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Implicit control motivation 1

Manuscript submitted for publication, Personality and Social Psychology Review

On the Implicit Nature of Control Motivation

John T. Jones

State University of New York at Buffalo

Acknowledgments: I am grateful to Brett Pelham, Sandra Murray, Barbara Bunker, Matt Mirenberg,

and Mireille Jones for their inspiration, patience, and insightful comments on a previous draft of this

paper.

Requests for reprints should be sent to:John T. Jones

Department of Psychology, Park Hall

SUNY-Buffalo

Buffalo, NY 14260

E-mail: [email protected]




Abstract

Past theory and research strongly suggest that the need for prediction and control represents a basic

motivation in both human beings and animals. Furthermore, recent research suggests that needs are

monitored unconsciously and that motivation often guides behavior automatically (i.e. without

intention, attention, awareness, or control). The current paper reviews these ideas as they relate to the

concept of implicit control motivation. Concerns regarding prediction and control do appear to

influence thought, feeling and behavior automatically. Thus the need for prediction and control may be

even more influential than previously believed. Theoretical implications of this view for mere

exposure, terror management, and self-verification are discussed and hypotheses are proposed to

address these issues empirically.




On the Implicit Nature of Control Motivation

Fortune tellers, doctors, meteorologists, therapists, and self-help gurus all have at least one very

important thing in common; their vocations are all based upon the ability (real or imagined) to predict

and control future events. They are not alone in this pursuit. The motive to render the world

predictable and controllable appears to be fundamental, not only to human beings, but to all living

organisms. The closely related motives of prediction and control arguably form the bedrock upon

which we construct meaning and understanding in an otherwise chaotic environment (Lefcourt, 1973;

Popper, 1963). That is, in a world that was either unpredictable or uncontrollable, our ability to take

sensible actions would be lost (Lakoff, & Johnson, 1999). Learning itself may be based upon the

discovery of predictable regularities in the environment (Skinner, 1953). From an evolutionary

perspective, one might argue that prediction and control are essential for solving numerous adaptive

problems (Wilson, 1978; Dawkins, 1989).1 It seems unlikely any of us would exist had our distant

ancestors been unable to predict the behavioral tendencies of predators and prey alike. In short, being

able to predict and control one’s world often proves to be the difference between life and death. At first

blush this claim may seem somewhat extreme. However, it is an idea grounded in a long tradition of

psychological thought and research.

The purpose of this review is to develop and evaluate the hypothesis that prediction and control

motives operate implicitly (i.e., unconsciously or automatically, Bargh, 1994), often guiding behavior

unconsciously. Furthermore, it is argued that knowledge of the implicit desire for control can help

integrate some seemingly divergent literatures in social and personality psychology. This review begins

with a presentation of past research highlighting the importance of the need for prediction and control.

The potential implicit nature of this motivation is supported by a review of recent research in implicit

social cognition. An empirical strategy is then presented, followed by potential implications of the

implicit control view.

Although the focus of the current review is on the construct of control, references will often be made

to both “prediction and control” or “prediction” alone. This is based on the assumption that where there




is prediction, control usually follows. Clearly these constructs are difficult to separate. While several

researchers have noted that the benefits of control may result from the enhanced predictability that

control provides (Averill, 1973; Schulz, 1976; Seligman, 1975), it is also clear that the ability to control

provides benefits above and beyond the ability to predict (e.g., Reim, Glass, & Singer, 1971; Greer &

Maisel, 1972). Still others note that increases in predictability do not necessarily lead to increases in

control and suggest that predictability should be treated as a separate construct (Skinner, 1996). The

precise relationship between prediction and control is ultimately an empirical question that remains to

be adequately addressed. What is known for certain is that (1) prediction and control are closely linked,

and (2) control is much less likely without some limited measure of predictability.

Control

Psychologists have long recognized the importance of control concerns (Adler, 1930; Bandura,

1977; Burger, 1992; Freud, 1894/1953; Harter, 1978; Heider, 1958; James, 1890/1950; Kelly, 1955;

Langer, 1975; Maslow, 1943; Rodin, 1986; Rotter, 1966; Skinner, 1953; Skinner, 1996; Swann, 1983;

Taylor, 1983; Thompson, 1981; Weary, Gleicher, and Marsh, 1993; White, 1959). Borrowing from

Nietzsche, the psychoanalyst Alfred Adler (1930) proposed that all organisms are predisposed through

natural selection to strive to master and assert control over the physical environment. According to

Adler, “a feeling of pleasure is founded in a feeling of power, that of displeasure in a feeling of

powerlessness” (in Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956, p.111). Similarly, in response to the proliferation of

drive theories offered to explain complex human and animal behavior, the developmental psychologist

Robert White (1959) developed a theory of effectance motivation. The desire to exert control over

one’s environment was also a central component of White’s theory. He noted that animals of differing

complexity display strong exploratory tendencies, even when their major needs have been met. For

example, rats will cross a mildly painful electrified grid exclusively for the “reward” of exploring new

surroundings (Nissen, 1930). White suggested that this tendency for exploration, and even “higher

order” mental processes such as language and thinking, reflect the basic and innate drive to interact

effectively with and control the environment.




Interest in the concept of control has only intensified in recent years. This is reflected in the

proliferation of control-related constructs in psychology. In developing an integrative framework of

control Ellen Skinner (1996) identified nearly 100 control-related constructs in the psychological

literature. This interest in the construct of control is due in no small measure to the well documented

importance of control for both physical and psychological functioning.

Consequences of Losing Control

A long line of empirical research supports the importance of control concerns by highlighting the

aversive consequences of threats to prediction and control (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989;

Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Pavlov; 1928; Seligman, 1975). As one early example, Pavlov

(1928) showed that dogs respond negatively when deprived of the ability to predict reward. Pavlov

trained dogs to discriminate between two shapes (a square vs. a circle) by conditioning them to expect

the onset of meat powder following the presentation of one of the forms but not the other. The dogs did

not have to make an operant response; the shape merely predicted the onset of reward. Over a series of

stimulus presentations the two shapes became increasingly similar in appearance, to a point where the

two forms were indistinguishable. Although the dogs continued to receive food on a consistent basis,

their ability to predict reward was lost. The dogs reacted to this loss of predictability with obvious

concern and distress.

