online msc/pgdipl/pgcert - ed.ac.uk · online msc/pgdipl/pgcert school of philosophy, ... r....

Epistemology, Ethics and Mind

Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert

SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES

Ethics Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert

Dr Debbie Roberts




Course aims and objectives

This course examines to what extent we can find a place for ethics in a

naturalistic, scientific picture of the world. This is one of the central issues in

contemporary ethics and metaethics, and we will address it by examining some

of the following questions: • Do we have free will? What if determinism is true?

• Can we be held morally responsible for our actions?

• Do moral judgments express beliefs? Are they ever true?

• Are there moral facts?

• What implications does evolution have for morality?

• What implications does neuroscience have for morality?

Intended learning outcomes

By the end of this course, students should: � Have a grasp of fundamental issues and views in philosophy of free will and

moral responsibility, e.g. determinism, compatibilism, incompatibalism,

libertarianism.

� Have a grasp of fundamental issues and views in metaethics, e.g. moral realism,

error theory, expressivism and of some of the implications of evolutionary

theory and recent work in neuroscience for meaethics.

� Be able to critically analyse and engage with literature by key philosophers in

this field.

� Be able to present arguments clearly and concisely both within a classroom

context and in a 2,500 word essay.

� Gain transferable skills in research, analysis and argumentation

People Course lecturer: Dr. Debbie Roberts [email protected]

Course secretary: Ms. Lynsey Buchanan [email protected]

Course librarian: TBA

Teaching assistants: Di Yang [email protected]




Syllabus

Free Will and

Responsibility

Week 1

(date)

Introduction to free will and

moral responsibility

Synchronous seminar

Week 2

(date)

Incompatibilism Synchronous seminar

Week 3

(date)

Compatibilism Asynchronous forum

seminar

Metaethics

Week 4

(date)

Introduction to metaethics,

moral realism

Synchronous seminar

Week 5

(date)

Error theory Asynchronous forum

seminar

Week 6

(date)

Expressivism Synchronous seminar

Week 7

(date)

The challenge from evolution Asynchronous forum

seminar

Week 8

(date)

The challenge from

neuroscience

Synchronous seminar

Week 9

(date)

The explanatory challenge Asynchronous forum

seminar

Week 10

(date)

Moral realism revisited Synchronous seminar

Week 11

(date)

Review Asynchronous forum

seminar

Week 1: Introduction to Free Will and Moral Responsibility

We might naturally think that in order to for us to be subject to moral

requirements at all, i.e. in order for there to be ways that we ought to act, that it

must be the case that we can choose how to act. Similarly, we might naturally

think that for us to be able to be held morally responsible for our actions, it must

be the case that we did them. This week, after an introduction to the issues in this

first section of the course, we’ll look at just what determinism is in more detail.

On the face of it, freedom and responsibility look to be in tension with

determinism. If determinism is true, and human behaviour is causally

determined, how can we ever be held responsible for anything we do? How can

we be subject to moral requirements?

Class readings

1. Kane, R. (2005) ‘The Free Will Problem’ in his A Contemporary Introduction to

Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2. Hoefer, Carl, "Causal Determinism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/determinism-causal/>.




Secondary readings

Butterfield, J. (1998) ‘Determinism and Indeterminism,’ in Routledge

Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig (ed.), London: Routledge.

Earman, J. (1986) A Primer on Determinism, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Eshleman, A. (2009) ‘Moral Responsibility’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/moral-responsibility/

Kane, R. (ed.), (2002) Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell.

O'Connor, T. (2013) ‘Free Will’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward

N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/freewill/

Watson, G. (ed.), (2003) Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Week 2: Incompatibilism.

Incompatibilists think that free will and determinism are just that: incompatible

– we can’t have both. Peter Van Inwaagen provides an argument for

incompatibilism called the Consequence Argument. Hard determinists hold that it

is free will that is illusory. Libertarians claim that determinism is false. Others

prefer not to take a stand on whether determinism is true or false, but who argue

that nonetheless, free will is impossible. Galen Strawson holds such a view.

Class reading

1. Strawson, G. (1994) ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’ Philosophical

Studies, 75: 5-24.

2. van Inwagen, P. (1975) ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism’,

Philosophical Studies, 25: 185–99.

3. Clarke, R. (2002). ‘Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-

Causal Accounts of Free Agency.’ In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Robert

Kane (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 356–85.

Secondary readings

Baker, L. R. (2008) ‘The Irrelevance of the Consequence Argument,’ Analysis, 68

(1): 13–22.

Balaguer, M. (2004) ‘A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of

Libertarian Free Will’, Noûs, 38: 379–406.




