on things called 'toward something

7/28/2019 On Things Called 'Toward Something'.

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ON THINGS CALLED TOWARD SOMETHING

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

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1. On things called toward something which, as such, are said to be ofanother thing, or

towardsomething else in some other way.

Cf. Aristotle, Cat., ch. 7 (6a 366b 11) (tr. B.A.M.):

But those things are called toward something which, as such, 1are said to be ofanotherthing, ortowardsomething else in some other way.2For instance, the greater as such is said

of another thing; for it is called greater than something; and the double as such is said of

another thing; for it is called the double of something. It is the same with whatever other

things are of this sort.

And the following are toward something as well: for instance, habit, disposition, know-

ledge, sensation, position. For all the things mentioned are, as such, said to be ofanother

thing, or towardsomething else in some other way, and not anything else. For a habit is

called a habit ofsomething, and knowledge [5] the knowledge ofsomething, and position the

position ofsomething, and likewise with the others.

Accordingly, toward something are whatever are, as such, said to be ofanother thing, or

towardsomething else in some other way. For instance, a large mountain is said toward[=

with regard to] something else. For it is called large toward[= with regard to] something.[10] And the similar is called similar to something. And likewise all such things are called

towardsomething.

Cf. Aristotle, Cat., ch. 7 (8a 29-37) (tr. B.A.M.):

If, therefore, the definition of those things which are toward something were adequately

assigned, it is extremely [30] difficult or impossible to show that no substance is said towardsomething.

If, however, it were not adequately , but rather toward something are those

things for which the being is the same as holding themselves 3 toward something in some

way, perhaps something might be said [in answer] to these [difficulties]. The earlier

definition does indeed follow closely upon4 [35] all the things toward something, but for

[each of]5 the things toward something the being is not the same as being said, as such, of

another thing.

Cf. Aristotle, Top., VI, 8, (146b 3) (tr. B.A.M.):

For of all the things toward something the essence 6 toward another

thing, since for each of the things7 toward something the being is the same as holding itself

toward something in some way.

1 as such, a(/per e)sti\n (Lat. inquantum sunt, inasmuch as they are, namely, what they are). On thistranslation, see the note below.2

That is, those things are called relatives which, as such, are said to be ofanother thing, or are said withregard to something else in some other way.3 holding (habitually maintaining) themselves, e)/xein (Lat. se habere, to have or hold themselves,having or holding themselves). On this translation, see the note below.4 follow closely upon, parakolouqei= (Lat.prope sequitur). On this translation, see the note below.5 I have added these words in view of the definition of relatives found in the Topics, where this exact phrase

(namely, for each of the things) is found (see next excerpt).6 Although the words in parentheses are not in the Greek, they are nevertheless required to complete the

sense.7 for each of the things, tau)to\n h)=n e(ka/st% (Lat. unicuique eorum).

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Cf. Aristotle, Cat., 7 (6a 366b 11): Parallel translations:

(tr. E. M. Edghill)

Those things are called relative, which, being

either said to be of something else or related to

something else, are explained by reference to

that other thing.

For instance, the word superior is explained by

reference to something else, for it is superiorityover something else that is meant.

Similarly, the expression double has this

external reference, for it is the double of

something else that is meant.

So it is with everything else of this kind.

There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit,

disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude.

The significance of all these is explained by a

reference to something else and in no other way.

Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge

is knowledge of something, attitude is the atti-tude of something.

So it is with all other relatives that have beenmentioned.

Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature

of which is explained by reference to something

else, the preposition of or some other preposi-

tion being used to indicate the relation.

Thus, one mountain is called great in compare-

son with another; for the mountain claims this

attribute by comparison with something.

Again, that which is called similar must be simi-lar to something else, and all other such attri-

butes have this external reference.

(anon. tr. of Boethiuss version)

Such things are called relations which, in

themselves, are said to be of other things, or else

they are somehow said to be to other things.

For example, the greater, as such, is [6b] said to

be of another, for it is said to be greater thansomething.

[text on double not included in translation]

And likewise with all things of this sort.

And these are relations as well: habit, dis-

position, knowledge, sensation, and position.

For all these just mentioned are, in themselves,

said to be of other things, or else they are some-

how said to be to other things, and they are not

said otherwise.

For a habit is said [5] to be a habit of something,

and knowledge the knowledge of something,and a position the position with respect to

something,

and likewise with other things.

Therefore all those things called relations are, as

such, said to be of other things.

For example, a mountain is called big [10] com-

pared to something else, for it is called big in

relation to something,

and a like thing is called like to something, andlikewise all such things are said to be to some-

thing.

(tr. H. G. Apostle)

Things are called relative [or relations] if as

such they are said to be of other things, or to be

somehow referred to something else.

(tr. R. Glen Coughlin)

Those things are called relatives which are, just

as such, said of others or in any other way in re-

gard to another.

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For example, the greater, as such, is said to be

of something else, for it is said to be greater

than some other thing,

and the double, as such, is said to be [6b] of

something else, for it is said to be double of

some other thing.

It is likewise with all others of this sort.

Other examples of relatives are the following:possession, disposition, sensation, knowledge,

and position;

for each of these, as such, is said to be of some-thing else and is not stated in any other way.

For a possession is said to be a possession of

something, knowledge is [5] said to be know-

ledge of something, a position is said to be a

position of something, and similarly with allothers.

Accordingly, relatives are things which, as such,

are said to be of something else or are referred

to something else in some way or other.

For example, a mountain is called great when

it is related to something, for it is so called bybeing referred to something;

[10] and that which is said to be similar is

similar to some other thing,

and all others of the sort are said to be relative

in the same way.

For example, the larger just as such is said of

another, for it is larger than something.

And the double just as such is said of another,

for it is said to be the double of something.

So too in whatever other such things.

Also among relatives are such things as habit,disposition, sensation, knowledge, and position.

For all the things mentioned are, just as such,and not as something else, said of another.

For a habit is called a habit of something, and

knowledge, knowledge of something, and posi-

tion, position of something {in regard to some-

thing}, and so too the others.

Therefore, relatives are whatever are, just as

such, said of others, or in any other way in

regard to another.

For example, a large mountain is said in regard

to something, for the mountain is called large inregard to another,

and the similar is said to be similar to some-

thing,

and other such things are similarly said in

regard to something.

Cf. Aristotle, Cat., 7, 6a 36-8b 24 (tr. E. M. Edgehill):

Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related

to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance, the word

superior is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something

else that is meant. Similarly, the expression double has this external reference, for it is the

double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are,

moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. Thesignificance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way.

Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the

attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned. Those terms,

then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the

preposition of or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one

mountain is called great in comparison with another; for the mountain claims this attribute

by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to

something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted that

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lying and standing and sitting are particular attitude, but attitude is itself a relative term. To

lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid

attitudes.

It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a contrary, vice, these both

being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all

relatives; double and triple have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.

It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For like and unlike,

equal and unequal, have the modifications more and less applied to them, and each of

these is relative in character: for the terms like and unequal bear unequal bear areference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of

variation of degree. No term such as double admits of this modification. All relatives havecorrelatives: by the term slave we mean the slave of a master, by the term master, the

master of a slave; by double, the double of its hall; by half, the half of its double; by

greater, greater than that which is less; by less, less than that which is greater.

