ogp safety performance indicators 2005[1]

Safety performance indicators – 2005 data

Report No. 379May 2006

I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n o f O i l & G a s P r o d u c e r s

Global experience

The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers has access to a wealth of technical knowledge and experience with its members operating around the world in many different terrains. We collate and distil this valuable knowledge for the industry to use as guidelines for good practice by individual members.

Consistent high quality database and guidelines

Our overall aim is to ensure a consistent approach to training, management and best prac-tice throughout the world.

The oil and gas exploration and production industry recognises the need to develop consist-ent databases and records in certain fields. The OGP’s members are encouraged to use the guidelines as a starting point for their operations or to supplement their own policies and regulations which may apply locally.

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Many of our guidelines have been recognised and used by international authorities and safety and environmental bodies. Requests come from governments and non-government organisations around the world as well as from non-member companies.

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Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publica-tion, neither the OGP nor any of its members past present or future warrants its accuracy or will, regard-less of its or their negligence, assume liability for any foreseeable or unforeseeable use made thereof, which liability is hereby excluded. Consequently, such use is at the recipient’s own risk on the basis that any use by the recipient constitutes agreement to the terms of this disclaimer. The recipient is obliged to inform any subsequent recipient of such terms.

Copyright notice

The contents of these pages are ©The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers 2006. All rights are reserved.

Publications

OGP safety performance indicators 2005

Report No: 379

May 2006

The safety statistics for 2005 were derived from data provided by the following companies:

OGP MembersADNOCAgip KCOAmerada HessAnadarkoBGBHPBPCairn EnergyChevronCNOOCConocoPhillipsDolphin EnergyDONGENIExxonMobilGNPOCHOCOLKuwait Oil CompanyMaerskMarathonHydroOccidentalOil SearchOMVPDVSAPetro-CanadaPetronas Carigali Sdn BhdPremier OilPTTEPQatar PetroleumRasGasRepsolSaudi AramcoShellStatoilTNK - BPTotalTullow OilVICO (Subsidiary of BP but reporting separately)

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Safety performance of the global E&P industry – 2005 data

© 2006 OGP

Table of contents

1 Summary 11.1 Fatalities ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 11.2 Lost time injuries .........................................................................................................................................................................21.3 Total recordable incidents ..........................................................................................................................................................21.4 Lost Work Day Cases - by cause ............................................................................................................................................... 31.5 Database ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 3

2 Overall results 52.1 Fatalities .........................................................................................................................................................................................52.2 Fatal accident rate (FAR) .......................................................................................................................................................... 62.3 Fatal incident rate (FIR) ............................................................................................................................................................ 72.4 Fatality causes ...............................................................................................................................................................................82.5 Fatality demography ................................................................................................................................................................... 92.6 Lost time injury frequency (LTIF) ........................................................................................................................................102.7 Severity of lost workday cases (LWDC) ............................................................................................................................... 112.8 Total recordable incident rate (TRIR) .................................................................................................................................. 122.9 Lost Work Day Case causes ..................................................................................................................................................... 132.10 Accident triangles ......................................................................................................................................................................16

3 Results by region 173.1 Fatalities .......................................................................................................................................................................................173.2 Lost time injury frequency .......................................................................................................................................................173.3 FAR and LTIF 5-year rolling averages ................................................................................................................................... 183.4 Severity of lost workday cases ................................................................................................................................................. 203.5 Total recordable incident rate (TRIR) .................................................................................................................................. 213.6 Individual country performance ............................................................................................................................................ 21

4 Results by function 234.1 Fatalities .......................................................................................................................................................................................234.2 Lost time injury frequency (LTIF) .......................................................................................................................................244.3 Severity of lost workday cases .................................................................................................................................................244.4 Total recordable incident rate (TRIR) ..................................................................................................................................254.5 Exploration performance ........................................................................................................................................................ 264.6 Drilling performance ............................................................................................................................................................... 284.7 Production performance ......................................................................................................................................................... 304.8 Other performance ....................................................................................................................................................................32

5 Results by company 355.1 Overall company results ........................................................................................................................................................... 355.2 Company results by function .................................................................................................................................................40

6 Significant incidents 416.1 Significant incidents by category ........................................................................................................................................... 41

7 Conclusions 42

AppendicesAppendix A Database dimensions ................................................................................................................................................... 43Appendix B Data tables ......................................................................................................................................................................47Appendix C Fatal incident reports by region .................................................................................................................................61Appendix D Significant incident reports by region ......................................................................................................................83Appendix E Restricted workday analyses ....................................................................................................................................... 97Appendix F Glossary of terms .........................................................................................................................................................105Appendix G Contributing companies .......................................................................................................................................... 107Appendix H Countries represented ...............................................................................................................................................108

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International Association of Oil & Gas Producers

© 2006 OGP

The principal purposes of this report are to present the safety performance of the global E&P industry in 2005, and to compare the performance to that of previous years. The report allows OGP members and others to benchmark their performance against that of the global E&P industry.

The key indicators presented are: number of fatalities, fatal accident rate, lost time injury frequency and total recorda-ble incident rate. The report presents global results for these

indicators, which are then analysed by region, function and company. A code is used for the company results to preserve anonymity. The performance of both companies and con-tractors is reported.

Wherever practicable, results are presented graphically. The data underlying the charts are presented in Appendix B. The tables are organised according to the section in the report where the chart appears.

Preface

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8 company and 76 contractor fatalities were reported in 2005. The total of 84 is 36 fewer than reported in 2004. In addition, 6 third party deaths were reported (one fewer than reported in the previous year).The decrease in the number of fatalities is against the background of a 4% increase in the number of workhours reported.The overall fatal accident rate (FAR) is 3.5 company/contractor fatalities per �00 million workhours. This represents a reduction of 33% on last year’s figure and the lowest recorded to date. The company and contractor FAR are �.25 and 4.36 respectively. Onshore and offshore FAR are 3.94 and �.99 respectively. All of these values are the lowest recorded to date.In line with previous years, the most common cause of fatalities is ‘vehicle incidents’, with ‘struck by’ incidents the second most common. An increase is seen in the number of deaths resulting from falls compared to pre-vious years.In each of the two incidents where the highest number of fatalities occurred there were 4 fatalities. In one incident 4 men died due to asphyxiation in an argon atmosphere. The 2nd incident, a head on crash between 2 company hired vehicles, resulted in the death of 3 contractor and � company personnel.

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1 Summary

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Fatal accident rateper 100 million hours worked

Fatality causes (excluding ‘unknown’)

Other 7.2%

Vehicleincidents37.3% Struck by 20.5%

Fall18.1%

Explosion/burn 4.8%

Electrical 3.6%Drowning 2.4%

Caught between 6.0%

The report summarises the safety performance of the global E&P industry for 2005. It is based on the analysis of 2381 million workhours of data, submitted by 39 companies from operations in 75 countries.

The primary indicators used to benchmark the safety performance of the industry are; number of fatalities, fatal accident and incident rates, lost time injury frequency, and total recordable incident rate. In 2005 an improve-ment can be seen in most of these indicators compared to previous years, particularly to the fatal accident rate.

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1.2 Lost time injuries

The overall Lost Time Injury Frequency (LTIF) decreased from �.09 in 2004 to 0.97 in 2005. This represents an ��% decrease compared to 2004 and the lowest overall LTIF recorded to date.Both company and contractor performance, at 0.83 and �.02 lost time injuries per million hours worked respectively, represent an improvement compared to the previous year’s performance. The contractor LTIF is the lowest on record.The difference between company and contractor LTIF continues to reduce, with the contractor LTIF being 23% greater than the company value.There were 22�4 reported injuries resulting in at least one day off work. This equates to an average of 43 such injuries every week of the year, a 7% reduction on 2004.Approximately 243 person-years are estimated to have been lost by reporting companies and their contractors as a result of injuries.

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The rate for all recordable incidents (fatalities, lost workday cases, restricted workday cases and medical treatment cases) was 3.05 incidents per million hours worked. This is a 23% improvement compared to 2004 and the lowest value on record to date.

Lost time injury frequencyper million hours worked

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1.3 Total recordable incidents

Total recordable incident rate - company & contractorsper million hours worked

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1.4 Lost Work Day Cases - by cause

The cause was provided for �243 of the 22�4 Lost Work Day Cases reported. The greatest number of LWDCs reported related to ‘struck by’ incidents. None were reported in the categories of ‘water related’ and ‘air transport’.

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1.5 Database

The database for 2005 embraces 238� million hours worked, a 4% increase on 2004 and the highest in the history of safety data reporting.

• 39 companies contributed data. All but 2 reported sta-tistics for their contractors.Operations in 75 countries are included in the data-base.

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Other 20%

Vehicleincidents

11%

Struck by 29%

Fall20%

Explosion/burn 4%

Electrical 1%

Caught between 15%

Lost Work Day Cases (excluding ‘unknown’)

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Company/Contractor Fatalities84 company and contractor fatalities were reported in 2005. This is 36 fewer than were reported in 2004. This is against the background of a 4% increase in the number of workhours reported.The 84 fatalities occurred in 74 separate incidents. In each of the two incidents where the highest number of fatalities occurred there were 4 fatalities. In one incident 4 men died due to asphyxiation in an argon atmosphere. The 2nd incident, a head on crash between 2 company hired vehicles, resulted in the death of 3 contractor and � company personnel.24 of the company/contractor fatalities occurred in Africa, 23 in FSU and �2 in the Middle East.

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Third Party FatalitiesNot all companies collect and report information associated with third party fatalities, hence comparison with previous years needs to be carried out with care.

6 third party fatalities were reported in 2005, one fewer than reported in 2004.4 of the 6 incidents reported were associated with vehi-cle accidents.

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2 Overall results

2.1 Fatalities

Company fatalities 8 (10%)Contractor fatalities 76 (90%)

Onshore fatalities 74 (88%)Offshore fatalities 10 (12%)

Third party fatalities 6

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Company workhours (27%)Contractor workhours (73%)

Onshore workhours (79%)Offshore workhours (21%)

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In this section the primary indicators used to measure the industry’s safety performance are presented. These are the number and nature of fatalities, fatal accident rate (FAR), fatal incident rate (FIR), lost time injury frequency (LTIF), and total recordable incident rate (TRIR).

A listing of all fatal incidents appears in Appendix C.

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Fatal accident rate - company & contractorsper 100 million hours worked

Fatal accident rate - onshore & offshoreper 100 million hours worked

2.2 Fatal accident rate (FAR)

Overall 3.53 (33% better)§

Company 1.25 (56% better)Contractor 4.36 (29% better)

Onshore 3.94 (21% better)Offshore 1.99 (67% better)

§ The percent. in parentheses relates to the 2004 average. The percentage is defined further in Appendix F.

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The overall fatal accident rate is 3.53 company/contrac-tor fatalities per �00 million workhours. This represents an improvement of one third compared to the 2004 value of 5.24 and the lowest overall FAR on record.The company and contractor FAR values are �.25 and 4.36 respectively, both lower than last year (2.82 and 6.�8) and both the lowest on record to date. The offshore FAR of �.99 is 67% better than the 2004 value (6.02).The FAR onshore value of 3.94 shows a 2�% improve-ment on the 2004 value of 5.00. The difference between the FAR onshore and offshore displays a large variation over the �0 year period shown. Neither is consistently better.The 2005 onshore and offshore FAR results are the lowest on record to date.

There has been an overall improvement in FAR in 2005 compared to the 2004 values, reaffirming the downward trend long-term.

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Fatal accident rate (FAR)

The number of company/contractor fatalities per 100,000,000 (100 million) hours worked.

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Fatal incident rate - company & contractorsper 100 million hours worked

Fatal incident rate - onshore & offshoreper 100 million hours worked

2.3 Fatal incident rate (FIR)

Without third party incidentsOverall 3.11 (28% better)§



§ The percent. in parentheses relates to the 2004 average

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With third party incidentsOverall 3.36 (27% better)§




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Fatal incidents are incidents resulting in one or more fatali-ties. The FIR is a measure of the frequency with which fatal incidents occur, in contrast to the FAR which measures the frequency of fatalities. Accordingly, for company and con-tractor fatalities only, FIR will be less than or equal to the FAR. Comparison of FAR and FIR gives an indication of the magnitude of the incidents in terms of lives lost.

The overall fatal incident rate fell to 3.��, representing a 28% reduction compared to 2004 (4.32). The inclusion of 3rd party incidents increases the FIR to 3.36. Whilst this represents a 27% improvement compared to 2004, it is a difficult indicator to use as not all companies report 3rd party incidents.In common with FAR, company FIR is consistently lower than contractor FIR. However, in contrast to FAR, for the majority of the past �0-year period, onshore FIR has been greater than offshore FIR.

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Fatal incident rate (FIR)

The number of fatal incidents per 100,000,000 (100 million) hours.

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Fatality causes% fatalities associated with each reporting category (excluding ‘unknown’)

2.4 Fatality causes

The pie charts show the percentage of fatalities within each of the reporting categories for 2005 and for the 5 year period 2000-2004.

In common with previous years, the largest propor-tion of the fatalities reported in 2004 was the result of vehicle related incidents. Similarly, incidents in which individuals were struck by moving or falling objects were the second greatest contributors to the fatality statistics. The number of incidents in which individu-als died as the result of a fall has increased compared to previous years.

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Vehicleincidents

29%

Struck by 20%

Falls 8%

Explosion/burns 9%

Electrical6%

Drowning 5%

Caught between 8%

Air transport 6%

2005 2000 - 2004

Other 7.2%

Vehicleincidents 37.3% Struck by 20.5%

Fall18.1%

Explosion/burn 4.8%

Electrical 3.6%Drowning 2.4%

Caught between 6.0%

Incidents Fatalities (not 3rd party)Air transport 0 0Caught between 5 5Drowning 2 2 (2)Electrical 3 3Explosion/burn 3 4Fall �5 �5Other 2 6Struck by �7 �7Vehicle incident 26 3� (4)Unknown � �Total 74 84

The figures in parentheses are the additional numbers of incidents that resulted in one or more third party fatality

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Number of fatalities by age group for 2003-2005Company and contractor

2.5 Fatality demography

The ages of victims were specified in 44 instances of fatali-ties in 2005. The chart shows the age distribution of victims when these cases are added to the 42 instances in 2004 and 45 instances in 2003.

Of the 78 employee fatalities where the gender was speci-fied, all were male.

While it is difficult to draw clear conclusions without infor-mation on age profile distribution within the industry, there appears to be some indication of an increase in the number of fatalities associated with younger employees.

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Lost time injury frequency - onshore & offshoreper million hours worked

Lost time injury frequency - company & contractorsper million hours worked

2.6 Lost time injury frequency (LTIF)





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There were 22�4 lost time incidents (excluding fatali-ties) resulting in at least one day off work. �694 inci-dents were contractor related and 520 were company related.The contractor LTIF is �3% better than the previous year.The overall LTIF and those associated with contractor personnel, onshore activities and offshore activities all represent the lowest values on record.The overall LTIF improved by ��% from �.09 in 2004 to 0.97 in 2005. Onshore performance is �2% better than in 2004. The difference between company and contractor LTIF continues to reduce, with the contractor LTIF being 23% greater than the company value.

The above equates to an average of 42 incidents every week of the year. Approximately 243 person-years are estimated to have been lost by reporting companies and their contrac-tors.†

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Lost time injury frequency (LTIF)

The number of lost time injuries (fatalities + lost workday cases) per 1,000,000 hours worked.

† assuming 220 working days per year

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Severity - company & contractorsaverage days lost per LWDC

Severity - onshore & offshoreaverage days lost per LWDC

2.7 Severity of lost workday cases (LWDC)

Overall 24.18 (2% worse)§

Company 25.59 (22% worse)Contractor 23.74 (4% better)

Onshore 24.46 (4% worse)Offshore 23.11 (8% better)


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In 2005 7�% of the reported hours qualify for inclusion in this analysis.

The upstream industry reported 44�95 days of work lost through injuries. This equates to around 200 man-years of activity. The number of days lost was reported for 83% of the lost workday cases. Overall a 2% increase can be seen in the 2005 result compared to 2004. The difference between company and contractor sever-ity levels has reduced to 7%.The difference between onshore and offshore LWDC severity is 6%.

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Severity

Severity is defined as the average number of days lost (where reported) for each lost workday case.

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Total recordable incident rate – company & contractorsper million hours worked

Total recordable incident rate - onshore & offshoreper million hours worked

2.8 Total recordable incident rate (TRIR)





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TRIR calculations are only made on returns that include information on medical treatment cases as well as other data. In 2005, 96% of the reported hours qualified for inclu-sion in this analysis.

Improvement can be seen in 2005 in all of the measures of TRIR listed above, each measure being the lowest on record to date. The overall value is 23% lower than the 2004 value.The greatest improvement in TRIR was associated with company activity, where the result was less than half that reported in 2004. Similarly, offshore a 39% reduction was measured against the 2004 value.

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Total recordable incident rate (TRIR)

The number of recordable incidents (fatalities + lost workday cases + restricted workday cases + medical treatment cases) per 1,000,000 hours worked.

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Number %Air transport 0 0Caught between �69 �3.6Electrical �4 �.�Explosion/burn 39 3.�Fall 226 �8.2Other 222 �7.9Struck by 3�7 25.5Vehicle incident �27 �0.2Water related 0 0Unknown �29 �0.4

Lost Work Day Case (LWDC)

A Lost Work Day Case is an incident resulting in at least one day of work. Fatal incidents are not included. Information on the cause of reported Lost Work Day Cases has been requested for the first time this year. LWDCs are categorised as “Air Transport”, “Caught Between”, “Electrical”, “Explosion/burn”, “Fall”, “Other”, Struck by”, “Vehicle incident” and “Water related”.

2.9 Lost Work Day Case causes

The pie chart shows the percentage of LWDCs within each of the reporting categories for 2005.

The greatest number of incidents was reported as “struck by” (3�7).

• Other 20%

Vehicleincidents

11%

Struck by 29%

Fall20%

Explosion/burn 4%

Electrical 1%

Caught between 15%

Lost Work Day Cases (excluding ‘unknown’)

In 2005, 33 of the 39 contributing companies reported Lost Work Day Case causes for 50 of the 74 reported countries (�243 of the 22�4 reported).

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Lost Work Day Cases by cause Onshore and offshoreCategory Onshore OffshoreAir transport 0 0Caught between 111 58Electrical 13 1Explosion/burn 34 5Fall 174 52Other 156 66Struck by 216 101Vehicle incident 127 0Water related 0 0Unknown 117 12 948 295

Other 19%

Vehicleincidents

15%

Struck by 26%

Fall21%

Explosion/burn 4%

Electrical 2%

Caught between 13%

Lost Work Day Cases (excluding ‘unknown’)Onshore

Other 23%

Struck by 37%

Fall18%

Explosion/burn 2%

Caught between 20%

Lost Work Day Cases (excluding ‘unknown’)Offshore

�27 vehicle related incidents were reported.Onshore 26% of the LWDCs were “struck by” incidents and 2�% were “falls”. “Vehicle incidents” accounted for �5% of reported cases. 37% of the offshore LWDCs were categorised as “struck by”.

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Lost Work Day Cases by cause Company and contractorCategory Company ContractorAir transport 0 0Caught between 20 149Electrical 3 11Explosion/burn 10 29Fall 43 183Other 36 186Struck by 43 274Vehicle incident 50 77Water related 0 0Unknown 68 61 273 970

Other 18%

Vehicleincidents

24%

Struck by 21%

Fall21%

Explosion/burn 5%

Electrical 1%

Caught between 10%

Lost Work Day Cases (excluding ‘unknown’)Company

Other 20%

Vehicleincidents

8%

Struck by31%

Fall21%

Explosion/burn 3%

Electrical 1%

Caught between 16%

Lost Work Day Cases (excluding ‘unknown’)Contractor

24% of the LWDCs that affected company personnel were “vehicle incidents”.“Struck by” incidents account for 3�% (274) of the con-tractor cases and 2�% (43) of the company cases.Falls are the second most frequent cause of LWDC injuries at 2�% for both company and contractor per-sonnel.

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2.10 Accident triangles

In this section the relative numbers of types of occupational injury are shown in the form of ‘accident triangles’. The ratios have been corrected to account for the absence, in some returns, of medical treatment cases.

Overall the ratio of lost time injuries to fatalities is 27:� and for total recordable incidents to lost time inju-ries about 3:�. In 2004 these ratios were 20:� and 3:� respectively.

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2005 accident triangles

2004 accident triangles

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3 Results by region

In this section the safety performance of regions and individual countries within the regions are presented.

A list of countries from which companies have reported information is provided in Appendix H, which also shows the division of countries into regions. The term Australasia refers to Australia, New Zealand and the islands in the SW Pacific.

3.1 Fatalities


Africa 0.67 (9% better)Asia/Australasia 0.35 (30% better)Europe 1.66 (4% worse)FSU 0.70 (33% better)Middle East 0.92 (10% worse)North America 0.81 (34% better)South America 2.20 (1% better)

§ The percent. in parentheses is relative to 2004 average

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The figure presents the LTIF for the seven regions for both 2005 and 2004. It can be seen that the LTIF has improved, compared to the 2004 values in South America, North America, the FSU, Africa and Asia/Australasia.

In common with the previous year, Asia/Australasia is seen to be the best performing region, and South America the worst. However, the largest improvement from 2004 to 2005 is seen for operations in the North American region from �.2 in 2004 to 0.8 in 2005, an improvement of one third.

Fatal Fatalities incidentsAfrica 19 24Asia/Australasia 3 3Europe 6 7FSU 23 24MiddleEast 9 12NorthAmerica 3 3SouthAmerica 11 11

The table shows the number of fatal incidents and fatalities in each of the 7 regions into which the data are partitioned. It can be seen that the highest number of fatalities occurred in the FSU region where 24 fatalities were reported, �7% fewer than in 2004.

A further 6 fatal incidents were reported involving third par-ties only, each the cause of one fatality. Five of the incidents occurred in Africa and � occurred in Asia/Australasia.

Further analysis of the fatality statistics is presented in Section 3.3, where 5-year rolling averages of FAR are pre-sented for each of the regions.

3.2 Lost time injury frequency

Lost time injury frequencyper million hours worked

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2005 average 0.97

Five regions, Middle East, North America, FSU, Africa and Asia/Australasia are seen to perform better than the world average of 0.97.

Further analysis of the lost time incidents is presented in Section 3.3, where 5-year rolling averages of LTIF are pre-sented for each of the regions.

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3.3 FAR and LTIF 5-year rolling averages

In order to smooth out variability in the annual values of the regional FAR and LTIF, 5-year rolling averages are com-puted which should provide a more reliable indicator of per-formance trends.

Each figure shows FAR and LTIF 5-year rolling averages for one of the seven regions, and includes the ‘all regions’ curves.

FAR 5-year rolling averageThe best performing region in 2005 is Asia/Australasia, with a 5-year rolling average value of FAR of 2.�, which is considerably lower than the average for all regions of 4.7.

The worst performing region is Africa, with a FAR of 7.0, although steady improvement can be seen over the �0-year period for the region.

The largest reduction in FAR during the �0-year period shown has occurred in the South American region, where the 2005 value (3.9) is just 27% of the �996 value (�4.3).

LTIF 5-year rolling averageSteady improvement in the LTIF in all regions is evident, with the 2005 values representing the lowest values on record. Asia/Australasia reported the best LTIF perform-ance, achieving a 5-year rolling average LTIF of 0.5.

The worst performing region is South America with an LTIF of 2.3. South America has been the worst perform-ing region since �996, although steady improvement can be seen over the �0-year period for the region and the 2005 value (2.3) is 69% lower than the �996 value (6.3).

The North American region has realised the greatest improvement in LTIF over the period shown, with the 2005 value (�.2) being just 30% of the �996 value (3.9).

