Anatoly Golitsyn

New Lies For OldThe Communist strategy of deception and Disinformation

An ex-KGB officer warns how communist deception threatens survival of the WestDodd, Mead & Company, 1984, 412 pp., $15

Editors' Foreword

Very rarely disclosures of information from behind the Iron Curtain throw new light on theroots of communist thought and action and challenge accepted notions on the operation ofthe communist system. We believe that this book does both these things. It is nothing if notcontroversial. It rejects conventional views on subjects ranging fro Khrushchev's overthrowto Tito's revisionism, from Dubchek's liberalism to Ceausecu's independence, and from thedissident movement to the Sino-Soviet split. The author's analysis has many obviousimplications for Western policy. It will not be readily accepted by those who have for longbeen committed to opposing points of view. But we believe that the debates it is likely toprovoke will lead to a deeper understanding of the nature of the threat from internationalcommunism and, perhaps, to a firmer determination to resist it.

The author's services to the party and the KGB and the unusually long periods he spent instudy, mainly in the KGB. but also with the University of Marxism-Leninism and theDiplomatic School, make the author uniquely qualified as a citizen of the West to writeabout the subjects covered in this book.He was born near Poltava, in the Ukraine, in 1926. He was thus brought up as a member ofthe postrevolutionary generation. From 1933 onward he lived in Moscow. He joined thecommunist youth movement (Komsomol) at the age of fifteen while he was a cadet inmilitary school. He became a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in1945 while studying at the artillery school for officers at Odessa.In the same year he entered military counterintelligence. On graduation from the Moscowschool of military counterespionage in 1946, he joined the Soviet intelligence service. Whileworking in its headquarters he attended evening classes at the University of Marxism-Leninism, from which he graduated in 1948. From 1948 to 1950 he studied in thecounterintelligence faculty of the High Intelligence School; also, between 1949 and 1952 hecompleted a correspondence course with the High Diplomatic School.

In 1952 and early 1953 he was involved, with a friend, in drawing up a proposal to theCentral Committee on the reorganization of Soviet intelligence. The proposal includedsuggestions on the strengthening of counterintelligence, on the wider use of the satelliteintelligence services, and on the reintroduction of the "activist style" into intelligence work.In connection with this proposal, he attended a meeting of the Secretariat chaired by Stalinand a meeting of the Presidium chaired by Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Bulganin.For three months in 1952-52 the author worked as a head of section in the department ofthe Soviet intelligence service responsible for counterintelligence service responsible forcounterespionage against the United States. In 1953 he was posted to Vienna, where heserved for two years under cover as a member of the apparat of the Soviet HighCommission. For the first year he worked against Russian emigres, and for the secondagainst British intelligence. In 1954 he was elected to be a deputy secretary of the partyorganization in the KGB residency in Vienna, numbering seventy officers. On return to

Moscow he attended the KGB Institute, now the KGB Academy, as a full-time student forfour years, graduation from there with a law degree in 1959. As a student of the instituteand a s party member, he was will placed to follow the power struggle in the Sovietleadership that was reflected in secret party letters, briefings, and conferences.From 1959 to 1060, at a time when a new long-range policy for the bloc was beingformulated and the KGB was being reorganized to play its part in it, he served as a senioranalyst in the NATO section of the Information Department of the Soviet intelligenceservice. He was then transferred to Finland, where, under cover as vice-consul in the Sovietembassy in Helsinki, he worked on counterintelligence matters until his break with theregime in December 1961.By 1956 he was already beginning to be disillusioned with the Soviet system. The Hungarianevents of that year intensified his disaffection. He concluded that the only practical way tofight the regime was from abroad and that, armed with his inside knowledge of the KGB, hewould be able to do so effectively. Having his decision, be began systematically to elicit andcommit to memory information that he thought would be relevant and valuable to the West.The adoption of the new aggressive long-range communist policy precipitated his decision tobreak with the regime. He felt that the necessity of warning the West of the new dimensionsof that threat that it was facing justified him in abandoning his country and facing thepersonal sacrifices involved. His break with the regime was a deliberate and long-premeditated political act. Immediately on his arrival in the United States, he sought toconvey a warning to the highest authorities in the U.S. government on the new politicaldangers to the Western world stemming from the harnessing of all the political resources ofthe communist bloc, including its intelligence and security services, to the new long-rangepolicy.From 1962 onward the author devoted a large proportion of his time to the study ofcommunist affairs as an outside observer reading both the communist and Western press.He began work on this book. While working on the book he continued to bring to theattention of American and other Western authorities his views on the issues considered in it,and in 1968 allowed American and British officials to read the manuscript as it then stood.Although the manuscript has since been enlarged to cover the events of the last decade andrevised as the underlying communist strategy became clearer to the author, the substanceof the argument has changed little since 1968. Owing to the length of the manuscript, asubstantial part of it has been held over for publication at a later date.

With few exceptions, those Western officials who were aware of the views expressed in themanuscript, especially on the Sino-Soviet split, rejected them. In fact, over the years itbecame increasingly clear to the author that there was no reasonable hope of his analysis ofcommunist affairs being seriously considered in Western official circles. At the same time,he became further convinced that events continued to confirm the validity of his analysis,that the threat from international communism was not properly understood, and that thisthreat would shortly enter a new and more dangerous phase. The author therefore decidedto publish his work with the intention of alerting a wider sector of world public opinion to thedangers as he sees them, in the hope of stimulating a new approach to the study ofcommunism and of provoking a more coherent, determined and effective response to it bythose who remain interested in the preservation of free societies in the noncommunistworld.In order to give effect to his decision to publish, the author asked the four of us, all formerU.S. or British government officials for editorial advice and help. Three of us have knownthe author and his views for twelve years or more. We can testify to his Sisphean efforts toconvince others of the validity of what he has to say. We have the highest regard for hispersonal and professional integrity. The value of his services to national security has beenofficially recognized by more than one government in the West. Despite the rejection of hisviews by many of our former colleagues, we continue to believe that the contents of thisbook are of the greatest importance and relevance to a proper understanding of

contemporary events. We were, therefore, more than willing to respond to the author'srequests for help in editing his manuscript for publication, and we commend the book forthe most serious study by all who are interested in relations between the communist andnoncommunist worlds.

The preparation of the manuscript has been undertaken by the author with the help of eachof us, acting in an individual and private capacity.The author is a citizen of the United States of America and an Honorary Commander of theOrder of the British Empire (CBE).Stephen De Mowbray Arthur Martin Vasia C. Gmirkin Scott Miler

Author's Note

This book is the product of nearly twenty years of my life. It presents my convictions that,throughout that period, the West has misunderstood the nature of changes in thecommunist world and has been misled and out maneuvered by communist guile. Myresearches have not only strengthened by belief, but have led me to a new methodology bywhich to analyze communist actions. This methodology takes into account the dialecticalcharacter of communist strategic thinking. It is my hope theat the methodology will come tobe used by students of communist affairs throughout the Western World.

I accept sole responsibility for the contents of the book. In writing it, I have received noassistance of any kind from any government or other organization. I submitted the text tothe appropriate US authorities, who raised no objection to its publication on grounds ofnational security....********************************************************

Part IThe Two Methodologies

1. 1. The Problems Facing Western Analysts2. 2. The Patterns of Disinformation--"Weakness an Evolution"3. 3. The Patterns of Disinformation--"Facade and Strength"4. 4. The Patterns of Disinformation--Transitional5. 5. The New Policy and Disinformation Strategy6. 6. The Shelepin Report and Changes in Organization7. 7. The New Role of Intelligence8. 8. Sources of Information9. 9. The Vulnerability of Western Assessments

10. 10. Communist Intelligence Successes, Western Failures and the Crisis in WesternStudies

11. 11. Western Errors12. 12. The New Methodology

Part II1. The Disinformation Program and its impact on the West2. 13. The First Disinformation Operation: The Soviet-Yugoslav "Dispute" from 1958 to

19693. 14. The Second Disinformation Operation: The "Evolution" of the Soviet Regime

(Part I)4. 15. The Third Disinformation Operation: The Soviet-Albanian "Dispute" and "Split"5. 16. The Fourth Disinformation Operation: The Sino-Soviet "Split"6. 17. The Fifth Disinformation Operation: Romanian "Independence"7. 18. The Sixth Disinformation Operation: The Alleged Recurrence of Power Struggles

in the Soviet, Chinese and Other Parties

8. 19. The Seventh Disinformation Operation: "Democratization" in Czechoslovakia in1968

9. 20. The Second Disinformation Operation: The "Evolution of the Soviet Regime (PartII)-- The Dissident Movement

10. 21. The Eighth Disinformation Operation: "Eurocommunism"11. 22. The role of Disinformation and Intelligence Potential in the Realization of the

Communist Strategies12. 23. The Evidence of Overall Coordination Between the Communist Governments and

Parties13. 24. The Impact of the Disinformation Program

Part III1. The final phase and the Western Counter-Strategy2. 25. The Final Phase3. 26. Where Now?

***********************************************************...Traces of Chinese communist thinking about splits can be found in the Chinese press. Theanalogy is drawn between growth in nature, which is based on division and germination,and the development and strengthening of the communist movement through "favorablesplits."The creation of two of more communist parties in one country was advocated openly. OneChinese paper use the formula: "Unity, then split; new unity on a new basis-- such is thedialectic of development of the communist movement." Problems of Peace and Socialismreferred disparagingly to Ai Sy-tsi, a Chinese scholar will versed in dialectics, who developedthe idea of the contradiction between the left and right leg of a person, which are mutuallyinterdependent and move in turn when walking. All of this suggests that the communistleaders had learned how to forge a new form of unity among themselves through thepractical collaboration in the exploitation of fictitious schismatic difference on ideology andtactics. (page 181)Home

The Golitsyn Predictions

by Mark Riebling

Even if one rejects Golitsyn's overall thesis -- viz., that Gorbachev's changes comprised along-term strategic deception -- one must still acknowledge that Golitsyn was the onlyanalyst whose crystal ball was functioning during the key period of the late 20th century.When the Soviet Empire collapsed in 1989, the CIA was chastised for failing to foresee thechange. "For a generation, the Central Intelligence Agency told successive presidentseverything they needed to know about the Soviet Union," said Senator Daniel PatrickMoynihan, "except that it was about to fall apart."

