okinawan problem
DESCRIPTION
giving some basic understanding about people of OkinawaTRANSCRIPT
INTRODUCTION
There have been many discussions on the existence of US
military bases in Okinawa since the end of World War II, which see
the problem as a problem of Japan as a sovereign state highly
dependent on foreign force for her security. However, for Okinawan
people, their “Okinawan Problem” has three aspects: problem of
identity, problem of social and economic discrepancy, and problem of
the existence of US bases.
By discussing the three aspects of Okinawan Problem, this
paper will see the problem as problem of dependency of Okinawan on
both the US bases and the Japanese central government. Finally, the
rape case of Okinawan schoolgirl by three US servicemen in 1995 and
a series of political processes that followed will be examined as case
study to show the dependency of Okinawa on both the US bases and
the central government. These processes were the biggest protest
rally that for the first time unified the opposition in Okinawan
parliament, governor Ota “rebellion” for refusing to sign necessary
papers which would force anti-base landowners to continue leasing
their lands, prefectural referendum which turned into anti-climax, and
the shift of governance from Ota to Keiichi which marked the “cooling
down” of anti-base movement in Okinawa.
1
THE OKINAWANS
For quite a long time Okinawa had been a separate political
entity, holding a stature equal to that of Vietnam, Korea, and to some
extent even of Japan, in the Chinese dominated sphere of East Asia.
The Kingdom of Ryuku formed in 1429 and Okinawan Islands were
part of it. The Ryukyu Kingdom was one of the most ‘faithful’
tributary states of China, sending regular and frequent tribute-
bearing missions to the Chinese court. “Japanization” of Okinawa
started in 1609 when the Ryukyu Kingdom was brought within the
domain of the Satsuma clan of Japan. However, while Ryukyu became
a vassal state paying tribute to Satsuma, it was allowed to retain its
royal family still sending tributary missions to China. Only after the
feudal system was abolished in the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the
Ryukyus became fully integrated to Japan with abolition of Ryukyu
Kingdom in 1879 to be brought under central Japanese government
as Okinawa prefecture.
Culturally, Okinawa shows its distinction from the proper Japan.
Language is probably the most common argument to say that
Okinawan are culturally Japanese. However, linguistic study shows
that Ryukyuan and Japanese language are cognate languages which
were separated from each other some time between 1,450 and 1,700
years ago.1 Physically Okinawan are not outside of Japanese racial 1 Hattori Shiro (1961), (tr. Mauer Torpe), “A Glottochronological Study of Three Okinawan Dialects,” International Journal of American Linguistic, vol 27 (1961),
2
stock. However, in comparison to the rest of Japanese (except to the
Ainu, which racially is undoubtedly not Japanese), Okinawans are
characterized by shorter stature, broader shoulder, darker skin,
grater nasal breadth, eider eye opening, and most notably, the
relative higher degree of (body) hairiness.2
Problem of Identity
The past Okinawan relationship with China had contributed to
the problem of Okinawan identity. Arts, architecture, philosophy and
Chinese laws (such as in regulation of land ownership) were among
Chinese influences to Okinawan culture, as were Chinese dietary
customs. The raising of pigs and eating of pork continues today to be
much more common than in the rest of Japan, and has been a source
for mainland perceptions of Okinawa as "Chinese" or "foreign."
The victory of Japan in Sino-Japanese War convinced many
Okinawans that closer identification with the victorious nation was
not such a bad idea after all. This reflected in some trends as Robson
describe,
An early effect of the [Sino-Japan] war was the decline of the pro-Chinese faction among Okinawan intellectuals. But among the population at large there was a broad, if not deep, effort to identify with Japan. Boys changed their hair-styles from
cited in Akio Watanabe (1970), The Okinawa Problem a Chapter in Japan-US Relations, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, p. 3.2 William P. Lebra (1966), Okinawan Religion: Belief, Ritual, and Social Structure, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 7-8.
3
the traditional topknot and pin to the crew cut popular on the mainland. Women began adding the -ko suffix to their given names, and men adopted kun pronunciations for their names which previously had readings that were closer to on. In Okinawa, unlike in Korea four decades later, such renaming was voluntary. 3
However, at least in Okinawans perception, the mainland
Japanese considered Okinawans “not Japanese enough” to be
integrated with the mainlanders. Actually, it is not culture or race but
ethnic discrimination that solidified both Okinawan and Japanese
identities. In 1903, there was an exhibition in Osaka that featured
what was called a Human Museum (jinruikan). As widely advertised,
this "museum" displayed "live specimens of exotic peoples" who were
Taiwanese, Ainu, and Okinawan women wearing their traditional
dress. Therefore Okinawans were explicitly regarded as outsiders or
migrants.4
There are a substantial number of Okinawan migrant workers in
mainland Japan, most of them work in low-paid jobs. These workers
reside in Okinawa mura (villages) in large cities. Employers regarded
Okinawans as lazy and unreliable, which justify the low wages they
gave, in contradiction to diligent and reliable Japanese workers.