Asia/Australasia FAR and LTIF 5-year rolling average(FAR per 100 million hours worked, LTIF per million hours worked)

Africa FAR and LTIF 5-year rolling average(FAR per 100 million hours worked, LTIF per million hours worked)

Europe FAR and LTIF 5-year rolling average(FAR per 100 million hours worked, LTIF per million hours worked)

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Middle East FAR and LTIF 5-year rolling average(FAR per 100 million hours worked, LTIF per million hours worked)

North America FAR and LTIF 5-year rolling average(FAR per 100 million hours worked, LTIF per million hours worked)

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10

15

20

Average LTIF

Average FARMiddle East LTIF

Middle East FAR

2005200420032002200120001999199819971996

0

5

10

15

20

Average LTIF

Average FARNorth America LTIF

North America FAR

2005200420032002200120001999199819971996

FSU FAR and LTIF 5-year rolling average(FAR per 100 million hours worked, LTIF per million hours worked)

0

5

10

15

20

Average LTIF

Average FARFSU LTIF

FSU FAR

2005200420032002200120001999199819971996

South America FAR and LTIF 5-year rolling average(FAR per 100 million hours worked, LTIF per million hours worked)

0

5

10

15

20

Average LTIF

Average FARSouth America LTIF

South America FAR

2005200420032002200120001999199819971996

20


© 2006 OGP

3.4 Severity of lost workday cases

SeverityAverage days lost per LWDC


Africa 12.41 (30% better)Asia/Australasia 14.29 (28% better)Europe 27.78 (3% worse)FSU 32.98 (22% worse)Middle East 17.54 (8% worse)North America 35.30 (37% better)South America 27.01 (12% worse)

§ The percent. in parentheses is relative to 2000-2004 average results

••••••••

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2000-2004 average

2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

Middl East

FSUEuropeAsia/Australia

Africa

2005 average 24.2 The figure shows the average number of days lost per LWDC for each of the 7 regions. Also shown is the average number of days lost for the preceding 5-year period for each region.

The severity of LWDC remains the highest in the North American region compared with the other regions, with 35.3 days lost per LWDC in 2005. Compared to an aver-age of 55.7 days lost per LWDC for the previous 5-year period, however, the North American average shows a 37% improvement.

No clear trend is evident in the changes in severity between the 2005 values and the preceding 5 years.

2�


© 2006 OGP

The figure shows the TRIR for the 7 regions, compared to the average for the preceding 5-year period for each of the regions.

The 2005 TRIR has fallen in all regions compared to the previous 5-year regional average value. The largest reduc-tion is associated with operations in Europe where the 2005 value (4.8�) is just 35% of the European average value for the preceeding 5-year period.


Total recordable incident rateper million hours workedOverall 3.05 (29% better)§

Africa 2.49 (19% better)Asia/Australasia 1.74 (24% better)Europe 4.81 (35% better)FSU 1.71 (18% better)Middle East 2.99 (21% better)North America 5.03 (31% better)South America 4.68 (18% better)

§ The percent. in parentheses is relative to 2000-2004 average results

••••••••

0

2

4

6

8

2000-2004average

2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast

FSUEuropeAsia/Australasia

Africa

2005 average 3.1

3.6 Individual country performance

The safety performance of individual countries is presented in terms of the lost time injury frequency of companies jointly with contractors. To preserve the anonymity of companies, performance is only published for those coun-tries for which at least 2 companies have reported statistics. Countries with less than 50,000 reported hours worked are excluded, since results for such small populations of hours would be unrepresentative.

Of the 75 countries from which data have been reported, �8 are excluded by these constraints.

The chart of relative performance for the remaining 57 countries compares the 2005 performance with that in 2004 and 2003.

South Africa, Bangladesh, Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore reported zero lost time incidents in 2005. However, they all reported relatively few work hours (�28,000, �675,000, �403,000, �253,000 and 266,000 respectively).

The large majority of countries in Africa, Asia/Australasia, FSU and North America perform at least as well as the global average (0.97). The majority of countries in the European region perform worse than the global average.

For comparison, the 5-year average FAR is shown for each of the regions. There appears to be little if any correlation between these values and the regional average LTIF values.

22


© 2006 OGP

Lost time injury frequency - companies with contractorsper million hours worked

FAR5-year rolling average

7.0

FAR5-year rolling average2.1


FAR5-year rolling average

6.7




Global average(2005): 0.97

0 2 4 6 8

2003

2004

2005

Trinidad & TobagoBrazil

BoliviaColombia

EcuadorSouth America average

ArgentinaVenezuela

PeruSouth America

USANorth America average

CanadaMexico

North America

UAEOmanKuwait

Middle East averageSaudi Arabia

IranSyria

QatarYemen

Middle East

AzerbaijanKazakhstan

FSU averageRussiaFSU

GermanyFrance

UKNetherlands

IrelandNorway

Europe averageItaly

DenmarkAlbania

SpainEurope

SingaporeVietnam

PhilippinesBangladesh

IndonesiaBrunei

PakistanPapau New Guinea

Asia-Australasia averageThailand

IndiaMalaysia

ChinaAustralia

New ZealandAsia-Australasia

South AfricaEquatorial Guinea

AngolaEgypt

CongoNigeria

Africa averageCameroun

GabonAlgeria

LibyaTunisia

Africa

2005 regional average

One or more fatalities (2005)

23


© 2006 OGP

4 Results by function

In this section the safety performance within different functions performed in the E&P industry is presented. Functions are defined as ‘exploration’, ‘drilling’, ‘production’, and ‘other’, the last being the category for activi-ties other than in the first three. The overall results quoted take account also of data provided by contributing companies which were not allocated to one of these four, ie the ‘unspecified’ category.

The distribution of company and contractor fatal incidents and fatalities between the functions are shown in the table for both 2005 and 2004. A reduction is noted in the number of fatalities reported as ‘unspecified’ for 2005 compared to 2004.

In order to compare the rate at which fatalities occur for each of the different functions, ideally the number of fatali-ties should be normalised by the associated number of workhours. Unfortunately, many operations around the world have reported workhours as ‘unspecified’ even though they relate a particular fatality to a specific work function (eg an organisation may report a drilling related fatality, how-ever all their workhours are reported as ‘unspecified’). In order to overcome this problem (and for this section only) all the hours reported as ‘unspecified’ have been reclassi-fied into ‘exploration’, ‘drilling’, ‘production’ or ‘other’ in accordance with the way the remaining hours are distributed within these categories. In addition, any fatality reported as ‘unspecified’ is excluded from this analysis.

The FAR associated with the different functions is com-pared in the above figure for the period �998 to 2005. Considerable variability can be seen over this period, with no clear evidence that the performance of one function is better or worse than any other.

4.1 Fatalities

Fatal accident rateper 100 million hours worked

0

2

4

6

8

10 ExplorationDrilling

Production

Other

20052004200320022001200019991998

2005 2004 Fatal Fatalities Fatal Fatalities incidents† incidentsExploration 2 2 1 1Drilling 6 6 13 21Production 22 22 30 35Other 33 41 39 42Unspecified 11 13 19 21

Fatal accident rate

Exploration Drilling Production Other1998 5.80 4.88 5.11 5.671999 2.31 2.03 8.10 5.812000 3.15 7.44 5.36 5.352001 5.69 8.05 2.64 3.002002 5.90 2.60 3.54 4.742003 7.06 7.09 3.75 4.892004 1.36 6.98 3.59 4.462005 3.10 1.93 2.57 3.57

† The number of fatal incidents in each category is derived from the job function of each fatality in each incident. Hence inci-dents where more than one job function is represented will be listed as an incident associated with each job function.

24


© 2006 OGP


Exploration 1.12 (84% worse)Drilling 1.53 (11% better)Production 1.22 (1% better)Other 0.76 (1% better)


•

••••

4.2 Lost time injury frequency (LTIF)

Lost Time Injury Frequencyper million hours worked

0

1

2

3

4

5 ExplorationDrilling

Production

Other

2005200420032002200120001999199819971996

The figure shows the LTIF associated with each of the dif-ferent functions. Compared to the 2004 values, improve-ment can be seen in the LTIF for all functions except ‘Exploration’, where the LTIF has increased by 84%. The ‘Drilling’ category has reported the highest LTIF through-out the period shown, however it has realised the greatest reduction in LTIF of all the functions since �996, with the 2005 value (�.53) being just 3�% of the �996 value (4.86).

4.3 Severity of lost workday cases

Severityaverage lost days per LWDC

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

2000-2004 average

2005

ExplorationProductionOtherDrilling

2005 average 24.2

The figure shows the average number of days lost per LWDC. The severity of drilling related injuries has decreased, show-ing a 29% reduction compared to the 2000-2004 average (37.3). The exploration average has almost halved compared to the 2000-2004 average.

25


© 2006 OGP


Exploration 2.91 (24% better)Drilling 5.80 (18% better)Production 3.64 (21% better)Other 2.24 (17% better)

§ The percent. in parentheses relates to the 2000–2004 aver-age

•

••••


Total recordable incident rateper million hours worked

0

2

4

6

8

10

2000-2004 average

2005

OtherProductionExplorationDrilling

2005 average 3.05

The figure shows the TRIR associated with each of the functions. The highest reported TRIR was associated with drilling related activities.

Improvement can be seen in all activities compared to 2004 results. Overall the TRIR has improved by 28% compared to the average of the preceding 5-year period (4.32).

26


© 2006 OGP

4.5.1 Lost time injury frequencyThe figures show the LTIF performance of companies and contractors for exploration related activities, in different regions of the world. The 2005 performance is compared to performance in the previous 5-year period.

In 2005 the average LTIF values for companies and con-tractors engaged in exploration activities are 0.39 and �.30 respectively; the global average LTIF is 0.97. The company result is down by 26% compared to the 2000-2004 aver-age (0.53) while the contractor result has increased by 44% compared to the 2000-2004 average (0.90).

There has been a marked increase in contractor LTIF per-formance associated with exploration activities in the African region. Both company and contractor LTIF per-formance in the Middle East have increased compared to the previous 5-year period for exploration activities.

NOTE: In many instances where the LTIF or TRIR is reported as 0.00, the number of workhours reported for the specific function and region are relatively low. A detailed breakdown of the hours by region and function is presented in Appendix B.

4.5 Exploration performance

Lost time injury frequency - explorationper million hours worked

0

1

2

3

4

5

Contractor 2000-2004 average

Contractor 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa0

1

2

3

4

5

Company 2000-2004 average

Company 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa

Contractor 2005 average 1.30

Company 2005 average 0.39

Exploration

Geophysical, seismographic and geological operations, including their administrative and engineering aspects, construction, maintenance, materials supply and transportation of personnel and equipment; excludes drilling.

27


© 2006 OGP

4.5.2 Total recordable incident rateThe figures show the TRIR performance of companies and contractors for exploration related activities, in different regions of the world. Notable improvements are seen in the TRIR performance of contractors in exploration activities in South America and Europe, while in the FSU the TRIR is nearly 4 times worse than the average for the previous 5-year period.

Total recordable incident rate – explorationper million hours worked

0

5

10

15

20


Contractor 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa 0

5

10

15

20


Company 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa



28


© 2006 OGP

4.6.1 Lost time injury frequencyThe figures show the LTIF performance of companies and contractors for drilling related activities in different regions of the world. Improvement can be seen in all regions for contractors and in all regions but Africa, Asia/Australasia and the FSU for companies.

4.6 Drilling performance

Lost time injury frequency - drillingper million hours worked

0

1

2

3

4

5


Contractor 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa 0

1

2

3

4

5


Company 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa



Drilling

All exploration, appraisal and production drilling and workover as well as their administrative, engineering, construction, materials supply and transportation aspects. It includes site preparation, rigging up and down and restoration of the drilling site upon work completion. Drilling includes ALL exploration, appraisal and production drilling.

29


© 2006 OGP

4.6.2 Total recordable incident rateThe figures show the TRIR performance of companies and contractors for drilling related activities in different regions of the world.

Improvement can be seen in contractor TRIR results in all regions apart from Africa when compared with the 2000-2004 average.

Total recordable incident rate – drillingper million hours worked

0

5

10

15

20


Contractor 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa 0

5

10

15

20


Company 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa



30


© 2006 OGP

4.7.1 Lost time injury frequencyThe figures show the LTIF performance of companies and contractors for production related activities in different regions of the world. The 2005 LTIF associated with com-panies working in production activities the South American region has doubled compared to the previous 5-year period. The LTIF for contractors working in production activities in Europe has reduced to 64% of the 2000-2004 average and the FSU 2005 result is just 35% of the average for the previous 5-year period for that region.

4.7 Production performance

Lost time injury frequency - productionper million hours worked

0

1

2

3

4

5


Contractor 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa 0

1

2

3

4

5


Company 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa

Contractor 2005 average 1.18Company 2005 average 1.31

Production

Petroleum and natural gas producing operations, including their administrative and engineering aspects, minor construction, repairs, maintenance and servicing, materials supply, and transportation of personnel and equipment. It covers all mainstream production operations including wireline. It does not cover production drilling and workover.

3�


© 2006 OGP

4.7.2 Total recordable incident rateThe figures show the TRIR performance of companies and contractors for production related activities in different regions of the world. When compared to the average for the previous 5-year period, improvement is shown in Africa, Asia/Australasia, Europe and North and South America for both company and contractor operations.

Total recordable incident rate – productionper million hours worked

0

5

10

15

20


Contractor 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa0

5

10

15

20


Company 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa

Contractor 2005 average 3.96 Company 2005 average 2.92

32


© 2006 OGP

4.8.1 Lost time injury frequencyThe figures show the LTIF performance of companies and contractors for ‘other’ activities, for different regions of the world. Compared to the average of the previous 5-year period, with the exception of Europe, the FSU and South America, the performance of contractors has improved, in particular those operating in the Middle East. The per-formance of companies operating in North America shows substantial improvement compared to the previous 5-year period while the South America average has more than dou-bled.

4.8 Other performance

Lost time injury frequency – otherper million hours worked

0

1

2

3

4

5


Contractor 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa0

1

2

3

4

5


Company 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa

Contractor 2005 average 0.83Company 2005 average 0.60

Other (as a category of work)

Major construction and fabrication activities and disassembly, removal and disposal (decommissioning) at the end of the life of a facility. Includes factory construction of process plant, offshore installation, hookup and commissioning, and removal of redundant facilities. Also includes personnel and incidents that cannot naturally be assigned to exploration, drilling or production.

33


© 2006 OGP

4.8.2 Total recordable incident rateThe figures show the TRIR performance of companies and contractors during the performance of ‘other’ activities, for different regions of the world. Compared to the previ-ous 5-year averages, improvement can be seen in all regions for contractors, except for those operating in the FSU. Similarly, improvement can be seen for companies operat-ing in all regions but Asia/Australasia and South America with the greatest improvement shown in North America.

Total recordable incident rate – otherper million hours worked

0

5

10

15

20


Contractor 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa0

5

10

15

20


Company 2005

SouthAmerica

NorthAmerica

MiddleEast


Africa



34


© 2006 OGP

35


© 2006 OGP

5 Results by company

This section compares the safety performance of individual companies with each other and with their perform-ance in previous years. The comparison is made in terms of the LTIF, which is believed to be the most representa-tive indicator for inter-company benchmarking.

Where non-operator companies have provided joint venture information, the information is excluded from the analysis to derive the company result.

5.1 Overall company results

For reasons of anonymity each of the 38 companies that has contributed relevant data and is to be included in this analy-sis has been allocated a unique code letter (A to LL).

The figure shows, in rank order, the LTIF for companies together with their contractors. 36 companies (A to JJ) con-tributed company and contractor data, although not always for every country in which operations were conducted.

The LTIF for the company alone is plotted alongside the LTIF for company and contractors jointly. The incidence of a fatality in either company or contractor operations is also indicated. Details of results are tabulated in Appendix B.

The best result is achieved by company JJ, with a LTIF of 0.22 for company with contractors. 22 companies with their contractors delivered a LTIF of less than �.2� companies’ performance was better than the average (0.97) and �5 companies’ performance was worse.The worst performing company, company A, has a LTIF of 9.43, nearly �0 times the 2005 industry average.�8 of the 36 companies presented below suffered one or more fatality. In �0 instances, contractors outperformed the compa-nies they were employed by.

•

•

•

•

•

•

Performance ranking of companies jointly with contractors – lost time injury frequencyper million hours worked

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Company only

Company with contractors

LLKKJJIIHHGGFFEEDDCCBBAAZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Fatality in 2005 (either companyor contractor operations)

2005 companies with contactorsaverage 0.97

36


© 2006 OGP

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Company only

Company with Contractors

ONMSKADDCCGGFFEEAAHHVIIJJUXFTRIHEYLLQCZKKWPGLJBBBD


2005 companies onlyaverage 0.83

In the figure below, the data are reorganised to show com-panies ranked according to LTIF performance for company personnel alone, omitting contractor input. Those compa-nies that only submitted data for company activities, KK and LL, are now included.

9 companies, GG, CC, DD, A, K, S, M, N and O, had no lost time incidents among company employees (LTIF zero). However, all these companies reported relatively few workhours, hence the results are unlikely to be a reliable indicator of their longer term perform-ance.The worst performing company, company D, achieved a LTIF of 4.�5, 5 times greater than the 2005 company average (0.83) and 55% greater than that of the next poorest performing company.25 companies performed better than the 2005 com-pany only average and �3 companies performed worse.

•

•

•

Performance ranking of companies alone – lost time injury frequencyper million hours worked

37


© 2006 OGP

In the figure below the LTIF is presented for those com-panies which, with their contractors, reported more than �0 million hours worked. 28 companies met this criteria. Companies are shown in rank order of the company-with-contractor LTIF performance.

�4 of the 28 companies with their contractors per-formed better than the global average for companies with contractors (0.95).The best performing company is JJ with an LTIF of 0.22 and the worst is C with an LTIF of 4.08.�7 of the 28 companies suffered one or more fatalities.

•

•

•

Performance ranking of companies jointly with contractors, joint hours>10 million – lost time injury frequencyper million hours worked

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Company only

Company with Contractors

JJIIHHGGFFEEBBAAZXWVUTRQPOMLKJHGFEDC


2005 industry average 0.95

38


© 2006 OGP

The table below shows the trends in company-with-con-tractor performance. The 36 companies reporting joint performance are listed together with the LTIF for 2005. For each company where data are available the chart shows whether performance in the reference year had improved or worsened relative to the previous year.

Only companies U and HH achieved improvement year by year over the previous 5-year period and only company G has improved year by year over the past 4 years.Companies I and II have shown consistent improve-ment over the past 3 years.No company’s performance deteriorated year by year over the period 200�-2005.

•

•

•

Company code

Company & contractor LTIF

LTIF Performance relative to previous year

2005 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

A 9.43 worse better worse better

B 4.37 worse

C 4.08 worse better better better better

D 3.01 worse worse worse better better

E 2.96 worse better worse worse worse

F 2.80 better worse better better better

G 1.77 better better better better worse

H 1.68 better better worse better better

I 1.46 better better better worse better

J 1.40 worse worse better better worse

K 1.37

L 1.36 worse worse better better better

M 1.22 better better worse better worse

N 1.19

O 0.98

P 0.96 better better worse better better

Q 0.96 worse better worse

R 0.95

S 0.93 worse better worse

T 0.88 better same better

U 0.84 better better better better better

V 0.83 better better worse better worse

W 0.79 better worse better worse better

X 0.77 worse worse better better better

Y 0.67 better worse better worse better

Z 0.66 better better worse better better

AA 0.46 better worse worse

BB 0.45 better worse worse better

CC 0.41 better worse better better better

DD 0.35

EE 0.34 better worse better worse worse

FF 0.32 better same better better

GG 0.30 better worse better better better

HH 0.26 better better better better better

II 0.25 better better better worse

JJ 0.22 better better worse better better

39


© 2006 OGP

The chart below shows the achievements of the two com-panies that showed the greatest year-by-year improvements from 200�-2005, companies U and HH. Also shown is the overall performance of all companies.

Company U achieved a 79% reduction in LTIF since 200�. From an LTIF around 2.5 times the average in 200�, in 2005 it performed at �3% below the overall average.Company HH has achieved a reduction in its LTIF since 200� of 6�%. In 200� its LTIF stood at 58% below the average for that year while today it has reduced to 73% below the average for 2005.

•

•

Exemplary improvements in LTIFper million hours worked by companies with contractors

0 1 2 3 4 52005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001Company with bestimprovement record since 2001

Company with second bestimprovement record since 2001

Average for all companies

Company U

Company HH

LTIF

40


© 2006 OGP

Results of companies together with their contractors have been analysed by function to allow more in-depth bench-marking between companies. The LTIF indicator has been selected, and the ranked results are shown in the following charts. Only companies who provided data by function are included, and then only those companies who had more

than �00,000 hours worked. Results against smaller num-bers of hours would not have any statistical significance. The company code letters are the same as used elsewhere in this chapter. For those companies that submitted data in both 2005 and 2004, details of whether the performance in 2005 was better or worse than in 2004 is shown on the graph.

5.2 Company results by function

Lost time injury frequency – Explorationper million hours worked by company with contractors

0

3

6

9

12

15

ZYWPLHHGDDBBBJJUFJSDXC

Overall 1.12 (worse)

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0

BetterNo changeWorseN/A

Lost time injury frequency – Drillingper million hours worked by company with contractors

0

3

6

9

12

15

NIJJGGWIISHHKZYJXDDULPQOMCCDCGFEAB

Overall 1.53 (better)

BetterNo change

Worse

N/A

0 0

Lost time injury frequency – Productionper million hours worked by company with contractors

0

3

6

9

12

15

YDDCCBBIIJJHHXZSPUQGGRWMJGILEBDFAC


BetterNo change

Worse

N/A

0000

43.9

Lost time injury frequency – Otherper million hours worked by company with contractors

0

3

6

9

12

15

YIIIJJHHCCGGDDLURQXZMWJPOSFKGECDBBB


000

BetterNo change

Worse

N/A

4�


© 2006 OGP

Appendix D gives details of the significant incidents reported for 2005. Significant incidents are intended to be incidents that result in a lost time injury or have the poten-tial to result in a fatality or serious injury.

In 2005, organisations were requested to limit the signifi-cant incidents they submit to those with a high potential to cause one or more fatalities, and for which there was a ‘high learning’ value. As such, comparison with significant inci-dent data submitted in previous years is of limited value.

As far as possible, the significant incidents are categorised into the same categories as used for the fatal incidents.

6 Significant incidents

6.1 Significant incidents by category

Significant incidents by category

Other 9%

Vehicle incidents 8%

Struck by 31%

Fall 12%

Explosion/burn 20%

Electrical 5%

Water related 1%

Caught between 12%

Air transport 2%Other - chemical 2%

Other - structural 6%

Other11%

Vehicleincidents

4%

Struck by 47%

Fall 4%

Explosion/burn 8%

Electrical 4%

Water related 2%

Caught between 4%

Air transport 8%

2005 2000-2004

Summary of 2005 significant incidents22 of the 39 contributing companies submitted significant incident reports. The total number of reports is 48. A wide range of incidents is reported. Associated with each are de-tails related to the underlying causes and corrective actions and recommendations.

A large number (47%) of the incidents reported were in the ‘struck-by’ category.

42


© 2006 OGP

7 Conclusions

The safety performance of the global E&P industry in 2005 has been presented. It is based on the analysis of 238� mil-lion workhours of data, submitted by 39 companies, from operations in 75 countries. This represents the largest data-base used in the analysis of the industry’s safety perform-ance.

Against the background of a 4% increase in workhours reported, the number of fatalities has fallen from �20 in 2004 to 84 in 2005. The resulting Fatal Accident Rate (3.53) is the lowest on record, adding further credence to a downward trend in this important parameter.

Vehicle incidents and individuals being struck by falling or moving objects remain the two most significant causes of fatalities reported by the E&P industry, representing 57% of the total. Fifteen (�8%) Fall related fatalities are docu-mented; a significant increase compared to previous years.