Seligman (1975) extended these findings to develop a theory of learned helplessness, which suggests

that facing repeated uncontrollable events leads people and animals alike to feel helpless, hopeless and

depressed. In the first experiment of this type, dogs were subjected to a series of painful, unavoidable

shocks. Initially the dogs showed distress and attempted to escape. They soon learned, however, that

escape was impossible. Neither barking, tail wagging, nor physical struggles to flee influenced the

shock. In other words, the dogs found themselves incapable of exerting control over their predicament.

When later placed in a shuttle box, an apparatus that provides the opportunity to avoid or escape shock,

the same dogs made no effort to flee. Instead they passively and dejectedly endured their “fate”

(Seligman, & Maier, 1967). Some consequences of lack of control for humans were demonstrated by




Glass and Singer (1973). Attempting to simulate the stress of urban living, they found that in

comparison with participants sitting in a quiet room, participants exposed to aversive uncontrollable

loud noise made more proofreading mistakes and gave up sooner on problem solving tasks.

Importantly, merely believing that they could turn off the noise, or having access to someone who

could, significantly reduced these deficits. Converging evidence supporting the negative consequences

of uncontrollability is provided by an influential study by Rodin and Langer (1977) who found that

elderly nursing home residents who had very little control over their day-to-day lives deteriorated more

quickly, and died sooner, than those who were experimentally given more control (e.g. by being given

plants to water, by being allowed to choose which night to watch a movie, by being given the

opportunity to determine how complaints were handled).

Focusing on enduring perceptions of personal control, the personality theorist Julian Rotter (1966,

See also Lefcourt, 1982; Phares, 1976; Strickland, 1989) drew a distinction between people with an

external locus of control – the belief that chance or outside forces control one’s fate – and those with an

internal locus of control – the belief that one has personal control over most of what happens in life. A

wealth of data highlights the benefits of an internal locus of control. Internals tend to be less depressed

(Benassi, Sweeney, & Dufour, 1988), to achieve more in school (see Findley & Cooper, 1983, for a

review), and to be more capable of coping with marital problems (Miller, Lefcourt, Holmes, Ware, &

Saleh, 1986).

At least some of these negative consequences appear to be mediated by the release of stress

hormones. People deprived of control experience both heightened cortisol levels (a physiological

marker of stress) and decreased immune functioning (Rodin, 1986). Similarly, the crowding that occurs

in densely populated cities, prisons, and college dorms is a likely threat to prediction and control and is

associated with an increase in both stress hormone and blood pressure levels (Fleming, Baum, & Weiss,

1987; Ostfeld, Kasl, D’Atri, & Fitzgerald, 1987).

These examples, and many others like them (Brown & Siegel, 1988; Donnerstein & Wilson, 1976;

Klein, Fencil-Morse, & Seligman, 1976; Lewinsohn, Hoberman, & Rosenbaum, 1988; Lopez & Little,




1996; Overmier, 1968; Pagel, Becker, & Coppel, 1985) strongly support the idea that repeated

experience with uncontrollability has aversive consequences for both humans and animals alike.2

Illusion of control

Another source of evidence that organisms have a basic need for prediction and control is based on

people’s tendency to overestimate their level of personal control. For example, people consistently

perceive control over outcomes that are actually determined by chance (Bouts & Van Avermaet, 1992;

Fleming, & Darley, 1990; Langer, 1975; Langer, & Roth, 1975). In one study, participants allowed to

choose their own lottery numbers were more confident of their chances to win compared with those

whose numbers were chosen for them. In a related study, people believed that they had greater control

over the outcome of a dice game when they personally rolled the dice rather than having someone else

roll on their behalf (Langer, 1975).

It appears that such inflated perceptions of control are not only common but also beneficial. The

illusion of control appears to have important consequences for both psychological and physical well-

being (Averill, 1973, Taylor, & Brown, 1988, 1994; Thompson, 1981). More specifically, illusions of

personal control appear to enhance adjustment to both short term aversive events (For reviews see

Averill, 1973, Thompson, 1981) and chronic threats to well-being (Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984).

According to Taylor (1983), one’s sense of mastery or personal control is challenged by life-threatening

conditions such as cancer. Patients who blame the cause of their disease on factors beyond their control

generally have worse outcomes than patients who blame it on causes they can change. To test this

hypothesis, Taylor, Lichtman, and Wood (1984) asked breast cancer patients to rate the extent to which

their cancer could be controlled (e.g. Do you think the course of your cancer is something you have

some control over?). Compared with patients who reported little control over cancer, patients whose

perceived more control (often unrealistically) reported less psychological distress (i.e. anxiety,

depression), higher levels of general well-being, higher self-rated adjustment and were rated as better

adjusted by both physicians and interviewers (for an alternative perspective on findings such as these

see Carver, Harris, Lehman, Durel, Antoni, Spencer, & Pozo-Kaderman, 2000).


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In contrast, relatively realistic perceptions of control are associated with both negative mood (Alloy,

Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981) and mild to severe depression (Alloy & Abramson, 1982; Golin, Terrell,

& Johnson, 1977). For example, Golin, Terrell, and Johnson, (1977) had both non-depressed and

depressed participants placed bets in a “craps” style dice game. Participants were informed that either

they or the experimenter would throw the dice. Subsequently participants rated how confident they

were that they would win the next throw. Compared with depressed participants, non-depressed

participants were more confident of success when they were allowed to roll the dice themselves.

However, the confidence of depressed participants rose when the experimenter rolled on their behalf.

In fact, depressed participants were unrealistically confident when they had less control. This finding

suggests that depressed people are less likely to over-estimate their degree of personal control compared

with the non-depressed.

