Chemical Weapons Convention, incomparison with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s 185 States Parties.Clearly, work still remains to be done as far asour convention is concerned. In regions such

Interview with Ambassador Lagos

New Chairmanof the CSP

I n his opening statement to the Conferencethe Director-General, Mr José M. Bustani,

highlighted the solid foundation workachieved by the OPCW in its first three years.He noted various positive developments,including:

– the receipt of initial declarations from all States Parties;– the commencement of chemical weapons destruction in all four declared possessorStates Parties, and compliance by three ofthese four States Parties with theConvention’s obligation to destroy 1% of their

declared Category 1 chemical weaponswithin three years of the entry into force ofthe Convention;– the verification by OPCW inspectors ofthe destruction of 4,650 tonnes of chemicalagent and 15% of total stocks of relatedmunitions and containers;– the elimination, following the certificationof the destruction of 21 chemical weaponsproduction facilities in seven States Parties, ofhalf of the total declared chemical weaponsproduction capacity, as well as the approval bythe Conference of the States Parties ofExecutive Council recommendations on

At its Fifth Session, held in The Hague from 15–19 May 2000, and

attended by 109 States Parties, two contracting States, and one

observer State, the Conference of the States Parties elected

Ambassador Jaime Lagos of Chile as its Chairman.

FIFTH SESSION OF TSTATES PARTIES OF T

By Nadine McNeil


21

as Africa and the Middle East the ability ofnations to join the Convention may in part belimited due to political constraints prevailingin these regions. I hope that, despite theunsuccessful outcome of the Camp DavidSummit, there will still be some positive effectwhich will lead to an increase in nations fromthe Middle East region joining the Convention.The biggest challenge still faced by theConvention is one of appeal – how to make itappealing to all nations of the world. To thisend, we need to focus on confidence buildingand public relations. In other words, theremust be a ‘chemical appeal’ – to destroy thisentire category of terrible weapons. There isno other Convention that aims to tackle bothdisarmament and nonproliferation.

As someone who represents a region where,thankfully, there is little or no history of the useof chemical weapons, why do you feel that LatinAmerica has played such a remarkably activerole in the implementation of the Convention?

It is true that the Latin-American region is freefrom chemical weapons. Long ago, the Latin-

American countries created the MendozaAgreement in order to free themselves fromchemical weapons. In general, I am very proudof the pioneering role played by the region – a concerted move towards universal peace.

The fostering of trade and international co-operation is a relevant area of activity for theOPCW. From your regional perspective, how doyou feel we ought to implement Chapter XI ofthe Convention?

This is a very crucial aspect of the CWC.Clearly, the Convention must ensure, as itdoes, that its regime does not hamperdevelopment. International cooperation ismuch needed, especially by the developingcountries. In his opening address to theConference of the States Parties at its mostrecent session, the Director-Generalmentioned several such pilot programmesalready underway. These programmes must bevigorously pursued, in order to heighten theirappeal.

Already, many in the field of disarmament aretalking about the Review Conference to be heldin 2003. Though it is early days as yet, do youhave any indication of what the main issues tobe addressed at this Conference are likely to be?

One of the main issues that we will face is thatof the 10 year lifespan of the convention.Already, particularly with the issue of theRussian destruction programme, it is clear thathis is an unrealistic time-frame. In this regard, Ihope that President Clinton’s appeal to theG8 nations to assist in Russia’s destructionprogramme will be beneficial.

Lastly, does being based in Copenhagen – awayfrom the seat of the OPCW Headquarters –have a significant impact on your ability to carryout your duties as Chairman of the Conferenceof the States Parties?

Not at all. In fact, very much the contrary.Many chairpersons of comparable decision-making organs are based in locations awayfrom headquarters, and this has not impingedon their capacity to make positive contributions.

requests for the conversion to peacefulpurposes of five such facilities, with sixadditional such recommendations submittedto the Conference at this session, forconsideration and adoption;– the receipt from the Russian Federation ofdetailed plans for the destruction of its largestchemical weapons destruction facility; and– the successful completion of the firstindustry inspection in the United States ofAmerica, following the receipt of the long-awaited industry declarations for its Schedule1, 2 and 3 chemicals.

The Director-General made a separatestatement on the fostering of internationalcooperation for peaceful purposes in the fieldof the chemical industry, in which heemphasised that enhanced internationalcooperation is, amongst other things, apowerful tool to attract countries that haveyet to join the Convention’s regime.The active

advancement of international cooperation bythe OPCW will accordingly greatly benefit itsaspiration to achieve universality.

Major actions taken by the Conferenceincluded the adoption of decisions on thefollowing:

– the 2001 programme and budget (in anamount of EUR 60,238,400 = NLG132,748,000, the same level as in the year2000.The number of fixed-term posts alsoremained constant, at 507);– international financial assistance to theRussian Federation, and the extension of thefirst intermediate deadline for the destructionof the Russian Federation’s chemical weaponsstockpiles;– the appointment of the Director-Generalfor a second four-year term commencing on13 May 2001; and of the External Auditors forthe years 2000 - 2005;

– six requests to use chemical weaponsproduction facilities for purposes notprohibited under the Convention;– three privileges and immunitiesagreements, with Kenya, Latvia, and the UnitedKingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland, respectively;– the model facility agreement for chemicalweapons destruction facilities;– national implementation measures;transfers of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals;guidelines regarding low concentration limitsfor declarations of Schedule 2 and 3chemicals; the reporting of ricin production;and confirmation of the Executive Council’sdecision on the methodology for selectingSchedule 3 plant sites for inspection.

The Conference of the States Partiesconfirmed that its Sixth Session will be held inThe Hague from 14–18 May 2001.

THE CONFERENCE OF THETHE OPCW


22

OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUST 2000 – SPOTLIGHT

T he establishment of a NationalAuthority and the promulgation of

national legislation to implement ChemicalWeapons Convention are crucial tomaintaining an effective international regimefor the control of chemical weapons. Yet, ofthe 135 States Parties to the Convention, only97 (71%) have so far set up NationalAuthorities, and only 45 (35%) have enactedimplementing legislation. This explains thecurrent OPCW focus on legislative issues andassistance in this critically important area. Therange of activity and the effectiveness ofNational Authorities vary greatly. Some havebeen established within a State Party’sministry of foreign affairs, while others workout of the commerce or economic ministries.While some states must focus on the controlof imports, others occupy their timemaintaining relationships with the chemicalindustry and monitoring its exports. TheNetherlands National Authority is unique inmany ways (not the least of which is that itoperates without a budget) that havecontributed to both its overall effectivenessand the ease with which it handles themultiple tasks required of a NationalAuthority.

The Netherlands star ted out with a goodenvironment into which a system to monitorthe production and use of, and trade in,

scheduled chemicals could be integrated – an efficient bureaucracy with decades ofexperience in international trade; agovernment aware of and concerned withissues of arms control and non-proliferation;established contacts with business andindustry through the Ministry of EconomicAffairs; and the nearby presence of theOPCW headquarters. Even so, the process ofputting together a legislative package toimplement the CWC and to designate aNational Authority took two years. Agovernment overhaul during the 1980s hadstressed delegation and a clear division oflabour between policy-making and policyimplementation. Consequently, while thecentral government subsequently concerneditself largely with policy-making at the nationallevel, a number of specialised agencies werecreated with the independence to acquirepractical experience of issues such as exportlicensing, economic investigation, and customsenforcement. This reorganisation ofgovernment has had a profound andfavourable effect on the implementation ofthe CWC in the Netherlands.

When the time came to designate aNetherlands National Authority, instead ofcreating a separate office – and allocating aseparate budget, the small group of individualsresponsible for the implementation of the

No Budget, No Problem:The Netherlands National Authority

Introduction – Measures to ensure the nationalimplementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention area cornerstone to the effective functioning of theConvention.When the drafters of the treaty establishedthe provision that States Parties shall ‘adopt the necessarymeasures’ to implement their obligations, under Article VIIof the Convention, they made particular reference to penallegislation. However, it has become very clear since theentry into force of the Convention that this is only a small

part of the preparations that Member States need toaddress. Other legislation, as well as a range of regulatoryand administrative measures and practical arrangements,are essential for the smooth functioning of the Conventionat the national level.

Networking between National Authorities from differentMember States has increasingly become a tool forimproving the implementation process.The OPCW has

SPOTLIGHT ONNATIONAL AUTHORITIES

A group of OPCW inspectors weretrained on 9 April 1998 in industrialsafety practices at a HuntsmanSchedule 3 production plant

By Pamela Mills, Harvard Sussex Program Researcher, OPCW


23

Convention were posted within the Divisionfor Export Controls and Economic Sanctionsof the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Theycoordinate the activities of numerousagencies with regard to industry outreach andchemical inspection, and utilise the existing‘short lines’ of communication between theMinistry and industry in the Netherlands.Meanwhile, previous customs legislation wasmodified to address the issue of chemicalweapons, and economic inspectors already inthe field, with experience in enforcinginternational law and gathering information,were asked to take on chemical weapons aspart of their mandate. The Economic ControlInvestigation Agency enforces the Conventionas part of its duties with respect to manydifferent control regimes and internationallaws relating to weapons of mass destruction,and the central licensing office collectsindustry declarations.