Forty-eight (57%) of the fatalities were associated with operations in Africa and FSU – the Fatal Accident Rate for the two regions being 5.08 and 5.4� respectively, com-pared to a global average of 3.53.

For the first time on record, the overall Lost Time Injury Frequency has fallen below �.00. This continues a long term downward trend in the parameter.

In an effort to understand better the underlying causes of Lost Workday Cases, a new addition to the report is the breakdown of these incidents into key categories. The major-ity of cases (25.5%, 3�7 cases) are associated with individu-als being struck by falling or moving objects, and a further 20% percent (226) are fall related.

Improvements to the data collection and reporting systems have resulted in more detailed information being presented concerning the root causes and corrective measures associ-ated with the reported fatalities and significant incidents. This should allow organisations to improve the learnings they gain from incidents other organisations have experi-enced.

43


© 2006 OGP

Appendix A Database dimensions

Hours workedmillions

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Manhours contractor

Manhours company

200520042003200220012000199919981997199619951994199319921991199019891988198719861985

Hours worked – by companypercent.

Cumulative number of companies

Cum

ulativ

e %

0

20

40

60

80

100

The database for the year 2005 covers 2,380,670,000 hours worked in the exploration and production sector of the oil and gas industry. The database is 4% larger than it was in 2004.

27% of the hours reported were associated with com-pany activities, 73% with contractor activities.79% of the hours reported were associated with onshore activities, 2�% with offshore activities.75 countries are represented in the database, 3 fewer than in 2004. Countries are listed in appendix H. 39 companies contributed data. All but 2 contributed contractor statistics, though not in every case for each country of operation. Of the 39 companies, 34 had contributed data in 2004. Since these 34 accounted for 96 % of the database in 2005, comparison of the year 2005 results with those of 2004 is legitimate and statistically meaningful. 33 of the companies submitting 2005 data had also provided data in 2003.

•

•

•

•

•

Hours reported (‘000s)

Onshore OffshoreCompany 546,158(23%) 93,134(4%)Contractor 1,330,851(56%) 410,527(17%)

44


© 2006 OGP

�0 of the companies contributed 74% of the hours. 5 companies between them covered nearly 50% of the hours, and the largest contributor accounted for �5%.

• In 2005 Africa contributed a larger share of the data than any other region (20%).

•

Europe is the region with the smallest percentage of the 2005 database (8%).More use has been made of the ‘unspecified’ and ‘other’ categories than in previous years. More hours fell into the ‘other’ category than any other.

•

•

A summary of the key elements of the database is shown in the table at the end of this section.

Hours worked - by region

South America13.2%

NorthAmerica10.6%

MiddleEast 16.2%

FSU 15.3%Europe 9.0%

Asia/Australasia

16.8%

Africa 19.8%South America

13.3%

NorthAmerica

9.4%

MiddleEast 16.1%

FSU 18.6%

Europe 8.0%

Asia/Australasia

16.8%

Africa 19.9%

2005 2004

Hours worked - by function

Unspecified21.1%

Other38.4%

Production28.2%

Drilling 10.3%

Exploration 1.9% Unspecified17.1%

Other34.1%

Production35.2%

Drilling 10.9%

Exploration 2.7%

2005 2004

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© 2006 OGP

For calculations of FAR, FIR and LTIF:All hours in the database were used.

For calculations of TRIR:Submissions without information on medical treat-ment cases were filtered out, leaving a database of 2,278 million hours, 96% of the total database.In 2004, the TRIR database was �,847 million hours, 8�% of the total database.In Europe, FSU and South America �00% of the data-base was used. The region where the smallest propor-tion of the database could be used is Africa (88%).

For calculations of lost workday severity:Submissions without information on days off work were filtered out, leaving a database of �,697 million hours, 7�% of the total database.In 2004, this database was �,455 million hours, 64% of the total database.Europe and North America have only 40% and 46% severity information respectively, whereas 85% of the Middle East database was useable and 82% of the South America.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

For calculations of RWDC + LTI frequency:Submissions without information on restricted work-days were filtered out, leaving a database of 2,�40 mil-lion hours, 90% of the total database.In 2004, this database was �,6�0 million hours, 70% of the total database.Just 54% of the South American database contains RWDC information. �00% of the African and FSU databases was included.

For calculations of restricted workday severity:Submissions without information on days assigned to restricted activities were filtered out, leaving a database of 938 million hours, 39% of the total database.In 2004 this database was 830 million hours, 36% of the total database.

More detailed information is shown in the table below.

•

•

•

•

•

Percent. of useable data – regions

Lost workday RWDC+LTI TRIR case severity frequency analyses analyses analysesAfrica 88% 72% 100%Asia/Australasia 96% 69% 88%Europe 100% 40% 93%FSU 100% 78% 100%MiddleEast 92% 85% 92%NorthAmerica 99% 46% 97%SouthAmerica 100% 82% 54%

Percent. of useable data – functions

Lost workday RWDC+LTI TRIR case severity frequency analyses analyses analysesExploration 87% 74% 89%Drilling 97% 67% 88%Production 91% 68% 88%Other 97% 71% 91%

Proportion of database used in analysis

46


© 2006 OGP

Summary of data

Region Type

Hours worked (‘000s)

No. fatalities

No. LWDCs

No. RWDCs No. MTCs FAR LTIF TRIR

Africa CompanyOnshore 66,104 1 39 4 33 1.51 0.61 1.05

CompanyOffshore 17,335 1 10 6 15 5.77 0.63 1.85

ContractorOnshore 291,459 21 171 58 402 7.21 0.66 2.41

ContractorOffshore 97,981 1 72 86 189 1.02 0.75 3.59

Sub Total 472,879 24 292 154 639 5.08 0.67 2.49

Asia/Australasia

CompanyOnshore 57,935 0 15 6 58 0.00 0.26 1.45




Sub Total 348,806 3 120 107 354 0.86 0.35 1.74

Europe CompanyOnshore 50,487 0 39 7 28 0.00 0.77 1.47




Sub Total 191,127 7 310 113 488 3.66 1.66 4.81

FSU CompanyOnshore 163,431 4 101 2 29 2.45 0.64 0.83




Sub Total 443,782 24 286 107 343 5.41 0.70 1.71

MiddleEast

CompanyOnshore 88,188 2 73 14 47 2.27 0.85 1.63




Sub Total 383,968 12 343 192 551 3.13 0.92 2.99

NorthAmerica

CompanyOnshore 72,604 0 36 31 100 0.00 0.50 2.30




Sub Total 224,603 3 180 350 593 1.34 0.81 5.03

SouthAmerica

CompanyOnshore 47,409 0 89 1 54 0.00 1.88 3.04




Sub Total 315,505 11 683 144 638 3.49 2.20 4.68

Total CompanyOnshore 546,158 7 392 65 349 1.28 0.73 1.51


ContractorOnshore 1,330,851 67 1,266 787 2,200 5.03 1.00 3.33


Grand Total 2,380,670 84 2,214 1,167 3,606 3.53 0.97 3.05

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© 2006 OGP

Appendix B Data tables

Fatal accident rate – company & contractor 5-year trend 2005 Fatalities by category

Lost time injury frequency – company & contractor 5-year trend

1 Management summary

Fatal accident rate – company & contractor

Year Overall Company Contractor1996 8.12 3.05 11.431997 8.35 3.34 10.881998 12.55 4.67 16.631999 7.02 4.81 8.102000 7.28 4.72 8.662001 5.11 2.37 6.402002 4.81 2.04 6.002003 4.94 2.26 6.062004 5.24 2.82 6.182005 3.53 1.25 4.36

Hours 2005(‘000s) 2380670 639292 1741378

Fatal accident rate – onshore & offshore

Year Overall Onshore Offshore1996 8.12 8.02 8.441997 8.35 8.11 9.231998 12.55 14.46 6.581999 7.02 6.21 9.452000 7.28 8.03 4.672001 5.11 5.28 4.492002 4.81 4.86 4.652003 4.94 5.18 4.162004 5.24 5.00 6.022005 3.53 3.94 1.99

Hours 2005(‘000s) 2380670 1877009 503661

2 Overall results

Year Company Contractor2001 2.37 6.402002 2.04 6.002003 2.26 6.062004 2.82 6.182005 1.25 4.36

Category Number %Airtransport 0 N/ACaughtbetween 5 6.0Drowning 2 2.4Electrical 3 3.6Explosion/burn 4 4.8Fall 15 17.9Other 6 7.1Struckby 17 20.2Vehicleincidents 31 36.9Unknown 1 1.2Year Company Contractor

2001 1.34 1.712002 0.90 1.172003 0.79 1.322004 0.87 1.172005 0.83 1.02

Fatal incident rate – company & contractor

Year Overall Company Contractor1996 6.4 2.8 8.91997 6.54 2.57 8.551998 7.43 (6.10) 2.85 (2.85) 7.78 (7.78)1999 5.93 (4.84) 2.53 (2.53) 5.98 (5.98)2000 6.73 (5.88) 5.77 (4.37) 7.25 (6.67)2001 5.62 (4.70) 3.95 (1.90) 6.40 (6.03)2002 4.81 (3.87) 2.20 (1.41) 5.93 (4.92)2003 5.16 (4.49) 3.01 (1.96) 6.06 (5.56)2004 4.63 (4.32) 3.29 (2.82) 5.15 (4.90)2005 3.36 (3.11) 1.72 (1.25) 3.96 (3.79)

figures in parenthesis do not include 3rd party incidents

Fatal incident rate – onshore & offshore

Year Overall Onshore Offshore1996 6.4 6.7 5.61997 6.54 6.80 5.621998 7.43 (6.10) 7.81 (6.06) 6.22 (6.22)1999 5.93 (4.84) 5.55 (4.11) 7.09 (7.09)2000 6.73 (5.88) 7.24 (6.22) 4.94 (4.70)2001 5.62 (4.70) 5.92 (4.83) 4.49 (4.25)2002 4.81 (3.87) 5.47 (4.24) 2.63 (2.63)2003 5.16 (4.49) 5.47 (4.66) 4.16 (3.97)2004 4.63 (4.32) 4.95 (4.55) 3.58 (3.58)2005 3.36 (3.11) 3.62 (3.41) 2.38 (1.99)

figures in parenthesis do not include 3rd party incidents

Lost Work Day Cases by cause

Category 2005Airtransport 0Caughtbetween 169Electrical 14Explosion/burn 39Fall 226Other 222Struckby 317Vehicleincidents 127Waterrelated 0Unknown 129

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© 2006 OGP

Fatalities by category

Category 2005 2000-2004Airtransport 0 33Caughtbetween 5 43Drowning 2 27Electrical 3 34Explosion/burn 4 48Fall 15 40Other 6 48Struckby 17 103Vehicleincidents 31 148Unknown 1 29

Fatalities by age group 2003-2005

Age group Number<21 221-25 2326-30 2031-35 1836-40 1541-45 1946-50 1851-55 12>55 5

Lost workday case severity

Year Company Contractor Overall Onshore Offshore1996 19.2 21.4 20.7 18.4 25.91997 19.1 23.5 22.2 23.6 19.31998 17.70 21.40 20.30 20.02 20.851999 27.52 28.90 28.46 26.40 32.942000 37.31 23.35 27.89 27.98 27.542001 36.16 20.84 24.65 23.94 27.432002 41.63 26.40 30.92 30.19 33.252003 41.40 18.60 24.16 21.33 36.712004 21.01 24.85 23.79 23.42 25.102005 25.59 23.74 24.18 24.46 23.11

Hours (‘000s)2005 465983 1230646 1696629 1388558 308071

Total recordable incident rate


Hours (‘000s)2005 586982 1691247 2278229 1780326 497903

Lost time injury frequency


49


© 2006 OGP

Lost Work Day Cases by cause – company & contractor

Category Company ContractorAirtransport 0 0Caughtbetween 20 149Electrical 3 11Explosion/burn 10 29Fall 43 183Other 36 186Struckby 43 274Vehicleincidents 50 77Waterrelated 0 0Unknown 68 61

Lost Work Day Cases by cause – onshore & offshore

Category Company ContractorAirtransport 0 0Caughtbetween 111 58Electrical 13 1Explosion/burn 34 5Fall 174 52Other 156 66Struckby 216 101Vehicleincidents 127 0Waterrelated 0 0Unknown 117 12

3 Results by regionLost time injury frequency

Region 2005 2004 Hours 2005 (‘000s)Africa 0.67 0.74 472,879Asia/Australasia 0.35 0.50 348,806Europe 1.66 1.59 191,127FSU 0.70 1.04 443,782MiddleEast 0.92 0.84 383,968NorthAmerica 0.81 1.22 224,603SouthAmerica 2.20 2.23 315,505All regions 0.97 1.09 2,380,670

Fatal accident rate & lost time injury frequency – 5-year rolling averages

Year Africa Asia/ Europe FSU Middle North South All Australasia East America America regions Fatal accident rate1996 11.0 6.8 4.2 13.5 6.2 14.3 8.91997 10.9 6.7 4.3 10.2 6.9 13.4 8.51998 9.6 7.0 4.0 10.2 6.7 16.1 9.11999 10.0 7.4 3.9 9.4 5.9 16.2 9.02000 10.4 6.2 4.1 9.0 5.9 14.9 8.62001 10.0 4.6 5.3 5.0 8.7 4.4 13.6 8.12002 9.0 3.9 5.2 6.8 7.9 4.2 12.0 7.42003 9.4 3.7 3.6 5.5 6.5 4.5 6.5 5.82004 8.6 2.9 3.6 6.7 6.4 5.1 4.7 5.52005 7.0 2.1 3.7 6.7 4.9 4.4 3.9 4.7

Lost time injury frequency1996 2.0 1.4 4.7 1.7 3.9 6.3 3.51997 1.9 1.2 4.2 1.5 3.4 5.8 3.21998 2.0 1.2 3.8 1.4 2.9 4.9 2.91999 1.9 1.1 3.6 1.3 2.5 4.4 2.62000 1.8 1.0 3.3 1.5 2.2 3.9 2.32001 1.7 1.3 2.6 1.3 1.5 2.0 3.5 2.12002 1.5 1.2 2.3 1.0 1.5 1.8 2.9 1.82003 1.2 0.7 2.4 0.9 1.6 1.6 2.6 1.52004 1.0 0.6 2.2 0.9 1.5 1.4 2.5 1.42005 0.9 0.5 2.0 0.8 1.3 1.2 2.3 1.2

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© 2006 OGP


Year Africa Asia/ Europe FSU Middle North South All Australasia East America America regions2000 18.5 25.6 26.43 33.16 17.3 49.5 26.4 27.92001 18.35 17.97 25.41 32.43 15.01 49.17 22.92 24.652002 18.81 18.50 27.01 33.61 15.16 68.61 26.73 30.922003 18.33 16.03 25.20 14.56 16.27 62.98 17.92 24.162004 14.37 22.55 32.24 22.15 18.83 41.53 25.01 23.79Ave2000-2004 18.17 19.08 31.29 30.48 15.64 51.25 25.91 27.002005 12.41 14.29 27.78 32.98 17.54 35.30 27.01 24.18

Hours2005 342431 241224 76543 346365 326810 103395 259861 1696629(‘000s)



Hours2005 415753 335342 191010 443120 354075 223424 315505 2278229(‘000s)

5�


© 2006 OGP

Lost time injury frequency by country

Country LTIF Hours (‘000s)AfricaTunisia 4.98 3,213Libya 1.02 49,121Algeria 0.97 32,945Gabon 0.86 12,717Cameroun 0.75 8,023Africa average 0.67 472,879Nigeria 0.59 187,710Congo 0.58 12,102Egypt 0.55 65,462Angola 0.51 53,398EquatorialGuinea 0.37 16,064SouthAfrica 0.00 128

Asia-AustralasiaNewZealand 2.27 2,203Australia 1.30 15,442China 0.57 43,574Malaysia 0.52 48,204India 0.42 14,228Thailand 0.36 16,488Asia-Australasia average 0.35 348,806PapauNewGuinea 0.34 8,759Pakistan 0.24 21,173Brunei 0.22 22,876Indonesia 0.16 147,600Bangladesh 0.00 1,675Philippines 0.00 1,403Vietnam 0.00 1,253Singapore 0.00 266

EuropeSpain 6.63 1,206Albania 5.63 355Denmark 4.01 9,468Italy 3.60 4,726Europe average 1.66 191,127Norway 1.48 68,810Ireland 1.39 717Netherlands 1.29 20,078UK 1.22 68,116France 1.15 8,680Germany 0.20 4,962

Country LTIF Hours (‘000s)FSURussia 0.87 263,295FSUaverage 0.70 443,782Kazakhstan 0.55 136,266Azerbaijan 0.11 37,469

Middle EastYemen 3.41 2,642Qatar 1.64 81,679Syria 1.49 3,345Iran 1.39 26,703SaudiArabia 1.07 29,946Middle East average 0.92 383,968Kuwait 0.68 41,386Oman 0.59 77,870UAE 0.53 120,362

North AmericaMexico 3.85 1,040Canada 0.89 49,716North America average 0.81 224,603USA 0.77 173,755

South AmericaPeru 3.16 1,582Venezuela 2.64 171,359Argentina 2.26 83,338South America average 2.20 315,505Ecuador 2.01 13,452Colombia 0.60 23,365Bolivia 0.56 7,099Brazil 0.50 1,983Trinidad&Tobago 0.15 13,320

Only countries listed are those for which at least 2 companies have reported statistics. All countries are

included in regional averages.

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© 2006 OGP

4 Results by function


Year Exploration Drilling Production Other Overall1996 2.48 4.86 2.29 N.A 2.681997 1.86 3.67 2.43 2.54 2.671998 2.34 4.29 2.45 1.17 2.421999 0.88 2.81 2.34 1.29 1.942000 0.97 2.29 1.62 1.75 1.882001 0.88 2.35 1.37 1.57 1.592002 0.40 1.69 1.22 0.75 1.092003 1.19 1.73 1.11 0.64 1.162004 0.61 1.71 1.23 0.77 1.092005 1.12 1.53 1.22 0.76 0.97

Hours (‘000s)2005 50,908 245,901 676,652 905,622 2,380,670


Year Exploration Drilling Production Other All functions2000 13.1 44.2 19.4 28.8 27.92001 17.1 36.3 21.2 20.4 24.72002 6.9 44.3 28.9 20.2 30.92003 22.2 36.3 23.2 18.5 24.22004 16.7 27.2 21.1 22.5 23.8Ave2000-2004 15.8 37.3 23.0 22.4 20.42005 8.4 26.5 26.7 21.8 24.2

Hours (‘000s) 2005 37,548 164,793 461,317 645,838 1,696,629


Year Exploration Drilling Production Other All functions2000 4.33 10.16 6.36 3.48 5.702001 5.76 9.14 4.83 3.76 4.862002 1.42 6.82 3.66 2.61 3.632003 3.50 5.31 3.81 2.02 4.002004 3.55 6.04 4.94 2.50 3.94Ave2000-2004 3.83 7.09 4.61 2.69 4.322005 2.91 5.80 3.64 2.24 3.05

Hours (‘000s) 2005 44,386 237,491 618,483 880,453 2,278,229

Fatal Accident Rate

Year Exploration Drilling Production Other1998 5.80 4.88 5.11 5.671999 2.31 2.03 8.10 5.812000 3.15 7.44 5.36 5.352001 5.69 8.05 2.64 3.002002 5.90 2.60 3.54 4.742003 7.06 7.09 3.75 4.892004 1.36 6.98 3.59 4.462005 3.10 1.93 2.57 3.57

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© 2006 OGP

Exploration – TRIR for company & contractor by region

Company Contractor Company Contractor manhours manhours (‘000s) (‘000s)Region 2005 2000-2004 2005 2000-2004 2005 2005Africa 0.00 1.08 3.35 3.10 1,294 14,630Asia/Australasia 0.00 0.91 0.90 2.65 1,237 7,747Europe 0.00 0.36 3.95 6.65 943 4,048FSU 0.00 0.00 16.39 4.46 99 305MiddleEast 2.33 0.52 3.40 2.07 860 2,645NorthAmerica 2.21 1.62 3.83 4.62 3,625 1,566SouthAmerica 0.00 7.93 5.82 12.24 751 4,636All regions 1.14 1.76 3.34 4.45 8,809 35,577

Drilling – LTIF for company & contractor by region

Company Contractor Company Contractor manhours manhours (‘000s) (‘000s)Region 2005 2000-2004 2005 2000-2004 2005 2005Africa 0.98 0.72 1.11 1.49 3,051 39,804Asia/Australasia 1.58 0.36 0.77 0.98 2,539 22,070Europe 0.75 1.19 3.21 3.33 2,670 17,775FSU 1.42 0.49 0.93 1.84 703 10,738MiddleEast 0.97 1.57 0.91 1.59 6,188 52,873NorthAmerica 0.32 1.71 1.05 1.66 3,168 28,503SouthAmerica 0.96 1.85 2.90 3.09 5,214 50,605All regions 0.93 1.49 1.59 2.00 23,533 222,368

Drilling – TRIR for company & contractor by region

Company Contractor Company Contractor manhours manhours (‘000s) (‘000s)Region 2005 2000-2004 2005 2000-2004 2005 2005Africa 2.45 3.64 5.68 5.32 2,453 34,345Asia/Australasia 3.15 1.49 3.86 4.21 2,539 22,009Europe 1.50 2.71 7.26 11.28 2,670 17,775FSU 2.84 1.51 3.17 6.70 703 10,738MiddleEast 2.05 1.71 5.60 5.94 3,896 52,873NorthAmerica 0.63 1.91 7.02 10.44 3,168 28,503SouthAmerica 2.69 1.77 7.81 8.52 5,214 50,605All regions 2.13 2.31 6.15 7.51 20,643 216,848

Exploration – LTIF for company & contractor by region

Company Contractor Company Contractor manhours manhours (‘000s) (‘000s)Region 2005 2000-2004 2005 2000-2004 2005 2005Africa 0.00 0.37 2.52 0.96 1,710 14,694Asia/Australasia 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.53 1,237 12,736Europe 0.00 0.12 1.24 1.63 943 4,048FSU 0.00 0.00 3.28 0.00 99 305MiddleEast 1.57 0.46 1.13 0.65 1,913 2,645NorthAmerica 0.28 0.19 0.00 0.78 3,625 1,566SouthAmerica 0.00 2.52 1.51 1.59 751 4,636All regions 0.39 0.53 1.30 0.90 10,278 40,630

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© 2006 OGP

Production – LTIF for company & contractor by region

Company Contractor Company Contractor manhours manhours (‘000s) (‘000s)Region 2005 2000-2004 2005 2000-2004 2005 2005Africa 1.06 1.30 0.55 0.96 25,563 111,230Asia/Australasia 0.53 0.48 0.27 0.55 18,883 48,874Europe 1.05 1.43 2.12 3.32 33,214 48,154FSU 1.14 1.15 0.42 1.20 47,205 26,239MiddleEast 1.01 1.02 1.05 0.80 51,441 86,427NorthAmerica 0.68 0.77 0.83 1.22 26,321 42,281SouthAmerica 4.60 2.16 2.45 2.71 21,303 89,517All regions 1.31 1.10 1.18 1.38 223,930 452,722