Theories of cognitive consistency

In addition to research dealing directly with prediction and control concerns, a number of social-

psychological theories are indirectly grounded in the belief that a predictable and controllable world is

fundamental human concern. This view is reflected primarily in theories of cognitive consistency (e.g.

Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; Osgood, & Tannenbaum, 1955; Rosenberg, 1956; Swann, 1987).

Perhaps the most influential of these is Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance. In its

original formulation, cognitive dissonance theory posited that simultaneously holding two inconsistent

cognitions produces an aversive state of tension that people are motivated to reduce. From a control

perspective, holding two dissonant thoughts is threatening because it highlights the possibility that even

one’s own thoughts may be unstable, unpredictable and ultimately uncontrollable. Festinger suggested

that the need to reduce inconsistency may be a “hard-wired” aspect of cognitive systems. If the

architecture of cognitive systems is indeed “designed” for consistency, we can infer that the pragmatic

result is an overwhelming motivation for and concern with prediction and control (see also,

Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). It should also be noted that this “hard-wired” view




strongly supports the notion that prediction and control concerns often operate outside of conscious

awareness (see also Lieberman, Ochsner, Gilbert, & Schacter, 2001).

Some of the strongest support for the aversive nature of inconsistency comes from research on self-

verification theory (Swann, 1983, 1987). Self-verification theory states that people strive for feedback

that is consistent with their own self-conceptions, even when more flattering but inconsistent

information is available. In other words, people want others to see them the way they see themselves,

even if they see themselves negatively.

People seek to acquire self-verifying feedback in at least two ways (Swann, 1987; Swann, &

Pelham, 2002). First, people create social environments that reinforce their existing self-views. For

example, Swann, Stein-Seroussi, and Giesler (1992) found that compared with participants with

positive self-concepts, participants with negative self-concepts preferred interaction partners who

viewed them negatively (but accurately) rather than positively. A second means by which people

acquire self-verifying feedback is through selective information processing. In support of this view,

Swann and Read (1981) found that people spend a disproportionate amount of time and effort analyzing

feedback (Study 1) and are more likely to recall feedback (Study 3) when this feedback confirms their

existing self-views, even when existing self views are negative.

The relation between prediction and control concerns and self-verification strivings has yet to be

assessed directly. However, the fundamental premise of self-verification theory is clear: “people strive

to confirm their self-conceptions to bolster their perceptions of prediction and control” (Swann, Stein-

Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992, p. 392).

Attribution theory

Prediction and control concerns also form the theoretical cornerstone of attribution theory, whose

pioneers have long suggested that inferences about the social world are made in the service of rendering

the world predictable and controllable (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965;

Kelley, 1967). As Gilbert and Malone (1995) point out “people make attributions because doing so


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enables them to achieve certain ends, for instance, to predict others and thereby control the extent to

which others’ behavior can affect them” (p. 34).

Pittman and Pittman (1980) surmised that if attributions are made in the interest of prediction and

control concerns, then people should be especially concerned with forming accurate impressions of

others after experiencing a threat to control. To this end, Pittman and Pittman first established three

levels of control deprivation (baseline, low, and high) by varying the amount of non-contingent

feedback participants were given on a concept formation task. Next participants were told of a man

who had written an essay opposing nuclear power plants in heavily populated areas. Participants were

told either that the man wrote the essay for payment (external cause condition) or for his personal

journal (internal cause condition). Finally, participants rated the extent to which they agreed that

“Some external influences probably caused him to write the particular essay” (p.383). In the external

cause condition participants deprived of control were significantly more likely to endorse this statement

compared with baseline participants. Conversely, in the internal cause condition participants deprived

of control were significantly less likely to endorse this statement compared to baseline participants. In

short, control threat significantly increased the sophistication of attributional analysis. Participants who

were deprived of control made strong attributions to the situation when a potent situational constraint

was apparent, and they made stronger attributions to the person when cues for internally driven

behavior were salient. This supports the hypothesis that attributions are driven by control concerns.

Long before the significance of control had been empirically verified, Adler (1930) suggested that

controlling one’s personal environment is “an intrinsic necessity of life itself” (p. 398). More recently

Lefcourt (1973) advanced a similar conclusion stating, “the sense of control, the illusion that one can

exercise personal choice, has a definite and positive role in sustaining life” (p. 424). Given the

voluminous literature demonstrating the significance of control concerns, these assertions seem well

supported.

Unconscious Processes




The central argument of the present paper is that the motivation for control may have much of its

basis in unconscious or implicit processes. Whereas the theory and research reviewed thus far suggests

that the desire for prediction and control is a fundamental human motivation, it fails to distinguish

between the conscious versus unconscious operation of this motive. One can infer that prediction and

control concerns have an unconscious basis for several reasons. First, existing evidence suggests that

animals as well as human beings are motivated by a desire for prediction and control. Consciousness,

at least human consciousness, does not appear to be a prerequisite for control motivation. This is

consistent with the assumption that the desire for prediction and control is the result of “hard-wired”

cognitive architecture and has its basis in the unconscious operation of this architecture (Dennett, 1991;

Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). However, knowing that the need for prediction and control motivates human

as well as animal behavior does not necessarily mean that human consciousness plays no role in

prediction and control motivation.

One might also infer that prediction and control concerns operate unconsciously because of the

conscious and deliberate operation of this motivation over time. That is, the conscious and deliberate

pursuit of prediction and control concerns over time may become habitual. At this point, consciousness

is no longer needed to initiate control concerns or guide behavior designed to allay these concerns. The

idea that routine psychological processes could recede from awareness and operate outside of

consciousness has been around since at least the end to the 19th Century (James, 1890/1950; Jastrow,

1906; Freud, 1933). Although James (1890/1950) avoided references to the unconscious per se, he

clearly recognized the automatic nature of everyday life. In fact, he argued that " The more of the

details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher

powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work" (p. 122). The concept of automaticity has

become an emerging theme in cognitive and social psychology (for reviews see Bargh, & Ferguson,

2000; Greenwald, & Banaji, 1995; Kihlstrom, 1987; Smith, & DeCoster, 2000). This accumulating

evidence shows that our thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and motivations are often influenced by powerful

and ubiquitous unconscious processes. Thus either because the need for prediction and control is the




result of hardwired affective/cognitive architecture, or because it is a function of over-learning and

habit, (and most likely an interaction of the two) it seems plausible that this need operates

unconsciously.

