on the problem of the external world in the ch'eng wei shih lun

8/9/2019 On the Problem of the External World in the Ch'Eng Wei Shih Lun

1/64


2/64

On the Problem

o

the External World in the

Ch eng wei shih lun


3/64

STUDI PHILOLOGIC BUDDHIC

Occasional Paper Series

XIII

On

the Problem of the External World n the

Ch eng wei shih lun

Lambert Schmithausen

Tokyo

The International Institute for Buddhist Studies

of

The International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies

2 5


4/64

On

the

Problem

of

the

External

l orld

in

the

Ch eng

w i

shih lun

Lambert Schmithausen

Tokyo

The International Institute for Buddhist Studies

of

The International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies

2 5


5/64

Published by the International Institute for Buddhist Studies o the IePBS:

5-3-23 Toranomon Minato-ku Tokyo 105-0001 Japan

© Lambert Schmithausen 2005

First published 2005

Printed in Japan by Bethel-Photo Printing Company; Tokyo

All rights reserved.

Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose ofprivate study research criticism or

review no

p rt

of

the book may be reproduced or translated

in

any form by print

photoprint · microform or any other means without written permission. Enquiries

should be made

to

the publishers.

ISBN 4-906267-52-1

Correspondence regarding all editorial matters should be sent to the Director of the

International Institute for Buddhist Studies in Tokyo.


6/64

Contents

Preface 7

1 A recent trend in interpreting the Ch eng wei shih

un

9

II Discussion

of

the basic evidence

13

III The spiritual context

of

vijiiaptimtitrata 49

IV Appendix:

Discussion

of

four

Ch eng wei shih

fun passages 57

V Abbreviati ons 65


7/64

reface

n earlier version of this paper

was

presented at a symposium on

Yogiicara Buddhism in China, organized by Prof. Chen-kuo Lin in

June 2000 at the International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden. I

take the opportunity to express my gratitude to the participants of

the symposium, as well as to Dr. Anne MacDonald and Prof.s Flo

rin Deleanu, Tilmann Vetter and Nobuyoshi Yamabe who were

so

kind

as

to read revised versions of this paper, for corrections and

stimulating critical remarks which have led to a number of modifi

cations and additions in the present version, which on account of

my own (temporal

as

well

as

other) limitations is nevertheless still

preliminary. To Japanese scholars working in the field, the result

may not come

as

a surprise, but the motive for taking up the issue

again will become clear from the following introductory remarks.

1

1 From a somewhat different angle f o c u s ~ i n g on the problem of the

plurality

of sentient beings

as

purely mental continua and their mutual in

teraction) but with similar results, the issue has also been dealt with in an

excellent paper by Nobuyoshl Y

M BE

( Self and Other in the Yogacara

Tradition , in: ~ t ~ 1 : t t ± t J : ; f f J ~ ~ i l i i J t ~ Kitabatake Tensei hakushi

koki-kinen rombunshu), Kyoto 1998: 15--41). Japanese readers may miss

references to secondary literature in Japanese. t is, however, not only be

cause of the constraInts of time but also on account of the special purpose

of

this paper (as dellleated in ch. I) that I shall base my argument on pri

mary sources only.


8/64

I. A Recent Trend in Interpreting the hJgng wei

shih lun

Yogacara thought has traditionally been understood as advo

cating the epistemological position that mind, or consciousness,

2

does not - at least not directly - perceive or cognize anything out

side itself, but rather cognizes only its own image

3

of an object, and

as propounding the ontological position that there are no entities,

especially no material entities, apart from consciousness, or, more

precisely, apart from the various kinds of mind

citta)

and mental

factors or mind-associates

caitta)

(see

§

II.2). This understanding

was not invented by modem scholars but is in line with the works

of medieval Indian (and Tibetan) authors, both non-Buddhist

4

and

2

In the present paper, I mechanically use mind for

,c, citta)

and,

after considerable hesitation (in view of the subliminal character of the

iilayavijiiiina), consciousness for vijiiiina, vijiiapti), although at le

ast citta and vijiiiina are substantially interchangeable. The term vijiiapti

is, more specifically, used for the

fune t on of vijiiiina,

i.e. in the sense of

making known , cognizing , and is then rendered by

7

or

73U ;

it

may, however, also qualify the object of consciousness

as

being nothing

but an image in consciousness. For

jiitina

(' )

I have chosen knowl

edge in the case of the Buddha, but insight in the context

of

the Path. I

beg the reader's pardon

if

my choice is not the most felicitous one, but

after all English

is

not my mother tongue.

3 The use of the word image to render Ch.

§

(when it is equivalent

to

f§ t,

i.e. the object part or aspect of a consciousness, probably corre

sponding to

Skt nimitta)

is for want

of

something better.

It

is not

intended to imply, necessarily, the existence

of

an original

of

which the

image is a reflection (as would often, though perhaps not always, seem

to hold good when the more specific term

~ ~ is

used).

4 C£.

e.g., Sailkara's commentary on

Brahmasutra

2.2.18:

vijiiiinasti

tva-mi.itra-viidinaJ:z and 2.2.28: vijiitinaika-skandha-viidaJ:z (the latter term

being, of course, hardly justified); or

Yuktidfpikii

(ed.

A. WEZLER

and Sh.


9/64

1

On the Problem

of

the External World

in

the

CWSL

BuddhistS. n recent times, some scholars, mainly from the Anglo

Saxon cultural sphere, have challenged the traditional understand

ing, and especially its ontological aspect. There is no doubt that in

some early

Yogacara works (especially the Yogiiciirabhilmi, but

also others like the Abhidhannasamuccaya)6 the above-mentioned

views are not found at

all

or at best only sporadically. However, the

issue of the critics is not just this but the interpretation of the very

principle of 'nothing'but consciousness' (vijiiaptimiitra(tii)), which

is usually taken to express the epistemological and ontological po

sition the Yogacaras are credited with. Even full-fledged vijiiapti-

miitra texts like Vasubandhu's Virhiatikii and Trirhiikii, and the

commentary on the latter compiled, 'on the basis

of

Indian materials,

by Hsiian-tsang

(1(*,

6027-664), viz. the Ch eng wei shih lun glG

MOTEO , Stuttgart 1998) p. 219,5-6: asattvarh bhiiviiniim (in a passage al

luding to Vasubandhu's

Virhsatikii).

5 Cf., e.g.,

Madhyamakiivatiira

(ed. DE LA

VALLEE POUSSIN,

St. Pe

tersburg 1907-,.12) 182,2-18 and 185,6-20, where CandrakIrti refutes the

Vijfilinavlidin's interpretation of the famous

Dasabhilmikasiltra

passage

cittamiitram idarh yad idarh traidhiitukam. According to CandrakIrti, the

purport of this passage is merely to negate that there is a permanent Self

as

an

agent and that matter

rilpa),

etc., ar:e of primary importance [for the

formation of the

traidhiituka];

its purport is not (as the Vijfianavlidin as

serts:

ct

181,8-12) to negate the

existen e of

matter

rupa) or

external

[objects] (phyi ral: 185,8), in the sense that only mind (cittamiitra) exists

whereas matter. does not, at any rate not apart from mind and mind

associates (sems tsam zhig kho na yod kyi gzugs ni med do: 185,19). Cf.

also BIo gsal grub mtha , ed. K. MlMAKI, 104-105: ... gzugs

...

thams cad

kyang sems dang sems las byung ba las gud na med do

6

Cf.

L SCHMITHAUSEN,

Zur Literaturgeschichte der alteren Yogli

c l i r a ~ S c h u l e ,

in:

Zeitschrijt der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesell-

schaft Suppl. I 3 (1696): 820-821; id., Spirituelle Praxis und philosophi

sche Theorie

im

Buddhismus , in: Zeitschrift flir Missionswissenschaft

und Religionswissenschaft 57.3 (1973): 161-186, esp. 165-167; id.,

On

the Problem

of

the Relation

of

Spiritual Practice and Philosophical The

ory in Buddhism , in:

German Scholars on India,

ed. by the Cultural De

partment, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, vol. II, Bombay

1976: 235-250, esp. 238-240; YAMABE 1998 (s. fn.l): 17.


10/64

A Recent Trend in Interpreting the CWSL

r J i . i i ~ f j A l f henceforward CWSL), are stated not to deny an independ

ent existence o material things rupa), or o the so-called external

(i.e. the physical) world.

A recent contribution in this vein is Dan LUSTHAUS S monograph

Buddhist Phenomenology.

7

According to LUSJHAUS (L 536), to

the extent that epistemological idealists can also be critical realists,

Yogacara may be deemed a type o epistemological idealism, with

the proviso that the purpose o its arguments was not to engender

an

improved ontological theory or commitment. I agree with his

view that the teaching o vijfi ptimiitr is basically not a theoretical

aim in itself but a therapeutical device , a soteric strategy, directed

against attachment and appropriation.

s

Still, Hsiian-tsang was also a

great scholar o Abhidharma, and in a sense the

CWSL

can also be

understood as an attempt to re-formulate conservative Abhidharma

in terms o

vijfiaptimtitra.

This may well imply a - preliminary -

ontological commitment. LUSTHAUS seems to admit that Yogacaras

reject the externality o objects (e.g. L 484), but he insists on some

kind o 'real' existence of matter

nlpa,

5 , which is independent

from mind in the same way that other persons' or sentient beings'

nlinds exist independently from one's own mind (L 492 and 512).

Not being a philosopher, I am not going to discuss LUSTHAUS s

philosophical interpretation of the

CWSL,

let alone.

o

the whole

Yogacara tradition. I shall rather try to re-examine the main pas

sage on which LUSTHAUS grounds his thesis of the independent ex

istence o matter from a philological point o view and on the basis

o vvhat I would like to call an internal, or 'ernie', interpretation o

pertinent textual materials.

