of epicycles and elegance

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Of Epicycles and EleganceAuthor(s): Frederick AdamsSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 637-641Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231891 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 637 Volume 24, Number 4, December 1994, pp. 637 - 642

Of Epicycles and Elegance FREDERICK ADAMS Central Michigan University Mount Pleasant, MI 48859 USA

I am pleased to be able to respond to Al Mele's reply to my paper on trying and desire ('Desiring to Try: Reply to Adams' and 'Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try/ respectively, both this volume). My remarks will be brief.1

First, it is not thesis T2 (as stated in Mele's reply) that I find objectionable. It may be possible for me to want TO TRY to quit smoking (prior to trying), while currently not wanting TO QUIT smoking (nor trying to quit). I may want to try because I want to ACQUIRE the desire to quit, since people persist in nagging me to quit. So I accept thesis T because it is not the issue. The issue is whether one can PERFORM THE ATTEMPT to quit smoking WHILE one lacks the desire to quit smoking. THAT is what I find objectionable and impossible. Mele accepts that it is possible. I believe such an attempt to be merely 'going through the motions' in bad faith and not a genuine attempt at all. I believe this for the control- theoretic reasons that I outlined in my original paper and elsewhere.3

Second, the issue of my accepting the component view (where trying is D's causing O) while Mele accepts the product view (where trying is O, when appropriately caused by D) is a complete red-herring (and Mele

1 In order to keep these remarks brief, I am going to presuppose that the reader of this piece has read and has freshly in mind my original piece and Mele's reply. So not much background will be supplied.

2 Mele's Thesis T = It is conceptually possible for an agent, in the absence of a desire to A, to want to try to A and to act on that want.

3 Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try'; Trying: You've Got to Believe,' Journal of Philosophical Research (forthcoming)



638 Frederick Adams

knows this).4 It is NOT 'at the core of Adams's critique' ('Desiring to Try/ 628), as Mele says. I knew that Mele did not hold the component view of trying (or acting) and I did not attribute the view to him. And he knew that I knew this because we have gingerly avoided the issue in papers we have written together (F. Adams & A. Mele, 'The Intention/ Volition Debate/ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 [1992] 323-38). So when I said that for Mele there must be an essence to trying and that it must involve a 'conative component/ I meant only that a conative cause must be involved (not that Mele accepts the component theory of action). On the product view alone, I reject his view. If trying to A is some product O, appropriately caused by relevant pro-attitudes D, then it seems clear that D must include some pro-attitude towards A-ing. Otherwise, there would be no reason to say O constitutes the attempt to A rather than to B or to C or to do something else. And if D does contain a pro-attitude towards A-ing, then that's good enough for me. That's a desire to A, in my book! If it walks like a duck (i.e., desire), and sounds like a duck, and has the control-theoretic profile of a duck, then it's a duck (i.e., desire) - Mele's denial that it's a duck not withstanding.

Third, since Mele uses the 'component' red-herring to avoid my first objection, I shall now REPLAY the objection clearly on the product view. Surely there is something that constitutes trying to do something A. Let it be essentially an outcome (i.e., product) O, as appropriately caused by the relevant pro-attitudes D toward A-ing. Now the desire D' to try to perform the attempt to A should be the desire to produce that outcome O (which, of course, will be caused by the appropriate pro-attitudes D toward trying to A). That is, there should be a pro-attitude (D) that causes the attempt itself. There should also be a pro-attitude (D') that exists in the desire to try to perform the attempt. How are the contents of these pro-attitudes D and D' related? Are they the same or not? AGAIN (in his reply), Mele does not answer my question. Instead, he drags in the bit about his not holding the component view and adds, about my question, 'But these points may be set aside' (629). He might have answered that the pro-attitude in the desire to try to A is itself the desire to try to A. But then the attempt and the desire for the attempt are not distinct, for the former shares a state with the intentional content of the latter. However, it certainly seems that an attempt and a desire for the attempt are separate entities, and if Mele's view denies it, so much the worse for Mele's view. If, on the other hand, the contents of D and D' are distinct

4 Mele knows this because we discussed it in Atlanta prior to his submitting the final draft.



Of Epicycles and Elegance 639

(as I maintain they are), then Mele owes us an account of the content of D. For he has given none but the content of D', viz. the desire to try to A. In the Belton case, he cannot make the content of D the desire to A, because Belton is supposed to lack that desire. On my view, the content of D (in the attempt to A) is the desire to A, a distinct content from the desire in the desire to try to A. Now Mele quips that we should not let our desire for simplicity get in the way of truth (633), and I have not. On this matter, his view is simpler than mine, if he lets the content of D and D' be the same. But then, I trust, his account would be wrong. I claim simplicity for the elegance of my overall view of intentional action, not necessarily for this tiny dispute with Mele.