So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to express the correlation differsin some instances. Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable,

that which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible;

by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception.

Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to exist. This comes about

when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a

man states that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two willnot be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings.

The reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be

relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged

creature. If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal, for we

can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged

creature as being such because of its wings.

Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists by which a

correlation can adequately be explained. If we define a rudder as necessarily havingreference to a boat, our definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this

reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot use

the terms reciprocally, for the word boat cannot be said to find its explanation in the word

rudder. As there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more accurate if wecoined some word like ruddered as the correlative of rudder. If we express ourselves thus

accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the ruddered thing is

ruddered in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately

defined as the correlative of that which is headed, than as that of an animal, for the animal

does not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head.

Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is related, when a

name does not exist, if, from that which has a name, we derive a new name, and apply it to

that with which the first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we de-

rived the word winged from wing and from rudder.

All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I add this condition because, if

that to which they are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found

to be interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case ofacknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdepend-

dence if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion,but by one of irrelevant significance. The term slave, if defined as related, not to a master,

but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in

relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said to

be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevantattributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was

correctly stated to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the

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correlative of the slave is said to be the master, then, though all irrelevant attributes of the

said master, such as biped, receptive of knowledge, human, should be removed, and

the attribute master alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave

will remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave. On the other

hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are

removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated

correlation will be found to have disappeared.

For suppose the correlative of the slave should be said to be the man, or the correlative

of the wing the bird; if the attribute master be withdrawn from the man, the correla-tion between the man and the slave will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the

slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute winged be withdrawn from the bird, thewing will no longer be relative; for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that

the wing has no correlative.

Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly designated; if there is a name

existing, the statement will be easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. Whenthe terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent.

Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is for the most part

true, as in the case of the double and the half. The existence of the half necessitates the

existence of that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the

existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely instances of

a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it follows thatthere is no half, and vice versa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not

appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously. The object

of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we

acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find

a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with

that of its object. Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at the

same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of this is not true. It is true

that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will nolonger be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does

not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of

the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object

of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all animalsceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of

knowledge.

This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object of perception is, it

appears, prior to the act of perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will

cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the per-

ceptible. For perception implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes

place. Now if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated,

for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does not exist, it follows that perception

also ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception.

But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the perceptible. For if the animal

is annihilated, it follows that perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body,

heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving subject, for it comes into

existence at the same time as the animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception;for fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before

the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible

exists before perception.

It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, as seems to be thecase, or whether exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary substances. With

regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither

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wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is not defined

with reference to something external. Similarly with the parts: a particular hand or head is

not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a

particular person. It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary sub-

stances; the species man and the species ox are not defined with reference to anything

outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some ones property, not in

so far as it is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But

with regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion; thus, such terms

as head and hand are defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are apart, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character. Indeed, if our

definition of that which is relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, toprove that no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if those

things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a

necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found.

The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing isexplained with reference to something else does not make it essentially relative. From this it

is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend

that to which it is relative. Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular

thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which relation to

something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it is related. For

if he does not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it isrelative. This is clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows definitely that such

and such a thing is double, he will also forthwith know definitely that of which it is the

double. For if there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not

know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows ne-

cessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more beautiful. He

will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less

beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely

that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is morebeautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less

beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends some relative thing definitely, he

necessarily knows that also definitely to which it is related. Now the head, the hand, and

such things are substances, and it is possible to know their essential character definitely, butit does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related. It is not

possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus these are not relatives, and,

this being the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative in character. It is

perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more

exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without

advantage.

Cf. idem, Cat. 7 (6a 36-8b 24) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):

Those things are called relatives which are, just as such, said of others or in any other way

in regard to another. For example, the larger just as such is said of another, for it is larger

than something. And the double just as such is said of another, for it is said to be the doubleof something. So too in whatever other such things. Also among relatives are such things as

habit, disposition, sensation, knowledge, and position. For all the things mentioned are, just

as such, and not as something else, said of another. For a habit is called a habit of something,

and knowledge, knowledge of something, and position, position of something {in regard to

something}, and so too the others. Therefore, relatives are whatever are, just as such, said of

others, or in any other way in regard to another. For example, a large mountain is said in

regard to something, for the mountain is called large in regard to another, and the similar is

said to be similar to something, and other such things are similarly said in regard to

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something. And lying, standing, and sitting are certain positions, but position is among

relatives. But to be lying, or to be standing, or to be sitting are not themselves positions, but

are denominatively said from the positions mentioned.

Contrariety belongs in relatives; e.g., virtue is contrary to vice, both of these being

relatives, and knowledge to ignorance. But a contrary does not belong to every relative. For

there is nothing contrary to double nor to triple nor to any such thing.

It seems that relatives admit more and less. For similar is said more and less, and unequal

is said more and less, each of these being a relative. For the similar is said to be similar to

something and the unequal, unequal to something. But not all admit more and less. For thedouble is not said to be more double or less double, nor is any such thing.

But all relatives are said in regard to something which reciprocates; e.g., the slave is calledthe slave of the master and the master is called the master of the slave; and the double,

double of the half, and the half, half of the double; and the greater, greater than the lesser,

and the lesser, lesser than the greater. So too in other cases.

Except that sometimes they will differ according to speech by ending; as knowledge iscalled knowledge of the knowable, and the knowable, knowable by knowledge; and

sensation, sensation of the sensible, and the sensible, sensible by sensation.

Not that they will sometimes not seem to reciprocate, if the one giving [the relatives] does

not properly give that in regard to which it is said, but errs. For example, if one should give

the wing as of a bird, bird of a wing does not reciprocate. For the first thing, wing of a bird,

is not properly given, for it is not as bird, as this, that the wing is said of it, but as winged.For there are wings of many other things, which are not birds. Whence, if it be given

properly, it will also reciprocate; e.g., the wing is the wing of the winged, and the winged,

winged by the wing. Sometimes it is necessary, perhaps, to make up a name, if there be not

laid down a name in regard to which it would be properly given. For example, should one

give the rudder of the boat, the giving is not proper. For it is not as boat, as this, that the

rudder is said of it. For there are boats of which there are not rudders. Whence, it will not

reciprocate. For the boat is not called the boat of the rudder. But perhaps the giving will be

more proper if it somehow be given thus: the rudder is the rudder of the ruddered, or inwhatever other way; for a name is not laid down. And it will convert if it be properly given.

For the ruddered is ruddered by the rudder. So too in the other cases, e.g., the head would

more properly be given as of the headed than being given as of animal. For it does not have a

head as animal. For many animals do not have a head. Perhaps one would grasp those forwhich names are not laid down most easily thus, if one would put down, from the first

things, the names for those in regard to which things reciprocate, as in the cases mentioned,

winged from wing and ruddered from rudder.

Every relative, then, if it be properly given, is said in regard to something which recipro-

cates, since, of it be given in regard to a chance thing and not in regard to that very thing in

regard to which it is said, it will not reciprocate. I mean that none would reciprocate even

among those which we agree are said in regard to something reciprocating, and which have

names laid down for them, if one should give it in regard to something accidental and not in

regard to that according to which it is said. For example, if the slave be given not as of a

master, but as of a man or of a biped or any other such thing, it will not reciprocate. For the

giving is not proper.