Clarke, R. (2003) Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, New York: Oxford University

Press

Kane, R. (2005) ‘Incompatibilism’ in his A Contemporary Introduction to Free

Will’ Oxford: Oxford University Press

Pereboom, D. (2001) Living without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Smilansky, S. (2000) Free Will and Illusion, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Vihvelin, K. (2011) ‘Arguments for Incompatibilism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia

of Philosophy Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/incompatibilism-

arguments/>.

Week 3: Compatibilism

Compatibilism is the view that there really is no conflict between free will and

determinism. If compatibilists are right, then we can have both free will and

determinism and we needn’t worry that future science will undermine our

ordinary conviction that we are free and morally responsible agents. Classical

compatibilists, like David Hume, argue that our natural belief in the

incompatibility of freedom and determinism rests on confusions about the

nature of freedom and the nature of determinism. New compatibilists, like Harry

Frankfurt, argue that free will and moral responsibility doesn’t require that you

could have acted otherwise. New compatibilists, like Peter Strawson, on the

other hand, argue that to understand free will we must focus on the practices of

everyday life and the attitudes we take to each other.

Class readings

1. Hume, D. (1748) ‘Of Liberty and Necessity (in two parts)’ in his An Enquiry

Concerning Human Understanding, Tom L. Beauchamp (ed), Oxford/New York:

Oxford University Press, 1999

2. Frankfurt, H. (1969) ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal

of Philosophy, 66: 820–39

3. Strawson, P.F. (1962) ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of the British

Academy, 68: 187–211.

Secondary readings

Hobbes, T. (1654) ‘Of Liberty and Necessity’ in Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty

and Necessity, Vere Chappell (ed.), 1999, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.




Kane, R. (2005) ‘Compatibilism’ in his A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will,

Oxford: Oxford University Press

Dennet, D. (1984) Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting,

Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press

Fischer, J. ( 2008) ‘Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Vihvelin,’

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38 (3): 327–42.

McKenna, M. (2009) ‘Compatibilism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/compatibilism/

_____ (1998) ‘The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of

Strawsonian Compatibilism,’ Journal of Ethics, 2: 123–42.

Nielsen, K. (1971) ‘The Compatibility of Freedom and Determinism’ in Free Will.

Robert Kane (ed. )Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, 34-46.

Scanlon, T.M., 2008. Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame,

Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Harvard Press.

Smart, J.J.C., 1963. “Free Will, Praise, and Blame,” Mind, 70: 291–306.

Week 4: Introduction to Metaethics, Moral Realism

The task of metaethics is to understand the nature of ethics. More specifically, it is

to understand the nature of moral reality, thought, talk and action. Metaethics is

not ethics in the same way that athletics commentators are not athletes, and

philosophers of science are not scientists. This week, after a more detailed look

at what metaethics is, we turn to G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument, an

argument that is sometimes held to support the autonomy of ethics, the view

that ethics is its own self-contained field, and not continuous with science for

example. We then turn to moral realism, of which Moore was a proponent.

Class reading

1. Moore, G. E. (1903) ‘The Subject Matter of Ethics’ in his Principia Ethica,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2. Cuneo, T. (2007) ‘Moral Realism of a Paradigmatic Sort’ in his The Normative

Web, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Secondary readings

Baldwin, T. (2010) ‘The Open Question Argument’ in The Routledge Companion

to Ethics, John Skorupski (ed.), Oxford: Routledge




Frankena, W. (1939) ‘The Naturalistic Fallacy,’ Mind, 48: 464–477

McNaughton, D. (1988) Moral Vision Oxford: Blackwell Chapters 1 & 3.

Railton, P. (2010) ‘Moral Realism and Its Alternatives’ in The Routledge

Companion to Ethics, John Skorupski (ed.), Oxford: Routledge

Sayre-McCord, G. (2012) ‘Metaethics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/metaethics/

_____ (2011) ‘Moral Realism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Edward

N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/moral-realism/

Smith, M. (2013) ‘Moral Realism’ in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory 2nd ed.

Hugh LaFollette and Ingmar Persson (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell

Week 5: Error Theory

Moral error theorists hold that although moral judgments express beliefs, none

of those beliefs are ever true. Moral judgments, say error theorists, are like

judgments about witches. People may have and express beliefs about witches,

but they are never true because witches don’t exist. And it’s the same for

morality because there are no moral facts for our moral judgments to be about.

The canonical statement of error theory comes from J. L. Mackie. This week we

examine his arguments for the error theory.

Class reading

1. Mackie, J.L. (1977) ‘The Subjectivity of Values’ in his Ethics: Inventing Right

and Wrong London: Penguin.

2. Joyce, R. ‘Moral Anti-Realism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/moral-anti-realism/

sections 1,2 & 4.

Secondary readings

Brink, D. 1984. “Moral realism and the skeptical arguments from disagreement and

queerness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 111-125.