A large-scale information campaignundertaken by the Netherlands NationalAuthority as part of its effort to establish andpromote good relations with industry is oneexample of a bold initiative that is also easy toimplement. Even before the Conventionentered into force, steps were taken todetermine which companies would beaffected by the Convention’s restrictions via asurvey of the more than 4,000 companies inthe Netherlands whose operations may haveinvolved scheduled chemicals. Once thesurvey had identified the minority ofcompanies whose activities fell within theambit of the Convention, those companieswere sent a manual outlining theirConvention-related responsibilities. An annualmeeting involving these companies, theNational Authority, and the central licensingagency, keeps them all informed and up-to-date. In the meantime the National Authoritylearns through the licensing process of newcompanies whose activities must bemonitored. To date, Dutch industry has fullysupported the Convention and the work of

the OPCW, and all inspections carried out bythe national export police and by the OPCWinspectorate have met with success.

Officials within the Netherlands NationalAuthority stress that the nationalimplementation of the Convention has notbeen entirely uncomplicated, and that it hasvery definitely been a ‘learning process.’ Theyfind that communication – both with theirdomestic industry and with other NationalAuthorities – is imperative, and that theOPCW provides a viable forum for this at itstraining sessions and seminars, and especiallythrough the annual National Authority Day inThe Hague. Through such meetings the Dutchhave established contacts with NationalAuthorities in the rest of the European Unionand Eastern Europe, and in particular in Japan,Canada,Australia, India, the Islamic Republic ofIran, South Africa, and the United States.They

stress, however, that appropriate nationallegislation is an important and necessary toolfor enhancing cooperation between National

Authorities and, in the final analysis, forimplementing the Convention.

Key ingredients in the Dutch system arecoordination, communication, and multi-tasking. The Netherlands tax authority, intowhich the Economic Control Agency wasrecently integrated, goes by the motto,‘Wecan’t make it fun, but we can make it easy.’ Inkeeping with that philosophy, the NetherlandsNational Authority and its associated agencieshave striven to make the rules governing theproduction and use of scheduled chemicals astransparent as possible. Furthermore, theyhave sought to present to Dutch industry asystem of licensing, export controls,declarations and inspections that is logical andthat forms a cohesive whole.

Many lessons can be drawn from the Dutchexample. Firstly, coordination is essential.There are many advantages in a small NationalAuthority that utilises the resources of otheragencies around it, thus avoiding theduplication of activities and responsibilities.Secondly, existing structures and legislationmust be utilised to their utmost, and thirdly,and perhaps most importantly, thecircumstances of each country are unique, andthose in government should thereforeconcentrate on their country’s assets whensetting out to implement the Convention. Asone Dutch official put it, ‘there is no standardrecipe.’ Yet, the ingredients for a successfulNational Authority, and for universaladherence to the Chemical WeaponsConvention, can be found in every country.

The ingredients for asuccessful NationalAuthority, and foruniversal adherence tothe Chemical WeaponsConvention, can befound in every country.

offered a range of opportunities for National Authoritiesto share their experience and exchange information:regional workshops, networks, the National Authority Day– all these measures are intended to assist NationalAuthorities in their difficult tasks and to help them developtheir capacity to implement the treaty.

Synthesis is a natural forum for this exchange of opinionsand knowledge.The series on National Authorities which is

being introduced by this article will enable representativesfrom these bodies to share with their colleagues fromother countries their experience of how they haveaddressed the specific problems which they faced and howthey resolve the myriad practical difficulties involved in theimplementation and verification of the Chemical WeaponsConvention.

By Ralf Trapp, Head, Government Relations Branch, OPCW

The information contained in this article was gathered in an interview by the author with Mr Roelofvan der Kraan and Ms Irma Keijzer, respectively the Head and the Senior Policy Advisor, Division forExport Controls and Economic Sanctions, Directorate-General for Foreign Economic Relations, Ministryof Economic Affairs,The Netherlands.


24

OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUST 2000 – GREEN CROSS

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), likeother disarmament regimes, is an agreementbetween nation states, administered by adedicated Secretariat. What role can a non-governmental organisation (NGO) like GreenCross International play in this arrangement?

When you look at any disarmament treaty, it isobvious that it is a long way from concluding itto implementing it. Just because adisarmament treaty is ‘morally good’ does notmean that it will not run into problems. Atsome time, the treaty has to be implementedsomewhere on the ground. The people wholive close to a planned chemical weaponsdestruction facility are afraid, of course, sincewords like ‘chemical’ or ‘nuclear’ always sounddangerous. They don’t care whether thefacility is for the benefit of a larger, even globalcause, but fear for their own health and theirenvironment. If the contents of the destructionplan do not address their concerns, theprocess will inevitably run into a dead end.

One problem for the government concernedis that in this game it is usually also astakeholder. It developed these chemicalweapons, usually under a shroud of secrecy;and sometimes the circumstances were ratherquestionable. This is where an NGO can be ofbenefit, by facilitating as a neutral third partythe consensus-building process between thegovernment and the local community. I wantto be very clear – NGOs cannot substitute for

the state, since they have neither the legalauthority nor the big money thatgovernments have, but they are often verywell informed about most aspects of the issueand are more innovative in the design of newsolutions.

I also have to say that our experience hasshown us that one key to success is to achievecommunication between all four levelsinvolved in international disarmamentprojects, i.e. the local communities, theregional administrations, the central power,and the international community. Each ofthese levels carries part of the responsibility,and it is important that they all remainconstructively involved. Green Cross places a lot of emphasis on this aspect of its work.

Green Cross International is an NGO withprimarily environmental concerns, typified by theorganisation’s ‘Legacy’ programme. From thatstandpoint, how would you rate the achievementsof the Convention and the OPCW to date?

Well, one has to be clear that the CWC is adisarmament treaty and not an environmentalagreement. However, the Conventionmentions that destruction projects shouldcomply with national environmentalregulations. Although this is good news inprinciple, I am a bit concerned about whetherthis can be enforced in reality. For the UnitedStates and the Russian Federation we have a

pretty good understanding of what kind ofenvironmental safeguards are in place, but forthe other two States Parties that havedeclared possession of chemical weapons,nothing is known. In view of the environmentallegacy that has resulted from excessivesecrecy during the Cold War, this is ratherdisconcerting.

As you are aware, one of the main goals of theOPCW is to attain universality of the CWC.What role do you feel that NGOs in general, andGreen Cross in particular, can play in assistingthe OPCW to reach that goal?

One important role could be in helping tomake chemical weapons a public issue. As longas the question of these weapons is dealt withby just three or four bureaucrats in eachcountry, it will remain difficult to obtain thefinances necessary for their destruction andfor ongoing industry verification, and also togenerate the public pressure creating apsychological barrier against their use, forexample, in terrorist actions. A good exampleof what public awareness can achieve is the1997 Landmine Ban Treaty, which was finallyconcluded because of increasing publicconcern.

Another service provided by Green Cross isto act as a neutral and independent thirdparty in controversial questions, and toprovide open and credible information. Only

Interview with Stephan Robinson

GREEN CROSS

Green Cross is a cooperative and not aconfrontational organisation, and [that] we see ourrole as facilitating the practical realisation, and notnegotiation, of treaties.

By Nadine McNeil


25

if all these elements are present will it bepossible to create the necessary trust amongthe different stakeholders. Otherwise you riskending up, sooner or later, in confrontation,thus stalling or killing the process. In principle,the OPCW has a neutral role, but its mandateis pretty narrow, i.e. it cannot act on questionsoutside the Convention, even if they have adirect impact on implementation. Also, theOPCW will always be a bit restrained in itsactivities, as it is the servant to more than 130masters.

You have suggested that the Convention’sdeadline for the total destruction of chemicalweapons arsenals (2007) is unrealistic . Why doyou say that? Don’t you agree that it wasnecessary to build some degree of urgency intothe destruction of these weapons?

I wish we could simply destroy these weaponsin a few years, but when the Convention wasnegotiated the complexity of safe methods ofdestruction was probably underestimated.There are quite a few reasons why I believethat we cannot meet even the 2012 deadline,but here I will state just two. First, I do not seeenough political interest to push forwardimplementation and to come up with thesubstantial financial means that will benecessary. This does not mean that politiciansare against the CWC, but simply that thereare more urgent issues on their agenda.Thesecond reason is the time that is needed toplan, build, operate and then decommission adestruction facility. Experience in the UnitedStates has shown that this process takes atleast 15 years per facility. Today, many facilitiesworldwide are still in the planning or earlyconstruction phase.

The question of the destruction of the Russianchemical weapons stockpiles remains for themost part unresolved.Although other Stateshave made significant contributions to thismonumental project, you say they have ‘barelyscratched the surface’. What then is the solutionto ‘the Russian problem’?

A successful Russian destruction programmeis certainly key for the credibility of the CWC.You can have long philosophical discussionsabout who should pay for the destruction ofthis gigantic arsenal. In my opinion, if we wantto ensure the credibility of the CWC, then weall have to share the burden. Therefore, I see

that at least four key steps are needed in theimmediate future.