Implicit social cognition

Initially, research in implicit social cognition focused primarily on the influence of unconscious

information processing on attitudes, person perception and stereotyping. For example, regardless of

their level of self-reported prejudice, most Whites hold negative implicit (unconscious) beliefs about

Blacks (Devine, 1989). These negative implicit beliefs can be subliminally activated and may influence

behavior without awareness (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 1998).

As another example, people also judge others on the basis of physical attractiveness yet are unaware of

this bias. In fact, compared with attractive infants, unattractive infants receive less affection from their

mothers, apparently as a result of unconscious preferences for beauty (Langlois, Ritter, Casey, &

Sawin, 1995). Finally, unconscious negative attitudes toward the color black may lead referees to

penalize black uniformed teams more than non-black uniformed teams (Frank & Gilovich, 1989).

Diverse findings such as these provide strong support for the argument that many of our preferences,

judgments and behaviors are influenced by factors that lie outside of awareness, do not require

intention, proceed in the absence of conscious attention, and at times may be beyond our control

(Bargh, 1994). The list of additional findings that support this general point is almost as long as the list

of contemporary research topics in social cognition (see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, for a review).

Implicit social motivation

Recently theorists have taken the argument a step further, suggesting that even goals and motivation

can be conceptualized as having an unconscious or automatic basis (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh,

1990; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996;

McClelland, 1980; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones, 2002;

Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). This argument trades on the assumption that mental




representations of goals are similar to that of other knowledge structures (e.g., stereotypes) and are thus

susceptible to automatic activation.

The idea that sources of motivation may be unconscious was popularized by Freud (1933) who

argued that basic biological needs exert an influence on behavior independent of conscious awareness.

Maslow (1943) also suggested that any definitive theory of human motivation should focus on ultimate

or basic goals that “imply a more central place for unconscious rather than conscious motivations” (p.

542). Freud’s notions about unconscious motivation have been both controversial and hotly debated.

Whereas many of his ideas have proven difficult to test (but c.f. Newman, Duff, & Baumeister, 1997 for

some recent support) an abundance of evidence does suggest that people are, at the very least, often

unaware of the causes of their own preferences and behaviors (Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones, 2002;

Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Zajonc, 1980).

Recently, social psychologists have begun to investigate the distinction between implicit and explicit

motivation. This research shows that specific motivations can be activated pre-consciously to influence

behavior in ways that most people would attribute to the conscious activation of the same specific

motivation (Bargh, 1990; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Chialdini, 1994; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel &

Schaal, 1999; Moskowitz, Salomon & Taylor, 2000; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998). In

short, goals may be activated preconsciously and then operate nonconsciously to influence behavior

(Bargh, 1990; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). According to the auto-motive model (Bargh, 1990) people

have specific chronic goals that are triggered automatically by specific environmental stimuli. These

auto-motives may include the desire for accuracy, consistency, or achievement. To test the idea that

goals may be unconscious, Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, and Trotschel (2001),

nonconsciously primed participants with either neutral words (river, shampoo) or achievement related

words (achieve, success). They found that compared with participants nonconsciously primed with

neutral words, participants primed with achievement related words preformed better (Study 1) and

persisted longer (Study 4) on an achievement related task. Importantly, Bargh et al. showed that such




priming effects replicate to other specific goals (cooperation – Study 2) and that these effects represent

automatic motivation effects and not automatic perceptual effects (Study 3).

In a similar vein Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel and Schaal (1999) predicted that people who

chronically pursue fairness in judging women would have this goal activated automatically in the

presence of stereotype relevant primes. To test this prediction, Moskowitz et al. (Study 3) assessed

participants’ chronic fairness goals toward women. Participants were classified as chronics if they

displayed compensatory behavior in response to being forced to make stereotypic judgments of women

and as non-chronics if they did not. Next, participants completed a pronunciation task in which male

and female photographs were presented as primes. Each prime was followed by either a stereotype-

consistent (e.g., irrational, dependent) or stereotype-irrelevant (e.g., colorful, lonely) attribute.

Participants were instructed to pronounce each attribute as quickly as possible. Moskowitz et al.

predicted that female faces should prime stereotypes of women and facilitate pronunciation for

stereotype-consistent traits; but only for non-chronics. Participants with chronic fairness goals should

not show this classic priming effect. This prediction was supported. Participants with chronic fairness

goals did not show the classic priming effect, even when conscious correction processes were inhibited.

This finding supports the idea that chronic goals can be activated automatically to control (or perhaps

replace) automatic stereotype activation. Furthermore, it supports the more general conclusion that

goals can operate non-consciously.

In addition to this small but growing body of research that directly investigates unconscious motives,

there is also a very large body of research that suggests indirectly that motivation has an unconscious

component. For instance, there is evidence that the implicit motivation to feel good about the self can

influence people’s evaluation of nearly anything associated with the self. Research on the mere

ownership effect shows that giving people objects, such as pens or mugs, causes people to evaluate

these objects more favorably than they would otherwise (Beggan, 1992; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler,

1990; Van Boven, Dunning, & Lowenstein, 2000). Furthermore, research on the name letter effect

(Hoorens & Nuttin, 1993; Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; Nuttin, 1985) shows that people evaluate the




letters in their own names more favorably than letters that are not in their own names. These

unconscious preferences even appear to influence major life decisions. For instance, Pelham,

Mirenberg, & Jones (2002) showed that people are disproportionately likely to live in cities or states

and to choose careers whose names share letters with their own first or last names. Thus, people whose

first or last name is Louis are disproportionately likely to live in Saint Louis, MO, and people named

Denise, Dena, Dennis, or Denny are disproportionately likely to become dentists.