Garner, R.T. 1990. “On the genuine queerness of moral properties and facts.”

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68: 137-146.

Joyce, R. 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.




Lillehammer, H. 2004. “Moral error theory.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

104: 93-109.

Mackie, J.L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

McNaughton, D. 1988. Moral Vision. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Miller, A. 2003. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity.

Shafer-Landau, R. 1994. “Ethical disagreement, ethical objectivism and moral

indeterminacy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 331-344.

Week 6: Expressivism

Like error theorists, expressivists are anti-realists about morality. But unlike

error theorists, expressivists think that moral judgements do not even attempt to

describe some moral reality; rather they express attitudes, emotions,

preferences or desires. This week we examine what expressivism is, and the

main arguments for it.

Class readings

1. Blackburn, S. (1988) ‘How to be an ethical anti-realist’ Midwest Studies in

Philosophy 12(1):361-75

2. Chrisman, M. (2011) ‘Ethical expressivism’ in The Continuum Companion to

Ethics London: Bloomsbury

Secondary readings

Ayer, A.J. [1936] 1971. Language, Truth and Logic. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon.

Blackburn, S. 1993a. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Blackburn, S. 1993b. “Circles, finks, smells and biconditionals.” Philosophical

Perspectives 7: 259-279.

Blackburn, S. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dreier, J. 2004. “Meta-ethics and the problem of creeping minimalism.”

Philosophical Perspectives 18: 23-44.




Hare, R.M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hare, R.M. 1963. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Joyce, R. 2002. “Expressivism and motivation internalism,” Analysis 62: 336-344.

McNaughton, D. 1988. Moral Vision. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Miller, A. 2003. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity.

Week 7: The challenge from evolution

A number of philosophers have claimed that evolutionary theory can be used to

undermine moral realism. These philosophers point out that evolutionary

accounts of the origins of our capacity to be guided by morality don’t require that

our ancestors grasped moral truths nor even that there are any such truths. All

we need to explain our capacity to be guided by morality, they say, is that natural

selection favored the development of such a capacity and tendency because of

the positive effects such traits had on biological fitness. This week we examine

whether this should undermine our confidence in the notions of moral truth and

knowledge.

Class readings

1. Street, S. (2006) ‘A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,’

Philosophical Studies 127: 109-66.

2. Kahane, G. (2011) ‘Evolutionary Debunking Arguments’ Nous 45(1): 103–125

Secondary reading

Fitzpatrik, W. "Debunking Evolutionary Debunking of Ethical Realism," forthcoming

in Philosophical Studies.

_____ "Why There is No Darwinian Dilemma For Ethical Realism," forthcoming in M.

Bergmann and P. Kain eds., eds., Challenges to Religious and Moral Belief from

Evolution and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Joyce, Richard. (2000) “Darwinian Ethics and Error,” Biology and Philosophy, 15:

713–732.

_______ (2002) The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_______ (2006a) The Evolution of Morality, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

_______ (2006b) “Metaethics and the empirical sciences,” Philosophical




Explorations, 9:133-148.

Ruse, Michael and Wilson, E. O. (1986) “Moral Philosophy as Applied Science,”

Philosophy, 61: 173-192. Ruse, Michael. (1998) Taking Darwin Seriously, Prometheus

Books.

Singer, Peter. (1993) Practical Ethics, 2nd Ed., Cambridge University Press. ――

(2005) “Ethics and Intuitions,” The Journal of Ethics, 9: 331–352.

Week 8: The challenge from neuroscience

Can neuroscience help us to answer questions about the nature of ethics?

Metaethical theories make claims about the nature of moral judgments. Because

of this, some philosophers have thought that these theories can, in a sense, be

empirically tested. This week we examine whether neuroscience can tell us

anything about which ethical theories we ought to find more plausible.

Class Reading

1. Greene, J. and Haidt, J. (2002) ‘How (and where) does moral judgment

work?’ in Trends in Cognitive Sciences vol 6, 517-523.

2. Joyce, R. (2008) ‘What Neuroscience can (and Cannot) Contribute to

Metaethics’, in Moral Psychology vol. 3, ed. Sinnott-Armstrong

Secondary Reading

Greene, Joshua. (2008) “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong,

ed., Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality, vol. 3, 35-79.

Levy, Neil. (2006) “Cognitive scientific challenges to morality,” Philosophical

Psychology, 19: 567-587.