1.The United States must continue its supportfor the Shchuch’ye project under itsCooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)programme, and it must be patient to allowthe Russians, Europeans and other countriesto coordinate their own support efforts;

2.The Russian Duma must allocate sufficientfunds to support infrastructure developmentin Shchuch’ye, and to ensure funding for thefacility operation over its entire lifetime. Thismeans a financial commitment of at least US $20–25 million per year ;

3.The Russian government must provide bothclear national programme leadership andbetter support for foreign supportprogrammes. It should also stress theimportance of accountability andtransparency of the flows of internationalfinances; and

4. Finally, the European countries, eitherbilaterally or through the European Union, aswell as other States Parties to the CWC, mustalso bear some of the cost burden forShchuch’ye and the other six Russian CWstockpile sites, and provide a reasonablematch to the US efforts.

The failure of the Russian destructionprogramme would seriously undermine the

INTERNATIONAL

Dr Stephan Robinson holds a PhD in nuclear physics from Basel University. During his compulsory

army service he worked in NC-defence, and since 1994, he has been with Green Cross International

as Co-ordinator of the Legacy Programme. In this capacity he has had the opportunity to meet with

all of the various groups involved in chemical demilitarisation at the global level, from governments to

individual citizens. In the few moments he is not working, he plays Balkan folk music with his band and

gives regular concerts.

Dr Bertrand Charrier, Executive Directorof Green Cross International, is leading adiscussion on the ‘Environmental Legacyof Wars’ program at the biannual GreenCross General Assembly in Geneva in June2000.Also at the head table (l-r) areCharrier, Dr.Alexander Likhotal, GreenCross Vice President; Green CrossPresident Mikhail Gorbachev; PavelPalezchenko, translator; and SwissParliamentarian Roland Wiederkehr,GC Special Advisor.


spirit of the CWC, including all the positivenew elements it has introduced intodisarmament. This will clearly have seriousimplications for future disarmamentnegotiations and multilateral efforts toprevent the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction.

The activities of the OPCW are governed by theChemical Weapons Convention, which dealsexclusively with the activities of Member States.That restriction can of course lead to somecurrent issues being ignored. Is this where theOPCW could benefit from the activities ofNGOs?

I think that not only the OPCW but alsoStates Parties can benefit from NGOs. In myexperience, NGOs usually have a morecomplete network with all stakeholders, moreup-to-date information, and sometimes also alarger view of all the issues involved. Forexample, many European countries involvedin Russia contact me regularly in order to geta third-party opinion on the situation andwhat is needed, because Green Cross hasaccess to unofficial information and also knowthe local stakeholders.

Also, because we are an NGO, we aresometimes given information that would notbe given to States Parties. We are sometimesused as an informal communication channel,or are even asked to ar ticulate ideas that thegovernment cannot do itself.

Last, but not least, NGOs have access tosources of funding that may not be availableto governments, such as charitablefoundations and private donors. In manycases, such funding can help us to address

issues that might otherwise be neglected.Governments have more problems in reactingflexibly on these issues, as they usually arerestricted by their parliamentary mandates.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),for various reasons, does not seem to beenjoying the same success as the CWC has,

and yet biological weapons ought to have similarimportance to the world’s nations. Is the BWC a major concern for Green Cross, and how wouldyour organisation seek to influence itsdevelopment?

First, I want to stress that Green Cross is acooperative and not a confrontationalorganisation, and that we see our role asfacilitating the practical realisation, and notnegotiation, of treaties. This means that webecome involved when parties have alreadyagreed in principle to disarm and to renouncecertain types of weapons, but then haveproblems with the practical implementation.I’m not sure whether there is such a general

agreement in the biological field as there is inthe chemical field. We have not yet found aniche where our involvement could make ameaningful difference. However, biologicalweapons are an item on our agenda andperiodically we reassess where we could bemost useful in contributing to the successfulimplementation of the BWC.

26

OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUST 2000 – GREEN CROSS

I think that not only the OPCW but also States Parties canbenefit from NGOs. NGOs usually have a more completenetwork with all stakeholders, more up-to-date information,and sometimes also a larger view of all the issues involved.

A good example of what

public awareness can

achieve is the 1997

Landmine Ban Treaty,

which was finally

concluded because of

increasing public concern.Green Cross International hosteddelegates from over two dozen nationalGreen Cross affiliates on five continentsat its biannual General Assembly inGeneva in June, 2000. Over fiftydelegates joined Green Cross PresidentMikhail Gorbachev here at the end ofthe three-day meeting.


27

In 1995 Green Cross organised a publicmeeting in Shchuch’ye, in the Kurgan region

of Russia, to discuss plans for the destructionof the Shchuch’ye chemical weaponsstockpile. Several hundred local residentspacked the small town hall, and many morestood outside in the square. Tensions wereobviously running very high in the community.The Shchuch’ye facility, one of the seven majorchemical weapons arsenals in Russia, had beenchosen by Russia and the United States as thesite for US support through its CooperativeThreat Reduction (CTR) programme.

As the two dozen American visitors andspeakers, including US governmentrepresentatives and contractors, filed throughthe crowd into the hall, shouts could be heard:Why are you bringing American chemicalweapons here? Why are you experimentingon us with unproven technologies? Why areyou smuggling nuclear weapons here todestroy them? Other opponents of theplanned CW destruction facility held up signsboldly proclaiming ‘No development – nodemilitarisation!’, highlighting their objectionto the planned CW destruction facility unlesssignificant investments were first made toimprove the infrastructure in this extremelypoor region.

The events in Shchuch’ye illustrate the strongand, at times, uninformed local and regionalconcerns and heightened mistrust that haveaccompanied the weapons destructionprogrammes in Russia, the United States, andelsewhere. Such local protests representformidable challenges for successfulprogramme implementation, anddemonstrate the need for full stakeholderinvolvement in decision making at all levels.

Green CrossGreen Cross International (GCI) was foundedin 1993 by former Soviet President MikhailGorbachev and other prominent leaders fromthe United States, Russia, Japan, Switzerlandand the Netherlands. Since then, it hasexpanded more than fivefold, with 26 nationalaffiliates on five continents, and is nowimplementing a wide variety of programmes.Green Cross grew out of the 1992 UnitedNations Conference on Environment andDevelopment (the ‘Earth Summit’) in Rio deJaneiro, at which many participants voicedtheir concerns over the lack of an effectiveglobal advocate for the environment. GCI wastherefore founded to help create, in broadterms, a sustainable future by cultivatingharmonious relationships between peopleand the environment. A central point in GCI’sworking philosophy is that cooperation with

all stakeholders, not confrontation, is the mostproductive approach to resolving problems.In 1994 GCI and its President MikhailGorbachev established the EnvironmentalLegacy of Wars programme to facilitate thesafe and environmentally sound destruction ofCold War weapons arsenals. As PresidentGorbachev pointed out,‘These weaponspresent real threats to local, national, andinternational security; it’s high time wedestroyed them in the safest and mostappropriate ways’. Over the last six years,three of GCI’s national affiliates – GlobalGreen USA, Green Cross Russia, and GreenCross Switzerland – have combined efforts tofacilitate consensus at the local, regional,national and global levels, in order to moveforward with weapons demilitarisationprogrammes.

The Legacy programme is just one of GCI’smajor efforts. Other programmes include:

– the ‘Environmental Education andCommunication’ programme, which utilisesworkshops, seminars, newsletters, youth ar tcontests, websites, conferences, and awardceremonies to raise public awareness of theneed to adopt environmental principles;– the ‘Energy and Resource Efficiency’programme, which promotes changes in

FACILITATING CHEMICALWEAPONS DESTRUCTIONGreen Cross Legacy ProgrammeBy Sergei Baranovsky, Stephan Robinson and Paul Walker

Sergei Baranovsky, Stephan Robinson and Paul Walker manage the Green CrossLegacy programmes in Russia, Switzerland and the United States, repectively.

The Legacy programme addresses issues such as the destruction of Cold War

weapons, the environmental impacts of the wars in the Persian Gulf and in the

Balkans, the long-term health consequences of the Vietnam War, and public

health issues related to the Cold War in Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine.


28

OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUST 2000 – FACILITATING

energy consumption patterns in order toreduce energy use, to stem climate change,and to conserve natural resources;– the ‘Water and Desertification’ programme,which mediates in conflicts in water-stressedregions and promotes appropriatemanagement of river basins and of dry zonesaffected by land degradation; and – the ‘Earth Charter’, an effort to improveglobal governance systems.

The Legacy programme addresses issues suchas the destruction of Cold War weapons, theenvironmental impacts of the wars in thePersian Gulf and in the Balkans, the long-termhealth consequences of the Vietnam War, andpublic health issues related to the Cold War inRussia, Belarus and the Ukraine. Green Crossand its affiliates always undertake these effortsas third-party, neutral facilitators andmediators, an approach that affords themaccess to, and legitimacy among allstakeholders, including local, regional andnational officials, citizens, academics and publicinterest groups.