7 Dan LUSTHAUS, Buddhist Phenomenology. A Philosophicallnvesti

gation o Yogiiciira Buddhism and the Ch eng Wei-shih lun. London:

RoutledgeCurzon 2002 (henceforward:

L).

The original version o the

present paper had referred to

LUSTHAUS s

PhD dissertation which is

stated by him to be the distant ancestor

o

this book (see L p. xi).

8 E.g. L 537. Cf. also YAMABE 1998

(s.

fn.

1):

35-37.


11/64

II

Discussion o the asic Evidence

[1 1] f I understand LUSTHAUS correctly, an 'independent exis

tence' of matter would involve that matter is not entirely reducible

to images in some form of mind or other. Fortunately, LUSTHAUS

produces at least one passage

9

from the CWSL which he considers

capable of proving that matter

(rapa)

exists independently, though

not separate from my mind (L 491), in the same way that the mind

continuum of another person does.

In

the context

of

the question of

knowledge cognizing another person's mind (paracittajfiiina) O,

11

HSlian-tsang points out that such a cognition is, to be sure, not pos

sible in a direct way but occurs only through the mediation of an

image into which one's own mind itself has transformed or devel-

o oped El p T 12 After quoting the

Sarhdhinirmocanasatra

13 in

support, HSlian-tsang continues:

9 Two more are adduced at L 512. For a discussion

of

these passages,

see appendix, §§ 1-2.

10 This is one of the supra-normal knowledges or powers (abhijiiii),

accessible only to Buddhas and advanced yogis or Bodhisattvas.

11 CWSL

39c9-16 / P 430; C 239; S 320.

12

The Sanskrit term at the basis of

is

parirziima,

which means

change, alteration, transformation; development; ripeness, maturity

MONIER WILLIAMS).

n

Vasubandhu's works (cf. my article Sautra

ntika-Voraussetzungen

in

Virilsatika und Trirhsika , Wiener ZeitschriJt

for die Kunde Siid- und Ostasiens 1111967: 109-136) it is used as an ac

tion noun describing a process taking place in the continuum (sarhtiina,

sarhtati) of a person or in the consciousness continuum or its latent stra

tum.

t

may also refer to the culmination

of

this process or to its result

(the actual kinds

of vijiiiina).

n

the CWSL, however, it refers to a e-

temporalized transformation or 'development' within a single moment

of

a vijiiiina or mental factor, i.e. to the fact that each moment arises in

such a way that it has 'changed' or 'developed', from the outset, into an

image ;fED of an object cognized (or into a duality of image ;f§ and vision


12/64

14

On the Problem

of

the External W orId in the CWSL

t l D ~ f t g { , \ , 1 S ~ m q ~ i j o (CWSL 39c16)

LUSTHAUS

(L

491)

translates the sentence

as

follows:

Other mind is this sort of condition; rupa, etc. are the same

case.

Forgrarnmatical reasons, this translation must be discarded; 14 in

Hsiian-tsang's diction,

tiD

can hardly mean this sort

of',

and is no

~ ; cf. SNSr vol. Thi 122bs: ta ba dang rgyu mtshan gyi rnam

par

yongs

su gyur pa). This image (or duality of image and vision) is called ~ P f T ~

( what vijfiiina has changed, or developed, into , which is equivalent to a

passive expression

developed by vijfiiina ) or, by way of an ellipsis of

~ , simply P f T ~ (also f T ~ : m , e.g. 46c8).

n

syntactically unambiguous

situations, this may even be reduced to mere ~ . This holds good not only

for ordinary consciousnesses but also for those

of

a Buddha as far

as

they

are directed towards the conventional (cf. CWSL 57c3-4; 58cl-3 and

27-29;

opposite view refuted at hU 317b19-29). The manifestation of an image

in consciousness is described by expressions like consciousness appears,

or arises, developed/changed into an image looking lL. '


13/64

Discussion

of

the Basic Evidence

15

doubt a conjunction corresponding with Jj\m',15 and * :11n{J' has to

be taken

as

verb

+

object,

as

it has been in the translations by

DE

LA

V ALLEE POUSSIN and COOK:

II en va de la pensee qui connait Ie Rupa, etc., comme de la

pensee qui porte iiIambaka) sur lapensee d'autrui (P 430).

As with having the minds of others as objects, so with

form, etc. (C

239;

cf.

S 320).

This syntactical analysis is also confirmed by a Tibetan rendering

of the passage in the Tibetan translation of a commentary on the

Salizdhinirmocanasiitra by Hsiian-tsang's Korean student W6n

ch'uk [ i ] ~ ~ U , Ch. Yiian-ts'e, Tib. Wen tshig [or tshegs]: 613

696)16;

As that which has another's mind as its object, so also [that

which has] riipa, etc., [as its object] SNSr voL Thi 119b3:

gzhan gyi sems la dmigs

pa

ji ta ba bzhin du gzugs fa sogs

pa

yang de bzhin no}

planatory additions, is perfectly correct, while

LUSTHAUS's

is wrong;

=

Jli tCz:

clearly means because it is one

of

the two

Jli

anyatara),

just as at 39a25 liJli- t5z: means because it is one of the five . The

reader of

LUSTHAUS's

book will also often be surprised at his quotations

of, or remarks on, Sanskrit expressions. Cf., e.g., L 497, where the correct

cvi-forrnation

sammukhf-bhilva

(which he seems

to

connect with

sam

mukhin) is

deliberately replaced by the non-existing word

sammukhii.

bhilva.

Incidentally, Ch. :E.ii''T, as the antonym of 'seeds'

bija),

corre

sponds to

samudilciira

( full, actual emergence ) or

sammukhlbhiiva

( becoming face to face , becoming actually present ), not

adhyilcilra

(which refers to committing an offence), as can be gleaned from Abhi

dharmasamuccaya

(ed.

P.

PRADHAN, Santiniketan 1950) 35,3 and 35,15-

16.

15 Cf.

CWSL

12bl-2;c5-6;

7-8;

9-10; 21a17;

39c5-6; 50a28-29; 58C4-5.

16

Cf. John POWERS, Lost in China, Found in Tibet: How Wonch'uk

Became the Author of the Great Chinese Commentary , in: Journal of the

International Association

of

Buddhist Studies

15.1 (1992): 95-103.


14/64

16 On the Problem of the External World in the

CWSL

Taking into account the context of the passage, i.e. the sentence

which immediately precedes the

Samdhininnocana

quotation,17 a

more explicit rendering would run

as

follows:

Just as [in the case of cons ciousness] having another's

mind as [its] objective support

~

X =

X-iiZambana)

[what

is directly cognized is not the other person's mind itself but

only an image of it developed by the cognizing mind itself],

so also [in the case of] visible matter 5 =n7pa),

etcY

(i.e.

in the case

of

a consciousness having visible matter, etc., as

its objective support) [what is cognized directly

is

only an

image developed by the cognizing mind itself].,,19

[1.2] But is this small passage really strong enough and suffi

ciently unambiguous to carry the burden of a radical reinterpreta

tion

of

the system

of

the

CWSL?

Does it really presuppose an exis

tence

of

matter that

is

independent

of

the cognizing mind? And

if

it

does, is

DE

LA

VALLEE POUSSIN s

interpretation

20

according to

17 [This knowlege]

is

called 'knowledge of another [person]'s mind'

paracittajiiiina) only because the latter, like [an image in] a mirror, etc.,

appears

as

an external object (viz.

as

the mind of another person), but

[this knowledge]

is

not capable

of

cognizing [another's mind] directly.

What

is

cognized directly, is [only the

i..mage of

the other person's mind]

developed by [the

paracittajiiiina]

itself. (CWSL 39c13-14:

{ E . : Z D ~ ~ ~ {J),

:9f-mfJ

~ T { i i M l ' O

? F ~ J i ~ g T o

~ J i p f T T ~

§ ~ s f T ~ o

P430; C239;

S 320; cf. L 491)

18 I suppose etc. refers to the other kinds of material sense-objects

(viz. sound, etc.),

as

at CWSL 39a26, b27 or c2 (cf. fn. 81), and not to the

viprayuk;ta-samskiiras and the asamskrtas,

as

at CWSL 4a7,

7a19

or, per

haps but not necessarily, 39c25.

19

In YAMABE

1998

s.

fn. 1): 31, whose rendering ( Cognizing other

people's minds or matter

is

also [effected] in the same way. ) slighly dif

c

fers from mine, the sentence has, probably by misprint, been included in

the Samdhininnocana quotation.

20

P 430: Le Rupa qui est

Ie

nimittabhiiga

de la pensee d'autrui

(Ie

corps d'autrui, developpement du VijfHina d'autrui), et aussi Ie Rupa qui


15/64

Discussion of the Basic Evidence

17

which this independent matter is to be understood as the image of

matter in vijfitinas other than the cognizing one, indeed nothing but

the imposition of his own idealist presupposition, as LUSTHAUS

(L

492-493 asserts? I, for my part, should rather prefer to under

stand the passage in the light

of

sufficiently explicit and unambigu

ous statements of the position of the CWSL in the CWSL itself. f

the picture emerging from the

CWSL

itself is explicitly confirmed

or organically supplemented by the earliest Chinese commentators

or by Indian and Tibetan sources, I am inclined to regard this as

.corroborative evidence.