Sovietologists both inside and outside CIA were indeed baffled, for their traditional methodof analysis had yielded virtually no clues as to what Gorbachev would do. When MikhailGorbachev took power in February 1985, after the death of Konstantin Chernenko, analystslike Roy Medvedev preoccupied themselves with trivial details in the Soviet press, andgained no larger view. "The black mourning frame printed around the second page wherethe deceased leader's picture was run] looked rather narrow," Medvedev observed. "It wasstill, however, a millimeter broader than the frames used for the second-page

announcements of the death of senior Politburo members like Marshal Ustinov, who haddied a few months previously." There was nothing in the measurement of picture frames tosuggest liberalization in the USSR; therefore, no one suggested it.

CIA's leadership acknowledged that fell short in predicting Gorbachev's reforms, but couldprovide no real excuse. "Who would have thought that just five years ago we would standwhere we are today?" Acting Director Robert Gates told Congress in late 1991. "Talk abouthumbling experiences." Gates could have said: Our reporting was poor because our Moscownetwork was rolled up, coincidentally or not, precisely as Gorbachev was coming into power.Gates did not say this, however. Instead, he suggested that "We're here to help you thinkthrough the problem rather than give you some kind of crystal ball prediction." This anti-prediction line was echoed by the Agency's deputy director, Robert Kerr, who told Congress:"Our business is to provide enough understanding of the issue ... to say here are somepossible outcomes.... And I think that's the role of intelligence, not to predict outcomes inclear, neat ways. Because that's not doable."

Yet someone had predicted glasnost and perestroika, in detail, even before Gorbachev cameto power. This person's analysis of events in the communist world had even been providedto the Agency on a regular basis.

In 1982, KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn had submitted a top-secret manuscript to CIA. In it,he foresaw that leadership of the USSR would by 1986 "or earlier" fall to "a younger manwith a more liberal image," who would initiate "changes that would have been beyond theimagination of Marx or the practical reach of Lenin and unthinkable to Stalin."

The coming liberalization, Golitsyn said, "would be spectacular and impressive. Formalpronouncements might be made about a reduction in the Communist Party's role; itsmonopoly would be apparently curtailed.... The KGB would be reformed. Dissidents at homewould be amnestied; those in exile abroad would be allowed to take up positions in thegovernment; Sakharov might be included in some capacity in the government. Political dubswould be opened to nonmembers of the Communist Party. Leading dissidents might formone or more alternative political Censorship would be relaxed; controversial plays, films,and art would be published, performed, and exhibited."

Golitsyn provided an entire chapter of such predictions, containing 194 distinct auguries. Ofthese, 46 were not soon falsifiable (it was too early to tell, e.g., whether Russian economicministries would be dissolved); another 9 predictions (e.g., of a prominent Yugoslavian rolein East-Bloc liberalization) seemed clearly wrong. Yet of Golitsyn's falsifiable predictions,139 out of 148 were fulfilled by the end of 1993 -- an accuracy rate of nearly 94 percent.Among events correctly foreseen: "the return to power of Dubcek and his associates" inCzechoslovakia; the reemergence of Solidarity" and the formation of a "coalitiongovernment" in Poland; a newly "independent" regime in Romania; "economic reforms" inthe USSR; and a Soviet repudiation of the Afghanistan invasion. -Golitsyn even envisionedthat, with the "easing of immigration controls" by East Germany, "pressure could well growfor the solution of the German problem [by] some form of confederation between East andWest," with the result that "demolition of the Berlin Wall might even be contemplated."

Golitsyn received CIA's permission to publish his manuscript in book form, and did so in1984. But at time his predictions were made, Sovietologists had little use for Golitsyn or his"new methodology for the study of the communist world." John C. Campbell, reviewingGolitsyn's book in Foreign Affairs, politely recommended that it "be taken with severalgrains of salt." Other critics complained that Golitsyn's analysis "strained credulity" and was"totally inaccurate," or became so exercised as to accuse him of being the "demented"proponent of "cosmic theories." The University of North Carolina's James R. Kuhlman

declared that Golitsyn's new methodology would "not withstand rigorous examination.Oxford historian R.W. Johnson dismissed Golitsyn's views as "nonsense." British journalistTom Mangold even went so far as to say, in 1990 -- well after Golitsyn's prescience hadbecome clear -- that "As a crystal-ball gazer, Golitsyn has been unimpressive." Mangoldreached this conclusion by listing six of Golitsyn's apparently incorrect predictions andignoring the 139 correct ones.

Golitsyn's analysis was as little appreciated within CIA as it was in the outside world."Unfortunate is the only term for this book," an Agency reader noted in an official 1985review. A CIA analyst took Golitsyn to task for making "unsupported allegations withoutsufficient (or sometimes any) evidence," and for this reason would be "embarrassed torecommend the whole." Golitsyn's case, other words, was deductive: He had no "hardevidence," no transcript of a secret meeting in which Gorbachev said the would do all thesethings. Perhaps most fundamentally, as the philosopher William James once noted, "we tendto disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use." Who had any use, in the end,for Golitsyn's belief that the coming glasnost and perestroika would merely constitute the"final phase" of a long-term KGB strategy to "dominate the world"?

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

by Jay Edward Epstein

Through the Looking Glassby Edward Jay Epstein

In the midst of a blinding snow storm, a short stocky man, bundled in a heavy overcoat,arrived at the American Embassy in Helsinki, Finland. He matter-of-factly identified himselfas a consul at the Soviet Embassy, and then asked to see Frank Friberg. The request,coming from a Soviet stranger, immediately set off alarm bells; Friberg was the CIA stationchief.The procedures for dealing with a potential defector were immediately put in effect. Afterescorting the Russian visitor to an isolated room, the marine guard alerted the desk officerat the embassy, who relayed the Mayday message to the CIA station. Within minutes,Friberg rushed down to meet this Soviet "walk in". The stranger came right to the point. Heidentified himself as Anatoli Golitsyn, a major in the KGB. To leave no doubt in the mind ofhis CIA counterpart, he handed over a sheath of secret documents from the files of theSoviet Embassy in Helsinki. He said he would make further information available about theSoviet espionage apparatus if the CIA immediately arrange his safe passage to the UnitedStates, along with that of his wife and daughter. It was an extraordinary offer. Fribergasked the Russian if he would consider returning to the Soviet Embassy and acting as anagent in place for the CIA. Golitsyn was adamant. He replied he would not survive if hereturned. The KGB had means of identifying CIA agents in place-- and he could disclosethem after he was safely in America. Friberg realized that he was suggesting that there wasa serious leak in the CIA. Unable to persuade him to work as a mole, he asked how muchtime he had to organize his defection. Golitsyn replied that he had to be out by Christmasday. After that, his wife and daughter would be expected back in Moscow, and Sovietsecurity personnel, who were being rotated over the holiday, would be back on active duty.

This gave Friberg a maximum of forty-eight hours. In Washington, the frantic searchthrough the CIA's central registry of records produced only a single "trace" on Golitsyn.Peter Derebian, a KGB officer who had been stationed in Vienna before defecting in 1954,had mentioned him to his CIA debriefers as a KGB officer who might be potentially disloyalto the Soviet Union. Before this lead could be followed up in Vienna, Golitsyn had beenrecalled to Moscow. The CIA had been given now a second chance. The Soviet Russiadivision authorized his immediate evacuation from Helsinki. No matter what diplomaticcomplications it would cause, it wanted to get this KGB officer in the palm of its hand, anduse him to identify, and possible approach, other potential defectors in the Soviet diplomaticCorp. On Christmas day, a US air force courier plane landed at Helsinki's snow-coveredairport. Servicing military attaches stationed abroad, such flights are routinely exemptedfrom foreign customs and immigration inspection. This was, however, not a routine trainingmission. While the plane waited on the runway, a car pulled up beside it. Its passengers,who carried no luggage, quickly boarded the plane. Among them were Golitsyn, his wife anddaughter. Minutes later, the plane was airborne again, en route to West Germany. The firstround of interrogations took place at the US Army defector center outside of Frankfurt.Golitsyn was required to write out by hand his entire career in the KGB from the day hejoined in 1948 to the day he defected-- listing all the positions he held, promotions hereceived and KGB officers with whom he came in contact. Unlike most previous defectors,who had field agents with limited knowledge about the central apparatus of the KGB,Golitsyn claimed to have been assigned to the KGB's headquarters in Moscow and also to its"think tank", the KGB institute, where intelligence operations were related to overall Sovietstrategy. To determine if his story was true, Golitsyn was next strapped into a stress-analyzing machine, used by the CIA as a lie-detector , and relentlessly quizzed aboutvarious details of his story -- a process known in the CIA as "fluttering". After each session,counterintelligence experts also compared each bit of information he provided with whatwas already known. By the end of the first week, the CIA was fully persuaded that he was abona fide defector who had indeed held the positions in the KGB he claimed. Arrangementswere then made to bring him and with his family to the United States. In February 1962, inan isolated and heavy-guarded CIA compound overlooking the Choptank River in TalbotCounty, Maryland, he began an extensive debriefing. To the amazement of his debriefers,he not only revealed knowledge of a wide range of secret NATO documents -- but heidentified them by their code numbers. He explained that for convenience the KGB used theNATO numbering system to request specific documents, which would than arrive from itssource in France in 72 hours. President John F. Kennedy, apprized of the Golitsynrevelations, then dispatched a personal courier to Paris, with an "eyes only" letter forPresident Charles De Gaulle. In it, he warned that the KGB had penetrated Frenchintelligence. A few weeks later, six French intelligence officers, handpicked by De Gaulle,arrived in Washington. They carried with them specially-devised ciphers that by passed thenormal channels of French intelligence, and kept their very presence in the United States asecret from even their own embassy. Their tape-recorded interrogation of Golitsyn, whothey code-named Martel, took 14 days, and left them in a paralyzing quandary. The Frenchintelligence secrets Golitsyn had provided came from the highest echelon of the Frenchgovernment. When the list of those having access to them was narrowed down, suspicionwas focused on both the head of French counterintelligence and De Gaulle's personalintelligence advisor. Golitsyn then dropped another bombshell. He told of a KGB plan he hadhelp draft in Moscow to use the French intelligence service to spy on missile sites in theAmerican Midwest. French intelligence officers would be ordered by Paris to use theircontacts to gather data -- for the benefit of Moscow. De Vosjoli initially was openlyincredulous of this allegation. It not only implied that the KGB controlled French intelligence,but that it would blatantly use its officers to spy on the United States. His first reaction wasthat Golitsyn was a "plant", dispatched by the KGB for the express purpose of disruptingUS-French relations. Several months later, however, he had to abandon this theory. Hereceived an order from Paris to begin organizing French spy networks in the United States.