Production – TRIR for company & contractor by region


Other – LTIF for company & contractor by region


Other – TRIR for company & contractor by region


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© 2006 OGP

5 Results by company


Company code 2005 Company with Contractors

2005 Company only

A 9.43 0.00

B 4.37 2.16

C 4.08 0.94

D 3.01 4.15

E 2.96 0.71

F 2.80 0.56

G 1.77 1.28

H 1.68 0.69

I 1.46 0.69

J 1.40 1.97

K 1.37 0.00

L 1.36 1.51

M 1.22 0.00

N 1.19 0.00

O 0.98 0.00

Overall 0.97 0.83

P 0.96 1.26

Q 0.96 0.90

R 0.95 0.69

S 0.93 0.00

T 0.88 0.63

U 0.84 0.32

V 0.83 0.19

W 0.79 1.26

X 0.77 0.50

Y 0.67 0.75

Z 0.66 0.95

AA 0.46 0.14

BB 0.45 2.68

CC 0.41 0.00

DD 0.35 0.00

EE 0.34 0.13

FF 0.32 0.12

GG 0.30 0.00

HH 0.26 0.16

II 0.25 0.29

JJ 0.22 0.30

KK 1.07

LL 0.86

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© 2006 OGP

Most improved companies - company with contractor LTIF

Company & Year contractor LTIFCompanywithbest CompanyU 2001 3.94improvementrecordsince2001 2002 1.59 2003 1.27 2004 0.96 2005 0.84

Companywithsecondbest CompanyHH 2001 0.66improvementrecordsince2001 2002 0.54 2003 0.41 2004 0.33 2005 0.26

Averageforallcompanies 2001 1.59 2002 1.09 2003 1.16 2004 1.09 2005 0.97

Lost time injury frequency by function

Exploration

Company code

Company & Contractor LTIF

C 14.29X 2.99D 2.81S 1.42Overall 1.12J 1.11F 0.60U 0.40JJ 0.17B 0.00BB 0.00DD 0.00G 0.00HH 0.00L 0.00P 0.00W 0.00Y 0.00Z 0.00

Drilling

Company code


B 10.30A 6.67E 5.24F 4.33G 3.67C 3.59D 2.54CC 2.30M 2.14O 2.11Q 1.66P 1.61Overall 1.53L 1.49U 1.47DD 1.06X 1.06J 1.03Y 0.92Z 0.88K 0.85HH 0.69S 0.48II 0.35W 0.27GG 0.13JJ 0.05I 0.00N 0.00

Production

Company code


C 43.87A 11.91F 3.82D 3.38B 2.92E 2.76L 2.01I 2.00G 1.67J 1.65M 1.51W 1.50R 1.24Overall 1.22GG 1.03Q 0.98U 0.98P 0.89S 0.73Z 0.73X 0.69HH 0.30JJ 0.27II 0.25BB 0.00CC 0.00DD 0.00Y 0.00

Other

Company code


B 9.89BB 3.15D 2.80C 2.16E 1.73G 1.44K 1.40F 1.16S 1.13O 0.92Overall 0.76P 0.75J 0.73W 0.72M 0.64Z 0.63X 0.62Q 0.53R 0.50U 0.49L 0.37DD 0.35GG 0.26CC 0.25HH 0.13JJ 0.10I 0.00II 0.00Y 0.00

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© 2006 OGP

6 Significant incidentsSignificant incidents by category

Appendix A Database dimensionsTotal exposure hours – 1985-2005

Hours worked (millions)Year Overall Company Contractor1985 656 410 2451986 544 306 2381987 602 356 2471988 616 364 2531989 656 331 3251990 721 332 3891991 941 441 4991992 944 431 5131993 919 410 5091994 872 397 4751995 841 356 4851996 912 360 5511997 1161 389 7721998 1131 386 7461999 1197 395 8022000 1634 572 10622001 1977 633 13442002 2121 636 14842003 2247 664 15832004 2290 639 16522005 2381 639 1741

Exposure hours by region (‘000s)

2005 2004Africa 472,879 453,714Asia/Australasia 348,806 364,929Europe 191,127 206,901FSU 443,782 349,832MiddleEast 383,968 370,625NorthAmerica 224,603 242,906SouthAmerica 315,505 301,546All regions 2,380,670 2,290,453

Exposure hours by function (‘000s)

2005 2004Exploration 50,908 60,958Drilling 245,901 249,212Production 676,652 806,812Other 905,622 781,032Unspecified 501,587 392,439All functions 2,380,670 2,290,453

Category 2005 2000-2004Airtransport 4 14Caughtbetween 2 83Electrical 2 33Explosion/burn 4 145Fall 2 87Struckby 22 226Vehicleincident 2 58Waterrelated 1 6Other 5 61Other-Health 0 7Other-Structural 3 27Other-Cuts 0 14Other-Chemical 1 23Other-Strains 0 7Struckby-Eye 0 11Unknown 0 4

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© 2006 OGP

Appendix E Restricted workday analysesCombined RWDC & LTI frequency - overall

2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 Hours (‘000s) 2005Company 0.75 0.82 0.73 1.01 2.03 571,115Contractor 1.59 1.55 1.64 1.90 2.00 1,569,344

Overall 1.37 1.37 1.39 1.68 2.01 2,140,459

Onshore 1.31 1.23 1.23 1.43 1.80 1,696,636Offshore 1.61 1.85 1.92 2.57 2.76 443,823

Severity of restricted workday cases

2005 2000-2004 Hours (‘000s) 2005Company 12.45 14.49 202,839Contractor 13.77 12.54 735,320

Overall 13.66 12.81 938,159

Onshore 14.74 10.12 737,574Offshore 9.55 19.82 200,585

Combined RWDC & LTI frequency by region


Hours(‘000s)2005472,500 306,812 177,655 443,120 353,522 217,083 169,767 2,140,459

Combined RWDC & LTI frequency by function

Year Exploration Drilling Production Other Overall2000 1.59 3.96 2.47 1.38 2.372001 1.11 4.28 1.96 1.95 2.012002 0.73 3.29 1.65 1.24 1.682003 1.19 2.33 1.40 0.91 1.392004 0.78 2.50 1.29 0.95 1.37Ave2000-2004 1.02 2.99 1.67 1.15 1.672005 1.66 2.68 1.55 0.93 1.37

Hours(‘000s)2005 45,134 216,805 595,813 820,055 2,140,459

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© 2006 OGP

Combined RWDC & LTI frequency – exploration

Company Contractor manhours manhours Company Contractor (‘000s) (‘000s)Region 2005 2000-2004 2005 2000-2004 2005 2005Africa 0.00 0.51 2.66 0.58 1,710 14,688Asia/Australasia 0.00 0.53 0.26 1.35 1,237 7,747Europe 0.00 0.18 1.48 2.97 943 4,048FSU 0.00 0.00 3.28 2.75 99 305MiddleEast 1.70 0.45 2.11 1.07 1,767 2,368NorthAmerica 0.28 0.35 1.28 3.00 3,625 1,566SouthAmerica 0.00 0.00 3.54 1.48 510 4,521All regions 0.40 0.00 2.01 1.00 9,891 35,243

Combined RWDC & LTI frequency – drilling

Company Contractor manhours manhours Company Contractor (‘000s) (‘000s)Region 2005 2000-2004 2005 2000-2004 2005 2005Africa 0.98 0.44 1.68 1.96 3,051 39,764Asia/Australasia 1.58 0.83 1.50 1.82 2,539 22,009Europe 1.63 1.68 3.80 4.39 2,448 16,299FSU 1.42 0.00 1.12 3.01 703 10,738MiddleEast 1.34 2.84 2.86 3.70 5,992 49,367NorthAmerica 0.32 0.65 3.47 4.20 3,159 28,503SouthAmerica 0.00 1.05 4.85 3.12 1,898 30,335All regions 1.06 1.00 2.85 3.00 19,790 197,015

Combined RWDC & LTI frequency – production

Company Contractor manhours manhours Company Contractor (‘000s) (‘000s)Region 2005 2000-2004 2005 2000-2004 2005 2005Africa 1.25 1.22 0.92 0.93 25,563 111,230Asia/Australasia 0.69 1.05 0.80 1.06 18,815 44,927Europe 1.31 1.65 2.76 4.66 31,371 44,209FSU 1.20 0.92 0.69 0.64 46,855 25,927MiddleEast 1.20 1.36 1.54 1.20 48,229 84,287NorthAmerica 1.63 1.68 3.05 3.41 24,589 42,281SouthAmerica 0.25 1.33 3.60 2.26 8,107 39,423All regions 1.19 1.00 1.73 1.00 203,529 392,284

Combined RWDC & LTI frequency – other

Company Contractor manhours manhours Company Contractor (‘000s) (‘000s)Region 2005 2000-2004 2005 2000-2004 2005 2005Africa 0.56 0.41 0.77 0.79 33,959 163,933Asia/Australasia 0.70 0.54 0.58 0.94 18,554 69,033Europe 0.51 0.48 3.03 2.93 21,530 31,966FSU 0.48 0.37 1.17 1.01 109,871 156,763MiddleEast 0.56 0.53 1.27 1.74 26,875 105,757NorthAmerica 0.14 2.13 1.67 1.50 13,849 12,008SouthAmerica 0.11 0.39 1.09 1.68 9,091 46,866All regions 0.49 0.00 1.11 1.00 233,729 586,326

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Africa

Onshore

Angola, Exploration, 25/05/2005 Number of deaths: (1) Type of Incident: Vehicle incident3rdParty

A vehicle reversed, hitting an elderly person who subsequently died.What Went Wrong:

Failure to notice presence of person.Corrective Actions and Recommendations:

Driver training. Ensure contractors have adequate standards.

Chad, Production, 23/12/2005 Number of deaths: (1) Type of Incident: Vehicle incident3rdParty

A bus was unable to stop or avoid a child that had fallen into the road, running over and killing the child.


A security car driven by a contractor struck a pedestrian resulting in a third party fatality.


A contractor vehicle struck and killed a cyclist while returning to office.What Went Wrong:

Excessive speed.

Egypt, Other, 06/03/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Unknown

The injured person fell from a scaffold board platform walkway on which wire ropes were used as safety guard rails. The person sustained fatal injuries from falling onto a tank roof 20m below.

Egypt, Other, 21/03/2005 Number of deaths: 4 Type of Incident: OtherAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:UnknownAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:UnknownAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:UnknownAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Unknown

4 fatalities occurred due to asphyxiation in an argon atmosphere.

Egypt, Production, 03/01/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

Returning to the Camp, a minibus was turning left onto the main road, opposite the Camp’s gate. A bus coming from the opposite direction hit the minibus. The incident ended with the death of the minibus driver. The bus crashed through the camp’s fence and stopped inside it.

Egypt, Production, 05/07/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: ElectricalAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

The worker suffered an electric shock while connecting an electric cable to a plug at the generator.

Libya, Drilling, 06/01/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

not available

Libya, Other, 15/02/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

While the welding crew was working, the tractor operator lost control and the truck moved backwards. The grinder who was standing behind this truck was crushed between it and another stationary vehicle.

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F a t a l i n c i d e n t r e p o r t s b y r e g i o n

Libya, Other, 02/06/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:ManualLabourer

The person was hit by a truck.

Libya, Other, 21/12/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Company Occupation:TransportationOperator

Not available

Nigeria, Other, 14/03/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:30 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Foreman,Supervisor

A 30-year-old surveyor was struck on the head by a tree felled in the vicinity of a survey point. He was taken to a nearby hospital, but died within 2 hours as a result of his injuries. The deceased was part of a 12-man GPS survey team. They were surveying a planned pipeline route between Gbaran and Koroama and an appraisal well location. The survey area lies in the seasonally flooded part of the Niger Delta (dry at the time) and is covered by alternating thick bush and cultivated land. It is about 2 hours’ drive by road from Port Harcourt. The deceased was leading a 4-man GPS crew that was working separately from the main survey team. They were tasked with taking accurate GPS measurements on 4 pre-installed “lease pillars”. The deceased had contracted a chainsaw operator from the local community to fell trees near the survey points in order to ensure the GPS equipment would have good satellite reception.

What Went Wrong:Cutting trees of girth greater than 30cmEngaged 3rd party chainsaw operator (unauthorised).Poor quality of site supervision under call-off contract.Inadequate information on management of a potentially serious risk.Station offsetting option not specified in Job Order.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Dispatch a letter to all contractor staff cascading learning from this accident, and restating the policy on ‘No felling of trees greater than 30cm in girth’ during Geomatics Operations.Reinforce to workers (during HSE forum) to always be alert to hazards around them.Hold a meeting with all contractors to reinforce the importance of workers wearing their PPE at all timesSpecify in contractor HSE MS and procedures, the prohibition of use of chainsaws (without special permission).Harmonise all tree-cutting procedures company-wide.Conduct an independent audit of site supervision across operating company to identify best practices for lateral learning.Set up a minimum supervisors pool to ensure a continuous employment for site supervisors supporting contractor operations.Identify and cascade across company good practices from Major Projects’ step-change HSE performance.

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Nigeria, Other, 11/07/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: DrowningAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Other

A member of staff of a Company catering contractor was due to resume duty at his post at a swamp location, after one week off duty. He and another colleague went to Osubi, a Company air transport point, to board a helicopter, but were unsuccessful as they were not booked on the flight. The victim’s colleague then left the airport, notified their camp boss of the flight situation, and deferred his day of arrival. The victim however chose to take a commercial boat to North Bank-Yokri on the same day. The commercial boat capsized as it was hit by a wave when the boat operator was trying to fix a fault in the engine. Eleven passengers and the boat operator survived whilst the victim drowned.

What Went Wrong:There was no flight booking for the victim.Victim did not attempt to re-schedule his flightVictim ignored directive on the use of boatsVictim could not swim.System for booking Contractor personnel onto helicopters did not provide appropriate feedback to passengers and was inadequately supervised.Verification of swimming certification failed.Compliance by Contractor personnel to waterway travel ban not effectively monitored.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Review the helicopter flight booking process for the contractor at the Location: define an appropriate deadline for the submission of roster; provide booking status feed back to contractor staff; institute system for following-up on contractor no-shows.Publish an alert to reiterate compliance with the rule that all staff and contractor travel to and from facilities in the waterways in the west is by helicopter.Contract Holder to fully verify compliance with swimming certification by contractor staff prior to employment and conduct periodic checks.Review policies, processes and systems governing movement of personnel, for all modes of transport, to and from company locations.Complete ongoing review of swimming certificate philosophy and management system.

Nigeria, Exploration, 30/11/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Drilling/WellServicingOperator

While a contractor staff member was operating a sand filter valve in a temporary well test setup, he sustained a severe injury caused by the impact from a female hammer union inadvertently dislodged from a side outlet, as well testing was in progress. He was thrown 19ft from the sand filter equipment. He was immediately medevaced to the Clinic, where he underwent emergency surgery. He later died in the clinic.

What Went Wrong:Inspection (physical check) was not done to identify mismatch between the male and female hammer unionRig up configuration did not provide for platform/permanent access to operate the middle valvesThe victim stood directly in front of the failed side outlet (hammer union) while operating the desander/middle valve.As built configuration (valve orientation) is different from the design layout.Insufficient dissemination of alerts on hammer union. Alerts on the danger of mismatch b/w 1502 & 602 were sent out but did not reach all intended recipients.Manufacturer’s assembling of equipment parts not according to designInadequate handover of equipment/manualEquipment was handed over without necessary/relevant documentations/drawings.Inadequate HAZOP and HAZOP implementation

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Contractors stopped work on all sites, and ran a check on all temporary piping to remove non-standard hammer unions from site.Alerted operating company to check and remove 2” 602 unions from their installations.Removed the Krebs desander from site, replaced it with a desander that have a safe operating platform.Print laminated alerts; hang on connections and temporary piping facilities and issue to all personnel to increase awarenessVerify that alerts have been communicated to relevant contractors and check that it is discussed during regular office and site safety meetings.Run a check on all equipment used for high-risk operations to confirm that they are in line with design specifications.Provide HAZOP training for relevant Well Services personnel.Develop a code of practice for Temporary Well Test and other non-rig related temporary pressure equipment set-ups.

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Nigeria, Other, 04/12/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: UnknownAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:ManualLabourer

On Sunday 4th December 2005, a casual labourer on a dredger working at San Bartholomew River was last seen about 5:20am walking towards the dredger kitchen. He was declared missing when a personal floatation device suspected to be that of the deceased was seen on the dredger, but he was nowhere to be found.

What Went Wrong:Inadequate compliance to approved employment process.The dredge supervisor and dredge masters acceptance of a new employee on board without verifying requisite HSE certifications (represented by the tag)Insufficient dissemination of Site Superintendents accountability for employment of casuals strictly in line with Contract provisions and established process.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Publish, display conspicuously at all work sites, and enforce that evidence of safety and medical certification are an absolute requirement for admission into work sites, regardless of the means of transport to site (whether contractor or community transport).Commence periodic checks on work sites to ensure that all personnel that are physically on board are indeed recorded in the Personnel-on-Board manifest.All supervisors to positively confirm HSE induction/ training for all old workers and new workers prior to deployment to any work. The exact cause of death is not known but the following actions will address the other lapses discovered.Issue an explicit Job Description to all Site Superintendents to include accountability for employment of casuals strictly in line with Contract provisions and established process, and demand a written acknowledgement and acceptance.Commence periodic checks on work sites to ensure that all personnel that are physically on board are indeed recorded in the Personnel-on-Board manifest.

Nigeria, Other, 06/12/2005 Number of deaths: 2 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:UnknownAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Unknown

On Tuesday 6th December, at about 07:08, a 3rd-party 18-wheel articulated Mack truck, while attempting to overtake a mini-bus at over 100 km/hr, invaded the opposite lane and collided head-on with a seismic contractor truck conveying 30 staff to the crew base camp. One of the passengers in the contractor truck died on spot while another contractor personnel died on admission to the Company Clinic. Twenty (28) other passengers suffered varying degrees of injuries. The articulated truck had a driver and a mate.

What Went Wrong:Reckless speeding, overtaking and invasion of the opposite lane by the 3rd party vehicle.The 3rd party Mack truck failed to come to a stop because of rusted and non-functional front brake drums.General poor road safety culture. This is not within the control of the Company.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Improve protective padding on all crew carriers.Discontinue the use of the 2 outer front corner seats within impact reach of the roll bar in the passenger compartment.Engage the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) to assist in monitoring/controlling traffic on highways especially with respect to speed control.Disseminate accident investigation findings across Company global seismic community as well as OGP/IAGC seismic industry organisations. Although the underlying cause was not within the control of the Company, the following actions are considered as management actions to minimize further exposure:Engage a traffic consultant via Company to review the design and layout of the passenger compartments of seismic personnel carriers.Collaborate in a company-wide effort to improve seismic personnel carrier transportation.For future surveys review the location of base camps/staging areas with the aim to minimise road exposure hours.

Nigeria, Production, 31/01/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

The driver for a service contractor under contract to prepare and deliver meals was driving a delivery vehicle when he failed to negotiate a bend in the road and collided with a fence.

What Went Wrong:The driver was not wearing his seatbelt and it is believed that he fell asleep at the wheel and ran off the road head-on into the fence.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:More frequent spot checks to ensure contractors are in compliance with company safety requirements.

Nigeria, Production, 06/08/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

A tank welder slipped and fell while working at a height of about 20 metres. He died from the reported injuries.

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Sudan, Unspecified, 15/01/2005 Number of deaths: 2 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge:40 Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperatorAge:25 Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

A truck loaded with gravel, heading from North to South, collided with a water tanker heading North. The water tanker was using the wrong side of the road (left side). 500 meters away the driver noticed the tanker and made signals by flashing but the tanker driver did not notice. The tanker driver tried to go back to the right lane but at the same time the truck was trying to avoid the tanker by moving to his right, but this move was difficult due to the danger of rollover. The gravel truck then turned left and at this point hit the tanker on the driver’s cabin side. The tanker driver died at the spot and the assistant was evacuated and later he died at the hospital.

What Went Wrong:The tanker was using the wrong side of the road violating the rules.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Increase the defensive driver training courses for contractors. Enforce company driving procedures.

Sudan, Unspecified, 05/07/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge:32 Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

A contractor light truck was heading from one field to another. The driver lost control of the truck and swerved to the right side of the road. He tried to turn left in order to return to the main road. The truck immediately skidded and rolled over 2-3 times on the road. The driver was seriously struck on the back of the head which caused bleeding from the mouth and nose, and passed away immediately.

What Went Wrong:Driver lost control while speeding.

Offshore

Cameroun, Other, 15/03/2005 Number of deaths: (1) Type of Incident: Drowning3rdParty

A Surfer (personnel transportation boat) collided with a fishing canoe. One fisherman died.What Went Wrong:

Canoe was hard to see - hidden in a trough of a wave, early morning and no navigation lights.Corrective Actions and Recommendations:

Only use Surfers in daylight hours.Investigate use of infra red vision systems.Liaison with local fishermen.

Nigeria, Other, 08/05/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:37 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

A guide post (5m long, 0.5m diameter, weight 1.1T) had to be welded to the deck of a crane barge. It was lifted and supported vertically by the deck crawler crane. The crane block started to swing due to the long period sea swell present. The block was lowered to deck level to stop it swinging, but before it reached the deck tension was put on the slings, pulling the post over. As it fell it struck the welder. Injuries were immediately fatal.

What Went Wrong:Failure to apply safety management system at deck level.No job safety assessment was done. It was regarded as “routine”. No permit to work was issued.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:An extensive safety training and coaching program for supervisors and workers at deck level was introduced.

Nigeria, Production, 18/05/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Explosion/burnAge: Employer:Company Occupation:Process/EquipmentOperator

An operator was sent to a normally unmanned platform to restart the wells following an process unit upset. A 16-inch condensate export riser separated below the cellar deck resulting in a release, explosion and fire. The operator was severely burned and later died.

What Went Wrong:16 inch condensate line separated.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Still under investigation.

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Asia/Australasia

Offshore

China, Other, 14/04/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:36 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Engineer,Scientist,Technician

A contract staff person was hit by a firefighting gas bottle.

Indonesia, Other, 09/12/2005 Number of deaths: (1) Type of Incident: Drowning3rdParty

A tug boat collided with a wooden long boat. 4 people in the fishing boat fell into the water. 3 were recovered, 1 drowned.What Went Wrong:

Failure to keep adequate watch.Late manouvering to avoid collision.Failure to sound warning horn.No communications available.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Safety navigation training for tug boat crews.Raise awareness of local villagers.

Malaysia, Other, 18/03/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Engineer,Scientist,Technician

A Fast Crew Boat (FCB) was moored bow to an offshore buoy at sea. Another Standby Boat (SB) was moored stern to stern to it. Weather was calm. At 21.30hrs, the FCB started its engine and conducted propulsion system (water jet) tests whilst still moored. The FCB moved leading to tensioning and subsequent parting of the mooring rope between the two vessels. The parted mooring rope whip-lashed and hit the 2nd Engineer, who was off-duty, onboard the deck of the SB. The 2nd Engineer sustained severe multiple fractures to his right leg and bruises on his forehead. He was given immediate first aid and medevaced to the nearest onshore hospital. After 2 hours of resuscitation by a hospital doctor, he passed away.

What Went Wrong:Inadvertent vessel movement during testing of propulsion systemHuman error: clutch was inadvertently engagedNo watchman/look-out assignedFCB Chief Eng did not inform his Captain just prior to starting vessel engineThe only positive feedback available of whether the clutch was engaged or otherwise is via the “Clutch OFF” indicator on bridge control panel which was malfunctioningThe SB crew was not informed of the testing and hence not aware of the hazards related to the FCB propulsion testing. Thus unable to exercise Duty to STOP.Whilst all crewmembers have formal certifications, competency of the FCB key personnel is deemed lacking.Inadequate procedure for vessel inspection and acceptance, in particular after major repairInadequate procedure related to mooring configuration of multiple vessels at offshore mooring buoysInconsistent management practices between primary versus secondary marine logisticsLack of enforcement and involvement in management of subcontractorLow hazard awareness and high tolerance for non-compliances.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Communicated initial findings across the region and issued Safety Alert on

Testing of vessel propulsion system (other then for pre-departure checks) shall not be carried out whilst moored.All vessels to conduct re-tests of the following safety-critical systems for full functionality: propulsion controls, emergency stops, bridge controls and indicators.Vessel’s inspection and acceptance by a competent team shall be conducted for initial mobilization as well as after every major repair.Communication with all affected parties shall be established prior to starting any risk activity“Duty to Stop Work” must be exercised whenever and before tasks are carried out without prior hazard assessments/communicationThe danger of mooring ropes under tension and the importance of effective site communication to be reiterated at toolbox meetings.To hold a Regional Marine Workshop of marine experts to cascade learnings and address/decide on key issues related to the underlying causes.To commit resources to effectively manage the totality of marine operations, which are responsive to the tight vessel market.To support and consider as global standard, recommendations arising from a planned review of mooring practices and alternative mooring ropes (which may be costlier).