[1 3] I am, of course, aware of LUSTHAUS S (L 382ff) distrust in .

the authenticity of the explanations ofK'uei-chi m£: 632-682)21,

Hstian-tsang's student and author of the only available direct com

mentary on the CWSL. It would certainly be desirable to systemati

cally search for additional information on the issue under consid

eration in the Samdhinirmocana commentary of K'uei-chi's oppo

nent Won-ch'Uk and in the Yogtictirabhilmi commentary by Tun

lun

~ { 1 l B

(or Tao-lun ~ { 1 l B l 2 , ~ Korean collaborator of K ' u e i ~ c h i

est Ie developpement d'un autre Vijfiana de la meme personne. [C'est-a

dire:

Ie

calqurvijfiiina darsanabhiiga)

a pour

iilambana

irnmediat son

propre nimitta, qui est une reproduction du Rilpadeveloppe de l Alaya

vi fiana].

21

I use the traditional name (cf. H8bFA p. 264, also for other

names). As Prof.

N

YAMABE kindly pointed out to me, the problems

about this name are discussed in

FuKAURA

Seibun

l*rmlEX,

~ p t g m l ¥

1iJf5i;, J : ~

: < : 9 : : ~ M i ~ , ffi :

k 8 X ~ ¥ :

[1954]1972: 256, n: 2, and

in Stanley

WEINSTEIN,

A Biographical Study of Tz'u-en , in: Monu

menta Nipponica

15.1-2 (1959): 119-149

(esp. 129

ff)

H8bFA p. 284 (s.v. Tonrin). The problem of his name is discussed

in

YUKI

Reimon i f ; f ~ 1 J ~ , ~ p t g m l ¥ : I l 1 : ~ 9 : : ~ ,Tokyo 1962: 264

ff,

and,

as

Prof.

N YAMABE

kindly informed me, also in

YDKI

Reimon, r ~ 3 i « { j ] D

~ i C ~

0 ) 5 / f ; g ~ I;:Mt-

Q ~ ,repr.

in:

~ i f ; f ~ 1 J ~ 5 / f 1 ' f ~ ~ ,

m-

~ :

p t g m l ) t . , ~ J

*ffi, *tk:t±

1999: 145-155, and

in: YANG

Pai-i tis

te,

r ~ ; g 0 ) ¥ 1 ~ J W I ) { J f H 0 ) ~ 3 1 i « { j ] D ~ i j j ± { g ~ M i ~ c ~ O)1iJf5i;J , in: *r ¥

m1iJf5i;

23.1 (1984): 292-305.


16/64

18

On the ProbJem o the External World in the CWSL

who, however, quite often quotes the interpretations of other exe

getes as well, including Wan-ch Uk, but this is beyond the limits o

my time; At any rate,

LUSTHAUS s

scepticism regarding K uei-chi s

ascriptions of

CWSL

materials to Indian authors, especially Dhar

mapilla, needs reconsideration in view of the fact that these ascrip

tions are, in significant cases, also confirmed by Wanch Uk. Even a

very sporadic use o his

Sarhdhinirmocana

commentary23 yielded

evidence to the effect that he too ascribes CWSL materials to

DharmapiHa, e.g., the explanation of the final verse o the fifth

chapter

o

the

Sarhdhinirmocanasiltra

at

CWSL

15c7-14.

4

Still

more important is Wanch ilk s quotation, from the CWSL (45c22-

26), o the two opinions on the question of whether all the eight

kinds

o

consciousness, or only some of them, are false imagination

i l g ~ g t ) ,

because he explicitly ascribes these opinions to Sthira

mati and DharmaplHa,25 respectively, just as K uei-chi does. There

is thus reason to assume that at least some

o

the ascriptions are not

just K uei-chi s forgery but go back to Hstian-tsang himself

(though admittedly this does not solve all the problems).

[2.] Let me start my re-examination o he passage quoted above

with a closer look at its context. It concludes a paragraph which is

introduced by the following objection to the ogacara point

o

view:

23

Unfortunately, I have no access

to

the Chinese original (as far

as

it

is

preserved) but have to rely on the

i b e t ~

translation by Chos grub.

24 SNST Ti 286a5(ff): bstan beos rNam

par

rig pa tsam du grub

pa i

nang nasslob dpon Chos skyong gi bshad pas ni ...

25

SNST

Ti

290a6-b1: kha Gig na re rnam par shes pa brgyad dang

sems las byung ba zag pa dang beas pas bsdus pa ni ... zhes zer te I di ni

Blo brtan gyi bshad pa

i

don to

II

yang kha

Gig

ni

mam par

shes pa drug

dang bdun pa i sems kyi rnam pa (text: pas) bdag dang clws su

dzin pa ni ... zhes zer te I di ni slob dpon Chos skyong gi bshad

pa i

gzhung ngo II In

this case, the position ascribed to Sthiramati

is

in

agree

ment

with his

T r i r h S i k i i b h i i ~ y a (TrBh 35,14-17 .


17/64


[Since according to your system] m

t ter

outside [the mind]

is non-existent in reality, it may be admissible [for you to

assert] that it is not an object of consciousness within. [But

even in your system] another s mind exists in reality.

vVhy

is it not an objective support of one's own [conscious

ness]?

CWSL

39c9 1O:

:91 5.;rm Q } 1 F P 3 l i ~ ~ § i L

fi:tM/Jf1' f

~ 1 F § p J T ~ o

/

P 430; C 239; S 320?6)

19

The opponent clearly presupposes that the Yogacara system ne

gates the existence

of

matter outside mind (ontologically) but ad

mits the existence of another's mind, i.e. his ontological interpre

tation

of

vijiiaptimatrata is that it excludes external matter but not a

plurality of mind continua. At the same time the opponent presup

poses an epis temological interpretation of vijiiaptimatrata in the

sense of each consciousness being strictly confined to itself, i.e.

unable to cognize anything outside itself. He also seems to corre

late the epistemological postulate to the ontological one y taldng

the former to be based on the latter, i.e. by assuming that the

Yogacara rejects external entities as objects of consciousness be-

cause of heir non-existence. But this would not hold good in the

case of other mind continua which exist and hence ought to be cog

nized (at least by yogis, as the Buddhist tradition generally as

sumes). This, however, would break the

epistemological

princi

ple

of vijiiaptimatrata

7

and hence render it doubtful also in the

case

of

matter.

The proponent rejoins by specifying the purport of

vijiiapti-

matrata: As an epistemological principle it means, to be sure, that

nothing outside the respective moment of consciousness itself can

be its

direct

objective support

( ~ ~ p M ) .

But it does

not

exclude

26 L 490 gives the passage a strange twist which forces him to

t ake

M

iIl

a concessive sense, which in view of the absence of a concessive

conjunction

is

improbable.

27

Cf.

Madhyamakavatara (see fn. 5) 166,14-16.


18/64

20

On the Problem o the External World in the CWSL

entities outside the respective consciousness from being its object

at all i.e. from being cognized in some

indirect

way. In this

context, the disputed sentence makes clear that this holds good not

only for another's mind but also for matter. But there

is

no

rejec

tion of the opponent's presupposition that [for the Yogacara] exter

nal matter, i.e. matter existing outside any form of mind, does not

exist in reality. On the contrary, the following paragraph which re

sumes the problem o how the principle of

vijiiaptimatrata

is com

patible with ontological pluralism is, it

is

true, quite explicit in in

terpreting

vijfiaptimatrata

to include a plurality of multi-layered

mind continua along with their mind-associates

(caitta)

and the in

tra-mental dyad

o

image (*nimitta) and vision (*darsana) into

which mind and mind-associates 'transform' or 'develop' P J T ~ 1 §

Jl ,), etc.:

"The word 'consciousness' ~ :

vijiiapti)

summarily indi

cates that in each

o

all the sentient beings there are

(1.)

eight [forms of] consciousness ~ ~ : vijfiana), (2.) six cate

gories of mind-associates, (3.) image- and vision-[part] into

which they develop, (4.) [their] different states :5tflE.il§:55U:

avastha-viseo?a, some of which are wrongly hypostatized by

the Sarvastivadins as

cittaviprayukta-samskaras),

and (5.)

true Suchness

~ P o :

tathata)

28

manifested

pJT

~ :

pra-

28 As for the tathata, I disagree with LUSTHAUS s (L 530f; cf. also

359 and 535) statement that it is merely a prajiiapti. This statement is

based on CWSL

6clO-20

where the unconditioned (asamskrta) entities li.\e

space

(aka§a)

are interpreted

as

denominations

(prajiiapti)

o the trans

conceptual, ineffable true ultimate nature

(dharmata)

o everything,

viewed under certain aspects.

n

this context, it

is

then added that even

[the term]

tathata

and the qualifications o

tathata

as existent, empty,

etc., are mere designations [of this dharmata] used with the purport

o

removing wrong conceptualizations

o

the transconceptual ultimate

nature. tathata, the text adds, must not be conceived o as an uncondi

tioned entity apart from the

dharmas

(matter, mind, etc.), as other Bud

dhist schools do. But at the same time this implies that

tathatii

as the

transconceptual, ineffable true ultimate nature (dharmata)

o

everything,


19/64


bhavita

by the principle

of

their voidness; for these (five

items] are [respectively]

(1.)

what has consciousness (or:

[the function of] cognizing)

( ~ ~ :

vijfiapti

as its specific

characteristic (E

1'll s v a l a k ~ a l J a , 29 (2.)

what is associated

(1'§H :30 samprayukta with consciousness

( ~ :

vijfiiin

,

(3.)

what the two [preceding items] 'develop' into, 4.) specific

states of the three [preceding items], and (5.) the true nature

of

the four [preceding items]. These

(lit.

such) dharmas, all

of

them not being separate from consciousness, are summa

rily designated as 'consciousness'. CWSL 39c20-24: ~ §

* , ~ ~ - W ~ I W : f r ~ j \ ~ . 1\{s vG,pff

.

f f ~ 1 ' § ~

.

