office of force transformation transforming defense the path not taken …yet the role of defense in...
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Office of Force Transformation
Transforming Defense
“The Path Not Taken …yet”
• The Role of Defense in National Security• The Management of Defense• The Force
Arthur K. CebrowskiDirector, Force Transformation23 July 2003
Vision: Broad and Sustained Competitive Advantage
Office of Force Transformation
Connecting the Present to Our Future
Expanding Competition Power and Principle
Strategic Posture Shrinking the Dysfunctional, Disconnected Gap of Globalization
Operational Maneuver Creating a one-two punch
Mapping Future Challenges Risk
Issues:• How to make near-term actions robust across alternative futures?• How to create on-ramps for capabilities?
Office of Force Transformation
Trends in Security Competition
• Short Cycle Time• New Competencies• Adaptive Planning • Integrated Joint • Interdependent
Information Age
• Developed Rules• Mature Markets• Narrowing Customer Base• Security=Defense
Globalization II• Emerging Rules• Market Opportunities• New Customer Base Emerging• Security=All Else+Defense
Globalization III
• Long Cycle Time• Well Developed Tools/Processes• Deliberate Planning• Deconflicted Joint• Tortured Interoperability
Industrial Age
Office of Force Transformation
Expanding Competition
Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}
U.S. power is unmatched
• Therefore, U.S. policy will be attacked through its moral principles (legitimacy, international law, etc.)
If the frontiers of National Security can be everywhere and are not territorial borders but fault lines within societies, then …
• The nexus of foreign and domestic security policy is intelligence
• We must be able to look and operate deeply within societies
Assured Access includes the domains of political victory
• Speed of modern warfare creates a continuum, not a succession of phases
Decisively Defeat
Duration
Assure, Dissuade, Deter
In
ten
sity
Office of Force Transformation
Security System Balance? … Major Movements
Forces Forward(Garrison Forward)(Sea-based)(Hubs)
Strategic DeployFrom Home
(Reactive)
Alliances
Strategic Distances(CONUS and Hubs)
Sea GarrisonForward
Strategic Maneuver/BalanceForces forwardStrategic deploy from home Allies
Operational Maneuver
From forward garrison From the seaFrom strategic distances
Deter Forward2d derivative forceSustaining forceConstabulary/Nation-building force
Office of Force Transformation
FunctioningFunctioning
FunctioningFunctioning
Functioning
Functioning
FunctioningFunctioning
Functioning
Mostly Non-Integrating Gap
Evac’s Peace/Relief Contingency Positioning Show of Force Combat
U.S. Military Responses to Situations, 1990-2002
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1970s 1980s 1990s* Total number of response days for all operations by Navy, Marines, Air Force and Army
Baseline9kMideast
Iraq
FRY
Somalia/Haiti
32k
22k
5k CombinedService
ResponseDays*
“Crisis”
Vietnam
Source: CNA Corp.
Strategic Posture … Exporting security
The Red Zone … … Our Response
Office of Force Transformation
Industrial Age
Information Age
Globalization IIIGlobalization II
Iraq 1
Iraq 2
Global Trends … Military Response
The Emerging American Military:
• More expeditionary (including lighter, more lethal)
• More networked (more interoperability at the JTF level)
• Designed to leverage the exterior positions (precision from distance as sensors move in)
• Leverages increasingly persistent ISR
• Tighter sensor-shooter timelines (sensing, C2, fly-out)
• Values Information Superiority (information operations)
• Expanded unmanned capabilities(UAV, UCAV, UUV, robotics)
Office of Force Transformation
Industrial Age
Information Age
Globalization IIIGlobalization II
Global Trends…Threats …Strategic Response
Strategic Capabilities:• More Preventative - Less Punitive
• Achieve unambiguous warning earlier
• More SOF-Like characteristics
• A Deter Forward Force
• An Intel/Surveillance-based force
• Coping with system perturbations
-----[Great Power War?]-----
Political Ideology
Hated Dictator
Hated Dictator w/Nukes
Nuclear Nationalists
Narco-terrorists
Regional Terrorists
International Terrorists
SEI w/Bugs
System
State
Individual
Office of Force Transformation
Top Level Issues …Culture: Values, Beliefs, Attitudes
Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}
Event Focused Continuous
Punitive Preventative
Access to Battlespace Access to Political Victory
Citizen SoldierVolunteer (Recruited) Force Professional
Warrior + Enforcer + “Systems Administrator”
Projecting Power Exporting Security
Office of Force Transformation
Candidates for Action Now …Identify issues of regret
Warfare Elements• Fire - Non-lethals, Directed Energy, Redirected Energy• Maneuver - Sea basing, vertical battlefield, lift for operational maneuver• Protection - Urban Operations, “Bug-to-Drug” Cycle Time• C2&C – Joint Interdependency vs. Interoperability• ISR - Demand-centered Intel, Tactically Responsive Space• Logistics - Joint demand-centered logistics
Risk Management Areas (creating on-ramps)• Joint S&T• Joint Experimentation• Modern Warfare Modeling Tools• People: cost or resource• Precision Deterrence
Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}
Office of Force Transformation
Transforming Defense
Surrogate Wars
System Perturbations
and Consequences
Global HomelandInterests Security
MADContainment
=>
1990
2000Global HomelandInterests Security
Precision Deterrence?