Fourth, it is false that 'Adams supposes I [Mele] take trying to A to require a desire specifically to try to A' (629). I suppose this ONLY in the Belton type of case, where Mele says Belton does NOT desire to A, only to try to A. All of my remarks were focused on this type of case. In Mele's example of answering the phone (629), he doesn't need the desire to TRY to answer the phone, in order to make the attempt, because he has the desire to ANSWER it. That suffices to make his picking up the phone his attempt to answer it. But this is not available in the Belton case, for Belton has no desire to solve the puzzle causing his moving of the chess pieces. So, yes, in the Belton type of case I do suppose that Mele takes trying to A to require a desire specifically to try to A (and nothing Mele says in his reply to me discounts that). For surely trying takes a desire or pro-attitude of some kind toward A and the desire to A is ruled out by Mele in the Belton type of example.5 About that I am right, not wrong as Mele suggests.

Fifth, I think Mele is probably right about explicit versus implicit content and this probably does solve the infant and animal problem for him (and for me, as he points out). I do think that the desire to try to A may take more conceptual sophistication than the desire to A, by the way, so I am not bothered by being saddled with that by Mele. Still, I was probably wrong to raise this particular objection and I accept Mele's reply. However, he still doesn't tell us why he needs rescuing unless his view does make the desire in D' refer to the desire in D (implicitly rather than explicitly). Still (and again) he has resisted making clear the rela- tionship between these desires, on his view, as I have pointed out above and in my original paper.

5 In a corresponding case with intention, Mele makes a similar move, maintaining that the intention to try A can serve the functional role of the intention to A, when the latter is not available ('She Intends to Try/ Philosophical Studies 54 [1989] 101-6).



640 Frederick Adams

Sixth, I stand by my claim that Mele's view of trying flies in the face of an overall control-theoretic account of intentional action and for the reasons that I mention in my original paper. It is true that Mele rejects some of the principles about intention to which I adhere and that he has to make corresponding adjustments in his overall theory to accommo- date those changes. To me, this constitutes tinkering and the addition of epicycles. To me, epicycles fly in the face of the TRUTH and ELEGANCE of a theory.

Seventh, in response to what Mele calls my sixth reason to reject his view, he attempts to skirt my objection by changing the subject, saying 'Here, again, a theorist should move from desire to intention' (634). However, Mele knows only too well that he and I have EXACTLY THE SAME dispute about INTENTION and trying. So this is no help at all and clearly does not advance the issue. I maintain that one cannot be attempting to A unless one intends to A. Mele maintains that one can attempt to A (and A intentionally) with the intention to try to A (without the intention to A) ('She Intends to Try'). As is clear, this is the same sort of dispute. So it cannot answer my challenge in the Belton example to bring in intention. If Belton does not desire to solve the puzzle, I see no reason to say his bodily movements constitute an attempt to solve it. How can it possibly help Mele to turn to intention? For if Belton does not intend to solve it, why will his movements constitute an attempt to solve it? Mele will say 'because Belton intends to try.' Yes, yes, but then it is 'deja vu, all over again,' as Yogi Berra said. This settles nothing. And Mele knows it!

Eighth, and lastly, on the issue of motivation, if Belton's desire is not to A (solve the puzzle), but to B (get $50 from Brett by moving some chess pieces in accordance with the rules of chess), then it is B, not A, that Belton is attempting (and doing, if Brett pays up). Mele can say Belton is trying to A, but Mele's saying it doesn't make it so. If there is no pro-attitude in Belton towards A-ing, then there is nothing to make his movements constitute the attempt to A (solve the puzzle), rather than to do B. It is B for which Belton is motivated, according to Mele (636), so it is B that Belton is attempting, not A. Now again, Mele may say, 'but Belton has solving the puzzle as a goal; he is settled on doing his best to solve the puzzle; is making all the moves that one would normally make to solve it; he is using feedback about whether he is getting closer to solving the chess problem; how can you say he's not trying to solve it?' My answer is disjunctive: either Belton is just going through the motions and trying to do B, not A, because he doesn't really desire to solve the puzzle at all, or he does have a pro-attitude towards solving the puzzle and it is guiding his movements and, thus, he really is trying to solve the puzzle after all. If the former, he is not really trying to solve the puzzle. If the latter, he is really trying BECAUSE he desires to solve the puzzle.



Of Epicycles and Elegance 641

Now in the end Mele and I are offering different theories. I have made the case for my theory in my original paper. I think that it is elegant, comprehensive, explanatorily powerful, and, therefore, likely to be true. Can I put forth a single counterexample that produces the knockout punch for Mele's theory for all to see? Maybe. Maybe you see it already. But if not (Mele clearly does not), then I say look at the overall package. If you like epicycles, you'll love Mele's views. If not, try mine!

Received: August, 1994



of epicycles and elegance

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