Appiah, Anthony Kwame: Experimental ethics (2008)

Greene, Joshua, et al: The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral

judgment in Neuron vol 44, 389-400, (2004)

Hauser et al: A dissociation between moral judgment and rational justifications in

Mind and Language vol 22, 1-21, (2007)

Haidt, Jonathan: The emotional dog and it!s rational tail, Psychological review vol

108, 814-834, (2001)

Racine, Eric: Which naturalism for neuroethics, Bioethics vol 22, 92-100, (2008)




Railton, Peter: Naturalism and prescriptivity, Social Philosophy and Prescriptivity vol

95, 151-174, (1989)

Roskies, Adina: Neuroethics for the new millennium, in Defining Right and Wrong in

Brain Science ed. Glannon, Walter, (2007)

Week 9: The explanatory challenge

On one view, we cannot be justified in believing a claim unless the truth of that

claim is necessary for the best explanation of some independent fact. Some

philosophers, most famously Gilbert Harman, argue that moral truths are never

necessary for the best explanation of any non-moral fact. If this is correct, it

follows that we cannot be justified in believing any moral claim. In other words,

Harman issues an explanatory challenge to moral realists. This week we examine

this challenge and possible realist responses to it.

Class reading

1. Harman, G. (1977) The Nature of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press,

Chapter 1.

2. Sturgeon, N. (1985) ‘Moral Explanations’, in Morality, Reason, and Truth, D.

Copp and D. Zimmerman, (eds.), Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld.

Secondary reading

Blackburn, S. “Just Causes.” Philosophical Studies 61 (1991): 3–17.

Copp, D. “Explanation and Justification in Ethics.” Ethics 100 (1990): 237–58.

Harman, G. The Nature of Morality. New York: Oxford UP, 1977

——. “Moral Explanations of Natural Facts – Can Moral Claims be Tested against

Reality?” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (suppl.) (1986): 57–68.

——. “Responses to Critics.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998):

207–14.

—— and J.Thomson. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell,

1996.

Jackson, F. and P. Pettit. “Program Explanation: A General Perspective.” Analysis 50

(1990): 107–17.

Kleiman, L. “Morality as the Best Explanation.” American Philosophical Quarterly 26

(1989): 161–7.




Leiter, B. “Moral Facts and Best Explanations.” Social Philosophy and Policy 18

(2001): 79–101.

Loeb, D. “Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs.” Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research 70 (2005):

193–208.

Majors, B. “Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences.” Philosophical Studies 113

(2003): 121–52.

Quinn,W. “Truth and Explanation in Ethics.” Ethics 96 (1986): 524–44.

Railton, P. “Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity.” Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research

58 (1998): 175–82.

Sayre-McCord, G. “Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence.” Essays in Moral

Realism. Ed. G. Sayre-McCord. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988.

Sturgeon,N.“Contents and Causes: A Reply to Blackburn.” Philosophical Studies 61

(1991):19–37

——. “Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts.” Southern Journal of

Philosophy 24 (suppl.)

(1986): 69–78.

——. “Moral Explanations.” Morality, Reason and Truth. Eds. D. Copp and D.

Zimmerman.

Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985.

——. “Moral Explanations Defended.” Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Ed. J.

Drier. Oxford:

Blackwell, 2006.

Week 10: Moral realism revisited

Some metaethicists, like J. L. Mackie for example, think that whether moral

realism is true or not makes to difference to our ordinary moral practices. Others

think that whether moral realism is true or not makes a great difference, that is

they think that there are moral implications at stake here. This week we try to

answer the question of what difference it makes whether moral realism is true.

Class reading

1. Sturgeon, N. (1986) ‘What Difference Does It Make Whether Moral Realism is

True?’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):115-141.




2. Enoch, D. (2011) Taking Morality Seriously Oxford: Oxford University Press,

Chapter 2.

Secondary reading

Drier, J. (2002) “Meta-Ethics and Normative Commitment,” Philosophical Issues 12:

Realism and Relativism, 241–63.

Dworkin, Ronald. (1996) “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it,” Philosophy

& Public Affairs, 25: 87-139.

Fantl, J. (2006) “Is Metaethics Morally Neutral?,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87,

24–44.

Gewirth, A. (1960) “Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics,” Mind 69, 187–205.

Kramer, M. H. (2009) Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine (Chichester and Malden,

Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell).

Week 11: Review

This week we will bring together the themes of the course, discuss essay

strategies, and anything else you’d like to go over.

Resources

Please ensure you have completed the library induction tutorial. Should you

have any problems accessing any of the materials for the course please contact

the course librarian *NAME* in the first instance.

Office Hours

My office hours will be ***. Office hours are a good time for you to come and

discuss ideas for your essays. Please don’t think you need a ‘problem’ to come to

office hours; I am always willing to use this time to chat through any thoughts

you may be having about topics covered in the course, or topics for your essays.

If you are unable to meet with me during office hours, please send me an email

and we can arrange an alternative time.

online msc/pgdipl/pgcert - ed.ac.uk · online msc/pgdipl/pgcert school of philosophy, ... r....

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