Moreover, if that in regard to which it is said be properly given, if all other accidentalthings be removed, but that alone in regard to which it is given properly remain, it will

always be spoken of in regard to that. For example, if slave is said in regard to master,whatever accidental things are in master being removed, e.g., being two-footed, receptive of

knowledge, man, there remaining only being a master, slave will always be spoken of in

regard to this. For the slave is said to be the slave of a master. But if whatever it is in regard

to which it is said be not properly given, other things being removed and there onlyremaining that in regard to which it was given, it will not be spoken of in regard to that. For

let the slave be given as the slave of a man, and the wing as of a bird, and let there be

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removed from the man his being a master. For no longer will the slave be said in regard to

the man, for there being no master, there is no slave. So too if being winged is removed from

bird. For the wing will no longer be among relatives. Whence, one must give properly

whatever it is in regard to which it is said. And if a name be laid down, the giving is easy;

there not being one, it is perhaps necessary to make up a name. Being given thus, it is

apparent that every relative is spoken of in regard to something which reciprocates.

It seems that relatives are together by nature; and in most cases this is true. For the double

and the half are together, and half being, double is, and slave being, master is. And the others

are similar to these. And these destroy each other. For, double not being, half is not, and halfnot being, double is not. So too in other cases, whatever are like these.

But it does not seem to be true in all the relatives that they are together by nature. For theknowable seems to be before knowledge. For in most cases we grasp knowledge of things

which exist beforehand. In few cases or in none would one see the knowledge coming to be

together with the knowable. Moreover, the knowable being destroyed, the knowledge is

destroyed with it, but the knowledge [being destroyed], the knowable is not destroyed withit. For, if the knowable does not exist, knowledge does not exist, for there will no longer be

knowledge of anything, but knowledge not being, nothing prevents the knowable being. For

example, the squaring of the circle, if indeed it is knowable: knowledge of it is not yet, but it

is itself knowable. Moreover, animal being destroyed, there is no knowledge, but many

things among the knowables can be. The things in the case of sensation are disposed

similarly to these. For the sensible seems to be before sensation. For, the sensible beingdestroyed, sensation is destroyed with it, but sensation [being destroyed], the sensible is not

destroyed with it. For sensations are about body and are in body; the sensible being

destroyed, body would be destroyed, for body is also among the sensibles, but body not

being, sensation too is destroyed. Whence, the sensible destroys with it sensation. But the

sensation does not [destroy with it] the sensible. For animal being destroyed, sensation is

destroyed, but the sensible will be, e.g., body, hot, sweet, bitter, and all other things which

are sensible. Moreover, sensation comes to be together with the sensitive, for animal and

sensation come to be together. But the sensible is also before the sensation. For fire andwater and such things, from which the animal is composed, are before the animal or

sensation are at all. Whence, the sensible seems to be before sensation.

There is a difficulty as to whether no substance is said among the relatives, as it seems, or

this can be in the cases of certain second substances. For it is true in the case of firstsubstances. For neither the wholes nor the parts are said in regard to something. For this man

is not called someones this man, nor this ox someones this ox. So too in the case of the

parts. For this hand is not called someones this hand, but someones hand, and this head is

not called someones this head, but someones head. So too in the cases of second substance,

for the most part. For example, man is not called someones man, nor ox someones ox, nor

wood someones wood (but they are called someones property). In such cases, therefore, it

is apparent that they are not among relatives, but in the case of some second substances there

is a question. For example, the head is called the head of someone and the hand is called the

hand of someone, and each such thing [is spoken of similarly]. Whence, these would seem to

be among relatives.

If, therefore, the definition of relatives was given sufficiently, untying so that no substance

is said among relatives is either among things extremely difficult or among thingsimpossible. But if not sufficiently, but relatives are those for which being is the same with

being somehow relative to something, perhaps something could be said about these[difficulties]. The definition given before, however, closely follows all relatives, but their

being said, just as such, of another, this is not being for relatives.

From these things it is clear that if someone should determinately see something among the

relatives, that thing in regard to which it is said will be seen determinately. This is thereforeapparent from itself. For if one should see that this certain thing is among relatives, but being

is, for relatives, the same with being somehow relative to something, he also knows that to

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which it somehow is relative. For if he does not at all know that to which this is somehow

relative, neither does he know whether this is somehow relative. And such a thing is clear in

the particular cases. For example, if one knows determinately that this certain thing is

double, he knows determinately right away that of which it is the double. For if he does not

know it to be the double of any one of the determinate things, neither does he know that it is

double at all. So too, if one knows that this certain thing is more beautiful, it is necessary,

through these things, that he know determinately that than which it is more beautiful. He will

not know indeterminately that this more beautiful than the inferior. For such a claim is

opinion, not knowledge. For he will no longer know precisely that it is more beautiful thanan inferior; for if it so happen, nothing is inferior to it. Whence, it is apparent that it is

necessary that one know determinately that in regard to which what one knowsdeterminately to be among relatives is said. But one can know determinately the head and

the hand and each of such things (which are substances), just what they are, but it is not

necessary [to know] that in regard to which they are said. But one cannot determinately

know [by this knowledge alone] whose head or whose hand it is. Whence, these thingswould not be among relatives. But if they are not among relatives, it would be true to say

that no substance is among relatives.

Perhaps it is very difficult to make known such things without having looked into them

often; still, to have raised difficulties about each of them is not useless.

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2. On things opposed as toward something, which are, as such, said ofopposites, or in

some other way towardthose things.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 10 (11b 24-31) (tr. B.A.M.):

Accordingly, whatever things are opposed as toward something are, as such, said ofop-

posites, or in some other way towardthose things.8 For example, the double, as such, is said

ofanother thing; for it is called the double ofsomething. And knowledge is opposed to the

knowable as toward something [as relatives], and [30] knowledge, as such, is said of theknowable. And the knowable, as such, is said toward [= with regard to] its opposite, i.e.,

toward[= with regard to] knowledge; for the knowable is said to be knowable by something,

i.e., by knowledge. Whatever things, then, are opposed as toward something are, as such,

said ofanother thing, or are said in some other way toward(= with regard to) each other.

3. Note on haper estin.

In justification of my translation ofhaper estin, a notoriously problematic expres-

sion, consider the following argument. According to Metaphysics, VII, 4 (1029 b 14-16),the what it was to be or essence of each thing is what the thing is said to be kath auto, in

virtue of itself or essentially. Hence, if someone were to ask you without qualificationwhat you are, and you happen to play the guitar, it would be incorrect to reply amusician, because you are not a musician in virtue of yourself, but in virtue of something

that belongs to you, namely, the art of music, which is an accident inhering in you. Like-

wise, if one were to ask what are the things called toward something said to be of, as

what is a wing said to be the wing of, or a rudder said to be the rudder of, it would beinaccurate to answer, a wing is the wing of a bird, or a rudder the rudder of a boat, for it

is not as such that a bird is winged, for there are winged things which are not birds, nor is

a boat ruddered as such, for there are boats without rudders; but rather, a wing is thewing of the winged, and a rudder is the rudder of the ruddered, as Aristotle afterward

explains (cf. Cat., 7, 6b 38 ff.). Moreover, as the Philosopher also says, if slave is said

toward master, whatever accidental things are in master being removed, such as beingtwo-footed, receptive of knowledge, and man, there remaining only being a master,

slave will always be said toward[with regard to] this (ibid., 7a 35-37). Consequently,

one must say that a wing, as such, is the wing of the winged, and a rudder, as such, is therudder of the ruddered, and a slave, as such, is the slave of a master. Likewise, knowledge,

as such, is of the knowable, and the knowable, as such, is known by the knowledge. And

so those things are called toward something which, as such, are said to be of another

thing, or are towardsomething else in some other way, as Aristotle says.

