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On What There Is by W.V. Quine

Main Points

Quine takes on the metaphysical question of what exists, in the spirit of

Russell in that:

(1 the question is metaphysical (this is why !lemke classifies Quine as a

user of lo"ico#metaphysical analysis an$

(% Quine takes the question on in the spirit of re$ucin" ontolo"ical

commitments from the number of commitments our surface "rammar

appears to commit us to a much smaller number, lea&in" out, for

example, nonexistent entities such as 'e"asus an$ roun$ squares.

'resents the problem of 'latos bear$ an$ "i&es )c*s an$ Wymans

explanation of this problem.

)c*s +r"ument for the xistence of -onbein"

1. f 'e"asus were not, we shoul$ not be talkin" about anythin" when

we use the wor$.

%. /he $enial of 'e"asus cannot be maintaine$.

0. /herefore, 'e"asus an$ non#existent entities must ha&e some form

of existence. (01

2. 'e"asus $oes not exist as flesh an$ bloo$.

3. /herefore, 'e"asus exists in the min$ of humans.

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+r"ues that 'e"asus is not an i$ea in the min$ of humans (no more than

the 'arthenon is not an i$ea in the min$ of humans since this is not

what people are $enyin" when they $eny existence to 'e"asus.

'resents Wymans ar"ument in terms of nonexistent entities as

unactuali4e$ possibles. +r"ues a"ainst the notion of unactuali4e$

possibles, mostly usin" 5ccams ra4or an$ cases like 6the fat man in the

$oo, an$ 6the fat man at the $oor.

+r"ues that sentences with non#referrin" terms (such as 'e"asus an$

the roun$ square $o not commit us to an ontolo"y inflate$ by non#

bein". 7or one thin", Russell has shown that $escriptions $o not name

entities in the worl$ an$ thus the phrase 6the roun$ square $oes not

commit us to the existence of a roun$ square. nstea$, any sentence

containin" that phrase is an existential statement. /hus the statement

8/he roun$ square $oes not exist9 is meanin"ful an$ true an$ 8/he

roun$ square exists9 is meanin"ful an$ false. -or $o statements with

names commit us to the existence of what they name. 7or names can

be shown to be $escriptions, an$ $escriptions $o not pick out thin"s in

the worl$.

Quine attempts to answer the question of how we know what ontolo"ical

commitments any "i&en theory has, usin" the followin" formula:

omethin" exists if an$ only it can be the &alue of a boun$ &ariable.

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/hat is, the statements of our theory only commit us to the existence of

entities o&er which our boun$ &ariables nee$ to ran"e in or$er to be

true. +s Russell pointe$ out, the surface "rammar of our sentences

often appears to commit us to the existence of thin"s that $o not

appear to exist. ;owe&er, further examination of the implications of

our utterances shows that we are not necessarily committe$ to the

existence of such entities.

'resents )c*s ar"ument for the existence of abstract entities

(attributes.)c*s +r"ument for the xistence of +ttributes

1. /here are re$ houses, re$ roses, an$ re$ sunsets.

%. /here must be somethin" all these thin"s ha&e in common.

0. What these thin"s ha&e in common is what we mean by the attribute

of re$ness.

2. /herefore, attributes an$ abstract entities exist. (0%0

+r"ues that neither sentences with names nor sentences with "eneral

terms (or pre$icates commit us to the existence of abstract entities.

We may say, e."., that some $o"s are white an$ not thereby commit

oursel&es to reco"ni4in" either $o"hoo$, or whiteness as entities.

6ome $o"s are white says that some thin"s that are $o"s are whiteustification at all. (0%2

+r"ues that more than one conceptual scheme is possible, with the

result that there are $ifferent ontolo"ies. 7or example, there is )c*s

conceptual scheme, accor$in" to which it is ob&ious that attributes such

as re$ exist. /hen there is Quines conceptual scheme, accor$in" to

which ob>ects an$ re$ ob>ects exist, but re$ness $oes not.

Bescribes three approaches to the problem of uni&ersals bein" $ebate$

by mo$ern mathematicians: lo"icism, intuitionism, an$ formalism.

Claims that each of these approaches correspon$s to one of three

me$ie&al approaches to the existence of uni&ersals, specifically: realism,

conceptualism an$ nominalism. Do"icism an$ me$ie&al realism hol$ a

'latonic &iew accor$in" to which uni&ersals are not create$ but

$isco&ere$. +ccor$in" to intuitionism an$ conceptualism, uni&ersals

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exist, but are create$ by humans. 7inally, both formalism an$

nominalism $o$"e the existence of uni&ersals.

Bistin"uishes between the question of the ontolo"ical commitments of a

theory an$ the question of what there is.

5ur acceptance of an ontolo"y is, think, similar in principle to our

acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we a$opt,

at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual

scheme into which the $isor$ere$ fra"ments of raw experience canbe fitte$ an$ arran"e$. 5ur ontolo"y is $etermine$ once we ha&e

fixe$ upon the o&er#all conceptual scheme which is to accommo$ate

science in the broa$est sense< an$ the consi$erations which

$etermine a reasonable construction of any part of that conceptual

scheme, e.". the biolo"ical or the physical part, are not $ifferent in

kin$ from the consi$erations which $etermine a reasonable

construction of the whole. /o whate&er extent the a$option of any

system of scientific theory may be sai$ to be a matter of lan"ua"e,

the sameEbut no more##may be sai$ of the a$option of an ontolo"y.

(0%

;ol$s that there are three main conceptual schemes containin" three

main ontolo"ies: phenomenalism, physicalism, an$, for those who

belie&e in mathematics, the 'latonic.

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