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Malaysia, Other, 11/09/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Explosion/burnAge:34 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

A flash fire occurred when workers opened the manholes of the water drum of the main boiler to inspect the internal of the water drum after hydro-testing. The incident was due to flammable mixture inside the water drum of the main boiler being ignited by the portable incandescent lamp used during maintenance.

What Went Wrong:Lack of training on Permit to Work;Planned preventative maintenance was not fully executed;Inadequate knowledge in safe working practices involving hydrocarbon.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:The requirement for control and barriers to be in place on any simultaneous operations activities;Pre-mob briefing must emphasise hazards associated with the job;Any entry to confined space of the boiler system required Permit to Work certificate;Install on-line monitoring to monitor hydrocarbon presence in steam condensate return line.

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Onshore

Netherlands, Other, 31/05/2005 Number of deaths: 2 Type of Incident: Explosion/burnAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:UnknownAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Unknown

At 09:00a.m. on the 31st May 2005 an explosion occurred, followed by a fire. Since February, refurbishment and inspection activities had been carried out on the location for which parts of the plant and the adjoining tank were made safe. The incident took place during pipe work installation of a vapour recovery system on the tank roof.

What Went Wrong:The tank was not emptied and cleaned.There was no positive isolation between the tank content and the piping under construction.Hot-work was executed in the Zone 0 on the roof of the tank.

The majority of the identified latent failures are in:Organisation, including

Unclear responsibilities for HSE on site.Within the operational organisation structure connections and hence communications across disciplines were not functioning properly.Fragmented attention due to multiple handovers.

Procedures, includingNo compliance checks and monitoring of actions from Risk Inventory and Evaluation.Existing procedures were not adequately applied.Deficiencies existed in the execution of the Corporate Management System.

CommunicationsLack of direct communication between PtW parties.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Immediate checks on hot-work. Work on tank suspended until JSA approved.2-hr “Time out for Safety” on 42 locations.Targeted verification of practices and assurance on:

Hot work near tanks and vessels with hydrocarbon inventoryApplication of Permit-to-Work system.Ownership and accountabilities of staff.

Clarify the Roles and Responsibilities as defined under (ARBO) Law.Review and adjust company’s operational organisation structure where necessary to ensure cross-discipline communication and adequate discharge of responsibilities.Improve the deployment of resources in relation to (fluctuating) workload.Review & re-confirm minimum quality standards for work preparation and identification of risks regarding HSE critical tasks.Improve the cooperation and coordination of HSE by re-aligning the teams in the HSE organization.

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Netherlands, Exploration, 24/12/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Unknown

A single-cab pick-up transporting a driver and two passengers collided with a 5 tonne truck traveling in the opposite direction on a public highway. The pick-up was on route from a seismic camp to the subcontractor’s facility in Gialo town.

What Went Wrong:Driver of the pick-up failed to take any significant avoiding action to prevent a collision given that the road was in good condition and offered a solid “run off” surface on either side.Visibility was reduced due to light rain and darkness approaching.The driving compartment of the pick-up had 2 seats fitted with 3-point seat belts. This day, 3 persons were riding in the cab.Area fencing and full access/egress controls were not yet available at the seismic camp during this phase of mobilisation to prevent unsafe driving activities (e.g. overloading and late departures).The sub-contractor did not have a proper Journey Management procedure in place. The journey between the seismic camp and the subcontractor’s base involves a round trip of 95km which had been made on a daily basis until the day of the accident to deliver supplies and transfer labour as necessaryContractor personnel resources were reduced over the Christmas period, which may have led to reduced supervision.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Further early engagement of all sub-contractors in HSE training, inspection and monitoring programmes including Journey Management.Deeper scrutiny of all journeys to and from facilities with the objective of reducing exposureProvide vehicle access/egress controls at campsites as early as possible during mobilisation.

Netherlands, Other, 20/05/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

The truck was parked by the side of the road close to the main traffic lanes. The driver was inspecting a noise under the truck when another truck collided with a passing fuel tanker. The collision caused spillage and as a consequence of the impact, the split fuel ignited and exploded immediately. The stream of ignited fuel was blown by the wind directly at the contractor’s truck.

What Went Wrong:Company’s Night Driving procedure was not adhered to.Contractor driver did not park the truck in a safe area to check the source of the noise (truck parked close to main traffic lanes).Company did not verify that the contract chain had implemented Company’s Road Safety Policy.Contractor did not brief subcontractor on the requirements for journey management and in turn, there was no briefing given to the truck driver on the hazards associated with his trip.The deceased driver was not aware of Company’s night driving procedure.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Company will ensure that in all future contracts the responsibility of the contractor to cascade Company’s HSE policies, standards and practices (e.g. night driving, drivers’ working hours, journey management, driving training…etc) to their sub-contractors is clearly stated and understood.Company made a commitment and plan to execute journey management audits on both contractors and their sub-contractors to ensure that both comply with Company’s HSE Policies and standards.A letter was sent to all contractors and their sub-contractors to share the lateral learnings from this incident and to increase drivers’ road safety awareness.Company CEO participated in Journey Management Audit on the seismic contractor last July and discussed with the contractor’s leadership ways to improve road safety.Company Department Managers will schedule monthly visits to seismic crews to check compliance with Company’s HSE standards and procedures.

Norway, Other, 31/01/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Caught betweenAge:46 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

A contractor was caught in a moving hydraulic door during completion/commissioning of a platform at the construction yard.What Went Wrong:

Unexpected closing of door due to mechanical failure of a spring in the opening/closing device. The injured person tried to pass through the door when the door was not fully open and got caught.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Information to all personnel, to vendor and Authorities.Investigation.Safety Alert issued to the industry.Updated work instructions and entering procedures.Requested vendor to modify door to improve its safety device.

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UK, Production, 13/09/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:HeavyEquipmentOperator

At 08.40 on 13th September 2005, a Materials Operative fell from his forklift truck while applying shrinkwrap to the roll over protection system (ROPS). The actual fall was not witnessed.

What Went Wrong:Equipment selection process did not consider environmental protection.Fitting of the shrinkwrap was an unauthorized modificationA safe means of access was not used during the fitting of the shrinkwrapColleagues saw the IP fitting the shrinkwrap but didn’t intervene.Second level medical care was not mobilized following the incident.Injured party did not inform the company Nurse of changes to his health or medication.Personnel who witnessed the activity of applying the shrinkwrap did not recognize this as a potentially hazardous activity.A toolbox talk had not been held at the start of the day due to the routine nature of the work.There was a lack of prescription not to attempt modifications to equipmentRoutine nature of the work may have led to complacency.Requirement to inform the company Nurse of changes to health or medication was not as explicit as it could have been.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Instruction issued to all bases reminding personnel that unauthorized modifications are forbidden.Design and implement training to refresh hazard awareness and techniques of safety intervention.Arrange training to refresh awareness of the Working at Height Regulations.Prepare guidance note to all Company personnel to raise awareness of the risks of head injury and the actions to take if even a minor head injury is suspected.Arrange a comprehensive training programme to revitalize hazard awareness and techniques of safety intervention.Ensure personnel understand that all head injuries – even apparently minor ones, must be treated with suspicion until checked by a medical professional.Review the use of open top forklift trucks and ensure this includes consideration of adverse weather.

Offshore

UK, Production, 11/11/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

At 10.25 a.m. on 11 November, 2005 a plater fell to his death whilst replacing stair treads on the platform. The fall was not witnessed.

What Went Wrong:The Injured Party died as a result of falling through an opening in a stair tower created when two stair treads were removed.The work permit stated that the work should be undertaken on a ‘one stair tread out, one stair tread in’ basis.For reasons that can never be established, a second stair tread was removed in a change to the permitted work method.This change was never subject to further risk assessment which might have identified additional controls.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Conduct a risk assessment to cover the specific case of stair tread replacement on the Clipper in order to clear the intent of the Prohibition Notice served by the Health and Safety Executive on 12 November 2005.With the agreement of the deceased’s family, use the circumstances surrounding this incident to reinforce the message that, if there is a change to an agreed method of work, a reassessment of the work controls must be undertaken. The message should also reinforce that in instances where absence of this practice is observed, supervisors and line managers should invoke Just Culture procedures.Permit system Custodian to review and amend as required the drop down screens for Hazard Description and Specific Controls to ensure suitability for single person working and inclusion of changes to Working at Height Regulations. For all tasks a technical discussion of ‘how’ (tools, processes, methods etc) should be held. Consider recording this, and the parties to the discussion, on the permit as part of the Task Description or by utilising the Head of Department facility within the permit system.

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Georgia, Other, 30/07/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Engineer,Scientist,Technician

QC inspector killed when, as sole occupant of stationary pick-up truck, it was hit by a dump truck. The dump truck’s brakes failed and it rolled backwards down a slope into the pick-up truck.

What Went Wrong:Dump truck driver did not operate his vehicle correctly; when dump truck stopped on slope, the braking system failed to hold it in position; pick-up truck parked at bottom of slope on the right-of-way, leaving it exposed

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Staff need sufficiently detailed operating and technical information and training in order to operate plant and make correct decisions; integrity of fail safe systems relies on adequate inspection and testing to reveal latent defects; safety management of simultaneous operations requires additional levels of site control and hazard recognition

Kazakhstan, Production, 08/02/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Unknown

A contractor’s minibus turned out of a field access road onto the main road and struck a vehicle travelling in the opposite direction. A contractor died of multiple injuries.

Kazakhstan, none, 02/09/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

A large commercial vehicle crashed against the guard rail on a downward incline, resulting in the vehicle leaving the road. The unrestrained driver died as a consequence of this incident

Kazakhstan, Other, 04/08/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:ManualLabourer

A worker from the day crew fell to the deck while working at height on rig structure. He was working for a company on contract to build and deliver two land drilling rigs.

Kazakhstan, Other, 20/09/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

A contractor’s truck carrying rock from the quarry, left the road on the down hill section towards the stockpile area. As a consequence the truck rolled over, coming to rest on its side on the slope. The driver died from injuries sustained during the accident.

Russia, Unspecified, 09/02/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge:0 Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

The driver of a UAZ vehicle (contractor) was driving on the wrong side of the road and collided with KAMAZ truck (third party). As a result of the road accident the contractor - UAZ driver was killed.

What Went Wrong:Violation of traffic regulations by driver of UAZ vehicle (contractor).


A UAZ vehicle driver (contractor) drove on the wrong side of the road and collided with a KAMAZ truck (third party) coming in the other direction. As a result of the accident the UAZ vehicle driver (contractor) was killed.

What Went Wrong:Violation of traffic regulations by driver of UAZ vehicle (contractor).Bad weather conditions.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Communicate these lessons learnt to management of all contractor companies providing transport services; managers of contractor companies must communicate this information to all drivers, and perform similar work with subcontractors.

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Russia, Unspecified, 19/05/2005 Number of deaths: 2 Type of Incident: OtherAge:41 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Foreman,SupervisorAge:39 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

When cleaning a gas separator two contractors entered the tank without gas masks and died of asphyxia.What Went Wrong:

Violation of procedures/regulations by individual employees/group of employees and persons responsible for implementation of work/supervising implementation of work.Reckless behavior and lack of awareness of risks existing during operations in confined spaces.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Company should reinforce control over safety of operations performed by contractor companies.Procedures ensuring strict implementation of established instructions should be developed and adopted.Contracting process should be changed in our interests to ensure work of contractors having appropriate work experience.

Russia, Unspecified, 31/05/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Caught betweenAge:54 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

While slinging a welding unit for further transportation by a caterpillar tractor crane, a contractor employee was crushed by the tractor against the welding unit and was fatally injured.

What Went Wrong:Lack of risk assessment system in LLC Burkan.Application of tractor crane KTP-6.3 was incorrect and not in compliance with its design.Personal carelessness of employees in the process of work implementation.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Contractor companies performing operations at hazardous industrial facilities and mining leases must have in place a developed and adopted risk assessment system.

Russia, Unspecified, 09/07/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:49 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Drilling/WellServicingOperator

In the process of pulling tubing out of the hole elevators ETA-60 opened and a tubing joint fell down on the rig floor from the height of 7 meters. This resulted in an injury to a contractor employee – workover operator, who was wearing a hard hat. The casualty was sent to a hospital where he died on 12/07/05.

What Went Wrong:Implementation of pipe tripping with not locked elevator ETA-60.Operator was standing in a hazardous area.Unsatisfactory supervision of operations by a tool-pusher.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Leaders of contractor companies performing well workover operations must organize work to reinforce control over workover crews in the area of implementation by them of instructions and other normative documentation requirements to safe work performance.

Russia, Unspecified, 03/08/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:49 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Process/EquipmentOperator

In the process of rigging suspended survey platforms on a well by a contractor company, a piece of a platform fell down. This resulted in a fatal injury to a contractor worker.

What Went Wrong:Inadequate fabrication and insufficient inspection of lifting structure quality.Insufficient information exchange both internally in Company and between Company and the contractor.Insufficient supervision of operations and work area.Insufficiently trained and informed construction/rigging crew.Unsatisfactory installation procedures.Violation of HSE requirements in the process of installation.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Make requirements to contractors stricter in terms of approval of their subcontractors by the customer prior to conclusion of any contract with them.For all contractors reinforce control over implementation of concluded contracts provisions in the part of professional competence of personnel, inspection, work planning and permits to hazardous types of operations.Ensure application by Company (Capital Construction Department) of control assurance/quality control process for commissioning of installed equipment. In addition, activities of commissioning team must be formalized and clearly oriented in terms of which equipment must be inspected/checked depending upon initial scope of work.

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Russia, Production, 16/08/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:50 Employer:Company Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

In the process of hot job implementation to tie-in a high pressure trunk water line a pup-joint broke from a blind flange. The flying part of the blind flange fatally injured an employee of the company – an electrogas welder.

What Went Wrong:Risk assessment was not performed prior to the work commencement and prior to a work permit issue.Implementation of a hot job on a pipeline with operating pressure of 190 bar without bleeding the pressure off.Lack of information exchange.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Managers of all levels must demonstrate leadership and responsibility in the area of safety issues.Ensure qualitative commissioning of construction facilities.Train personnel and prior to implementation of higher risk operations perform risk assessment.Conduct sensible and efficient, but “not for show”, briefing on HSE requirements observance.

Russia, Other, 16/08/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:45 Employer:Company Occupation:Drilling/WellServicingOperator

In the process of pipe tripping on a well a tubing joint fell to the rig floor. This resulted in a serious injury to an assistant driller (employee). The casualty was provided with first aid and sent to a hospital where he died later.

What Went Wrong:Implementation of pipe tripping operations without secured locking of ES- 60M elevator grips.The assistant driller was standing in a hazardous zone under a pipe when it was going down.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Shut down pipe tripping operations when workers are in a hazardous zone.Prohibit tool-pushers from leaving crews during working hours when hazardous operations are implemented without a permission from their department managers.


Under poor visibility conditions a contractor UAZ vehicle driver drove into a service rig (third party) which was parked on the side of the road. The parked vehicle was not displaying any hazard signs. As a result of the collision the driver of UAZ vehicle (contractor) was killed. He was not using a seat belt.

What Went Wrong:Violation of traffic regulations by both drivers.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Vehicles that are not fully operable and equipped must not be allowed to make trips.Observance of speed limits.System.

Russia, Other, 10/11/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge:34 Employer:Company Occupation:TransportationOperator

While towing a KRAZ Palfinder vehicle with a ZIL truck an operator in the KRAZ vehicle (employee) was hit by the back platform of the vehicle in the area of his chest. The injury caused the death of the employee at hospital.

What Went Wrong:Violation of procedures by the employee, equipment operation without a permit, incorrect position in the process of work implementation.Carelessness/lack of knowledge, inattention to stability and surroundings, not meeting requirements equipment.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Shop Managers shall:

Acknowledge all the Shops’ vehicles’ drivers with the Lessons Learned from the incident and Immediate Reporting Procedure, conduct unscheduled safety briefings on occupational health for 100% of employees and ensure their acknowledgement by signatures before 05.12. 2005, where special attention should be drawn to the following guidelines:

drivers shall strictly follow the approved route;in the event of the vehicle being out of order, becoming stuck in mud, any other incidents, the driver shall inform the manager direct by any means available (Head or Mechanics Engineer of the vehicle fleet), Dispatch Service or Vehicles’ Integrity Inspectors, and call for technical aid;drivers shall not engage third parties having no driving licenses and skills of driving the vehicle to tow a broken or stuck vehicle.

Organise examination of the most frequently used traffic routs in the oilfield; specify the most dangerous road sections. Take measures on risk mitigation before driving.

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Russia, Unspecified, 18/11/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: ElectricalAge:28 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

In the process of operations on a 6KV power line an electrician from a contractor company was fatally injured by electric current.

What Went Wrong:Failure to perform adequate risks assessment prior to job start.Failure to adequately recognize hazards and follow standard for energy isolation.Failure on the part of company to identify the cultural flaws within the contracting organization.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Company should have closer control over safety of work permits.Voltage detection equipment in use is inferior and can fail to alert worker of danger. A safety alert has been issued.All potential sources of voltage must be isolated even if risk of contact appears to be low. Conditions can change quickly.Look for critical leadership failure in contracting organisations.

Russia, Production, 18/11/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: ElectricalAge:20 Employer:Company Occupation:Process/EquipmentOperator

A 3-person crew of oil and gas production operators were installing cables on a wellpad cable rack in order to connect a control station and an electric engine of a beam-pump. In the process of operations a 4-grade operator (employee) came into contact with a cable splice going to an adjacent well and was fatally injured by electric current.

What Went Wrong:Performance of unusual work which requires special registration and permit by oil and gas production operators.Cable joint which does not meet technical requirements.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Company should have a closer control over safety of jobs performed with cable goods.It is necessary to update or elaborate and implement procedure for this type of work.To give extra safety briefing to the staff performing this type of work.

Russia, Production, 29/05/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

Two sub contract painters were working in a shaft installing thermal insulation on the risers. One of the men wanted to use a piece of plywood that was lying on the floor for cutting isolation material or as a storage board for their tools and materials. He picked up the edge of the wood without realising that there was an open manhole underneath. As he lifted the board, he stepped forward to raise the wood to vertical and fell down the open manhole, falling some 12 metres to the floor of the cell beneath.

What Went Wrong:The barricade had been removed from the manhole and had not been replaced.The plywood covering the manhole was not marked or secured.No inspection by the shaft watchman had taken place during the days leading up to the incident due to the shaft being closed during sand blasting.Lack of housekeeping had left several plywood sheets on the base of the shaft covered with a substantial layer of dark grey blasting sand.The lighting in the shaft was barely adequate.Lack of permanent barriers/covers/hazard identification.Time and schedules pressure resulting in priority on schedule vs. safety.Inadequate management of change from construction phase to marine/demobilisation phase, resulting in reduced supervision and attention.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Check barricades in place and fix where possible to eliminate unauthorised movement or modification.Introduce marking and securing of covers.Ensure adequate staffing of watchmen position to improve frequency and quality of inspections.Improve housekeeping and reinforce “clean as you go policy”.Prevent working in bad light by reinforcing message that if anything is unsafe, including poor lighting, then STOP work.Management “time out” to review HSE aspects of change management throughout the whole Phase 2 Project.Reinforce culture that anyone should stop work if they consider conditions/environment is unsafe.

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Russia, Other, 07/08/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge:30 Employer:Contractor Occupation:ManualLabourer

The incident occurred at about 3:00am. The victim, a 30-year-old Russian worker, was trying to get into his upper bunk bed after a card playing and drinking session in his shared room in one of the dormitories in the construction camp. He fell, his head hit the floor and his room mates found him lying on the floor and unconscious. After unsuccessful attempts for about 15 minutes to bring the victim round, the Emergency services were called and attended the scene within 5 minutes of call-out. Attempts to resuscitate the victim first at the scene of the accident and thereafter in the camp clinic failed and he was declared dead at 04:00 in the camp clinic.

What Went Wrong:The victim was under influence of alcohol (1 litre of vodka consumed by 4 people involved, with witnesses stating that the deceased drank most of it. A Russian medical examination report states 2.4ppm or approx 2mg/ltr alcohol in blood)The victim fell down while attempting to climb to his upper bunk bed, fell backwards, and hit his head on the hard floor.Social acceptance of drinking to excess and lack of peer pressure from other dormitory occupantsLimited ability to enforce the Camp Management Policy and Code of Conduct with respect to availability, obtaining and consumption of alcoholLack of awareness among personnel about risks of alcohol abuse.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Improve camp access control to enable stricter screening for alcohol of vehicles coming inReview and make practical improvements to Camp and Drugs/Alcohol Policy (camp inspection protocol, lights out policy, routine Security surveillance of dorms during the night, enforcement of disciplinary measures).Expand mandate of Security staff to include inspection and surveillance of the dormitory blocks and to act in cases of rowdy behaviour within the dormitory rooms.Put Camp issues on the agenda of the site management and HSE meetings.Make practical improvements to Medical Emergency Response Plan and improve Induction Training to reiterate steps to be taken in an emergency.Organise shared learning review of camp and alcohol policies with main Phase 2 Project contractors, and implement best practicesContinue to implement alcohol and drug awareness campaign chaired by Company.

Russia, Production, 26/08/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: DrowningAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:ManualLabourer

A tug was engaged for towing a Barge to transport rock from the port of Vostochny. The technique adopted for loading the barge in the port entailed the barge being moored to the quay and the tug being moored to the barge on the seaward side. Four off-duty members of the tug crew decided to go ashore for a walk. Just before the incident two of the four had already crossed from the ship to the barge via the well-lit gangway, the third was on the bridge collecting his Seaman’s book. The fourth member of the party who was the casualty was apparently on the main working deck of the tug. A crewman on the bridge heard a call, and upon investigating discovered his colleague in the water between the vessel and the barge. He raised the alarm, went to the scene, saw the casualty apparently unconscious in the water, jumped in and supported him until assistance arrived to pull him out. CPR was given and the port authority contacted by radio. On arrival at the ship the agent transported the casualty to the local hospital in his own vehicle.

What Went Wrong:Unknown. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident. Circumstances suggest the deceased may have fallen while jumping from the tug to the barge instead of using the gangway.Failure to use proper access from the tug boat to the barge (location/setup of gangway may be considered as an error inducing condition).Slip/trip and struck against the tugboat or the barge in the course of fall resulted in inability of the victim to fight for life when in the water.Steelwork (handrails) wet with condensation.Poor condition and lacing of work boots.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Further review of optimum configuration for gangplank.Reinforce message to crew members of the importance of using only properly authorised routes for access and egress.Reinforce the message that only authorised means of access and egress should be used.Ensure vessel HSE induction covers usage of appropriate means of access and egressIncrease Company surveillance to monitor proper usage of access and egress.

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Russia, Production, 04/10/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

The victim, along with 3 other scaffold erectors, was erecting scaffold (for steel work modification) at the 33 metre level of the LNG flare structure. The victim indicated to the remaining crew that he intended to descend to make use of the toilet facilities. One of the crew members witnessed the victim climb on to the ladder and fall and also confirms that, immediately prior to the fall, he observed him with the lanyard clip in his hand, i.e. unclipped from the permanent handrail above the ladder. Finally he confirms that no attempt had been made by the victim to attach to the fall arrestor prior to stepping off the grating on to the ladder. The victim appears to have fallen sideways from the ladder and descended head first through the structure landing some 14 metres below the top of the ladder on to a scaffold structure at the 19 metre level. The ladder itself is in good condition and there is no evidence of any specific deterioration in the rungs, which may have led to a slipping hazard. The victim’s work boots are also in good condition with adequate tread.