4. Note on echein and hexis.

Echein and hexisare also terms notoriously difficult to translate. I have endeavored

to explain my renderings elsewhere. Here, let it suffice to say that for some things to behabitually maintained requires an active effort on our part, as health or virtue demand of us

certain ways of acting in order to acquire them, and, once acquired, to maintain them. Withrespect to its nature, it may be said in sum that a hexisor way of holding oneself is:

8 That is, those things are opposed as relatives which, as such, are said ofopposite things, or are said in some

other way with respect to opposite things.

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(1) an order possessed to something, that something being the nature of the thing; and

(2) a disposition in the sense of an order of parts with respect to the form and speciesof the whole to which it belongs.

5. Onparakoluthei.

At Categories, ch. 7, 8a 35-36, Aristotle states that the earlier definition does in-

deed follow closely upon (parakoluthei) all those things which are toward some-thing.By the earlier definition, he means the definition he gave at the beginning of the chapter,where he stated that those things are called toward something which, as such, are said to

be ofanother thing, or toward something else in some other way. By all those things

which are toward something, he means the larger, the double, master and slave, aswell as habit, disposition, knowledge, sensation, position, and the other examples

he gives of things which are toward something; for, he goes on to say, all the things

mentioned are, as such, said to be ofanother thing, ortowardsomething else in some otherway, and not anything else (ibid., 8b 4-7).

But what does it mean for the earlier definition to follow closely upon all those

things which are toward something? In order to understand what Aristotle is saying here,consider the following text from thePoetics, ch. 2 (1448a 3-5, ed. Kassel, tr. B.A.M.):

ta\ ga\r h)/qh sxedo\n a)ei\ tou/toija)kolouqei= mo/noij,

kaki/a? ga\r kai\ a)reth=? ta\ h)/qhdiafe/rousi pa/ntej, h)/toi belti/onaj h)\kaq h(ma=j h)\ xei/ronaj h)\ kai\toiou/touj.

...for character nearly always follows upon these

alone,

for by their vice or virtue all men differ

according to character, (being)either better thanus or worse or such .

On this passage, the commentator on thePoetics, D. S. Margoliouth,9 remarks:

Clause 3 gives very little trouble when we have learned the meaning of akolouqei=n,which is not explained at all in Liddell and Scott, and is unsatisfactorily glossed by Bonitz. It

is a technicality of logic, meaning to come after in the order of thought, i.e. to be the genus

of a species1 or the species of an individual.2 Of these species only is character regularly the

genus is an intelligible expression. Its meaning is only thus can character be regularly

classified. Of any character we may say that it is relatively good or bad, but not necessarily

anything else.

1 Defined in Sophistici Elenchi 181a 23, 24. e)/sti ditth\ h( tw=n e(pome/nwn a)kolou/qhsijh)\ ga\r w(j t%= e)n me/rei to\ kaqo/lou oi(=on a)nqrw/p% z%=on either as general toparticular, e.g. animal to man. (The other is based on the Law of Contradiction.) This use

pervades the logic, e.g. Topics 113b 31 t$= a)ndrei/a a)reth\ a)kolouqei= courage is avirtue. 128b 4 w(j ge/nouj tou= a)ei\ a)kolouqou=btoj. Numerous cases of it and e(/pesqaiin Prior Analytics 43b 44a.2De Generatione Animalium 768b 13, pa=sin a)kolouqei= tou=to (to\ a)/nqrwpoj) toi=j

kaq e(/kaston Man is the species of all the individuals.

9 Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, The Poetics of Aristotle. Translated from the Greek into English and from Arabic

into Latin, with a revised text, introduction, commentary, glossary and onomasticon (London, New York,

Toronto, 1911), pp. 33-34.

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Margoliouth here understands Aristotle to be saying that of the species virtue and

vice, character is regularly the genus, and so character as the genus regularly comesafter or follows upon virtue and vice. Likewise, the earlier definition of those things

called toward something comes after or follows upon those things called toward

something as being the definition10 of the genus which is predicated of the species, andtherefore of the individuals coming under it. According to this way of speaking, a species

will come after the individuals belonging to it; but the genus (and hence its definition)

will come after the species. It follows from this that the individuals coming under thespecies will themselves come after nothing.It appears that the meaning of after here goes with the third meaning of before

which Aristotle enumerates in the Categories, namely, what is said to be before according

to a certain order, as in the cases of sciences and discourses (cf. ch. 12, 14a 36ff., tr. DuaneH. Berquist), or what is before in the discourse of reason. In sum, the genus comes after

the species, the species comes after the individuals, but the individuals do not come after

anything. Hence, the definition of the genus immediately follows upon the species comingdirectly under it, and so it will closely follow upon the individuals coming under the

species.

In conclusion, the foregoing interpretation may be applied to Aristotles claimsabout his definitions of toward something as follows: At this point in the chapter, the

Philosopher is distinguishing between those relatives for which the being is to hold (or

maintain) themselves toward something and those for which it is not. But the earlier

definition, expressing as it does a nature common to both species, is for that reasonapplicable to both, and hence it follows closely upon all the things toward something

that is, upon all relatives. But not everything called toward something is such as to have

its very being be toward something else: for there are some things for which the being is tobe a substance or a quality and the like, but which nonetheless have a relation following

upon them, as is the case with knowledge and the knowable and all other things which are

said toward something as the measurable is said toward a measure (cf. Meta., V, 15,1020b 32; 1021a 30ff.)that is, with regard to the measurement of being and truth, as

St. Thomas Aquinas says (cf.In V Meta., lect. 17, n. 3)and things of this sort belong to a

category other than pros ti. Still, in virtue of the relation which follows on them, they are

said toward something.But it must be remarked here that some commentators take Aristotles introduction

of a second, amended definition of those things which are toward something as evidence

that the Philosopher is here excluding this second kind of relative from the category of re-lation, apparently assuming that only those things are true relatives for which the being is

to be toward another and nothing else; whereas things belonging to another category are

for that reason excluded from this predicament, presumably because one and the samething cannot belong to two different predicaments. But this interpretation cannot stand.

In the first place, if Aristotle had wished to include only the first kind of relatives,

he could have written the chapter beginning with the second definition, and then givenappropriate examples of each and the properties following on them. He could then have re-

marked that those things which are called toward something include such things as

habit, disposition, knowledge, sensation, position, but that these things are not true rela-

tives because they belong to another category, being calledtoward something solely be-cause they have a relation following upon them, not because they are essentially relations.

10 To be perfectly precise, it is rather a true description of the genus, inasmuch as a highest genus has no

definition, properly speaking.