Pelham, et al. (2002) referred to findings such as these as implicit egotism. Implicit egotism refers

to the general idea that people’s positive associations about themselves spill over into their evaluations

of objects associated with the self. Presumably, implicit egotism represents an unconscious

manifestation of the self-enhancement motive – an automatic process whereby people maintain their

positive thoughts and feelings about the self (Pelham et al., 2002). Consistent with the auto-motive

model (Bargh, 1990), it appears that the unconscious self-enhancement motive displays properties

consistent with the pursuit of conscious self-enhancement. For example, self-serving tendencies are

particularly pronounced among people high in explicit self-esteem (Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Pelham &

Swann, 1989; Shrauger & Rosenberg, 1970; Steele, 1988; Swann, 1987) and recent research suggests

that these self-serving tendencies are manifest not only on explicit, but implicit measures of self-

evaluation (Dodgson & Wood, 1998; Hetts, 1999; Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002; Sinclair &

Kunda, 2000). On the basis of findings such as these, Jones et al. (2002) argued that a great deal of

self-regulation occurs unconsciously. Although it would be nice to have more direct evidence that the

self-enhancement motive operates unconsciously, there is certainly a large amount of evidence that is

consistent with this idea.

Finally, an explicit theoretical distinction between implicit and explicit motivation is offered by

McClelland and colleagues (McClelland, 1980; McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989).

According to McClelland, implicit motives are those that find expression directly in behavior and guide

behavior without a person’s conscious access. As such, implicit motives are revealed only through

indirect measures (e.g., objectively coded themes that emerge in people’s free-stories, the style of




people’s drawings or doodles). In contrast, explicit (or self-attributed) motives are those that are

accessible to the person, are often given as post-hoc explanations of behavior, and are revealed through

traditional self-report measures of personality and motivation.

The distinction between implicit and explicit motives is important because implicit and explicit

motive measures do not correlate with one another (e.g., Child, Frank, & Storm, 1956; Holmes & Tyler,

1968) which suggests these measures tap two different constructs, each with distinct implications for

behavior. To this end McClelland (1980) suggested that implicit motives predict long-term behavioral

trends better than explicit motives, which better predict immediate choices in controlled settings that

prompt conscious questions about self-attributed motives (including many laboratory settings). For

example, Heckhausen and Halisch (1986) found the typical lack of correlation between an indirect and

direct measure of achievement motivation. Importantly, each measure was significantly correlated with

different classes of behaviors. The indirect or implicit measure of achievement was correlated with the

number of job related activities in which employees had spontaneously engaged. On the other hand, the

explicit measure of achievement was correlated with setting higher levels of aspiration and making

higher ratings of self-perceived ability. This result is consistent with the idea the implicit motives guide

behavior spontaneously over time while explicit motives reflect the operation of goals that people

consciously decide to pursue (McClelland, Koestner, &Weinberger, 1989).

Implicit Control Motivation

As the current review demonstrates, implicit, or unconscious formulations of motivation have a long

history in psychology. However, these formulations have only recently been given direct empirical

attention. Unfortunately, little of this existing research addresses the extent to which our thoughts

feelings and behaviors are motivated by the implicit desire for prediction and control. Given both the

well-documented importance of control, and the emerging consensus regarding the implicit nature of

social cognition and motivation, such an investigation seems overdue.

The implicit control motivation hypothesis states that people are fundamentally driven to satisfy

control needs and that this drive has a large implicit or unconscious component; that is, it motivates




behavior independent of conscious awareness and intention. According to this view, people are ever

vigilant to assess their state of control in any specific context (Bandura, 1977; 1982) and make these

assessments automatically. This automatic assessment can preconsciously activate control concerns

which may then influence thought, feeling, and behavior in the current situation. In everyday

experience, this process is presumably triggered upon the detection (either consciously or

preconsciously) of a discrepancy between one’s actual state of control and a standard against which the

pursuit of control is evaluated (see Carver & Scheier, 1981; 1999). Such discrepancies can potentially

arise in any situation in which control is threatened or the pursuit of control is blocked (see Moskowitz,

2002 for some preliminary support for this type of process). This suggests that people are often

influenced by the need for prediction and control even though they (1) may fail to realize that this is a

concern, (2) may fail to realize that this concern is being monitored, and (3) may fail to realize that their

current behavior is influenced by this concern. It follows that self-reported or conscious explanations

for a person’s responses will not always reflect the a priori motives guiding those responses. As

Jacoby, Lindsay, and Toth (1992, p.802) put it, “people sometimes consciously plan and then act, but

more often behavior is influenced by unconscious processes; that is, people act and then, if called upon,

make their excuses.” Thus, upon conscious reflection people may explain their responses without

refering to concerns about prediction and control, even when these concerns have played a fundamental

role in guiding their responses (McClelland, 1980; Nisbett, & Wilson, 1977). This raises several

testable questions: Can concerns for prediction and control be activated outside of awareness? Can

people be influenced by these concerns without realizing it? To what extent do these concerns

automatically influence people’s preferences, decisions, and behaviors?

