[>ol)mesia in Review: Issues and Events,

I July I998 to 30 June I999

Reviews of American Samoa, theCook Islands, Hawai'i, and Tuvaluare not included in this issue.

FRENCH POLYNESIA

The year under review holds echoesof years past in terms of yet anothersplit in the governing coalitionbetween Gaston Plosse's Tahoeraaand Emile Vernaudon's Ai'a Api. As aresult Vernaudon was bent on revengeand joined forces with the pro-inde­pendence opposition. The outcome ofthe senatorial elections also broughta sense of dejii-vu as Plosse added thefinal jewel to his collection of politicaloffices. Concurrent with the electioncampaign was the trial of antinuclearactivists who participated in the air­port riots three years ago. No'nviolentdemonstrators were let off with awarning, whereas those guilty of vio­lence and two trade union leaders, thesupposed instigators of the riots, weresubject to prison sentences. Defenselawyers failed to persuade the judgeof a government conspiracy againstthe activists. The issue that most pre­occupied the government during thesetwelve months was the campaign toreform the statute of autonomy viaa constitutional amendment. Theprocess and content of the reformwas, however, quite different fromthat of the Noumea Accord in NewCaledonia.

After the territorial by-elections,President Gaston Plosse consolidatedhis power and rewarded his followersin a ministerial reshuffle in mid-June

1998. This expanded the cabinetfrom IS to 17 members, including 4women. More important, the reshuf­fle prompted the resignation from thegoverning coalition of Emile Vernau­don, leader of the Ai'a Api party. Ver­naudon was enraged by Flosse's coop­tion of his hitherto closest Ai'a Apicolleagues, Jean Christophe Bouissouand Lucie Lucas, with the inducementof ministerial posts.

This strategy of luring the leadinglights from junior alliance parties andensuring their loyalty was preciselyhow Plosse rid himself of Jean Juven­tin and effectively brought about thedemise of the Here Ai'a party in themid-I990S (TP, July 1998,7-9).Vernaudon suspected that a similarfate was planned for Ai'a Api. Therupture was yet another in a longhistory of short-lived marriages ofconvenience and subsequent divorcesbetween Vernaudon and Plosse. Thelatest alliance had enabled Vernaudonto win a seat in the French nationalassembly in May 1997. By alienatingVernaudon, who is not only a deputybut also mayor of Mahina and a terri­torial assemblyman, Plosse set himselfup for harsh criticism of his leader­ship in both Tahiti and Paris.

Vernaudon claimed that Plossewanted to eliminate the Ai'a Apiparty due to Vernaudon's persistentdisagreement with decisions taken bythe government. Notably, in 1998Vernaudon was opposed to the blow­out of costs for building a presidential"palais, " which was estimated to

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222 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC' SPR;ING 2000

reach over 3 billion FCFP, the 200million FCFP for the inaugural presi­dential bodyguard service, IOO mil­lion FCFP to pay for the additionalministers, and I.2 billion FCFP to pur­chase a mere 5 acres as the site for awaste facility. He noted Plosse's prac­tice of subsidizing municipal councilsthat demonstrate loyalty to the Taho­eraa party. This practice includes thetransfer of territorial land to Plosse'sown council of Pirae for the construc­tion of an ostentatious new town hallto be built at the cost of 800 millionFCFP (TP, Sep I998, 26-29).

Another salvo was launched byVernaudon against Plosse and hisgovernment in October, this time atthe national assembly. Much of thespeech consisted of vitriolic attackson Plosse's leadership, especially alle­gations with regard to his politicalempire building, his failure to declarethe extent and origins of his immensewealth, his dicta,tori~l style, and hisobsession with incessant reform of theterritory's statutes. Reiterating an oldopposition refrain, Vernaudon arguedthat the government only enjoys itsmajority rule thanks to a skewed elec­toral system that favors the outerislands, these mostly being conserva­tive strongholds of Plosse's Tahoeraaparty. The result is a situation wherethe largely urban Society Islands, with75 percent of the population, electonly half the territorial representa­tives. This marked the beginning ofVernaudon's campaign to reform theterritorial electoral system givinggreater representation to the urbanareas (Vernaudon's speech of 23 Octo­ber, reprinted in full in TP, Nov I998,20). Later, on II March I999, he sub-

mitted a draft electoral refol;m law tothe French national assembly.