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The fact that he did not do this, but, to the contrary, explicitly included such things among

the relatives, tells against such an interpretation.Furthermore, the assumptions underlying this view are mistaken. To begin with, the

ten predicaments are distinguished not according to theirbeingas such, but according to

theirbeing said of somethingthat is, according to the figures or modes of predicating.For, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains,

sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem

praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in

species, sed secundum diversum modum essen-

di.

modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis

praedicandi.

praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dici-

mus hoc esse illud:

unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem

praedicamenta.

it must be understood that being is divided

into the ten predicaments not univocally, as a

genus into species, but according to a diverse

mode of being.

Now the modes of being are proportional to the

modes of predicating.

For in predicating something of some other

thing, we say this is that.

And for this reason the ten genera of being are

called the ten predicaments.

(In III Physic., lect. 5, n. 15, tr. B.A.M.)

It follows from this that both kinds of relatives belong to the predicament towardsomething, inasmuch as both are said of something.

Further, in Chapter 10 of the Categories, where Aristotle defines those things

which are opposed as relatives (cf. 11b 24-31), he gives as his second example know-ledge and the knowable, a procedure which is inexplicable if he had excluded this kind

of relative from the predicament of toward something.

Finally, if these things are to be excluded on the basis of their being, then surelythey should be excluded from a treatment of toward something in the science of being as

being. Yet, as noted above, in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, Chapter 15, Aristotle in-

cludes as the third mode of those things which are said toward something this very kind

of relative, apparently forgetting that he had excluded them in the Categories.It should also be remarked that, as we have seen, Aristotles second definition of

relatives, which is of those things which are essentially relative and nothing else, leaves

open the possibility of other things which are something else, but upon which a real rela-tion follows. Implicit here is a distinction recognized by Scholastic philosophers and theo-

logians and systematically explained by St. Thomas Aquinas as follows:

dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt im-

posita ad significandum ipsas habitudines rela-

tivas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et

huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundumesse.

quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res

quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines, sicut

movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia

huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum

dici.

it must be said that certain relatives have been

imposed in order to signify the relative habi-

tudes themselves, such as Lord, servant,

father, and son, and the like, and these arecalled relatives according to being.

But some have been imposed in order to signify

the things upon which certain habitudes follow,

like mover and the thing moved, head and

the thing having the head, and others of the

sort, which are called relatives according to

being said.

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(Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7, ad 1, tr. B.A.M.)

In both cases there is a true relative, in the one case the name being placed upon the

habitude or relationship itself; in the other, upon a thing upon which such a relationship

follows. Hence, in both kinds something essentially relative is included, and so both areappropriately ordered under the predicament toward something.

As for the difficulty occasioned by the objection that one and the same thing cannot

belong to two different categories, it vanishes when it is considered that the second kind ofrelative may be placed in one category directly, and in another indirectly. In this way

knowledge, considered in itself, comes directly under the third species of quality; but con-

sidered as having a relation following upon it, it comes indirectly under the category oftoward something. It must also be recognized that the opposed position, by excluding this

kind of relative from the predicament, thereby excludes the relations following upon them.

But these things are called toward something univocally with the first kind, since their

being is the same as being possessed as an order to something else, and therefore deserveto be included in the category of relation.

6. The relation of contrariety to relatives according to Cat., ch. 7 (6b 15-19) (tr. R. GlenCoughlin):

Contrariety belongs in relatives; e.g., virtue is contrary to vice, both of these being

relatives, and knowledge to ignorance. But a contrary does not belong to every relative. For

there is nothing contrary to double nor to triple nor to any such thing.

7. That contrary is said in two ways according to F 119 R3 (Simplicius, Commentarius inCategorias 389.5-10) (In: The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes, p.

2428):

He [sc. Aristotle] in his book On Opposites says that justice is contrary to injustice, but

that the just man is not said to be contrary, but to be contrarily disposed, to the unjust man. If

these too are contraries, he says, contrary will be used in two ways: things will be calledcontraries either in themselves, like excellence and badness, movement and rest, or by virtue

of sharing in contraries, e.g. that which moves and that which rests, or the good and the bad.

8. Note on the ways in which contrary is said and the case with regard to relation.

According to the report of Simplicius, Aristotle held that contrary is used in two

ways: in one way, things will be called contraries either in themselves, like excellenceand badnessthat is, like virtue and viceor by virtue of sharing in contraries, like

what moves and what rests.

Now a similar distinction applies to the category of relation as such; some things

being relatives secundum esse, and hence relative in themselves, while others are rela-tivessecundum dici, and hence relative by virtue of something elsein this case, by vir-

tue of having a relation follow upon them, as is the case with the mover and the thing

moved or of the head and the thing having the head.

9. The foregoing distinctions in sum.

contraries (things called contraries in themselves)

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excellence and badness (= excellence and defect, i.e. virtue and vice)

movement and restcontrarily disposed (things called contraries by virtue of sharing in contraries)

the good and the bad (that which is excellent and that which is defective)

that which moves and that which rests

relativessecundum esse

movement and resthaving a head and not having a head

relativessecundum dici

the mover and the thing movedthe head and the thing having the head

10. On virtues and vices as relations according to Aristotle, Phys. VII, 3 (246a 30247a28) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):

[30] Indeed, neither is [alteration] in habits. For the habits are virtues and vices, and every

virtue and vice is among the relatives, just as health is a certain [246b 20] balance of the hot

and the cold, either of things within [the body] or in relation to what contains. So too good

and strength are in relation to something. For they are certain dispositions of the best [thing]

to the finest [action]. I call the best, however, what saves and is disposed in regard to nature.

Since, therefore, the virtues and the vices are among [those things that are] related to

something, and these [25] are not comings to be [generations], nor is there coming to befrom these, nor, generally, is there alteration of these, it is apparent that there is no alteration

at all in the case of habits.

Nor, then, [is there alteration] in the case of virtues and vices of the soul. For virtue is a

certain perfection. For each thing is most perfect when it happens upon its proper virtue and

is most according to nature, just as the circle [246b 30] is most according to nature when it is

most a circle. Vice, however, is the [247a 20] destruction and removal of these.

The seizing of virtue and the throwing off of vice come to be, therefore, when something is

altering, yet neither of these is alteration.

It is clear, however, that something is altered [in these cases]. For virtue is either a certain

impassivity or is being passive in a certain way, and vice is being passive or a passivity

contrary to that of virtue.

As a whole, moral virtue occurs with pleasures and pains. For it [25] either concerns

pleasure according to act, or through memory, or from hope. If, therefore, [it concerns

pleasure] according to act, the cause is sense; if through memory of from hope, it is from thissame sense, for the pleasure is either by remembering such things as we suffered or by

hoping we will suffer such things. [28]

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11. Aristotles definitions of toward something (pros ti).

According to Cat., ch. 7 (6a 36-37):

But those things are called toward something which are, as such, said to be ofan-other thing, ortowardsomething else in some other way.

Pro/j ti de\ ta/ toiau=ta le/getai, o(/sa au)ta\ a(/per e)sti\n e(te/rwn ei)=naile/getai, h)\ o(pwsou=n a)/llwj pro\j e(/teron.

According to Cat., ch. 7 (6b 3-4):

For all the things mentioned are, as such, said to be of another thing, or towardsomething else in some other way, and not anything else.

Pa/nta ga\r ta\ ei)reme/na au)ta\ a(/per e)sti\n e(te/rwn ei)=nai le/getai kai\ ou)k a)/llo ti.