In the field of chemical weapons, Legacy’sproject ‘ChemTrust’ (‘Chemical weapons:Trustbuilding for their destruction’) aims toseek practical local solutions to the issue ofdestruction. Under this project, local outreachoffices have been established at five of theseven Russian stockpile sites; seven publichearings and workshops have been organisedat the local and regional levels; andinformation has been distributed throughboth electronic and print media. Citizens’advisory boards have also been created tostimulate national dialogue and to encouragelocal participation in innovative technologydevelopment, and Russian–Americanexchanges and partnerships have beenpromoted.This work has been fundedthrough public charitable contributions,

foundation grants, and British, Swiss and USgovernment contracts.

In the process of destroying chemicalweapons, a number of fundamental challengesdeserve specific mention here.

Deadlines versus reality The Chemical Weapons Conventionstipulates that all CW arsenals must beabolished not later than 10 years after theentry into force of the Convention, by 2007,with a possibility for the Conference of theStates Parties to grant an extension of up tofive years, to 2012.This timeframe ofmaximum 10–15 years has placed noticeablepressure on the implementing agencies inboth the United States and Russia. Over thelast five years, funding constraints, delays inobtaining environmental permits,technological problems, and local politicalconcerns have combined to make theselegally binding deadlines appear unrealistic.For example, local officials have stated that ifgiven the choice between meeting theConvention’s deadlines or waiting for greatersafety and public health assurances, theywould opt for the latter in order to protecttheir constituents. It could be that the timerequired for planning, obtaining permits,

constructing and putting into operation achemical weapons destruction facility in somecases would be as much as 12 years or more,so that all of the Russian and at least two USsites might not be able to meet the 2012deadline.This ‘deadline versus reality’ issueoften leads to conflicting approaches andconfrontations in programmeimplementation.

The funding gapIt is apparent that when chemical weaponswere being produced decades ago in suchlarge numbers and in such complicated ways,little thought was given to dismantling them.Today, it is estimated that it will cost $25billion to destroy the total of 70,000 tonnes ofmunitions contained in the Russian andAmerican CW arsenals, an amount thatdwarfs the initial costs of production.TheUnited States is committing more than $1billion annually to its destruction programme,and has already destroyed almost 20% of itsarsenal, but Russia finds itself unable toprovide the finance needed to implement itsdestruction programme.The United Stateshas therefore committed itself to helpingRussia demilitarise as well, through the eight-year-old Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)programme.The United States has borne thelargest part of the Russian chemicaldestruction burden to date, having spentsome $150 million on planning andtechnology development for the Shchuch’yesite. Other States Parties to the ChemicalWeapons Convention (including Germany,Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden andSwitzerland) and the European Union havepledged a total of $50 million, although this isonly 2–3% of the amount Russia will need toeliminate its CW stockpiles.

It is clear that the United States must continueits support, through the CTR programme, for

NGOs can play an essential role in the

implementation of programmes such as the

historic elimination of chemical weapons.

Green Cross President MikhailGorbachev, on the occasion of thebiannual Green Cross General Assemblyin Geneva in June, 2000, signed threedozen letters to US, Russian, andEuropean leaders appealing forexpanded support of Russian chemicalweapons destruction and fullimplementation of the ChemicalWeapons Convention.


Russian chemical weapons destruction; this isthe ‘long pole’ in the weapons destructiontent. If this ‘long pole’ is removed, the tent mayremain standing for a while, but it will collapsesooner or later. Other States Parties to theConvention must also increase their support ifRussia is to have any chance of success inmeeting the treaty’s deadlines.

Infrastructure needsMost of the local communities that have beenaffected by these large chemical weaponsarsenals are in need of considerableinfrastructure development.This is particularlythe case in Russia, where many towns andvillages still lack the most basic necessities,such as adequate housing, central utilities,sewerage and potable water supply systems,schools, emergency and public health services,roads and bridges. In many cases it isimpossible to construct and operate adestruction facility without first upgrading theinfrastructure. One American community –Tooele, Utah – has even required the Army toprovide local compensation in fees-per-tonnein order to destroy the stockpile. Russia, withWestern support, must commit itself toproviding an adequate infrastructure that willbring the communities living near destructionfacilities into the 21st century. Suchdevelopments must also be well planned,perhaps through the international community,in order to prevent a ‘boom and bust’ cycle,and to build a truly sustainable economy inthese regions.

The technology gap Not only is it expensive to destroy chemicalweapons in secure, automated facilities, it isalso very complicated, requiring extensiveR&D to devise new technologies that areindividually appropriate for each weaponstype and stockpile site.The incinerationprocess used in the United States, for

example, has undergone thousands ofengineering design changes since it was firstinstalled over a decade ago. Recent leaks ofnerve agent from the smokestack at Tooele,and ongoing difficulties in safely destroyingdunnage (related non-agent waste such aswood and plastics), illustrate that fur thertechnology development is necessary. Mostexperts now recognise that there is no ‘silverbullet’ to the problems involved in destroyingchemical agents and munitions, and that avaried toolbox of complementarytechnologies, not all of which are yet fullydeveloped, will be necessary to carry out thetask of full and safe destruction.

Public involvement In constructing very large CW destructionfacilities and, ultimately, in abolishing an entireclass of weapons of mass destruction, perhapsthe most challenging aspect is to ensure thatall stakeholders are involved in the decisionsthat will affect their lives.The extent of publicinvolvement may vary from site to site, but apro-active outreach effort – not just publicrelations – is needed, preferably by a neutralthird party, to ensure that the demilitarisationprocess is properly and successfullyimplemented. For example, if anenvironmental non-governmentalorganisation (NGO) opposes the plans tobuild and operate a destruction facility, theensuing legal proceedings will inevitably causedelays and lead to additional costs. If local orregional officials oppose a technology, lawscan be passed to block implementation. Iflocal public health or environmental officialsare unconvinced, permits can be withheld orwithdrawn.Therefore, the ongoinginvolvement of the public, including regulatoryofficials, in the planning, monitoring andexecution of any demilitarisation programmeis absolutely essential to ensure success in thelong term.The American experience in recent

years has clearly shown the benefits of publicoutreach for the quality of the entire process.

In Shchuch’ye, for example, the Legacyprogramme has helped facilitate publicinvolvement for more than three years.Activities have included public hearings thatare open to all stakeholders; pro-activeoutreach to the press, citizens and publicofficials; maintenance of local informationoffices; independent risk and healthassessments; emergency preparednesstraining; public involvement training forRussian citizens in the USA; and partneringbetween Shchuch’ye and US stockpile sites.We are also in process of establishing aCitizens’Advisory Commission, which willhelp to oversee and advise thedemilitarisation process. Although theseefforts have not totally overcome localconcerns and opposition, they have served toempower the community, to raise criticalissues and, we believe, to improve the wholestockpile destruction programme.

Over the past five years of the Legacyprogramme, we have learned that NGOs canplay an essential role in the implementation ofprogrammes such as the historic eliminationof chemical weapons, especially in view oftheir legitimacy among many stakeholdercommunities. We therefore urge MemberStates of the OPCW to include NGOs inorganisational proceedings as well. GreenCross, under President Gorbachev’sleadership, is fully committed to helpingfacilitate the implementation of the ChemicalWeapons Convention, not only because of itsgoal to eliminate all such weapons, but also forthe important and long-term precedent it setsfor global disarmament and verification ingeneral.

29

Dr Paul F. Walker is Director of the Legacy Program of Global Green USA, an effort focusing on military toxic

waste cleanup and other legacies of the Cold War. He was formerly a Professional Staff Member of the Armed

Services Committee in the US House of Representatives where he served as

a senior advisor to the Chairman and full committee. Dr Walker has lectured

widely both in the USA and abroad and has published numerous books,

articles, and op-eds on military and foreign policies as well as teaching at

M.I.T., Harvard, and Tufts University.


30

OPCW SYNTHESIS / AUGUST 2000 – US FUNDING

30

T he United States’ arms control record in1999 was abysmal. The US Senate

rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,and the Clinton administration accelerated itsnational missile defence plans, both widelyreported acts. Little noticed, however, wasanother serious US action with significantimplications for arms control – the suspensionof funding for the Shchuch’ye chemicalweapons destruction facility in Russia.1

Despite the fact that this project is at theheart of the struggling Russian chemicaldemilitarisation effort and is mainly supportedby US dollars, the United States is once againabout to cut funding for it. Such an actionwould intensify fur ther the desperate state ofRussia’s chemical demilitarisation programme.Disturbingly, it would also continue the UnitedStates’ abandonment of its role as the leaderin international arms control.

Located in Russia’s Kurgan region, the Russiantown of Shchuch’ye is home to just over 13percent of the Russian chemical weapons(CW) stockpile, and houses reserves of VX,sarin, soman, and phosgene. 2 The Shchuch’yedestruction facility is one of seven suchfacilities that Russia plans to construct.Although some infrastructure constructionhas begun, progress has been delayed, 3 andfacility construction has not yet star ted.

