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Jonathan LangsethPhi466

Peirces On the Fixation of Belief

In his essay, On the Fixation of Belief, C. S. Peirce presents a

unique portrayal of how it is that humans come to think logically, how

belief, doubt and inquiry are manifest in human nature, and concludes,

with qualifications, that the method of science affords the most

advantageous approach to the settling of doubt into belief.

The act of inquiry, of investigating the world with the hope of

some resulting knowledge gained, or, with Peirce, the struggle,

caused by the irritation of doubt, to attain a state of belief (Peirce,

126), has led to the use of reason (as the, usually unconscious, use of

logic). Pierce cites practical gains from such use: Logicality in regard

to practical matters is the most useful quality an animal can possess,

and might, therefore, result from the action of natural selection.

(Peirce, 123). One might wish to stop here by asking why wouldnt we

proceed logically, given or ability to do so. Yet Peirce proceeds to delve

deeper into the forces at play behind the actual process of coming to

an unsettled state of doubt, and a static, position of belief.

Peirce notes that all inquiry rests on implicitly assumed

premises. Yet the relation of premises to conclusions in the form of an

argument, says Peirce, finds its validity in facts, not thought. This is an

important claim that runs counter to the standard view of what

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constitutes of valid argument. In order to grasp the importance of such

a claim, the reasons for and the implications derived from this position

are in need of further explication. Whereas the traditional view says

that an argument form is valid if and only if it is true under all

interpretations (thus giving prevalence to the structure of an

argument), Peirce says that:

The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what wealready know, something else that we do not know. Consequently, reasoning is goodif it be such as to give a true conclusion from true premises, and not otherwise. Thus,the question of its validity is purely one of fact, and not of thinking. A being the

premises and B the conclusion, the question is, whether these facts are really sorelated that if A is, B is. If so, the inference is valid; if not, not. (122)

And

That which determines us, from given premises, to draw one inference ratherthan another, is some habit of mind, whether it be constitutional or acquired. Thehabit is good or otherwise, according as it produces true conclusions from truepremises or not; and an inference is regarded as valid or not, without reference tothe truth or falsity of its conclusion specially, but according as the habit thatdetermines it is such as to produce true conclusions in general or not. (123)

Peirce gives the name guiding principle of inference to any

proposition formulated by a specific habit of mind that determines any

inference. It would seem from the above quote that Peirce is merely

reiterating the Humean notion of how induction is derived from the

experience of constant conjunction. But what of deduction? Is Peirces

distinction between constitutional and acquired habits equivalent to

the distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning? If so this

would seem to suggest the Kantian distinction between a priori

analytic and a posteriori synthetic forms of cognition. The former, as

constitutional, predetermines the form and possibility of experience;

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the latter is derived out of experience through engagement with the

world.

Yet one could also interpret constitutional habits as those basic,

naturally occurring impulses and drives that lead us to action in the

world, such as hunger and desires. Such an interpretation can further

illuminate the relation between doubt and belief. Confronting the

unknown places us in doubt. This doubt, which in a state of uncertainty

is the conjunction between our needs/wants and the world by which

such needs and wants are to be gratified, moves us to action in order

to establish beliefs that will successfully satisfy the basic constitutional

habits/impulses required for the furtherance of life. Naturally, if how

our doubts and beliefs lead us to act in order to appease the wants and

needs essential for life are not successful, it is probable that we would

not exist; natural selection would have phased us out. This explains

why Peirce likens the use of logical thought to natural selectionlogic

is the best means (so far) of getting along in the world. In other words

the practical result of a belief or way of thinking determines whether

that belief of way of thinking works or, what the pragmatists want to

claim is the same, is true.

Peirce proceeds to outline four methods by which we may move

from states of doubt to states of belief. These methods, as should

become apparent, all require a belief structure that is fixed in a

community. These four methods are that of tenacity, of authority, the a

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priori method, and the scientific method. In brief, the method of

tenacity is akin to the deriving of beliefs through traditions and

customs; the method of authority comes from accepting or being

forced to accept beliefs without personal experience to justify the

beliefs; the a priori method by which foundational propositions guide

ones pursuance of belief; and the scientific which presupposes a world

of facts independent of our thought of them, which we discover

through experimentation.

Although he grants each approach certain benefits, in the end

Peirce regards the scientific method as the most successful method to

date. I believe Peirce would argue that if we recognize how much

science pervades our lives we have evidence of its superior

methodology.

On Peirces How to Make Our Ideas Clear

The essay begins with the between clear and obscure

conceptions, and distinct and confused conceptions, first brought

under philosophical scrutiny by Descartes. Peirce defines a clear idea

as one that is so apprehended that it will be recognized wherever it is

met with, and so that no other will be mistaken for it (137), and a

distinct idea as one that contains nothing that is not clear (138).

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Utilizing the distinction of methods, put forth in his essay On the

Fixation of Belief, Peirce gives an abridged rendition of how he sees the

historical progression of an ever-increasing awareness of clarity in

thought. In Descartes we find the transition from the method of

authority to the a priori method. In Peirces day the western world was

in the midst of finalizing the transition from a priori method to the

scientific method. From a historical point of view we could say this was

also the slow transition into modernity, a transition arguably beginning

with Bacon and Hobbes. In this essay Peirce wants to further develop

his analysis of belief, show beliefs dependence on habit, and conclude

by proving we come down to what is tangible and practical, as the

root of every real distinction of thought (145).

Peirce says beliefs have three properties: our being aware of

them, that they erase doubt, and that they involve the establishment

in our nature of a rule of action, i.e. a habit. This last property Peirce

goes on to deem as the essence of belief. In equally strong claims he

says, the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action

and ...what a thing means is simply what habits it involves (145).

This emphasis on habit focuses on the connection of self and world

through action. When someone has a belief, this belief is tested

through how that person proceeds in the world having that belief. If it

appears to work and no viable option is known to be available, we can

say with Peirce that thought is at rest, and the belief is true, having

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meaning to the extent that the belief produces results or successful

action. The persistence of belief, unchallenged, creates habits which,

typically, subside from consciousness and guide our decisions

throughout experience. If a particular belief is challenged by a new

experience or competing belief, doubt may arise. If a competing belief

produces precisely the same practical result as an already established

belief, the two beliefs are equal in all discernable regards. Thus, beliefs

are produced and maintained or challenged, by how they enable us to

get along in the world, by their practical consequences.