Accordingly, toward something are whatever are, as such, said to be ofanother

thing, ortowardsomething else in some other way.

Pro/j ti ou)=n e)sti\n o(/sa au)ta a(/per e)sti\n e(terwn ei)=nai le/getai, h)\o(pwsou=n a)/llwj pro\j e(/teron.

According to Cat., ch. 7, (8a 32-33):

Rather toward something are those things for which the being is the same as

holding (= habitually maintaining) themselves to something in some way.

a)ll ) e)/sti ta\ pro/j ti oi(=j to\ ei)=nai tau)to/n e)sti t%= pro/j ti pwj e)/xein.

According to Cat., ch. 7 (8a 29-37):

The earlier definition does indeed follow closely upon all the things towardsomething, but for [each of] the things toward something the being is not the same as being

said, as such, of another thing.

o( de\ pro/teroj o(rismo\j parakolouqei= me\n pa=si toi=j pro/j ti, ou) mh\ntau)to/n ge/ e)sti t%= pro/j ti au)toi=j ei)=nai to\ au)ta a(/per e)sti\n e(te/rwn le/gesqai.

According to Top., VI, 8 (146b 3):

For of all the things toward something the essence toward an-

other thing, since for each of the things toward something the being is the same as holding

(= habitually maintaining) itself toward something in some way.

Panto\j ga\r tou= pro/j ti h( ou)si/a pro\j e(/teron, e)peidh\ tau)to\n h)=n e(ka/st% tw=n pro/j ti to\ ei)=nai o(/per to\ pro/j ti/ pwj e)/xein.

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12. Aristotles definitions of things opposed as toward something.

According to Cat, ch. 10 (11b 24-25):

Accordingly, whatever things are opposed as toward something are, as such, said

ofopposites, or in some other way towardthose things.

(/Osa me\n ou)=n %(j ta\ a)nti/keitai, au)ta\ a(/per e)sti\ tw=n a)ntikeime/nwnle/getai h)\ o(pwsou=n a)/llwj pro\j au)ta/.


Whatever things, then, are opposed as toward something are, as such, said of

another thing, or are said in some other way toward(= with regard to) each other.

o(/sa ou)=n a)nti/keitai w(j ta\ pro\j ti, au)ta\ a(/per e)sti\n e(te/rwn le/getai h)\o(pwsdh/pote pro\j a)/llela le/getai.

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13. Definitions of toward something (ad aliquid) according to St. Thomas Aquinas.

According to Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 8, art. 2, obj.; cf.In I Sent., dist. 33, q. 1, art. 1:

Further, those things are called toward something whose being is to hold them-selves to something else.

Praeterea, ad aliquid dicuntur quorum esse est ad aliud se habere.

Understood as what is relativesecundum esse or according to being:

(1)

For sometimes a name is imposed in order to signify the relationship itself, as is the

name lord and the like, which are relativessecundum esse. (In I Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2,c.)

Aliquando enim nomen imponitur ad significandum ipsam habitudinem; sicut hoc

nomen dominus, et hujusmodi, quae sunt relativa secundum esse.

(2)

Certain relatives have been imposed in order to signify the relative habitudes (or

relationships) themselves, as are lord, servant, father, and son and the like, and

these are called relativessecundum esse. (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7, ad 1)

Relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas, ut

dominus, servus, pater et filius, et huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse.

(3)

Some name may imply a respect in two ways.

In one way such that the name is imposed in order to signify the respect itself, as

does the name father, or son, or fatherhood itself. (Qu. Disp. de Ver., q. 21, art. 6, c.)

Aliquod nomen potest respectum importare dupliciter.

Uno modo sic quod nomen imponatur ad significandum ipsum respectum, sicut hoc

nomen pater, vel filius, aut paternitas ipsa.

Understood as what is relativesecundum dici or according to being said.

(1)

But sometimes a name is imposed in order to signify that upon which a relationship

is founded, just as the name knowledge, a quality upon which follows a certain respect to

a knowable thing. (In I Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, c.)

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Aliquando autem nomen imponitur ad significandum illud supra quod fundatur

habitudo, sicut hoc nomen scientia, qualitatem, quam consequitur respectus quidam adscibile.

(2)

But some [names] have been imposed in order to signify the things upon which

certain relationships follow, like mover and the thing moved, head and the thinghaving the head, and others of the sort, which are called relatives secundum dici. (Summa

Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7, ad 1)

Quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam

habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur

relativa secundum dici.

(3)

But some names are said to imply a respect because they signify a thing belongingto some genus which a respect follows upon, albeit the name is not imposed in order to

signify the respect itself, just as the name knowledge has been imposed in order tosignify a certain quality upon which a certain respect follows, but not in order to signifythe respect itself. (Qu. Disp. de Ver., q. 21, art. 6, c.)

Quaedam vero nomina dicuntur importare respectum, quia significant rem alicuius

generis, quam comitatur respectus, quamvis nomen non sit impositum ad ipsum respectumsignificandum; sicut hoc nomen scientia est impositum ad significandum qualitatem

quamdam, quam sequitur quidam respectus, non autem ad significandum respectum

ipsum.

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14. On ad aliquidaccording to St. Thomas Aquinas.

(1)

I reply that it must be said that among all Catholics it is certain that relations existin the divine. But in the placing of relations [in God], diverse opinions of the doctors are

found.

Some, like the followers of Porretanus, said that relations in the divine are merelyattached [assistentes]. But some said that relations in the divine are the Personsthemselves, and that when they are signified in the abstract this is only on account of the

manner of speaking, just as we say I beseech your benevolence, that is, you [to be]

benign. And in the same way are to be explained all the expressions in which relations orproperties are said in the abstract.

Others say that relations are the Persons and are in the Persons according to the

truth of the thing, and not only with regard to the manner of speaking. And all of these[doctors] have expressed something of the truth. Nevertheless, the last opinion contains the

whole truth.

In order to understand this, it must be understood that, as was said above (dist. 8,

quaest. 4, art. 3), in relation, as in every accident, there are two things to consider, namely,

its own being [esse suam], according as it places something in it [i.e. its subject], according

as it is an accident; and its own account [ rationem suum], according to which it is referredto something else, on account of which it is located in a determinate genus. And from this

account it does not entail the placing of something in that of which it is said, [unlike] all

the other absolute forms [which] by reason of their very own accounts do entail the placingof something in that [of] which they are said. And so there are found certain relations

placing nothing in that of which they are said. And some philosophers, paying attention to

this, said that relation is not some one genus of beings, nor is it something in the nature ofthings, but it is merely a certain respect found here and there [ respersus] in all beings, and

that relations are of second intentions [sunt de intentionibus secundis] which do not have

being except in the soul, with which also the opinion of the followers of Porretanus

appears to agree. But this is false, since nothing which is merely a being in the soul islocated in a determinate genus. And so distinctions must be made between relations.

For there are some which possess something in reality upon which their being is

founded, as equality is founded on quantity. And relations of this sort are really somethingin the thing [i.e. of which they are said].

But there are some which do not have a foundation in the thing of which they are

said, as right and left in those things in which these determinate positions do not existaccording to nature, as they do in the parts of animals. For in that case, namely, in the

animal, those relations really exist because they are founded in different virtues [powers]

of the determinate parts; but in other things they do not exist except according to theaccount of a habitude [relationship] of one thing to another, and so they are called relations

of reason. And this happens in four ways, namely, that they are relations of reason and not

of the thing [sint relationes rationis, et non rei].