:B-{ll

~ 5 5 U

& i ~ ~ f - ' p f f ~ ~ : t m o

~ E 1 ' § i M z , ~ ; f § H i M z , = p f f ~ i M z ,

=:B-{lliiX, rzgJltiiiXo

t z D : l i k ~ 1 t ; ; ,

. ~ f i ' . ~ ,

* , ~ J L ~ : g o /

P 431; C 240; S 320-321; cf. L 487.)

21

ut

the text is equally unambiguous in excluding matter as some

thing really existing entirely apart from any form of mind as it is

conceived

of by ill-

or untrained people:

which becomes manifest in transconceptual insight nirvikalpam jfiiinam:

cf. CWSL 49c20(ff)' is not rejected. Tathatii constitutes the primordial

nirviiJ:la

of natural purity (55b7-8) and is the basis of all fonns of actual

ized

nirviiJ:la

(55b12-17)'.

In

its non-conceptualized, true nature, it can by

no means be a mere

prajfiapti. n

fact, elsewhere the

CWSL

explicitly

states that the Perfect Nature ~ ~ . t ±

=

a r i n i ~ p a n n a ~ s v a b h i i v a ~ ) ,

which is expressly equated with tathatii at CWSL 46b15-16,

is

exclusively

truly existent because it is not constituted as a [mere] designation pra

jfiapti) on the basis of something else CWSL

47c12-13:

~ ~ . t ± ~ ~

~ ,

/ F { 1 X { i f t ~ mJDffig it:t&o ).

29 Cf. Vasubandhu, Paficaskandhaka (Peking Tanjur vol. Si) l6b8:

rnam

par

shes pa gang zhe na I dmigs pa rnam par rig pa o

II

which

probably renders Skt. *vijfiiinam katamat I i i l a m b a n a v i j f i . a p t i ~

/

Hslian

tsangs Chinese rendering of the passage (T

vol.

31

no. 1612: 849c27)

is

as

follows:

: z : ; ; f i I T ~ ~ o

fj §i

: a ~ J 5 f T * & m

T 3 U ~ t i o This use

of

'Ii is very close

to that of

S

T§ in the passage translated above.

30 Chinese lit. corresponding , in agreement , which is in fact an

aspect included in the tenn (cf., e.g.,

AKBh

62,6-10).


20/64

22

On

the Problem of the External World in the CWSL

The

word -matra

merely

excludes

3

visible matter, etc.,32

as they are conceived

of

by ill- or

untrained

people, i.e. as

something really existing definitely apart

from any form

of

consciousness.

(CWSL

39c24-25: r l l j § 1 E . ~ ®'


21/64


[in such a way that it] resembles an external object. (CWSL

7a22-23: E 8 l f : t f f ~ D o J f ~ 1 7 i - m , i l i i § p g ~ { ~ 1 7 i - m : S : . o /

P 84;

C 40-41;

S

59. Cf. also

CWSL

1b14-I5 and 1b2-3.)

An external object, because of being established arbi

tr rill

3

, does not exist [in the same way]

as

consciousness

[exists]. (CWSL 1b

10-11: 1 7 i - m J l j ' r w f f f l n f f i ~ ~ t 1 j ( ~ ¥ i § t z D ~ o /

P 10; C 10; S 13. Cf. also CWSL 1aI2-l3.)

In

order to dispel the wrong conception that an object ex

ists in reality outside mind and mind-associates, it is

t ught·

that there is only consciousness (vijfiaptimtitra). (CWSL

6c24-25: ~ ~ ~ t t {j\ L pJT17i- Jfi§mt1j(,

§ 3 t i l i i § ~ o

/ P

80;

C 39; S 57; cf. L 531.)

[When] they have thoroughly understood that there is no

objective support separate from consciousness, then they

are taught that the image part [of the respective conscious

ness itself] is the objective support. (CWSL lOb5-6:

~ ~

~ p J T ~ m ~ , f f i 1 U § 3 t 1 § : 5 t ~ p J T ~ o /

P 128; C 62; S 79.)

23

These sorts of statements may well intend a wholesale denial of the

existence

of

entities existing outside any form

of

mind, or inde

pendently, but

if

we want to be cautious we should suspend judge

ment and rather interpret these statements epistemologically, i.e. as

rejecting extra-mental entities merely as o jects

of

consciousness

(which would leave them the possibility of existing

as

non-objects,

i.e. without being cognized, or at least without being cognized

in

a

way which justifies their being termed 'objects'

of

consciousness).

[3.2]

However, according to CWSL 7a17-19 (P 82;

C

40; S 59)

the reason why mind and mind-associates definitely do

not

have

331lil lfll

is used in the sense of 1 l i l ~ l f l l : cf CWSL 1bs and Shu-chi

243b20+22; CWSL 3el3 and Shu-chi 265a29.

In

Hsiian-tsang's translation

of the Yogiiciirabhlimi (T vol.

31

no.1579: 639as-9: 1 l i l l f l l ~ 1 F ~ ~ : i , *

: = : f i : ~ 1 T ) the expression Ilil ffll corresponds to Tibetan ci 'dod dgur as

he likes (Peking Tanjur vol. Zi: 160b2).


22/64

24

On the Problem

of

the External World in the CWSL

external matter, etc., as their objective support (iilambana) is that

such extra-mental entities do notreally exist:

Thus, Self and

dharmas

apart from consciousness, as they

are conceived of by [respectively] the non-Buddhists and

the [followers of the] other Vehicles, are all non-existent it

reality.

Therefore,

mind and mind-associates certainly do

not use external matter, etc.,

as

their objective support

(iilambana). ( P D ~ 5 } i l l ~ * p f T ~ A ~ ~ ~ f . Z 1 f § ' ? F . ~ o

tJ z

l>G,pfT

1 : R : 5 E / f f f l 5 H s ~ 1 ~ P f T ~ ~ o )

And there are other passages as well which flatly assert, in obvi

ously ontological terms, the non existence of external matter,34

as, e.g.,

CWSL

5a5-6 (P 53; C 28; S 35):

Thus one

should

know that in reality

there

s

no ex-

ternal matter, and only internal consciousness arising [in

such a way that it] develops (or, more literally: transforms

itself into) [an image] resembling matter. (rnlf:lJl 5;Oo

~

5H:i3 O l ~ p j § ~ ~ { J ~ H s 1 : : o )

Though what precedes is a refutation of the Abhidharmic concep

tion of matter, there is no indication that any other way of main-

34 Cf. also TrBh 15,25-16,1: Dharmas and a Self

do

not exist outside

a transformation of consciousness (dharmii/liim iitmanas

c

vi}iiiina-

parilJ.iimiid

bahir

abhiiviit); 17,2: biihyiirthiibhiiviit; 16,22-23: vinafva

biihyenarthena (cf. also 16,6-7 and

IS).

There seems

to

be a tendency to

read more into the term artha than what may have been intended by the

Indian writers. According to Sanskrit lexicographers (e.g.

Amarakosa

3.3.86; Srldharasena,

Abhidhiinavisvalocana,

ed. L. JAMSPAL, Naritasan

1992: 942-,-943), it may not only mean, among other things, purpose

(prayojana), meaning (abhidheya), or object ( v i ~ a y a , not in Amara),

but may also simply mean thing (vastu). This suggests that it was felt

to

cover both the epistemological and the ontological aspect. Cf. also Sthira

mati, comm. on Mahiiyiinasiitriilarikiira XI.47: gzugs

l

sogs pa phyi'i

dngos

po

ni med kyi

...

(Tanjur, Peking vol. Mi 213al; Derge vol.

i

192a7-S;

O. HAYASHIMA, " D h a r m a p a r y e ~ i " ,

in: Bulletin

of

Faculty of

Education, Nagasaki University 27/1978: 116).


23/64


25

taining the existence of extra-mental or independently existing mat

ter would be exempted from criticism. Actually, the text argues that

real matter is logically

impossible

because

as

a divisible whole it

would not be real and as indivisible atoms it would be without any

shape or physical substance ~ ~ l M =

*amarta)

and hence, in the

last analysis, immaterial (CWSL 4all-13 / P 39--40; C 24; S 30).35

Summing up its arguments, the text concludes:

Hence one must know that all obstructive

(sapratigha,

i.e.

ordinary) matter is [merely] a manifestation [of an image]

developed by consciousness, and does not consist of atoms

. (i.e. is not really material).

(CWSL 4c4-5:

E 8 J J t ~ J O : ~ 1 §

fiE ~ ~ f ~ ~ F @ 1 W z m < o /

P 47; C 27; S 33.)

And:

Since even obstructive matter, which [at least] looks mate

rial, turns out, on investigation by logical arguments, not to

exist apart from consciousness, how much less can unob

structive (apratigha) matter, which does not even look like

matter, be called a real material entity.

(CWSL

4c6-8: ~ ' § 1 §

fiE f ~ 1 § 5 T § t'JJ]=[: =1tJt I i l l § ~ w ~ o { 5 t ~ f i 5 f J 1 , ~ 5 T §

m f a J I D t ~ ~ . 5 1 : f t : o / P 47; C 27; S 33 i

[4.1]

However, there are also some passages which

affirm

the

existence of external

dharmas ,

albeit in a specific sense.

CWSL

35 This is,

of

course, the same argumentation as in Vasubandhu's

Virhsatikii (ed. S. LEVI) p. 6,22 ff

36 Similarly, at CWSL

39c24-25

what is stated to be excluded by the

element

°miitra

in

vijiiaptimiitra

is

(visible) matter, etc., insofar

as

it is

regarded

as

really existing apart from mind (fltti'§

1iHfft

~ 7 C , P J T t t \ f E l f I ~

Jl1 f-ES: i¥). According

to

other passages it is real entities

(Jlt? i)

apart

from mind (but not entities not separate from mind like the mind

associates) (CWSL 38c24-25:

fltti'§ : f . i 1 ~

l f I ~ J l t ? i , 1 ~ ~ l f I ~ { p M * : ' i ¥ o ) ,

or just the external (:9i-, or extra-mental, cf. 59a16:

~ ~ t : ) ,

which is enti

rely non-existent

( 1 l G ~ ) ,

n contrast to the internal object

( p g ~ )

(59a8-

9: f l t t i ' § ~ : 9 i - , ~ ~ p g ~ ; 59a14: 1 ~ ~ l l

p g ~

t z D : 9 i - 1 l G ~ ) .