What Went Wrong:Access was not fit for purposeDeceased was not tied off.Deceased chose not to use the fall arrestor.Access to the work place was not adequately addressed in the work method statement, risk assessment and job safety analysis.Lack of access in the flare structure led to a number of ad hoc access solutions being provided without formal review and updating of the work method statement / risk assessment and job safety analysis.Supervisors knowingly allowed a subcontractor to carry out tasks (scaffold/ladder erection) for which they were not competent and the subcontractor carried out a task, which was not in his work scope.Supervisory personnel condoned use of access which was not in compliance with basic site standards.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:All work at height stopped for the entire construction site.All temporary access inspected by competent personnel and corrected.Personnel who condoned unsafe working practices removed from the work site.All site supervisory staff informed of the details of the fatality, the supervisory failures underlying the fatality and the disciplinary measures taken against the individuals concerned.Named individuals identified from each (sub)contractor and for each area of the construction site, responsible for day to day coordination of HSE.Communicate the incident findings to all Company locations.

Russia, Other, 13/06/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

The blast resistant door assembly (weight 505kg) was placed in the doorway of the Field Auxiliary Room # 3 (FAR 3) and secured with wooden wedges. On the next day, 13th June the door had been finally aligned and was held in position by a reduced number of wooden blocks and wedges. Having finished the alignment the work crew chose to move a second door, from its location adjacent to FAR 3 to its final location, and then to take their morning break prior to completing the permanent fixing of the blast door. For that reason the door was left unattended and supported only by wooden restraining wedges for approximately 45 minutes prior to falling outwards from the building and crushing the victim who was at that time standing on top of the concrete cable duct directly in front of the door.

What Went Wrong:The overturning moment created by force acting to topple the door overcame the resisting force of the wedges attempting to jam the door frame against the concrete structure of the building. These forces are most likely to be a combination of the doors themselves having opened marginally through improper restraint and a direct force exerted by the victim as he tried to inspect the joint between the cable pit and the building.No signage and no barriers in place around the door allowing easy access to the area in front of what was an intrinsically unstable door assembly.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:The job was not identified as requiring major hazard control at any point in the planning or execution process. A simple to use tool to perform informal risk assessments or recognise when their hazard controls need to be reviewed shall be available.Generic risk assessments and work instructions can be inadequate and sometimes do not recognise the risk involved in the specific activity.

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Azerbaijan, Production, 24/04/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

Assistant welder on pipe laying barge fell into the sea. In preparation for replacement of a section of over-water grating, the tack welds were cut but the grating left in place. The grate gave way when the assitant welder, newly assigned to the task, stepped on it. Recovery efforts were not successful.

What Went Wrong:Existing control of work processes not followed;Risks not cmmunicated to workers;Proper PPE not utilised; roles & responsibilities not clearly assigned

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Permit to work system upgraded;Clear accountabilities and safety expectations established;Additional training provided

Middle East

Onshore

Kuwait, Other, 05/06/2005 Number of deaths: 4 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge:38 Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperatorAge:52 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Engineer,Scientist,TechnicianAge:49 Employer:Company Occupation:Engineer,Scientist,TechnicianAge:56 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Engineer,Scientist,Technician

A traffic accident was the result of a head on collision between two company hired vehicles. There were four fatalities in this accident; one company employee and three contractor employees.

What Went Wrong:One of the vehicles pulled out to his left to overtake two vehicles but his vision was restricted because he was driving too close the vehicle in front. He was unable to see the vehicle travelling towards him, resulting in a collision.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Defensive driving and awareness programs launched.Accelerated the project to widen the narrow single track roads.Safe driving policy and procedure has been introduced.

Kuwait, Other, 07/08/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge:27 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Engineer,Scientist,Technician

A contractor employee was monitoring the pressure gauge of a 10” process liquid line which was under hydro testing without anchoring his safety belt line yard. He fell down from a height of 10 meters to the ground due to the sudden release of pressure caused by failure of the end plate.

What Went Wrong:Procedures were inadequate and not followed.End plate used for hydrotesting is not of rated capacity and the weld joint was non standard.Standard safety procedures were voilated.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Reviewed & updated the procedures.Imposed Quality control on all welding activities.Emphasised audits on all contractor activities.

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Oman, Drilling, 31/05/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Drilling/WellServicingOperator

A derrick man and several members of the night shift crew were preparing the rig to commence drilling operations after completing a rig move. Part of this task is to set back the mast lifting line equalising yoke. This requires working at a height of 35 metres above the rig floor. It was planned to be done with one man in the mast itself and one man on a man-riding winch, both assisting in tying the yoke back. During this operation the cable supporting the derrick man fell off the snatch block hung underneath the crown block. The derrick man and the supporting cable fell 35m to the rig floor.

What Went Wrong:The retaining bolt securing the cheek plate on the snatch block backed out. The safety pin had not been installed. The block had been subject to many activities during the preceding 8 hours which may have contributed to the backing out of the boltThe deformed cheek plate had been subjected to a load much greater than man-riding alone. The same air winch had pulled out the master-bushings preceding this incident.The derrick man was lifted too high. He was suspended on a 10m tail chain, this caused the tail chain to roll off the open snatch blockNo fall device was fitted below the snatch blockThe utility winch instead of the man riding winch was used to lift the derrick man.A climbing belt was used instead of a man-riding harness. No secondary fall device was used on this belt.No hazard awareness or control. The PTW system was disregarded. No meaningful TBT was held or Job instructions were given.Failure of the HSE-MS. Many of the rules and procedures present in the MS were openly violated on the rig.A culture of progressing work, supported by the senior staff on the rig, at the cost of safety was presentFailure of the Company new start selection and induction processThe competence of rig staff, at all levels, to recognise, rig up and verify safety critical equipment.Empowerment to Stop an unsafe act was not active on this rigEquipment standards generally across the fleet had deterioratedThe competence of Supervisors and HSE leaders across the fleet had deteriorated.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:All rig and hoist contractors have submitted a statement of fact regarding how they manage their man-riding operations.Operational practices are now being updated on all units in the fleetContracting company is revising its HSE on-boarding process. No individuals will start work without a good understanding of their basic HSE requirements.Contracting company will review its man-riding requirements and make them realistic and controlled to the work that is required.Contracting company management is to review how its HSE MS is interpreted on each unit. All procedures are to be reviewed for effectiveness and accuracyContracting company to roll out safety critical tasks to all employees, verification of understanding is to be undertakenWell engineering company to undertake a 3rd party review of standards and competencies across the fleet and subsequently act upon findings and place resources in the field to maintain standardsWell engineering company to modify the HSE Case slinging and lifting section in line with findings from this incidentWell engineering company to modify the ROHM File (Rig Operational Hazard Management) in line with findings from this incidentWell engineering company will take an in depth look at equipment standards, competence and HSE attitude/leadership across its fleet, resources will be made available to correct any deficiencies notedAll well engineering contractors are to introduce dedicated (not dual purpose) man-riding winches, on all drilling unitsAll well engineering contractors will critically review means to phase out man-riding by Dec 2006

Qatar, Other, 20/03/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge:24 Employer:Contractor Occupation:ManualLabourer

A company employee driving a pick-up van lost control of his vehicle within the Industrial Area. The vehicle went off the road and hit a contractor casual worker who was standing 2 meters away from the main road. The worker died as a result of the injury sustained.

What Went Wrong:Driving too fast for the road conditionPoor judgement on the part of the driverDriving culture (prevailing bad driving habit)

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Road safety campaigns, seminars and workshopsConstruction of speed breakersSpeed monitoring systemZebra crossingRoad signs

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Saudi Arabia, Production, 17/08/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge:47 Employer:Company Occupation:Drilling/WellServicingOperator

An employee was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving a company vehicle at an intersection.What Went Wrong:

Improper passing and/or delayed perception

UAE, Other, 30/05/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge:44 Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

A passenger bus had left the site on its way to the labour camp when it collided into the back of a water tanker.What Went Wrong:

Supervisor selected a fatigued workerInadequate planning & preparation for shiftInadequate scheduling resulting in excessive workloadCrew teamwork – nobody questioned this poor decision.

Yemen, Drilling, 06/11/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge:29 Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

During a rig move, a truck failed to make a bend in the road. It overturned and the driver was killed.What Went Wrong:

Probably excessive speed. The only witness – a passenger in the truck – left the country before he could be interviewed.There were a number of levels of subcontracting, leading to a loss of control over safety standards.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Limit the number of levels of sub-contractors used.Ensure contractors and sub-contractors work to the same standards.

Offshore

Qatar, Drilling, 07/09/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Caught betweenAge:25 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Process/EquipmentOperator

A supply vessel operated by a third party marine service company was alongside a drilling rig (operated by another third party) pumping fresh water and offloading and back loading drilling supplies. While back loading an empty container from the deck of the drilling rig to the supply vessel, an able bodied seaman who was assisting with the cargo operations was caught between the container suspended from the rig’s crane and a stationary diesel hydraulic power pack on the deck of the vessel. He suffered crush injuries to his chest, which proved to be fatal.

What Went Wrong:The able bodied seaman positioned himself in an unsafe position as the container was being lifted; failure of the drilling rig and marine vessel supervisors to prevent unsafe loading and unloading practices by crew.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Improve the scope of the shipboard operations manual to include detailed cargo handling procedures to incorporate risk assessments of hazardous and routine operations;Ensure that its vessel supervisors hold a document pre-job meeting, which shall include a JSA and operational overview of the job, before cargo handling operations commence at each location;Complete an assessment of its current management controls, including availability of resources, training, and conduct of internal audits with respect to operations in order to identify shortfalls requiring remedial actions.

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UAE, Drilling, 13/11/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:46 Employer:Contractor Occupation:ManualLabourer

During routine tripping operations the derrick man lost control of a stand of drill pipe while at the monkey board. The loose stand fell back out of the alley and underneath the To Drive System. The TDS came down, bending the stand, which recoiled, hitting the derrick man.

What Went Wrong:Obstruction of driller’s direct visual line and camera angleLack of latch guard to prevent loose stands falling out of alleyReliance on monkey board camera inadequateDerrick man did not attend JSAJSA deemed inadequateTeamwork lacking to compensate for lack of vision of monkey boardDriller did not confirm stand was secured in finger board prior to lowering TDS.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Revise tripping procedureRelocate the camera to a better vantage pointUpdate camera systemInstall a non-return gate system on monkey boardMore training on dropped stand precautionsEnhance the JSA format.

North America

Onshore

USA, Drilling, 04/04/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:29 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Drilling/WellServicingOperator

A contractor well pulling crew was in the process of servicing the well for parted rods to return the well to production. During the course of work the rig crew was trying to fish out a parted sucker rod string with a rod overshot tool. The crew had been unsuccessful in earlier attempts to latch onto the parted rod string. During the run involving the incident, the crew turned the rod string with a 24-inch pipe wrench in an attempt to latch onto the parted rod string. Sufficient torque built up in the rod string indicating that the overshot tool had latched. During the course of releasing the torque, one crew member was handing the 24-inch pipe wrench to the injured employee. The wrench slipped and struck the injured employee in the chest.

What Went Wrong:Human Performance Difficulty-Improper tool used;Procedure not followed;Supervision during work;

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:All rig contractors to re-enforce their safety policies with all employees regarding rotating rod strings and their appropriate tools to be used.All rig contractors to provide documentation of policy re-enforcement regarding rotating rods and increased emphasis and training on policies in general and hazard identification, particularly torque or stored energy.

USA, Drilling, 03/09/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge:26 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Drilling/WellServicingOperator

Operator killed when he fell 40 feet from snubbing unit. Although there were 15 people on site, no one saw him fall, as focus was on repairing a power pack at ground level.

What Went Wrong:Operator failed to observe 100% tie-off at elevations above 6 feet.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:All personel with this contractor must complete training and discussion of lessons learned from this incident before working on our locations;Review contractor fall protection policy and procedure and communicate expectations to all employees;Implement comprehensive system for reporting and tracking failures of contractors to comply with fall protection policy and procedures and implement a progressive disciplinary programme for violations.

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USA, Other, 04/08/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

The employee, whilst working unsecured at height on a structure under fabrication, fell to the ground when attempting to descend, resulting in a fatality.

South America

Onshore

Argentina, Other, 21/10/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge: Employer:Contractor Occupation:HeavyEquipmentOperator

Truck driver found near overturned water sprinkling truck with severe head injuries.What Went Wrong:

Water truck not fitted with emergency brake system, driver elected to descend incline in high gear, driver left cab of truck before rollover

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Removed similar trucks from use until brake system improvedTrain drivers in mandatory driving rules and response to emergency situationsImprove contractor maintenanceImprove road conditions where risk of accident is high

Argentina, Production, 22/01/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:25 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

During the reassembling of a Beam Pumping Unit (BPU), a counterweight was being lifted by inserting a rod through it and passing the sling under both ends of the rod. As the counterweight came into contact with a part of the BPU, the sling lost tension and was released from the rod. Then the counterweight fell to the ground, on to a beam, which was catapulted and hit a worker on the head, resulting in his death.

What Went Wrong:Slinging procedure not followedLack of proper lifting equipmentLack of proper trainingPoor contractor bid evaluation.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Improve selection of contractorsCarry out an audit at start of each contractIncrease level of supervision, both by contractor and by CompanyQuarterly evaluation of contractor competence level

Argentina, Production, 08/06/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Caught betweenAge:28 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

While changing the packing of a Progressive Cavity Pump (PCP), the operator observed that the speed indicator was not working properly and decided to measure the actual speed of the pump. Weather conditions where poor and the upper side of the equipment was dirty. The operator (a new, young employee) decided to take a direct speed measurement off the shaft on top of the PCP. While he was climbing the unit his right arm sleeve was caught between the shaft and the clamp of the pump, which dragged him repeatedly against the equipment and ground. When the equipment was stopped the operator had suffered multiple fractures, which together with a general infection, resulted in his death 7 days later.

What Went Wrong:Lack of qualification and trainingInadequate supervison/leadershipAbsence of a procedure for measuring r.p.m. of PCP’sLack of proper Job Hazard AnalysisPoor housekeeping

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Develop a clear, specific work instruction for taking r.p.m. measurements on PCP’sDevelop and disseminate a clear set of safe working practices for working in the vicinity of a PCP or BPU (Beam Pumping Unit)Reinforce training in self assessment of risks prior to starting a taskRevise crew structure and roles of each member

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Argentina, Drilling, 02/12/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Vehicle incidentAge:53 Employer:Contractor Occupation:TransportationOperator

A tanker was transporting water late at night, along a paved road. The driver lost control of the vehicle, which skidded and rolled over. The driver was thrown out of the tanker and suffered injuries which resulted in his death.

What Went Wrong:Lack of a Journey Management System

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Implement a Journey Management System

Colombia, Exploration, 30/03/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge:32 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Engineer,Scientist,Technician

After a 2 hour walk, exposed to the sun, the victim became lost, dehydrated and disorientated in high temperatures without water. The Geologist had lost his way and went 500 metres off the original path. He fell down into a river from a vertical cliff 40 metres high.

What Went Wrong:FatigueFears or fobiasReduced mechanical attitude.Poor performance feed-back.Staff training progam.No training in STOPLack of procedure for displacement of “alone” workers.Lack of risk analysis for this specific jobNo consequences due to violations of procedures in HSE.No culture report of pre- existing conditions.Communication methods.Poor communication between groups.

In summary:Non-application of proceduresNo analysis of risks

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Exclusive Radio-operator to contact “on line” personnel.Mandatory norm for risk assessment consultation in activities planning.Protocols for “ Alone on line”, topographic, climatic, PPE.Line responsibility – job descriptions, assurance in personnel and activities.Establish consequences for violations of HSE norms.Training – reinforcemet Staff – incident report culture.HSE-MS review with Contract Manager.Assurance in company Staff of HSE-MS:

BID process, qualification, follow-up and assessment of HSE-MS.Auditing. Compliance and follow-up of previous audits and management inspections.

Venezuela, Production, 08/02/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:23 Employer:Contractor Occupation:ManualLabourer

A contractor was installing a portable steam generation plant close to a production well, when one of the workers entered the restricted area of the rod pump, without an authorization. He stood too close to the pump and was struck by one of the moving weights.

What Went Wrong:Violation of the permit systemContractor employee without appropiate safety training

Venezuela, Production, 02/05/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:32 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

A contractor entered the restricted area of a production well to check the data of the electric motor of the rod pump. He stood too close to the motor and was struck in the chest by one of the moving weights.

What Went Wrong:Violation of operational/maintenance procedure

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Venezuela, Other, 24/11/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: FallAge:42 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

A welder was on top of a 12m high mobile scaffold inside of a cone roof tank. When he decided to go to lunch, he used a hoist fixed to the work platform of the scaffold to go down instead of using the ladder. The scaffold lost its stability and both the welder and the scaffold fell to the floor of the tank.

What Went Wrong:Unsafe behavior of welder using the hoistInadequate ScaffoldPoor supervision

Venezuela, Production, 26/04/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:38 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

A contractor was changing the structure of a rod pump in a production well. The old structure was succesfully removed. When the crew was placing the new structure on the existing base, the wire rope failed and the structure fell from the crane and one worker was caught between the structure and the ground.

What Went Wrong:Inadequate procedurePoor supervision

Venezuela, Production, 26/04/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Caught betweenAge:28 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Maintenance,Craftsman

During re-assembly of a Beam Pumping Unit (BPU) at a location, the crew installed the top half of the gearbox, including the counterweights, and bolted it onto the bottom half, but did not secure the assembly to the concrete base. The crank arms of the gearbox had to be lowered from the horizontal position to the dead weight position (vertical). This required removing a catch. The gearbox was left held in place by the crane using only 1 sling, attached to one of the counterweights. The counterweight was then lifted slightly, so that the operator could remove the catch. The assembly tilted, the sling broke, the assembly rocked and fell off its base. The operator lost his balance, fell onto the ground, and was crushed under the BPU.

What Went Wrong:The procedure for replacing pumping units only considered using a Lowboy trailer. As it was unavailable at the time, another trailer was used, and as a consequence the BPU was dismantled prior to transport. The procedure had not been modified to consider this change in circumstance and additional hazards and risks involved.Causes:

Lack of a detailed operating procedure.Lack of change control.No risk identification.No toolbox talk.Lack of standarized steps and roles.Passive supervision.

Corrective Actions and Recommendations:Ensure competence of workers and supervisors with roles in lifting operations.Develop a clear operational procedure for this particular operation. Engage a specialist to advise.Reinforce the principle of change control.

Offshore

Venezuela, Production, 11/12/2005 Number of deaths: 1 Type of Incident: Struck byAge:28 Employer:Contractor Occupation:Process/EquipmentOperator

A contractor worker was replacing a manometer on a water injection platform (2.700 psi), when the 1/2” nipple connecting the pipe with the needle valve and the manometer, failed. The piece formed by the nipple, valve and manometer struck the worker in the chest, and then he fell from the platform to the water.

What Went Wrong:Poor supervision that allowed the worker to perform the activity without following the safe procedures

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Appendix D Significant incident reports by region

Africa

Onshore

Nigeria Other Explosion/burn

At 07:00hrs on Tuesday 20th December 2005, it was reported that an explosion had occurred at the block valve manifolds at a channel, resulting in a major spill and fire. All production from relevant land areas was shut down. Supply to the refinery was stopped. Over fly was carried out and Joint Investigation Team confirmed sabotage action by unknown persons. Community reported fatalities to Red Cross Organisation (Rivers State), but no confirmation could yet be made. Intelligence reports indicate that communities were chased away by the attackers before the explosion. A riser on the trunkline was also damaged by explosives on the 20/12/2005, but no leakage occurred.

What Went Wrong:Unknown persons detonated explosives on the 3 pipelines.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:New security threat with objectives of destroying oil field installations at unprecedented scale.Current external security patrol and intelligence gathering around major oil installations is inadequate to cope with this new situation.

Offshore

Nigeria Production Fall

Expat personnel fell through a manhole left unattended during personnel transfer to offshore locations. He sustained injuries to his right chest area.

What Went Wrong:Manhole was left open, was not attended nor roped off or with appropriate warning signs.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Barriers placed and signage around all manholes when opened for maintenance.

Nigeria Other Struck by

A jacket was being lifted from a transportation barge by a DP crane barge. One of the tugger lines snapped, leading to uncontrolled motion of the jacket. The jacket was lowered partailly into the water to dampen its motion. The tugger line was replaced but snapped again. The jacket and crane then made an uncontrolled slew from starboard to port side. The barge developed an 11° list; this was corrected when the jacket was lowered all the way to the seabed.

What Went Wrong:The partially submerged jacket seems to have been affected by the DP thrusters stream, sufficiently enough to sufficiently enough to overcome the crane brakes.Engineering and operational procedures were not detailed enough or not followed precisely.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Ensure engineering and operational procedures take this risk into account.

Asia/Australasia

Onshore

India Exploration Other

While studying rock outcrops in a riverbed in Assam, India, a geological team had three shots fired at them from an unidentified source. The team’s security personnel returned fire while the rest of the team retreated back to the vehicles. No injuries were incurred by any memeber of the geological team. It is believed that one of the insurgency groups that operate in the area fired the shots as a warning to keep away.

What Went Wrong:Improper use of informationIndadequate security systemPolice officers with the group were from outside the area and did not know of the insurgents’ presence. Local guides were not used during the field trip as the site was close to a jeep track. It is possible that a local guide would have steered the group away from the area.Written job procedure did not anticipate contributing factors.

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s i g n i F i c a n t i n c i d e n t r e p o r t s b y r e g i o n

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Immediate actions: Work was suspended in the area, the number of liason officers was increased, and a security review was conducted.Long term actions: An investigation was conducted to try and establish who had fired at the party.Management actions: A police base was obtained close to operations, local guides were used and security arrangements were reviewed.

India Other Struck by

During offloading of equipment from vessel to rig, the whip line parted, causing the block to fall from 8-10 mtrs on to the deck of the rig. Nobody was injured in the incident; however, it was deemed to be a high potential incident since under different circumstances it could have resulted in a serious injury or even in the worst case a possible fatality.

What Went Wrong:During the loading of the casing as the crane operator slackened the whip line to facilitate unhooking of the sling, the whip line parted above the ball which fell onto the casing bundle on the rig pipe deck.The basic cause of the incident was determined to be the incorrect installation of a load weight indicator on the crane whip line.The underlying causes were determined to be the failure by the drilling contractor to follow routine crane maintenance/inspection procedures, non availability of replacement criteria for the wire ropes and failure to follow ‘change management procedures’ during the installation of the load weight indicator.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:The rig’s crane inspection and maintenance procedures should be reviewed and revamped in accordance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) Guidance.The OIM or his nominated representative is to ensure that detailed check lists/plans are prepared in accordance with this guidance.The crane inspection programme is to include checks on all of the exposed metal areas for signs of deterioration, corrosion, erosion etc.Details of the boom length, load, boom radius displayed by the safe load indicator on the recorder must tally with the crane load chart furnished by the crane manufacturer.Prior to performing any modifications, the rig management is to adhere to the relevant ‘Management of Change’ procedure and seek approval for the design change before conducting the work.The crane operator should ensure that the crane is functioning correctly, and is properly maintained each and every time the crane is operated.

India Other Electrical

During a move of a drilling rig between locations in Rajasthan, the kelly hose attached to the rig mast came into contact with a live overhead power line carrying 11,000 volts. This caused heavy arching and lead to smouldering of tyres. The driver of the prime mover and 2 persons riding with the rig mast did not sustain any injury.