In one way, as has been said in this article just above, when a relation does notpossess something in the nature of the thing upon which it is founded: and for this reason it

sometimes happens that a relation is really in one thing and not in another, since in the one

it has a certain motion upon which it is founded, which it does not have in the other; just as

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in all those relations by which God is referred to creatures, which, in fact, are really in

creatures, but not in God.In a second way when the relation does not involve some real diversity between the

extremes, as in a relation of identity; and so this places nothing with regard to the thing,

but only with regard to reason, as when a thing is said to be the same as itself.In a third way when some relation of a being is designated [designatur, i.e.

referred] to a non-being, as when it is said that we are prior to those who are to come: for

this priority is not some relation with regard to the thing, but only with regard to reason,since a real relation requires both extremes in act.In a fourth way when a relation is posited of a relation: for the relation itself is

referred by itself [per seipsam] and not by another relation. And so in creatures fatherhood

is not conjoined to a subject by some intermediate relation. And Avicenna gives these lasttwo ways; but the first two may be drawn from the words of the Philosopher.

Accordingly, since these relations, fatherhood and sonship, have some foundation

in the thing, namely, the nature itself, which is shared according to a sharing of the nature,it cannot be denied that they really exist in God. And by reason of the simplicity they are

the same as the Persons in which they exist, and by reason of the truth of relations they

must be signified in another way.Therefore the first [group of men], paying attention in relations only to that which

is toward another and not to the foundation which they have in the thing, said the relations

are attached, as if coming from [advenientes] a habitude [relationship] belonging to

another thing. The second, paying attention to the foundation belonging to the thing and tothe divine simplicity, said that the relations are not in the Persons, but rather are the

Persons themselves. But the third, considering both, said that they are in the Persons by

reason of the true account of relation, and that nevertheless they are the Persons by reasonof the simplicity, just as deity is in God, and nevertheless is God. (In I Sent., dist. 26, q. 2,

art. 1, c.)

(2)

I reply that it must be said that, having supposed that relations exist in the divine, it

is necessary to say that they are the divine essence, otherwise one would have to hold thatthere is composition in God, and that relations in the divine are accidents, because

everything inhering in something beyond its substance is an accident. It would also be

necessary that some things be eternal which will not be the divine substance, all of whichare heretical.

Accordingly, to see that this is so, it must be understood that among the nine genera

which are contained under accident, some are signified in accordance with the ratio of anaccident: for the ratio of an accident is to be in; and so I maintain that those things are

signified in the manner of an accident which are signified as inherent in another, like

quantity and quality; for quantity is signified as belonging to that in which it is, andlikewise quality. But toward something [ad aliquid] is not signified in accordance with the

ratio of an accident: for it is not signified as something of[= belonging to] that in which

it is, but as to that which is outside. And on this account the Philosopher also says that

knowledge, insofar as it is a relation, is not of the knower, but of the knowable.And so some men, paying attention to the mode of signifying in relatives, have said

they do not inhere in substances, as, so to speak, being attached to them [ eis assistentia]:

because they are signified as a sort of intermediate between the substance which refers, andthat to which it refers. And from this it would follow that in created things relations are not

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accidents, because the being of an accident is to be in. And so certain theologians, for

instance, the followers of Porretanus, have extended an opinion of this sort even to thedivine relation, saying that the relations are not in the Persons, but are, so to speak,

attached to them [eis quasi assistere].

And because the divine essence is in the Persons, it would follow that relations arenot the divine essence; and because every accident inheres, it would follow that they would

not be accidents. And they understood in accordance with this the words brought in from

Augustine, namely, that relations are not predicated of God with regard to substance, norwith regard to accident. But upon this opinion it follows that relation is not some thing, butonly according to reason: for everything is either a substance or an accident. Wherefore

some of the ancients also held that relations are of second things understood [esse de

secundis intellectis], as the Commentator says in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics.And so it was also necessary for the followers of Porretanus to say that the divine relations

do not exist except according to reason. And thus it would follow that the distinction of

Persons will not be real, which is heretical.And so it must be said that nothing prevents something from being inhering,

although it is not signified as inhering, as even action is not signified as in the agent, but

as from the agent, and yet it is undeniable that action is in the agent. And likewise,although something is not signified as inhering, still it is necessary that it be inhering. And

this is when the relation is some thing; but when it is merely according to reason, in that

case it is not inhering. And just as there must be accidents in created things, so there must

be substance in God, because whatever is in God is His substance. And so relations withregard to the thing [secundum rem, = in reality] must be the divine substance, which,

nevertheless, do not have the manner of a substance, but have another manner of

predicating from those things which are predicated in God. (Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 8. art. 2,c.)

(3)

To the twelfth it must be said that since relation is an accident in creatures, its being

is to be in [esse suum est inesse]; and so its being is not to have itself toward something

else [ad aliud se habere]; but to be of this [sed esse huius, i.e. to belong to this] accordingas [it is] toward something [secundum quod ad aliquid], is to be an order possessed toward

something else. (Qu. Disp. De Pot., q. 8, art. 2, ad 12)

(4)

But toward something [ad aliquid], even according to the account of the genus,does not imply any dependence on the subject; on the contrary, it is referred [refertur] to

something outside: and so it is found in the divine even according to the account of the

genus. (In I Sent., dist. 8, q. 4, art. 3, c.)

(5)

Although relation is placed in God, it nevertheless does not follow that there is inGod something having a dependent being. For in us relations have a dependent being since

their being is other than the being of the substance. And so they have a proper mode of

being according to a proper account, just as happens in the other accidents. For, since allthe accidents are certain forms added onto the substance and caused by the principles of

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the substance, their being must be added on over and above the being of the substance, and

depending on it. And the more the being of each of them is prior or posterior, the more theaccidental form, with regard to its proper account, will be nearer to the substance and more

perfect.

For this reason a relation really coming to a substance has a being both last in order[postremus] and most imperfect [imperfectissimum]: last in order, in fact, since not only

does it require the being of the substance, but also the being of the other accidents by virtue

of which [ex] the relation is caused, just as [being] one in quantity causes equality, and[being] one in quality [causes] likeness; but the most imperfect because the proper accountof relation consists in the fact that it is toward another [ad alterum], and so its proper

being, which it adds on to a substance, not only depends on the being of the substance, but

also on the being of something exterior. (Summa Contra Gentes, III [IV], lect. 14, n. 12)

(6)

Further, the weaker in being something is, the more repugnant it is to the highest

perfection. But among all the other beings relation has the weakest being, as the

Commentator says. And so it is also founded on all the other beings, as equality is foundedon quantity, and so on in the case of the others. Therefore, since relation is found in the

divine, with much greater reason are the other predicaments [found there].