24/64

26

On the Problem of the External World in the CWSL

7a12-13 (P 81; C 40; S 59), e.g., may, at least at first glance, be

taken to state that in the case of the various forms of clinging to

(or: hypostatizing) entities

( : ~ :

dharma-graha)

described in the

immediately preceding portion of the text,37 the actually existing

factors distorted by the hypostatizing mental activity are not only

dharmas inside

one s

own mind § l G , j 5 I g ~ t ; ; ) but, in certain cases,

also dharmas outside

one s

own mind (§lG':9i- :; my translation of

§

lG is preliminary and will be revised in § 4.3):

As for all [these different forms of] 'clinging to entities'

dharma-graha) that have been described thus (i.e. in the

preceding lines

of

the text), dharmas outside [one's] own

mind are partly present, partly absent, whereas dharmas in

side [one's] own mind are invariably present.

(tiO;@?JTm

- W ~ t ; ; ~ , § l G ' : 9 i - : ~ ~ ~ ~ o § l G , j 5 I g ~ t ; ; - W ~ ~ o )

[4 2]

Still, we have to ask the question what, precisely, is meant

by these

dharmas,

which I shall, for the sake of convenience, call

'external' and 'internal' dharmas. A first possibility to be consid

ered is understanding these 'external' and 'internal' dharmas in a

general sense, i.e. as the constituents of

the complex

of

conditions

which in the case of the two forms of dharmagraha based on theo

retical reflection : 5 t ~ U : vikalpita) is stated to include 'external'

conditions

: 9 i - ~ ) 3 8 , 3 9

whereas the inborn

({J' ,1:=.:

sahaja) dharma

graha arises from previous impregnations

; W ; ~ :

vasana), i.e. an

'internal' cause (j5Igl2Si), only.4o But the text contains a passage (sc.

CWSL 2a9-29 where the various forms of clinging to a

Self ~ ~ :

atmagraha) are described in a way which is exactly parallel in

37

I.e. CWSL 6c26-7a12.

38

K'uei-chi does not specify what, precisely, these 'external' condi

tions are, but perhaps the expression refers to the wrong teachings and

wrong reflections mentioned subsequently;

cf.

also

YoBhii 162 11-12.

39 CWSL 7a5; cf. 2al7.

40

CWSL

6C27-28;

cf. 2alO-Il.


25/64

Discussion o the Basic Evidence

27

structure to the aforementioned description o

dharmagrilha:

In the

corresponding part o this passage, we are told that in the case o

the various forms

o

clinging to a Self 'external'

skandhas

(El{, :9}

ID are partly present, partly absent, whereas 'internal' skandhas

(

l

{, pg

ID are invariably present. 4

In

view o the canonical

statement, actually quoted in the

CWSL 2a27-29),

that all views

o

a Self have the five upildilna-skandhas, or at least one or another o

them, as their object,42 the reference to the

skandhas

in the context

o clinging to a Self unambiguously refers to its objective sup-

p rt

43

Hence, in the case o clinging to dharmas, too, the refer

ence to 'external' and 'mternal'

dharmas

ismost naturally under

stood as pointing to its objective support.

44

Actually, the immedi

ately following sentence makes clear that the 'internal' dharmas

consist in the image 113)45 that appears like

dharmas 1PUt ,

which

is manifested within [one's] own mind (El {,'Ffffl)46 and which

41 CWSL 2a24-25 (P 19): t z D ~ p f T I D t - - I ; 7 J ~ t \ , §{, :9 f-c

~ * , g j G 1 \ t

§{,'P


26/64

28


must be its objective support

( Y S J T ~ [ * ~ ] : iilambana[pratyaya]),

in

analogy to, e.g., the sense consciousnesses, in the case

of

which the

objective support is defined as the image

tED

appearing like visible

matter, etc.

( { ~ 5 ~ ) ,

this image being developed by one's own

consciousness El Y S J T ~ :

va-vijiiiina-parilJiima).47

But

what are the external

skandhas

or

dharmas

which are

stated to be, in some cases, involved in the arising of the clinging to

a

Self or to

dharmas?

It is self-evident that they cannot be the hy

postatized dharmas, i.e. those qualified, a few lines later CWSL

7a18), as "apart from consciousness" . ~ ) and as not really exis

tent"

( ~ F . i ' § ) ,

li.\.e the hypostatized

Self atman)

in the case of

iitmagriiha.

On the contrary, while in the cases

of

purely fictional

conceptions of Self (like the

iitman

of the V a i s e ~ i k a s ) or

dharmas

(like the Sarikhya concept

of

'primary matter'

pralqti

or

pradhana)

or the V a i s e ~ i k a concept of 'substance'

dravya-padiirtha)

'exter

nal'

skandhas

or

dharmas

seem to be absent,48 the

CWSL

itself

makes clear

that their presence is invariably required precisely in

those conceptual activities that are inborn ( { ~ : 3 : . :

sahaja).49

What

fested within one's own mind (cf., however, § 4.3 ) [but] falsely appre

hend it

as

really existing [apart]."

( ~ i i 5 l : $ t ~ ,

- § ~ s

' ~ ' P f T : E R { J J . $ ,

t ~ m

jf1 f

0) n the case of atmagriiha CWSL

2a25-26),

only the term

f§

=

nimitta is used (see fn. 45).

47 CWSL 4b24-25:

s ~ P f T ~

M B ~ f § m p f T * ~ o

Cf. also 4b3-4 (P 42;

C 25; S 31): "Since in the case of these [sense-consciousnesses, i.e.] vis

ual consciousness etc.[,] an external objective support (here clearly refer

ring to matter existing outside any form of mind), [can]not reasonably [be

taken

to]

exist, one must necessarily admit that [an image] developed by

one's own consciousness functions

as

[their] objective support."

( J . [ t § N ~

~ , : 9 i - P f T ~ ~ J ; ~ ? F 1 " f t & , 1 : R : 5 E J ~ L p s P f T ~

m p f T ~ ~ o )

48

Cf.

Shu-chi 250C16-17

(cf. also C18-19) and 293c25-26.

49 Cf.

CWSL 40C27-29

(P 447; C 247; S 327):

~ - t ; I ~ ' J " r : l

... ,

~ { J ' l : ± i i 5 l : ,

'{Y:::9Hf; Shu-chi 249c24: " .. because it is not [possible] that [a concep

tion] might be inborn without having [as its 'remote objective support']

an 'original'

bimba)

[of its own image]" ( ..

?F1I\Ii*1f

~ { J ' l : ± i i 5 l : o ) .


27/64


29

kind of factors, then, are referred to by these 'external' skandhas or

dharmas? Do they include the independently existing matter rapa)

postulated by LUSTHAUS?

[4.3] Let me start with a comparatively easy issue. One of the

two inborn sahaja) conceptions of Self, and also of dharmas, is

based

on

the 'seventh consciousness',

manas,

and is stated to be

continuous. The inborn conception of Self of the 'seventh con

sciousness' is defined as follows (once again, the translation is pre

liminary, for the time being):

The first [inborn conception of Self] is continuous and oc

curs in the 'seventh consciousness'. Taking the 'eighth con

sciousness' (i.e. aZayavijfiana) as

its objective support, it

produces an image nimitta) in [one's] own mind (§j{j\;f'§)

and conceives of it as a real Self. CWSL 2a13-14: - 1*;f §

.

f f ~ t ~ o

~ ~ J \ ~

M\§j{A§,

¥ A ~ . f t o

/

P 17;

C 13; S 17 18.io

Being inborn {J1:5=.: sahaja), the conception of a Self based on the

'seventh consciousness' must have, as its objective support, not

only 'internal' skandhas but also 'external' ones (see

§

4.2 with

fn. 49). Since the 'internal' skandhas are, in analogy to the 'inter

nal'

dharmas,

to be understood

as

an image

nimitta)

in one's own

mind

(§j

{A§ , they are easily identifiable in our definition be

cause the expression used here is the same as there.

51

As for the

'external' skandha s),52 the only candidate in our present definition

50

The continuous conception

of dharmas

based on the 'seventh con

sciousness'

is

defined analogously CWSL 6C29-7a2: - lftt§i\I,

1 ± ~ - t ;

~ ~ o ~ ~ J \ ~ ~

~ g H ~ A §

¥ J \ ~ J f i : o /

P 80; C 39; S 58).

51

Cf. Shu-chi

250C20

(ad CWSL 2a25), expressly equating the 'inter

nal'

skandhas

with the 'close objective support': §All: EHA7Sffilill -Wt§

1§ jzj1E1: * ~ p J T ~ f u o

52 Actually, according to the position which seems to be favoured by

HSlian-tsang (cf. CWSL 21c17-22a13, esp. 22a7-8) the clinging to a Self

of

the 'seventh consciousness' may be taken to have only the

*darsana-


28/64

30


is

the 'eighth consciousness', the

iilayavijfiiina.

53

This is confmned

by

the CWSL

itself.

n

its systematic treatment

of

the notion

of

'ob

jective support' the

CWSL

54

distinguishes between a 'close objec

tive support'

( ~ J ? J T ~ ~ )

and

it

'remote objective support'

I D I t ? J T * ~

~ ) .