During World War II Okinawa became the only Japanese war field. The
3 Steve Rabson (1996), “Assimilation Policy in Okinawa: Promotion, Resistance, and Reconstruction” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 8, October, available online http://www.jpri. org/jpri/public/op8.html4 John Lie (2001), Multi Ethnic Japan, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 98.
4
Japanese military had regarded Okinawans as unreliable, believing
the lacking in martial spirit and less loyal to the Emperor.5
However, no matter how hard they tried to integrate
themselves, the Okinawans were not fully accepted as "Japanese." In
1945, their tie with Japan was abruptly severed, as Okinawa was
placed under occupation of the United States military. This separation
from Japan did not encourage the Okinawans to seek their
independence, although the occupation force tried to convince
Okinawans that they were not Japanese. Instead, the Okinawans
pursued reversion to Japan as a way to free themselves from the
American occupation, demanding equal treatment with the mainland
Japanese.
On May 15, 1972 Okinawa was "re-assimilated" into the
Japanese polity. Yet assimilation persists as an issue today. On the
one hand, it is seen as insufficient to have boosted Okinawa to a level
of material prosperity equal to the rest of Japan. Local economic
conditions have improved markedly since reversion, but Okinawa's
per capita income is still the lowest in Japan.
For Okinawans, becoming "Japanese" means discarding their
ethnic identity and characteristics first. Then, separated from Japan
and under American occupation, they awoke to their own distinct
identity. Yet, they were not free from the legacy of being "Japanese,"
5 Ishihara Masaie (1992), “Okinawasen no shosoo to sono haikei,” as quoted in John Lie (2001), Multi Ethnic Japan, p. 99.
5
and had to assert their Japanese identity in order to free themselves
from foreign occupation. Since its reversion to Japan, Okinawa has
poured with capital from the central government along with rigid
bureaucratic control designed, as noted by Amemiya, “to wipe out
regional characteristics.”6
Okinawans now have lost their own language and cultural
identity. Only in recent years there are some efforts to revive the
Okinawan language in literature and the performing arts. Okinawans
have been struggling to reestablish their identity and searching for a
system of ideas with which to help determine their own destiny.
Economic Discrepancy
Being separated from the rest of Japan until 1972, Okinawa did
not experience the process of rebuilding Japanese economy soon
after the war. As cold war period started to begin, the Korean War
broke out in 1950 had contributed to the Japanese economic recovery
through the opportunity to become supplier of US military. Another
source of war-generated industrial boom for Japan was the Vietnam
War. Again, Japan became the main supplier of US forces during the
war. Okinawa did not enjoy the advantage of these two wars since it
6 Kozy K. Amemiya (1998), “Being “Japanese” in Brazil and Okinawa” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 13, May, available online http://www.jpri.org/jpri/public/op13.html
6
was still under US military occupation during the Korean war, and
although the Vietnam War ended when Okinawa has been returned to
Japan, industry in Okinawa at that time was far from ready for such a
boom.
Okinawa prefecture has been the poorest prefecture in Japan.
Twenty years after reversion, Okinawa’s per capita income was only
72 percent of the national average, while unemployment rate was 7.6
percent, two times higher than the national average.7 Ten years later,
Okinawa is now still the poorest prefecture with its both living
expenditure and household expenditure accounted of 75.4 percent of
national average.8
Problem of US Military Bases
Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, Okinawa was under US
rule. Since then, Okinawa became an American military outpost and
played important role during the Vietnam War. In the process,
Okinawa itself became highly militarized. Although Okinawa
7 Okinawa Prefecture, “Promotion and Dedvelopment of Okinawa” available online http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/97/kokusaitoshikeisei/mokuji-e.html8 Japanese Government, “National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure” available online http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/zensho/3.htm
7
constitutes only 6 percent of total Japanese landmass, about 75
percent of American military bases in Japan were located there.