The mission would be to ferret out secret data about American missile bases. De Vosjolicould not believe his eyes: it was the very order that Golitsyn claimed he had seen a yearearlier in Moscow. Since he knew that France itself had no need for such information aboutUS bases, he queried Paris for further clarification. The answer instructed him to implementthe plan without further delay-- or questions. At this point, he realized that Golitsyn'sassertion , as implausible as it first seemed, was correct. The KGB had penetrated Frenchintelligence. He refused the order. In Paris, a top official, who was identified throughGolitsyn's leads as a member of a spy ring, code-named Sapphire, was thrown from awindow-- and died. When well-connected friends in Paris then informed de Vosjoli that thiswas done on orders of French intelligence to protect others in the ring. He then attemptedgoing out of his normal reporting channels to General De Gaulle himself, but to no avail. ByNovember 1963, he realized his own life was in jeopardy and he sought the protection ofthe CIA. Golitsyn, the source who had caused all this turmoil, was becoming throughout thisperiod increasingly more difficult to debrief. He was an angry, short-tempered man with nopatience for matters that he considered trivial. He prided himself on being a historian ofSoviet foreign policy. His interrogators, on the other hand, needed to test every petty detailin his story. This led to constant friction. The Soviet Bloc Division seemed mainly concernedin having Golitsyn identify the KGB officers working under cover as diplomats at eachembassy. He was tediously shown over one thousand snapshots of Soviet diplomats, usuallysurreptitiously taken, and asked if he recognized them. Then Golitsyn refused to look at anymore photographs, shouting at his debriefers, "What good is knowing all the names in theKGB. .. if you don't understand what they do?". He insisted that they should be debriefinghim on strategy-- not personnel. The interrogators let him finish his tirade, then, returnedto the snapshots. Their job was to identify officers of the KGB, not delineate its geopoliticalstrategies. Then, when these photo sessions were over, Golitsyn was asked whether hewould be willing to go abroad and personally contact former KGB acquaintances on behalf ofthe CIA. He refused, explaining "The KGB knows all your operations in advance". To provehis point, he ticked off a number of examples of CIA attempts to recruit Soviet diplomats inSwitzerland and Austria which the KGB had had advanced warnings. The debriefers showedlittle interested in this assertion; instead they implied his debriefings were coming to anend. Golitsyn then demanded to see the President of the United States. When informed thatsuch an audience was impossible, he became even less cooperative, and asked permissionto go to England.. By the end of his first year, the CIA had concluded that they had"squeezed" Golitsyn of all the information he knew. In early 1963, it arranged to send himto England to be "resettled" under a new identity. Stephan De Mowbray handled his casethere Before his defection, Golitsyn had worked at KGB headquarters in the northernEuropean espionage division, which included England. He had prepared his defection bymemorizing English as well as French documents. Many of these came directly from the filesof MI-5, the British equivalent of the FBI. For example, he quoted verbatim from a secretreport on the breaking of a Soviet code by British intelligence. As it turned out, one of hisinterrogators had written the report. When he rechecked the "bigot list"-- which identifies allthose with access to the report, he found that it had been circulated is to only the topexecutives officers of MI5. How then could have Golitsyn seen it in Moscow? The onlyanswer was that one of these executives had provided the KGB with the report. The searchfor that tainted executive, which would continue for over a decade, began with the settingup of a secret unit, called innocuously "The Fluency Committee". The members included DeMowbray and six other counterintelligence officers drawn from both MI-6 and MI-5. Theirsole job was determining who was the mole. As these investigators evaluated the clues fromGolitsyn and other sources, they gradually eliminated most of the names on the Bigot list.There remained two prime suspects-- Sir Roger Hollis, the Director of MI-5, and hisdeputy,Graham Mitchell. Both were put under surveillance. When the investigation thenrules out Mitchell, Sir Roger, the head of MI-5, remained the sole candidate. Although theFluency Committee had no direct evidence that Sir Roger ever was in contact with Sovietintelligence, De Mowbray went personally to the seat of the British government at 10

Downing Street, identified himself, and asked to see the Prime Minister. To his surprise, hereceived an immediate appointment. He came right to the point and told him that there wasreason to believe Sir Roger was a traitor. This initiative was not "popular" with his superiors.Two years later, De Mowbray retired. Golitsyn's stay in England turned out to beunexpectedly brief. During his interrogation about the KGB agents in British intelligence, healluded to a similar situation in the CIA. This possibility was of great concern to MI-5. Itmight explain the origin of some of its own untraced leaks. Arthur Martin, one of the mostskilled interrogators in MI-5, quickly zeroed in on the CIA treatment of this charge. Had hisleads been followed? Golitsyn insisted that they had not. Instead, the interrogators from theSoviet Russia Division persisted in asking the wrong questions. They wanted to know thenames of case officer from the KGB, not the purpose behind their activities. They confusedtactics, with strategy. He explained that the tactic was making contact with the "mainenemy", the CIA, in order to compromise and recruit agents. The strategy was not merelyto neutralize the CIA but to turn it into an instrument to serve Soviet objectives. Martinlistened attentively. He already knew, from his experience with recruits the KGB had madein British intelligence, of the vulnerability of intelligence officers. He had also come tobelieve that the CIA had placed too much faith in security procedures, such as lie detectortests. He asked Golitsyn if he had any ideas about why his CIA interrogators haddownplayed, if not entirely avoided this issue. Golitsyn said that he knew the KGB had beensuccessful in recruiting at least one, and possibly more, CIA officers in the Soviet RussiaDivision. He assumed from the way he was treated that the mole (or moles) was stillinfluential in the Division. It was clear to both Martin and De Mowbray that the CIA hadbadly mishandled Golitsyn's interrogation. While they did not the entirely buy his theory ofan active mole in the Soviet Russia Division, they realized that it might have inhibited himfrom openly discussing this issue with the CIA. In any case, his allegation could not belightly dismissed. If there was a penetration of this sensitive part of the CIA, it would affectall the allied intelligence services. Martin decided to go directly to his friend, JamesAngleton. Angleton had himself come to a similar conclusion about Golitsyn's originaldebriefing. Whatever was the reason, the Soviet Bloc Division had not got the full story outof Golitsyn. He thus went to Helms with an unprecedented request. He asked thatresponsibility for this defector be re-assigned to his counterintelligence staff. Helms foundAngleton's case persuasive. He not only made the re-assignment but, as he explained tome, he gave Angleton "carte blanche" authority to use whatever resources were needed. Indoing so, although he didn't realize it at the time, he set in motion the longest and mostincredible debriefing in the history of the CIA. In July 1963, through a leak arranged byMI-5, a story appeared in the Daily Telegraph revealing that Golitsyn (under the purposelymisspelled name "Dolitson" was in England. It had the calculated effect of persuadingGolitsyn that his security could not be assured in England. Three weeks later, Golitsynarrived back in the United States. Under Angleton's tutelage, there would be no moreexhaustive grillings of him or repetitive showings of snapshots of Soviet diplomats. Angletontold him that his interest was not the KGB's staffing, or "order of battle", as it is called; butthe "logic of Soviet penetration". As Angleton saw it, it was not a debriefing, but an"elicitation". Golitsyn became an intellectual partner in the process where their dinnerswould turn into discussion of Soviet politics that would continue into the early hours of themorning. Golitsyn was allowed to sift through sanitized copies of Angleton's "serials",searching for connections between these clues. To build his confidence, Angleton arrangedfor Golitsyn to brief Attorney-General Robert F. Kennedy on the KGB threat, and took himon trips to Europe and Israel to speak to allied intelligence executives. Golitsyn, encouragedby this attention, proposed organizing a new counterintelligence service which would beindependent of the CIA. Angleton took it under consideration, although it had no chance ofcoming to fruition, to further drew out his ideas about the KGB. While this elicitation wasproceeding, Angleton moved to plug the putative leak in the Soviet Russia Division. Golitsynhad insisted that it had to come from more than a single agent, and used the analogy of agrowing "cancer" that the patient refused to recognize -- or cut out. With the assistance of