The former

is

invariably present in all mental factors, whereas

the latter is present in certain forms

of

mind but not in others

(CWSL

40Cl9-21). t

is obvious that this dichotomy corresponds to

the distinction between 'internal' and 'external'

skandbas

or

dharmas

at

CWSL 2a24-25

and 7a12-13. Actually, the 'close objec

tive support' is defined

as

not separated from the mental factor that

takes its form or image

( ~ § ) ,

whereas the 'remote objective sup

port' or 'original' (I'model'

I prototype ?)

((;;$:)jif: *bimbai

5

is

separated from it and expressly characterized

as

'external'

(:P f.)56.

bhiiga

of

the

iilayavijfiiina

(Ji 9:D

If:t,lS,

{ l . i j & ~ ~ ~ : 5 t ) ,

hence only the

skandha vijfiiina,

as

its objective support. Cf. also Shu-chi 249c17 ( ~ f H : ;

~ c p n m ~ 5 3 U ~ C o )

and

SNS

Ti 257b1 (

..

nyon mongs pa can gyi yid ni

I kun gzhirnam par shes pa'i

Ita

(Peking wrongly lte) ba i rnam pa la

dmigs shing bdag dang chos su dzin

par

byed do

II .

53

That iilayavijfiiina

is

included in the scheme of the five skandhas is

clear from, e.g., CWSL

15a23-27,

where the iilayavijfiiina is equated with

the *iisamsiirika-skandha(s) of the MahIsasakas; cf. also Mahiiyiinasam

graha

(ed.

E.

LAMOTTE,

Louvain 1938)1.11.3.

54 CWSL

40Cl4-19

/ P 445-446; C 246-247; S 326-327.

55 Cf. A

HIRAKAWA

(ed.), Index

to

the A b h i d h a r m a k o ' § a b h i i ~ y a , pt.

1:

Tokyo 1973, s.v. bimba; Samdhinirmocanasutra (ed.

E. LAMOTTE)

VIIl7;

H. NAKAMURA,

Bukkyo-go Daijiten: Tokyo 1975: 1264c: ...

~ 1

t§0)

0

J::

~ c ::"::, /5 c :: it 0 t o ; F.S. COUVREUR,

Dictionnaire classique de

la

langue chinoise,

repro

Kuangchi Press 1966: 883f (s.v.

if :

matiere,

substance,

...

; base, fondement;

...

temoignage, preuve, garantie . Cf. al

so L

501, who opts for the rendering hyle , which to my mind suggests

something too amorphous. My impressionis that in Hstian-tsang's use of

the term

(;zfs::)if

the aspects

of

basis and original are more relevant

than the aspect stuff .

56

CWSL 40c21; cf. 4la2. Cf. also Shu-chi 606a26 expressly referring

'exteml,llity' to the 'remote objective support'

ex:

~ P J T ~ ~ ~ f J - ) , i.e.

the 'original' (;zfs::if:

T vol. 67 no. 2266: 915b16-l7), and distinguishing


29/64


31

The CWSL is quite explicit in stating that the 'seventh conscious

ness', being inborn, is, necessarily, based on such an externaJ

'original'

(:9'f--]f):

As long as it is not yet fundamentally restructured [by the

Bodhisattva path], the cluster

57

of

the 'seventh conscious

ness', because of

being inborn

sahaja,

i.e. spontaneous),

necessarily relies on an external 'original' *bimba); hence,

it invariably also has a 'remote objective support' .

CWSL

40c27-29:

~ - t ; { J ' d b

* ft


30/64

32


pressions §{J\pg and §{J\:9'f- as well should not be understood as

inside/outside

one s

own mind in the comprehensive sense

of

the

whole, multi-layered mental continuum

of

a person or sentient be- .

ing . They should rather be taken as referring to skandhas or

dharmas inside/outside the specific form or moment

of

mind

with which the respective iitma- or dharmagriiha is associated.

6o

A

more precise rendering

of

the passage CWSL 2a24-25 (translated at

the beginning of § 4.1) would thus be:

As for

all

[these different forms of] 'clinging to entities'

(dharma-griiha) that have been described thus (i.e. in the

preceding lines

of

the text), dharmas outside [its = he re

spective dharmagriiha s] own mind

6

are partly present,

partly absent, whereas dharmas inside [its] own mind are

invariably present.

( t z o ~ ? J T ~

-t}] ¥tI, §{J

v

9Ht

~ f f

~ ~ o

§{J\pg -t}]-§ ffo)

The same holds good for the expression § {J\1§, which therefore

should, in this context, rather be rendered as image in

[its =

the

respective dharma- or iitmagriiha s] own mind , or even as a

mental image

of

its own .62 This is confirmed by K'uei-chi who, in

60

Cf. Shu-chi 50Ia15-17, where the condition consisting in the remo

te objective support

( I D R P J T ~ ~ ) ,

characterized as being outside the

[respective] mind ({,,:9 }: 50Ia28-29), is stated to comprise both [images,

or appearances] developed by Gonsciousnesses of others and [images, or

appearances,] developed by separate [forms of] consciousness in one's

own continuum W J T ~ , : W f g g ~ L \ 1 § . * , ~ o ~ ~

R P { f u ~ p f f ~ ,

:

§ J l t r : p J . l U ~ p f f ~ o ttffi Jf::g-, ~ o ) Similarly, Shu-chi

250C14-15.

61

Or could one understand: outside the [respective] mind itself' and,

analogously, in the next line: inside the [respective] mind itself'?

62 As far as I can see, the passages under discussion do not distin

guish the atma- or dharmagriiha as a caitta from the citta itself but rather

seem to. take it as the function of the

citta

itself. f such a distinction is

made, the rendering a mental image of its own would definitely be

preferable. For even though the image-parts of all mental factors

(citta


31/64


33

the case of the conception of Self of the 'seventh consciousness',

specifies the image in [its] own mind

of CWSL 2a13-14

as the

image in [its, i.e. the

iitmagriiha's]

own mind, [i.e. in] the 'seventh

consciousness'

(Shu-chi 249b27-28: ~ ~ - : : : : : ~ § { J ' Z 1 § ) . 6 3

There

fore, the passage translated in the beginning

of §

4.3 (viz.

CWSL

2a13-14)

should rather be rendered

as

follows:

The first [inborn conception of Self] is continuous and oc

curs in the 'seventh consciousness'. Taking the 'eighth con

sciousness' (i.e.

iiZayavijfiiina)

as

its [remote] objective sup

port, it produces an image

(nimitta)

[of this remote objec

tive support] in [its] own mind (or: a [corresponding] men

tal image of its own) § , 1§) and conceives of it as a real

Self.

( ~ , m113* , : t E ~ - : : : : : ~ 0 ~ ~ / \ . § ~ , ill\§IL, 113,

~ ~

.fto

[4.4] Let me now turn to the inborn (but intermittent) clinging to

a Self and to

dharmas

that is associated with the 'sixth conscious

ness', i.e.

manovijfiiina.

Its definition runs thus:

The second [kind

of

inborn clinging to a Self] is intermit

tent and occurs in the 'sixth consciousness'. Taking as its

objective support an image

(113) of

the five appropriated

skandhas

(or, in the case

of

dharmagriiha,

of

skandhas,

iiyatanas

and

dhiitus)

- together or separately - that is de

veloped by consciousness ( ~ ~ ? J T ~ ) , it produces an image in

[its] own mind (or: a mental image

of

its own) §

1L, 113)

and

conceives of it

as

a real Self (or

dharmas). (CWSL

2a14-15:

and

caittas)

of a given 'cluster'

§lp)

are alike, each factor develops an

image-part of its own.

63 In the case of the inbom clinging to a Self of the 'sixth conscious

ness' (i.e.

manovijnana)

it

is

the sub-commentator Chih-chou

~ f , 1 U

who

makes clear that the expression image in the [cognizing] mind itself (or:

in [one's] own mind) in the

CWSL

refers

to

what

is

developed by the

sixth consciousness [and

is

hence its] own, immediate image-part (Yen

p

825a23-24:

$ 7 \ J i J T ~ S ~ J j 1 § 7 t , -r:x55U[j t:

Il l is{A§

...0).


32/64

34

On the Problem of the External World in the

CWSL

= ffF 'lWT, i E ~ 7 \ § l l t * ~ § l l Z p J T ~ 1 i f x ~ ~ § , ~ * J ~ ~ J j U , ~

§ {A§ ¥ J t ~ . f 1 ( ; o /

P 17; C

13-14;

S 18.-

CWSL

7a2-3: =

ffF 'lWT,

i E ~ 7 \ ~ o

~ § l l Z p J T ~ ~ ~ J l l . ~ § , ~ * J & ~ J j U ,

~ § { . J \

~ § , ¥ J t ~ . 1 ' * o /

P 80-81; C 39; S 58.)

Here too it

is

perfectly clear that the

skandhas

or

dhannas

outside

the cognizing mind that are involved are mental phenomena, more

precisely: images or appearances

;fa)

developed by consciousness

( ~ P J T ~ , vijiiiina-paririima).

To be sure, there is a problem here, viz. that the 'external' ele

ments that are reproduced (and then misconceived) by the

iitma-

or

dhannagraha of

the 'sixth consciousness' are defined

as

mental

images

of sets of factors

skandhas,

etc.) that include mind and

mind-associates. ·Why

is

it not mind and mind-associates

them

sel ves

that are taken to be

the

external' objective support, just

as

the

iilayavijiiiina

in the case of the 'seventh consciousness'? The

problem has been seen and discussed by later commentators.

64

But

I need not go into details since this is not crucial for my main issue,

i.e. independently existing matter. With regard

to

matter

CIS:

rupa),

the definition does not pose any problem,65 and

it

would indeed

64

Yen-pi

825a25-bl; T vol. 67 no. 2266 (by Tan-e

m , 1675-1747):

1

17blO 22

(quoting the I-yiin; see

fn.