Empirical Implications

It is conceivable that implicit control motivation plays a role in several existing social-psychological

phenomena, including the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968), terror management processes

(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986), and self-verification processes (Swann, 1983; 1987),

among others. Prominent theories regarding all three of these phenomena can be viewed through the




common perspective of unconscious concerns with prediction and control. Moreover, seen through the

common vantage point of implicit control motivation, our understanding of each theory could be greatly

expanded and enriched. The next section of this review addresses whether implicit control concerns

may turn out to be the hidden hand guiding each of these phenomena.3

Mere exposure

Research on the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968; see Bornstein, 1989; Harrison, 1977 for

reviews) has shown that liking for novel stimuli increases as exposure to these stimuli increases. In

short, familiarity leads to liking. The typical mere-exposure experiment involves presenting novel

stimuli (i.e. line drawings, irregularly shaped polygons) a varying number of times followed by some

dependent measure of liking for each stimulus. For example, in Zajonc’s first study, participants

viewed a series of nonsense words. The exposure frequencies for these nonsense words varied from 0

to 25. Subsequently, participants were asked to rate the extent to which each word represented

“goodness of meaning”. Zajonc found that the more often participants were exposed to a word, the

more favorably they rated its meaning. This finding was extended to preferences for socially relevant

stimuli in Study 3. In this experiment, participants were shown a series of faces (college yearbook

photographs) from 0 to 25 times. Participants were then asked to make liking ratings of each stimulus

person. Zajonc found that the more frequently a particular stimulus face was presented, the more it was

liked.

Initially, mere exposure effects were regarded as the product of exposure to stimuli presented

supraliminally (above the threshold for conscious awareness). It soon became clear, however, that

stimulus recognition is not a pre-requisite for the production of mere-exposure effects. In fact, even

when stimuli are presented subliminally (below the threshold for conscious awareness), participants still

prefer frequently presented stimuli (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980;

Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000; Murphy, Monahan, & Zajonc, 1995; Wilson, 1979). In perhaps

the most influential study to investigate this issue, Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) exposed

participants to a series of irregular polygons five times each at exposure durations of only 1 ms.




Participants were then asked to select which polygon they preferred, and which they recognized, from

pairs of previously exposed versus novel polygons. Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc found that participants

preferred subliminally exposed polygons over novel ones 60% of the time. In support of the hypothesis

that this enhanced liking was not a function of stimulus recognition, recognition accuracy was only

48%, or about what would be expected by chance alone.

Not only is stimulus recognition unnecessary to produce mere exposure effects, it may actually

inhibit them (Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992). In support of this view, Bornstein

(1989) reported the results of an informative meta-analysis. Across the studies Bornstein reviewed, the

average mere exposure effect size for subliminally presented stimuli corresponded to an r of .528,

compared with an r of .140 for studies with supraliminally presented stimuli (results reported in

Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992). Further, as a direct test of the hypothesis that stimulus recognition

inhibits mere exposure effects, Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992) assigned participants to either a 5ms

(subliminal) condition or a 500ms (supraliminal) condition. Participants exposed to stimuli for 5ms

showed significantly stronger mere exposure effects than those exposed to the same stimuli for 500ms.

This finding provides strong support for the notion that conscious recognition of stimuli actually

undermines the mere exposure effect. The idea that conscious recognition of stimuli inhibits implicit

phenomena is a hallmark of research in implicit social cognition as well (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji,

1995; Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001; Newman, Duff, & Baumeister, 1997; Schwarz &

Clore, 1983).

Until very recently (Zajonc, 2001) fans of mere exposure noted that what makes the mere exposure

effect particularly intriguing is that enhanced liking for frequently exposed stimuli occurs in the

complete absence of reinforcement. Or does it?

According to Skinner (1953), even generalized, nonspecific feedback from the environment may be

reinforcing to the extent it allows the organism to successfully manipulate (or control) its environment.

While Skinner was arguing about the ubiquitous role of reinforcement in daily life, a minor twist on this

notion is the idea that organisms are constantly assessing the status of their control over the




environment. Consistent with this idea, Skinner suggested that “we are automatically reinforced, apart

from any particular deprivation, when we successfully control the physical world” (p.77). This raises

the question of whether increased liking of repeatedly exposed novel stimuli is due to reinforcement

after all. That is, familiarization through mere exposure might be reinforcing because familiar stimuli

are more predictable (almost by definition) and controllable than are unfamiliar stimuli. This forms the

basis for the hypothesis that we may prefer what is familiar precisely because familiar stimuli are

predictable and controllable. As an organism continually confronts a stimulus that does not result in a

negative outcome it comes to prefer that stimulus: the stimulus is tagged as safe and its consequences

predictable (Zajonc, 2001). Taste aversion conditioning is a potential example of this type of process

(Garcia, & Koelling, 1966). One way animals learn what is safe to eat is by sampling small amounts of

novel foods. If an animal gets sick after tasting a novel food, it will avoid recently ingested novel foods.

Conversely, if an animal does not get sick after ingesting a novel food, it will eat that food again in the

future, in larger quantities. This process ostensibly occurs automatically.

If mere exposure really is a result of the need to predict and control the environment, participants

deprived of control should be motivated to re-establish controllability, which should lead to heightened

preferences for familiar, compared to less familiar stimuli. This relation could be tested directly by

experimentally manipulating participants’ levels of control and assessing the effect on either

experimentally or naturally existing created mere exposure preferences.

More specifically, control could be experimentally undermined in an initial control deprivation task.

This deprivation should activate an implicit goal to compensate for this loss of control. If familiar

stimuli generally enhance prediction and control, then familiar stimuli should be especially attractive to

those recently deprived of control. This would suggest that participants are motivated by control

concerns even though they have no conscious intent to re-establish control. This would also provide

support for the motivational nature of the mere exposure phenomenon. Most importantly, this result

would provide an important and powerful demonstration of the implicit operation of control motivation.

Terror Management Theory




Implicit control concerns may also be relevant to terror management theory, or TMT (Greenberg,

Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). TMT posits that a great

deal of human behavior is the result of the uniquely human awareness of one’s own mortality. TMT

suggests that people adopt and defend cultural world views (“Don’t speed, Drug use is immoral,

Communism is superior to Democracy”) and self-esteem (“I am a worthwhile person.”) as buffering

mechanisms against the potential anxiety that death awareness arouses. More recently TMT has been

offered as an all-encompassing theory of human social motivation. As such, TMT claims that most

social psychological motives are rooted in the existential crisis instigated by death awareness (for a

review see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). More specifically, TMT argues that “a wide

variety of social motives can be viewed as serving a terror management function” (p.7).