Following his departure from thegovernment, Vernaudon worked withthe Tavini party in the opposition, andthey ran a joint campaign in the sen­ate elections, even though he does notshare Tavini's desire for independencefrom France. The united front was toprove unsuccessful, however, throughno fault on their candidate's part. Theopposition would have been hard putto field a better candidate than Jean­Marius Raapoto (formerly head of thedefunct Tireo party) in terms of intel­ligence, integrity, and commitment tothe welfare of the people.

The result of the election on 27September for French Polynesia's solerepresentative to the French Senatewas no surprise, given that it wasnever a question of whether Plossewould win but rather by how much.Plosse's Tahoeraa party and its alliescontrol 37 of the teqitory's 44 munic­ipal councils, which in turn nominatethe majority of representatives to theelectoral college determining thesenate position. Of the 50I electors,385 (or 80 percent) voted for Flosse;89 (I8.4 percent) for Raapoto of theTavini-Ai'a Api coalition; 8 for YvesConroy, an independent; none forAlain Ferte of the National Front;and I9 cast informal votes (DT, 28Sep I998, 26"':28).

The landslide victory for Plosseearned him a national rec.ord in- termsof votes for senate candidates. How­ever, his accumulation of offices hasgiven cause for concern. A formerpresident, Francis Sanford, believedhe could only do justice to thedemands of one high office and

POLITICAL REVIEWS· POLYNESIA

resigned from the senate to devotehimself to the presidency. By contrast,Flosse deems himself more than ableto carry out the duties of his concur­rent public offices as president, sena­tor, and mayor, though he stressesthat his obligations as president takepriority and he may review his posi­tion as mayor by the next municipalelections (DT, 28 Sep, 26-28). It isnoteworthy that one of Flosse's firstacts in the French Senate was todefend the holding of multiple officesby politicians during a debate on asocialist party draft law designedto prohibit such practices.

Flosse's ascendancy to the senatesignals the departure of SenatorDaniel Millaud, the last representativeof the founding generation or theTahitian autonomist movement, whichincluded leaders such as Pouvanaa aOopa, John Teariki, and Francis San­ford. These men were all lobbying forexpansive forms of autonomy longbefore Flosse saw the light in 1980.As early as 1969, Millaud gave sub­stance to the autonomist vision ascoauthor of a report detailing thenature of such a status. During hisyears of service to the territory assenator, Millaud has scrutinized theimpact of the nuclear test program,campaigned against French incursionson territorial autonomy, and, morerecently, sought a fair deal for FrenchPolynesia in its dealings with theEuropean Union.

Also in late September, the long­awaited trial took place of the peoplecharged with rioting at the interna­tional airport on 6 September 1995(see earlier review), the day afterFrance resumed its nuclear test pro-

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gram. (Those charged with arson andlooting in Papeete on the same daywere tried separately.) The defendantsin this case were mainly members ofthe Tavini party or the radical A TiaI Mua trade union federation. Thedefense alleged a conspiracy on thepart of the territorial and state gov­ernments in targeting these oppositiongroups. It was argued that the terri­tory seized the opportunity to dis­credit the independence movementand ban the most troublesome tradeunion, while the state was left to con­clude its nuclear test series in peace.In keeping with past traditions relat­ing to charges against independenceand antinuclear activists, defenselawyers presented their case as atrial of French nuclear colonialism(TP, Oct 1998, 7-1°; DT, severaleditions, 19-26 Sep 1998).