65).

65

Cf. T vol. 67

no.

2266: 117b9 10 and

b14 15

(quoting the I-yiin ~

~ ) , where it is first stated in connection with the inborn conception of

Self of the 'sixth consciousness' that in this case the 'sixth consciousness'

apprehends the nimitta

(i §)

of the five upiidana-skandhas developed by

the 'eighth consciousness' but that this expression

is

unproblematic only

with regard

to

matter, whereas the four immaterial

skandhas

(i.e. mind

and mind associates), not being part of the objective support of the

'eighth consciousness', cannot be called 'developed [by mind]' in the

usual sense, and, if they are called so

in

another sense (cf.

Shu-chi

317a18-b7), cannot be called tr§ at least not in the sense of 'image' ( ..

7 \ ~ ~ ~ , ~ $ ) \ ~ p f T ~ l i I f ) Z * ~ t r § m o p ~ o Brn, ) \ p f T ~ 5 P J r n o ~

[ Z : 9 ~ , A l ' ~ , t z D f r . f f W ~ o

...

F p ~ o ~ ~ P J r n o [ Z : 9 * ~ r e E ? f $ ) \ ~ 1 * , fij

: g ~ 1 § o

...

).


33/64


35

seem that it was in the first place

matter,

corporeal or other, that

Hstian-tsang had in mind when coining it. At any rate, the passage

clearly shows that the material entities that function

as

the 'exter

nal' objective support

of

the inborn conception

of

Self or dharmas

of the 'sixth consciousness' are understood by Hstian-tsang exclu

sively as images 113) of material entities n consciousness

~ ,

vijfitina

_

But in which form

of

consciousness? Hstian-tsang does not spec

ify it, and the commentators disagree_

66

At any rate, images

of

ma

terial things are, intermittently, available in the sense conscious

nesses_

67

Besides, an image of one's own body and matelial sense

faculties and a - more or less complete - image of the surround

ing material world and also

of

the bodies of other sentient beings68

is continuously produced by the alayavijfitina of every sentient be

ing:

69

Wilen the tiZayavijfitina itself arises due to its causes and

conditions 70 it develops internally into _00 the body pos

sessed of sense-faculties, and externally into the surround

ing [world]

(bhtijana),

and it takes these very [images] into

which it has developed as its object (tilambana)_ (CWSL

66 Cf., for iitmagriiha, Yen-pi 825a22-24; I-yen 24a6-12; for dharma

griiha, Yen-pi 854al-lO_

67 Cf., e_g_, CWSL

4b3-4

(see frL 47 _

68

That the bodies of others belong, properly speaking, to the sur

rounding world is explicitly stated in Tun- (lTao-) lun's commentary on

the

YogiiciirabhUmi

(T vol. 42

no_

1828: 602b23:

~ ~ m { i 2 . ~ , J f : ~ P : : 9 H

Ffffllfo

69 According to T vol. 67 no_ 2266: 117blO (see fn_ 65), it is this im

age of corporeal matter in the iilayavijfiiina that is the 'original', i_e_ the

'external' objective support, of the image in the natural conception

of

Self

of the

sixth consciousness' _

70 Le_, according to Shu-chi 317a9-1o, the direct seeds as hetu pra

tyaya) ~ J l . I 2 S I ~ ) and the karmic seeds as adhipati)pratyaya

**Yf.i}


34/64

36


lOa17-19:

I l i l r * i 1 f ~ ~ ~

[ s / ~ 1 J i j ) z : § a : ± J l ~ p g ~ : F . %

fl;f liH},

: 9 H ~ : F . % ~ o . m . t ) J i J T ~ : F . % § ? J T ~ / P 125; C 60-61; S 78. 71

Due to the ripening of common seeds *siidhiirm:r-a-bfja),

the consciousness which is [the result of kannic] maturation

vipiikavijfiiina)72 develops into an image appearing as the

surrounding world (lit. 'container world': bhiijanaloka)

[consisting] of visible matter, etc., i.e. the

external

gross

elements mahabhuta) and secondary matter upiidiiya

n7.pa .

Although the [images

of

the surrounding world] de

veloped by each sentient being are [numerically] different,73

their appearance is similar and their location without dis

tinction;

just

as the lights of many candles [in a room], each

filling the whole [room], look as

if

they were one [and the

same light, so the images of the surrounding world in the

vipiikavijfiiinas of different beings, each filling the same

space, look as

if

they were one and the same]. (CWSL

lOc13-16: ~ ~ ~

E 1 3 ~ f ' § f m r & : ~ 1 J i C z :

~ { t ) 5 ~ ~ t t r f 3 ~ f ' 8 o

H P : 9 } ~ R?JTill5o

B ~ f l ' r F r ? J T ~ : ; ; 5 j U ,

rm f'8 f'8{t) ~ ? J T

~ ~ o t z D ~ : f f i : ~ : ; ; ~ { J ; l - 0 /

P 135-136; C 64; S 81.)

Due to the ripening of special seeds *asiidhiirar:r-a-bfja),

the consciousness which is [the result of karmic] maturation

vipiikavijfiiina)

develops into [an image] appearing as

[one's own subtle] material sense-faculties rupfndriya)74

71 There

is

a Tibetan translation of this passage at S Sr Ti

269a3-4

in

which

~

X ( develops or changes into )

is

translated by X

Ita bur

snang

( appears as X ).

7

Another designation of the 'eighth consciousness' with a wider

range of application than

iiZayavijiiiina

(cf. CWSL

13c13-19).

73

Each sentient being has its own iiZayavijiiiina (or at least its own

'eighth consciousness '): see CWSL 2b5-6; Y M BE s. fn. 1):

2l.

74

Cf. also CWSL 20a25-26 (P 235; C 119; S

162):

The

iiZayavijiiiina

de

velops into what appears as the material sense-faculties, the support of

the sense-faculties, the surrounding world, etc.

( / l P T * i l f ~ ~ ~ 1 ) : B i ' R Ez


35/64


37

and [one's own gross body which is] the support

of

[these]

t l H & ~ ~ i ± t F s ~ ~ ) ; 41alO-ll (P 449; C

248;

S 328): The first five [i.e. the]

material [sense-]faculties consist in ( . ~ t ~ E =

-svabhava) the clear matter

ntpaprasada) of [the faculty of] sight

( c a k ~ u s ) ,

etc., [this clear matter

being an image] developed by the 'root consciousness' miilavijfiana, i.e.

the 'eighth consciousness'), etc. (1WlietR

j . : ) . ) j ; : ~ ~ p f T ~ § R ~ ~ e ~

t ~ ) . I am sure that LUSTHAUS s (L 495 n. 25) interpretation of the pas

sage is untenable. He renders the sentence

as

follows: The five

Tupa

or

gans, which alterations so-pien) in the mUla-vijiiana, etc., take in through

the eyes, etc. Pure rupa [ ( ] ~ e ching-se) is regarded as their nature. Ac

cording to LUSTHAUS, the purport of the passage is that visible experi

ence of 'pure Tupa is registered as 'alterations in the mUla-vijiiana, etc. ,

and that far from implying a causative idealist theory, the alayavi

jiiana . and other consciousnesses are passive recorders

so-pien)

of the

activities of the visual organ and its corresponding object. Apart from

contradicting the more explicit passages adduced above,

LUSTHAUS s

translation (somewhat odd even in English; should one perhaps read the

passage as one sentence by introducing a colon: ... etc.: Pure ... 7) is, as

far as I can see, entirely incompatible with the rules of Chinese syntax

since he seems to take j.: as the

main verb

( take in ), followed by

:: :

~ ~ P f T ~ ( alterations in the

miila-vijfiana,

etc. ) as the

subject

which

in its tum would be followed by

an

unmarked instrumen

tal

element

§ ~

( through the eyes ). The initial expression

l ietR

(not rupa or

gans but the subtle material sense-faculties,

rupfndriya

=

rupin

+

indriya)

which is, at least ad sensum, (rightly) connected with the final portion

of

the passage, is at the same time also construed as the object of the verb j.:

( take in ), which leads to the consequence that organs or sense-faculties

are both the object and the means of the taking-in or registering. Actually,

there can be little doubt that the passage is construed on the common pat

tern A

j.: B

~ t ~

( A, taking B,

m a ~ e s

it its nature , A takeslhas B

as

its

nature ,

A

consist in B ). Hence, : : : ~ ~ P f T ~ § & ~ ~ e must be the de

finiens (B), constituted by the traditional

§ R ~ ~ e

=

c a k ~ u r a d i - r i i p a

prasada)

qualified by the attribute : : : ~ ~ P f T ~ ( into which the 'root

consciousness', etc., develops, or: has

developed , i.e., developed by the

'root consciousness', etc. ;

d.

also

CWSL

56bz6) which

is

specifically

Yogacara. I admit that the ( etc. ) in this expression requires explana

tion; one may think

of

the mind-associates

of

the eighth consciousness or

of the sixth consciousness (cf. T vol. 67 no. 2266: 160a18-20), but I am

not sure whether this is the right track.


36/64

38

On the Problem

of

the External World in the CWSL

sense-faculties (indriyildhi.J hilna), i.e. the

intern l

gross

elements and secondary matter. There are [other] common

seeds due to the ripening

of

which [the

vipilkavijfiilna

de

velops into yet another image:] where there are bodies of

others,75 it also develops into [an image] appearing as these;

otherwise it would not be possible to experience [the physi

cal presence of] others. CWSL lla8-11: ~ ~ ? i ~ : : f j t t § ~ . i

~ ~ ~ : 1 J M z : ~ 1 ~ t s 1 N E H N ' ( f ( ~ o

R P p g * ~ . i

R?JT TItso

I f

t § ~ . i ~ J l : ~ : 1 J i i 3 z :

J J ~ 1 t P J l ~

2 J } \ ~ { ~ i E t

: : f m J t ~ ~ f f l { t P , ~ o

/ P 138; C 66; S 83.)