The bases occupy 20 percent of Okinawa Island with 25,000 US
military personnel as of 2001, thus accidents and incidents have
been the consequences. Since 1972 reversion, 39 aircraft crashes
happened, means more than once a year. There ware report of toxic
waste disposals from the bases, and the common complaint of local
resident is noise exposure. Regarding this noise pollution, there was
1999 report of a research on the aircraft noise influences to health by
a team chaired by Takeo Yamamoto from Kyoto University, which
concluded that hearing ability of people reside near the bases was
85-95 percent of normal.9 Crimes committed by US military personnel
is also recorded, and as percentage of total crime in Okinawa it was
0.9 percent in 2001, with the highest rates was 6.9 and 6.5 percent in
1973 and 1974.10
US occupation had brought notably ethnic consequences.
Intermarriage between American military personnel and Okinawan
women occurs, resulting in the increasing number of haafu (from
“half,” half Japanese, half American), children born from
intermarriage. US presence in Okinawa also generated considerable
9 This report is available online at http://www.asahikawa-med.ac.jp/dept/mc/hygiene/okinawa/ report-e.html10 Okinawa Prefecture, “The Number of Criminal Cases in which SOFA Status People have been Arrested,” available online http://www2.pref.okinawa.jp/oki/okinawa.nsf/98ec0e16075d27 aa492567340044e504/6b5dda8761e27dd049256b7200236c4d?OpenDocument
8
anti-American sentiments, which in turn contributed pro-Japanese
sentiments during the occupation period.
The existence of the vast US military bases in Okinawa has had
a huge impact on the local economy. Bases revenues (revenues
generated by military-related transactions), which consists of salary
paid to Japanese bases employees, rental fees for land used by the
US military paid to the local landowners and money spent by SOFA
status people in the local economy, have played an important role in
the prefecture's economy. For instance, at the time of Okinawa's
reversion, bases revenues accounted for 15.6% of prefectural gross
expenditure.
Since reversion, the percentage of bases revenues within
Okinawa's gross expenditure has reduced over the years as the rest
of the prefectural economy expanded. By 1998, it has declined to
approximately one third to stand at 5.2%. However, the value of
bases revenues has approximately doubled from 78 billion yen at the
time of reversion to 187.3 billion yen in 1998. Thus, bases revenues
still remain a large source of income for Okinawa's economy as one
of the essential element in the prefecture's economic activities.
9
THE RAPE: UNIFIED THE OPPOSITION
Unlike previous crime involving US military personnel, the rape
of a twelve-year-old schoolgirl by three US servicemen in September
4, 1995 brought immediate anger throughout the prefecture, due to
the brutality and the young age of the victim. Through the
development of the case, there were two growing feeling within the
people of Okinawa. First, the growing anti-US bases sentiments and
the view that the central government was not serious in responding
to the frustration of Okinawan over the high concentration of US
bases and personnel there. These feelings were due to the delay in
turning the three suspects to Japanese authorities. Article 17 of the
Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) prevented the three suspects from
being handed over to the Japanese authorities until they were
indicted.
The rape was a spark to the growing anti US bases sentiments
in Okinawa. There were two other fuels for this sentiment. First, the
rally organized by some citizen organization to protest the bases. The
rally in Genowan city in October 21, 1995 was the biggest people
gathering in Okinawa, attended by nearly 100,000 people. The rally
called for acceleration of the reduction of the bases, the revision of
SOFA so that crimes committed by US military personnel will be
properly handled, and compensations and apologies to victim of
10
crime committed by US military personnel. The importance of the
rally was that all opposition parties attended the rally; thus the rally
was able to unite disparate political parties behind the common
agenda of the issues the gathering sought to address.
The second fuel to the anti US bases sentiment was the
“rebellion” of the governor of Okinawa. On August 28, 1996, the
central government (the Supreme Court) ordered Governor Ota to
sign the necessary papers that would force 35 anti bases landowners
to continue leasing their lands at some bases Naha, Koza, and
Yomitan village. Feeling confident with support from the mass and
the Okinawan Parliament, Ota which was elected as governor on the
bases of anti US base platform, refused the order.
THE REFERENDUM: ANTI CLIMAX
In addition to the two fuel for anti US bases sentiments, the
expected to be the third fuel, the prefectural referendum was failed
in gaining support from the mass. The referendum, for which 479
million yen was allocated, asked one question consisted of two not
necessarily related parts: “(How do you feel about) reviewing the
Japan-US SOFA and reducing the American bases in our prefecture?”11
The options of answers were “agree” and “oppose.”