=>
Office of Force Transformation
Evolution of Precision Strike: … Effectiveness against fixed targets
Then & Now: One-sixtieth the tonnage required to drop a bridge span
1940s
B-17240 Tons
1960s
F-4D200 Tons
1970s
F-4D LGB12.5 Tons
1990s
F-117 LGB4 Tons
2000s
All weatherB-1 JDAM
4 Tons250
200
150
100
50
0
To
ns
Req
uir
ed
Tons of bombs required to drop a bridge span (90% confidence)
Office of Force Transformation
UnguidedUnitaryBombs
1940s
So
rtie
s re
qu
ired
1960s
UnguidedCluster
Weapons
1970s
Maverick
1990s
SFW
2000s
WCMD/SFW/P3I
Evolution of Precision Strike: … Effectiveness against mobile targets
Then & Now: Sorties required to neutralize 10 mobile armored battalions *
* Damage 15 out of 30 armored vehicles per battalion
Office of Force Transformation
176 Bombs88 F-4 Sorties
400' CEP
1970s
Evolution of Precision Strike:… Quantity of bombs assigned for 90% Probability of Kill
Then & Now: Over Three Orders of Magnitude reduction in weapons required to destroy a fixed target
Advanced weapons systems armed with precision munitions are extremely accurate but are highly dependent on quality information
9,000 Bombs1,500 B-17 Sorties
3,300' CEP
1940s
2 Bombs1 F-16 Sortie
10' CEP
1990s
1 Bomb1 B-2 Sortie< 10' CEP
2000s
Office of Force Transformation
Paradigm Changes … To Enable Precision Deterrence
• Large Area Affected Makes up for Lack of Precise Weapon and Target Location
• Non-Linear Political Consequences
• Self Deterring
• Precise Weapon and Target Location Allows Focused Effects
• Militarily Relevant
• Operationally Useful
Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Nukes)
Weapons of Precision Deterrence
Precision Deterrence = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}Ours & Ours & Ours &Theirs Theirs Theirs
Office of Force Transformation
Deterrence is …
Context Dependent– Highly reliant on intelligence
– A state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction relevant to those we wish to deter
An Effects Based Operation– Precision Deterrence: creating
a precise local effect in the cognitive domain
– Ways can be military, financial, economic or diplomatic
– The Duality of Means …
Precision Deterrence must have a local effect – it can have a global impact
Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Nukes)
Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Nukes) Weapons of
Precision DeterrenceWeapons of
Precision Deterrence
Viewed as Viewed asDisproportionate Proportionateby the Target by the World
PrecisionEffect
Office of Force Transformation
Military Options … for Precision Deterrence
• Directed Energy Weapons– Lasers
• Covert engagement at a safe distance
• All aspect engagement and re-targeting capability
• Ultra precise targeting and aimpoint
• Adjustable delivered energy
– High Powered Microwaves• Deter belligerents
• Ultra precise targeting and aimpoint
• Deny an area to personnel
• Control crowds
• Non-Lethal Weapons– Counter-Personnel– Counter-Material– Counter-Capability
• Need for decision space and time– Ability to act while
discriminating intent– Increase engagement time
and range
• Need to satisfy policy and operational constraints– Target– Non-combatants– Own force
Operational Commonality
?
Office of Force Transformation
Precision Deterrence … Issues and Choices
How do we balance local (tactical) deterrence and global (strategic) deterrence?
What kind of JWAC-like process is required to create cognitive effects?
Can our intelligence community identify that which our adversaries hold most dear?
What are the new tools of deterrence that support our moral principles and strategic interests and how do they interact?
What are the new concepts for deterrence?