What Went Wrong:Absence of reliable and robust system to ensure positive electrical isolation.Lack of clarity in responsibilities in the ‘Rig move procedure’

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Establish a formal and reliable electrical isolation systemClarify the responsibilities/fix accountabilitiesReinforce field supervisionImpose stringent control for movement of critical loadsGeneral Recommendation-Hire low bed trailers for over dimension loadsRecord / communicate the height of loaded vehiclesFollow buddy system (Convoy system) strictlyEmergency preparednessRig reviews of this incident

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Malaysia Other Air transport

On 18th June 2005, at about 12:05 hours, a Super Puma AS332L1 helicopter, operated under long term charter to the operating company, encountered technical difficulties and made an emergency landing in the sea approximately 7nm from the gas platform. The helicopter turned over soon after hitting the water.At the time of the incident, the helicopter was on a routine crew-change flight from Miri to the platform with 11 passengers and 2 crewmembers. All passengers and crewmembers managed to evacuate the helicopter and climbed onboard one of the helicopters’ externally mounted life rafts, which had deployed. The helicopter sank to the seabed several minutes after the life raft was released.The company’s emergency response team was immediately activated to locate and subsequently rescue all 13 personnel using the dedicated standby boat to the platform and thereafter flown to Miri for medical observation and treatment.Outcome: All 11 passengers and 2 crewmembers survived the incident. 3 of the passengers (1 with minor injuries) received hospital treatment due to inhalation/ingestion of seawater. The rest had no injuries and were released following the initial hospital observation.The helicopter was subsequently recovered from the seabed (at a depth of 280ft) to facilitate root cause investigation.

What Went Wrong:The helicopter encountered technical difficulties soon after descent from cruise height.At this stage the technical difficulties appear to have been associated with the loss of tail rotor control.Malaysia Department of Civil Aviation is currently undertaking the root cause investigation with full support provided by the operating company, Eurocopter and Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyses (BEA) of France. This investigation is on-going and may take some months.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:All survivors attributed their survival in a large part to the HUET safety training, as well as the pre-flight safety briefing/video.The pilot’s simulator training, which has recently been increased to annual attendance, was also key in enabling a degree of control to be maintained over the helicopter during the emergency.Seating arrangement on the helicopter of maximum 2 passengers to an exit window assisted in an early egress from the inverted helicopter.The externally mounted life rafts also played a critical role in the recovery of the passengers from the water.Some of the passengers had first aid training and had helped their colleagues whilst in the life raft.Overall emergency search and rescue operation was deemed efficient, due to the availability of a dedicated standby boat from the nearby platform. This was supported by a second helicopter in the area, which was able to pick up the emergency locator beacon signal.Provisions of post-crisis counseling to affected passengers/crew and spouses are essential.Lessons related to the incident root cause(s) will be the subject of further communication when details are made available through the DCA.

Papua New Guinea Exploration Struck by

The incident occurred while a new section of 13 metre waterline was being fitted. The line collapsed sending large number of pipes in all directions narrowly missing pipe installation crew who were positioned on the upside of the pipe construction.

What Went Wrong:No engineering design standard for waterline construction.Poor job planningNo MOC process used to manage the significant increase in work load for managers/supervisors.Inadequate induction and training.No risk assessment undertaken.Construction team unfamiliar with this type of job.Failure to implement project HSES plan.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Create an OSL Lessons Learned system.Waterline construction requires a thorough risk assessment prior to start.Managers/supervisors to receive formal training in HSES management systesm, HSES plans, etc.Develop a technical engineering specification for waterline construction and design.Ensure all projects are conducted in accordance with OSDES project planning tool.Training of supervisors and construction crew was poor.HSES Alert distributed.

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Papua New Guinea Drilling Struck by

Whilst picking up a single joint of 4” drill pipe up the V-door, the lifting nubbin failed and the pipe slid back down the V-door onto the catwalk below.

What Went Wrong:Failure of lifting nubbin.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Training of roustabout crew on correct procedures for lifting loads from catwalk to Drill Floor.Review of lifting nubbin and threads.Inspection procedures for lifting gear.Distribution of HSES Alert.

Papua New Guinea Drilling Struck by

Hook on air winch opened up and shackle fell out of the hook landing at the back edge of Driller’s console approximately 8’ from Driller’s console.

What Went Wrong:Spring mechanism on latch configuration faulty due to poor maintenance routines.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Maintenance checks on all hooks and safety latch mechanisms.Review use of hook with latch mechanism for air winch operations.Amend procedure on air winch operations, particularly as regards maintenance routines, checks.Distribution of Safety Alert.

Papua New Guinea Production Vehicle incident

A driver returning to camp along mountain road lost control on a wide corner resulting in the vehicle rolling over.What Went Wrong:

Poor driving technique. The vehicle was checked and had no defects.Corrective Actions & Recommendations:

Defensive Driver course.Check braking system, tyres, etc.Review maintenance history of the vehicle.Provide extra grit to road surface.

Papua New Guinea Exploration Air transport

A helicopter crash landed at a village near to Moro Airport. The pilot was the only person onboard. No injuries.What Went Wrong:

The tail rotor disintegrated whilst in the air due to excessive wear/tear and lack of maintenance.Corrective Actions & Recommendations:

Inspection of all tail rotors.Review maintenance and inspection routines of contractors who supply helicopters for very short term jobs (3 days).Maintenance schedules against CAA requirements and internal aviation guidelines.Training of maintenance personnel.Safety Alert distributed.

Papua New Guinea Exploration Air transport

A new employee took a short cut around the helicopter and via the tail rotor.What Went Wrong:

The employee had not been inducted and was unaware of the hazard of the helicopter tail rotor.Corrective Actions & Recommendations:

Counsel local community on helicopter operations.Thorough induction for EVERYONE.Pilot to conduct helicopter briefing away from the helicopter.Where possible enclose tail rotor, though this not possible on some designs.Improve supervision around helicopter access/egress.Safety Alert distributed.

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Offshore

Indonesia Production Struck by

Four drums on a wooden pallet were being lifted at the Platform in Indonesia when the wooden pallet and metal banding straps failed, causing the four drums to fall. Two drums were lost to the sea and sank immediately and the other two fell to the south west stairway of the platform, damaging the stairway. Luckily there were no injuries.

What Went Wrong:Equipment: Inappropriate equipment (web slings) was used for the lifting job, possible defective pallet, no inspections for integrity carried out.Inadequate training/poor training standards: many of the people involved in the lift had not received any lifting and rigging training.Inadequate supervision: supervisors should have observed the incorrect procedures and stopped the operations before the incident happened.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Immediate and long-term action: the job was stopped and discussed with the deck crew, lifting and rigging procedures were reviewed, training was arranged for crew members.Management action: management investigation to review causes, methods and crew competency

Malaysia Production Caught between

When the Chief Officer tried to move the belting with his right hand, the motor started, dragging his fingers into the pulley groove. As a result, the tip of his index, middle & ring fingers were amputated.

What Went Wrong:An established work control with respect to troubleshooting was not followed;Improper isolation of live equipmentIneffective training/pre-mob briefing.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Review HSE Training Guide to require all contract administrators/ executors to attend “Managing Contractors’ HSE”;Issued standing instructions to require Pre-Mob and Mob sessions for short term contracts and Instruct the electrician to brief all fleet CEs and COs on positive electrical isolation.

Thailand Production Other

During deanchoring of an accommodation barge, one of the anchor wires hooked a subsea pipeline flange and caused major subsea pipeline leak.

What Went Wrong:Poor proceduresLack of quality supervisionLong flange bolts (easy to hook a cable)

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Extra marine personnel recruitedFlange bolt protectors installedNew complimentary work permit/checklist developed

Europe

Onshore

Austria Production Other

One employee discovered, during normal maintaince work, that the outer ring gasket of the sour gas pipeline was broken.What Went Wrong:

In the past the outer ring gasket was always made out of one piece and in this specific case the outer ring gasket was welded.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:The whole delivery of welded ring gaskets has been x-rayed by the operating company. The results of this x-ray examination showed that a lot of gaskets were defective. All of the ring gaskets that were already installed at the sour gas pipeline and at the sour gas production facilities have been replaced. Our safety related reaction was extremely proactive and for that reason we decided to replace all ring gaskets from this supplier. In the worst case sour gas could be released from the related production facilities into the atmosphere which could result in multiple fatalities.

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Offshore

Norway Production Struck by

The accident ocurred during the transfer of a Production Riser from the reel on the aft deck to the tension tower radius controller (chute). The 12 tonne soft strop supporting the head snapped when lifted up to the chute. The initiation head dropped to the deck before continuing over the side of the vessel. No personnel were injured but the riser is seriously damaged. The initiation head that was dropped had a weight of approx. 7 tonnes. It was dropped from a height of approx. 15 metres.

What Went Wrong:The support strop holding the termination head broke and the initiation wire holding the riser over the radius controller also broke. As there was no other means of supporting the termination head and riser on the radius controller, it fell backwards causing considerable damage. The strops had broken because they had experienced abnormally high loads as they were pulling against each other rather than working together. The incorrect configuration was not spotted by the deck foreman controlling the lift or by others involved in the operation.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Carried out an operational review of all the project procedures.Training course developed and delivered to the offshore personnel.Installed an additional work platform which offers better access.

Norway Drilling Struck by

Two drill pipes were being transferred from the pipedeck to the catwalk on the platform. A magnetic pipehandling gantry crane was used for this operation. A person was in the same area preparing another pipe for transport onshore. When the crane driver became aware of this person in the lifting area he stopped the gantry crane. One of the drillpipes (600kg) came loose from the crane and hit the person who subsequently fell against pipe on the deck. The person received a serious head injury. He was given first-aid onboard the platform and then transported onshore for further treatment.

What Went Wrong:Insufficient control of operations on the pipedeckLack of compliance with lifting proceduresInsufficient trainingInsufficient document controlTechnical weaknesses related to gantry crane

Norway Production Other

During the testing of the deluge system it was found that various sections are contaminated with biofilm. Sea cucumbers, shells, crabs and starfish were found. The reason why the system is contaminated is probably that insufficient chlorine was used during jetting. Investigation ongoing.

What Went Wrong:Inadequate toolInadequate design/construction

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:The deluge system was cleaned up.Work is ongoing with this problem.

Norway Production Other-Structural

Due to noise from a recirculation valve, the platform organisation had to take action to measure vibration and to carry out a frequency analysis to find the under tension the valve and pipe system was exposed to. In connection with this operation they found that one of the flange bolts was broken. The second broken bolt was discovered when they removed the first flange bolt. The third bolt was nearly broken. There are 8 bolts in total. A possible reason for this could be that they did not take their time when tightening the bolts. They had to shut down the platform. The recirculation valve was opened and the compressor was stopped normally. The potential in this accident was a large gas leakage.

What Went Wrong:Defective equipmentHigh noise levelInadequate design/constructionUnsatisfactory controlWear and tear

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Norway Drilling Struck by

The Spear Assembly came lose from the BX elevator from a vertical position when placed on the drill floor for disconnection. The Spear Assembly, approximately 8m and 2.7 tonnes, fell from a vertical position to the drillfloor towards the catwalk. A person was hit on the lower legs by the Spear Assembly when it hit the deck.

What Went Wrong:Unplanned operation.Inadequate risk-assessment of work operation.The work site was not properly secured.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Implemented new routine where the elevator function is always set in disable modus when not in use.Contacted vendor and improved the drilling programme to ensure 2 barriers in place at any time.Experience transfer within company, to authorities and to the industry.

Spain Production Caught between

During the off-loading of containers from the supply boat to the offshore platform, the first officer was directing the operation, but located in a blind spot. As the lifting began, the first officer was trapped by a guide rope hanging from the container with a loop at the end, and was dragged against the bannister of the boat. The crew was unable to release him and they had to open the bannister letting the man fall into the water, since the vessel was moving away from the platform. The crew threw him a life buoy and launched the life boat. Thirty minutes after falling into the water, the rescue team managed to cut the rope and move him onboard the platform for medical attention and helicopter evacuation. The officer suffered multiple leg fractures.

What Went Wrong:Non-fulfiment with procedures about supply boat: The boat was not moored up to the platformLack of loading/off-loading procedures at the platformLack of toolbox for lifting operations and job safety analysis between supervisors, crane operator and supply crew.Inadequate supply boat (poor visibility from bridge)Lack of hands-free communication for crane operator

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Develop an specific procedure for loading/off-loading from supply boatRegulate the use of PPE’s for the crew of the supply boatReview the emergency plan to minimize the man over-board rescue timeTrain the personnel in self risk assessment

UK Production Struck by

Four drums on a wooden pallet were being lifted at the platform when the wooden pallet and metal banding straps failed, causing the four drums to fall. Two drums were lost to the sea and sank immediately and the other two fell to the south west stairway of the platform, damaging the stairway. Luckily there were no injuries.

What Went Wrong:Equipment:

Inappropriate equipment (web slings) were used for the lifting job;possible defective pallet;no inspections for integrity carried out.

Inadequate training/poor training standardsMany of the people involved in the lift had not received any lifting and rigging training.

Inadequate supervisionSupervisors should have observed the incorrect procedures and stopped the operations before the incident happened.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Immediate and long-term actions:

The job was stopped and discussed with the deck crew;lifting and rigging procedures were reviewed;training was arranged for crew members.

management action:Management investigation to review causes, methods and crew competence

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UK Production Other

On the 25th March a Telecomms Technician went to maintain the camera located on the de-aerator Tower, overlooking the Accommodation - Deck Bridge. On arrival the Technician found only the pan & tilt gearboxes present, the camera was missing entirely. The 14 core cable, which has 110V AC power supply on it, was live, hanging down 1 metre with no camera on the end. The camera was discovered at the foot of the de-aerator tower. A closer look at the camera revealed yellow paint marks on the casing. The external damage to the camera was slight, the cowl had been dented, the jubilee clips retaining the camera inside had burst open, the camera body had 2 small dents, and after it was stripped down the internals were found to be badly damaged. Three M6 bolts that hold the camera to the mounting had failed.

What Went Wrong:Bolts Failed by fatigue – the camera was mounted high on the de-aeration tower. Wind had caused the camera to vibrate (vortex shedding) etc. Fatigue failure of the 3 small diameter mounting bolts resulted in the camera failing.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Review of condition of other camera mountings. Fix cameras in position where possible (to remove gearboxes). Fall arrestors attached to all cameras. Meetings with manufacturer to discuss failure and remedial action. SADIE (industry wide) alert raised and distributed.

FSU

Onshore

Russia Unspecified Struck by

The well service crew was pooling the hydraulic bailer out of a hole with the 73mm tubing. At 10:00, while moving the tubing from the rack post, the tubing slipped from the operator’s hands, fell down to his right hand and injured him. The injured person was transported to the first aid station where the first aid was rendered to the person, after that the person was transported to the emergency station. The diagnosis is open syntripsis fracture of the middle phalange, the second finger of the right hand and osteectopy.

What Went Wrong:Violation by individual (the well service operator knew that the gripping fork should be used for pooling the tubings in).Violation by supervisor (the well service foreman knew about use of special tool for pooling the tubing in but he allowed the staff to work without being equipped with the gripping fork).Shortcuts (laying the tubings down without the special tool is shortcutting the job).Non-use of special equipment (the special gripping fork was not used for pooling the tubing in).Routing activity without thought (the process of pooling the tubing in and laying it down is a routing work putting the person off his guard).Improper performance is rewarded (Pooling the tubing in with hands is handier than use of the special tool).No training provided (the well service operator wasn’t trained to safe laying the tubing down the racks on-job).Inadequate supervision.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Corrective measures:

Prepare the Lessons Learnt report and to circulate it among all contracting companies;Action the targeted HSE commissions auditing the contracting companies to focus on the safe work practices and to shut-in the operations performed unsafely;Inform personnel about the causes and the conditions of the incident when the investigation is completed.

Lessons learned:The person auditing the site has to consider all types of violations, assess the potential severity of the injury as a result of the personnel hazardous actions and to take immediate adequate actions; when the violation is repeated the actions in regards of the person should become more rigorous.Use of special proper tools may reduce the risk of injury and help the employee to make his work easier.

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Middle East

Onshore

Iran Drilling Fall

While dismantling a metal frame shelter, a labourer climbed onto the roof in order to get better purchase on a nut he was undoing. The roof, which was constructed of light weight corrugated sheets, gave way under his weight. He fell 2½ metres to the ground, injuring his right ankle and left wrist. He suffered a short period of decreasing consciousness.

What Went Wrong:Lack of skills.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:A selection of warning notices including “Warning fragile roof” were obtained and positioned on relevant structures and areas. At the morning tool box meeting all workers were reminded of the dangers of climbing on fragile structures and to think of the repercussions that their actions may have with regard to the safety of themselves and others.

Iran Other Struck by

A hook with load came free from the wire and fell down about 2 metres. The weight of the load is estimated at 600 kg. The load consisted of steel supports for electrical cable trays. The steel supports fell and hit the ground 1.5 m from the 5-6 workers, who were located around and very close to the lifting operation. There was no barrier round the lifting operation.

What Went Wrong:The lifting wire was damaged and worn out.The weight of the load (approximately 800kg including the lifting block) was too high for the wire.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Establish 3rd party certification of all cranes and providing load tables & charts. Focus on lifting operations and barrier philosophy in panel discussions in the upcoming Safe Behaviour Programme workshops. Carry out courses/workshops regarding lifting for crane drivers, supervisors, foremen and selected workers. Install weight indicators on all cranes.

Kuwait Other Water related

A crew boat collided with a mooring boat near the pier. The crew boat hull plates ruptured in several places & water gushed into the compartments. All the crew members were evacuated before the boat sank into the sea. However with the help of divers the crew boat was floated back up with in 48 hours.

What Went Wrong:Due to horseplay of the skipper of crew boat.Crew boat obscured from the site of other boats.Mooring boat skippers did not anticipate the bad behaviour of the crew boat skipper.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Disciplinary action has been initiated to correct the unsafe behaviour of the person engaged in horse play.Enhanced the close supervision of all activities.Strict implementation of safe procedures.

Kuwait Drilling Struck by

A blow out occured in a drilling rig due to the accidental entry of a fluid influx into the well and incorrect TIW safety valve cross over on the rig floor (unmatched work string). The well was killed and secured within 3 hours 30 minutes. However there was no loss of life or injury to personnel, no damages to the property.

What Went Wrong:Accidental entry of fluid influx in to the wellbore (or existing gas/oil in the wellbore) created an under balanced condition in the string and has resulted in an uncontrollable flow.Incorrect TIW safety valve cross over threads on the rig floor which has prevented installation of safety valve.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Review Dual workover procedure.Update the field manuals at the well site.Implement a formal risk control program.Job safety analysis shall be carried out.

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Kuwait Production Other-Chemical

A major crude oil leak from a 16” transit line due to accidental hitting by the excavator while closing the excavation pits. The spill was 360 bbls and the quantity recovered was 285 bbls. Loss is 75 bbls.

What Went Wrong:Improper supervision.Violation of procedures. Instead of manual closing of excavated pits in critical areas, excavator has been used for the said job.Accidental hitting of the pipe line.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Strictly adhere to the company fire & safety regulations.Strictly follow the excavation procedures.Enhance the supervision activities in critical areas.

Oman Other Struck by

The rig was being prepared for a move to the next location. After scoping down the top section of the telescopic mast, the rig floor was jacked down using the hydraulic rams (cylinders). The hydraulic rams were then re-positioned for the next step: lowering the mast. Whilst lowering was in progress, with the mast at about 20-40 degrees from vertical, the driller’s side cylinder failed and the mast fell down under its own weight and impacted on the ground and substructure.At the time of the incident there were four people on the rig floor: night tool pusher, driller, assistant driller and one floorman.

What Went Wrong:Failure of the hydraulic rams/cylinders while lowering the mast from vertical to horizontal.Precise cause of the failure of the rams is still under investigation.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Review system specifications and operating procedures for the hydraulic mast raising cylinders.Review of the positioning of personnel within the vicinity of the rig during mast raising and lowering operations.

Qatar Production Other-Structural

The bundwall of waste water lagoon at the Refinery collapsed, causing major flooding in the neighbouring tank farm area of Terminal and Export Dept.

What Went Wrong:The waste water lagoon was constructed as a temporary storage facility for waste water from the tank farm in the 80s. It later became part of the refinery and no longer considered a temporary structure. There was a substantial increase in the water level in the lagoon which stressed the bundwall beyond its limit and design capacity, it failed and collapsed.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:New permanent waste water storage facility is being designed.Secondary wall is being constructed on the Tank Farm end.Spillway has been constructed for the existing lagoon (Post incident).Regular checks and inspection of the integrity the bundwall already established.

UAE Other Struck by

After the final piece of lifting gear was disengaged from a concrete column it started to fall and as it fell hit guy wires of adjacent concrete columns. 3 columns collapsed and 2 were destabilized. No one was hurt or injured.

What Went Wrong:The foreman could not read or write English so did not understand the policies and procedures. The method statement, safe work method statement and lifting plan were not at the worksite. Failure of one of the four turnbuckles.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Verification scheme for competencies of supervision, revision to method statements for lifting, erection and leveling activities to include sequential step by step procedures for activities, compulsory inspection of rigging and lifting equipment.

UAE Other Explosion/burn

During mini-turnaround of gas plant, there were 2 valves which were not de-isolated, resulting in 2 incidents where the process system was over pressured, causing gasket failures and consequent hydrocarbon releases. The second resulted in 6 tonnes of LPG enveloping the plant as a vapour cloud.

What Went Wrong:Plant started without being de-isolated; valve left closed leading to overpressurisation of pipe work; failure to comprehend significance of first gas leak, which was not communicated or resolved prior to restart.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Start up procedures to be modified to prevent re-occurrence; isolation control certificate used as primary control for isolations and de-isolation activities within ops team and audited by team leaders regularly; reinforce that all incidents must be immediately reported to ensure full assessment can be carried out.

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Offshore

Qatar Drilling Struck by

An LPG tanker (87m long, 12 knots) sailed within 100-200m of a jack-up drilling rig that was on a wellhead platform. Attempts to contact the tanker by radio were not acknowledged until after it had sailed past the jack-up.

What Went Wrong:The 3rd mate who was steering the LPG tanker thought the jack-up rig was on tow and misjudged the vessel’s course.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Advise vessels to stay clear of fixed installations, maintain adequate watch and listen to radios.

UAE Other Struck by

Bails failure offshore where they dropped from the derrick to the rig floor. No one was hurt or injured.What Went Wrong:

Quality Control of corrosion cracks.Corrective Actions & Recommendations:

Thorough inspection of all bails, lifiting and hoisting traceability has been audited.

UAE Other Other-Structural

A 4-leg construction jack-up barge was being positioned next to a fixed platform. At the 2nd stage pre-load, leg 3 suffered punch through quickly followed by leg 2. Essential personnel onboard were mustered and evacuated safely.

What Went Wrong:Barge was not evenly loaded.The detailed requirements for jacking in the Operations Manual were not followed.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Provide up-to-date stability calculations.Review the Operations Manual.Inspections by company or 3rd party.Competent 3rd party representative to be onboard during positioning.

UAE Production Electrical

An electrical supervisor sustained 3rd degree burns to 40% of his body due to a short circuit of the 6.6kV spare cubicle he was inspecting.

What Went Wrong:The Permit-to-Work system was violated in that work was carried out that exceeded the visual inspection rules.Circumvention and failure of Energy Isolation barriers within the equipment that was being examined.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Enact a “Stop Work” system where all level of employees are empowered to stop any unsafe practice without negative consequence.Enhance compliance to Permit-to-Work System and ensure effective monitoring and auditing process is in place.The use of Entry Permit to Switch Rooms for visual checks, to identify hazards, specify precautions and record system inhibited, is to be enforced.

North America

Onshore

USA Production Struck by

A worker was performing a task at a wellhead facility and was struck in the arm by the bonnet of an air/gas actuated valve, severing the arm.