[5.] But what about sense consciousnesses or the illayavijfiilna?

Are they, or the internal images of material entities which they de

velop, in their turn also based on a 'remote objective support' or

external 'original'? And

if

so, couldn't at least this external 'origi

nal' be independently existing matter'?

[5 1] As for the first question, the CWSL is unambiguous in the

case of the sense consciousnesses:

The clusters

of

the first five [forms of] mind (i.e. the sense

consciousnesses),

as

long

as

they are not yet fundamentally

restructured, ... are necessarily based on 76 an external

'original' and hence invariably also have a remote objective

7

I am not sure whether my understanding o f ~ ~ ... JJ1 (disregarded

by P and C) is correct. I presume Hstian-tsang wants to say: where the

bodies of other sentient beings are located in the 'image-part' of the vi-

pakavijfianas of the beings whose bodies they are.

7

LUSTHAUS

L

504) translates

13t

by confronted with , which

seems to be based on the meaning weapons

of

war; to fight , but this

appears far-fetched. 13t as well as

t:3t

(the reading preferred in the

Shu-chi,

e.g. 501c15) also have the meaning to rely on . That this is the meaning

in which the word is used by Hsiian-tsang

is

evident from CWSL 20c4,

stating that 'basis' fiX) refers

to

the fact that in order

to

arise and stay on

all impermanent dharmas rely on causes and are dependent on conditions

(f3tl3lg.t;ff ).

Cf. also Shu-chi 317a14: 1 3 t ~ l i l t t g . t ; .


37/64

Discussion

of

the Basic Evidence

support.

CWSL

4Ia3-4:

l W 1 i I ~ \ Q b ,

*,,{1t{3i:, ::L\{3t5 i-Jif,

t r Y : ~ . J E 1 f i B R P J T ~ ~ o

/ P 448; C 248; S 328.)

39

[5.2] In the case

of

the iilayavijfulna, the CWSL reports dis

agreement. AccordiIlg to one opinion, it has no remote objective

support but is merely determined by karmic forces

CWSL

40c21-

22). But according to others, at least the image

of

those parts

of

the

material world which are experienced alike by many sentient be

ings

--

i.e. the surrounding world as well as gross bodies - is based

on an 'original'

40c22-27:

two positions, the second, more restric

tive one being authoritative). But this 'original' (and this answers

the second question) is explicitly defined as consisting in the [im

ages] developed by others, i.e. others' minds:

There are [some who] assert that [the

iilaya-

or

vipiika

vijftiina] invariably has also a remote objective support be

cause it must rely on an 'original'

Jif)

[consisting in an im

age] developed by [the consciousnesses of] others

( { ~ ~ ) 7 7 :

only then it develops its own [image].78 There are [others

77 In the tenninology of the WSL (cf. fn. 12), ~ for P J T ~ (cf.

CWSL

40c24-25:

{ i g P J T ~ ) =panl}iima, is an abbreviation for ~ ~ P J T ~

vijiiiina-paril}iima) and inevitably suggests

mental

images (or at least

mental aspects, if we take the 'aspect of vision', the JM3-, into account).

Thus, { - m ( P J T ) ~ is a shorthand for { - m ~ ~ P J T ~ . Actually, in his commentary

on the definition of the 'remote objective support' (see fn. 60) K'uei-chi

expressly states that it consists not only in [images, or appearances,] into

which other consciousnesses

of

the same person have developed, but also

in [images] into which the consciousnesses

of

other persons have devel

oped

( { - m ~ P J T ~ ) .

No further kind

of

'remote objective support' , existing

independently

of

any fonn

of

mind, is mentioned.

78

LUSTHAUS L 502) translates: .. since it is the influence of others'

changes ( { - m ~ ... that is the hyle directing one's own changes § j ]

...) . Does this mean that he takes j ] as a verb ( to direct ) and as

its object (together with § which seems odd)? Actually,j] is rather a

conjunction here ( then only ), as is supported by K'uei-chi's paraphrase

of

the sentence: This eighth consciousness must rely on [images] devel-


38/64

40

On the Problem of the External World in the

CWSL

who] assert that ... one's own [body] and others' bodies as

well

as

the earth (i.e. the surrounding world) can be mutu

ally experienced [only] because the [corresponding im

age(s)] developed by [the minds of] others function as the

original

of

one's own [mind, i.e. iilayavijiiiina, and vice

versa]. ... " CWSL

40c22-25:

~ ~ : J j \ 5 E ~ & R p J T * f * f , ~ { 3 t

{ i Q ~ ~ § j : 1 J ~ ~ j ( 0 ~ ~ : ... § j { i Q } ± P J 1 L ~ f f l , { i Q P J T ~ : t f

~ § j ~ ~ j ( o ... / P 447; C 247; S 327.)

It is hardly conceivable that these images developed by others'

minds could be anything other than the corresponding images in

their iilayavijniinas; for it is only th s images that are similar to

the image in one's own iilayavijfiiina.

A fully explicit statement to this extent is found L. 1 the commen

tary on the

Yogiicflrabhami

compiled

byK uei-chi s

Korean col

laborator Tun-Iun

~ { ~

(or Tao-Iun ~ { ~ ) 7 9 :

"One should not raise the objection that since the 'eighth

consciousness' has no 'original' * for * ~ ) , [one cannot

see] how [in its case mind and mind-associates] could have

the same object (if this means that they are based on the

same 'original': aI2-l3); for the 'eighth consciousness' has

images developed by the 'eighth consciousnesses'

of

others

as its 'original'." T vol. 42 no. 1828: 317aI6-17):

/fB Jli:§:

) \ ~ * , P O { j j J ~ 3 t : l i [ P J - P J T f o f f l { i Q ) \ p J T ~ ~ 1 § ~ * ~

6) 0)

[5.3] Since even the image of the material world in the iilaya

vijniina is not based on an independent material world but on other

mental images (viz. those in other beings'

iilayavijniinas),

it is

highly improbable that the situation is essentially different in the

oped by others[' consciousnesses] as its 'original', then only

(15)

it is

able to develop [one]

itself

Shu-chi 501b9-1O:

l l t ~ J \ ~ ~ 1 ' j : { i M ~ ~ 2 j s :

15fJgi3f' D.

79 See

fn.

22.


39/64


4

case of the sense consciousnesses: In view of the fact that in their

case an external object (in the strict sense) is categorically re

jected,8o their remote objective support, too, can hardly be inde

pendent matter, and is most likely to be understood as images of

matter in some other, deeper form of mind. What suggests itself as

'original', at least in the case of ordinary consciousnesses, is, of

course, the image of the material world (surrounding world as well

as bodies) in one's own alayavijfiiina. This is confirmed by an un

ambiguous statement which the

CWSL

(42cll-15) makes in the con

text of a systematic clarification of the causal relations between the

different forms of consciousness within one and the same contin

uum. With regard to the objective support

( ? J T ~ ~ : alambanapra

tyaya) we are told that only the eighth consciousness (viz. alaya- or

vipakavijfiana), and neither the seventh consciousness (viz. man as)

nor the sixth (viz.

manovijfiana),

can function as objective support

for the five sense-consciousnesses (nor,

of

course, can they be an

objective support for one another),

...

for the five [sense-]consciousnesses base themselves ex

clusively on the image[-part] of the eighth [consciousness]

CWSL 42c14-15: 1 i ~ ~ r l ~ { ; ~ J \ f § i i 5 z : o P 69; C 59;

S 349; cf. L 505).

8

CWSL

4b3-4 (see fn. 47). Cf.

Shu-chi

269b22-23 and

270a8-9:

An

objective support [completely] outside mind, however,

is

definitely non

existent. ... f we do not rule out

dharmas

outside [the respective cogniz

ing] mind as functioning as a remote objective support, this is just [in the

sense] that the eighth [consciousness] functions as the 'original', resting

on which the remaining consciousnesses develop [into a corresponding

image of their own].

( ~ l c , : 9 } p J T * ~ * ~

13


40/64

42


K'uei-chi paraphrases this passage

as

follows:

... for the five sense-cons.ciousnesses take [an image] de

veloped by the

root

consciousness' * ~ : mUlavijfiiina, i.e.

the eighth consciousness) as their object; they do not pre

suppose visible matter 5 :

rupa ,

etc.

t

,

as

developed by

the sixth cons.ciousness (i.e. manovijfiiina as

their own ob

ject.

Shu-chi

512b24-25:

1 i ~ ~ * ~ ? f T ~ ~ ~

/Ff-'ff /\

~ ? f T ~ 5 ~ ~ ~ ~ M I : o ) 8 2

The same idea is expressed by K'uei-chi also in other places:

... because functioning

as

their 'original' ( * ~ ) , visible

matter, etc., [as developed in] the image [-part] of the eighth

[consciousness] generate visible matter, etc., as the image

part of the five [sense-]consciousnesses. (Shu-chi 512blO-

1 1 : ~ ) m j \ 1 § 5 ~ ~ f i ; * ~ ~ 1 i ~ 1 § : 5 J - 5 ~ MI:o)

Or, still more explicitly:

... The eighth consciousness develops [an image] appear

ing like the five sense faculties and the five sense objects.

The five sense-consciousnesses - visual [consciousness],

etc. -, basing themselves on those sense faculties developed

b ~

the [eighth consciousness], take those 'original' sense

objects (i.e. those developed by the eighth consciousness) as

81 In

this passage, etc. clearly refers

to

on the problem of the external world in the ch'eng wei shih lun

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