the CIA's Office of Security, which has responsibility for ferreting out moles, he arranged aseries of "marked cards" for the Soviet Russia Division. These were selected bits ofinformation about planned CIA operations passed out, one at a time, to different units of theDivision to see which, if any, leak to the enemy. The "marked card" in the initial testrevealed that an effort would be made to recruit a particular Soviet diplomat in Canada. TheOffice of Security agents, watching the diplomat from a discreet distance, then observed theKGB putting its own survelliance on him on the day of the planned contact, realized that the"marked card" had gotten to the KGB. This test confirmed Golitsyn's suspicion that the molewas still active. Through a process of elimination, subsequent marked cards narrowed downthe leak to the unit directly involved with recruiting REDTOPS. Since more than oneindividual was exposed to this marked information, and there was no way of knowing ifthere was more than one leak in that unit, the investigation could not weed out the mole (ormoles) from the roster of suspects. Instead, beginning in 1966, the entire unit was cut offfrom sensitive cases until its personnel could be reshuffled. Murphy, Bagley and a dozenother officers were re-posted to Europe, Africa and Asia. This "prophylactic", as Angletoncalled it accounted for what appeared to the uninitiate be a "purge" over the Nosenko case.In any case, after the transfers, additional "marked cards" indicated that the penetrationhad been remedied. Angleton's interest, however, went well beyond the security problemarising from the recruitment of western case officers by the KGB. He wanted to know whythe KGB had focussed its attention on particular units of the CIA, such as the operationalside of the Soviet Russia Division. The real issue to Angleton was what purposes thesepenetrations advanced. Golitsyn explained that they were a necessary part of the deceptionmachinery that had been out in place in 1959. Their job was to report back on how the CIAwas evaluating material it was receiving from other KGB agents. These moles attempted towork their way into positions of access in the Soviet Russia Division or other parts ofAmerican intelligence that intercepted soviet data. With them in place, disinformationbecame a game of "show and tell" for the KGB. The dispatched defectors and otherprovocateurs, who could be anyone from a Soviet diplomat to a touring scientist, " showed"the CIA a Soviet secret, and then its moles told the KGB how the CIA had interpreted it. Itwas all coordinated from Moscow like an orchestra. This system was designed by the KGB,according to Golitsyn, to gradually convert the CIA into its own mechanism for manipulatingthe American government. Angleton wanted to know more about the Soviet apparatus foedeception. Why had the KGB moved from being a espionage to deception? Why had it beenre-organized? Golitsyn suggested that it all began with a Politburo assessment in the mid1950s that the Soviet Union would be unlikely to prevail in a nuclear war. It followed that ifit was to win against the West, it would be by fraud rather than force. For this singularpurpose, Soviet intelligence would have to undertake the tricky job of manipulating theinformation western leaders received. This sort of manipulation was not a new role forSoviet intelligence. After all,,under the leadership of Felix Dzerzhinskii in the 1920s, it hadran sustained disinformation campaigns, such as The Trust, against the West. AleksandrShelepin, a top executive of the Communist Party, was put in charge of the KGB in 1959,and given a mandate to return it to a mission of strategic deception. Under Shelepin, duringthis reorganization, Golitsyn worked on an analysis intended to demonstrate how conventionspying could be subordinated to deception goals, without potentially compromising thesecrecy of the latter. The intrinsic problem was that KGB officers had to be in contact withwestern intelligence officers either to recruit them or to pass them disinformation, and, thispresented the opportunity to defect or otherwise be compromised. In fact, scores of Sovietintelligence officers had either defected or offered information to the CIA since the end ofthe war. While some of these sources could be assumed to be dispatched defectors from theKGB, a large number of the others turned out to be legitimate. How could the KGB sustaindeceptions-- if it was probable that some of its officers would defect or otherwise betray itssecret. Golitsyn explained that the KGB re-organization in 1958-9 was designed to avoidthis vulnerability. It effectively separated the KGB into two distinct entities. An outer andinner KGB. The "outer" KGB was made up of personnel who, out of necessity, had to be in

contact with foreigners, and were therefore vulnerable to being compromised. It includedKGB recruiters and spotters posted to embassies and missions ,military attaches,disinformation and propaganda agents and illegal case officers who worked abroad. Sincethey had to be in touch with Westerners, if only to attempt to recruit them as spies, theywere assumed to be "doomed spies". A certain percentage would, by the law of probabilitywould be caught. These "doomed spies" were the equivalent of pilots sent on raids overenemy territory. They were not only restricted from knowing any state secrets (other thanwhat was necessary for their mission), but they were purposefully briefed on what it wasuseful for the enemy to learn if they were captured. The "inner" KGB was the real repositoryof secrets. It was limited to a small number of trusted officers, under the direct supervisionof the Politburo, who planned, orchestrated, controlled and analyzed the operations. (According to Golitsyn, all potential security risks, which included most of the officers ofJewish descent, were transferred into the outer service in preparation for thereorganization). A "China wall" existed between these two levels. No personnel from theouter service would ever be transferred to the inner service, or vice versa. Nor would anypersonnel in the outer service ever be exposed to strategic secrets other than what hadbeen prepared for them to divulge as disinformation. Angleton realized the implications ofthis reorganization. If Golitsyn was correct, it meant that the CIA knew virtually nothingabout its adversary's capacity for orchestrated deception. To be sure, it had receivedfragmentary clues from other sources that Soviet intelligence was undergoing shifts in itspersonnel in 1959 but it had not been able fit these developments into any meaningfulpattern. Seen through the new perspective provided by Golitsyn, the KGB turned out to be adifferent and much more dangerous instrument of Soviet policy. Its principle objective wasto provide information to the CIA that would cause the United States to make the wrongdecisions. Such information would appear to be credible because it would be fashioned todovetail that U.S. intelligence received from other sources. It meant, moreover, that verytargets the CIA was going after as recruits-- diplomats, military attaches, journalists,dissidents and intelligence officers-- were the carriers of this disinformation. They were all inthe outer KGB. Even if they were persuaded to work in place as moles for the CIA, theirinformation would be of dubious value. All they would have access to, aside from trivialdetails about their own espionage apparatus, was disinformation. Nor would anymicrophones the CIA planted in Soviet embassies be of any use. The chatter they wouldeavesdrop on would come from those excluded from the real strategic secrets of the innerKGB. They would thus only reinforce the disinformation. The Golitsyn thesis went furtherthan invalidating the present tactics of the CIA and FBI. It impeached many of their pastsuccesses-- at least since the reorganization in 1959. This reassessment would beparticularly damaging to double-agents and defectors who claimed to have access tostrategic secrets. If they could not have had such access, as Golitsyn asserted, they had tobe redefined as either frauds or dupes. In this new light, heroes became villains,andvictories became defeats. It was the equivalent for the CIA of stepping through a lookingglass. When Angleton presented the Golitsyn thesis to CIA and executives on theoperational side, it aroused fierce resistance. Neither CIA nor FBI recruiters were willing toaccept the idea that they were going after the wrong Soviet personnel. This would makethem the accomplices, albeit unwitting, of Soviet deception-planners. They also were notreceptive to a concept of the CIA that discredited valued sources, such as Oleg Penkovskiy,on whom many of them had built their careers. There was also the practical problem thatthe conclusions drawn from these sources had been forwarded over the years to theNational Security Council and the President. The inference that this CIA product was basedon KGB disinformation was not therefore not attractive to most of the executives of the CIA.At the FBI, the Golitsyn thesis was rejected out of hand by J. Edgar Hoover. He had a verypowerful motive since FBI agents had recruited a number of Soviet diplomats at the U.N.,such as Fedora and Tophat, as sources. They not only claimed that they had access tosecrets from the decision-making level of the Politburo, but they furnished them on demandto the FBI. Hoover had personally passed some of this material directly to the President. He

was not about to accept an interpretation that would render this data KGB disinformation. In1967, he ended the issue, at least within the FBI, by branding Golitsyn a Soviet-controlled"provocateur and penetration agent" . He advanced the theory that the KGB had staged hisdefection to discredit the FBI. He then refused any further cooperation with the CIA aimedat substantiating Golitsyn's story. For example, he pointedly withdrew a FBI surveillanceteam which had been watching a suspect round-the clock on behalf of the CIA. And, as thetensions over this case increased, Hoover broke off all liaison relations with the CIA. (In1978, after Hoover's death, the FBI acknowledged that Fedora and Tophat were KGB-controlled disinformation agents). By 1968, American intelligence was , as Helms describedthe situation, "a house divided against itself". Angleton's staff, and others executives whoaccepted Golitsyn's thesis, saw the need to take precautions against a reorganized KGB.Instead of targeting Soviet bloc embassy personnel, as it had done before, they wanted tofind new ways of penetrating the heart of Soviet intelligence. They also had to make surethat their decisions were not being fed back to the KGB-- even if this meant disturbingcareers paths in the CIA. Those involved in the gathering of intelligence saw the situation invery different terms. The attempt to validate the thesis of a Soviet defector had preventedthe CIA's Soviet Russia Division from going after promising Soviet recruits. It had also led todefectors being held offshore to avoid another "Nosenko" incident. And it kept reportsofficers, whose job it was to extract information from agents' reports, from extractingvaluable information from sources who had already been recruited. It had, from their pointof view, all but paralyzed normal intelligence operations. The frustration of these officerswas intensified by the secrecy surrounding the dispute. Few of them were briefed on theGolitsyn thesis. All they knew was that their work was being called into question byAngleton and his staff. As the years dragged on, the mysterious investigation appeared tothem as nothing more than "sick think". What neither side in the CIA could see was theother's logic. It was like the celebrated experiment in Gestalt psychology in which one caneither see two faces or a wine cup in a picture , but not both. Similarly, the CIA could notdeal two mutually exclusive concepts of its enemy. What its operational officers andanalysts looked at as valid information, furnished by Soviet sources who risked their lives tocooperate, counterintelligence officers saw as disinformation, provided by KGB dispatchedand controlled sources. Finally, Helms decided that Gordian knot had to be cut. Hesuggested that the test of Golitsyn's thesis should be its utility. Could it be used to identifythe deceptions of the Kremlin? If not, what good was it to the CIA? Helms asked, what had7 years of debriefing Golitsyn produced in practical terms: " an elephant or a mouse?."Golitsyn had never claimed to have participated in any of the actual deceptions planning. Hehad only seen the mechanism for executing them being put in place. When pressed byAngleton's staff as to what these deceptions might be, Golitsyn could only extrapolate fromclues a decade old. They were, at best, unproven theories. For example, he speculated thatmany of the apparent divisions in the eastern bloc, including the split between China andthe Soviet Union, had been staged to throw the West off balance. When he presented themin 1968 to the special committee Helms had assembled, he was unable to convince itsmembers, especially since they directly contradicted the CIA's picture of world events. Whenskeptic pressed him about his evidence, he became extremely defensive, and demandedtheir evidence for disputing his theories. The meeting ended acrimoniously, with Golitsynshouting back at the CIA experts as they subjected him to a cross-fire of objections. Helmsconcluded that whatever the value of the "vintage" information that he supplied, Golitsyn'sspeculations about current KGB operations, to which he had no direct access, was worthlessto the CIA. He had failed the test. Angleton, who had survived in the CIA bureaucracy fortwenty years, understood that this meant that ~Golitsyn was to be "put on the shelf". Apatient man, he was willing to wait to see if future evidence developed. In the meantime, heencouraged Golitsyn to set down all the details of the KGB reorganization in a manuscript.The issue of Soviet deception was not settled until 1973. While Helms was willing to toleratethe doubts of Angleton, the new Director William E. Colby, was not. Colby, the son of aJesuit missionary, whose main experience in the CIA had been in paramilitary and political

activities, rejected out of hand Angleton's complicated view of KGB strategic deception. Hesaw the job of the CIA as a straight forward one of gathering intelligence for the President.He considered "the KGB as something to be evaded" . It was not to be the "object of theCIA's operations". Whereas Angleton had encouraged a policy of suspecting "walk in"defectors and double-agents, he decided to encourage their recruitment. He explained: "Wespent an inordinate amount of time worried about false defectors and false agents. I'mperfectly willing to accept if you try to go out and get ten agents you may get one or twothat will be bad. You should be able to cross check your information so that you are not ledvery far down the garden path... at least you'll have eight good agents." This conceptualchange was reflected in a top secret order that went out to all CIA stations in 1973. Ratherthan rejecting REDTOPS who made contact, until their bona fides could be established, itadvised: " Analysis of REDTOP walk-ins in recent years clearly indicates that REDTOPservices have not been seriously using sophisticated and serious walk-ins as a provocationtechnique. However, fear of provocations has been more responsible for bad handling thanany other cause. We have concluded that we do ourselves a disservice if we shy away frompromising cases because of fear of provocation... We are confident that we are confident ofdetermining whether or not a producing agent is supplying bona fide information." Angletonhad lost the battle. It was only a question of time before Colby formally got rid of him.