With an estimated price tag of $1.6 billion forits life cycle, 4 the Shchuch’ye facility is wellbeyond Russia’s budget and requires muchforeign aid. For its part, the United States is inthe process of designing, and hopes toconstruct, a chemical demilitarisation facility atShchuch’ye as part of the Cooperative ThreatReduction (CTR) programme.Washington’sfinancial support for the project began in fiscalyear (FY) 1992 and totalled almost $200million by the end of FY 1999. 5 The USDepartment of Defence (DOD) estimatesthat the total amount of US assistance neededwill be almost $900 million. 6 Pendingcongressional funding this year and in the

US FUNDING FORSHCHUCH’YE INJEOPARDY

By Seth Brugger,Managing Editor, Arms Control Today


3131

future, the United States currently plans tohave the facility ready for operation in 2008. 7

However,Washington opted in 1999 to cutfinancial support for FY 2000, insteadchoosing to give $20 million towardenhancing security at Russia’s existingchemical weapons storage sites. Had theShchuch’ye project received funding,construction activities such as dir t removaland establishing a site office would havebegun. Instead, the project was forced to relyon past funding to continue designing thefacility..8

Currently, the US assistance programme isfocusing on pre-construction activities, whichare just over half way complete and scheduledto finish in March 2001. 9 Activities includepreparing documentation, developing Russianchemical destruction technology, anddesigning the CW destruction facility.Theproject’s next steps, which includeconstruction of the facility, can be undertakenonly with congressional allocation ofadditional funding and the establishment of anadequate infrastructure by Russia. 10(Russianlaw requires infrastructure development, suchas the construction or upgrading of electricaland water systems, before allowing actualconstruction of the destruction facility.) If theproject continues without US funding in thenext fiscal year, it will have proceeded withoutnew US appropriations for two consecutiveyears. According to Michael Morales, a CTRspokesman, if this happens, it is ‘very unlikely’that construction will ever begin. 11

In addition to the United States, Canada, Italy,Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdomhave each announced relatively small financialcontributions to the Shchuch’ye project. TheNetherlands is also considering a donation. 12

DOD estimates that the project will requiresome $721 to $756 million in non-USinternational assistance,13 but so far, currentfunding is about four percent of that amount.

International donations to Russia’s overallchemical demilitarisation effort have not faredmuch better. In addition to the abovecountries, only the European Union, Finland,and Germany have donated aid, despiterepeated Russian assertions that it needsinternational funding to fully implement theChemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

This lack of funds has taken its toll.TheConvention establishes a set of deadlines thatgovern when States Parties must destroy acertain percentage of their chemical weaponsstockpiles. Russia has already failed to meetthe first deadline – the destruction of 1percent of its Category 1 chemical weapons(the highest risk category) by 29 April of thisyear.At its Fifth Session, in May of this year, theOPCW’s Conference of the States Partiesextended this deadline for Russia, giving it until29 April 2002, the date of the next CWCdeadline, to come into compliance. Russia is inserious danger of missing this seconddeadline, the time by which States Partiesmust destroy 20 percent of their Category 1chemical weapons. It is also possible thatMoscow may not meet other future interimdeadlines or the Convention’s final deadline, in2007, for States Parties to destroy all theirchemical weapons. (The OPCW may extendthe latter deadline by up to five years.)

The Shchuch’ye destruction facility is centralto Russia’s chemical demilitarisation effort.Shchuch’ye houses weaponised VX nerveagent loaded in SCUD and FROG warheads,and it is considered to be one of the mostthreatening Russian CW storage locations.14

Despite its slow rate of progress, theShchuch’ye project still represents Russia’smost substantial chemical demilitarisationeffort. Only the Gorny site has progressedfurther, as facility construction began a yearago. However, Gorny poses less of a threatthan Shchuch’ye since its stockpile, comprisedof unweaponised lewisite and mustard gas, isless than three percent of the total Russian

stockpile.15 Other sites lag much furtherbehind. Some survey work has been done atthe Kambarka site, but progress at the othersites has been limited to public involvementand outreach conducted by the internationalorganisation Green Cross International. 16

Reportedly, the Russian Ministry of Defencewants to begin fulfilling Moscow’s CWCobligations by using mobile destructionfacilities until Russia’s chemical weaponsdestruction facilities are operational.However, others in the Russian Governmentappear to oppose these plans.

Despite the all-important role of theShchuch’ye facility in the Russian chemicaldemilitarisation effort, the United States is setonce again to cut project funding for the nextfiscal year. Funding is addressed in twoCongressional bills – an appropriations billand an authorisation bill. Authorisation billsestablish a legal framework in accordancewith which appropriations bills can allocatefunding. A programme can be authorised, butit does not necessarily follow that it will alsobe granted funding in an appropriations bill.For a programme to receive money, theappropriations bill must include funding. Bothhouses of the US legislature – the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate – separatelydraft their own authorisation andappropriations bills and then conference toproduce a final version of each bill.

On the appropriations side, the House andthe Senate both agreed to and passed aconference report in July that includes nofunding for the Shchuch’ye facility. The Housemust now send the report to the president.The president will then have the option ofsigning it into law or vetoing it. If it is vetoed,it will go back to Congress, which can overridethe veto.

The House and Senate have not formallybegun conferencing on the authorisation bills.The Senate’s version, passed on 13 July,

Without international support, theRussian chemical demilitarisationprogramme is destined to fail.


32

NOTES1 Public Law 106-65, 106th Congress, 1st session.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year2000, 5 October 1999.

2 Vladimir Ulyanov, Chemical Stockpile Disposal in the Russian Federation, Russian Ministry of Defense, Spring 1999.

3 General Accounting Office,Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More,Achieve Less Than Planned, GAO/NSIAD-99-76, 13 April 1999.

4 House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, 106th Congress, 2nd session,House Report 106-616.

5 Senior CTR official, telephone conversation with author, 27 July 2000.

6 House Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.

7 Michael Morales, spokesman for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program,personal communication with author,26 July 2000.

8 Morales, telephone conversation,24 July 2000.

9 Morales, personal communication,26 July 2000.

10 Statement by Adolf Ernst, product manager for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, July 2000. Morales, personal communication, 26 July 2000.

11 Morales, telephone conversation,24 July 2000.

12 Senior CTR official, telephone conversation,27 July 2000.

13 House Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.

14 Paul Walker, director, Legacy Program,Global Green USA, telephone conversation with author, 25 July 2000. Dr.Walker conducted an onsite inspection at Shchuch’ye in 1994.

15 Ibid.Vladimir Ulyanov, Op cit.16 Walker, telephone conversation, 25 July 2000.17 House Committee, National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.18 Senior CTR official, telephone conversation,

27 July 2000.19 Ibid.20 Morales, telephone conversation, 25 July 2000.21 Morales, personal communication, 26 July 2000.

Seth Brugger is the Managing Editor of Arms Control Today, a monthly magazine on arms control published by

the Arms Control Association. His primary responsibilities are editing Arms Control Today, working with

research analysts on their contributions to the magazine, and researching and writing on chemical and

biological weapons issues. Before joining the Arms Control Association, Mr Brugger was the editor of

The Arms Control Reporter, a monthly reference journal on arms control issues. As the editor, Mr Brugger

managed and edited the journal and also researched and wrote on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons-

related issues.

approves the Clinton administration’s requestfor $35 million, but has made fundingconditional on four requirements. For fundingto go forward, the Senate wants Russia toagree to provide at least $25 million annuallyof its own money for the Shchuch’ye project.To date, Russia has not come close toappropriating this amount.

The Senate also requires Russia to agree touse Shchuch’ye to destroy the other fourremaining nerve agent stockpiles at the Kisner,Pochep, Leonidovka, and Maradykovsky sites.Meeting this condition could prove difficult,since Russian law bans the transport ofchemical agents from one stockpile locationto another for destruction. The Senate alsomandates the United States to obtainmultiyear commitments from other countriesto fund infrastructure projects at Shchuch’yein amounts sufficient to ensure that the facilityis properly maintained during its life cycle.Finally, the Senate wants Russia to agree todestroy its chemical weapons productionfacilities (CWPFs) at Volgograd andNovocheboksark. (The CWC already requiresStates Parties either to destroy their CWPFsor to convert them to peaceful purposes.)

Unlike the Senate version, the Houseauthorisation bill, passed on 18 May, includesno funding for the Shchuch’ye project. AHouse Armed Services Committee reportaccompanying the authorisation bill said thatone of the reasons why Congress cut fundslast year was Russia’s ‘inability to absorb all ofthe prospective costs’ for the Shchuch’yeproject. The report asserted,‘This concernhas not abated.’The committee was alsoconcerned that Russia would not be able tooperate the facility long enough to fulfil itspurpose, and consequently, the United Stateswould spend ‘more than a billion dollars’without having the facility ‘accomplish itsobjective.’ 17

In summary, the Senate has authorised projectfunding, with conditions, while the House hasnot. A final outcome is pending. Moreimportantly, Congress has opted not toappropriate any money for the project, greatlyslimming the chances of FY 2001 funding.However, even if the United States providesno new money, a senior CTR official indicatedthat the authorisation of construction activity,currently banned by the 1999 legislation,would be helpful. 18

The recent G-8 Summit in July issued acommuniqué in which the leadingindustrialised nations of the world pledged to‘work to increase the level of internationalcontributions to the Russian chemicalweapons destruction programme.’ TheUnited States should take the lead in thisregard since, according to the senior CTRofficial, most other countries’ donations areconditional upon sustained US funding. 19

Furthermore, if the United States does notrenew its funding, it will probably be able tofinish designing the Shchuch’ye facility, but willthen be unable to star t constructing it,20 thuscondemning the project to an uncertainfuture.