The defense argued that policeactions had contributed to provokingthe violence at the airport. Defendantswho gave testimony acknowledgedthat a "collective insanity" ensuedafter a gendarme threw a tear gasgrenade at the protesters, including agroup of women engaged in a sit-in.It also emerged that a police grenadewas responsible for starting the firethat destroyed part of the airport, sodie defendants were not charged witharson.

An impressive range of witnesseswere called for the defense, includingJacques Ihorai and Monseigneur Cop­penrath, the respective heads of theEvangelical and Catholic churches inPapeete; Cotra Uregei, a prominentKanak trade unionist and indepen­dence activist; Cyril Legayic a Tahi­tian trade union leader; Gabriel

224 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING 2000

Tetiarahi, a leader of Tahitian non­government organizations; and a let­ter of supp~rt was presented fromDominique Voynet, the Green Frenchenvironment minister. These witnessesdid not condone the violence commit­ted by some defendants, but they didmaintain that public outrage aboutthe nuclear test resumption by Francewas understandable, especially for thedisadvantaged youth. The only wit­ness who gave testimony hostile tothe defendants was Gaston Flosse.

A verdict was issued on 20 Octo­ber. The sixty defendants weregrouped into several different cate­gories. The first concerned somethirty people who were charged withoccupying the tarmac of the airportand obstructing air traffic and, thoughthey were judged culpable for theiractions, because they had behavedpeacefully they received no penalty.People convicted of theft and vandal­ism received fines anli .su!,pendedprison sentences, while those foundguilty of armed violence against thepolice received short prison terms.

The court did not accept the politi­cal reasoning behind the defense case.The stiffest prison terms were thusreserved for the alleged ringleaders ofthe airport riots, both then leaders ofthe A Tia I Mua trade union. RonaldTerorotua and Hiro Tefaarere receivedprison terms of 6 and 18 monthsrespectively. Tefaarere had been aFrench public servant until he wasdismissed after the riots and is cur­rently a Tavini party territorial assem­blyman. His penalty was severe, giventhat he had at no time personallyengaged in violence. Both men areseeking appeals and have been sup­ported in this quest by the Tavini

party (DT, 26 Sep 1998; TP, Nov1998,7). .

The overriding political priorityfor President Flosse in the year underreview was to catch up with theprogress made by New Caledonia inits statutory relationship with France.Flosse was caught off guard as theFrench state, the FLNKS, and the RPCR

signed off on the Noumea Accord inMay 1998, granting the territorysweeping new powers and, pending'approval of the process in a referen­dum, the long-term option of acced­ing to independence. Noumea wasgiven the power to restrict employ­ment opportunities to New Caledo­nians, a dispensation Tahiti had beenseeking for decades. Flosse immedi­ately began drafting, and negotiatingbehind the scenes, a new packageof rights for French Polynesia. Withastute political timing, Flosseannounced the initial gains duringhis budgetary speech:to-the territorialassembly one week before the senateelections.

The president informed the assem­bly that, like New Caledonia, theirterritory would enjoy a new status asa result of a planned amendment tothe French constitution. Although thedeal was not finalized, he was confi­dent about certain rights being forth­coming. The territorial assemblywould be empowered to pass its ownlegislation as a "country," with thesame status as the constitution givesto national laws. A form of Polyne­sian "citizenship" would be instituted,but within the parameters of Frenchnationality, which Flosse believedto be of symbolic significance. TheTahitian government would obtaingreater powers for negotiating inter-

POLITICAL REVIEWS' POLYNESIA

national agreements in the PacificIslands. However, Flosse emphasizedthat, in contrast to the NoumeaAccord, their statutory deal wouldreinforce autonomy, and indepen­dence was not even on the agenda(Dr, 18 Sep 1998, 22-23).