What Went Wrong:The valve was found to have a connection at wellhead pressure (unregulated) tied into the actuator. The bonnet overpressured, sheared the retaining bolts, and struck the worker.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Air/gas supplies to valve actuators must be regulated not to exceed the maximum pressure rating of the actuator. Pressure relief devices on actuators must also function properly. Modifications to air/gas supplies or piping configurations to valve actuators must be reviewed through the MOC process.

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USA Production Struck by

A contractor was performing well servicing operations. The crew had completed their work for the day and were in the dog house changing their clothes. When the crew remembered that they needed to fully open a surface casing valve to relieve pressure on the casing, one employee who had already changed out of his work clothes went alone to open the valve. Although no other employees witnessed the accident, it is believed that when the employee opened the ball valve, the blow down line whipped across the location and struck him simultaneously in both legs. His legs were broken and subsequently both legs had to be amputated. The employee also sustained a fracture of the right shoulder scapula.

What Went Wrong:Did not open the 2” valve slowly per applicable safety practices.Crew did not adhere to the Hearing Protection Policy. The 2” ball valve was used to choke the flow rate and thus reduce the noise level.The crew installed a 90-degree elbow on the end of the blow down line.Did not follow staking practice.Clarification is warranted to specify criteria for the appropriate use of a choke valve.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Share incident during Safety Stand Down meeting. Distribute Safety Alert informing of incident.Contractor will review its hearing policy with all workers and then monitor for compliance.Supplement safety practice to recommend not using directional connections on the end of open-ended blow down and vent lines. Any variance from the recommendation requires local management approval.Distribute Safety Alert to all employees informing them of incident and will discuss the importance of following the safety practice on staking lines during contractor safety meetings.

USA Exploration Vehicle incident

Contractors were collecting data from the RSR boxes. They had just finished Line 1 and were in the process of moving to a different location. While riding in a 4-wheeler (Treker), the driver made a wide turn on a non-paved surface, and the Treker flipped on its side. During the rollover, the passenger stuck his hand out of the vehicle apparently to brace himself for the fall, and the Treker’s roof landed on his fingers. The passenger’s three fingers on his right hand were nearly cut off, as they were barely attached.

What Went Wrong:Lack of hazard recognition.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:A safety meeting was held with the crew to discuss the causes of the incident, and a Safety Alert was sent to all crews describing the incident and the importance of following all safety procedures.

USA Drilling Struck by

While picking up a stand of drill pipe, the driller hit the derrick crown with the travelling block assembly, driving through the crown block safety braking system. The crown-o-matic failed to stop the blocks from strking the crown due to faulty adjustment between the crown-o-matic and the brakes. The drill line was severed and the entire travelling block assembly, kelly and joint of pipe fell uncontrolled to the rig floor from a height of approx 110 feet. The motorman sustained a fractured scapula and abdominal injuries requiring surgery to repair. The rig was down 15 days for repair.

What Went Wrong:Driller was distracted by crew adding polymer to drill pipe; improper adjustment of crown-o-matic cylinder due to faulty reassembly after brake maintenance; rig leadership not trained on proper procedures for testing crown-o-matic.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Improve control of work measures on rig floor designed to significantly reduce distraction to driller during tropping ops and while making connections;Improve system for inspection, preventive maint and competency of personnel working on critical safety devides (e.g. crown-o-matic); develop written guidance/JSA for rig crews around how to properly perform functional tests of safety critical equipment;Increase rig management involvement and understanding of major risks, safety critical equipment and functional testing of such on the rig.

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South America

Onshore

Argentina Drilling Explosion/burn

While preparing the 3rd run of a perforation operation, a detonator which was placed inside the safety tube exploded just after being checked.

What Went Wrong:Polyethylene roll, used to avoid soil contamination, was unfolded next to place where detonators were being checked, causing a significant electrostatic charge in a dry environment. There was a failure to recognise this potential static electricity source.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Install polyethylene blankets before handling detonators.While moving or unfolding blankets during operations, remove all detonators from corresponding area to the wire-line truck.Develop training plan, including analysis of all potential static electricity generation sources and determine ways to avoid or mitigate (including use of polyethylene).

Bolivia Drilling Struck by

During the fill up operation the injured person was hit by a low pressure ball valve on the end of the mud hose which parted. As a result the injured person suffered fractures to the arm.

Colombia Drilling Struck by

While manually aligning the Casing Filling Tube (CFT) to put it in the 7” casing and proceed with the elevator change (pickup elevator for side door elevator), the hanging end of the CFT hit the 7” coupling casing border averting the trajectory of the CFT and hitting the derrick man on his chest, pushing him back and injuring his left thigh.

What Went Wrong:Work Supervision: Lack of supervision during critical activities.Communications: should be improved before critical activities and where personal changes should be done.Training: Lack of personal skills evaluation.Management System: Standars, Polícies and administrative controls.Controls should be improved.Corrective actions must be improved.Human Engineering: Human-Machine interface. Alarms/Comunication must be improved.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Carry out a workshop in Team Work and Leadership.Programme and execute pre-opertional meetings includinging all of the personnel invloved in the operation.Audit AST program and implement recomendtions as soon as possible.Review all personnel skills and include them in every personnel HSE-passport verifying and correcting deviations found.Establish a procedure to inform company of all personnel changes, justifying and supporting them.Schedule and carry out inspections to review recomendations for audits, implementation of incident investigations.Provide a communication system between the supervisor and the derrick man.

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Ecuador Production Explosion / burn

A temporary pump, driven by an internal combustion engine, was being used for an offloading operation from a gasoline road tanker onto a fuel tank on a production facility. This pump was positioned inside the bundwall. When the operation was almost completed, the operator (with 8 years experience) went to look for the supervisor to obtain his conformity. When the operator came back, the fuel tank was overflowing and spilling petrol inside the bundwall. The operator rushed to shut the valve. At that moment, the pump engine ignited the pool of petrol, causing 2nd degree burns to the operator and to the tanker driver. The speedy action of personnel allowed rapid extinction of the fire, which otherwise could have propagated through the production plant and a series of oil tanks, leading to a mayor catastrophe.

What Went Wrong:Poor design: no proper transfer pump, fuel tank located adjacent to crude tank farmLack of change controlLack of hazard awareness: activity not covered by by a PTWComplacency of the refuelling operator.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Revise refuelling proceduresChange location of fuel service installationsImplement a permit to work system for loading and discharging fuelRegulate the use of fireproof overalls to personnel exposed to fire hazards.

Ecuador Production Air transport

Personnel were being transported to field operations via a comercial flight, landing at an official airport. The aircraft touched down 4 metres short of the landing strip, due to strong winds pushing the plane downwards. The landing gear suffered impact and broke. The airplane started sliding, initially along the runway and then on the surrounding ground, until it crashed against the wall of the facility. Fortunately some personnel only suffered minor injuries. An official investigation was carried out by the national authorities.

What Went Wrong:Approach and landing procedures were not being followed strictly, touching down too soon, maybe partly to facilitate early parking of the aircraft. This, combined with a gust of wind triggered the incident.

Corrective Actions & Recommendations:Civil aviation authority and Airline company took the following actions:

Remind the crews of the obligation to comply fully with company operational procedures, including “sterile cabin”, full briefings and call-outs at all stages of flight.Correct in reference documents the elevation datum of the airport (it was stated 14 feet lower than in reality).

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Appendix E Restricted workday analyses

The figures show the frequency of RWDC and LTI for com-panies and contractors, and onshore and offshore activities.

The overall frequency remains unchanged at �.37 com-pared to 2004.The frequency of RWDCs and more serious injuries remains higher in the offshore environment.

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Overall 1.37 (no change)§

Company 0.75 (9% better)Contractor 1.59 (3% worse)

Onshore 1.31 (7% worse)Offshore 1.61 (13% better)


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RWDC+LTI frequency - company & contractorper million hours worked

RWDC+LTI frequency - onshore & offshoreper million hours worked

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20052004200320022001

E.1 Overall RWDC+LTI frequency

Not all companies include in their safety data the category of Restricted Workday Cases (RWDCs). RWDCs are injuries and occupational incidents which are severe enough to prevent a person from performing normal duties, but not so severe that lighter duties cannot be performed.

For the analyses in this appendix, data are only used where there is a clear indication that incidents resulting in restricted work are collected. Accordingly, the database of hours worked is reduced to 2140 million, 90% of all hours.

Please note that the averaging period used in this section alters in response to limitations in the data partition in earlier years.

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Overall 13.66 days (7% more)§

Company 12.45 days (14% fewer)Contractor 13.77 days (10% more)

Onshore 14.74 days (46% more)Offshore 9.55 days (52% fewer)

§ The percent. in parentheses relates to the 2000-’04 average

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Severity of restriced workday cases – company & contractoraverage days of restricted work per RWDC

Severity of restriced workday cases – onshore & offshoreaverage days of restricted work per RWDC

0 5 10 15 20

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2005

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2005

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E.2 Severity

Many companies do not have the RWDC category of inci-dent, and even fewer collect data on days of restricted work. The database is 938 million hours worked, just 39% of the total database.

A total of 7402 days were lost as a result of restricted workday cases, in the sense that normal duties could not be performed. This compares with 44�95 days lost as a result of lost time injuries (on a database 2.5 times as large).The average number of days lost to restricted work per case increased compared to the previous 5-year period, most noticeably among contractor staff work-ing onshore.Offshore the number of days lost has fallen by 52% compared to the previous 5-year period.

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Africa 0.99 (2% worse)Asia/Australasia 0.70 (29% better)Europe 2.15 (16% better)FSU 0.94 (6% better)Middle East 1.48 (8% better)North America 2.42 (11% better)South America 2.35 (5% worse)

§ The percent. in parentheses relates to the 2000-’04 average

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E.3 RWDC + LTI frequency by region

The figure shows the frequency of RWDC and LTI for the different regions, in comparison to the regional average for the preceding 5-year period.

Improvement in performance is seen for all regions except Africa and South America.The greatest improvement is associated with opera-tions in Asia/Australasia, where the 2005 value (0.70) reduced to 7�% of the average for that region for the preceding 5-year period (0.98).

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RWDC+LTI frequency - regionsper million hours worked

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E.4 RWDC + LTI frequency by function

The figure shows the frequency of RWDC and LTI associ-ated with the different functions.

There has been an improvement in the RWDC+LTI frequency associated with the functions of ‘drilling’, ‘production’ and ‘other’, relative to the average for the previous 5-year period.The performance in the ‘exploration’ function is 63% worse than the 2000-2004 average.‘Drilling’ performance is almost double the industry average for 2004.

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Drilling 2.68 (10% better)

Production 1.55 (7% better)

Other 0.93 (19% better)

§ The percent. in parentheses relates to the 2000-2004 average

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E.4.1 Exploration

Contractors in Asia/Australasia returned a frequency of just �9% of the value for the preceding 5 years.Relative to the 2000-2004 average for those regions the 2005 RWDC + LTI frequencies for European and North American exploration contractors have halved.

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The result for contractors in Africa for 2005 was nearly 5 times that reported in the previous 5-year period. In South America the average has doubled.The company only average is 0.4 in 2005 for exploration however the hours worked in these functional groups are too small to draw any useful conclusions. Similar results appear in the LTIF analysis.

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E.4.2 Drilling

Drilling contractors improved their overall perform-ance from an average of 3.00 for the preceding 5-year period to 2.85 in 2005.Contractors in the FSU returned a frequency of just 37% of the average for the previous 5-year period for that region.

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E.4.3 Production

A marked improvement can be seen in contractor per-formance in Europe.The frequency for contractors in South America has increased by 59% compared to the previous 5-year period.A slight improvement can be seen in company perform-ance in all regions except Africa and FSU.

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Production RWDC+LTI frequency by regionper million hours worked

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E.4.4 Other

The European average for contractors remains high compared to the other 6 regions at 2.7 times the aver-age for all regions.The 2005 frequency has improved in South America for both contractor and company employees.

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Other RWDC+LTI frequency by regionper million hours worked

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Accident severityThe average number of lost days per lost workday case.

‘Better’/’worse’The terms ‘better’ and ‘worse’ refer to performance change

relative to the previous year. For example, if LTIF is �0% ‘better’, its value is 90% that of the previous year.

Caught betweenInjury where injured person is crushed or similarly injured

between machinery moving parts or other objects, caught between rolling tubulars or objects being moved, crushed between a ship and a dock, or like incidents.

Company employeeAny person employed by and on the payroll of the report-

ing Company, including corporate and management per-sonnel specifically involved in exploration and production. Persons employed under short-service contracts are included as Company employees provided they are paid directly by the Company.

ContractorA ‘Contractor’ is defined as an individual or organisa-

tion performing work for the reporting company, following verbal or written agreement. ‘Sub-contractor’ is synony-mous with ‘Contractor’.

Contractor employeeAny person employed by a Contractor or Contractor’s

Sub-Contractor(s) who is directly involved in execution of prescribed work under a contract with the reporting Company.

DrillingAll exploration, appraisal and production drilling and

workover as well as their administrative, engineering, con-struction, materials supply and transportation aspects. It includes site preparation, rigging up and down and resto-ration of the drilling site upon work completion. Drilling includes ALL exploration, appraisal and production drill-ing.

ExplorationGeophysical, seismographic and geological operations,

including their administrative and engineering aspects, construction, maintenance, materials supply, and transpor-tation of personnel and equipment; excludes drilling.

Explosion or burnIncident caused by burns, toxic gases, asphyxiation or

other effects of fires and explosions. ‘Explosion’ means a rapid combustion, not an overpressure.

FallIncident caused by falling off, over or onto something.

Fatal accident rate (FAR)The number of company/contractor fatalities per

�00,000,000 (�00 million) hours worked.

Fatal incident rate (FIR)The number of fatal incidents per �00,000,000 (�00 mil-

lion) hours. Incidents involving a third party fatality are included (since �998), provided they directly result from company or contractor operations.

First aid caseCases that are not sufficiently serious to be reported as

medical treatment or more serious cases but nevertheless require minor first aid treatment, eg. dressing on a minor cut, removal of a splinter from a finger. First aid cases are not recordable incidents.

Hours workedThe actual ‘hours worked’ are recorded in the case of

onshore operations. For offshore workers, the ‘hours worked’ are calculated on a �2 hours workday. Consequently average hours worked per year will vary from �600 to 2300 hours/person (averaging 2000) depending upon the shift on/off ratio. Vacations and leaves are excluded.

Hours worked in year (000’s)Hours are rounded to the nearest thousand.

Lost time injury (LTI)A fatality or lost workday case. The number of LTIs is the

sum of fatalities and lost workday cases.

Lost time injury frequency (LTIF)The number of lost time injuries (fatalities + lost workday

cases) incidents per �,000,000 hours worked.

Lost workday case (LWDC)Any work related injury other than a fatal injury which

results in a person being unfit for work on any day after the day of occurrence of the occupational injury. “Any day” includes rest days, weekend days, leave days, public holidays or days after ceasing employment.

Medical cause of deathThis is the cause of death given on the death certificate.

Where two types of causes are provided, such as “pulmo-nary oedema” caused by “inhalation of hot gases from a fire”, both are recorded.

Medical treatment case (MTC)Cases that are not severe enough to be reported as fatali-

ties or lost work day cases or restricted work day cases but are more severe than requiring simple first aid treatment.

Number of days unfit for workThe sum total of calendar days (consecutive or otherwise)

after the days of the occupational injuries on which the employees involved were unfit for work and did not work.

Appendix F Glossary of terms

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Number of employeesAverage number of full-time and part-time employees, cal-

culated on a full-time basis, during the reporting year.

Number of fatalitiesThe total number of Company’s employees and or

Contractor’s employees who died as a result of an incident. ‘Delayed’ deaths that occur after the incident are included if the deaths were a direct result of the incident. For example, if a fire killed one person outright, and a second died three weeks later from lung damage caused by the fire, both are reported.

Occupational injuryAny injury such as a cut, fracture, sprain, amputation, etc,

which results from a work accident or from a single instan-taneous exposure in the work environment. Conditions resulting from animal bites, such as insect or snake bites, and from one-time exposure to chemicals are considered to be injuries.

Offshore workAll activities and operations that take place at sea, includ-

ing major inland seas (eg. Caspian Sea) and other inland seas directly connecting with oceans. Includes transportation of people and equipment from shore to the offshore location either by vessel or helicopter.

Onshore workAll activities and operations that take place within a land-

mass, including those in swamps, rivers and lakes. Activities in bays, in major inland seas, or in other inland seas directly connected to oceans are counted as offshore.

Other (as a category of work)Major construction and fabrication activities and disas-

sembly, removal and disposal (decommissioning) at the end of the life of a facility. Includes factory construction of process plant, offshore installation, hook-up and commis-sioning, and removal of redundant facilities. Also includes personnel and incidents that cannot naturally be assigned to exploration, drilling or production.

ProductionPetroleum and natural gas producing operations, includ-

ing their administrative and engineering aspects, minor construction, repairs, maintenance and servicing, materi-

als supply, and transportation of personnel and equipment. It covers all mainstream production operations including wireline. It does not cover production drilling and worko-ver.

Restricted workday case (RWDC)Any work-related injury other than a fatality or lost work

day case which results in a person being unfit for full per-formance of the regular job on any day after the occupa-tional injury. Work performed might be:

an assignment to a temporary job;part-time work at the regular job;continuation full-time in the regular job but not per-forming all the usual duties of the job.

Where no meaningful restricted work is being performed, the incident is recorded as a lost workday case (LWDC).

Struck byIncidents where injury results from being hit by moving

equipment and machinery, or by flying or falling objects.

Total recordable incident rate (TRIR)The number of recordable incidents (fatalities + lost work-

day cases + restricted workday cases + medical treatment cases) per �,000,000 hours worked.

Vehicle incidentIncidents involving motorised vehicles designed for trans-

porting people and goods over land, eg cars, buses, trucks. Pedestrians struck by a vehicle are classified as vehicle inci-dents. Fatal incidents from a mobile crane would only be vehicle incidents if the crane were being moved between locations.

Water relatedIncidents other than fatalities (drowning) in which water

played a significant role.

Work-related injurySee occupational injury.

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Appendix G Contributing companies

The table below shows the size of the database in thousands of hours worked for each contributing company and whether reported data includes information on contractor statistics, breakdown by function, medical treatment cases, restricted workday cases, and days lost following lost workday and restricted workday cases. All company submissions include data on numbers of fatalities and lost workday cases.

Company Hours (‘000)

Contractor data

Data by function

MTCs RWDCs LWDC days

RWDC days

ADNOC 89,201 yes yes yes yes yes yes

AgipKCO 19,353 yes yes mostly mostly mostly no

AmeradaHess 17,962 yes mostly yes yes yes no

Anadarko 6,975 no mostly yes no yes no

BG 54,607 yes mostly yes yes no no

BHP 10,295 yes yes yes yes yes yes

BP 210,732 yes yes yes yes no no

CairnEnergy 11,226 yes yes partly partly partly partly

Chevron 240,044 yes no yes yes yes yes

CNOOC 32,567 yes no mostly no partly no

ConocoPhillips 78,767 yes no yes yes no no

DolphinEnergy 24,056 yes yes yes yes yes yes

DONG 318 yes yes yes yes yes yes

ENI 176,533 yes mostly mostly mostly mostly no

ExxonMobil 151,078 yes mostly yes yes no no

GNPOC 16,822 yes no yes yes yes yes

HOCOL 6,436 yes yes yes yes yes yes

KuwaitOilCompany 30,366 yes yes yes no yes no

Maersk 11,821 yes yes mostly partly no no

Marathon 24,937 yes mostly yes yes no no

NorskHydro 7,522 yes mostly yes yes no no

Occidental 40,362 yes no yes yes yes yes

OilSearch 8,577 yes yes yes yes yes yes

OMV 9,841 yes mostly yes yes yes partly

PDVSA 145,738 yes yes yes no yes no

Petro-Canada 17,097 yes yes yes yes yes yes

PetronasCarigali 20,771 yes no yes yes yes yes

PremierOil 2,969 yes mostly yes yes no no

PTTEP 9,802 yes yes yes yes yes yes

QatarPetroleum 27,429 yes yes yes yes yes yes

Rasgas 42,984 yes yes yes yes no no

Repsol 78,569 yes mostly yes yes yes mostly

SaudiAramco 29,893 no yes no yes yes yes

Shell 372,505 yes yes yes yes yes yes

Statoil 48,658 yes yes yes yes no no

TNK-BP 162,649 yes mostly yes yes yes no

Total 127,108 yes yes yes yes yes no

TullowOil 2,523 yes mostly mostly mostly mostly mostly

VICO 11,577 yes yes yes yes no no

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Appendix H Countries represented

No. reporting HoursCountry companies (‘000)

Africa

Algeria 9 32,945Angola 4 53,398Cameroun 4 8,023Chad 1 15,149Congo 2 12,102Egypt 4 65,462EquatorialGuinea 3 16,064Gabon 6 12,717GuineaBissau 1 25Libya 5 49,121Nigeria 6 187,710SouthAfrica 2 128Sudan 1 16,822Tunisia 4 3,213

Asia/Australasia

Australia 8 15,442Bangladesh 2 1,675Brunei 2 22,876China 7 43,574HongKong 1 45India 4 14,228Indonesia 9 147,600Japan 1 89Malaysia 4 48,204Myanmar 1 3,151NewZealand 2 2,203Pakistan 7 21,173PapuaNewGuinea 2 8,759Philippines 2 1,403Singapore 5 266SouthKorea 1 370Taiwan 1 7Thailand 5 16,488Vietnam 3 1,253

Europe

Albania 2 355Austria 1 2,512Belgium 1 3Croatia 1 1,260Denmark 3 9,468FaroeIslands 1 2France 2 8,680Germany 2 4,962

No. reporting HoursCountry companies (‘000)

Europe (continued)

Ireland 3 717Itay 5 4,726Netherlands 5 20,078Norway 10 68,810Romania 1 232Spain 3 1,206UK 17 68,116

FSU

Azerbaijan 4 37,469Georgia 1 6,745Kazakhstan 7 136,266Russia 9 263,295Turkmenistan 1 7

Middle East

Iran 5 26,703Israel 1 35Kuwait 5 41,386Oman 2 77,870Qatar 8 81,679SaudiArabia 2 29,946Syria 4 3,345UAE 8 120,362Yemen 3 2,642

North America

Canada 8 49,716Cuba 1 92Mexico 2 1,040USA 14 173,755

South America

Argentina 7 83,338Bolivia 4 7,099Brazil 7 1,983Colombia 5 23,365Ecuador 3 13,452Peru 2 1,582Surinam 1 7Trinidad&Tobago 5 13,320Venezuela 10 171,359

The tabulation shows the breakdown of reported hours worked in regions and countries. Also shown are the num-bers of companies reporting data in each country. The table does not necessarily show all hours worked in the upstream petroleum sector in each country.

What is OGP?

The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers encompasses the world’s leading private and state-owned oil & gas companies, their national and regional associations, and major upstream contractors and suppliers.

Vision

To work on behalf of all the world’s upstream companies to promote responsible and profitable operations.

Mission

To represent the interests of the upstream industry to international regulatory and legislative bodies.To achieve continuous improvement in safety, health and environmental performance and in the engineering and operation of upstream ventures.To promote awareness of Corporate Social Responsibility issues within the industry and among stakeholders.

Objectives

To improve understanding of the upstream oil and gas industry, its achievements and challenges and its views on pertinent issues.To encourage international regulators and other parties to take account of the industry’s views in developing proposals that are effective and workable.To become a more visible, accessible and effective source of information about the global industry, both externally and within member organisations.To develop and disseminate best practices in safety, health and environmental performance and the engineering and operation of upstream ventures.To improve the collection, analysis and dissemination of safety, health and environmental performance data.To provide a forum for sharing experience and debating emerging issues.To enhance the industry’s ability to influence by increasing the size and diversity of the membership.To liaise with other industry associations to ensure consistent and effective approaches to common issues.

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Internet site: www.ogp.org.uke-mail: [email protected]

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