Without international support, the Russianchemical demilitarisation programme isdestined to fail. This would deal a seriousblow to the Chemical Weapons Convention,as Russia possesses some 40,000 tons ofchemical weapons, the world’s largeststockpile. Indeed, according to Morales, aclosedown of US financial support forShchuch’ye would ‘probably impact the overallcapability of Russia to meet [its obligationsunder] the Chemical Weapons Convention’. 21

Russia and the international community arecounting on US funding to get the Russianchemical demilitarisation programmeunderway. Given such stakes, the administrationshould take appropriate action to make surethat funding is available for FY 2001 and thatthe Shchuch’ye project is completed.


33

New Permanent Representatives

Turkey

H.E. Mr Aydan Karahan, thePermanent Representative of Turkey to theOPCW,presented his credentials to Director-General José Bustani on 4 May 2000.Prior to his current posting as Ambassador to the Netherlands and PermanentRepresentative to the OPCW, Mr Karahanserved as Deputy Undersecretary forAdministrative Affairs and as an Advisor at theMinistry of Foreign Affairs. Between 1996 and1997, he was Acting Director-General of theDirectorate General of Press and Information.Mr Karahan has also served as Turkey’sambassador to Northern Cyprus and toLebanon, and has held diplomatic positions atother Turkish embassies, including in the USAand the former Soviet Union. During histenure at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr Karahan has held a number of positions indifferent departments, including the Economicand Social Affairs Department and theBilateral Economic Relations Department.

Ambassador Karahan is a graduate of theFaculty of Political Sciences at AnkaraUniversity.

Eritrea

H.E. Ms Hanna Simon Ghebremedhin,the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the OPCW, presented her credentialsto Director-General José Bustani on 10 May 2000.Prior to taking up her current posting asAmbassador Extraordinary andPlenipotentiary to the European Union and

the Benelux, Ms Ghebremedhin served from1993 to 1999 as the desk officer in-charge ofScandinavian countries and Eastern andCentral Europe at the Ministry of ForeignAffairs.After joining the Eritrean liberationstruggle in 1997, Ms Ghebremedhin held anumber of positions in the Eritrean People’sLiberation Front, including in research andtraining and in the monitoring service, in theDepartments of Information and Culture.

Ambassador Ghebremedhin has a post-graduate degree specializing in internationalrelations from the Institut Internationald’Administration Publique, Paris.

Estonia

Chargé d’Affaires Mr AndrusNormet, the Permanent Representative of Estonia to the OPCW, presented hiscredentials to Director-General José Bustanion 11 May 2000.Prior to taking up his current posting asChargé d’Affaires to the Netherlands andPermanent Representative to the OPCW,Mr Normet served from 1997 to February2000 as Division Director of the PoliticalDepartment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.In that position, he was Division Director forWestern and Southern Europe, NorthAmerica, and previously also for NorthernEurope. His previous diplomatic posting wasin Denmark, from 1993 to 1996.At theMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Normet hasheld positions in the Political Department andin the Information and Press Department.

Mr Normet has a masters degree inphilosophy from Saint Petersburg University,Russia. He is fluent in English, Danish, Finnish,and Russian, and is also familiar with French,German, and Norwegian.

Oman

Ambassador Khadija bint Hassanbin Salman Al Lawati, AmbassadorExtraordinary and Plenipotentiary to theKingdom of the Netherlands and PermanentRepresentative of Oman to the OPCW,presented her credentials to Director-General José Bustani on 12 May 2000.Prior to becoming Ambassador, Mrs Al Lawatiserved as the Deputy Head of Economic andTechnical Cooperation from 1997 to 1999.Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, she hasheld the posts of First Secretary in theDepartment of International Conferences andCounsellor. Mrs Al Lawati was transferred tothe Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1975 from aprevious post in the Ministry of Development.Ambassador Al Lawati has a bachelors degreein English Literature from the University ofBaghdad, and has also studied in the UnitedKingdom and the United States.


34

Mr Jaime Burgos MoralesCounsellor, Embassy of PeruAlternate Representative to the OPCW

Upon graduating fromthe DiplomacyAcademy of Peru in1982, I joined thediplomatic service andserved in the former

Soviet Union (1984-86), Portugal (1986-90)and Egypt (1993-97).

At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I workedfirstly in the Multilateral Division; then in theInternational Cooperation Office, as Head ofthe North, Central and South AmericaDepartment, and as Officer-in-Charge of theAsia Department; and subsequently in theBilateral Division, as Head of the Middle Eastand European Union Departments.

I arrived in The Hague in April 2000 to take upmy new assignments as Counsellor-DeputyHead of Mission at the Embassy of Peru, andalso as Alternate Representative to theOPCW. I find the latter responsibility achallenge, considering the importantcontribution of the OPCW to achieving thegoal of a world free of weapons of massdestruction.Within this context Peru isworking actively towards the full and universalimplementation of the Chemical WeaponsConvention.

I am married with two children.

Mr Li ChijianAttaché, Embassy of ChinaAlternate Representative to the OPCW

I joined the diplomaticservice in 1997. Sincethen, I have beenworking in the ArmsControl andDisarmament

Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairsdealing with CWC issues.

I arrived in The Hague in early March 2000.Since it is my first assignment in a foreigncountry, I am finding it both exciting andchallenging to experience multilateraldiplomatic activities. I regard this young andenergetic organisation as an important pillarin the arms control field, and I am grateful for

this opportunity to serve as a diplomat for mycountry.

I am accompanied by my wife, and we bothenjoy life here very much.

Mr Mohammad KhodadadiCounsellor, Embassy of IranDeputy Permanent Representative to the OPCW

After graduating insociology fromHayward StateUniversity in California,Mr Khodadadi returnedto Iran and became

head of the news information section atIranian Radio and Television. He then joinedthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in 1982took up his first foreign service appointmentas chargé d’affaires at the Embassy of theIslamic Republic of Iran in Canberra,Australia.

From 1990 to 1995, he was Deputy Head ofMission at the Iranian Embassy in Paris, wherehe took the opportunity to learn French.During this period he served as therepresentative of the Embassy to UNESCOand the Council of Europe.

Mr Khodadadi returned to Iran in 1995 andwas appointed Deputy Director of theDepartment of Disarmament andInternational Affairs at the Ministry of ForeignAffairs (1995–1997). In the meantime, heattended various international fora andconferences, such as IPU in Sofia, OIC inDakar and Jedda (1995), the Conference onDisarmament and the Biological WeaponsConvention in Geneva (1996), COPUOS inVienna (1997), and UNDC in New York(1997). He then joined the Iranian NationalAuthority for the Chemical WeaponsConvention before being posted to TheHague.

As a result of his close contacts with theIranian victims of the chemical weapons thatwere used during the Iran–Iraq war, MrKhodadadi developed a strong commitmentto contribute to the best of his ability toupholding the goals and objectives of theConvention. He is currently serving as theDeputy Permanent Representative of Iran tothe OPCW in The Hague. He is married andhas three children.

Mr Hasyim SalehMinister, Deputy Chief of Mission,Embassy of IndonesiaDeputy Permanent Representative to the OPCW

I joined the Ministry ofForeign Affairs in 1973after graduating inInternational Relationsfrom the Faculty ofSocial and Political

Science, Gajah Mada University, Indonesia.Before serving in The Hague, I was posted inBangkok, Brasilia and Riyadh, while myprevious assignment in the Ministry was asDirector for Middle East and African Affairs.

As the second man in the Embassy here,besides assisting my Ambassador in thefurtherance of the interest of my country inThe Netherlands, I am also assigned to theOPCW. Considering my background is indealing with bilateral issues, OPCW issues arenew for me and very challenging. However,with close working relations with friends fromother missions, I hope that I could do my duty.

In The Hague, my wife and one daughteraccompany me, while my two sons arecontinuing their studies in Indonesia.

Other New DelegatesMs Benetia Chingapane (Botswana);Mr Carlos Eduardo Ospina Cruz (Colombia);Mrs Sonia Marina Pereira Portilla (Colombia);Mrs Marie-Cruz Evuna Andeme (EquatorialGuinea); Mr Vladimir Novakovic (FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia); Mrs Sanja Milinkovic(Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); Mr JovicaCekic (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia);Mr Vladimir Sreckovic (Federal Republic ofYugoslavia); Col. Radisav Petrovic (FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia); Mr TeimurazGamtsemlidze (Georgia); Mr AltynbekYegizbayev (Kazakhstan); Mr Raja AznamNazrin (Malaysia); Mr Eduardo vanGlassenapp (Paraguay); Ms Liliana Pasecinik(Moldova); Mr Andrei Dragancea (Moldova);Mr Dorian Mihai, Counsellor (Romania);Mrs Daniela Bazavan,Third Secretary(Romania); Mr Vladislav V. Nakorchemny,Second Secretary (Russian Federation); Ms Ester James(St. Lucia); Mr Mansour AttytallahAlmazmoumi (Saudi Arabia); Mr Anani KokouNyawouame (Togo); Mr Djobo E. Palanga(Togo); Mr Sébadé Toba (Togo)

Newcomers


35

The Director-General, Mr José Bustani, visited the Czech Republic from28–31 May 2000 at the invitation of the Czech Government. While inthe Czech Republic, he met with H.E. Mr Jan Kavan, the Deputy Prime

Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; H. E. Mr Vladimir Vetchy, theMinister of Defence; H. E. Mr Miroslav Grégr, the Minister of Industryand Trade; Senator Krámek, the Vice-Chairman of the SenateCommittee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security; Senator Matuska,a member of the Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence andSecurity; Mr Doktor, a member of the lower house of the CzechParliament, Foreign Relations Committee; and Mr Teplik, a member ofthe lower house of the Czech Parliament, Economic Committee.