Elaboration of Flosse's conceptionof "citizenship" followed at a confer­ence on Identity, Nationality and Citi­zenship in the Overseas Territoriesheld in mid-November. He definedcitizens as being those who were bornin this country or of parents born inthis country, and, as a second cate­gory, citizenship would extend to resi­dents of 5 to 10 years. He emphasizedthat the Polynesian form of citizen­ship would have no ethnic dimensionand was meant to be all inclusive.These citizens would benefit from anemployment policy that discriminatedin their favor. Plosse envisaged thatcitizenship would also protect the landownership of the people against incur­sions by foreigners and metropolitanFrench, whose acquisitions would becontrolled by the territorial govern­ment. Curiously, unlike electoral pol­icy in the Noumea Accord, citizenshipwould not entail birth or residencerestrictions on the right to vote, pur­portedly because Tahiti intended toremain within the French Republic.This means that metropolitan Frenchtemporarily residing in Tahiti willretain the right to vote in local elec­tions (TP, Dec 1998, 32).

By April, more gains under theforthcoming statutory reform wereoutlined by Flosse on his return froma meeting in Paris with the secretaryof state for Overseas France, Jean­Jack Queyranne. French Polynesiawould become an overseas country

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(pays d'outre-mer, or POM) insteadof an overseas territory (TOM). More­over, the name Tahiti Nui, whichPlosse's government had already beenusing for years in the region withoutFrench approval, would be "added"to French Polynesia. Plosse was alsohopeful that the new status wouldallow Tahiti Nui to join the SouthPacific Forum.

In addition, the complex timetablefor the next stage of statutory evolu­tion was set for the authorization ofthe draft constitutional amendmentby the following levels of government:territorial assembly (6 April), councilof state (15 May), French cabinet (26May), national assembly (10 June),senate (13 October), and finally theCongress of Versailles. Apparently anational (ie, French) referendum wasnot required for this type of amend­ment. The way would then be clearfor an organic law to be drafted, spec­ifying the detailed application of thegeneral principles in the constitutionalamendment. Such a law would not befinalized until sometime in the year2000 (DT, 14 April 1999, 22).

By early 1999, criticisms of theway in which the territorial govern­ment had approached both the processand content of the statutory reformwere emerging. The critics, not sur­prisingly, included members of theopposition such as Oscar Temaru,Emile Vernaudon, and Boris Leontieff(mayor of Arue and leader of FetiaApi), and also scholarly commenta­tors such as Guy Sem.

First, there was concern that the allimportant negotiations for statutoryreform had been undertaken entirelyby the government (Plosse) and state(Queyranne) behind closed doors.

226 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING 2000

/' Both the advisory economic, social,and cultural council and the territorialassembly were presented with a faitaccompli in the last week of Marchand had little time to peruse the draftconstitutional amendment, much lessalter it, before it was forwarded toParis on 6 April. As a result the docu­ment was not passed unanimously bythe assembly, as it ideally should havebeen; rather, the government pushed itthrough with its majority. This processwas in stark contrast to the lengthyand widespread public consultation,including of opposition parties, thatpreceded the Noumea Accord andensured it of public support.

The process in Tahiti was also lessdemocratic insofar as no referendumwas scheduled for the'population toregister their approval of the pro­posed statutory changes. Once again,this was not the case in New Caledo­nia, where 72 percent of voters (and amajority of all persons'eligible to vote)endorsed the Noumea Accord in areferendum held 8 November 1998.In addition, and unlike New Caledo­nia, critics decried the decision by theterritorial government to deliberatelyexclude the prospect of a referendumon self-determination, thus excludingindependence as a future option.

The territorial government arguedthat extensive consultation, bipartisanconsensus, and popular referenda werenot necessary on the grounds that thepresent reform did not entail a processof decolonization (TP, Dec 1998, 31).This explanation points to the reform'skey limitations. In an assessment ofthe constitutional amendment, GuySem described it as a "pale replica"of the Noumea Accord, which, in partdue to its approval through rigorous

democratic processes, has obtainedconstitutional status in its own rIght(TP, April 1999, 36).