11 Translation by Robert D. Eldridge (1997) in his “The 1996 Okinawa Referndum on US Base Reduction” in Asian Survey, Vol. 37 No. 10, October 1997, pp. 879-904.
11
As predicted, 89 percent of the voters participating answered
“agree.”12 However, intended to question the US military bases, the
referendum turned to gain less than sixty percent of eligible voters.
Voter absenteeism was as high as 40.47 percent. Prior to the
referendum, almost everyone in Okinawa seemed to agree with the
need to reduce US bases and review the SOFA agreement.
Unfortunately, the question of the referendum was vague; there was
no clear understanding of what its goals were. In the referendum
question, there was no clear indication to what extent the “reduction”
of the base would be.
The referendum turned to be an anti climax for anti US bases
sentiments, followed by announcement by Governor Ota that he
agreed to sign the papers that would end the resistance of 35
landowners to continue leasing their lands to the US bases, just two
days after the referendum. Ota’s surrender after he met Prime
Minister Hashimoto in which Hashimoto promised to pour additional 5
billion yen to the prefecture, showed that Okinawa was highly
dependent on the central government economically and that it was
difficult for the prefectural government to act differently from Tokyo’s
policy. Ota was aware of the possible use of the 1952 Special
Measures Law to create a special legislation to simplify the procedure
of settling the dispute.
12 Vote result available online http://www.okinawa.ttc.co.jp/resultvote.html
12
OTA MASAHIDE AND THE SEEK OF AUTONOMY
Ota was the governor of Okinawa for two periods. He was
elected for the first time in 1990 with his anti-base platform
campaign. Basically, his policy was based on his believe that the US
bases would be expelled from Okinawa someday. In Ota’s calculation,
the bases problem would solve itself overtime, as East Asia stabilizes.
In his own words, “There is a good chance that by 2015 the Korean
problem will be solved and the relationship between China and
America will be much better,” and when it happens, “American tax
payer will lose interest in spending more than $30 billion a year to
maintain an unnecessary and unwanted East Asian garrison.” 13
When the withdrawal becomes a reality, Okinawa, looking into
what happened to the Philippines, will lose important source of
income: the bases for the base-related transaction and the central
government’s “compensation policy.” This compensation is a form of
form of soft coercion to obtain community support for desired
government objectives. In the case of Okinawa, the subsidies that the
prefectural government receives for the possible loss of tax revenue
are well above standard compensation outlays. Thus, Okinawan
economy is dependent on both the base and the Japanese central
government, as Table 1 shows.
13 Ota Masahide, cited in Mike Millard (1998), “Okinawa, Then and Now” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 11, February, available online http://www.jpri.org/jpri/public/op11.html
13
Table 1 shows that the dependency of Okinawan economy on
the base-related transaction has decreased, but the dependency on
“revenues from outside the prefecture” has reached 85 percent in
1997. Recently, the Japanese central government has three new
channels for the pouring of money to calm down anti-base sentiment:
(1) a pool of 7.5 billion yen for each district hosting US military base;
(2) large-scale endowments for municipalities that volunteers sites
for relocation within Okinawa prefecture, and (3) 100 billion yen over
seven years for projects proposed under the Informal Council on
Okinawa Municipalities Hosting US Base. 14
Table 1
14 Julia Yonetani (2001), “Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theatre” Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 74-75.
14
Source : Okinawa Prefecture Homepage
What Ota wanted for Okinawa was more autonomy and was
called “grassroots federalism” since he based his struggle on the
popular voice of Okinawans. As stated by an activist that since the
1995 rape case, “More people have begun talking about Okinawan
15
independence, about taking more autonomy from the central
government . . . . We didn’t think that way before.”15 Ota’s
government hoped to wring some economic concessions fro the
central government in return of a gradual reduction or relocation of
the bases. By receiving special treatments from Tokyo in term of
tariff and tax concessions that would attract investment, Ota hoped
to achieve economic parity with the rest of Japan.
KEIICHI INAMINE AND “HONEYMOON PERIOD”
Ota’s defeat from Inamine in 1998 was not a surprise since he
had lost most of his anti-base posture when he gave up from Tokyo’s
pressure and signed up necessary papers to force anti base
landowners continue leasing their land for bases’ purposes. Ota saw
an opportunity in a local plebiscite in Nago City, where 51.3 percent
of the citizens voted against the plan to build Nago Air Station.16 Ota
used this issue in the hope of rebuild his anti base image, but he
failed in the 1998 election. His competitor, Inamine, in his election
campaign promised a fifteen-year lease limit and joint civilian use of
the Nago base. 17 At least his public image differed from the standing
of the central government and the US government.