While in the Czech Republic, the Director-General also visited twofacilities – the State Institute of Nuclear, Chemical and BiologicalProtection in Pøíbram; and the Military Technical Institute of Protectionin Brno.

In his talks with Czech officials, Mr Bustani commended the CzechRepublic’s exemplary record of implementation of the CWC. He alsosaid that the Secretariat valued the close cooperation between theCzech authorities and the OPCW, as well as the support rendered bythe Czech authorities to the OPCW on matters of training andassistance under Article X of the Convention.The Director-Generalasked the Minister for support in promoting the goals of theConvention in the Middle East and in Africa.

T he Director-General, Mr José Bustani,spoke at a meeting of ambassadors from

the Latin American and Caribbean countrieson the implementation of the ChemicalWeapons Convention and on issuesspecifically related to Latin America and theCaribbean.

He visited the Cuban Institute of GeneticEngineering and Biotechnology, and brieflyparticipated in the OPCW workshop onchallenges and opportunities in theimplementation of the Chemical WeaponsConvention, which coincided with his visit.

Mr Bustani was accompanied by the DeputyMinister for International Cooperation of theMinistry of Science and Technology, Mr FabioFajardo, and the Cuban PermanentRepresentative to the OPCW,Mrs Sonia Díaz Yera. In addition, the Director-General had the opportunity to meet with other high-ranking Cuban officials.

In his talks, the Director-General stressed theneed to ensure the Convention’s universalityas the only way to guarantee theimplementation of the treaty’s goals andobjectives. In this regard he stressed that therewere still countries in the Caribbean regionwhich have signed but not yet ratified theConvention, and others which have not yetacceded to it. He indicated that theConvention was a unique non-discriminatorydisarmament treaty, and that its provisionsrelating to assistance, protection andinternational cooperation were specificallydesigned to provide incentives to countrieslike Cuba, which do not possess eitherchemical weapons or a highly developedchemical industry, to join the CWC. Heinvited the Cuban Government to promotethe goal of the Convention’s universality in theCaribbean region, and received a positiveresponse from the Cuban authorities.

In addition, the Cuban authorities reiteratedtheir government’s commitment to fullcompliance with the Convention, as well as itswillingness to continue to demonstrate thefullest possible cooperation with itscompliance mechanisms.They also expressedtheir preparedness to share with otherMember States the experience acquired inthe process of implementing the Convention.

Other issues of mutual interest were alsodiscussed, including the importance that Cubaattributes to the Organisation’s internationalcooperation programmes.The Cubanauthorities expressed their appreciation forthe benefits received by their NationalAuthority through the OPCW’s capacitybuilding programmes, as well as theirappreciation for the support given to someCuban scientists through the InternationalCooperation and Assistance Division.

The Director-General met with several LatinAmerican and Caribbean ambassadorsaccredited in Havana.

The Cuban national press commentedextensively on Mr Bustani’s visit. His interviews were broadcast on national radio and television news programmes.

Outreach Activities

The Director-General Visits Cuba

At the invitation of the Cuban Government and its National Authority, theDirector-General paid an official visit to Cuba from 4–7 June 2000.During his stay in Cuba, the Director-General had meetings with theMinister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Science,Technology and theEnvironment, and the Minister of Basic Industry.

Director-General’s Visit to the

Czech Republic

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36

T he purpose of the meeting was toreview the status of implementation of

the Convention in the region, and to identifyways and means to improve regionalcooperation between National Authoritiesand collaboration with the OPCW.

The participants reiterated their satisfactionregarding the absence of chemical weapons inLatin America and the Caribbean, and theneed to promote universal adherence to theConvention throughout the region.Theyhoped that the frequent contacts betweenthe Secretariat and the Association ofCaribbean States would continue to fosteruniversality in that part of the world. In thiscontext, they also noted the entry into forceof the restrictions on trade in Schedule 2chemicals and discussed the implications forthe economies of the countries in the regionand for regional cooperation.

The participants discussed in detail a widerange of issues relating to verification,legislation, assistance, protection andinternational cooperation.They acknowledgedthe importance of the role of customsauthorities in the implementation process, andbenefited from a special presentation by therepresentative of the Peruvian NationalAuthority on this subject.They suggested thatthe Secretariat consider organising a regionalseminar for customs authorities to facilitatethe exchange of experiences for the benefit ofthe implementation process.

The participants recognised the benefit ofestablishing a regional network of legalexperts who could provide assistance, uponrequest, to States Parties in the process ofpreparing their national implementinglegislation. Such assistance could benefit allStates in the region and would complementthat provided by the Secretariat in this field.

The representatives of the Latin Americanand Caribbean National Authorities reviewedtheir contributions to the second meeting ofNational Authorities and chemical industry

representatives, which was held in The Haguein May 2000.They agreed that this annualevent provides an excellent opportunity forthem to interact with representatives ofNational Authorities from other regions andto exchange experiences.

The second regional meeting of NationalAuthorities in Latin America and theCaribbean will be held in Chile in 2001.

First Regional Meeting of National Authorities in Latin America

and the Caribbean Lima, Peru

From 28–30 March 2000, representatives of the National Authorities of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay,Venezuela and Spain, met inLima, Peru, for the first regional meeting of National Authorities in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The National Authority of Bulgaria, incooperation with the Secretariat, organised anational course on the Convention in late Mayand early June 2000 at the InteroperabilityCentre of the Ministry of Defence in Sofia.The OPCW participation in the course was

confined to the week of 5-9 June 2000, duringwhich a total of ten lectures were delivered byrepresentatives of the External RelationsDivision and the Inspectorate to about 20participants from the relevant ministries andinstitutions, including the Bulgarian Ministry of

Defence.The course helped to prepare thoseinvolved in the implementation of theConvention to use proper terminology andprocedures in fulfilling their obligations underthe Convention, and also reviewed the workundertaken so far in this regard.The Bulgarianauthorities are currently in the process ofdrafting legislation to facilitate the nationalimplementation of the Chemical WeaponsConvention.

National Course Organised by the

National Authority of Bulgaria Sofia, Bulgaria

Outreach Activities



37

The purpose of the workshop was twofold: tobring to the attention of signatory States inCentral America and the Caribbean theopportunities that the Convention offers todeveloping countries, and to take a closer lookat ways and means to facilitate theimplementation of the provisions related toassistance, protection and internationalcooperation.

The workshop focused on the Convention’sprovisions regarding protection in the eventof the use or threat of use of chemicalweapons. An adequate protective capacity isimportant not only in relation to chemicalweapons, but also in other circumstances, suchas an accidental release of toxic industrialchemicals, or a terrorist attack involving toxicchemicals.As stipulated in the Convention, theSecretariat can provide expert advice to

States Parties on the implementation ofprogrammes for the development of aprotective capacity. In turn, States Parties arerequired to inform the Secretariat of thestatus of their protective programmes, with aview to increasing transparency. The Secretariathas set up and is developing a data bank onprotection so that all States Parties can easilyaccess information that can be used toimprove their national programmes related to protection. Furthermore, a protectionnetwork has been established, composed ofprotection specialists from various StatesParties.

The participants also discussed theConvention’s provisions regarding assistanceto the victims of the use or threat of use ofchemical weapons. It was concluded that asignificant increase in the Voluntary Fund for

Assistance – which have stood for some timeat just over NLG 1.25 million – is necessary.Although it is hoped that the assistanceprovisions of the Convention will never needto be used, the credibility of the entireOrganisation would be jeopardised if theSecretariat were unable to deliver timely andeffective assistance.Although many countriesin the region do not possess the technicalmeans to provide assistance, the measuresthat States Parties may elect need not belimited to offers of protection equipment orknow-how. Expertise in other fields, such asmedical and paramedical personnel andresources, could also be beneficial.

International cooperation in peaceful uses ofchemistry is becoming an increasinglyimportant aspect of the Secretariat’s activities.As the world’s stockpiles of chemical weaponsdiminish, the importance of internationalcooperation will increase.

Throughout the Latin American region thereis wide adherence to the Convention, andArticle XI constitutes a significant incentive tomembership.Although at present resourcesare limited, the workshop participantsrecognised that the Secretariat is trying tomake the most of them, and is continuallylooking at new ways to improve what is beingdone.The successful implementation ofArticle XI will be of benefit to all StatesParties in the region.