Bombs Away18 December 2004J.R. Nyquist, interviewes

If you leap into a well... ...Providence is not bound to fetch you out.

Recent Interviews With Foreign Language JournalistsIn recent months J.R. Nyquist has been interviewed by Brazilian and Polish writers. First,Midia Sem Mascara's interview last October; second, an interview by Dariusz Rohnka,author of Fatalna Fikcja [The Fatal Fiction].

Mídia Sem Mascara: The United States is currently under great tension as Nov. 2 getscloser. In your opinion, which candidate -- John Kerry or George W. Bush -- would be themost suitable to deal with America's enemies?JRN: The United States is in a difficult position because the media, the system of higherlearning, the intelligence bureaucracy and most politicians do not understand the threatAmerica is facing. This threat involves the coordination of organized crime, drugtrafficking, traditional intelligence operations, subversion, disinformation, propaganda,terrorism, the manipulation of raw material supplies (i.e., metals and oil), attacks oninformation systems, the proliferation of WMDs to North Korea and Iran and cleverfinancial sabotage operations directed against hedge funds (or employing hedge funds asa mechanism to stimulate a general financial crash). All these elements can be tied tothink tanks at the "strategic centers" of Russia and China. The alliances between leadinginternational crime syndicates and Russian-Chinese intelligence are generally ignored byU.S. policy-makers. The fact is, the infiltration of the U.S. political system began decadesago, and this has helped forestall U.S. counter-measures. The use of bribery andblackmail by foreign intelligence services and associated mafias is an ongoingphenomenon which cannot be fully appreciated or measured at this time. As to whichU.S. presidential candidate is best to cope with this multidimensional threat, themelancholy answer is that neither is very well equipped -- though President Bush has

shown a certain instinctive grasp of the situation, leading him to bold offensive actionsthat tend to throw the terrorists, criminals and rogue state elements off balance. SenatorJohn Kerry, on his side, shows a certain lack of strategic judgment in his opposition toNational Missile Defense and nuclear modernization. One good thing about Kerry is thepromise he has made to add two divisions to the United States Army. This is desperatelyneeded. But Kerry's problem is a problem stemming from his fuzzy-leftist tendencies; abasic nihilism and atrophy of instinct, moral sense as well as common sense. This isabundantly evident if we look at his voting record as a Senator, which by someassessments is the most "left" voting record in the U.S. Senate. Bush over Kerry is theonly possible answer with regard to this question.

Mídia Sem Mascara: In your most recent article ("Talking up the Russia Threat"), youmentioned President Putin's revival of the KGB. Sometimes, reading your articles, we arereminded of Anatoliy Golitsyn's warnings. What is the role of Anatoliy Golitsyn on youranalysis and articles? Do you believe, given what is happening today in Russia and China,that we can fully accept Anatoliy Golitsyn's statements as factually accurate?JRN: Golitsyn wrote a book in 1984 titled New Lies for Old. In that book he predicted thecollapse of the communist bloc. He said this collapse would be deceptive and it would beorchestrated from above. There can be no doubt on this point: the long-range strategy ofthe communist bloc is real, and not a paranoid fiction. We know about it from defectorslike the Czech general, Jan Sejna. It wasn't only Golitsyn who warned the West. We haveheard similar statements, as well, from Vladimir Rezun and Col. Stanislav Lunev. Thecommunist bloc strategy is predicated on the development of deceptive changes(perestroika) in communist bloc countries. These changes began in the late 1980s, asforetold by Golitsyn in his 1984 book. And these changes were, as he predicted, directedfrom the Kremlin according to a well-worked out plan. Without an understanding ofSoviet clandestine methods -- methods that were developed over a period of seventyyears -- it is impossible to understand the grand sweep of Russian and Chinese movestoday. This kind of strategy is alien to Western thinknig. In essence, despite the changesthat occurred in 1989-91, the old communist bloc still exists. Only the label has beenremoved, and the iron hand now fits inside a velvet glove. These communist countriesare weak countries, predicated on terror, oppression and war. They can only hope tosucceed against America and the West by deceptive means, by the pretense of peace anddemocratic reform. In reality, they are building their military power in secret, workingwith criminal groups and terror groups through intermediaries. They seek to economicallycripple the United States, diplomatically isolate America and destroy the foundations ofAmerican military power. All of this is made possible by a broad-based, long rangedeception strategy. If they achieve their objectives the world will belong to thecommunists who continue to consolidate their grip in Africa, South America, Europe andAsia. Golitysn's predictive methodology successfully anticipated the changes in EasternEurope; he foretold the advent of the Russia-China alliance and the present campaignagainst "American imperialism." We can ill-afford to ignore this methodology when it hassuccessfully anticipated so many crucial developments. Even if Golitsyn has mademistakes, his basic approach is an invaluable tool for understanding the grand strategy ofRussia and China, and whoever ignores Golitsyn's warnings is making a potentially graveerror.Mídia Sem Mascara: Why does the Western intelligence community, especially theAmerican CIA, ignore such important and grave Communist strategies? Why do you thinkthe West so easily accepted the "fall of Communism" that occurred in 1989-91? Why isthe West so susceptible to deceptions like those orchestrated by Moscow?JRN: The intelligence community in the U.S. doesn't exist in a vacuum. It exists in acultural milieu that is permeated by misguided liberalism and a superficial media-

generated version of reality that American consumers (including intelligenceprofessionals) take in as their mothers' milk. We are the creatures of our culture. Fewcan escape the powerful clichés and images that are generated by television, radio andthe mainstream press. In addition, intelligence professionals have degrees from leadinguniversities and leading universities are centers of radical anti-Western thought. Thepoison is imbibed thoughtlessly, almost without the subject realizing what is happening,and that is because the subject is ignorant from the outset (as a student). It must beadmitted, though few are ready to admit the seriousness of the crisis, that education inAmerica has collapsed in terms of the teaching of history and philosophy (the two mostcritical subjects for understanding politics), and the present market culture simplypromotes confused ideas through fashionable crazes. There is also another problem thatcommercial culture exacerbates: People feel a profound need to belong, and thus a kindof mob mentality takes over. If a person wants to advance his career it is necessary forhim to belong to the "in-crowd." Therefore the criteria for thinking is not truth and logic,but group-dynamics and trendy "duckspeak." As Gustav le Bon showed in his famousstudy of crowd behavior, the "psychological crowd" possesses a low critical intelligence,and accepts the most idiotic nonsense as truth. It doesn't make the least difference if theindividual is highly intelligent, if his emotional need to belong is active he will be reducedto idiocy. Now let's look at the specific example you mention: With regard to the "fall ofcommunism," the thing that fell was a word -- the word "communism." And you can seehow easily words can be dispensed with as organizations and methods are adapted tonew conditions. Yes, overtly Stalinist structures have been swept aside in favor of subtleBonapartist structures, in the sense of a soft-totalitarianism which aims at a greatereffectiveness. It is important to acknowledge that the malevolent essence of thetotalitarian structures remain, despite superficial appearances. The great relief felt inWest, especially among conservative elites, is perfectly understandable in this context.The conservatives felt embattled on the Cold War issue because the liberals had begun toreject the communist threat as a serious issue in the early 1980s (if not earlier). Thehedonist party in America long ago voiced the opinion that conservative anti-communistswere more dangerous than communists and more likely to trigger a world war. One onlyhas to look at the liberal propaganda against President Ronald Reagan in the mid-1980s.In light of these attitudes, the supposed fall of communism was uncritically accepted bythe American right because the Republicans could not resist claiming a victory, becausethe conservatives felt tremendous relief that the controversy over communism was finallyput to rest, and because the business community was eager to reduce defense spendingand enjoy an era of rapid growth founded on the "peace dividend." If we closely considerthe psychological mechanism behind all totalitarian deceptions (but especially thedeception under discussion), they are very powerful. And this is nothing new. The Westwas fooled by Lenin's NEP in the 1920s, by Stalin's "liberal" Constitution in the 30s andhis dissolution of the Commintern in the 40s, by Khrushchev's "secret" speechdenouncing Stalin in 1956, by Brezhnev's Detente, by Gorbachev's perestroika andYeltsin's supposed "democracy." The deceptions of totalitarian regimes are constant, andthe lies are always believed by the West. Only with time are Western leadersdisillusioned. It must be understood, above all, that the totalitarian ruler is always re-inventing himself. And yes, there are changes in such regimes, and sometimes thesechanges bring greater freedom for a time, but the criminal nature of the regime alwaysremains. During moments of liberal flowering the names of the regime's enemies arelisted, and the inevitable contraction occurs. Putin is presently rounding up selectedenemies. Eventually he will initiate purges on a grand scale. This is the pattern, and weshould expect nothing else.