The Flosse government's statutoryreform appears high on symbolism,notably in the constitutional refer­ences to French Polynesia "govern­ing" itself (replacing the term "admin­istering") as an "overseas country"and "Polynesian citizenship." Yet,closer scrutiny of the revised article78 suggests that the new status maybe low on substance. The French stateretains control over foreign policy,defense, justice, nationality, law andorder, currency and foreign exchange,civil liberties and rights, electoral law,and credit (DT, 27 May 1999, 22).Authority in other domains may betransferred gradually to Tahiti. Theamendment outlines new territorialpowers in the most general terms,with reference to the assembly beingsubject to review only by the Frenchconstitutional council (thus removingthe administrative tribunal), the spe­cial privileges of citizens to work andland, and the assembly's limited rightsto engage in relations with Pacificstates.

It must be emphasized that bychoosing to limit the scope of the con­stitutional amendment in comparisonto the Noumea Accord, the Tahitiangovernment severely curtailed its peo­ple's future options due to the obsta­cles faced in amending the constitu­tion. Moreover, although the Frenchnational assembly unanimously passedthe amendment, at the time of writingthere was still scope for that versionto be changed by the French senate.Significantly, the specific nature andscope of the powers to be transferredto French Polynesia remain to be

POLITICAL REVIEWS· POLYNESIA

defined and interpreted by the forth­coming organic law.

Contrary to the wishes of PresidentFlosse, French Polynesia did notaccede to its new status at the sametime as New Caledonia, which hadits organic law passed on 23 March1999. By the end of the year underreview, and in contrast to their exclu­sion from negotiations on the consti­tutional amendment, an oppositiondelegation including Vernaudon andTemaru was invited to meet withQueyranne and other officials in Paristo discuss the content of the organiclaw.

The rationale behind the Tahoeraagovernment's determination to remainpart of France (and one shared by asizable portion of the population) isthe knowledge that independencewould certainly entail a sharp reduc­tion in the transfer of funds fromParis. Despite the closure of thenuclear test program, state funding.has continued at high levels as thefol~owing figures demonstrate: Franceinjected a total of us$1. 5 billion(I 52.5 billion FCFP) into the territoryof only 224,000 inhabitants during1998, of which $300 million weretax exemptions and $1.2 billion weredirect transfers (PINA nius online,7 June 1999)·

Direct transfers from Paris can bebroken down as expenditure in thefollowing areas: state controlled sec­tions of the civil service and emer­gency relief (16.65 billion FCFP), edu­cation and research (40.5 5 billionFCFP), national defense (3 5 billionFCFP), pensions (12.5 billion FCFP),municipal government (6.66 billionFCFP), and a grant to the territorialbudget (9.9 billion FCFP or 12.66 per-

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cent of the budget). The extent of thisdependence on the state is reinforcedby the latest trade figures, which,though showing a steady growth inexports, still exhibit a gaping deficit,with exports covering only 23.9 per­cent of the cost of imports (DT, 6 May1999, 20). To add to its economicwoes, the territory is struggling torecover from another natural disaster,as floods in Tahiti on 19 Decemberleft hundreds homeless and causeddamages of up to 5 billion FCFP(TP, Jan 1999, 53)'

Emile Vernaudon and Boris Leon­tieff, among others, have argued thatthe territorial government ought tobe doing more to promote sustainableeconomic development and social jus­tice, and spend less money, time, andenergy on never-ending piecemealreforms to the statute of autonomy.

KARIN VON -STROKIRCH

References

TP, Tahiti Pacifique. MontWy. Papeete.

DT,· La Depeche de Tahiti. Daily. Papeete.

PINA, Pacific Islands News Association,quoted in Pacific Islands Report<http://pidp.ewc.hawaii.edu/PIReport>

MAORI ISSUES

Politically the second half of 1998was very disappointing for Maori­dom. In 1996 New Zealand First hadcaptured all five Maori seats in Parliac

ment and formed a coalition govern­ment with the National party. Thecabinet included three Maori minis­ters, all from New Zealand First, with