The meetings and workshops organised bythe Secretariat in the region have proved tobe inspiring and useful events where theparticipants are able to exchange practicalexperiences. The potential advantages ofregional cooperation can not be over-emphasised.Workshops such as the one inHavana have a beneficial impact on theparticipating countries, and also set anexample for other regions of the world.

Regional Workshop on the Chemical

Weapons Convention Havana, Cuba

A regional workshop on challenges and opportunities in the implementationof the Chemical Weapons Convention, from assistance and protection tointernational cooperation, was held in Havana, Cuba, from 6–8 June 2000.The participants included representatives of the host country, and of 19 other States Parties:Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, CostaRica, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,Spain, St Lucia,Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.The workshopwas also attended by a representative of the Stockholm International PeaceResearch Institute (SIPRI).


38

Participants from a total of 25 States Parties,mainly from the region, attended the forum,which provide a context within whichgovernment officials, representatives of thechemical industry and the Secretariat coulddiscuss and share their experiences inimplementing the Convention.The forum alsoaimed at promoting the universality of theConvention in the Asia-Pacific region.

The focus of the forum was on declarationsand inspections under Article VI. Presentationscovered areas such as the identification of

declarable activities, declaration obligations,the role of national escorts during OPCWinspections, facility agreements, and issuesrelated to the protection of confidentialinformation.The discussions benefited fromthe participation of experts who had eitherbeen personally involved in a number ofindustry inspections, or who had considerablepractical experience of the identification ofdeclarable industrial facilities.The discussionswere consequently very specific and practical,and were not at all abstract.There also was apresentation by the World Customs

Organisation on the role which theHarmonised System could play in identifyingexports and imports of scheduled chemicals.Finally, an inspector from the OPCWSecretariat presented his experiences of theconduct of chemical industry inspections.

The participants felt they had gained a lotfrom the discussions and had also benefitedfrom the presentations.The forum furtherenhanced the good relationship between thegovernments of Member States and theirchemical industries.

Singapore Regional Forum 2000

From 3–5 May 2000 the National Authority of Singapore, with the support of the OPCW, organised the SingaporeRegional Forum 2000.This forum addressed a range of issues related to the implementation of the Chemical WeaponsConvention, with a particular focus on those related to the implementation of the Convention in the chemicalindustry.

The Government of the Republic of Croatiaand the Secretariat organised a regionalworkshop on the implementation of theChemical Weapons Convention in Dubrovnik,Croatia, from 12–14 April 2000.

The workshop drew participants from 23 Member States, including Croatia’simmediate neighbours and closest tradingpartners:Algeria,Austria, Belarus, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the CzechRepublic, France, Greece, Georgia, Italy,Lithuania, Hungary, Germany, Poland, Romania,Slovakia, Slovenia, the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia,Turkey, the UnitedKingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

The workshop provided a framework withinwhich government officials andrepresentatives of the chemical industry wereable to discuss and share their practicalexperiences in the implementation of theConvention.

In her welcoming address, Ms Ana-MarijaBesker, head of Croatia’s National Authority,reflected on the stability pact for south-eastern Europe and its relationship to thepresent workshop, both of which were ofconsiderable importance for security andcooperation in the region.Ambassador Besker stressed the need for the universalityof the Convention in south-eastern Europe. Inhis opening address, the Deputy Director-General of the OPCW, Mr John Gee called foruniversality throughout the Mediterraneanregion.Ambassador Ignacio Pichardo Pagazaof Mexico, in his capacity as Chairman of theExecutive Council, also addressed theworkshop.

The workshop programme covered a rangeof issues of national, regional and globalsignificance, and also addressed specificconcerns relating to the role of the chemicalindustry in the implementation of theConvention.The participants felt that theworkshop was particularly successful, in that

the discussions ranged beyond the confines ofany one region, thus making the interactionsmore productive for all participants.Thediscussions focused on declarationrequirements and the identification ofdeclarable activities; the receiving of routineinspections; the protection of confidentialinformation; the role of industry inimplementing the Convention; the prohibitionon transfers of Schedule 2 chemicals to Statesnot party to the Convention; the advantagesand possibilities of an integrated approach tothe implementation of international treatiesrelated to the safe management of chemicals;and international cooperation under ArticleXI.The workshop participants underlined theneed to increase awareness within thechemical industry of the Convention and itsrequirements.The participants also addressedthe need to improve coordination betweenNational Authorities.

The participants felt that the workshop madea significant contribution to improving theimplementation process in the region, whilealso fostering regional cooperation andencouraging the universality of theConvention.

Regional Workshop on the

Chemical Weapons Convention

Dubrovnik, Croatia

Outreach Activities

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39

On 10 July 2000,The Mayor of The Hague,Mr W.J. Deetman, visited the OPCW. TheMayor discussed with the Acting Director-General, Mr John Gee, the concerns of theinternational community in The Hague, andways to promote the city as an internationalcentre.

Headquarters Events

On 26 May 2000, Senator María de losAngeles Moreno, in her capacity as Presidentof the Senate of the United Mexican States,visited the OPCW together with her delegation.The Director-General, Mr José M. Bustani,and Mr Sylwin Gizowski accompanied her on a visit to the Ieper Room.

The seminar was attended by participantsfrom 15 States Parties - Chile, China, Cuba,Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan,Pakistan, Poland, the Republic of Korea,Switzerland, the United Kingdom of GreatBritain and Northern Ireland, and the UnitedStates of America.They included delegatesfrom The Hague, governmental experts fromMember States, experts from the ScientificAdvisory Board, and two staff members of theOPCW Secretariat.

As part of the seminar, the participants visitedthe chemical plant in the industrial complex‘Zaklady Azotowe’ in Tarnow, where theholdings of adamsite formerly present inPoland, which dated back to before the end ofthe Second World War, were destroyed in

1999.The participants received informationabout the destruction operations, includingthe safety requirements that had to be met.A video film documenting the final phase ofthe destruction operations was shown, andthe participants were given a guided tour ofthe plant.

During the seminar itself, which took place inthe city of Krynica, Polish experts presented indetail the technology they had developed forthe destruction of adamsite.They discussedthe principal alternatives that had beenassessed for their suitability, the criteria thatwere used to deciding on the technology tobe used, the process chemistry involved, andthe technological and safety considerationsthat had to be addressed.There was a lively

and wide-ranging discussion of these matters,with many technical details being highlighted.

This seminar was a good opportunity for theexchange of scientific and technicalinformation on alternative destructiontechnologies. It was a first step in what bothPoland and the Secretariat perceive as a long-term commitment to scientific andtechnological exchanges and discussions ondestruction technologies within the contextof the OPCW’s international cooperationprogramme.The papers presented during theseminar will be made available to all MemberStates as soon as possible, in the proceedingsof the seminar.

Seminar on Alternative Destruction Technologies

Tarnow and Krynica, Poland

The National Authority of Poland, in collaboration with the OPCW Secretariat, conducted an internationalsymposium on alternative destruction technologies.The seminar specifically focused on the destruction technologydeveloped in Poland for adamsite.The seminar took place in the cities of Tarnow and Krynica, from 26–28 April 2000.


Forthcoming Events

OPCW Events

OPCW/Swedish Chemical Support Team Exercise SwedenNational Authority Training Course Odessa, UkraineBriefing for Brussels-based delegationsBrussels, Belgium11th Meeting of the Executive CouncilThe Hague,The NetherlandsOPCW Regional SeminarBeijing, ChinaTechnical Workshop on the Development of Electronic Tools for National Authorities to Support CEC Declarations in a Common Electronic FormatThe Hague,The NetherlandsVisit by the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme to the OPCWThe Hague,The NetherlandsNational Authority Training Course Tunis,TunisiaHague Workshop for delegations based outside of The HagueThe Hague,The NetherlandsExecutive Council, 21st SessionThe Hague,The NetherlandsOPCW Course on Medical Aspects of Defence Against Chemical WeaponsTehran, IranWorkshop on Legislative IssuesSeville, SpainInternational Symposium on ‘Legal Cooperation & Assistance for Effective Implementation ofInternational Agreements’The Hague,The NetherlandsExecutive Council, 22nd SessionThe Hague,The Netherlands

Other Events

2nd International Symposium on ‘Destruction of Chemical Weapons’Munster, Germany50th Annual Pugwash Conference: Eliminating the Causes of WarCambridge, EnglandUN Millennium SummitNew YorkEXPO 2000 Symposium on Ground Water Sanitation & Drinking Water SupplyMünster, Germany3rd International Workshop on BC-DetectionStenungsbaden, SwedenWilton Pact Conference ‘Eliminating Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Twenty-First Century:What Needs to be Done?’Steyming, United Kingdom21st Session of the BWC Ad Hoc GroupGeneva, Switzerland14th Pugwash CBW Workshop: Key Issues for the Review ConferenceGeneva, Switzerland5th Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on POPS ConventionJohannesburg, South Africa

7–26 August 2000

14–22 August 2000

25 August 2000

1 September 2000

4–8 September 2000

18–19 September

25 September 2000

2–10 October 2000

11–12 October

3–6 October 2000

23–26 October 2000

26–27 October 2000

15–17 November 2000

5–8 December 2000

30 July–3 August 2000

3–8 August 2000

6–8 September



29 September-

1 October 2000

13–24 November

18–19 November

4–9 December


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