Mídia Sem Mascara: Why do you think the United States invaded Iraq? Is it a strategy

to get closer to China? Was it a wise move? Were the reasons presented to the public forinvading Iraq the real ones?JRN: In games of mixed chance and skill the ultimate usefulness of a move is found inthe outcome. As it stands, we have no idea of the ultimate outcome. Here is the thingyour readers should reflect upon: The decision to invade Iraq was unique to PresidentBush's character. This president has strategic instincts superior to most politicians. Heknows that aggressive action knocks an enemy off balance. The United States is at adistinct disadvantage against totalitarian states when it refuses to use its conventionalmilitary strength against them. This reluctance led President Ford and President Carter togrief (especially Carter), and President Reagan was also fairly timid (despite his rhetoric).Dictators therefore have a tendency to regard America as a "paper tiger." By actingagainst Iraq the president threw all the rogue states into confusion and panic. Russia wasso frightened by the decisiveness of President Bush that Putin abandoned SaddamHussein by offering to overthrow him after acknowledging intelligence that Saddam waspreparing a major terror strike against the United States. President Bush did not take theKremlin's bait and refused to allow the Russians to replace Saddam with a more pliableKGB puppet. President Bush boldly struck the dictator, frightening Libya into concessionsand forcing North Korea to huff and puff itself into a state of political exhaustion. Syriaand Iran have been flanked. The U.S. position, in terms of striking down the worst rogueregimes, has been enhanced. Now the ball is in Moscow's court and we see the desperatemaneuver the Kremlin is attempting, with this sly post-Beslan mobilization and the codeddeclaration of war against the United States. Sadly, the U.S. is effectively blind in termsof intelligence collection and analysis, and nobody in the White House took Putin's codewords seriously. While it is true that a massive amount of data is collected by U.S.satellites, the real intelligence game is played out by human agents on the ground and byanalysts. And this is where the U.S. has been completely outmaneuvered, penetrated,spoofed, tricked and misled. There is only the dimmest awareness of a Russian/Chinesecombination threat. Furthermore, threats from smaller countries are misunderstoodbecause they are analyzed out of context. The former CIA director, George Tenet,recently admitted that he initially thought Iraq had WMDs. If you read the CIA reportsand analysis going back several years this was the official conclusion. How is thePresident of the United States to blame for misinformation from the CIA? To furtherconfuse the public's mind, the CIA (through leaks) has attempted to blame PresidentBush for their mistakes! This is the real story. If you read Laurie Mylorie's account, BushVs. the Beltway, the picture comes into focus. The fact is, Bush and his vice presidenthad a better intuitive grasp of Saddam's relationship to al Qaeda than the CIA. PresidentBush strongly suspected Saddam was involved in 9/11. And I don't think Bush waswrong. When the leading American expert on Iraq thinks the CIA was hopelessly ignoranton Iraq, that Saddam was closely working with al Qaeda, then we must conclude that theCIA has made a pudding. As for an imperialist economic motive for war: Business peoplehere in the U.S. were quite gloomy about the idea of war with Iraq in the months leadingup to the invasion. Everyone realized that Iraq's oil production would be disrupted for twoto three years, and that is real pain for America's economy. Everyone I talked to in theinvestment community in early 2003 knew that there would be a negative economicimpact from the impending war, and a negative fiscal impact on the U.S. federal budget.Only ignorant observers uncritically accept the propaganda that the U.S. invaded Iraq tograb oil. As it happens, the U.S. was -- at the time -- far more dependent on Venezuelanoil and the crisis in Venezuela was ripe for U.S. intervention in early 2003 -- but theUnited States continues to ignore the emerging communist regime in Venezuela. If theU.S. is motivated to take oil, then why has Hugo Chavez remained in power? Critics ofthe U.S. are very selective in their world view, and prefer to ignore facts that areinconvenient to their thesis. To understand President Bush's rhetoric in early 2003 you

have to understand the conflict within the U.S. intelligence community, and theintellectual laziness of that community together with the undercurrent of belief within theWhite House that Saddam was working with al Qaeda, plus the strategic location of Iraqas a point where Syria and Iran could be split [and for safeguarding Saudi security].

Mídia Sem Mascara: So, in your understanding is "internationalism" aninevitable political trend in which all countries need to grow together,driven into each others' arms by long range weapons of mass destruction?Am I correct?

JRN: Internationalism has many causes. It is animated, on the one hand, by therationalist idealism of the cosmopolitan spirit. This is a spirit entirely cut off fromtradition. It's rootless quality leads it into the error of imagining that all men arebrothers, all disputes can be negotiated peacefully, and free trade will solve humanity'seconomic problems. There are also socialist internationalists, who believe in theconstruction of a socialist world state. There are arms control internationalists who seekto limit the spread of WMDs. All these cross-currents of internationalism work in variousways, cooperating to form international bodies for the regulation of human affairs. Thesebodies routinely fail to perform their function because they are rooted in abstractions thatdo not motivate the people of the world, even if they animate a few bureaucrats andintellectuals. We live in a world of nation states, and these hold the power to make waror actualize agreements. Economic internationalism, by way of free trade, is inevitableonly so long as the present economic order lasts and continues to rationalize itsoperations. When the next world war comes, when the nations fall into their next greatquarrel, the greater the interdependence of the nations, the greater the calamity.Economics can hold countries together for many decades, but not forever. The UnitedNations will disintegrate at the outset of the next world war just as the League of Nationsdisintegrated at the outset of the Second World War.Mídia Sem Mascara: Let me insist a little bit more here regarding the UnitedNations and, in particular, John Birch Society conspiracy theories. EdwardGriffin, in his books The Fearful Master and The Creature of Jekyll Island,cites a long list of Americans working as Soviet spies involved in thecreation of UN, IMF, World Bank and other organizations (Harry DexterWhite and Alger Hiss, for example). Why were the Russians so eager tomold and control the United Nations if it is a "weak organization" as youclaim?JRN: The Soviet Union sought to dominate the U.N., especially its military bureaucracy,from the outset. In 1945 nobody knew how far the West's internationalists would go inweakening British and American sovereignty. The Soviets wanted to encourage thisweakening and the surrender of U.S. power to international bodies (using agents ofinfluence like Hiss and White in the process). Meanwhile, the Kremlin would neverconcede anything to an international body themselves. If the U.S. agreed to hand over itsnuclear arsenal to the United Nations, the Russians would merely pretend to do thesame. In this way the Russians could use internationalism to advance their own imperialschemes. One might view the United Nations as a means to sabotage the United States.As such, it hasn't been terribly effective since Americans refused to put their trust in theU.N. In terms of practical advantages, the U.N. headquarters in New York has served thecommunist bloc as an ideal nest for spies in the midst of America's financial capital.Mídia Sem Mascara: Are you aware of Lev Navrozov's writings regardingsuper weapons? What do you think of Navrozov's warnings? Won't this

have a big affect on the dynamics of the next world war described in yourbook?JRN: I am aware of Lev Navrozov's work. I had dinner with Lev in New York six yearsago, and he has a remarkable sense of Moscow's dark side. Significantly, Lev writesabout super weapons in order to warn us about the decisive weapons of the next war. Itmust be understood that Russia is determined to develop such weapons, while Americahas become lax and confused about military-technical issues. Lev understands that the"zone of militarism," which includes Russia and China, isn't run along consumerist lines.The East is not like the West. Militarist states know that they will never produce the kindof prosperity known to Western countries. But a decisive weapon can be developed insecret, and the balance of power can be changed very quickly. The presently modifiedtotalitarian systems of Russia and China are unwilling to adopt Western models in full.And why should they when a super weapon might make Western economic and politicalstructures "obsolete."Mídia Sem Mascara: You recently said that "something has to be done towake a sleepwalking nation." So, as a geopolitical analyst and scholar,what advice would you give to the American leaders? (intellectuals,politicians, and businessmen) to wake America? Are the Americanconservatives taking the right course of action? Is there any politician orpolitical party in America that we can rely on?JRN: Perhaps I am too pessimistic in my assessment of present trends, but I don't seeAmerica's political leaders asking the right questions. Without asking the right questionsthey will never find the right answers. Certainly, I may be mistaken in my views onRussia and China. On the other hand, the evidence is strong enough that a debate shouldbe taking place. Questions should be asked, and nobody in government seems to belooking at the very serious strategic-economic-diplomatic combination developing againstthe United States today. I would have greater confidence in President George W. Bush ifhe publicly expressed doubts about Russian intentions and announced plans forrestricting trade with China. Such statements would be extremely effective in limitingRussia's future moves (and China's potential for troublemaking). As it is, a naive attitudeprevails in the Bush administration. It is an attitude reminiscent of 1938. President Bushis committed to eliminating six thousand U.S. nuclear warheads during the next fewyears. The Russians have no obligation to eliminate any part of their nuclear arsenal.Meanwhile, China is in the midst of a nuclear buildup. This is a very alarmingdevelopment, not to mention the way Russia and China use criminal groups and terroristsas allies and proxies.