One primary source of support for TMT comes from studies investigating the role of mortality

salience in the defense of cultural world-views and self-esteem. The mortality salience hypothesis

states that if cultural world views and self-esteem provide protection from the anxiety of death, then

reminders of death should increase the need for the cultural world view and self-esteem. In support of

this hypothesis, studies have shown that mortality salience makes people more likely to punish those

who violate moral standards (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989), more

likely to overestimate social consensus for one’s attitudes (Pyszczynski, Wicklund, Floresku, Koch,

Gauch, Solomon, & Greenberg, 1996), and more likely to aggress against those who challenge one’s

beliefs (McGregor, Lieberman, Solomon, Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, & Pyszczynski, 1998).

Although an abundance of empirical evidence supports the terror management perspective, there

may be an alternative view that can account for these findings. From an implicit control perspective,

death awareness is but one of many threats to control (See also Snyder, 1997). Death is ultimately

unavoidable, and thus ultimately uncontrollable. In many instances, of course, death is also

unpredictable, taking innocents and loved ones without warning. From the perspective of TMT, this

awareness lies at the foundation of nearly all other social motivations. From an implicit control

perspective, this awareness is not the foundation but a cornerstone, beneath which lies a more primitive




and fundamental motivation for prediction and control. This should not undermine the importance of

death awareness. In fact, from the perspective offered here death awareness is likely the major threat to

prediction and control that humans face. To more clearly understand the role of control motivation in

TMT, it is important to elaborate the TMT perspective.

According to TMT (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997) all human behavior is oriented

toward the superordinate goal of staying alive. To meet this ultimate goal, humans are motivated by

three main motivational systems; direct, defensive, and self-expansive. Direct motives include

biological processes and innate behaviors like the regulation of blood sugar levels and the innate fear of

snakes. Defensive motives are composed primarily of symbolic means of self-preservation. More

specifically, “the pursuit of meaning and value, or faith in the cultural world view and self-esteem, is

the primary means of coping with the potential for terror that results when an animal instinctively

programed for self-preservation becomes aware that inevitably it will die” (p.5). According to TMT,

most motives studied by social psychologists, including the motivation to seek cognitive consistency

(e.g., Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1944; Swann, 1983), the motive for justice or fairness (e.g., Lerner,

1980), and the need to belong (e.g., Leary & Downs, 1995) represent symbolic means of defending

against the anxiety caused by death awareness. Finally, self-expansive motives include the desire to

explore the environment and develop a more adequate understanding of that environment, something

roughly analogous to the desire for autonomy or prediction and control (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1991,

White, 1959). Self-expansive motives are posited to be the least urgent of the three types and “do not

stem from a sense of discomfort, distress, or deficit that the individual desires to minimize”

(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997, p.6). Thus, TMT mainly explores the implications of the

defensive motive system and suggests that nearly all psychological motives have their roots in this

system.

In contrast to this view, the view suggested here is that implicit control motives operate at all three

levels of the TMT system. That is, the need for prediction and control may not simply be a product of

the self-expansive motive system, and as such may not be so independent of the defensive and direct




motive systems. As previously noted, the motivation for prediction and control is posited to be a “hard-

wired” aspect of cognitive systems. As such, prediction and control may be a fundamental drive that

enhances the likelihood of both survival and reproduction. From this perspective prediction and control

are adaptive in that they enhance an organism’s ability to identify and avoid sources of danger and to

identify and obtain sources of pleasure. In this way prediction and control motives may influence both

defensive and expansive modes of behavior. In this light, the threat instigated by death awareness

stems from a more fundamental and primitive threat to prediction and control. Not surprisingly, this

threat triggers defensive responses designed to ameliorate this anxiety.

Some evidence suggests, albeit indirectly, that the need the need to manage existential terror is

derivative or subservient to the need for prediction and control. For example, there is abundant

evidence that preferences for consistency or control are present in both animals (Seligman, 1975) and

human infants (Papousek & Papousek, 1979), neither of whom have a need to manage existential terror.

This suggests that compared with terror management concerns, concerns for prediction and control

represent more primitive concerns. This makes sense from an evolutionary perspective. It is safe to

assume that in the evolutionary history of our species, self-awareness and death awareness are relatively

recent players on the evolutionary stage (Pelham, 1997).

Some evidence also suggests that death awareness is troubling because it is a major threat to control.

Assessing the relation between self-esteem and death related anxiety, Leary, Bednarski, and Saltzman

(1995) found that self-esteem was more strongly correlated with fears about dealing with pain and

uncertainty than with the fear of non-existence per se. To the extent that uncertainty is related to

control, self-esteem may just as likely be a control-anxiety buffer as a death-anxiety buffer. Quite

clearly, this argument remains theoretical and will require extensive empirical investigation.

The implicit control perspective on terror management effects raises some testable hypotheses. For

example, if thoughts of death motivate social behavior because they pose a threat to prediction and

control, then death scenarios that differ in their implications for predictability and controllability should

have differential effects on death awareness outcomes. More specifically, a predictable death should be




less threatening than an unpredictable death. Consistent with this idea, people who are asked to

imagine dying in their old age after a predictable bout with a chronic disease should show weaker TMT

effects than people asked to imagine dying as a young person who suddenly learns that he or she has a

deadly and inoperable brain tumor.

Another possible empirical direction is grounded in the TMT finding that temporary reminders of

ones’ mortality lead to enhanced self-esteem and cultural world view defense. It can be hypothesized

that if the threat of mortality represents a more basic threat to control, repeated and unavoidable

references to one’s own death should actually diminish self-esteem and world view defense in a manner

consistent with learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975). Bettleheim’s (1943) case studies of prisoners in

Nazi concentration camps are highly consistent with this line of reasoning. He reported that over time,

prisoners largely abandoned their existing world views and adopted world views similar to those of

camp guards.