To the fourth it must be said that the weakness in being of relation is consideredaccording to its inherence in a subject, the reason being that it does not place something

absolute in the subject, but [it places something in the subject] merely through a respect to

something else. And so that it come into the divine predication belongs to it from thisbecause the less it adds, the less repugnant it is to the divine simplicity. (In I Sent., dist. 8,

q. 4, art. 3, obj. 4, ad 4)

(7)

To the sixteenth it must be said that, while the other genera, insofar as they are of

this sort, place something in the nature of things (for quantity from the very fact that it isquantity bespeaks something [in the nature of things11]), only relation, by the fact that it is

of this sort, does not entail the placing of something in the nature of things, since it does

not predicate something, but toward something. And so there are found certain relationswhich place nothing in the nature of things, but in reason alone, which, in fact, happens in

four ways, as one may gather from the words of the Philosopher and Avicenna.

In one way, as when something is referred to itself, as when it is said a thing is thesame as itself; for if this relation were to place something in the nature of things in addition

to that which is called the same, there would be a process to infinity in relations, since the

very relation through which something would be called the same would be the same asitself through some relation, and so on to infinity.

Second, when the relation itself is referred to something. For it cannot be said that

fatherhood is referred to its subject by some intermediate relation, since that intermediate

relation would also need another intermediate relation, and so on to infinity. And so thatrelation which is signified in the comparison of fatherhood to a subject does not exist in the

nature of things, but in reason alone.

11 As, for instance, we speak of the size of Socrates, where of Socrates is a subjective genitive.

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Third, when one of the relatives depends on the other and not the other way around,

just as knowledge depends on the object of knowledge and not the other way around; andso the relation of knowledge to the object of knowledge is something in the nature of

things, but not the relation of the object of knowledge to knowledge, which exists in reason

alone.Fourth, when being is compared to non-being, as when we say that we are prior to

those who are to come after us in the future; otherwise it would follow that there could be

infinite relations in the same thing, if generation were to be infinitely extended in thefuture.Accordingly, when all is said and done, it is apparent from two things that that

relation of priority places nothing in the nature of things, but rather only in the

understanding, both because God does not depend on creatures, and because such a prioritybespeaks a comparison of being to non-being. And so from this it does not follow that

there is some eternal truth other than in the divine intellect, which alone is eternal, and this

is the first truth. (Qu. Disp. de Ver., q. 1, art. 5, ad 16)

(8)

I reply that it must be said that certain names implying a relation to the creature are

said of God temporally and not from eternity.

To see that this is so, it must be understood that some people held the opinion thatrelation is not a thing of nature, but rather of reason alone. This, indeed, appears to be

false, from the fact that things themselves have a natural order and relationship to each

other. Nevertheless, it must be understood that, since a relation requires two extremes,there are three ways in which it [an extreme] can stand in regard to being a thing of nature

and of reason.

For sometimes on either side it is of reason alone, when, namely, an order orrelationship cannot exist between certain things except according to the apprehension of

reason alone, as when we say that a thing is the same as itself. For according as the

intellect apprehends some one thing twice, it establishes it as two; and thus it apprehends a

certain relationship of it to itself. And the case is similar with all the relations which existbetween being and non-being, which reason forms insofar as it apprehends non-being as a

certain extreme. And it is the same with all the relations which follow upon an act of

reason, like genus and species, and the like.But some relations, with respect to either extreme, are things of nature, which is the

case when there is a relationship between some two things according to something really

belonging to both. This is clear with all the relations which follow upon quantity, likelarge and small, double and half, and the like, for quantity exists in both extremes.

And it is similar with relations which follow upon action and passion, as mover and

mobile, father and son., and similar things.But sometimes the relation in one extreme is a thing of nature, but in the other is of

reason alone. And this happens when the two extremes do not belong to one order. For

instance, sensation and knowledge are referred to the sensible and the knowable, which,

insofar as they are certain things existing in natural being, are outside the order of thesensible and the intelligible. And so in knowledge and in sensation there is a real relation,

according as it is ordered to knowing or sensing a thingbut the things themselves

considered in themselves are outside an order of this sort. And so in them there is notreally some relation to knowledge and to sensation, but rather according to reason alone,

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insofar as the intellect apprehends them as the terms of a relation to knowledge and to

sensation. And so the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics that they arenot called relative because they are referred to other things, but because other things are

referred to them. And likewise right is not said of a column except insofar as animal is

placed to the right, and so a relation of this sort is not really in the column, but rather in theanimal.

Accordingly, since God is outside the whole order of creatures, and all creatures are

ordered to Him, and not the other way around, it is obvious that creatures are reallyreferred to God Himselfbut in God there is not some relation of His to creatures, butrather according to reason alone, insofar as creatures are referred to Him. And so nothing

prevents names of this sort implying a relation to the creature from being predicated of

God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of a change in thecreature, just as a column comes to be to the right of an animal with no change existing

about it, but rather when the animal has passed. (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7)

15. On relation as an order possessed toward something according to In III Physic., lect. 1,

n. 6.

The third division is of one genus of being, namely, what is toward something.

For motion appears to pertain to this genus in some way, insofar as the mover is referred to

the mobile. Accordingly, in order to understand this third division, one must consider that,

since relation has the weakest being, because it consists solely in the fact that it holds itselftoward something else [ad aliud se habere], it must be founded on some other accident; the

reason for this being that the more perfect accidents12 are closer to substance, and through

their mediation the other accidents are in substance.Now relation is chiefly founded on two things, which possess an order to some-

thing else [quae habent ordinem ad aliud], namely, quantity and action: for quantity can

also be a measure of something outside; but the agent pours out its action into somethingelse. And so certain relations are founded on quantity, and especially on number, to which

the first notion of measure belongs, as is clear in double and half, multiple and sub-

multiple, and in other things of the sort. Moreover, the same and the like and the

equal are founded on unity, which is the principle [beginning, starting point] of number.But the other relations are founded on action and passion: either according to the

act itself, as heating [calefaciens] is said toward what is heated [calefactum]; or

according to that which has acted, as a father is referred to his son because he has begottenhim; or according to the power of acting, as a lord [master] [is referred to] to a servant

[slave] because he can compel him.

The Philosopher explains this division clearly in the fifth book of the Metaphysics(V, 15, 1020b 26); but here he touches on it briefly, saying that one sort of toward

something [relative] is according to excess and defect; which in fact is founded on

quantity, as double and half: but the other is according to the active and passive, and theable-to-move and the mobile, which are referred to each other, as is clear through

themselves.

12 St. Thomas refers to quantity and quality as the more perfect accidents because they are intrinsic and

absolute, as he explains in many places.

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16. On the three ways in which one thing is ordered to another according to In V Meta.,

lect. 17, nn. 1-5.

n. 1 Here the Philosopher determines about toward something: and with respect to

this he does two things. First, he puts down the modes of those things which are towardssomething according to themselves [secundum se]. Second, [he gives the modes] of those

things which are toward something by reason of another thing, at But those things because

of their genera [are said toward something].With respect to this he does two things. First, he enumerates the modes of those

things which are said toward something according to themselves. Second, he proceeds (to

treat) of them at, The first things, however.

He therefore puts down three modes of those things which are said toward

something, the first of which is with regard to number and quantity, like double to half, andtriple to a third part, and the multipliedthat is, the multipleto a part of the multiplied

that is, to the submultipleand the containing to the contained. But the containing is taken

for what exceeds with regard to quantity. For everything exceeding with regard to quantity

contains in itself what is exceeded. For it is this and more besides, just as five contains in

itself four, and three cubits contains in itself two.

n. 2 The second mode is according as some things are said toward something withregard to action and passion, or an active and p

on things called 'toward something

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