As for the American "conservatives" (so-called), I am disappointed. Narrowly focused on"cultural" or economic issues, these writers and thinkers have entirely forgotten thatthousands of nuclear-armed missiles are aimed at the country, and they haveirresponsibly refused to discuss realistic civil defense. In fact, the conservativeintellectuals in this country, despite their lip service to "tradition," are creatures ofconsumerism and market hedonism. I often suspect that these people do not knowthemselves, and do not recognize the rottenness of their own milieu.Mídia Sem Mascara: But isn't America founded on a solid Christian culture? Imean, to ask the right questions, isn't it necessary first to bring back aminimum Christian mindset that could properly deal with foreign threats?After all, aren't the Russians and Chinese seeking to weaken Americanthrough its culture, as Antonio Gramsci once advocated? In Brazil, forinstance, almost all of the Catholic leaders are Liberation Theology

followers, i.e., communists. The ruling communist party, Workers' Party(PT), was forged by these Catholic leaders, and now Protestant leaders arealso being co-opted by the communists.JRN: Yes, the "crisis of modernity" has everything to do with the disintegration of theChristian faith -- Catholic and Protestant. The corruption of doctrine, the corruption oftime-honored rules and ideas, was allowed to advance decade after decade. Materialistthinkers have yet to acknowledge the negative power of modernity's de-spiritualization.Decade after decade secular leveling advanced. At times it seemed that we weresuccessfully coping, adapting and learning. But the leveling of the soul, the shrinking ofthe West's soul, has already occurred. To understand the pace of change, I was born in1958 and my generation absorbed many of the old ideals, though we did not always liveby them. Those born after 1980, however, have absorbed almost nothing of the oldideals. The churches have failed to bring Christian thinking to today's young people.Secular entertainment and secular schools have shoved religion aside. In light of suchprofound spiritual change there is no way, no possible way, that our civilization can longavoid a period of destructive wars and political upheavals. My work has been to envisionthe specific causes of the coming destructive wars, knowing full well that the real cause(i.e., the deeper underlying cause) is spiritual and not political. The West will be forced tolearn a bitter lesson. For the present, the leading pundits deny what is coming. Theydeny history, arguing that modern man is somehow exempt from history's pattern. Butwe are not exempt and we will suffer the same fate as those who, in previous history,followed this very path. Our technology cannot save us. In fact, it only assures that ourdestruction will be swifter, more efficient and thorough.

Mídia Sem Mascara: Speaking of religion, we know that Europe is under aslow but sure Islamicization process. Do you think Europe is going tobecome an Islamic continent in the future? And what about America?Wouldn't America be the next step in this Islamic expansion? Does thespread of Islam have something to do with Russia and China, or is it anindependent development?JRN: Islam is penetrating Europe through immigration.It is penetrating America as well, but today's Western politicians do not see a problem.They see cheap labor. In other words, their thinking is driven by hedonistic calculation.This demonstrates a lack of historical understanding, as well as basic survival instinct.Our thinking today is also influenced by fundamental errors like atheism and materialism,and these are reflected in catastrophic policies. If there is no God, what difference does itmake what religions are practiced within your commonwealth? If the meaning of life ismaterial accumulation then cheap labor is an absolute good.

I do not believe that "liberalism" will continue much longer with this program of decayleading to the slow and final dissolution of the West (and the victory of Islam). Themechanisms of our civilization are too delicate. The economic mechanism is nearlycompromised already, and the military mechanism -- under a regime of strategicmisconception -- is bound to invite aggression from the leading Asiatic powers. I believewe are facing, in the not-too-distant future, a double catastrophe. This catastrophe willsave the West from slow death by the immediate prospect of quick death.

END OF MM INTERVIEWDariusz Rohnka interview follows:Rohnka: What was the origin of the American anti-communist in the 1980s? Was it acommon path for the young American in this time or rather a rare way of looking for theanswer?

JRN: Americans in general are anti-communist. But there has been a qualitative changein this stance. In the 1950s Americans realized that communist spies had penetrated ourinstitutions, and they were alarmed by these penetrations. But the alarm gradually faded.Communist subversion ceased being a national issue despite the fact that communistsubversion advanced from strength to strength. After the culture shifted from print media(books, magazines and newspapers) to television, the public lost interest in communism.By 1980 Ronald Reagan appeared as a quaint old-fashioned anti-communist. He hadbeen a film star, so he translated his Cold War message easily to television. And thisworked until Gorbachev won Reagan's friendship with his "glasnost" and his"perestroika." During the Reagan years the main anti-communist youth movement wasYAF (Young Americans for Freedom). This was an insignificant group, made up of ahandful of "conservative" students. On a campus of 20,000 you might find ten to fifteenactive YAF members. As a graduate student in political science at the University ofCalifornia, I did not participate in YAF beyond attending one or two meetings, havinglearned that the leading YAF organizers smoked marijuana and one of the East Europeangirls in the group repeated what I'd said about a left-wing professor to the professor. Thiswas not encouraging. All in all, anti-communism was not a normal concern (and thoseconcerned with it were not considered normal), and as far as I could see being anti-communist was never an answer to anything, and was more like a noose around myneck. But I accepted this noose. One might say I preferred to "hang with the truth." Itwas, at least in my case, the result of an unpleasant discovery. Far too many professorsand graduate students were Marxists. They were not Soviet spies or agents of a foreignpower. They were simply pro-socialists who hated capitalism and thought the SovietUnion was harmless. Some tended to believe Soviet propaganda while assuming thateverything done by the U.S. government was "evil." They generally mocked the U.S.political system, disparaged American freedoms, despised the free market and secretlydreamt of revolution. Their animating spirit was thwarted ambition, resentment, envyand malice. Some communists I met were sincere idealists; but most were sour littlesouls inwardly wounded by their own cosmic unimportance. In my view, Karl Marx was afraud and communism was a criminal enterprise from the outset. By 1987 I concludedthat America's tolerance of communism within the educational establishment indicated acoming "time of troubles."Rohnka: Am I wrong if I see the American anti-communist today as a strange mix ofconsistent conservative attitudes and a touch of crazy conspiracy theory? I rememberwell my shock at reading that the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia had been mastermindedby a small circle of New York Masonic strategists. How would you comment on thisphenomenon, and what is your experience with people of such views?JRN: The idea, on the part of conspiracists, that the Bolshevik Revolution was engineeredby Masonic conspirators in New York, is the dirty step-child of the Protocols of the Eldersof Zion. This theory is poisonous, ignorant and futile. The people in America who believesuch theories are opponents of the U.S. government. They oppose the capitalists andunwittingly side with the communists, imagining that in doing so they are opposing THECONSPIRACY. In reality, the Protocols and similar conspiracy nonsense was invented byRussian secret police officials for purposes of mass manipulation. And Russia continues touse this sort of thing world-wide. The Arab world along with most Islamic countries are inthe grip of the Protocols, and the same can be said for our primitive anti-communists inAmerica -- like the John Birch Society -- who have been convinced that there is aconspiracy "above communism" (i.e., capitalism). Grand conspiracy theory is, in fact, acontagious intellectual illness.Rohnka: What was the influence of Anatoliy Golitsyn on your political views, and couldyou imagine Jeffrey Nyquist's analysis without New Lies for Old?

JRN: Golitsyn indirectly influenced my political views. He influenced my perception ofSoviet grand strategy, which then caused me to recognize certain weaknesses within thecapitalist West. This led me to trace Western weakness to market hedonism, de-spiritualization and the baneful affects of television. Please note that Russia and Chinaare weak powers when compared with America. But wealth and power are corrosive if theantidotes to corrosion are set aside. And I believe that's what the American people havedone. America has developed a serious weakness as well as blindness, and the Russiansare eager to take advantage of a developing situation. In fact, they have thesophistication to manipulate the U.S. in a variety of ways. I want to add, especially, thatGolitsyn is not a god and his analysis is not 100 percent correct. There are manymysteries with regard to the inner workings of the "former" Soviet power structures. Wedo not understand how these structures work (in detail) because they are so secretive.We do not know what the principal players actually believe (in terms of ideologicalorientation). But one thing I am certain of, after watching their behavior for the past 15years: Golitsyn is right in terms of the final tendency of Russian politics. Whatever the"changes" in the communist world signify, there has been a consistent effort to use thesechanges to detach America from Europe, to build a military alliance with China, to retoolSoviet war industries, to use criminal organizations as allies in a secret war, to sabotageAmerica's economic system via control of raw material inputs and the penetration ofmajor banks, to ultimately isolate and destabilize the United States, and to destroy anychance of it rising from the ashes or using its nuclear arsenal. Following that, the powerstructures of Moscow and Beijing plan to split the world into spheres of influence, withlesser nations having a share in "looting rights." One might think of this process as agrand strategic proposition that never dies or surrenders. It simply adjusts itself to newconditions and new requirements. The inner nature of the leaders in Moscow has notchanged (whatever their ideological pretensions), and this should be obvious becausereal change -- internal change -- rarely happen in this world. Whether Golitsyn's accuratepredictions are due to his own previous involvement with KGB strategists, or to psycho-sociological intuition, he has correctly anticipated the overall direction of internationalaffairs. My own thinking owes a great deal to his insights.Rohnka: Let us look at the early 1960s. The Soviet spy named Golitsyn came toWashington. He comes over with a strategic revelation in his head, and he wants tospeak with the first man in American policy -- the President of the United States. This is aproblem, of course, because it is impossible for President Kennedy to meet with a Russianspy. Then Golitsyn meets Angleton, the chief of CIA counter-intelligence. For about 13years Golitsyn and Angleton work together to convince the American establishment aboutthe grand threat posed by Russian deception strategy. Their warning is not heeded. In1974 Angleton is fired from the CIA, Golitsyn is pushed into the political wilderness. Don'tyou think this was the turning point in American defense history? Is there anycoincidence that detente policy coincided with the government's rejection of the Golitsynmessage?JRN: The administration of President Nixon was a disaster in many respects. Nixon'sdetente policy, his opening to China, were naturally fatal to Golitsyn's message andAngleton's function as counter-intelligence chief. It may not be generally known inPoland, but a Polish intelligence defector, Michael Goleniewski, claimed that Nixon'snational security advisor, Henry Kissinger, was a Soviet agent recruited by the GRUduring the occupation of Germany in 1945. There were problems with Goleniewski'smental stability, to be sure, but the intelligence he provided had always been first rate.In the case of Kissinger, there are known facts that tend to confirm Goleniewski's claim.Books about Kissinger reveal that on more than one occasion, after becoming Secretaryof State, he brought people into the State Department who were found to havecommunist ties. Kissinger's handling of Vietnam and the China opening are also suspect.