15 Chikako Yoshida, cited in Mike Millard, Ibid.16 Nago was the chosen site for the relocation of Futenma Air Base.17 Julia Yonetani (2001), “Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theatre” Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, p. 79.
16
Inamine was an LDP supported candidate and was the deputy
chair of Shima-kon. His involvement in Shima-kon gave a clue for his
more “pro-Tokyo” policy. Discussing the bases, he writes “When the
best option is out of reach and only a second-best option is available,
I believe one should settle for the latter . . . , rather than refuse to
compromise at all and come home empty handed” 18 As an
entrepreneur, LDP supported candidate, and had a high position in
Shima-kon before elected governor, Inamine administration have
secured the flow of central government’s money to the prefecture in
return of the reduction of prefectural challenging position on bases
issue.
Inamine administration is sort of “honeymoon period” with
Tokyo compared to Ota’s. Right after his inauguration, Inamine called
a meeting of Okinawa Policy Council which had been frozen by Ota
due to Futenma relocation issue. In this meeting, Prime Minister
Obuchi immediately promised a 10 billion yen additional budget to
Okinawa prefecture, doubled what Ota had from Tokyo for the
resolution of lease problem. In April 1999, Tokyo announced that
Okinawa would be the host of G8 Summit in 2000. The fact that
Okinawa ranked the last in the readiness of facilities only gave
another justification to transfer funds to the prefecture to build
facilities needed.
18 Inamine Keiichi (2000), “Okinawa as Pacific Crossroads” in Japan Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, p. 14.
17
Inmine administration continues to seek more autonomy as
what his predecessor did, but he relies more on the central
government’s supports which to some extent creates an image of
more pro Tokyo policy and less anti base than Ota’s. However,
Inamine considers his governance gets support from Okinawan
people, therefore recently announced his candidacy for the next
election.
CONCLUSION
If prefectural election result is more or less representing what
Okinawans want, looking into Inamine’s success in the prefectural
election in 1998, the “honeymoon period” with Tokyo, and his
confidence to go to his second governor candidacy, it is likely that
Okinawans have been becoming accepting the existence of the US
military bases. Identity problem would not be as strong as it had been
during the first years of reversion as Okinawans have found their
destiny (and dependency) as part of Japan. Although now Okinawa
prefecture still has the lowest income per capita in Japan, its
economy has improved significantly since the reversion. To put it in
other words, although only 72 percent of the national level,
“Okinawa’s per capita income exceeded that of Italy, France, and
Great Brittain.”19
19 John M. Purves (1995), Island of Military Bases: a Contemporary Political History of Okinawa, MA thesis, International University of Japan, p. 188.
18
REFERRENCES
Amemiya, Kozy K. (1998), “Being “Japanese” in Brazil and Okinawa” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 13, May, available online http://www.jpri.org/jpri/ public/op13.html.
Eldridge, Robert D. (1997), “The 1996 Okinawa Referndum on US Base Reduction” in Asian Survey, Vol. 37 No. 10, October 1997.
Japanese Government, “National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure” available online http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/zensho/3.htm
Keiichi, Inamine (2000), “Okinawa as Pacific Crossroads” in Japan Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3.
Lebra, William P. (1966), Okinawan Religion: Belief, Ritual, and Social Structure, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Lie, John (2001), Multi Ethnic Japan, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Millard, Mike (1998), “Okinawa, Then and Now” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 11, February, available online http://www.jpri.org/jpri/public/op11.html
Okinawa Prefecture, “Promotion and Dedvelopment of Okinawa” available online http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/97/kokusaitoshikeisei/mokuji-e.html
Okinawa Prefecture, “The Number of Criminal Cases in which SOFA Status People have been Arrested,” available online http://www2.pref.okinawa.jp/oki/
19
okinawa.nsf/98ec0e16075d27aa492567340044e504/6b5dda8761e27dd049256b7200236c4d?OpenDocument
Purves, John M. (1995), Island of Military Bases: a Contemporary Political History of Okinawa, MA thesis, International University of Japan.
Rabson, Steve (1996), “Assimilation Policy in Okinawa: Promotion, Resistance, and Reconstruction” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 8, October, available online http://www.jpri.org/jpri/public/op8.html
Watanabe, Akio (1970), The Okinawa Problem a Chapter in Japan-US Relations, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Yonetani, Julia (2001), “Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theatre” Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1.
20