TMT, Implicit Control, and Theories of Cognitive Consistency

As previously noted, psychologists have recognized the importance of consistency as a basic

psychological motive. Moreover, most major consistency theorists presume that the need for

consistency is grounded in basic perceptual and motivational systems (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1944;

Newcomb, 1953). Terror management theorists provide an alternative view by suggesting that a desire

for consistency reflects efforts to manage existential terror rather than concerns with consistency per se

(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). From this perspective consistency serves a more

profound psychological function; it is a prerequisite for an orderly and stable conception of reality that

imbues life with meaning. In other words, without consistency a meaningful world view is

unattainable, and without a meaningful world view, people are incapable of controlling the terror of

death. This seems to imply that consistency serves a function, and without that function, terror

management would falter. This begs the question of whether the need for consistency or the need to

manage existential terror is more basic (Pelham, 1997). Put another way; if terror management depends




upon consistency, then how can the need to manage terror supersede the need for consistency in any

hierarchy of motives? This is an empirical question that remains to be addressed.

One intriguing direction for future research on this question would be to investigate the role that

terror management and implicit control processes play in self-verification. Self-verification theory

(Swann, 1987) challenges the notion that people have a fundamental need for positive self-esteem by

demonstrating that people low in self-esteem typically prefer negative but consistent self-relevant

feedback over feedback that is positive but inaccurate. But why do people prefer consistent self-

relevant feedback in the first place?

In addressing this question, TMT theorists argue that “it is not consistency per se that is the

superordinate goal that they are pursuing but, rather, the protection from anxiety that is provided by

whatever conception of themselves they have become invested in” (p. 14). Thus ultimately, terror

management theory suggests that self-verification is driven by the need to manage existential terror.

Self-verification theorists themselves also seem to agree that consistency is not necessarily important in

its own right (e.g., see Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992). Instead they argue that self-

verification stems from an underlying need to maintain one’s feelings of prediction and control. To test

this hypothesis, Swann et al. gave high and low self esteem participants the opportunity to choose

between two potential interaction partners. One of these partners verified participants’ self-view while

the other did not. Participants were asked to think aloud into a tape recorder as they made their

decisions. Consistent with self-verification theory, participants were significantly more likely to choose

interaction partners who verified their self-views. The most prominent reasons cited for this preference

reflected both epistemic (a need for accurate self-knowledge) and pragmatic (a desire for smooth social

interaction) concerns – both of which were interpreted as concerns with prediction and control.

While these findings are consistent with the implicit control view, this research is limited in at least

two ways. First, the control interpretation of self-verification would be strengthened by the

demonstration that experimentally manipulated perceptions of prediction and control have theoretically

predictable consequences for self-verifying preferences. Specifically, it seems reasonable to expect that




experimentally manipulated threats to prediction and control would enhance peoples’ preferences for

self-verifying feedback (see Swann & Reed, 1981, Study 2 for evidence that indirect threats to control

enhance self-verification). It also seems important to address the terror management alternative – that

self-verification is ultimately a product of attempts to deal with the anxiety of death awareness. As one

example, participants experimentally primed to think about their own mortality may show enhanced

preferences for self-verifying feedback. However, from the implicit control perspective, this effect

should be attenuated by subsequent control affirmation. Needless to say, unraveling this tricky question

would be a difficult but worthwhile endeavor.

Summary and Discussion

A large body of theory and research supports the idea that control is a fundamental human need.

The current analysis suggests that we may nevertheless underestimate just how fundamental this need

is. This may be due in part to the fact that control has traditionally been conceptualized at the explicit

or conscious level. In light of the overwhelming importance and influence of control, and given the

accumulating evidence that motivation has an implicit or unconscious component, an implicit control

motivation perspective is proposed.

The implicit control motivation perspective suggests that people are fundamentally driven to satisfy

control needs and that this drive has a large implicit or unconscious component. The implicit nature of

control motivation is posited to be a function of both “hard-wired” aspects of cognitive/affective

systems and automatization resulting from the deliberate and conscious pursuit of prediction and

control over time. This unconscious motive is posited to reflect a primitive, evolutionarily adaptive

mechanism that allows organisms to meet the challenges of a complex environment. As such it is

proposed that people are often influenced by the need for prediction and control even though they (1)

may fail to realize that this is a concern, (2) may fail to realize that this concern is being monitored, and

(3) may fail to realize that their current behavior is meaningfully influenced by this concern. This

perspective raises several empirical questions: Can prediction and control concerns be activated outside

of awareness? Can people be influenced by prediction and control concerns without realizing it? To




what extent do these concerns automatically influence people’s preferences, decisions, and behaviors?

Several strategies are presented to test these questions empirically, including strategies for manipulating

people’s feelings of predictability and control and assessing the consequences of such motives for

preferences such as those grounded in mere exposure.

The implicit control motivation perspective is consistent with the conclusions of Wegner and

Wheatley (1999) who suggested that “the real causal mechanisms underlying behavior are never present

in consciousness. Rather, the engines of causation are unconscious mechanisms of the mind” (p. 490).

According to the current analysis, these unconscious mechanisms are ultimately control mechanisms.

From this perspective, conscious perceptions of control (i.e., the illusion of control), and even the

experience of free will, may result from the shadow cast by these unconscious control mechanisms. Of

course, this is highly speculative and there is much to be done to validate this line of theorizing. At the

very least it seems possible that prediction and control concerns operate implicitly to influence a very

diverse and seemingly unrelated set of psychological phenomenon. An empirical investigation of these

issues is needed to more fully understand and appreciate the roots of human social motivation.




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Footnotes

1. The ideas presented in this passage are taken from Pittman (1998). This perspective is also

presented by Weary, Gleicher, and Marsh, (1993).

2. It should be noted that enhanced perceptions of personal control are not universally beneficial

(e.g., Burish, Carey, Wallston, Stein, Jamison, & Lyles, 1984) and in some circumstances may even be

maladaptive (e.g., Burger, 1989; Halliday & Graham, 2002).

3. The highly descriptive term “hidden hand” is taken from Lakoff and Johnson (1999).

on the implicit nature of control motivation

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