His arms control treaties with the Soviet Union, as well as the unilateral destruction ofAmerica's biological weapons stockpiles cry out for explanation. These actions werecarried out on his advice. The policies later advocated by Kissinger's deputies in lateradministrations (e.g., Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft and Alexander Haig) alsoraise alarm bells. But more significant than the possible penetration of the U.S.government by Soviet agent networks, we find that a kind of hedonism had begun to setinto American thinking by 1975. Unpleasant thoughts, the necessity of hard choices,tough reforms in the intelligence community, were simply out of the question. An innersoftness was, by then, dominant. Golitsyn's analysis and Angleton's fears were dismissedas "Cold War paranoia." Fear of Russian penetration, fear of Russian deception, wasnecessarily characterized as "mental illness." Here we see an example of "the sociology ofknowledge" at work. Under certain cultural conditions, certain facts cannot be knownbecause they are socially unacceptable.Rhonka: The 1980s were the years in which Solidarity took shape in Poland. LechWalesa was the great hero. Threats of Soviet intervention, tanks on the streets, werevery real at the time. Poland dreamed of freedom. Did you have any suspicions then thatit could be some kind of political trick?JRN: In America I heard various things from my Polish-American friends, but peoplewere hopeful. I had no suspicions in the early 1980s. Americans liked the idea of a freePoland; and for them, Walesa was a hero. Nobody paid attention when Golitsyn warnedagainst Solidarity in his 1984 book, New Lies for Old. He explained that the communistshad moved to take Solidarity over and use it to introduce controlled changes. I watchedthe 1989 revolutions with skepticism. I looked for critical thinking from Western analysts.But there wasn't any. Everybody accepted the 1989-91 changes uncritically. No debateoccurred. Golitsyn's name was mentioned, from time to time, as a curious footnote. Thenseveral anti-Golitsyn books were published, smearing his name and slandering his ideas.Tom Mangold's Cold Warrior is one example. Mangold appeared on many talk shows. Thepublic was told that Golitsyn was mentally unbalanced. His accurate predictions were notmentioned, and his reputation was destroyed.Rohnka: Ronald Reagan personified the hope of anti-communists everywhere in theworld. How could you explain that his presidency was chosen for implementing Sovietdeception strategy? Was it the best timing or simply a coincidence?JRN: If Moscow's strategists could trick Reagan then they could accomplish anything. Ofcourse, Reagan was getting old and soft. So they took aim during the last years of hissecond term. After playing Cold War games, they flattered Reagan and built him up. Theymade concessions. This was a very effective tactical switch. As everyone knows, thegreat charm offensive worked and Reagan led the way -- along with Thatcher -- inaccepting Gorbachev as "a man we can do business with." Afterwards no conservativedared question the changes in the communist bloc. The conservatives, in fact, were eagerto claim victory. The whole process was incredibly self-serving, and the Republicans wereshameless in their readiness to claim what they had no right to claim.Rohnka: The false collapse of communism, the so-called "democratic revolutions" incountries like Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Romania, etc., were judged, in spite ofthe obvious facts, as real historical events by the establishments of Western Europe andthe United States. Was this typical Western naiveté, the well-crafted work of agents ofinfluence or a lucky outcome for Moscow?JRN: People love to think of themselves as winners. Nothing is more flattering than theappearance of victory. The announced changes in Poland and Czechoslovakia andRomania brought a wave of relief. This was the political equivalent of a drug. Already theWest was divided on the issue of communism, with the left arguing that communism wasnever a serious threat in the first place. Furthermore, the West by that time had becomehedonistic in its responses, as I mentioned earlier.

Rohnka: Have you an unequivocal opinion about the goals and methods of Sovietstrategy associated with the false collapse of communism? On the one hand we haveunilateral disarmament of the Western alliance and intensive Russian rearmament behindthe legend of rusting Soviet military equipment. Secondly, the convergence strategy isstill alive, which means a progressive coming together of both political systems. Don'tyou think that, in the light of increasing leftist trends in the Western countries, that themilitary option will not be required?JRN: This is an excellent question because it illustrates the difference betweenrationalistic thinking about history versus the empirical approach. The intention of anypower, of course, is to win an easy victory. To win without fighting, as Sun Tzu said, "isexcellence in warfare." But the process of subversion, the process of convergence, theprocess of deceptive change and corruption -- in the East as well as the West -- involvesa moral and intellectual unraveling. Such a process necessarily leads to catastrophicviolence, on an epic scale. You cannot derange a man's sense of what is, you cannotabolish the foundations of order itself, without unleashing anarchy in the soul which leadsto abuse of the economic system, rampant criminality, revolutionary intrigue and socialupheaval. The readiness to exploit such an upheaval is present in Russian and Chinesenational strategy, even though they hope to win bloodless victories. Yes, they havemanaged remarkable changes within their own social systems -- the Chinese haveachieved an economic revolution as Russia has achieved a mock political revolution withinthe CIS countries. But the breakdown of the global economic system, based as it is onAmerican dominance, means total breakdown. It means international anarchy anddictatorial opportunism. It signifies the advent of another world war.Rohnka: As I know you are very critical of social and political reality in the United States.In your book, Origins of the Fourth World War, you present a tragic picture of the moraland spiritual condition of your nation. What will be the future of America?JRN: I believe that the dollar will continue to fall, an economic crisis will occur, the U.S.will become politically unstable and the communists (i.e., Moscow and Beijing) will exploitthe situation strategically.Rohnka: The Moscow putsch has a long, 15-year history. In the Soviet bloc there wereno authentic democratic reforms during this period. The communists ruled as usual inalmost every corner of this dolorous space. The West seems to have no interest inchanging this situation. The West has its own problems: terrorism, drugs and organizedcrime -- with no time for secondary matters. In reality the West itself is the biggestproblem. The traditional sense of freedom disappeared in something like a dark hole.Huge bureaucracy, unbelievable corruption, political correctness, total surveillance of itsown citizens, unimaginable fiscal stringency indicate where things are headed. It is notfreedom in the West, but slavery. A new Bolshevik face. What should be the answer ofmankind or of a single man?JRN: I should correct a false impression that many people in Eastern Europe have aboutAmerica. Knowing how the U.S. security system works and how police and securityfunctions are executed (having been a security professional myself), the idea that thereis "total surveillance" of American citizens is seriously mistaken. I remember beingshocked, in 1988, when I asked a Czech waiter how he liked America. He said that it wasjust like Eastern Europe, only richer. This puzzled me, so I asked what he meant. He saidthat it was the same surveillance state that he'd left, only the CIA and FBI were "moreefficient." Their cleverness, he said, consisted in the fact that they were watchingeveryone in such an inconspicuous way that nobody suspected they were being watched.This is a laughable instance of "mirror imaging." It is hard for East Europeans, I think, torealize how absolutely unsupervised Americans actually are. Our political culture insiststhat police surveillance of anyone -- excepting known criminals or spies -- is itselfcriminal. This view has been translated into law. It has escaped notice by many critics of

America, but civil suits were successfully filed against FBI officials in the 1970s -- and theFBI lost in court. Before 9/11 it was illegal for the FBI to spy on American citizens unlesslegally authorized by a judge (who alone can authorize wiretaps). Furthermore, the FBI isa very small organization, incapable of watching more than a fraction of the crazies,Nazis, communists, Islamists, etc. Please note, FBI officials were forced to pay penaltiesand fines in the late 1970s because of surveillance conducted during anti-terroristoperations (versus the communist Weather Underground). Security officials in thiscountry have lost their jobs over petty infractions. In 1974 the head of CIA counter-intelligence (James Angleton) was forced to resign because he was part of a scheme toopen mail from the Soviet Union. All government officials in this country know thepenalties. They know that the ACLU and the National Lawyers Guild (the legal arm of theCommunist Party U.S.A.) are watching for violations. Security in this country wasparalyzed for two decades. The attack of 9/11 occurred under a legal regime thatsafeguarded the spy, the saboteur and the criminal. We have many rights in this country,and a policeman's lot is not a happy one. The famous gangster Al Capone could not beprosecuted successfully for many years because he had rights that gave him the edge incourt. Only when he was found guilty of a tax violation was he put in prison. Since 9/11more sensible measures have been put in place, allowing the police and FBI to monitorsuspects and keep files on subversive groups. For the past 20 years, before the WorldTrade Center attacks, it was illegal for the FBI or CIA to maintain files on subversiveAmerican groups based in the U.S.A. It should also be understood that the Americanintelligence services are run by university-educated liberals. George Tenet was such aman. These are people who think anti-Communism was a sick joke (and that communismis a meaningless term anyway). There is this impression out there, due to anti-Americanpropaganda, that America is a right-wing country. But America is a country that hasgrown soft and slovenly during five decades of prosperity. Basically, the security regimeremains lax. The people are too busy shopping and having fun. Everything here ispredicated on work and consumption.

Now I will say a word about crazy legislation and bureaucracy in the United States. Whilethe left is attacking the police and the intelligence services, the left simultaneouslycampaigns to take guns out of the hands of citizens through legislation. Environmentallegislation deprives land-owners of their property rights. Laws for fighting drug cartelshave been misused by lazy police officials to confiscate property, and entrapment wasused in an attempt to recruit Randy Weaver to spy on Idaho Nazis -- which backfiredwhen Federal officials opened fire on Weaver's family. The government is not all-powerfulin this country, and Randy Weaver's acquittal could not have happened in a genuinelytotalitarian country. While it is true that left wing crazies are given teaching positions atleading American universities, right wing crazies like Timothy McVeigh imagine that thederanged laws passed by Green Party activists and other leftist busy-bodies prove theexistence of a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. But the multiplication of resentful, derangedideologues proves nothing. It is merely a symptom of a society that will not maintain itsstandards, traditions and intellectual integrity. A kind of anarchy reigns, and the result isan ideological free-for-all in which leftists can dictate certain environmental policies (likecrippling the nation's timber industry in the Northwest), while right-wingers armthemselves for "Judgment Day" in the futile belief they are governed by ZOG (ZionistOccupation Government). It was Timothy McVeigh who once suggested to Ted Kaczynski(the "unabomber") that the far left and far right should come together since they had thesame enemy. This very concept was adopted by Stalin in the 1930s. It is the concept ofthe Red-Brown alliance.The problem with America is distraction, enervation, intellectual decline, fiscalirresponsibility, lax attitudes, materialism and permissiveness. At the same time,

however, the strengths of America deserve to be listed. Europeans do not understand thekind of freedom and initiative that still exists in the United States. Freedom forces theaverage American into a kind of discipline, in terms of creative work. I believe thatfreedom is essential. But licentiousness must not be permitted. Civilization also dependson traditional values, belief in God and classical teachings. We must have balance, andwe must return to aristocratic standards of culture.